Masks and Soldiering - Eyal Ben-Ari

Masks and Soldiering: The Israeli Army and the Palestinian Uprising Author(s): Eyal Ben-Ari Source: Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 4, No. 4, (Nov., 1989), pp. 372-389 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the American Anthropological Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/656247 Accessed: 02/07/2008 04:32 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=black. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.

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Masks and Soldiering: The Israeli Army and the Palestinian Uprising Eyal Ben-Ari

Departmentof Sociology and Social Anthropology and TheHarryS. TrumanInstitutefor the Advancementof Peace TheHebrew University

Personal Circumstances; General Questions I writelikea soldier alienatedfromanypoliticalawareness, andthefeelingsalternating duringthisguardshift arewaryof lookingateachother. -Z. Stemfeld, IntifadaDiary (1988)

Frommid-Aprilto mid-Mayof last year (1988) I served a month-longstint with my Army reserve unit in the Hebron area of the West Bank. During this period my battalionperformedall of the "usual" activities IDF (Israel Defense Forces) units are entrustedwith in the occupied territories:for example, setting up roadblocks,maintainingpatrols, and carryingout arrests.A few weeks after this periodof dutyI helpedorganizea partyfor the unit's officersandseniorNCOs (noncommissionedofficers) in a Jerusalemnight club. Such parties-which take place in civilian establishments-are held not infrequentlyby many of the army's reserveunits. This gathering-which was attendedby wives andgirlfriends-was not held in orderto conclude the period in Hebronbut as a farewell partyto two officers who were leaving the battalion. Having come back deeply troubledby what I saw and felt in HebronI think that I expected the partyto provide an opportunityfor us to discuss, to raise questions, or at the very least to hint at what this particularperiod of duty (our first during the intifada, the uprising) had "done" or meant to us as soldiers, as human beings. In short, I expected the party-set apartfrom the period of active duty in termsof space, time, and rules of behavior-to provide an occasion for reflection. The hints, the questions, let alone the full-blown discussions that I had half-hopedwould be heard, were not raisedat all. The curious combination of troubled citizen and anthropologistthat has guided me in the last four years when looking at my society questionedwhy this was so. Partof the answerlies, I soon realized, in the characterof such periodic 372

MASKS AND SOLDIERING 373

partiesas opportunitiesfor celebratingthe solidarityand essential unity of a combat unit. This was not a suitableoccasion, I furtherunderstood,for raisingpotentially divisive issues, or for openly acknowledgingthe personaldifficultiesmany of us had enduredduringthe period of time spent in the territoriesoccupied by Israel. Beyond such answers,however, I kept on wondering.I continuedto be troubled, to be disturbedby wider issues that I would like to discuss here: how do armyreservistsinterrelate,reconcile theirexperiencesof serving in the territories duringthe intifada(the Palestinianuprising)with those of living their "normal" everydayIsraeli lives? To be sure, Israeli forces have carriedout similar "missions" associatedwith the occupationof the territories(the West Bank and Gaza) long before the uprising (see, for example, Lieblich 1987:322; Zucker et al. 1983). But as it sometimes happenswhen one is thrustinto an extreme situation, one can begin to examine and illuminate many features that are ordinarilyrendered invisible by the "normality" of this same situation. So it is with the intifada. The uprisingraises the following question:how do people perform-within the contextof theirarmyservice, and for its duration-acts that are totally different from, in directcontradictionto, the way in which they behave while they are civilians? On one level this question is a psychological or social psychological one.1 Hereone may well ask as to the mechanismsor techniquesby which people who see themselves as members of a "normal" democraticsociety, cope with their participationin policing activities within anothersociety that is governedby differentrules and expectations:the ways, to put this by way of example, in which reservistscontendwith their participationin such activities as daytimeand nighttime arrests,dispersalof demonstrations,or forcing "local inhabitants"(always PalestinianArabs)to clear away roadblocks. Yet this question is not limited to the realm of psychology or of social psychology. It also involves issues thathave to do with armyservice as the enactment of meanings. WhatI am proposing, in otherwords, is the need to view service in Israel's army reserves from what is perhaps a novel perspective:that is, as an activity throughwhich differentmeaning systems are producedand reproduced. More specifically, I will attemptin this analysis to situate some of the more individual-centeredmechanisms and small-group dynamics by which reservists cope with their tours of duty duringthe uprising, within three wider processes: the constructionof (male) identities throughmilitary service, the transitionbetween civilian and army lives, and the workings of the interpretiveschemes that underliemilitaryactivities. Before moving on to the analysis I should, perhaps, trace out the limits of the presentargument.Whatfollows is based on the impressionsand observations of a deeply troubledparticipant.While I am by professionan anthropologistI did not carryout a piece of systematicfieldworkwhile in Hebron, nor did I envisage a systematicanalysisof the situationwhile there. Along these lines, my discussion is based foremostlyon my own experienceduringthatearly stage of the uprising, on a small numberof interviewsI conductedwith some of the battalion'sofficers,

