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Masculinities, Sport, and Power: A Critical Comparison of Gramscian and Foucauldian Inspired Theoretical Tools Richard Pringle Journal of Sport and Social Issues 2005; 29; 256 DOI: 10.1177/0193723505276228

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JOURNAL OF SPORT & SOCIAL 10.1177/0193723505276228 MASCULINITIES, SPORT, ISSUES AND/ August POWER 2005

MASCULINITIES, SPORT, AND POWER A Critical Comparison of Gramscian and Foucauldian Inspired Theoretical Tools Richard Pringle Although feminists have increasingly found Foucauldian theorising effective for examining issues associated with female sport and exercise contexts, the Gramscian-inspired concept of masculine hegemony remains dominant in masculinities research. This article compares and contrasts the theoretical tools stemming from the writings of Gramsci and Foucault with respect to their use for examining sport and masculinities. It is argued that it is troublesome to combine Foucauldian and Gramscian concepts without acknowledging fundamental theoretical differences. Questions of concern are also discussed with respect to how the concept of hegemonic masculinity has been used in studies of sport and masculinities. It is suggested that the concept of masculine hegemony does not simply refer to a dominant form of masculinity but is underpinned by particular understandings of power that some may find problematic. The conclusion discusses how Foucauldian theorising could be advantageous for future examinations of sport and masculinities. Keywords: Gramsci; Foucault; hegemonic masculinities; power; discourse

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ince the late 1980s, the concept of hegemonic masculinity, as popularized by Connell and colleagues (Carrigan, Connell, & Lee, 1987; Connell, 1987, 1990, 1995, 2002), has provided the dominant framework for examinations of the complexities associated with masculinities, sport, and gender relations. Rowe’s (1998) overview of the conclusions drawn from these studies is succinct: To summarize (and, once more, grossly to simplify) such positions, sport is a crucial site for the reproduction of patriarchal structures and values, a maledominated secular religion that has celebrated the physically aggressive and often violent deeds of men. Sport has been an integral element of selfsustaining forms of exclusivist male culture, lubricating a closed system of male bonding and female denigration. (p. 246)

Many researchers clearly find the concept of hegemonic masculinity valuable for helping understand the gendering processes related to sport. The concept provides an important antiessentialist, antireductionist, anaJournal of Sport & Social Issues, Volume 29, No. 3, August 2005, pp. 256-278 DOI: 10.1177/0193723505276228 © 2005 Sage Publications


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lytical framework for examining the construction of subjectivities and power relations within sports. The concept is robust and has helped provide pertinent critiques of heavy contact, male-dominated sports, such as rugby union and American football, and the sexist and violent cultures that support such sports (Messner, 1992; Sabo & Panepinto, 1990; Sparkes & Smith, 1999; Young & White, 2000; Young, White, & McTeer, 1994). Notwithstanding these successes, I argue that the continuing dominance of the usage of the concept of hegemonic masculinity may not be entirely fruitful for further analyses of the articulations between masculinities and sport. To help support my argument, I draw on Sparkes’s (1992) contention with respect to the research paradigms debate that “if one voice, or paradigm, dominates then there is real danger that we end up just speaking to ourselves. This can lead to a form of tunnel vision whereby some problems are explored exhaustively while others are not even perceived” (p. 48). Sparkes’s concern about problems associated with paradigmatic dominance can be applied to the theoretical ascendancy of the Gramscian inspired concept of hegemonic masculinity. The prime concern being that if researchers continue to examine sport and masculinities through a lens filtered by neoGramscian understandings of power that they risk conceptualizing and representing linkages between sport and masculinities in one particular manner. Rowe (1998) expressed similar sentiments and suggested that for future sociological studies of sport to avoid redundancy and repetition, there is a need for a more reflexive, pluralistic, and even passionate research approach to be used, and for a reappraisal of how power and resistance operates. In making these suggestions, Rowe (1998) stated that his aim was “not to play down manifest and persistent inequalities” as reflected in sport and gender issues but to encourage researchers “to avoid the writing of the narrative in advance and following the script of inevitable defeat . . . and to evade and confront ossified and highly ritualized protocols of classification and response” (p. 248). More boldly, Star (1999) argued that Connell’s ideas concerning multiple masculinities and the gender order have been hampered by a neoMarxist perspective that views power as stemming from ruling groups and acting in a somewhat repressive manner on the ruled. In contrast, Star asserted that “Foucault’s radical retheorizing of power” (p. 40) has helped revitalize gender research concerned with femininities. Indeed, a growing number of sport feminists have found his ideas useful for investigating issues of gender associated with physical activity and embodiment (Bordo, 1993; Chapman, 1997; Cole, 1994; Duncan, 1994; Eskes, Duncan, & Miller, 1998; Maguire, 2002; Markula, 1995, 2003; Shogan, 1999; Star, 1999). This is despite Foucault’s relentless use of masculine pronouns. Yet relatively few, as Andrews (2000) reported, have used an exclusive Foucauldian approach to investigate issues of manliness and sport: Strangely, in recent times Foucault has been largely neglected by the growing band of productive scholars interested in examining the relationship between


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sport and the male or masculine form. This oversight would appear destined to be rectified, as Foucauldian theorizing offers blatantly fruitful strategies for challenging the blithe, uncritical celebration of sport’s status as a natural male domain, by problematizing the mutually constitutive discursive linkage between sport and masculinity. (p. 125)

A number of researchers have, however, creatively combined Foucauldian and Gramscian ideas, such as the master concepts of discourse and hegemony, to examine masculinity issues within sport (Edley & Wetherell, 1997; Light & Kirk, 2000; Naess, 2001; Wetherell & Edley, 1999). Yet this theoretical blurring raises the question of whether the philosophical and pragmatic views of Foucault and Gramsci are compatible. In this article, given my concerns about the theoretical dominance of the concept of hegemonic masculinities and the blurring of theoretical boundaries, I compare and contrast the theoretical tools stemming from the writings of Gramsci and Foucault with respect to their use for examining sport and masculinities.1 In summarizing Gramscian and Foucauldian theorizing, within the confines of this article, I risk caricaturing their complex life works. Although I try to avoid this risk, I suggest that my review of Gramscian and Foucauldian theorizing can be thought of as a heuristic technique for encouraging further reflection, discussion and debate to invigorate fresh ways of perceiving sport and masculinities. With respect to this objective, I have been influenced by Foucault’s challenge “to detach from established knowledge, ask fresh questions, make new connections, and understand why it is important to do so” (Cole, Giardina, & Andrews, 2004, p. 207).

