Migration Letters - special issue - CiteSeerX

migration letters Volume 2 Number 3 December 2005

an international journal of migration studies

Recognition of Islam In European Municipalities Edited by

Altay A. MANÇO & Spyros AMORANITIS

special issue

In collaboration with IRFAM Liege, Belgium

Migration Letters seeks to advance knowledge of human migrations by providing a forum for discussion of research and policies. CO-EDITORS: Ibrahim SIRKECI , European Business School London, UK (Managing Editor) Jeffrey H. COHEN, Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA Elli HEIKKILA, Institute of Migration, Turku, Finland ADVISORY BOARD: Aderanti A DEPOJU, University of Lagos, Nigeria; Thomas FAIST, University of Toronto, Canada; Daniel KUBAT, University of Waterloo, Canada; Jan RATH, Institute of Migration and Ethnic Studies, Netherlands; Levent SOYSAL, Kadir Has University, Turkey; Paul E.WHITE, University of Sheffield, UK EDITORIAL BOARD: Muhammad Ali A L-RAMADHAN , Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research, Kuwait; Anna Maria BIRINDELLI , University of Milano, Italy; Christina BOSWELL, Hamburg Institute of International Economics, Germany; Jørgen CARLING , International Peace Research Institute Oslo, Norway; Yoshimi CHITOSE, National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, Japan; Lisa CLIGGETT, University of Kentucky, USA; Sara CURRAN, Princeton University, USA; Maria Carmen FAUS-P UJOL, University of Zaragoza, Spain; Eduardo de Sousa FERREIRA, Universidade Tecnica de Lisboa, Po rtugal; Joao Batista FERREIRA-PINTO , Border Planning and Evaluation Group, USA; Deianira GANGA, Brunel University, UK; Ayse GEDIK , Middle East Technical University, Turkey; Hermanus S. GEYER, Potchefstroomse University, South Africa; Breda GRAY, University of Lime rick, Ireland; Runlong HUANG , Nanjing Normal University, China; Robyn IREDALE, University of Wollongong, Australia; Charalambos KASIMIS , Agricultural University of Athens, Greece; Nabil KHATTAB, University of Bristol, UK; Rafael Reyes MORALES , ITO, Oaxaca, Mexico; Altay A. MANÇO , University of Liege, Belgium; Apostolos PAPADOPOULOS , University of Ioannina, Greece; Karen PHALET, University of Utrecht, Netherlands; Nicholas P ROCTER, University of South Australia, Australia; John C.H. STILLWELL, University of Leeds, UK; Aileen STOCKDALE, University of Aberdeen, UK; Stephane DE T APIA, CNRS and CeRATO, France; Turgay ÜNALAN, Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies, Turkey; Robert M.V ANDERBECK, University of Leeds, UK; Östen WAHLBECK , Åbo Akademi University, Finland; Philippe WANNER, Swiss Forum for Migration and Population Studies, Switzerland Signed articles are the responsibility of the authors. Views presented in Migration Letters do not necessarily reflect the views of the publisher or editors. For information, subscription or submissions please log on to our http://www.migrationletters.com or send an email to [email protected].

website

at

© Ibrahim Sirkeci, Migration Letters, 2003 ISSN: 1741-8984 (print), 1741-8992 (online). All rights reserved. With the exception of fair dealing for the purposes of research or private study, or criticism or review, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored, transmitted or sold in any form or by any means without the prior permission in writing from the copyright holder. Subscribed institutions may make photocopies of this publication for free for teaching purposes provided such copies are not sold. Migration Letters is published biannually in April and October.

Recognition of Islam in European Municipalities Actions against Religious Discrimination Special Issue edited by Altay A. MANÇO & Spyros AMORANITIS

Migration Letters London, United Kingdom 2005

Special Issue Editors: Dr. Altay A. Manço Scientific Director of the Institute for Research, Training and Action on Migrations (IRFAM). Email: [email protected] Spyros Amoranitis Managing director of the Institute for Research, Training and Action on Migrations (IRFAM). Email: [email protected]

All manuscripts were translated from French by Marie-Anne Lutchmaya

Acknowledgment: This research was carried out within the framework of research action “Faiths and Social cohesion» by the Institute of Research, Training and Action on Migrations (IRFAM) and supported by the Programme against discrimination and in favour of social rights, launched by the European Commission – DirectorateGeneral “Employment and Social Affairs”. These papers are also available in French through: http://www.harmattan.fr/index.asp?navig=catalogue&obj=livre& no=19788

MIGRATION LETTERS An international journal of migration studies

VOLUME 2 NUMBER 3 December 2005

SPECIAL ISSUE: Recognition of Islam in European Municipalities – Actions against Religious Discrimination Contents Introduction and methodologic al framework: “Faiths and Social cohesion”. Construction of social participation within religious differences: local Muslim communities in Europe. A. MANÇO and S. AMORANITIS Good cities, good practices: systematization of a theoretical and methodological framework for local actions to fight against religious discrimination. A. MANÇO Local actions: Out of the cellar and into the landscape park… Challenges around the relocalization of a mosque in Roubaix. O. MARONGIU Respect, equal treatment and community power: working with Muslims in Granada. E. R. LOZANO Religious discrimination and public policies: “Muslim burial plots” in Ghent. M. KANMAZ and S. ZEMNI Arrival and institutionalization of Islam at the municipal level: the case of the Turkish community in Schaerbeek. U. MANÇO

182

189

214

239

265

280

Cheratte-Visé: a Muslim village in Wallonia. CH. PARTHOENS, D. SENSI and A. MANÇO

308

Muslims and their social participation in Rome. G. CANDIA

345

General evaluation and cross analyses: Evaluation of the project “Faiths and Social cohesion”: lessons to be learned in the fight against discrimination. D. SENSI Ostracism, tolerance or recognition: Muslims in Europe. D. HELLY and J. CESARI “Faiths and Social cohesion”: political recommendations and “good practices”. A. MANÇO, S. AMORANITIS, D. SENSI, U. MANÇO and G. LOGEZ About IRFAM

366

383

408

421

Recognition of Islam in European Municipalities

EDITORIAL “Faiths and Social cohesion” Establishing social participation with religious differences: local Muslim communities in Europe Altay Manço and Spyros Amoranitis1

Abstract The action entitled “Faiths and Social Cohesion” the results of which are presented in this volume is supported by the European Commission - Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs - within the framework of the European Programme against discrimination and in favour of fundamental social rights and the civil society (Art 13 of the treaty of the Union). This is an action for identification, validation and transnational exchanges “good practices” and information against discrimination coordinated by the Institute for Research, Training and Action on Migrations (IRFAM). This action is carried out at the transnational level with six sets of partners hailing from various countries Keywords: Recognition of Islam, European Union, local government, religious discrimination, social cohesion The action entitled “Faiths and Social cohesion” the results of which are presented in this volume is supported by the European Commission – Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs – Altay Manço is Associate Professor at the University of Liege, and Scientific Director of the Institute of Research, Training and Action about Migrations (IRFAM). Email: [email protected]. Spyros Amoranitis is managing director of the Institute of Research, Training and Action about Migrations (IRFAM). Email: [email protected]. Migration Letters, Volume: 2, No: 3, pp. 182 – 188. December 2005 (ISSN: print: 1741-8984 & online: 1741-8992) 1

ALTAY MANÇO AND SPYROS AMORANITIS

within the framework of the European Programme against discrimination and in favour of fundamental social rights and the civil society (Art 13 of the treaty of the Union). This is an action for identification, validation and transnational exchanges “good practices” and in formation against discrimination coordinated by the Institute for Research, Training and Action on Migrations (IRFAM). This action is carried out at the transnational level with six sets of partners hailing from various countries: - In Spain: the Association of Intercultural Mediators in Spain (ASMINE) and the University of Granada in collaboration with the Municipality of Granada. - In France: the association “D’un Monde à l’Autre” (DUMALA) in Tourcoing and the city of Roubaix, local associations as well as the “Groupe de Sociology des Religions et de la Laïcité” (GSRL) in Paris and the “Groupe d’Analyse des Politiques Publiques” (GAPP) in Cachan, these two groups are integrated into the National Scientific Research Centre (CNRS). - In Italy: “l’Association de Recherches et d’Interventions” (PARSEC) in collaboration with the city of Rome and local groups. - In Belgium: “les Facultés Universitaires Saint-Louis” in Brussels, the University of Ghent, the Executive of the Muslims in Belgium (EMB) and the city of Visé, as well as various local associations. - In Great Britain: Oxford University. - Finally, outside of Europe, “l’Institut National de Recherche Scientifique” (INRS) in Montreal, Quebec, and the “Middle-East Studies Center” at Harvard University, Ca mbridge, Massachusetts. The global objective of this action is to highlight “good practices” in local governance that seek to manage religious diversity and thus, to better fight against religious and cultural discrimination to which the Muslim communities in Europe are exposed: - Identification and the development of skills of associative actors, religious communities and communal institutions with regard to Community mediation, intercultural negotiation, social coordination, information, education and awareness building concerning religious and philosophical diversity; identification and support for agents of change and dissemination of the results.