374 CULTURALANTHROPOLOGY

and on a review of many articlesfrom popularjournalsand newspapersthathave been devotedto the subject. The Battalion Let me begin with a short descriptionof the army unit to which I have belonged duringthe last five or so years. The battalionis partof one of the army's elite infantrybrigades:it is distinguished,to put this by way of thatcombination of abstractionand preciseness which characterizesmilitaryparlance, by a high level of readinessand combateffectiveness. Yet it is an organizationthatis made up exclusively of reservists,of miluim-nicks(literally,people who fill in the gap). These soldiers and officers volunteeredfor one of the "crack" infantryforces2 duringtheircompulsorytermof service anduponcompletionof thatterm(usually three years) were assigned to our unit. By law every man who has completed compulsoryservice can be mobilized (until the age of 55) for a yearly stint of up to 42 days.3 In reality units like our battalionare usually called up at least twice a year and for longer periods. As in other parts of the army (Gal 1986:40) the burdenshoulderedby officers and senior NCOs is considerablygreaterthan that of lower-rankingsoldiers. The formerare continuouslyinvolved in such matters as briefings,staff meetings, additionaltraining,or tacticaltours. Like manyreserveunits in the army, the generalatmospherein the battalion tendstowardthe informalandthe familiar.A close relationshipandunderstanding holds officers and other ranks together. Rank is not emphasized and everyone (includingthe unit's commander)is called by their firstname (or equivalentnicknames). All of us serve undersimilarconditions:the same beds and barracks,the same food and canteen services, similar clothes and equipment, and approximatelythe same kind of furloughs. The battalionis, to borrowa term often used in the IDF, an "organic unit" (yechidaorganit). Organizationallythis implies (1) a frameworkcharacterizedby a permanentmembershipand structureof roles, and (2) that upon mobilization the whole battalion(as one complete organizationalunit) is recruited."Socially" this term implies a militaryforce characterizedby camaraderie,a high level of cohesion, well developed primarygroups, and no less importantlya sense of a sharedpast. Let me give a few examples. Like the "buddysystem" found in the Americanand Canadianarmies(Kellet 1982:99; Moskos 1975) or the "comradeship" found in the British forces (Richardson1978:chapt.2), so too the battalionis made up of a numberof close groupingsthat have often developed over the course of a numberof years. This is clearlyevidentin the happyrenewalof friendshipsthatgoes on at the beginning of each tourof duty. Yet it is also apparentin the attachmentof nicknamesused only duringmiluim, the emergence of "characters"within the battalion's subunits(the companyclown or the platoon's "expressive" leader, for example), or the knowledgemany men have of each other's personallives and interests. Many of the quieterperiods duringreserve duty are devoted to the recollection andcreationof sharedexperiences:the warof 1973 for a few of the remaining

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older soldiers, the war in Lebanon, skirmisheswith terrorists,or the hardshipsof trainingenduredduring previous stints of duty. On other occasions parties and picnics areheld eitheron the last day of duty or upon a returnto civilian life (with people's families). It is duringthese occasions that the solidarityof the force is celebratedand what the British term "regimentalspirit" is displayed and subtly honored. Every year on the morningof RemembranceDay many soldiers and officers join the unit's veteransto gatherat the battalion'smemorialsite. This site-which is situatedin one of the hills surroundingJerusalem-was built to honor the battalion's dead fromthe 1973 Yom KippurWar. Duringthe shortceremonyprayers and songs are sung, flowers placed next to the small memorialtablets, very brief speeches given, and again people meet, renew acquaintanceships,and share memories. Later some of us proceed on to other military cemeteries across the countryto join smaller family services for men who have been killed in the last few years. And myself? During reserve duty I become an army bureaucrat.I am the battalion'sadjutant(shalish)-a staff officer-and hold the rankof captain.With the exceptionof a briefperiodduringmy compulsorytermof service, I have been in such a noncombatantsupportrole in frontlineunitsfor almostall of my military career.My responsibilitiesare variedand include such mattersas helping the battalion's commanderissue orders, mobilizing and demobilizingthe whole unit, or dealingwith personnelproblems(soldierswho have gone AWOL, or promotions, for instance). I have been with the battalionsince returningfrom four years of study abroadand volunteering-upon my return-for service in a frontlineunit. Preparing for Hebron The pitchforksin local women's handsare brown: nails and nails, rustand rust at theiredges and a long wooden handle intendedto pierce the flesh of our faces, to pluck.

Ourwomen, plucktheireyebrows.

-Z. Sterfeld, IntifadaDiary (1988)

While being inducted a day or two before moving to the Hebron area, the special role we were to carryout in relationto the intifadabecame clear:we were orderedto become policemen. This was evident firstof all in the nonstandardgear that was issued: rifles for shooting canistersof tear gas, special helmets, visors, and shields (for protectionagainstrocks), clubs (which were, by orderof the battalion's commander,later left unused in the barracks),and implementsmounted on standardrifles for shooting rubberbullets (one of those unique technological innovationsthatmilitaryindustriescontinuallytake pridein). Next the termsused duringthe preparatorybriefingsbelonged to the world of policemen (see, for ex-