GRAMSCI AND FOUCAULT: A COMPARISON OF THEORETICAL TOOLS Although some may view Gramsci’s work as an extension of Marxism and Foucault’s as a rejection, in many respects Gramsci’s and Foucault’s ideas grew from dissatisfactions with Marxism. The two bodies of thought share many political concerns and ontological similarities. Cole (1993), for example, considered Foucault’s conceptualizations of the body and power as an elaboration, in part, of Althusser’s “discussion of the reproduction of the state” (p. 85), of which Althusser was clearly influenced by Marx. Not surprisingly, a small number of commentators have argued that with certain modifications, there is a basis for convergence between Foucault and Gramsci (Cocks, 1989; Holub, 1992; Kenway, 1990; Olssen, 1999). Kenway (1990) stated, for example, that for pragmatic reasons, Foucault is usefully complemented by a “poststructuralist reading of Gramsci” (p. 172). Olssen (1999) further suggested that Gramsci’s more unitarist approach resulted in the use of terms like “cultural and moral leadership, cultural hegemony, and so on” (p. 102), but these could be adjusted “to echo Foucault’s mode of expression, where he speaks in the plural of ‘hegemonies’, ‘knowledges,’ ‘regimes of truth’ and so on” (p. 102). Olssen concluded “in the final analysis, Gramsci and Foucault present a more powerful perspective on social struc-



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ture taken together than each does on his own” (p. 110). Yet for others, such as Geras (1990) and Gruneau (1993), Foucauldian and Gramscian ideas remain incompatible; the ontological foundations are believed to be too divergent. What are the similarities and differences? Although some researchers have positioned Foucault as an extreme idealist (Connell, 2001; Messner, 1996), many agree that Foucault and Gramsci were materialists who recognized the importance of the workings of language and intellectuals in helping form social realities (Andrews, 2000; Davidson & Shogan, 1998; Markula, 2003; Olssen, 1999). Foucault and Gramsci also had relatively similar ideas about the workings of power. They rejected the idea that power is a possession that could be held and in contradistinction viewed power as a relational concept that worked through the actions of people (Holub, 1992). In this sense, they believed that power is omnipresent. Foucault and Gramsci accordingly shared a belief that power is “produced from within systems and subsystems of social relations, in the interactions, in the microstructures that inform the practices of everyday life” (Holub, 1992, p. 199). Foucault (1988b), more specifically, stated that he always used the term power as a “shortcut to the expression . . .the relationships of power” (p. 11) and argued that power relations exist within all human relations whether they be a conversation between friends or an institutional relationship. Gramsci and Foucault similarly viewed power as productive, as opposed to just repressive, as the workings of power were assumed to produce social meanings, relations, and identities (Cocks, 1989; Olssen, 1999). They also believed that people do not have equal access in their ability to exercise power and recognized that inequitable power relations are often problematic (Holub, 1992). Finally, they asserted, in their own distinctive ways, that dominating groups’ abilities to exercise power or maintain their privileged positions are always subject to change and resistance. A prime difference between Foucault and Gramsci relates to their beliefs about how the inequalities in power relations are formed (Cocks, 1989). Holub (1992) stated, “It would seem that Gramsci’s insistence on the ubiquity of power is of secondary importance when compared to his analysis of the hierarchical structure of power” (p. 200). Gramsci (1971) believed there were recognizable directions and purposes within power relations and he drew on the concept of hegemony to explain how a ruling class establishes and maintains control of subordinate groups. He critiqued the reductionist problem of Marxism and suggested that hegemony was not solely dependent on economic modes of production and structures but on the ability of the rulers to convince the ruled on the legitimacy of their system of beliefs (Jarvie & Maguire, 1994). Gramsci, more specifically, argued that hegemony is gained through complex processes of consent and coercion associated with a “series of cultural, political and ideological practices” (Hargreaves & McDonald, 2000, p. 49). Gramsci helped chart some of the locations of the headquarters of power so that counter-hegemonic strategies could be designed and implemented with the desire to achieve a more egalitarian society. Jarvie and