183

FAITHS AND SOCIAL COHESION

- The concrete support for Muslims in Europe and the positive inscription of their religious and educational practices within their municipalities. - The copying of these practices using comparisons taken from national cases with the objective of transferring them to other contexts. - Publication and dissemination of the results of the experiments in the fight against religious discrimination. The action entitled “Faiths and Social cohesion” thus opts for a strategy of investment and close follow-up of local actors in municipalities in order to gain fuller comprehension and co-operation. The experiments developed in European cities envisage the production of new, transnational know-how which has become necessary because of the effects of globalisation on our behaviour. Action and observation at the local level make it possible to attain an in-depth level of knowledge and comprehension of those realities that are connected to discrimination against Muslims and Islam in small towns in Europe. In this way it is also possible to achieve practical knowledge on the most effective methods of intervention in order to overcome these blockages. Designed as a research-action, the concrete intervention of partner teams in municipalities and people under their jurisdictions contribute to identify and validate relevant practices in intercultural mediation, information, awareness building, consultation and collaboration at the intercommunity level in the fight against religious and other types of discrimination to which Muslims are exposed in Europe: - Thus, the Spanish team, for example, opted for sociocultural mediation in order to create bonds between the Muslim communities themselves, and also between them, the leaders and nonMuslim inhabitants, as a way to overcome the difficulties of comprehension and suspicion with regard to the Muslims of Granada. It was also a question of following up on the starting up of the activities of a new mosque. - In Italy, it was through an increase of exchanges, where on the one hand, the idea was to bring the Muslim inhabitants closer to the others, and, on the other, to see that the representatives of the Muslim communities came closer to the socio educational and medical services available in the city of Rome. Thus it was a ques-

184


tion of creating an atmosphere of mutual comprehension which is a guarantee in the fight against discrimination and stereotypes. - In Roubaix, France, a systematic follow up was introduced and the role of “professional counsel” was achieved both with regard to the Municipality and the Muslim community with the idea of establishing a cultural complex for the Muslim population there, while respecting the laws of the Republic and the needs and specific expectations of the Muslim citizens. - In Belgium, three sites have benefited from this type of work. In Ghent, a university structure working for the Muslim community has already been set up. It is a question of encouraging the local councillors to accept a certain number of changes in the dossier concerning burial rites. In Visé, (Liege), informal advice has been offered to the Muslim group in its relations with the local and supra-local authorities, as well as with other groups that exist within the territory. The reason for this mobilization is because of the historic nature of the establishment of the Turkish community in this locality. In Brussels, work was done on awareness building and setting up of a successful practice. It concerned the erection of a minaret for a mosque in Schaerbeek. This episode is presented in the form of an article, and could be used by other people who might find themselves in a similar situation. - In Great Britain, work on regulations and popularisation through the media was possible using the results of statistical studies undertaken by Professor Ceri Peach from the department of social Geography at Oxford University. Having observed the behaviour of the town planning administrations in various cities over a historical period of several decades with regard to the applications made for setting up mosques, the C. Peach team discovered very great distortions in the way in which members of various religions were treated. Awareness with regard to and information on a particular type of injustice is the first step towards its elimination. When one examines the number of existing mosques in this country, one notes that this figure has progressed from only 7, in 1961, to 614, in 2001. If there seems to be certain saturation in these numbers compared to the size of the Muslim population at the moment, it must also be noted that the creation of great numbers of mosques in the past has been the cause of problems related to the system of urban development. The British project is dealing with this problem on the basis of a local case in Birmingham: it was a question of verifying the town planning dossiers to find out 185


whether the problems encountered by the Muslims wishing to set up mosques over the past 40 last years, were of a more serious nature than those of other members of other faiths. Indeed, it is noted that there are a higher number of administrative refusals for the creation of mosques than for places of worship for Sikhs, Hindus or Christians. However, the refusals were also made on the basis of the whole of nature of the end use of the projects: thus, the urban authorities in the city of Birmingham were, in the past, very opposed to the idea of transforming residential houses into mosques. On the other hand, they were very flexible when it came to the conversion of old churches, cinemas, libraries or swimming pools into places of prayer, even monumental ones, in so far as the local architectural styles were respected. Taking in to account the specific nature of daily prayers, Muslims are very much in favour of transforming houses into small places of worship near their dwelling places: in fact, the majority of the applications received from these people were for this type of project. Although the rules are applied to all in an identical manner, the need for Muslims to have a place of worship close to their dwellings has not been understood by the competent authorities, and the data that has been analysed thus far, points up to the fact that the members of this religion are victims of what one might term indirect discrimination. - In Canada, Montreal, work is finally being done to mobilise persons in charge of Muslim associations and bring them together on a platform for hearing citizens’ complaints and in this way, the wishes of this group are relayed to the political decision makers. For Professor Denise Helly of the INRS who is leading this project, it is a question of basing this work around a common denominator to overcome internal splits. However, the Canadian and British cases will unfortunately not be treated in more detail in the body of this work. Our operational objective is thus to compare these practices and their contexts, and this is done thanks to the contribution of experts and specialists in immigration in charge of cross analyses and the production of political and concrete recommendations. Indeed, the diversified methods available to fight against discrimination produce different results according to the socio-political context and according to the precise objective being studied. It will thus be a question for us to produce an experiment and knowledge that is

186


validated on the means used to combat discrimination in different contexts. This book is a sequel to and seeks to complete a first publication from the network “Faiths and Social cohesion” directed by Professor Ural Manço of the University of Saint-Louis in Brussels. This first book entitled “Recognition and discrimination: presence of Islam in Western Europe and North America”, published in 2004 in the same collection, shows that despite the existence of legislation that respects human rights, nowhere do Muslims enjoy freedom of worship without hindrances, when compared to the faithful in other religions. This is the point of departure and the observation made in this initial document which presents a progress report on the Muslim presence in the West: approximately thirteen million Muslims in Western Europe and nearly six million in North America participate in the life of our democratic societies. The Muslim presence mainly results from international migrations, but with the acceleration of naturalisation, the appearance of natives who have been converted and the advent of generations born in the West, it is no longer just due to migration. These people, who are believers and practise their religion, claim the right to live their religion in peace, dignity and legality. The Muslim identities and the Islamic practices of the future in Europe and America will undoubtedly be determined by the progress that will be achieved with regard to the question of general recognition of this faith. This in turn will determine the contour of local observations which will be examined in this volume. The network “Faiths and Social cohesion” which functioned from 2001 to 2004, is also a series of six transnational meetings and three international conferences held in Rome, Granada and the final one organized in Liege on 21 September 2004 on the topic of the “local Governance and religious diversity: the case of the Muslim faith in Europe and in Canada”. This final meeting brought together all the partners and about 120 participants among whom there were social actors, political decision makers, administrative staff, those in charge of religious communities and students hailing from various countries. This work constitutes the revised acts and their modifications. Several other productions in the form of books, booklets, press clippings or even on-line texts relating to local actions that have been carried out provide additional information on the project.

187


Lastly, the project “Faiths and Social cohesion” also proposes innovative ideas as regards products for dissemination: a documentary CD-ROM which sets out the stages in the realization of certain actions undertaken in the framework of this initiative. The realization of this document which has been entrusted to the journalist Mehmet Koksal aims to provide an outline of three years of research and actions carried out by a transnational and multidisciplinary team of researchers and social workers. The CD-ROM proposes to show the different stages of the international meetings, the realization of work on the problems, extracts of an international conference, filmed interviews of persons who gave personal accounts, and also the possibility of contacting specialists or consulting their Web sites. The results of the observations and actions seeking to fight against religious discrimination are thus presented in the form of summaries and diagrams. The subject matter is also illustrated with photographs.

188


Good cities, good practices: systematization of a theoretical and methodological framework for local actions designed to combat religious discrimination Altay Manço

2

Abstract The Muslim population of Western Europe composed of at least 13 million individuals, brings together primarily people resulting from working class immigrants from the second half of the twentieth century. Its roots are found deep in the Turkish countryside, in the Balkans and, of course, in the old colonies: the countries of the Maghreb, the Indo-Pakistani sub-continent, the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia. There exists moreover, relatively low but growing numbers, of converts of European extraction. This paper presents the theoritical and methodological approach of whole of the project "Faiths and Social cohesion". Keywords: Islam, Europe, religious discrimination, Muslims. The Muslim population of Western Europe composed of at least 13 million individuals, brings together primarily people resulting from working class immigrants from the second half of the twentieth century. Its roots are found deep in the Turkish countryside, in the Balkans and, of course, in the old colonies: the countries of the Maghreb, the Indo-Pakistani sub-continent, the Middle East, subSaharan Africa and Southeast Asia. There exists moreover, relatively low but growing numbers, of converts of European extraction. From the point of view of its geographical distribution, this population is highly concentrated in industrial areas, like in the North of France and the North of England, the Ruhr, Catalonia, in the region of Rotterdam. A sizeable number of Muslims are also found in the capital cities such as Berlin, London, Paris and Rome; the same situation prevails in Brussels, the capital of Europe, and I acknowledge contributions of Ural Manço to this paper. Migration Letters, Volume: 2, No: 3, pp. 189 – 213. December 2005 (ISSN: print: 1741-8984 & online: 1741-8992) 2