ample, Reiss 1971:xiii): search and seizure, stop and frisk, squelching disturbances, or maintainingorderand quiet. Finally, overlayingall of this was a heavy emphasison the legal aspects of our activity. We were remindedthat the "objects" of our activity were civilians, that all of the activities undertakenby the battalion'ssoldiers had to be properly(i.e., lawfully) "covered" by regulations, that the right forms (for evidence and complaints) had to be filled out at local police stations, and that all of this be done underthe supervisionof suitably authorizedofficers. Yet this was not a smooth process. During these first few days the usual gripesaboutarmylife (or more specificallyaboutthe transitionto armylife) were compoundedby new complaintscenteringprecisely aroundour new role: army soldiers, most of the argumentswent, were being taken to do police work. We were being turnedfrom soldiers to policemen. The army, as the more sophisticated soldiers put it, is an organizationentrustedwith trainingand preparingfor an attackby the forces of an externalenemy. Here we were being orderedto become a policing force, one chargedwith enforcinglaw andorder.The complaints, while not questioningthe deeper issues of Israel's presence in the occupied territories,neverthelesswell underscoredthe basic unease that many soldiers felt at havingto be deployed in one of the majorurbancentersof the West Bank. This unease must be understoodagainst the backdropof how the uprising was perceivedby many, if not most, of the unit's soldiersandofficers. The picture we had received of the uprising throughthe mass media had been one of mass demonstrations,concentratedrock throwingandtireburning,andthe constantuse of Molotov cocktails. This situationled, of course, to the emergenceof anxieties and apprehensionsat being mobilized in orderto deal with these expressions of Palestiniananger and frustration.In one of the interviews I held with the unit's officers, a young commanderrecalled: Itlookedas thoughtheuprisingwasveryveryviolent,veryverydifficult.That'swhat was shownon television.AndI expectedit to be veryhard,thatwe weregoingto abouthow war.It wasnota matterof routine.AndI camewitha lotof apprehensions onedealswiththesecircumstances. Compoundingsuch anxieties were the interpretationsmany men gave to the intifadain termsof theirexperienceof the war in Lebanon.4A numberof men thus relatedto me how the uprising in the West Bank had raised recollections, triggeredassociationsof the lawlessness and utterchaos they had encounteredin Lebanon. Having been away doing a Ph.D. in Englandand fieldworkin Japanduring Israel'sLebanesedebacle, I was sparedthese kinds of associations. For me, however, the thoughtof serving in Hebronduringthe intifada raised memories and fearsI had thoughtforgotten.I found myself transportedback to the Yom Kippur Warof 1973, when as a 19-year-oldinfantrysoldier I was woundedby an Egyptian sniperand takenout of action for a numberof weeks. The uprisinghad thus "succeeded" in jarringme: jarringme to the extent of experiencinganew at least some of the fears I had felt duringthat war.

MASKSANDSOLDIERING377

Two soldiers refused to go to Hebron on moral grounds. Some effort was made-and this is no doubta reflectionof the battalionbeing an "organicunit"to persuadethemto come with us. They were given assurances,for example, that they would not be put in situationswherecontactwith the "local population"was inevitable, or that their duties would be limited to guardingstrictly military installations.Whenthey stood by theirdecision both were sent to be court-martialed by the commanderof the brigade.Both soldiersreceived a sentenceof one month in jail. The treatmentthey received after being sentenced also reflects the atmosphereof our unit. As their trialwas held late in the evening, and as they could be sent to the militaryprison only on the following day both men were sent back to theircompanies. They spent thatnight, in otherwords, with their "buddies" and friends. The generalattitudetowardthese soldiers was not one of censureor of banishment. Ratherit was a mix of respect for their ability to stand by their beliefs and a feeling thatthey were somehow misguided. Indeed, laterwhen we were in Hebron,a numberof their friends telephonedtheir families to find out how they were doing in prison. Othersapproachedme for news aboutthem (being formally in chargeof discipline in the battalionI had askedfor informationaboutthese two people from the brigade's adjutantwho had visited them). In mid-April,four monthsafterthe beginningof the uprisingwe moved into Hebron. Masks and Disguises Thoughtheboysthrowstonesatfrogsin sport, yet thefrogsdo notdie in sportbutin earnest. -Plutarch, quotedin Fine(1988:43) Softpeople preferto stayat theobservation post ... Uri with the diamondearring ...

He is thefirstcasualtyof theuprising;

I hit him with the communicationsgadget

(bleedingin his righteyebrow).

Does not react-

Oneshouldn'tgivepleasureto thelocals ....

Uri has a soft voice and an English accent.

He tellswitha smile

how he was CharlesBronson; Kickedthe doors of night. -Z. Sterfeld, IntifadaDiary (1988)

In attemptingto understandmy battalion'sexperienceduringour stint in Hebron, let me suggest a somewhat unconventionalviewpoint in regardto reserve duty in general, and then relate it to the case of the uprising. Essentially the argumentis the ratherobvious one thatgoing into miluiminvolves enteringa special


behavioralframe (Bateson 1972; Handelman1977) which is governed by rules different(even contradicting)from those of civilian life.5 What is less apparent, however, are the peculiar patterningsof and assumptionsthat lie behind these rules. Let me try and make this clear by way of a metaphorsome of my army friendsuse to characterizetheir inductioninto miluim. Many soldiers referto the wearingof uniformson the first day of reserve duty as the donningof disguises, as the bearingof masks. What I would suggest is that this metaphorilluminates how the transitionto soldier involves more than a "mere" transitionto a new social role and its attendantnorms and expectations. This is because the use of masks or disguises involves a special potentialfor behaviorwhich is at one and the same time normativelydifferentfrom civilian life and in a special sense also nonnormative. As Honigmann(1977:275) has shown, masqueradesare often special means thatfacilitatea temporaryseparationbetween the personalidentityof the "users" andthe behaviorthatis being enacted. For the durationof theirperformances,the disguisedarein a positionto expresshostilitywith impunitybecausethey are "not themselves" (Honigmann1977:272;Walter1969:83). Along these lines, I would suggestthatfor the limitedperiodof miluimthe reservistscease to be the normally identified, circumscribed,constrainedmembers of Israeli society who must be concernedwith how they are regardedby themselves and by others. On one level these circumstanceswork towardallowing many reserviststo display "irregular"public behaviorlike cursingand swearing,belching and farting, urinatingand spitting, or talking dirty. This situationalso allows many men to freely exhibit the "macho" dimensions of their armycharacter.This point is readily evident in regard both to nonverbal behavior-posturing, hunching of shoulders,or excessive preoccupationwith guns and equipment-and verbalbehavior-free use of the imperative, barkingwords in a forceful manner, or the abandonmentof politeness forms. On anotherlevel, however, the disguises donned duringreserve duty have hada numberof implicationsfor the way in which relationswith local Palestinians have takenshapeduringthe uprising.One primeexample, noted by many people in my battalion,is how the special circumstancesin Hebronallowed them to play with relativelyfew restraints.Some talked of chasing rock throwersas games of "hide-and-seek"or of "catch-as-catch-can."Otherscharacterizedthese games as battles of wit in which each side attemptsto outfox the other. One man's observationsevoke Czikszentmihalyi's(1975) characterizationof the "flow" element in play: Manytimesit's likea game.A gameof learninghowto dealwithit. Thereis a certain problemandyouhaveto givea solution.You-I think-cut yourselfoff fromallsorts here.It'sa game of thoughtaboutwhatyou'redoing,andhowandwhat'shappening likea crossword puzzle,of technique,of howyoudealwitha problem. Anotherexamplewas providedby the commandersof one companyin developing whatin theirwordswas a game of "bingo." At the roadblocksthey manned,they