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Maguire (1994) asserted that Gramsci’s theorizing suggested that “the task for the working class . . . was not only to seek control of the state in order to achieve socialism, but also to strive through political struggle in order to win hegemony in the sphere of civil society” (Jarvie & Maguire, 1994, p. 114). Gramsci’s ideas, accordingly, embody strategies for social change with the seductive appeal of the possibility of emancipation. Gramsci’s overriding concern with class and ruling groups, as Gruneau (1993) stated, continues “to dominate Gramsci’s legacy” (p. 100). Yet Gruneau warned that he was not sure whether this concern with class could “be so easily wished away simply by piggybacking a consideration of nonclass struggles onto the analysis of hegemony” (p. 100). In summary, Gramsci accepted the existence of a binary division between dominators and the dominated or between different classes of people (Olssen, 1999). These concerns with different classes, the constraints of institutional structures and the hierarchical workings of power have subsequently influenced Connell’s (1987, 1990, 1995, 2002) and Messner’s (1988, 1990a, 1990b, 1992) landmark research on masculinities. In contrast to Gramsci’s concern with the connections between ruling groups and power, Foucault (1978) did not reject the importance of the state but the idea that power was easily locatable and a binary division existed between the ruled and rulers. He argued there is “no such duality extending from the top down and reacting on more and more limited groups to the very depths of the social body” (p. 94). He warned that the analyses of power “must not assume that the sovereignty of the state, the form of the law, or the overall unity of a domination are given at the outset; rather, these are only the terminal forms power takes” (p. 92). Foucault correspondingly asserted that influential groups do not arrive at their position because they have power, but they become influential because of the contingent workings and, at times, tactical usages of discourses, which he conceptualized as “practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak” (Foucault, 1972, p. 49). Discourses, accordingly, were understood as shaping and constraining perceptions of reality, including understandings of self and others. Foucault was, therefore, interested in the material connections between discourse, power, knowledges of self, and regimes of truth (Cole et al., 2004). Foucault (1977a, 1978), more specifically, theorized about the emergence of new forms of power associated with development of industrial capitalism.2 He argued that within this historical period a shift of emphasis occurred away from the centrality of sovereign rule, coercion and force, toward more complex technologies of power aimed at individuals (anatomopolitics or disciplinary power) and populations (biopower). Foucault asserted that these dual powers were productive as they helped constitute disciplined or docile individuals and, more broadly, regulated social order. Moreover, Foucault (1983) suggested that the development of these technologies of power involved greater government or state control of various relations of power. Yet, seemingly paradoxically, Foucault was not arguing that increased processes of government resulted in increased levels of direct



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state control. In contrast, Foucault suggested that modern forms of governmentality involved the dispersion of disciplinary techniques so that individuals become normalized and disciplined to take greater responsibility for their own management (Maguire, 2002). Smart (1986) summarized that from a Foucauldian perspective: The modern state does not constitute a monolith confronting individuals from above, but a ‘matrix of individualization’ that forms, shapes and governs individuality through the exercise of a new form of ‘pastoral power’ over the social, that is to say the deployment of various measures directed to the health, well being, security, protection, and development of both the individual and the population by public institutions and ‘private ventures, welfare societies, (and) benefactors’. In short the ‘State’ or ’civil society’ dichotomy is displaced by an analytic focus upon the ‘governmentalization’ of power relations . . . (p. 162).

Halperin (1995) stated that Foucault’s understanding that ‘power is everywhere’, disturbed traditional liberalists as it provided a “dark vision of modernity” (p. 19) that challenged Enlightenment values associated with truth, freedom, and rationality. Foucault’s work, for example, suggests that modern liberalism has not resulted in the restriction of forms of power but in greater techniques of social control: Techniques that do not present themselves as forms of domination and are, therefore, more insidious and “difficult to challenge or oppose” (Halperin, 1995, p. 19). The prime differences between Gramscian and Foucauldian thought on the workings of power likely stems from the distinct contexts in which they developed their ideas. Gramsci (1971), for example, wrote his masterwork while imprisoned because of the political threat he posed to Mussolini’s fascist dictatorship of Italy in the 1920 and 1930s, whereas Foucault developed his ideas in the context of modernizing France in the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s, partly in response to the political ferment of the times and to prevailing social theories, such as structuralism, existentialism, and Marxism.3 Another prime difference between Gramsci and Foucault relate to their focus or lack of focus on the body: Gramsci tended to omit reference to the body whereas Foucault highlighted the centrality of the body as a site for the workings of discourse or power. Gruneau (1993) asserted: A neo-Gramscian perspective can certainly accommodate discussion of the representation of the body as a bearer of social and political meanings, but it has much greater difficulty discussing how bodies are variously constituted . . . .For Gramsci, all people are intellectuals, and their capacity to act as conscious agents interests him far more than any unconscious choreography of authority that might be sedimented in the body. (p. 99)

In contrast, Foucault (1977a) asserted that the body was immersed in a political field, where the workings of discourse or power “invest it, mark it, torture it, force it to carry out tasks, to perform ceremonies, to emit signs” (p. 25). Foucault was interested in the discursive processes that constituted


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a body’s postures, thoughts, performances, social interactions and subjectivities. His theoretical focus on the body has subsequently played a leading part, in conjunction with feminist writings, in producing the increased interest in embodiment within sport sociology (Loy, Andrews, & Rinehart, 1993). The focus on the body has also informed research on the construction of masculinities (Connell, 1995; Light & Kirk, 2000). In a simplistic contrasting summary, Gramsci traced the working of ideologies back to a ruling group(s), whereas Foucault connected the workings of power to multiple discourses but avoided fingering a set group as responsible for producing or controlling these discourses. Foucault perceived of regimes of truth without a master, yet he asserted that each discourse had a specific history and that the power effect of each discourse remained influential through specific social mechanisms or tactics. Smart (1986) summarized the differences: Analytically Foucault’s work pries open the problem of hegemony in so far as it decenters the question of the state, introduces a nonreductionist conception of power, and displaces the concept of ideology, through which Gramsci sought to theorize questions of ‘intellectual and moral leadership’ central to the achievement of hegemony, with analyses of the relations of ‘truth’ and ‘power’ through which ‘men [sic] govern (themselves and others)’. (p. 162)