GOOD CITIES, GOOD PRACTICES

this population represents 17 % of Muslims (Manço U., 2000). Let us point out that about half of the Muslims in Europe live in France. This population shows a constant demographic growth because of the continuous arrival of new immigrants (because of family regrouping) and a high rate of fertility as compared to other populations. Consequently, the European Muslims constitute the youngest demographic element and also the most dynamic in the mosaic that represents the populations on the continent. The massive arrival of the Muslim population between the end of 1960’s and the beginning of the 1970’s coincided with the end of the period of economic growth, where full employment was the norm, and the beginning of an unstable period where socioprofessional insecurity gained ground (Manço U., 2001). If at the present point in time the socio-economic and political integration of this population, and the acceptance of its various cultural and religious heritages are problematic, one of the determining factors of this situation could be found in the societal changes that occurred in Europe and its consequences were the loss of legitimacy of the presence of non native, unqualified immigrant workers and their descendants who had become too numerous in a postindustrial society. A considerable number of Europeans, who, by birth or ancestry, find their origins in a Muslim country, belong to the most underprivileged social categories in our countries and are in a socio-economic situation of marginality. They have a high failure rate or are school drop outs, as well as having low professional qualifications. They face discrimination at the time of recruitment, and have very often to take up precarious and lowly employment. The high rate of unemployment in this group points the difficulties encountered by the people of Muslim culture on the European labour markets. As Muslims, these immigrants and their children do not enjoy rights similar to those granted to the members of the other faiths traditionally present in Europe nor those rights officially recognized by the various Member States of the EU. At the specifically religious level, the process of institutional recognition of the Is lamic faith in Europe proves very different from one country to another. In any case, it is generally speaking, far from being completed (Manço U., 2004). For several years, Islam seems to have become the target of the debates on immigration in Europe in particular because of the fact that European identity, despite its national variations and a long history of secularization, remains anchored in the Christian tradition. Let us examine, for example, the 190

ALTAY MANÇO

way in which the school calendar is organised, the festivals and important holidays, the family rituals, toponymy, the organization by the Christian denominational authorities of school services, hospital services, social aid, at the monarchical institutions which concern many countries. The sensational declarations of such or such political tenor about the “Old continent” remind us besides, from time to time of this consubstantial Christianity (Zolberg and Woon, 1998). The significant number of Muslims present in Europe, the geographical proximity of the geopolitical centre of gravity of the Muslim world and the complicated and certainly passionate history of the Muslim world and Christian Europe undoubtedly explain this difficulty of representing a European Islam, especially since the end of the Soviet Empire and the new dualisation of the World that one proposes to us as an analytical category: “The West versus Islam” (Helly, 2002; Zemni, 2004). “Islam feeds and maintains the phantasm of a kind of malignant tumour that threatens European unity and integrity from the inside…” (Zolberg and Woon, 1998, 39).

1. Discrimination against the Islamic faith: how to combat it? Islam has been present in the contemporary West for a long time (more than a century in the case of France), It however has become a “political question” only since the 1980’s. The cultural identity of the Muslim newcomers raised very little interest during the period 1960-70, since they were especially regarded as temp orary immigrants, destined to play an additional role as temporary labourers with low qualifications. Living a solitary existence in a predominantly male world, some of these immigrants initially put the practice of faith “on the back burner”. For those who were among the first to arrive, the stay in European was to be temp orary. Religious practices, when they were carried out, were private, individual or done in small groups. Everywhere in Europe at that time, the Islamic faith was practised discreetly almost stealthily. Islam started to be talked about in second half of the 1970’s after the stopping of organized immigration of workers when the ending of these policies encouraged the regrouping of families. Many Muslim families were reconstituted in the space of a few years and their arrival in the host countries took on a definitive, final turn by the spurring on of the Muslim population to have progress rapidly at the demographic level. At that time, these workmen who appeared indifferent to religion rapidly assumed 191


their (new) responsibilities as heads of family. They developed a kind of attitude that could be qualified as“piousness of the father of the family”, and became concerned with their spiritual wellbeing, the transmission of their culture and the Islamic faith to their children (Zolberg and Woon, 1998; Manço U., 2000; Manço A., 2001). Thus the prescriptions and the practices of Islam made their appearance not only in households, but also in public areas, thus giving rise to problems of cohabitation, which seemed difficult to overcome for the majority of the natives. In those sectors of public life which touch at the heart of cultural identity, like education, health and social services, negotiation related to the integration of foreign groups who even appeared strange, can be a painful experience. Indeed, a great number of controversies exploded in all the host countries starting from the end of the 1970’s particularly concerning the way in which parents could transmit their Islamic heritage to their children (Manço A., 1992, 1993, 2001). One regularly witnessed bitter struggles that could lead to hurtful or humiliating situations for the Muslims, both men and women, concerning questions such as physical education and swimming, sex education, biology courses and religious teaching; school trips, food served in school canteens, the wearing of the head scarf, mixed marriages or marriages known as arranged, etc Insofar as the Muslim immigrants did not always encounter school establishments favourable to their religious or cultural traditions, without referring to all those which are openly hostile towards them, it is not surprising that some of them today would like to have schools, youth centres and student residences which are reserved for them. Among other areas in which the Muslims could face “religious stress”, it is possible to evoke the following: the problems involved in the slaughter of animals, the access to halal food, the indifference or the hostility of employers and public authorities concerning the need for the practice of one’s faith in the workplace, the difficulties related to the inadequacy of Islamic holidays and feast days, etc. Community services like slaughter-houses or cemeteries not being adapted to the needs of Muslim communities adds to the feeling of discrimination of a population that is maltreated during highly sensitive moments, for example, when there is a death or during the festival of sacrifice (Aldeeb, 2002; Dasetto et al, 2001). The Muslims in Europe benefit only very little from the available public facilities to practise their religion. The countries where Islam is recognized by the State, the financing of the various aspects of 192

ALTAY MANÇO

this religious practice or its teaching suffer from manifest inequalities compared with the financing which other faiths receive - this is the case, for example, in Belgium (Husson, 2000). Thus a multitude of arbitrary attitudes and discriminatory situations exist which hinder the full expression of freedom of conscience and worship for Muslims in Europe, whereas these freedoms have been granted constitutionally and legally in all European countries. These obstacles probably originate from unsound legitimacy, negative roles and minimal visibility that the native authorities and public opinion sometimes want to grant to cultural demonstrations and those pertaining to an expression of faith by the Muslim population (Affes et al, 1999; Dassetto et al, 2001; David et al, 2001; DUMALA, 2000). The Muslims are numerous in thinking that legislation, rules and administrative practices in their country of adoption are not equitably applied to their own community, and that there is an important phenomenon of ignorance or lack of sensitivity concerning the problems of the Muslim minorities in general. They tend to suspect the existence of a policy of discrimination against Islam (Gatugu, Manço and Amoranitis, 2004). The responsibility for these different types of discrimination from which the Muslim population suffers in the exercise of its freedom of worship and conscience is undoubtedly divided by, on the one hand the opinions and the authorities in the European countries, and on the other, those who profess to be the representatives of the Muslims themselves. Admittedly, the authorities are, in the majority of the cases incapable of imagining solutions which would directly involve the Muslim population and its representative associations, and the Muslims of Europe do not as yet have the organisational capacity to transcend the national, ethnic, linguistic, sociological, political, theological and philosophical differences. This great diversity generates ceaseless internal friction. In addition, the quality of the procedures that allow the requirements of the Muslim faith to be taken into account is extremely variable in Europe. On the whole, certain progress has been noted over these past years, for example in the United Kingdom (Peach, 2004), where the authorities have been granting licences for the slaughter of animals in the religious context, and for Muslim cemeteries and Islamic schools. The British case is similar to what has been observed in this area in North America and particularly in Canada (Isin and Siemiatycki, 2000; Germain, 2000; Cesari, 2004; Helly, 2004). As for Belgium, it is a pioneer as regards official recognition of Islam (since 1974), but very many practical and procedural prob193


lems remain to be solved (Manço and Kanmaz, 2004). The question is even more delicate in a country like France, which traditionally does not recognize the public expression of religious worship (Boyer, 1998; Leveau et al, 2001; Cesari, 2004). Despite notable differences in the general principles which govern the relations between the Church and the State, the general observation goes along with the idea that the institutions of Islam are not at all on an equal footing with those of the majority of traditional religions. The principle of recognition such as it is practised in Germany, in Belgium, in Spain or in Italy for example, means that only those religions that satisfy certain bureaucratic criteria will have access to State infrastructures and funding. However, the Islamic authorities in these countries are often far from being able to respond to the criteria in question. The diversity of the Muslim “umma” and specificities of this religion, which has no Church or clergy for the great Sunnite majority, are such that negotiations progress very slowly. One of the basic observations in the research project, (and the book that you are now reading constitutes one of these reports), is that European Muslims are constantly being marginalised, and even suffer cultural or identity stigmatization. Their ways of life, presumably different from European practices, are often misunderstood, seen as worthless and are even rejected. It seems that for many Europeans, it is difficult to look upon the people of the Maghreb and those of Turkish or Pakistani origin, to consider their ritual or cultural activities without anxiety, regardless of their particular relationship with Islam or their degree of piety and religious practice, whatever the precise conception of the world and the morals of these Muslims might be (Manço U., 2004; Zemni, 2004). The situation described here is amplified by what takes place at the international geopolitical level. Events like the Iranian revolution, the Israeli-Arab wars and successive Intifadahs, the Gulf wars, the war in Afghanistan, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and March 11 2004 produce tangible effects on the way in which the Muslim populations are received. International news (and the way it is treated by the Western media), together with the presence of movements or radical Islamist actors negatively influence the perception of the Muslim populations and has a negative bearing on the place they occupy in the country in which they are established (EUMC, 2001; Helly, 2002). This situation produces harmful effects on the possibility of relations between individual Muslims and Europeans, and also between the authorities and the representatives of this minority. A kind of “islamophobia” (Manço 194