looked for license plates of "hot" cars: not stolen vehicles but those owned by suspectswantedby the GeneralSecurity Service. On yet anotherlevel, the use of disguises andmaskshas, to statethe obvious, very seriousand direct implications. A companycommander'swords: FromwhatI saw manyof the localstherealso thoughtof us as partnersin a sortof gameuntilsomethinghappened,someonegothitor somethinglikethat. Here the argumentis that use of masks and disguises provides at least some reservists with a legitimate license to behave in ways that they would not normally-that is, within the bounds of their everyday civilian life-associate with them-"selves. "6 One example (aboutwhich I sensed quite a bit of unease among a numberof officers and soldiers) were nighttimearrests.These forays into Hebron's urbanneighborhoodsor the city's adjoiningvillages often consisted of a similarpatternof actions: knocks on the door in the middle of the night, seizing the suspects against a backgroundof crying women and children, handcuffing them with plastic handcuffs, blindfoldingthem and then moving them out to detention centers for questioningby the General Security Service. Other, perhaps less extremebut no less serious, instancesof the special kinds of behaviorthat I witnessedwere purposelymakingpeople wait for hoursin the hot sun until given permissionto proceed beyond army roadblocks, or, when riding army vehicles, contraveninglocal trafficrules (going up one-way streets, or expecting a line of cars standingat a trafficlight to let one through).7 When conceived in these terms the dynamics of militaryservice within the context of the uprising may be better understood.Thus, reservists during their stint of duty are temporarilynot themselves but people placed in special circumstances, circumstanceswhich in themselves may allow (or more forcefully, demand)a certaintype of behavior.8Indeed, this kind of explanationis one that is often found at the bottom of the account many reservistsgive in regardto their stintsof dutyin the territories:highly delimited-spatially as well as temporallyepisodes duringwhich they become an-otherperson (a certain "other" to themselves).9

A Benign Occupation? Inthebeginningtherewasfear, theheartbeathard. Thencameblackanger, likea cloudof blacksmokerisingandtheirhateclungto us. I raisedmy handto strike, I sawnothinguntilmy clubof angergrewheavy. I stoodin disbelief staringthroughmy tears attheemptyhandnowstrange, atthehandthatbeat,untilhatewasquenchedandat thebloodthatclungto myhand. -A.

Arzi, A Cloud of Smoke(1988)


This kind of explanation-of becoming an-otherperson in the army-may well illuminatethe type of behaviorfound in a large numberof specific situations in which soldiersfind themselves. At the same time, however, it tends to deproblematicizethe actual act of disguise as well as the continuingneed at least some soldiers feel to somehow relate their "masked" behavior (and the behavior of theircomrades)to theiridentityas ordinaryIsraelicitizens. Two examplesrelated to the intifadaand throughthat to one of Israel's most durableoxymorons-the attemptto managea "benign occupation" in the territories-may bringthis point out. The firstexampleis a personalone. One day I was askedto take a Palestinian arrestedthatmorningto brigadeheadquarterssome fourkilometersaway. Before asking the man to get on the vehicle I was driving, I allowed the soldier accompanyinghim to take off his blindfold and the plastic handcuffon his hands, and to let him urinate. The Palestinianmanaged a short, tear-chokedthank you in Hebrew. The second instance was relatedto me by one of the battalion'sclerks (a soldierI am directlyresponsiblefor). He was orderedto accompanya bus load of detaineesto the nearbymilitaryprison. Accordingto his story, as the detained men were let off the bus one of the prison guardsasked him: "How many pieces (chatichot) have you broughttoday?" When he replied that they were human beings andnot things, the guardwas strucktemporarilydumb, only to retortsome minuteslaterwith: "Are you some kind of leftist or something?" Both instances-and they can be multiplied many times over-exemplify two interrelatedprocesses that form part of masked behavior. On the one hand they representa process Lifton (1973:206-207) terms resensitization:that is, a situationin which despite encounterswith an enemy in stereotypicterms(or as an object), they areneverthelessturnedinto individualpeople. On the otherhandthe two examplesillustrateone of the primeparadoxesof behaviorin disguise:despite the disjointednessof identityengenderedby the use of masquerades,one always remains(albeit to a limited extent) a humanbeing. Hence the need I felt-and accordingto theirtestimonymany other soldiers feel as well-to accountfor our actionsin termsof somehow humanizingthe occupation,of somehow presenting a more humaneface to the occupying force. There are yet other mechanisms, techniques of neutralization(Sykes and Matza 1957), that individualreservistsemploy in orderto deal with the situation in the territories:repressingmemories associated with miluim, playing down the seriousnessof theirbehavior, or isolating their experience (statingthat armyand civilian "lives" areessentiallyunrelated).Anothercoping strategyhas been characterizedby StanleyCohen(1988:61) as a sortof ritualincantation:people believe and accountfor their actions in terms of their forming partof the militaryeffort to "restorelaw and orderuntil a political settlementis reached." For all this however, while these kinds of explanationswell illuminatethe problematicnatureof disguised behavior, and highlightthe type of accountspeople (myself included) mobilize in order to deal with the contradictioninbuilt to servicein the territoriesthey still do not suffice. This is because, as I will presently show, they still fall short of explicating the way these mechanismsthat operate