Foucault and Gramsci’s ideas on power share many similarities, yet their accounts of the origins and structures of power, position the two bodies of work as fundamentally distinct. Yet, as Olssen (1999) observed, “it is commonplace today for authors to cite Foucault on one page and Gramsci on the next” (p. 89). Wetherell and Edley’s (1999) insightful critique of the concept of hegemonic masculinity, for example, talked of the “need to consider the multiple and inconsistent discursive resources available for constructing hegemonic gender identities” (p. 352). Wetherell and Edley’s combination of Foucauldian and Gramscian ideas is not by any means unusual, yet Olssen suggested that this blurring is typically being undertaken “without mention of the fact that the work of these two authors (Gramsci and Foucault) belong to fundamentally different theoretical traditions” (p. 89). The question of importance relates to how this theoretical blurring influences the quality of the research and the development of respective arguments. If one conceives that Gramscian and Foucauldian ideas are compatible (Cocks, 1989; Holub, 1992; Kenway, 1990), then it is likely perceived that the combination of theoretical insights is an advantage. Yet if one believes that they are incompatible at least without significant adjustments, the combination is likely deemed problematic. The resulting risk of this combination, in this case, is that the potency of each set of theoretical tools is downplayed, and the coherency of the argument suffers. Andrews (2000), more specifically, warned that it is a troublesome practice “when researchers appropriate particular theoretical discourses and concepts without fully acknowledging, or perhaps even recognizing, the social, politi-



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cal, economic, technological and philosophical contexts which fashioned them, and which are necessarily implicated in their use” (p. 108). Within this section of the article, I have aimed to illustrate the distinct theoretical lineages that underpin the work of Gramsci and Foucault and to increase awareness of the potential troubles associated with unacknowledged theoretical blurring. Given that these troubles are debatable, I suggest, at the least, that researchers who combine the concepts of hegemony with discourse should offer an explanatory account. In the following sections, I critically examine the strengths and weaknesses of Gramscian and Foucauldian inspired tools for examining sport and masculinities.

UNDERSTANDING SPORT AND MASCULINITIES THROUGH FOUCAULDIAN AND GRAMSCIAN LENSES Messner (1990a) reported that a particular strength associated with the concepts of hegemonic and plural masculinities was that researchers were encouraged to move beyond “static sex-role theory and reductionist concepts of patriarchy that view men as an undifferentiated group that oppresses women . . .” (p. 107). The analysis of sport and masculinity through a hegemonic lens has, accordingly, facilitated acknowledgment that some sportsmen enjoy greater ability to exercise power than others and that sporting practices contribute to inequitable power relations between males and females. Numerous studies have subsequently documented the workings of power within sport and how males differentially understand sporting involvement (Anderson, 2002; Kidd, 1990; Nauright, 1996; Pronger, 2000; Rowe, 1995). Messner (1990a), for example, revealed distinctions between how males from different class and racial backgrounds make sense of sporting experiences and how different structures of opportunity were available for different males with respect to the constitution of a “respected masculine status” (p. 106). Foucault’s research tools have also been used to illustrate how the workings of power are differentiated within sporting contexts. Feminists who have adopted Foucauldian tools, for example, have illustrated how a disciplinary power that is “everywhere and yet nowhere” (Bartky, 1988, p. 74) acts to constrain female sporting and exercise practices (Cole, 1993; Eskes et al., 1998; Markula, 1995). Markula (2003) stated that these researchers have focused on the sport, fitness, and health industries as discursively constructed disciplines that limit possibilities of existence and subsequently act as “vehicle(s) of women’s domination” (p. 88). Gruneau (1993), however, was critical that usage of Foucault’s concept of a disciplinary power would result in overtly negative representations of sport and humanity. In response to similar criticisms, Foucault (1988b) accepted that he had not focused enough attention on how humans can creatively influence power relations. In his later works, Foucault subsequently explored specific practices used to help transform understandings of self; he referred to these processes of self-formation as “technologies of self ” (p. 19). A growing body of researchers have subsequently explored how athletes negotiate sporting


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experiences and understandings of self with respect to technologies of self and technologies of dominance (Chapman, 1997; Guthrie & Castelnuovo, 2001; Johns & Johns, 2000; Markula, 2003; Shogan, 1999). Guthrie and Castelnuovo (2001), for example, concluded from their Foucauldian examination of women with mobility disabilities that “despite the restrictive notions and norms they regularly experience, these women have all found ways to successfully manage their disabilities, and thus enhance the quality of their lives” (p. 18). Guthrie and Castelnuovo’s research helps counter concern that employment of Foucauldian theorizing encourages pessimistic representations of sport and circumscribed portrayals of humans as docile subjects. Although an advantage of Gramsci’s concept of hegemony is that it can allow “for cultural experiences such as sports to be understood as both exploitative and worth while” (Hargreaves & McDonald, 2000, p. 50), the hegemonic masculinity research has tended to highlight negative aspects of sport. McKay, Messner, and Sabo (2000), for example, stated that the critical sociological research represents sport relatively scornfully “as a hostile cultural space for boys to grow up in and to develop relationships with one another and with women” (p. 6). In similar tone, but with more detail, Messner (1992) concluded the following: The competitive hierarchy of athletic careers encouraged the development of masculine identities based on very narrow definitions of public success. Homophobia and misogyny were the key bonding agents among male athletes, serving to construct a masculine personality that disparaged anything considered ‘feminine’ in women, in other men, or in oneself. The fact that winning was premised on physical power, strength, discipline, and willingness to take, ignore, or deaden pain inclined men to experience their own bodies as machines, as instruments of power and domination—and to see other peoples’ bodies as objects of their power and domination. (p. 151)

Given these somewhat ominous conclusions, McKay et al. (2000) reflexively questioned whether critical researchers have “overstated the extent to which sport is a conservative institution that largely reproduces existing inequalities, while ignoring or downplaying the range and diversity of existing sport activities” (pp. 6-7). In light of these concerns, and in similar manner to how Gruneau (1993) questioned the impact of Foucault’s ideas on critical analyses of sport, it is appropriate to reflect on the sway of Gramsci’s ideas. A number of social commentators have expressed concerns about representations of sport via a hegemonic lens (Harris, 1992; Miller, 1998b; Morgan, 1997; Tomlinson, 1998). Tomlinson (1998) for example argued, with respect to Sage’s (1990) influential text Power And Ideology In American Sport: A Critical Perspective that Sage’s usage of hegemony theory resulted in sport being represented as a prime cultural setting in which the hegemonic power structures in capitalist societies were continually fortified:



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. . .The picture that is portrayed is of a monolithic power structure in sports against which some resistance might be possible, and such resistance is linked to transformation. It is an all-or-nothing model of resistance, which separates the process of resistance from the power dynamic itself. The Sage vision could be formulated syllogistically: You are powerful; I (we) resist; things change. For all its sociological subtlety, and its acknowledgement of the importance of hegemony theory in which is recognized the interactive and reflexive dimensions of the power relation, Sage’s model is not an adequate portrayal of the dynamics of power within sport cultures and practices. (Tomlinson, 1998, p. 237)

Tomlinson was concerned, in part, that the dualistic model of hegemonic power (e.g., consent-resistance) did not allow for readings of power that could accommodate the ambiguities and contradictions of lived sporting experiences. Yet, do the sport hegemony theorists portray the workings of power as part of a monolithic structure and as an all-or-nothing model? Messner and Sabo’s (1990) influential sport and masculinities research was underpinned by a recognition of the problem of unitarist perspectives of power and, in response, they used a “nonhierarchical theory” (p. 10) that recognized multiple and dynamically interdependent axes of power. Through employing this theoretical perspective, Messner and Sabo aimed to not privilege one form of power “at the expense of distorting or ignoring the others” (p. 10). Power, therefore, was not presented as a grand structure that fortified the capitalist elite. The multiple axes of power were still, however, considered by them to “represent various forms of oppression: class, race, gender, age, and sexual preference” (p. 11). In this manner, they viewed power as existing in multiple ways but as working in a manner that either privileged or harmed certain groups of people. Under this theoretical lens, the connections between sport and men’s sporting experiences were typically presented as (re)producing masculine hegemony (Messner, 1992; Messner & Sabo, 1994). Howe (2003), correlatively, argued that women who play confrontational contact sports such as rugby or American football could be regarded as “agents in the resistance against hegemonic masculinity” (p. 235). The workings of power within sport, as drawn by these hegemony theorists, therefore, corresponded to Tomlinson’s (1998) concern of an “allor-nothing model” (p. 237) as sport was represented as either supporting or resisting hegemonic masculinity. Yet de Garis (2000) argued the notion that sportsmen simply “either disrupt or contribute to the gender order” (p. 91) is problematic. He asserted that this bipolar conceptualization makes it difficult for researchers to recognize admirable or positive practices within male sporting cultures. de Garis was also concerned that this dualistic framework was not representative of the lived complexities of men’s experiences in sport. He supported this concern with results from his boxing ethnography by concluding that the “situationally specific experiences and meanings and range and inconsistencies of ideologies and practices exhibited by boxers” in his study made it difficult to formulate a generalized conclusion about boxing and its links “to broad relations of male dominance” (pp. 105-106). Other sport and mas-


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culinity researchers have similarly illustrated that masculine subjectivities are constructed through discontinuous and contradictory processes and that some male athletes even experience sport as such (Connell, 1990; Messner, 1992; Sabo & Panepinto, 1990). Nevertheless, the hegemony theorists have tended to draw generalized conclusions that represent sportsmen as either embodiments or exemplars of hegemonic masculinity and male sport as a prime producer of masculine hegemony. Young et al. (1994), for example, concluded from their critical analysis of 16 sportsmen’s experiences of pain and injury that many of the athletes, irrespective of their sporting involvement, “espoused values and ideas consistent with hegemonic forms of masculinity” (p. 181) and, on a grander scale, “that the social construction of sports injury is linked to the reproduction of male force, which in turn tends to be linked to the broader subjugation of alternative masculinities and femininity” (p. 192). A topic of relevance, given the dualistic conclusions, relates to the sway of the theoretical lens. Miller (1998a), relatedly, questioned whether Connell’s (1995) theory of four broad categories of masculinities (e.g., hegemonic, subordinate, complicit, and marginalized) acts to shape research conclusions in a manner that makes it difficult to account for more fluid or ambiguous subjectivities. Although Connell clearly warned of the danger of oversimplification through collapsing multiple masculinities into different typologies of men, Miller suggested that the multiple masculinities paradigm makes it difficult to represent an individual whose bodily performances could be interpreted as hegemonic and marginal at the same time. Miller argued that “it is doubtful that the concept of hegemonic masculinity” (p. 201) could help us understand the complexities associated with Ian Roberts’s subjectivities—a gay, heavily muscled, exprofessional rugby league player with a reputation for brawling. Miller suggested it would be problematic, for example, to try and categorize Ian Roberts as either an embodiment or exemplar of hegemonic or marginalized masculinity. Miller concluded that Roberts’ subjectivity is possibly more complex than the multiple masculinities framework allows us to understand. Miller (1998b) was also concerned by the relative rigidity of how the theory of hegemonic masculinity contributes to the representation of subjectivities. He asked rhetorically: Can hegemonic masculinity allow for theoretical diversity and historical change, and for those times when men are not being men, when their activities might be understood as discontinuous, conflicted, and ordinary, rather than interconnected, functional, and dominant—when nothing they do relates to the overall domination of women or their own self formation as a gendered group? (p. 433)

Miller (1998b) suggested that although individuals are always gendered, it is not useful to think that gender can explain all behaviors. In this sense, Miller questioned whether the concept of hegemonic masculinity