ALTAY MANÇO

U., 2000, 2004) indeed creates obstacles everywhere in Europe in the context of dialogue between citizens of different origins, public authorities (in particular local or municipal) and the Muslim communities, as well as between European civil society and the organizations set up by Muslims. Turning a blind eye to this problem which arises from a lack of dialogue is filled with grave danger for our democratic regimes. Certain members of the Muslim communities who feel that they are victims of annoyances and frustrations, can commit or contribute to the perpretation of foolish and violent acts against the institutions and the population in the host country. Without a learning process in place to bring the parties together at the intercommunity level, the risk is that the marginalized Muslim population becomes the target of racist violence, as in the case of the recent events in the Netherlands which unfortunately provided us with an example of this after the assassination in 2004 of the anarchist film producer and writer T. Van Gogh by a radical Islamist militant. The fight against the exclusion of and discrimination against the Muslim population is more than ever presented as a challenge to our institutions to open up and adapt to globalisation, populations flows and the most diverse thoughts which penetrate into the European region. The advent of a Muslim population in the process of “autochtonisation” indeed calls for a wide reaching and new thought process on the relations that exist between the faiths and the authorities, on the role of the secular State as regards religion, on the nature and the respect of the rights of minorities in a modern society, and on the articulation of the local and national levels within this debate. Two types of social actions make it possible to fight against sociocultural discrimination against the Muslim communities in Europe by supporting the latter in their effort to achieve democratically negotiated negotiation of their spiritual life in the European public area: a total and extensive level, and a local and intensive one. The first one has already been created or relayed by various official or semi-official national institutions in the fight against racism, by various important associations, by pressure groups, as well as by international organizations (the Council of Europe, 1999; Manço U., 2000; Aldeeb, 2001). In order to intensify the fight against racism in general and islamophobia in particular, some propose, for example, the introduction of history courses into seco ndary school education curricula dealing with international migrations and comparative history on civilizations and religions. These courses 195


would raise awareness of all students on the question of the unceasing ethnic and cultural intermixing of the populations of Europe, and on the diversity and the historic quality of religious facts, which would make it possible to draw a distinction between cultural facts and those pertaining to religious faiths. Moreover, by reminding people of the contribution made by Muslims to the advancement of knowledge, by describing their role in the preparation of the Renaissance, it could draw the attention of young people and their teachers to the peaceful and beneficial exchanges between civilizations. A programme of awareness building could also be drawn up for professionals in the media and executive staff in public administrations, as well as the personnel at the European political, national, regional and municipal levels. Another proposal which has recently started to make waves in political circles is the teaching of Islamic theology adapted to the European context in order to train the teachers of the Islamic religion, the Imams, the Islamic moral counsellors and the executive staff in religious associations who have to serve European Muslims. The same applies to the granting of an administrative status to professional teachers of religion, like Imams, moral counsellors, professors of religion (in the countries where courses on religion are exempted from official teaching programme), as well as the production of pedgogical material and/or very open support adapted to the need for knowledge on Islam meant for children and adult Muslims (or non Muslims) in a democratic, multicultural and multi -religious society. At the political level, these proposals must be linked to a much older objective but one which has still not been achieved throughout Europe: the granting of a legal personality to the representative establishments in charge of managing and maintaining the goods and property assigned to the exercise of the Islamic faith, their financing by the authorities and/or their exemption from various taxes so as to put them on an equal footing with the institutions of other faiths confessions that are recognized and/or present on the territory. However, setting up such necessary institutions, instruments or policies to help Muslims in Europe will not in itself help to wipe out the incomprehension, the condescension or the rejection towards Muslims by the political community and European public opinion, nor will it help to eradicate the discriminatory or islamophobic behaviour to which the Muslims are subjected whether they practise their faith or not. Increased animosity with regard to the financial means and cultural rights that Muslims have received that some are likely to find unjustified, is perhaps to be feared. In 196

ALTAY MANÇO

addition, if the construction of Islam in the form of a religious reality which is publicly recognized in European societies - where, in general, the religious expressions are thought to be residual and limited to places of worship or to private areas – is problematic (Zolberg and Woon, 1998), it should indeed be wondered how and with which support processes, could the Muslims who come from countries where religion is dominant both socially and politically, transform their religious experiences and thus constitute a secularized and negotiated “Islam-religion” (Cesari, 1998). Usually, this question is posed at the national level when it is a question of observing the process of the institutionalization of Islam. The national level has all its relevance of course, but it does not suffice to understand the range of transformations because it is at the local level that practices are expressed, as are adaptations and claims of this minority in all their variety and concreteness, and with all their contradictions. The road that leads to the acceptance of Muslims and their faith within European societies necessarily requires socio-pedagogical work to be done at the grassroots level - it must be intensive in nature and of long duration, undertaken in collaboration with social, political and religious actors at the local level who are invited to meet each other in public areas in towns and in European communes. In fact, what are the local obstacles that stand in the way of full application of Muslims’ rights to freedom of worship and conscience? How can Islam be constructed as a minority faith starting from the multiple Islamic identity forms, be they religious identities or not, that are seen emerging in various local contexts? Under which leadership could this intercultural negotiation be carried out it? What are the principal claims and arguments that are encountered at the level of European municipalities? With what type of strategies, mobilizations and support systems? Finally, towards which negotiated solutions can we move? With what degree of effectiveness and satisfaction? The objective of observant participation for the integration of Muslim diversity, which is the basis of this work, is to establish throughout Europe a typology of local problems together with their solutions in order to define and to contribute to the dissemination of effective action systems leading to the local recognition of the Muslim minority. This would mean that there would be, in parallel, a reduction in tensions, responses adapted to the objective needs and democratization of local public decisions. The work of observation and local intervention necessitates the emergence of mutual confidence and practices based on partnership which the 197


researcher-workers would develop among the various communities and the political leaders. This intervention strategy, which is an essential complement of the work of the political decision makers, constitutes an original line of action. The current analysis of municipal public policies requires the integration of the finalities and modalities of local interventions operated by the social researcher-workers. It is true that henceforth, it is not just simple and durable rules that are sought after, but also objectives for local democracy, namely coordination between private and public actors or, better still, the direct and constructive participation of private actors in public management. The need for increased information from the decision makers and the involvement of civil society in public decisions is thus imperative (Helly, 2000). What is now being said on new political ethics stresses the need to recreate bonds between citizens so that a sense of harmonious livingtogether materialises, which is much stronger than the diversities that are perceived, and by encouraging and involving each one in the management of collective work, in particular local work. Then there would follow the attempt to achieve broader delegation to manage social problems and cultural tensions in the associative sector, an extension in consultation of civil society organisations and the adoption of programmes seeking the participation of residents in city contracts, within the priority action zones set up to resolve cultural disagreements or blatant social inequalities (Helly, 2000). With these local power relations inscribed within this democratic circle of influence in multicultural and multifaith contexts, the research-action would opt mainly for the strategy of investment and close supervision for minority actors in municipal areas to allow for the realization of wider mutual comprehension and co-operation of a better quality.

2. Objectives, assumptions and expected results The action entitled “Faiths and Social cohesion” supports a philosophy that would lead to the construction of an integrative dialogue which develops religious and ethnic diversity. Through the development of otherness in the religious context and intercultural and citizen participation in municipalities, a process of positive identity comes into being and is reinforced within a population that finds itself in the minority, and could fall prey to all kinds of exclusions and discriminations. The intervention “Faiths and Social cohesion” has its operational objective which is to analyse how the 198

ALTAY MANÇO

municipalities deal with religious requests made by the Muslim populations, and the place granted to their representatives at the time of taking and applying public decisions in these matters, and the roles and the positions of these local Muslim actors in these situations. The work of this research-action is focused on municipal cases where there is significant Muslim immigration and precise requests are being made (with high levels of controversy) as regards freedom of worship and conscience. The action aims to achieve the following: (1) to note the constraints and obstacles in this work; (2) to identify strategies and arguments proposed by the parties (non Muslim residents, Muslim residents and municipal authorities); (3) to set up and to support the processes of mediation; (4) to clarify the adopted solutions for each party; (5) finally, to evaluate their effectiveness. The central assumption of the project stipulates that incomprehension, the non-communication and the divergences among Community or Muslim religious associations and the municipal decision makers, as well as non Muslim residents can be overcome only if formal and informal meetings and places of regular exchanges are organized and hosted for these actors on the subject of local and common challenges. It is a question of building citizen participation for all concerned on a daily basis. This objective will be attained if the exchanges encourage actions and concrete and significant results for all the parties concerned. A dialogue of this quality is often lacking between the local organizers in charge of Muslim religious life ( mosque associations, courses on Islamic catechism, religious dignitaries) and municipal authorities, as well as the representatives (religious or not) of non Muslim residents. The organization of consultations between representatives of different faiths and philosophies, and introduction of co-operation of all kinds between Muslim representatives and local councillors, possibly elected officials of Muslim origin, can play an appreciable role in the dynamization of the relationships between different communities. The persons in charge of Muslim associations and those in charge of municipal authorities would be more effective in their approach for reconciliation if they were supported by information mechanisms, advice, mediation, etc 199


The action that is suggested relates specifically to identifying and overcoming discriminatory situations, thus raising the question of islamophobia. However, the effectiveness of the programme requires flexibility in order to abetter apprehend local specificities present at the different sites, and to see whether it might be necessary to widen the field of intervention to include subjects that are not specifically related to religious worship, but are necessary to fight against discrimination, like the question of education or health, for example. It is understood that sometimes widening the sphere of activity proves to be politically and methodologically useful. Five sets of questions direct the action entitled“Faiths and Social cohesion”, and the intention is to provide a coherent investigative and operational framework for all the teams concerned while defining the practical priorities of this concerted action: Religious discriminations. Partners in the programme were asked to try to identify and define the differences of treatment and recognition which specifically affect Muslims in European communes, in their capacity as practitioners with specific religious convictions. Can these differences of treatment and recognition be religious and cultural discriminations which are not compensated for by other mechanisms? Aren’t these differences of treatment and recognition due to political, historical, social, local contingencies, etc? Are these differences of treatment and recognition found with regard to communities other than the Muslims? How can there be effective support for the authorities in their task that seeks to eliminate discriminations and the differences in treatment that specifically affect Muslim citizens in their religious practice? Links with other types of discrimination. Partners were also requested to try and define the systemic links between specific religious discriminations and other forms of discriminations, difficulties and exclusions. What are these social, political and economic exclusions, and the psychological tensions which discriminate in religious matters against the immigrant and Muslim communities? Does this situation cause Muslims to turn inwards to their communtiy, and is there a lack of confidence between the Muslim communities and the institutions in the host country, which could damage the integration of immigrants and their children? How to effectively support the local authorities and civil society in their task of combatting exclusions and discriminations other than religious, with regard to Muslims?