on the individualor small group levels are enveloped within wider processes of the productionandreproductionof meaningin the army. This may be understood throughreferringagain to my battalion'sexperience in Hebron. Clean Work As I describedbefore, our movement into the city and its environs also signaleda movementinto the role of policemen (and all thatthis role entails in terms of tasks, equipment,and legal terminology). Whathappened,however, was that in the space of a few shortdays everyone-officers and soldiers-reverted to the typicalmode of militarythinkingandperceptionthatHasdai(1982) has called the "doer" (bitsuist)orientation.10 This developmentwas reflected, in the firstplace, in the kinds of termspeoused. Terms like nikui shetach ("clean-up" or "mop-up") were in constant ple use: clean-upthis village or mop-upthat streetor avenue. This expression, which is usuallyused in times of war or skirmishesin orderto referto the eliminationof pockets of enemy resistancein a given area, was now used in regardto clearing away of "civilian" (i.e., Palestinian)roadblocks, stones, tires, PLO flags, or demonstrators.Othermilitarytermsthatcreptinto use includednot only the usual arrayof army acronyms or the expressions officially designated by the signals corps, but also such words as deployment (prisa), breakthrough(pritza) into houses, raids (peshita), or paralleluses of forces (avoda bemakbil). Whatis perhapsof greatersignificancefrom the point of view of the present argument,however, was not only thatthe usualtermsandperceptionsused within the context of the armywere infused into the policing activities of Hebronand its environs. What is of greaterimportancewas that after a few days in the shetach (whichis the way armymen referto the field) the criteriaby which officers, single patrols,companies, or the whole battalionitself were appraisedwere the type of standardsthat are used in regardto regulararmy tasks (whetherin times of war, or along the country'sbordersduringthose misnamedperiods of peacetime). Thus, for example, one set of criteriathat was utilized time and again in evaluating how a certain unit carried out its mission was whether it had done "clean work" (avodah nekiya):that is, operatedwith minimaldamageto "our" forces, efficiency, smooth execution, and no delays in the designatedtimetable. Two excerpts from the interviews I held may well illuminate this point. One young officer who joined our unit two or three years ago put it in the following terms: Whenyou'rethereandyou'vegot a goal-that everythingwillrunsmoothly(yidfok) likethearmywantsit to run-then it reallybecomesa personalmatter.Therehasto

be a solutionto a problemand I have to find it immediately.

Anotherofficer-one of the company commanders-told me how they had entereda village and given chase to hundredsof people who had subjectedthem to a barrageof rocks:

382 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY It workedreallywell, andfromthisaspectI was satisfied,frommy pointof view as andhowthepeoplefunctioned in situations wherethey (tifkedu) companycommander wereputunderpressure. " A relatedset of criteriarevolved aroundthe success of the commandersof a unit in exploiting the stint in Hebronin orderto "solidify" or "crystallize" the unit (gibushyechidati) (see Katriel 1986:30-31). This refersto the success of officers in fosteringa sense of solidarityamong their soldiers and their channeling of this solidarityto the practicalitiesof coordinationbetween soldiers, smooth intraunitcommunicationof orders, or mutualhelp between its members. To reiterate, these are the type of standardsthatare usually appliedto armyunits which carryout "regular"militarymissions: borderpatrols, incursionsinto enemy territory,or combatmissions.12 The use of these criteriais summarizedin the words of a company commanderfrom the paratroopers(a unit very similar to ours) who was asked in a newspaperinterviewabouthis experiencein the territories(KolHair, 10.2.89): We cameoutbettersoldiersthanwhenwe wentin becausewe saw it as a military mission.Individual soldiering,themovementof thewholecompany,andourfamiliaritywithcombatin builtupareasall roseto a higherlevel. Military Culture Whatdoes all of this imply? Here again I would suggest looking at the army experiencefrom a ratherunconventionalviewpoint:that is, viewing armylife as organizationalculture, as the enactmentof certainmeanings. When viewed from sucha perspective,I would argue, the developmentsI have describedareevidence of a process of "naturalization"(Dolgin et al. 1977:39) that the battalionunderwent duringthe firstweek or two in Hebron. In a word, given the organizational structureand rules throughwhich the battalionoperated, and given the criteria and termsthroughwhich the environmentand the unit's activities within it were appraised,it is only "natural"thatthe uprisingbegan to be perceivedthroughan essentiallymilitary(as opposed to police) orientation. The unit's reality constructors(Morgan 1986:132), such as the officers and NCOs, because of their conceptionsof "what we are" and "what we are trying to do" establishedpoints of reference that "properly" belong to the domain of the military. The argument,then, is that the interpretiveschemes suited to "ordinary"armycontextsformedthe frameworkfor understanding(andactingupon) the new circumstancesof the intifada:that is, to a situationin which the army is in heightenedcontactwith civilian populations,and has to reactto types of resistance it is not trainedto deal with such as stone throwing, flag raising, demonstrating,burningtires, or using Molotov cocktails. Yet this is not just a simple shift from an emphasis on policing to one that has to do with the tactics of militarywarfare.The shift is much more subtle and has to do with the natureof the IDF as a certainkind of army. The Israeli army, like many other moder military forces, is guided by a very strong managerial