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directed too much attention to the place of gender in the construction of subjectivities and tended to overlook or underestimate the constituting influence of other discourses. Others have also expressed concern with the concept of masculine hegemony and the possibilities of understanding that it allows (Donaldson, 1993; Kraack, 1999; Speer, 2001; Star, 1999; Wetherell & Edley, 1999). Donaldson (1993), for example, has raised questions about the multiple masculinities paradigm, particularly with respect to the viability of using elite male sport participants as consistent exemplars of hegemonic masculinity, he stated, A football star is a model of hegemonic masculinity. But is a model? When the handsome Australian Rules football player, Warwick ‘the tightest shorts in sports’ Caper, combined football with modeling, does this confirm or decrease his exemplary status? When Wally (‘the King’) Lewis explained that the price he will pay for another 5 years playing in the professional Rugby League is the surgical replacement of both his knees, this is undoubtedly the stuff of good, old, tried and true, tough and stoic, masculinity. But how powerful is a man who mutilates his body, almost as a matter of course, merely because of a job? When Lewis announced that he was quitting the very prestigious ‘State of Origin’ football series because his 1-year-old daughter had been diagnosed as hearing impaired, is this hegemonic? (p. 647)

Donaldson (1993) concluded that the concept of hegemonic masculinity is “as slippery and difficult as the idea of masculinity itself ” (p. 644). I suggest that the slipperiness associated with the concept of hegemonic masculinity is partially because it is attempting to represent an unstable or contextually bound amalgam of multiple and independent discourses. Hegemonic masculinity, for example, is typically defined in relation to discourses of sexualities (e.g., heterosexual and homosexual), affects (e.g., emotional toughness, resilience and work ethics), appearances (e.g., muscular, rough and large), behaviors (e.g., aggressive, sexist, homophobic, staunch, and violent), occupations (e.g., men’s work vs. women’s) and dominations (e.g., male dominance and leadership of females, children, and subjugated and marginalized males; Trujillo, 2000). Yet these multiple discourses are not mutually dependent. Hegemonic masculinity is a term of generalization and generalizations, although useful for helping understand big picture accounts can be problematic for understanding the constitution of individual subjectivities. Wetherell and Edley (1999), for example, asserted that the concept of hegemonic masculinity has difficulty accounting for how male identities are reproduced and how males negotiate understandings of self and masculinities. Moreover, they were concerned about the nebulous and seemingly improbable nature of hegemonic masculinity and questioned “the appropriateness of a definition of dominant masculinity which no man may actually ever embody” (p. 337). The concerns about the use of the concept of hegemonic masculinity to investigate sport and masculinity linkages can be summarized as related to


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the bipolar conclusions and narrow representations of sportsmen’s subjectivities. In light of these concerns, I suggest a turn to Foucauldian theorizing, as augmented by poststructural feminist thought, could prove advantageous. The recent poststructural turn in social theory, for example, has encouraged vigorous examination of “dualistic distinctions that underlie our descriptions of the world (e.g. subject/object, self/other, nature/culture, mind/body, private/public, sex/gender, and heterosexual/homosexual) . . . showing how they may serve to exclude and limit understanding” (Petersen, 2003, pp. 55-56). In this respect, a poststructural perspective could encourage questions to be asked about how the hegemony theorist’s conclusions inform but also constrain ways of knowing sport and gender. Foucault’s (1978) perspective of power, more generally, could encourage a rounded focus on sport and masculinity to help understand the complex and, at times, ambiguous workings of power. Foucault was highly critical of the notion that power stems from one group or one source, as he was concerned that such a perspective acts to obscure a myriad of different ways that power can operate. Foucault (1978), more specifically, asserted that it is within discourse that power and knowledge are united and subsequently we must conceive discourse as a series of discontinuous segments whose tactical function is neither uniform nor stable. To be more precise, we must not imagine a world of discourse divided between accepted discourse and excluded discourse, or between the dominant discourse and the dominated one; but as a multiplicity of discursive elements that can come into play in various strategies . . . .We must make allowance for the complex and unstable process whereby discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy. (pp. 100-101)

A Foucauldian informed understanding of discourse or power could, accordingly, help encourage belief that sport “cannot be understood purely as conformity or rebellion” (Lenskyi, 1994, p. 358) but that it may act “as a contradictory and complex medium for masculinity making” (Fitzclarence & Hickey, 2001, p. 118). Such a perspective does not negate the recognition that sport is influential within gendering processes, but accepts that the exercising of power and resistance, within these processes, are multifaceted. Foucauldian tools could, therefore, encourage researchers to be wary of drawing categorical conclusions with respect to the diffuse workings of power. Sparkes (1992), relatedly, stated, “recognizing and learning to celebrate ambiguity and diversity introduces a certain humility as we are constantly made aware of the precarious quality of our particular ways of knowing and our own research agendas” (p. 26). A Foucauldian analysis could also help with understanding and revealing the complexities associated with the constitution of sportsmen’s subjectivities. Foucault (1988b) stated that his prime research objective throughout his academic career had “been to sketch out a history of the different ways in our culture that humans develop knowledge about them-



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selves” (pp. 17-18). Foucault (1980), more specifically, theorized that through the productive workings of discourse or power, “certain bodies, certain gestures, certain discourses, certain desires, come to be identified and constituted as individuals” (p. 98). His antiessentialist view of the self suggests that the self is “necessarily unstable, disunited and fragmented” (Andrews, 2000, p. 115). Such a position allows understanding of why few men, on close examination, embody the traits typically associated with dominant forms of masculinity. An advantage of Foucault’s theory of subjectification, accordingly, is that it allows for understanding the constitution of contradictory and unstable subjectivities. Davies (1989), for example, stated that Foucauldian theorizing “allows me to focus on the contradictions in my experience, not as failures of rational thought but as the creative source of new understandings, new discourses” (p. 139).