200

ALTAY MANÇO

Endogenous reasons for these difficulties. Parallel to the sometimes difficult relations that exist between Muslims and local governments (or the other non-Muslim inhabitants), the participants were requested, in the course of the action to consider the relations, competition, confrontations, the divergences, etc even within the Muslim community: between those who were practising their faith and the laity, between men and women, young people and adults, first wave -immigrants and those born of immigrant parents, between people with low qualifications and the Muslim elite, between Muslims of different nationalities or origins, between immigrant and converted European Muslims, between immigrants and asylum seekers or refugees, between Muslims of various political orientations, between Muslims of different religious persuasions and different religious schools, between Muslims of contrasting economic conditions, etc Do these disparities and internal divisions facilitate matters or on the contrary do they make for more complex relations between Muslims and non-Muslims? Are these divisions a source of Community or endogenous deficits standing in the way of recognition of the Muslims in Europe? By taking account of the absence of a higher theological authority in Is lam, what can be proposed for an effective representation and a federation of Muslims vis-a-vis local and supra-local administrations? How can these communities be supported in their task of federation leading towards a judicious and efficient representation? Discrimination on the basis of gender. The question of unequal treatment towards the women is basic and we must deal with it. To ask about the condition of women in Islam or in the cultures that make up the Muslim populations, is to touch at the heart of non-communicability that characterizes the relations between the institutions in Western countries and the representatives of the Muslim communities. Within this difficult framework of ideological confrontation it is a question of seeking to identify what the local mosques and religious associations are doing with and for the women of their community. What are the activities launched, the means provided, the objectives established, which are the groups targeted for these activities? How are these activities identified, recognized, supported or not by the municipalities? How and why is it necessary to support this type of activities for and with women within the framework of the policies that seek to open up to the Muslim populations? Which real possibilities of emancipation do they offer to the women within their community? What type of progress can these activities achieve as regards bring201


ing together Muslim communities and non-Muslim women, Muslim communities and local governments and, finally, different Muslim communities? Is it simpler and more effective to negotiate one’s difference when one is a Muslim woman? How to effectively support the local authorities in their task of fair recognition of the cultural, religious and social activities intended for Muslim women? Discrimination as regards age. The question of discrimination towards young people takes on a particular and strategic importance. It is known that the role of religious and family education and associative inclusion are of primary importance in the development of identity in children and young people who are born of immigrant parents (Manço A., 1999). The malfunctioning created on these grounds by an absence of dialogue between local authorities and immigrants who organise religious activities hinder the development of these young people. The potentially positive role of the organizations and religious personnel to protect young people of immigrant background from delinquency, drug dependence, family conflicts, psychological problems and violent behavior, as well as their positive effects on encouraging schooling and having access to employment is well known. It seems therefore the right moment to pose the question concerning the place of young people in the actions for development and recognition of the cultural and religious life of Muslim populations. It will thus be a question of identifying what the mosques and religious associations are doing with and for the young people in their community. What are the activities, the means, the objectives, and for which target public? How are these activities identified, are they supported or not by the municipalities? How and why is it necessary to support this type of activities with young people? What are the possibilities of real emancipation and psycho-social development that they offer to young people within their community and in the host country? What progress can these activities achieve as regards bringing together Muslim communities and non-Muslim women, Muslim communities and local governments and, finally, different Muslim communities? Is it simpler and more effective to negotiate one’s differences when one is a young Muslim? How to effectively support the local authorities in their task of fair recognition of cultural, religious and sports activities, entertainment and educational programmes intended for young Muslims? The action “Faiths and Social cohesion” made it possible to achieve two types of results and products: results and local prod202

ALTAY MANÇO

ucts, on the one hand, and results and transnational products, on the other. In this volume each local action is described in a specific chapter and this makes it possible to examine a practice and its final evaluation. These actions allowed municipal decision makers, Muslim actors and the local population to meet and to better to know everyone in order to construct mutual understanding. These actions invited people or groups to reflect on the Muslim presence and its diversity, its local integration and understand how its requests were being dealt with by the authorities. These local experiments encouraged the politicians, Muslim actors and ordinary inhabitants to get along and act together on the subject of intentional discrimination. Support systems that are other than relations of local researchers, which gave rise to the present book, in particular journalistic and multimedia support, were produced within the framework of this vast project. They are intended for various publics who must become aware of certain aspects, such as decision makers and local government staff, Muslim communities and their non Muslim neighbours. Meetings that are open to the public in the localities concerned are useful to popularize the methods and the positive effects of the practices of mediation and negotiation between communities and administrations, as well as for constructing social cohesion and setting the conditions for equality that transcend the differences. The results and the transnational products of the action will be recounted in comparison to the local actions. They are of major importance. The transnational action is based on the teams responsible for the national and local projects who met on several occasions and in different contexts, as well as on the validation of their specific experiments through comparison and the cross analysis of local actions. Experts were associated with this work. It is a question, initially, of attaining a deeper level of general knowledge on the subject of religious discrimination against Muslims in European municipalities. At the second level, the transnational action makes way for the deployment of European know-how on the interventions as regards fighting against religious discrimination at the local level. It makes it possible to precisely define the steps, the conditions and the means necessary for such positive initiatives. After verification and validation in various municipal contexts in Europe, the relevant practices in intercommunity mediation and collaboration could then be transposed to other communes in Europe. The parameters of the transnational experiment are also 203


obvious in the present publication; we took great care to build a comparative dimension into our project. This work will thus allow the representative public authorities and, on a wider level, all European citizens to better acquaint themselves with the following: (1) the sociological and religious diversity of the Muslim minority in Europe, as well as its principal elements for organization and authority, presented particularly as a typology of the local and supra-local leaders and federations; (2) forms of participation in local citizenship requested by Muslim organizations and granted to them by the municipalities, like their impact in terms of combatting discrimination and for social cohesion, to prevent tensions or conflicts, etc; (3) the list of claims made by the Muslim communities: mosque, Muslim burial plots, organization of a halal meat industry, wearing the headscarf in schools, combatting racism, civic rights, etc; (4) the list of modes and strategies for action and mobilization of Muslims in the context of their claims; (5) types of local resistance, whether public or private, official or semi-official, encountered during the negotiations and mediations within local institutions, and the solutions adopted to deal with them; (6) social conditions (possibly discriminating ones) arising from the decisions or municipal practices, and their effects on making tensions linger, on highlighting them or reducing them, resistances and pressures exerted by the actors involved; (7) finally, ad hoc responsess or democratic and mutually satisfactory political changes that have been found to respond or not to the various requests made by the Muslim citizens, solutions put forward within their local socio-historical framework and the twists and turns leading up to their concrete application. Thus the action that is presented allows European decision makers and social actors to understand and take ownership of the various methods that have been tested out in order to prevent cases of discrimination, tension and conflict in religious matters.

204

ALTAY MANÇO

3. Making the project operational: actions undertaken and structure of the work The local action project was launched in four European countries that have undergone massive immigration flows coming from Muslim coun tries. Local partnerships bring together associations: residents and/or local associations of Muslim immigrants active in the field of the practice, animation and religious education; local councillors and municipal administrations; professional organizations specialized in intervention work, of hosting and intercultural mediation; as well as researchers in social sciences. It should be noted that the willingness to work in France and in Belgium much more than being just a pragmatic choice, is also connected to the desire to point out the realities that are present in a context of ancient Muslim immigration which to a great extent has already commenced its process of autochtonisation. Belgium is a country that is in advance when compared to France in the context of the formal recognition of Islam. This data offers the possibility of comparison that could reveal the possible democratic progress obtained thanks to the constitutional recognition of Islam by a European State. Moreover, the relatively new Muslim presence in the south of Europe and raises questions related to discrimination in a new form: recently installed groups of first wave immigrants with a low level of community structuring within an indigenous population little accustomed to immigration. This is the result of investigations realised in Italy, in contrast to the generalization of the Muslim immigration which is a fact in the north of Europe. A co ntrario, Spain has, just like Belgium, a constitutional base to accomodate Islam which is a historical fact on the territory of this State. The choice of these four countries thus gives the observer a variety of four cross situations: a context of immigration which is either ancient or recent with or without constitutional recognition. In addition to these four intervention countries, two other cases have been associated with the action, the observations, and the analyses, by inviting experts to present research-action projects as regards integration of the Muslim faith in their respective countries. They are Great Britain (the case of Birmingham) and Canada (the town of Montreal). The comparison with Canada and its model of multiculturalism makes it possible to compare European specificity in its openness towards the Muslim faith. Initially, the researcher-field workers in the project entitled “Faiths and Social cohesion” sought to discover solutions through intercultural and intercommunity negotiation, which would be 205