ideology.13As Feld (1977:52-53; see also Lang 1972:chapt.2) notes, the commandersof modem armiesare often guidedby a desireto gainthemaximumutilityfromthemachinesandmanpowerat theirdisposalandinclinedto employtheseitemsaccordingto the prevalentmanaratherthanforcethemintothemoldof militarycodeandtraditions. gerialstandards Along these lines, it may be betterunderstoodhow my battalion'scommandersand I would reasonably argue that this holds for many other reserve units as well-came to defineandreactto variousproblemsposed by the uprisingnot only in militarytermsbut in the special termsof militarytechnology and organization. To borrowfromLifton's (1973:65) remarksaboutanothersituation,the problems posed by Palestinianresistancecame to be seen as problemsto be solved by the applicationof the right technique, the properknow-how.'4 In this way the recourse to militaryinterpretiveschemes allowed for a redefinitionof some of the personal(or ethical) problemsinvolved in serving in the territoriesinto questions of an essentially professionalmilitarynature.In a word, moralmisgivings were, in effect, displacedonto an organizationalplane. An analysis of the types of selfreflectionthatareencouragedin these circumstancesmay makethis point clearer. Continuities in Identity Let us begin by way of the kind of reflection that is promoted within the context of the army itself. Here what is evident is that the process of "militarization" of the intifadaoperatesto channelaway any basic questioningof the situation. By allowing, indeed even actively encouraging,field commandersto reflect upon and to consider such tactical issues as deployment, the efficient use of manpowerand other resources, or "creative" reactionsto local action there is a diffusion of reflexivity on a deeper level: the level of basics such as Israeli presence in the territoriesor the impact of this presence on Israeli society. In other words, the promotionof reflectionabout "role performance"-a reflectionthat is consistentwith other facets of Israeli male identities-tends to reduce considerationof the basic legitimacy of this role. The diffusionof a morepenetratingself-analysis is reinforcedby two further points. The firsthas to do with the fact thatdespite the events of the last decadeespecially the war in Lebanon-for most Israeli men participationin the army is still consideredto be a rewardin itself. As Horowitzand Kimmerling(1974:265) note, such "participationdefines the extent to which an individualis in the 'social-evaluative'system of Israel." Any acute self-reflectionengenderedby service duringthe uprisingthen by definitiontouches upon the right of reserviststo be partof this system of evaluation.It may disrupt,given the tendencyof military identityto be a centralcomponentof Israelimale identity(Lieblich 1987:11), their conceptionof themselves as Israelis. At the same time this situationis intensifiedin the case of "organic units." In unitslike my battalionthe close primary-groupties and the "spirit" of the unit also workto channelaway a self-reflectionthatmay touch on the deeperproblems


of the intifada.In otherwords, because soldiers and officers evaluatethemselves andareevaluatedwithinthe context of tight groupsof importantothers, self-analysis may come "dangerously"close to questioningthe feelings of belonging and solidarity,the sentimentsof pride and unity of purpose, and the common experiences and ideals representedby the unit.15 Against the backgroundI have just traced out it may now be clearer how some reservistsmay returnto their ordinary,everydayexistence and accountfor theirperiodof dutyin termsof another-perhaps slightly moredifficultbut neverthelessjust another-stint of miluim.What are thus experiencedupon a returnto noncombatantlife-and it is just this meaning of civilian that takes precedence in this context-are certainsentimentsof empathywith the "locals," and astonishmentat one's actions, but also very deep-felt emotions of pride at army missions well done, of solidaritywith one's comrades, and of sharingwith them another militaryexperience. The observationsof a company commanderfrom the paratroopersthat I quotedbefore bringthis out (Kol Hair, 10.2.89): I haveno doubtthatagainstforceyouhaveto reactwithforce,andthatthemissions definedforthearmyarelegitimate.At thesametimeyousee thatthelocalpopulation are suffering . . . and I did these things. As a soldier I am at peace with myself re-

gardingmy actions.As a humanbeingI amnotat peacewithmyself. At the Edge of My Society

Stonesandpebblescannotbe tamed,untilthe endtheylook at us withveryquiet, verycleareyes. -based on Z. Herbert,Poems(1984) When one colleague and friendread an earlierversion of this article he observed that permeatingmy whole analysis is a deep sense of guilt (he is an extherapist).Yet guilt can be a "positive" motivatingforce. Telling this tale-or more precisely relating my personal story to the more distanced analysis-has providedme with a meansfor confrontingthe experienceof Hebronas well as for facing some of the deeperimplicationsof my actions and those of my friendsand comrades.This, of course, has been far from easy. I statethis in no way in order to minimizethe sufferingsof the Palestiniansor to overstressthe "psychology" of the rulersat the expense of the oppressed(Bishra 1989). Rather,I believe that in orderto understandthe complexity of the situationone must take into account both the patternsof thoughtof those Israelis who are chargedwith managingthe occupationof the territories,and the process throughwhich someone such as I begins to tell you such a tale. AlthoughI was rarelyin directcontact with Palestinianswhile in Hebron, I found myself in a state of turmoilfor weeks aftermy return:I did not sleep well, could not concentrateon my teaching and research, and was shortwith my children. Above all, however, I was very defensive about any criticism of the army andof the actions of soldiers in the territories.As I then only vaguely sensed and now more explicitly realize I took these criticismsand questionsperson-ally:that