POWER, INTENTIONAL RULE AND RESISTANCE Gramsci’s legacy concerning the centrality of class has manifested itself in the hegemonic masculinity research concerning masculinities and sport. The hegemonic masculinity theorists have typically portrayed sport as closely influenced by “upper- and middle-class, White, heterosexual men” (Messner, 1992, p. 18) and as an institution that provides ideological support for the same group. Burstyn (1999), more pointedly, has vividly mapped links between sport culture, mass media, consumerism, big business, men’s bodies and the pervasion of hegemonic masculinity. The hegemonic masculinity literature, therefore, has strongly intimated connective links between ruling group(s) of men, sport, and the gender order. Hegemony theory, more generally, has a tendency to hold the ruling groups as responsible for inequitable power relations (Jarvie & Maguire, 1994). Yet, is it appropriate to intimate that ruling groups of men are intentionally or unconsciously involved in structuring sport to help maintain cultural dominance? The notion of intentional rule can be problematic (Cocks, 1989, p. 33). Cocks, as a poststructural feminist, for example, vigorously critiqued radical feminism by stating that it is far too simplistic to represent males as holders of power “who wield power self-consciously and with malignant intent” (p. 123) and the oppressed sex as “powerless, innocent, and blind” (p. 123). In contrast, she drew on Foucault’s notion of power as omnipresent, to argue that we all play a role in the regime of truth she labels masculine or feminine. Cocks, therefore, argued that both males and females help structure gender relations. In this manner, we should not necessarily think that a ruling group of men devise and orchestrate select discourses of masculinity to gain patriarchal benefit from them. Connell (1995) similarly stated that we should not envisage the existence of the headquarters of patriarchy. Yet such sentiments do not imply that privileged men “do not consciously pursue goals that in fact advance their own position” (Bordo, 1993, p. 174), so “we must ask whether those enjoying the prerogatives of social power are by the same token the self-conscious authors and masters of sociocultural life” (Cocks, 1989, p. 183).


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The Foucauldian critique of intentional rule encourages concern about the assertion that to understand how particular definitions of masculinities become dominant, it is pertinent to examine “how particular groups of men inhabit positions of power and wealth and how they legitimate and reproduce the social relationships that generate their dominance” (Carrigan et al., 1987, p. 179). In addition, it raises questions about Messner’s (1990b) contention that elite male athletes in heavy contact sports are, in effect, marginalized men “who are sacrificed in order that the elite may have a clear sense of where they stand in the pecking order of intermale dominance” (p. 214). Messner’s contention intimates, with a degree of subtlety, the existence of a ruling group of men who are able to critically reflect on and possibly shape masculinity relations for their own advantages. Although a Foucauldian examination would likely be concerned with examining the tactical productivity of discourses that help support dominant groups and how they help sustain regimes of truth that act to marginalize other ways of knowing, such an examination would not begin with the assumption that a top group is able to consciously direct “the overall movement of power relations” (Bordo, 1993, p. 144). A Foucauldian examination of the workings of power in male sport would, therefore, not specifically aim to identify ruling groups but would likely aim to examine the power effects of discourses of gender and the “strategical integration” of these discourses within sporting contexts (Foucault, 1978, p. 102).

RESISTANCE AS GENEALOGY Foucault and Gramsci also differ with respect to engineering acts of resistance to enhance social transformation. A Gramscian approach theorizes about hegemonic origins and allows for the identification of select counter-hegemonic strategies for the purposes of emancipation. This theoretical ability to help identify specific strategies of resistance appeals to people concerned about sport and problematic relations of power. Indeed, many researchers are perhaps drawn to this approach because of this perceived advantage. With respect to examinations of sport violence, some researchers have suggested counter-hegemonic strategies that could be used to challenge the ill effects stemming from the heavy contact male sport (Birrell & Richter, 1987; Burstyn, 1999; Kidd, 1990). More than 16 years ago, Birrell and Richter (1987), for example, asserted that male sports promote patriarchal ideology through emphasizing competition, elitism, and a rigid hierarchy of authority. They suggested that a counter-hegemonic strategy would promote an alternative model of sport that “is process oriented, collective, inclusive, supportive, and infused with an ethic of care” (p. 395). Birrell and Richter’s recommendations sound helpful and promising, yet I have two reservations with respect to their well-intended, counter-hegemonic strategies. Firstly, they tend to assume there are ethical and unethical ways of playing sport and overlook that different people view the world differently, and each



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may react differently, even contradictorily, in similar situations. Secondly, I am concerned that the counter-hegemonic strategies could result in the dominance of hypermasculine sports being replaced with a new dominance that similarly disciplines and divides people internally and externally. In essence, my concern with counter-hegemonic movements is that they may replace one form of domination with another. In contrast, Rojek (2001) offered a more supportive view of counterhegemonic strategies. He stated “although emancipatory politics has not succeeded in eliminating exploitation, inequality, and oppression, it has substantially freed social life from the fetters of tradition and custom, thus creating the conditions in which life politics flourishes” (p. 116). Rojek accepted that people are never autonomous from the workings of power but that counterhegemonic tactics have helped achieve certain positive ends. In this respect, he might applaud the strategies of resistance offered by Birrell and Richter (1987), Burstyn (1999), and Kidd (1990). Yet how could Foucauldian ideas be useful for challenging the dominance of male sports played in contexts of violence? Although Foucault is often criticized for apparently sidestepping issues of how to transform society, Olssen (1999) asserted that Foucault was primarily concerned with changing the social world. However, Foucault’s strategies of social transformation did not center on revolutionary tactics for changing social structures but related to more localized and less coordinated approaches focused on the connections between discourse and subjectivity. More specifically, in his later works, Foucault (1988a, 1997a, 1997b) directed his attention to the techniques or ethics of self-management that focused on the care of the self as a process related to social politics. He stressed that ethical work is inherently political, as caring for the self implies caring for others also. Yet Foucault stressed that the ability to care for the self, as opposed to knowing thy self, revolved around a critical awareness of the various effects of regimes of truth. Foucault’s (1977b) prime research tool for aiming to help raise critical consciousness of the workings of discourse or power was genealogy. A specific aspect of genealogical analysis—the analysis of emergence—is concerned with examining the historical workings, shifts, and junctures of relations of power. Through undertaking various genealogical studies, Foucault (1977b) asserted that current power relations are not secure but are subject to change, and people can be active in attempting to change the workings of power. However, he warned that this political task is fraught with problems, primarily because of the complexity of attempting to understand the workings of discourse or power in conjunction with the workings of contingency. Thus, it is possible that individuals or groups with specific political intentions can enact social change in a way that eventually acts against their desires. The luxury of hindsight has revealed many such political backfires within sporting contexts. Such as the New Zealand Rugby Football Union’s promotion of the South African rugby tour of 1981 that caused massive civil unrest within New Zealand and encouraged resistance against rugby’s state