deemed satisfactory by all the protagonists and which would be transferable elsewhere, through specific and contentious elements contained in the case study (establishment of mosques, dealing with the noise levels connected to the practice of the faith, dealing with the question of the ritual slaughter and the festival of the Aïd Al-Adha sacrifice, wearing of the Islamic headscarf at the school or at work, allotting space for Muslim burials in the cemeteries, etc). Hosting, mediation and consultation work that went on during intercommunity meetings was to allow for reciprocal comprehension between communities in order to prevent discrimination and tensions that grew out of religious, community and ethnic matters. The principle of the intervention is precisely to bring to the negotiating table representatives of local authorities who are competent in the field of organization the cultural and religious life of immigrant communities, together with representatives of the local Muslim communities, persons in charge of associations, organizers, religious personalities, etc. Thus, the representatives of the Muslim communities are associated, from start to finish, with the whole action process. Non Muslim groups of inhabitants and researchers specialised in questions of integration are also invited in order to take the role of counsellor and regulator. In the second stage, it was necessary to analyze the conduct of the negotiations and other local, official or informal exchanges that came about because of the project itself. Then, comparison of these elements and the results produced on the various intervention sites had to be made in order to define “good practices” as regards management of the disagreements related to the coexistence of several religious and philosophical options in municipalities. It is clear that the local socio-historical analyses of the Muslim presence at each point of the project, as well as the analysis of the scientific literature available on the subject matter, are also necessary for the correct interpretation of the observations (Crawford et Al, 1998; Wiener, 1998). A grid for a common system to analyse the actions was drawn up by the partners. The reader will find this plan in the later chapters of this book which show the changes that occurred and the results of the actions carried out in each city that took part in the project. The grid aims to homogenize and make it possible to compare the presentation of the local actions. This is done on the basis of four points:

206

ALTAY MANÇO

(1) Description of the local context in which the intervention takes place: context of employment, housing and schooling of the Muslim populations in the city concerned. What is the sociological and historical profile of the target public? (2) The inventory of places where discrimination was detected and the action that followed: what are the types of religious discrimination identified? How is this measured? Who are the associative actors, the political and administrative ones, and the media which seem to be most important? What are their respective relationships as regards the implementation and/or the identification of the difficulties uncovered? What are the principles and legal provisions? Is there a difference between the practices and the theories of the local actors? What are the position and the precise claims of the Muslim populations? What is the position adopted by third party organizations? Which concrete actions have already been carried out to combat a particular type of religious discrimination against the Muslim community? Which objectives do these actions respond to? How can these objectives identify and point up to an exaggerated level of discrimination against the Muslims? Which actors seem to be relevant as agents in favour of dialogue and change in comparison to the nature of the action itself? What are the contributions of these persons or institutions, and their expectations with respect to the project? What are the objectives of identified changes and the means made available for the intervention? (3) Description and evaluation of the impact of the intervention: to what degree were the objectives matched by the actions? What were the effects on the awareness process of the discrimination mechanisms and on the resorption capacity of these mechanisms? How can we explain this? What kinds of measurement and observation systems were developed for this task? Which factors/actors made it possible to move towards the objectives for change? Which factors/actors slowed down the achievement of these objectives? What are the more general lessons that can be drawn in terms of political and practical recommendations? What is new in the field on participation and recognition of the Muslim organizations as social actors? (4) Definition of future prospects: what still remains to be done in the locality? How can we design these actions? Change of strategy? Partners? Method? Deepening and consolidating what was done during the project? How to ensure the ongoing quality of 207


the progress? How to effect the transfer of the know-how and products to other contexts? What about the dissemination of the results and the products? The chapters which are connected to the descriptions per intervention site were designed to be comparative and transnational in order to identify and illustrate, through all the cases described in detail here, the concept of religious discrimination against the Muslim population in Europe, and to contribute to the construction of a typology of indicators of a specific type of discrimination. It goes without saying that detailed attention was paid to the identification, illustration and evaluation of local initiatives meant to combat religious discrimination, in order to systematize the knowledge and the know-how acquired at the time of the realization of the project entitled “Faiths and Social cohesion”. Policy recommendations in the form of “good practices” complete this volume.

Selective bibliography Affes H., Albouty R. & Boubaker D. (1999), La mosquée dans la cité, Paris: La Médina. Aldeeb S. (2002), Cimetière musulman en Occident : normes juives, chrétiennes et musulmanes, Paris : L’Harmattan. Amiraux V. (2000), «Turcs musulmans en Allemagne : ‘established’ ou ‘outsiders’ ? Retour sur les conditions et les voies de la participation », Tosi L. (ed.), Europe, its borders and the others, Naples : Ed. Sci. Italiane, 483-512. Amiraux V. (2004), « Pourquoi parler de discrimination religieuse ? Réflexion à partir du cas des musulmans en France », Confluences Méditerranée, n° 48, 61-70. Beyens D. Y. (2001), L’alchimie de la médiation musulmane, Paris : La Médina. Bistolfi R. & Zabbal F. (1995), Islams d’Europe. Intégration ou insertion communautaire ?, Paris : Ed. de l’Aube. Bielefeldt H. (2000), Moslims in de lekenstaat. Het recht van moslims mee vorm te geven aan Europese samenleving, Gand : CIE-Cahiers, n° 6. Blaise P. & de Coorebyter V. (1997), « La reconnaissance et la représentation de l’Islam », Coenen M.-T. & Lewin R. (eds), La Belgique et ses immigrés. Les politiques manquées, Brussels : De Boeck-Université, 221-237. Bouzar D. (2001), L’islam des banlieues : les prédicateurs musulmans, les nouveaux travailleurs sociaux ?, Paris : Syros. Boyer A. (1998), L’islam en France, Paris : PUF. Canatan K. (1995), Avrupa’da müslüman azinliklar (Les minorités musulmanes en Europe), Istanbul : Insan yay.

208

ALTAY MANÇO

Centre d’Etude de l’Islam en Europe (CIE) (1998), Gent : een stad waar ook moslims zich ‘thuis’ kunnen vollen, Gand : CIE-Cahiers, n° 3. Centre d’Egalité des Chances et de Lutte contre le Racisme (1996), « La situation actuelle de la reconnaissance du culte islamique en Belgique », in Engagements pour l’égalité. Rapport d’activités 1995, Brussels, 123-132. Cesari J. (1994), Etre musulman en France. Mosquées, militants et associations, Paris : Ed. Karthala. Cesari J. (1995), L’Islam en Europe, Paris : La Documentation Française. Cesari J. (1997), Etre musulman en France aujourd’hui, Paris : Hachette. Cesari J. (1997), Faut-il avoir peur de l’islam ?, Paris : Presses de Science Po. Cesari J. (1998), Musulmans et Républicains : les jeunes, l’islam et la France, Brussels : Complexe. Cesari J. (1995), « L’islam en France. Naissance d’une religion », Hommes et Migrations, n° 1183, 33-40. Chodoire J.-Y. (1991), Regards multiples sur l’intégration. La querelle du voile islamique dans quatre hebdomadaires (La Cité, Le Vif-L’Express, Le Nouvel Observateur, Le Point), Louvain-la-Neuve : Université Catholique de Louvain, Département de Communication. Christiaens L.-L. (1998), «Une mise en perspective du concept de culte reconnu en droit belge », Derenne C., Kwaschin J. (eds), L’islam en Belgique, Brussels : Editions Luc Pire, 23-40. Christians L.-L. (1996), « L’intégration religieuse en droit belge », Agenda Interculturel, n° 140-141, février 1996 : 13-16. Conseil de l’Europe (1999), La religion et l’intégration des immigrés, Strasbourg : Conseil de l’Europe. Crawford B. & Lipschutz R. D. (eds) (1998), The Myth of « Ethnic Conflict » : Politics, Economics, and Cultural Violence. Berkeley : International and Area Studies, University of California Press. Dasetto F., Maréchal B. & Nielsen J. S. (eds) (2001), Convergences musulmanes. Aspects contemporains de l’islam dans l’Europe élargie, Louvain-laNeuve : Academia-Bruylant. Dasetto F. (1990), «Visibilisation de l’islam dans l’espace public », Bastenier A. & Dasetto F. (eds), Immigrations et nouveaux pluralismes : une confrontation de sociétés, Brussels : De Boeck-Université, 179-208. Dasetto F. (1993), «Islam en Belgique : espace mi-ouvert et institutions fermées », Arkoun M., Leveau R. & El Jisr B., L’Islam et les musulmans dans le monde, Beyrouth : Centre culturel Hariri, 269-290. Dasetto F. (1996), La construction de l’islam européen. Approche socioanthropologique, Paris : Ed. L’Harmattan. Dasetto F. (1997), «L’islam en Belgique et en Europe : facettes et questions », Dasetto F. (ed.), Facettes de l’islam belge, Louvain-la-Neuve : Academia-Bruylant, 17-34. Dasetto F. & Bastenier A. (eds), Enseignants et enseignement de l’Islam au sein de l’école officielle en Belgique, Louvain-la-Neuve : Ciaco ed. Delruelle E. (2004), L’impatience de la liberté. Autonomie et démocratie, Brussels : Labor.