is, as attackstouchingupon my identityas an armyofficer and throughthat as an Israeli, and as assaults upon my commitmentto the army and by way of that to my own society. These circumstanceswere made more difficult by the unfulfilled expectations many people had (myself very much included) that stints in the occupied territoriesduringthe intifadawould effect an immediatepoliticalbacklashleading to mass movements for change. If anything-as my analysis tries to explainwhat I witnessed at that time (a few months after the uprising's beginning) was the basic resiliency of the situation:in otherwords, how the applicationof "double standards"to behaviorswithin and across the green line could continue. It was against this backdropthat sometime in June I was asked to make a shortpresentationat a roundtablediscussion organized at my departmentabout the intifada.This discussiongrew out of the feeling some of us held thatwe should and could react to the uprisingas anthropologistsand sociologists (ours is a joint department).At the beginning I toyed with the idea of presentingsome kind of general-and of course very distanced-analysis about the microeconomics of the intifadaor aboutits implicationsfor territorialbehavior.I sensed very quickly, however, that this just would not do and that I needed to presentsomething that grew out of my own turmoiland as yet only vaguely defined questions. Yet this was problematicto say the least. I was one of those IsraeliacademicsthatStanley Cohen (1988:95) talks about: Mostof my academiccolleagueshaveno senseof beingon theedgeof theirsociety, of seeingit fromtheoutside.As a result,theyarereluctant to takea standthatmight be interpreted as "disloyal"or "unpatriotic" or (worstof all) "anti-Zionist."So, eventoday,theydefendanidealizedversionof Israelihistoryandcultureas if it were reality. The presentationthatI did eventuallygive-a shortten-minutetalk based on some very rough notes-was trying. It was my first public attemptto divulge a deeply personalstory and to analyze some of its implications, to own up to my experience and yet to subject it to the anthropologicalscrutinythat I apply as a matterof course to my normalsubjectsof research. Duringthe summerI spentover two monthsdoing fieldworkin Japan.It was only at the end of this period, however, thatI finally felt that I could commit my experienceto writing. I had to literally travel away from my society in orderto travelto its edge, to be able to look at it from an externalvantagepoint. Yet I am still very much partof my society. These days I returnhome dreadingto look at the post box: will a new mobilizationorderbe there? Notes Acknowledgments.I would like to thankU. Almagor, Y. Bilu, E. Cohen, R. Gal, D. Han-

A. Levi,A. Lieblich,E. Lomsky-Feder, delman,S. Heilman,R. Kahane,B. Kimmerling, A. Seligman,andespeciallyG. Aranforcommentson anearlierversionof thiswork.The

386 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY HarryS. TrumanInstituteand the KoretFoundationgrantedme financialaid towardcompletingthe manuscript.Translationsof the poems from the Hebreware my own. 'Indeed, a numberof Israeli psychologists (see, for example, Bar-On 1988) have raised this question. 2A descriptionof one such force, the paratroopers,can be found in Aran (1974:149). 3A fuller expositionof the armyreserve system can be found in Gal (1986:38). 4Lieblich's(1987) very sensitive accountof the experience of soldiers who went through the war in Lebanonbringsthese points out. Some of the soldiers thatshe describesare the kind of men that, upon completion of their compulsoryterm of service, have joined our unit. 5See Feige (n.d.) for an analysis along these lines. 6Sutton-Smithand Kelly-Byre (1984:187) point out that behaviortermedplay or playful may often be used as masks for otherforms of behaviorsuch as crueltyor violence. 7Indeedunder certain circumstancesone may well hypothesize that the wearing of uniformsinducesa certainprocess of deindividuation:enteringa stateof lessened self-awareness, reduced concern over social evaluation and weakened restraintagainst prohibited forms of behavior(Aronson 1988:216). 8Althoughvery little is known abouttheiractivities I would suggest thatthe secret intifada committees(the invisible Palestiniangovernmentin the territories)may be analyzedalong the lines I am suggestingin regardto the Israeliarmy. These committees-which function, it seems, not unlike the secret societies of West Africa (Walter 1969:chapt.V)-also use masksto dissociatethemselves from as well as cover theirpublic identitiesas individuals. Theireffectiveness, however, in contrastto the armydependson mystery, dramaticintervention, and the suddenreturnto invisibility. 9Thissituationis not uniqueto the situationthat I am describing. First take the following accountof the Poro secret society studiedby Harley: Gbana . . . was a grandold man with pure white hair when I last saw him. He always had a kindly smile. At the height of his influencehe was judge for a total of nine towns .... It is hard to reconcile the gory history of [his] blood stained mask with the benign clear-eyed patriarch. [Walter1969:85]

Next take the example of a Vietnamveteranrelatedby Lifton (1973:104-105) I came to be fascinatedby my threatenedlife and to enjoy the immediacyof it, and yes, to hate it too and to hate myself for enjoying it. ... I was two of myself, one human and the other inhuman. ... At a time like that you find out what man is like. You learnthatthis is what man is.

'?Onthe psychological backgroundof this kind of mentalitysee Lieblich (1983) and Lieblich and Perlow (1988:44). 1Lateron in the talkwe hadthis same mannotedhow importantit was to fulfill the officer's role despite any misgivings he had: I triedto disconnectmyself from the whole idea of whetherwe shouldbe there [in the territories] or not because afterall as the companycommanderI always had to tell the soldiersthat we have to do it, and we have to do it well, and with a lot of motivation.