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of dominance (Richards, 1999). Foucault even asserted that specific discourses could be used for alternative, even opposing, political endeavors. Hence, he was reluctant to offer universal strategies for political problems. Nevertheless, accusations that Foucault is a nihilist or apolitical can be refuted. His genealogical approach, for example, can be regarded as a political tool for promoting social transformation (Sawicki, 1991). Although Foucault was pessimistic about controlling the workings of power, he was not resigned to accepting social practices or beliefs that he believed were unjust or unsound. His genealogy of discipline and punishment, for example, can be read as a protest against the dominant beliefs that informed penal practices (Foucault, 1977a). More generally, his genealogical examinations of psychiatry, medicine, and sexuality aimed to promote subjugated knowledge and marginalized voices as acts of resistance against oppressive social practices. In contrast to Gramsci, Foucault’s political intentions were not driven by the desires of emancipation but by belief that people are never completely free from the workings of discourses and their associated relations of power. Although Foucault was reluctant to promote specific tactics or strategies for social transformation, he provided a framework of ideas that he suggested could be used like tools for various research projects. A growing number of politically inspired researchers have subsequently used his tools to help promote social change related to gender issues (Davies, 1997; Reed, 1999; Weedon, 1987). Their prime research strategy has revolved around the belief that discourses constitute subjectivities and power relations and, therefore, there is benefit in promoting discursive resources that can be used to reconstruct or promote alternative—and hopefully less problematic— subjectivities. Hence, although Foucault has been critiqued for being apolitical, his toolkit, under various guises, is now proving useful for helping devise strategies to help promote social change.

FINAL WORDS There are many similarities between Gramscian and Foucauldian theorizing with regard to the workings of power, and, as Apple (1998) urged, it would not be wise to dismiss the conceptual strengths that either offer, both offer conceptual tools for projects of social justice concerned with the politics of gender and sexualities. However, there are key differences associated with their respective accounts of the origins and workings of power, and these ensure that the two bodies of work remain relatively incompatible without significant reworkings. Researchers who combine Foucauldian and Gramscian concepts such as discourse and hegemony should be encouraged to carefully reflect on the theoretical coherency of such combinations; and if they decide to combine the two theoretical approaches, it would be helpful to account for how Gramsci’s tentatively poststructuralist approach can coexist with Foucault’s (1978) candid poststructuralism. Andrews (2000) warns that researchers who use particular theoretical concepts but fail to acknowl-



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edge or recognize the academic baggage that is implicated in their use, risk the charges of “indiscriminate theoretical pillaging” (p. 108). Gramsci’s legacy concerning the centrality of class has manifested itself in the hegemonic masculinity research concerning masculinities and sport. Many researchers undoubtedly find this legacy beneficial, particularly given that a Gramscian-inspired approach theorizes about the origins of power and allows for the identification of select counter-hegemonic strategies. Moreover, since the late 1980s, the appropriation of Gramsci’s ideas into a framework for analyzing gender relations has helped transform understandings of the significance and problematic links between sport, masculinities, and gender relations. Despite the recognition of these research successes, I have argued that the continued dominance of the concept of hegemonic masculinity may not be fruitful for future understandings and representations of the linkages between sport and masculinities. My reservations relate not just to the possibility that such dominance risks repetition and redundancy within future research, but that the concept of masculine hegemony does not simply refer to a dominant form of masculinity but is underpinned by select ideas of the workings of power that I find questionable. I am concerned, for example, that the concept of hegemonic masculinity is linked to a clear division between ruling groups and the dominated, a binary conceptualization of the workings of power, and notions associated with intentional rule. Last, given there are benefits in examining social issue from multiple theoretical perspectives and that many feminist sport scholars have found Foucauldian theorizing effective, I suggest that a turn to Foucault could be advantageous for continued examinations of the complex articulations between sport, masculinities, and relations of power. Rather than justifying what is already known, Foucault’s ideas encourage researchers to ask new questions, think differently and allow for the creation of new understandings and possibilities. Indeed, as Foucault (1984) expressed, “There are times in life when the question of knowing if one can think differently than one thinks, and perceive differently than one sees, is absolutely necessary if one is to go looking and reflecting at all” (p. 8).

NOTES 1. In writing this comparative article, I assumed that readers would already have a relatively sound understanding of the prime ideas of Gramsci and Foucault. Yet for those who wish to do more in-depth reading on Gramscian ideas in relation to sport, I suggest Gruneau (1988), Hargreaves and McDonald (2000), Jarvie & Maguire (1994), Sage (1990); with respect to Foucault, I suggest Andrews (1993), Cole, Giardina, & Andrews (2004), Maguire (2002), and Rail and Harvey (1995). 2. A critique offered by more traditional historians is that Foucault’s historical work is inaccurate and lacks methodological rigor. In contradistinction, Foucault’s work has been cited as influential in the development of New Historicism, which involves juxtaposing texts from different historical times and respectfully analyzing their discursive contexts (Mills, 2003). 3. A more detailed discussion of contextual influences that helped fashion Foucault’s writings can be found in Andrews (2000).


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AUTHOR Richard Pringle’s research interests include the discursive construction of masculinities in sport and governmental funding of elite sport and exercise promotion schemes.

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