209


De Galembert C. (1995), « L’inscription de l’islam, dans l’espace urbain », Annales de la recherche urbaine, n° 69, 179-188. De Galembert C. (1997), « Etat, Eglise et musulmans en France : la médiation catholique et ses limites », Migrations-Sociétés, v. 9, n° 53. De Ley H. & al. (1998), Gent : een stad waar ook moslims zich « thuis » kunnen voelen, Gand : FoGI. DeMarinis V. & Grzymala-Moszczynska H. (1995), « The nature and role of religion and religious experience in psychological cross-cultural adjustement : ongoing research in the clinical psychology of religion », Social Compass, v. 42, n° 1, 121-135. Dembour M.-B., (1996), « Le foulard : un faux problème », Agenda Interculturel, n° 142, 14-18. Derenne C. & Kwaschin J. (ed.) (1999), L’islam en Belgique, Brussels : Editions Luc Pire. D’Un Monde A L’Autre (DUMALA) (2001), Gestion multiculturelle des sociétés urbaines contemporaines. Diagnostic régional des lieux de culte musulman, Tourcoing : DUMALA. European Monitoring Centre on Racisme and Xenophobia (EUMC) (2001), Anti-Islamic reactions within European Union after the terrorist attacks against the US. Country reports, Vienne : EUMC, accès : http://eumc.eu.int Gatugu J., Manço A., Amoranitis S. (eds) (2004), La vie associative des migrants : quelles (re)connaissances ? Réponses européennes et canadiennes, Paris, Turin, Budapest : L’Harmattan, coll. « Compétences interculturelles ». Gerholm G. & al. (1993), The New Islamic Presence in Western Europe, Londres, New-York : Mansell. Germain A. (2000), L’aménagement des lieux de culte : enjeux et dynamiques locales, Montréal : INRS. Grollety P. (1998), « Financement des cultes et laïcité en Belgique », Derenne C. & Kwaschin J. (ed.), L’islam en Belgique, Brussels : Editions Luc Pire, 15-22. Haider G. (1996), « Muslim Space and the Practice of Architecture » Daly Metcalf B. (ed.), Making Muslim Space in North America and Europe. Berkeley : University of Cal ifornia Press, 31-45. Haut Conseil à l’Intégration (2000), L’Islam dans la République. Rapport remis au premier ministre français, décembre. Helly D. (2000), « La nouvelle citoyenneté, active et responsable », Boisvert Y., Hamel J. & Molgat M. (eds), Vivre la citoyenneté. Identité, appartenance et participation, Montréal : Liber, 119-134. Helly D. (2000), Citoyenneté, nation et minorités ethnoculturelles. Le cas canadien à travers le multiculturalisme, 1991-1997. Rapport remis à Multiculturalisme Canada, Montréal : INRS. Helly D. (2000), « Le multiculturalisme canadien : de l’intégration des immigrants à la cohésion sociale », Cahiers de l’URMIS – CNRS, n° 7, 720. Helly D. (2002), «Occidentalisme et islamisme : leçons de guerres culturelles pour les chercheurs », Collectif, Actes du colloque « Savoirs

210

ALTAY MANÇO

constitués, savoirs à construire : les événements du 11 septembre et les orientations de la recherche sur les relations ethniques », 21-22 février 2002, Montréal : CEETUM. Honneth A. (1997), «Reconnaissance », Canto-Sperber M. (dir.), Dictionnaire d’éthique et de philosophie morale, Paris : PUF. Husson J.-F. (2000), « Le financement public des cultes, de la laïcité et des cours philosophiques » Courrier hebdomadaire, Brussels : CRISP, n° 1703-1704. Isin E. F. & Siemiatycki M. (2000), Making space for mosques : struggles for urban citizenship in immigrant Toronto, Toronto : York University. Rath J. & al. (2001), Western Europe and its islam. The social reaction to the instutionalization of a « new » religion in the Netherlands, Belgium and the United Kingdom, Leiden : Brill. Kepel G. (1997). « Islamic Groups in Europe : Between Community Affirmation and Social Crisis », Vertovec S. and Peach C. (eds), Islam in Europe : The Politics of Religion and Community. New York : St Martin’s Press, 48-55. Khosrokhovar F. (1996), « L’universel abstrait, le politique et la construction de l’islamisme comme forme d’altérité », Wieviorka M. (ed.), Une société fragmentée. Le multiculturalisme en débat, Paris : Ed. La Découverte. Lamchichi A. (1999), Islam et Musulmans en France. Pluralisme, laïcité et citoyenneté. Paris : L’Harmattan. Leman J., Renaerts M. & Van Den Bulck D. (1992), « De rechtspositie van de islamitische praxis in België », Leman J. (ed.), ‘De integratie van de islam in België : anno 1993’, Cultuur en Migratie, n° 2. Lesthaeghe R. (1998), « Islamitische gemeenschapen in België. Fundamentalisme of secularisatie ? », Sociologische Gids, vol. 40, n° 3, 166-179. Leveau R., Mohsen-Finan K. & Withol de Wenden C. (eds) (2001), L’islam en France et en Allemagne : identités et citoyennetés, Paris : La Documentation française. Lewis B. & Schnapper D. (eds) (1997), Musulmans en Europe, Avignon : Actes Sud. Lochak D. (2004), « La notion de discrimination », Confluences Méditerranée, n° 48, 13-23. Manço A. (1992), «Enfants issus de l’immigration musulmane et leurs écoles ... », Agenda Interculturel, n° 107, 10-13. Manço A. (1993), « Organisation de l’Islam et positions des leaders d’opinion turcs en Belgique », Agenda Interculturel, n° 114, 12-16. Manço A. (1995), « Intégrisme et intégration : analyse d’une collaboration belgo-immigrée dans la région visétoise (Belgique) », Cahiers Internationaux de Psychologie sociale, n° 19, 49-66. Manço A. (1996), « Pratiques religieuses : quelques chiffres », Agenda Interculturel, n° 140-141, 22-26. Manço A. (1998), Valeurs et projets des jeunes issus de l’immigration. Le cas des Turcs en Belgique, Paris : L’Harmattan. Manço A. (1999), Intégration et identités. Stratégies et positions des jeunes issus de l’immigration, Brussels : De Boeck-Université.

211


Manço A. (2000), Sociographie de la population turque et d’origine turque : 40 ans de présence en Belgique (1960-2000). Dynamiques, problèmes, perspectives, Brussels : Centre des Relations Européennes, Ed. Européennes. Manço A. (2001), « Violences et médiations dans les familles immigrées », Les Politiques Sociales, n° 3-4, 23-37. Manço U. (dir.) (2004), Entre reconnaissance et discrimination : présence de l’islam en Europe et en Amérique du Nord, Paris, Turin, Budapest : L’Harmattan, coll. « Compétences interculturelles ». Manço U. (1997), « Les organisations islamiques dans l’immigration turque en Europe et en Belgique », Dasetto F. (ed.), Facettes de l’islam belge, Louvain-la-Neuve : Bruylant-Academia, 143-158. Manço U. (2000), Voix et voies musulmanes de Belgique, Brussels : Publications des Facultés Universitaires Saint-Louis de Bruxelles. Manço U. & Meyers J. (1999), «Chronique d’un dossier à rallonges (la reconnaissance du culte islamique) », Agenda interculturel, n° 179, 4-9. Manço U. (2001), « Populations musulmanes de Belgique et la stratification du marché de l’emploi » disponible sur le site du Centrum voor Islam in Europa, Université de Gand : http://www.flwi.rug.ac.be/cie/umanco/umanco6.htm. Nielsen J. S. (2000), « ’Mapping’ Muslims Organisations in Britain 1998 », Tosi L. (ed.), Europe, its borders and the others, Naples : Ed. Sci. Italiane, 513-524. Nielsen J. S. (1992), Muslims in Western Europe, Edimbourg : Ed. Uni. press. Peach C. (2001) « Social Geography. New Religions and Ethnoburbs Progress report », Progress in Human Geography. Poinsot M., Manço A. & al. (2002), Les violences exercées sur les jeunes filles dans les familles d’origine étrangère et de culture musulmane : le développement des capacités de négociation interculturelle et de la prévention (Allemagne, Belgique et France), Paris : Agence pour le Développement des Relations Interculturelles (A.D.R.I.). Renaerts M. (1996), « L’historique de l’islam en Belgique et la problématique de sa reconnaissance », Cahiers de l’Institut de Philologie et d’Histoire Orientales, 51-63. Renaerts M. (1997), « La mort de l’exclusion à l’intégration », Dasetto F. (ed.), Facettes de l’islam belge, Louvain-la-Neuve : Academia-Bruylant, 211-223. Robert J. (2004), La fin de la laïcité ?, Paris : O. Jacob. Shadid W. and Koningsveld P. (eds), Muslims in the Margin. Political Responses to the Presence of Islam in Western Europe, Kampen : Pharos. Slyomovics S. (1996), «The Muslim World Day Parade and ‘Storefront’ Mosques of New York City », Daly Metcalf B. (ed.). Making Muslim Space in North America and Europe. Berkeley : University of California Press, 204-216. Verhoeven M. (1993), « Minorités musulmanes et villes européennes », Nieuwsbrief steunpunt migranten, n° 2, 28-29. Weiner E. (ed.) (1998), The Handbook of Interethnic Coexistence. New York : Continuum.