MASKSANDSOLDIERING387 12Asomewhatless pronouncedset of criteriafor appraisingactivity can be seen as a direct outgrowthof the fireandmovementemphasisthatis partof Israelitacticaldoctrine(Kellett 1982:250). These criteriahad to do with the degree to which actions were created and initiatedby various commanders(pe-ulot yezumot)ratherthan being reactions to the initiativeof the "locals." '3Historically,of course, many modem managerialcodes were developedduringthe modernizationof the Prussianarmy (Morgan 1986:23-24). '4Sadly, later developmentsbear this point out. The Israeli army has, over the course of the intifada, attemptedto deal with the situationthroughintroducinga series of different "technical solutions": the use of clubs, administrativearrests, the explosion of houses, rubberbullets, plastic bullets, special canon for shooting glass marbles, and so on. '5Thiskind of analysis bringsout, I would furtherargue, how many soldiers, despite misgivings and doubts they may have, are "gently" swept into a situation that is "beyond their control." It is beyond their control not in the sense of their inability to direct the practicalconsequences of their actions, but on the deeper level of not controllingthe assumptionsthat lie at the basis of these activities. Along these lines one implicationof my discussioninvolves realizing how facile may the army's futuremoves be into "new" and as of yet for manyIsraelisunthinkableactivities. If the IDF has so readilyadaptedto police workagainstArabs, will we be witness to a relativelyeasy adaptationto "work" (avoda) againstIsraelicitizens-Arabs and Jews-first beyond the green line and then (within appropriatecontexts) within it as well? References Cited Aran, Gideon 1974 Parachuting.AmericanJournalof Sociology 80(1):124-152. Aronson, Eliot 1988 The Social Animal. New York:Freeman. Arzic, Amran 1988 A Cloud of Smoke. Hedim (Echoes) 22(132):9. (Hebrew) Bar-On,Dan 1988 Interviewwith a Psychologist. Hedim 22(132):44-49. Bateson, Gregory 1972 Steps to the Ecology of Mind. San Francisco:Chandler. Bishra, Azmy 1989 The Uprising's Impact on Israel: A PreliminaryAssessment. Middle East Report. (forthcoming) Cohen, Stanley 1988 Criminologyand the Uprising. Tikkun3(5):60-62, 94-95. Czikszentmihalyi,Mihaly 1975 Beyond Boredomand Anxiety. San Francisco:Jossey-Bass. Dolgin, JanetL., David S. Kemnitzer,and David M. Schneider,eds. 1977 As People ExpressTheir Lives, So They Are. ... In Symbolic Anthropology. Pp. 3-44. New York:ColumbiaUniversityPress. Feige, Michael n.d. The CardGame and the Army: A Story a Reserve Unit Tells Itself. Jerusalem: Departmentof Sociology and Social Anthropology.UnpublishedMS.

388 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY Feld, MauryF. 1977 The Structureof Violence: Armed Forces as Social Systems. Beverly Hills: Sage. Fine, GaryA. 1988 Good Childrenand Dirty Play. Play and Culture1:43-56. Gal, Reuven 1986 A Portraitof the Israeli Soldier. New York:GreenwoodPress. Handelman,Don 1977 Play andRitual:ComplementaryFramesof Metacommunication.In It's a Funny Thing Humour.N. J. Chapmanand H. Foot, eds. Pp. 185-192. London:Pergamon. Hasdai, Yaakov 1982 'Doers' and 'Thinkers'in the IDF. The JerusalemQuarterly24:13-25. Herbert,Zvika 1984 Poems. HakibbutzHameuhad:Siman Keri'a. (Hebrew) Honigmann,JohnJ. 1977 The MaskedFace. Ethos 5:263-280. Horowitz,Dan, and BaruchKimmerling 1974 Some Social Implicationsof MilitaryService and the Reserve System in Israel. EuropeanJournalof Sociology 15:262-276. Katriel,Tamar 1986 Talking Straight:"Dugri" Speech in Israeli Sabra Culture. Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress. Kellett, Anthony 1982 CombatMotivation:The Behaviorof Soldiers in Battle. Boston: Kluwer. Lang, Kurt 1972 MilitaryInstructionsand the Sociology of War. Beverly Hills: Sage. Lieblich, Amia 1983 Between Strengthand Toughness. In Stress in Israel. S. Breznitz, ed. Pp. 3964. New York:Van Nostrand. 1987 The Springof Their Years. Tel-Aviv: Schocken. Lieblich, Amia, and Meir Perlow 1988 Transition to Adulthood During Military Service. The Jerusalem Quarterly 47:40-76. Lifton, RobertJ. 1973 Home from the War: Vietnam Veterans-Neither Victims nor Executioners. New York:Touchstone. Morgan,Gareth 1986 Images of Organization.Beverly Hills: Sage. Moskos, CharlesC., Jr. 1975 The AmericanCombat Soldier in Vietnam. Journalof Social Issues 31(4):2538. Reiss, AlbertJ., Jr. 1971 The Police and the Public. New Haven:Yale UniversityPress. Richardson,F. M. 1978 FightingSpirit:A Study of PsychologicalFactorsin War. London:Leo Cooper. Sternfeld,Zbigniew 1988 IntifadaDiary. Iton 77(106-107):93-95. (Hebrew) Sutton-Smith,Brian, and Diana Kelly-Byrne 1984 The Masks of Play. In The Masks of Play. BrianSutton-Smithand Diana KellyByrne, eds. Pp. 184-199. New York:LeisurePress.


Sykes, GreshamM., and David Matza 1957 Techniquesof Neutralization:A Theoryof Delinquency. AmericanSociological Review 22:664-670. Walter,Eugene V. 1969 Terrorand Resistance:A Study of Political Violence. New York: Oxford University Press. Zucker,Dedi, et al. 1983 Researchon HumanRights in the TerritoriesHeld by the IDF. Jerusalem:InternationalCenterfor Peace in the Middle East.

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NGUNAVOICESis unique in several respects: it is the II first monographto be writtenconcerning this particular I Pacific culture;it includes 33 oral texts in their original IIII language as well as in Englishtranslation;it contains an I exhaustive glossary of the foreignvocabulary;and itpro- I vides methodologyand problemsinvolvedintextualtran- I scription,translationand presentation. These features I make it of considerable value to Oceanic specialists as III well as to general linguists, folkloristsand enthnogra- II I phers. II Publishedby I The University of Calgary Press I -2500 University Drive N.W. I T2N 1N4 I Calgary, Alberta; 11111111111111111111111((1 (1111111111111111111lllrl11llrl1ll1lllrl l1ll1l(llrilmIllrllrl