212

ALTAY MANÇO

Withol de Wenden C. & Cesari J. (1990), « La gestion locale des problèmes religieux », ADRI, L’intégration des minorités immigrées en Europe. Politiques locales et problèmes spécifiques, tome 2, Paris : C.N.F.P.T., 103. Zolberg A. R. & Woon L. L. (1998), « Why Islam is like Spanish ? Cultural Incorporation in Europe and the U.S. », Politics and Society, v. 27, n° 1.

213


Local actions Out of the cellar and into the landscape park Challenges around relocalization of a mosque in Roubaix Omero Marongiu-Perria3 Abstract The objective of the initiative launched in Roubaix within the framework of the network entitled “Faiths and Social cohesion”, aims to study the way in which the local governments manage religious diversity and in particular their links with the Muslim presence and its mosques. The method adopted, in agreement with the coordination of the network supported by the European Union, was to have only one case study, i.e. a municipality with a significant Muslim population and the presence of one or several mosques, to study transactions of various types between religious communities and local institutions, as well as to experiment with a role of facilitation in the framework of these relations. Keywords: Roubaix - France - Mosques - Relocalization. The objective of the initiative launched in Roubaix within the framework of the network entitled “Faiths and Social cohesion”, aims to study the way in which the local governments manage religious diversity and in particular their links with the Muslim presence and its mosques. The method adopted, in agreement with the coordination of the network supported by the European Union, was to have only one case study, i.e. a municipality with a signifiOmero Marongiu-Perria is a part-time lecturer at D’un Monde à l’Autre (Regional Resource Centre against Discrimination and fore Equal Opportunities in Nord-pas-de-Calais). He is also works with the Sociology Group of Religions and Secularism at the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes in Paris. Email: [email protected]. Migration Letters, Volume: 2, No: 3, pp. 214 – 238. December 2005 (ISSN: print: 1741-8984 & online: 1741-8992) 3

OMERO MARONGIU-PERRIA

cant Muslim population and the presence of one or several mosques, to study transactions of various types between religious communities and local institutions, as well as to experiment with a role of facilitation in the framework of these relations. Roubaix is the second metropolitan area for the urban community of Lille with nearly 100 000 inhabitants. This city has over a long period of time represented one of the most flourishing examples of the French textile industry. The first immigrant workers to come to Roubaix were Belgians. Until the first half of the 20th century, they were the driving force of the city’s industrial growth and they made up more than half of its population during the period of strong growth before 1914. From 1945 there was a very significant arrival of Italian immigrants, followed shortly after by the Iberian labour force, Maghrebian labourers and those from Black Africa. Certain researchers estimate that the population coming from countries where Islam is a majority religion was practically close to 40 % of the city, which represents a considerable proportion. In 1990, out of a population of 97 793 inhabitants, Roubaix had 16 461 foreigners, but if one takes the nationality of the head of household into account, there were 29 938 people, that is to say 30, 62 % of the population, who lived in a household where the reference person was a foreigner or was naturalized. The statistical data on the geographical distribution of the populations indicate that out of the 13 districts that make up the city, some have a strong Community concentration. A quick glance at the geography of the city reveals a striking contrast between the southern part which has a lower population density, a pleasant quality of life and attracts a population of company executives and the professions who work outside the city, and the northern part, which underwent the pangs of an industrial decline and still bears all the scars of impoverishment. It is necessary all the same to point out that Roubaix went through several restructurings and at the moment there is a project for urban reconfiguration. The political, economic, social, cultural and religious life in Roubaix are strongly marked by the presence of this population of foreign origin and, more particularly, by that of the communities originating from the Maghreb region. The question of integration of these populations has, until recently, strongly mobilized the elected officials and social and institutional actors, and in Roubaix it largely conditioned the implementation of what is called in France, the “the city policy”. The use of the term “integration” 215

OUT OF THE CELLAR

refers to the existence of the universe of representations where different sets of themes such as insecurity, Islam, immigration or unemployment are to be found. In certain domains, this led to the practice of discriminatory measures by the employers who refused to employ people of North African origin because they were “concerned” about preserving their image to their customers, but sometimes the elected officials also, who were not willing to enter into a conflict with a part of their electorate. This discriminatory situation is not specific to Roubaix alone. It was also observed in the principal French metropolitan areas where the situation was more favourable in Paris and in the East of France. If initiatives exist to fight against this discrimination, it also happens that the actions of “positive discrimination” do not always work in favor of those populations who are of immigrant stock. Thus, the simple fact of classifying a district as a priority area to benefit from the city policy could reinforce the negative perceptions to the detriment of the inhabitants of this district. Generally speaking, discrimination in the treatment of categories of the population is very obvious not only in the difficulties of accessing employment, but also in the responses given to the requests pertaining to the exercise of their faith for Muslim people or Muslim associations. 1. Principal characteristics of Islam in Roubaix The challenges of Islam felt at the national level have direct repercussions at the local level. We can thus say that in Roubaix, the ingredients of the configuration of Islam in France are perfectly visible, in particular through: - A low rate of frequentation of the places of worship which is cyclical, according to the important moments of the year or in the life of practising Muslims; - An ethno-national distribution of places of worship; - A hiatus between old and young generations in their elationship with Islam; - Very peripheral phenomena of radicalism, but which have nonetheless several times sullied the image of the faithful in the communities in the metropolitan area; - Places of worship generally managed by rather old migrants. 216


The Muslim population in the city is thus characterized by its heterogeneity. Coming mainly from the Maghreb region, these Muslim immigrants can be divided into two principal groups, those coming from Algeria – with a strong proportion of repatriates (Harkis) - and those from Morocco, as well as fewer numbers of people from Tunisia. Finally, the people who came from Turkey and Black Africa who complete this table. This situation is responsible for maintaining a whole series of intra-community divisions among Algerians, but also between Algerians and Moroccans, in particular with regard to the management of places of worship where the Algerian element is dominant. The Turkish population goes to the mosque managed by the Islamic religious organization of the Turks in the North of France. It is thus difficult to talk about the existence of a local “Muslim community”in the strict sense of the term. One could say, in extreme cases, that the concept of “Oummah”, or community, plays a strong symbolic role, but is lacking in any kind of “concrete structure” both at the local and national level. The town of Roubaix has, at the moment, eight places of worship for Muslims, of which six are officially recognised by the local authorities, and the remaining two are more like back rooms rearranged for older persons in the neighbourhood: - The mosque managed by a Turkish association has a surface area of 600 m2, it is located in an old factory, and brings together approximately 400 people every Friday. It is connected to the embassy of Turkey. - The dominant element in the mosque managed by the Religious and Cultural Association of Roubaix is Morrocan. It is located in an old bookstore, and the prayer room has a surface area of 75 m2, and brings together about fifty people on Friday. - The Abou Bakr mosque, managed by the Islamic Association of the Abou Bakr mosque is established in two dwelling places and has a surface area of 700 m2and accommodates up to 300 faithful on Friday. The Imam of the mosque is appointed and remunerated by the Paris mosque. - The Sunna mosque, managed by the Islamic Cultural Association for the Arab Language,is one of largest in the area, has a surface of 2000 m2and accommodates several hundreds of people during prayer time on Friday. It is the only mosque in Roubaix that has a

217

OUT OF THE CELLAR

minaret. The Imam is appointed and remunerated by the Paris mosque. - The Adaw'a mosque which accommodates groups of preachers from Tabligh is located in an old warehouse with a surface area of 700 m2 distributed over four floors. The faithful are mainly of Algerian origin. - The mosque managed by the Afro-Islamic Association, or 2AI, is in a bicycle garage located in a low rent housing public sector (HLM) in the district of Epeule. If the diligent Muslims who observe the tenets of their religion are in the minority, the majority of the persons in charge of the mosques however state that they have increasing demands for the practice of their religion.More than just a question of enlarging the prayer rooms, additional needs emerge, in particular for women and younger persons. With regard to the present research-action coordinated by the association called “From one World to Another” in Tourcoing, the project initiated by the neighbourhood association which is the “Afro-Islamic Association” (or 2AI) was used as a starting point and place of major observation in its capacity as a local partner.

2. Study of the acquisition of a new place for Muslim worship One of the places of prayer for the Muslim population of Roubaix is currently managed by association “2AI”. The directing body of the association reflects the composition of the Muslim population of the district, which is mainly Moroccan. The president is a thirty year old trader who came from the North -East of Morocco, a few years ago. He succeeded the current vice-president who was 46 years old and whose parents were a couple of AlgeroMorrrocan migrants It should be stated here that the vice-president is the director of an association for reintegration and very involved in local community life; he is well regarded by the faithful and the local councillors, as the life giving force of the association and the privileged interlocutor for the outside world. The place of prayer of the association is located in a room where bicycles are stored, which measures 50 m2, and for many years now it has been allowed to use it by the real estate company which manages the real estate housing in Epeule. It should be 218


noted that the prayer room for men, for women and the classroom are not located within the same space since they have three different entrances. Also, for more than three years now, the association has been requesting the town hall for a new place which would meet the needs of the local community that requires a new place of worship adapted to its requirements. This point was put on the Town Council’s agenda in December 21, 2000, and until today, the project has not given the desired results, although it has made significant progress. Indeed, as the local press has pointed out in several articles published during the year 2001, the project gave rise to a battle of words at the political level, with an action launched by the extreme right wing party during the election campaign, which with the local commercial union protested against the choice of the site earmarked at the beginning for the relocalization of this place of worship. The dossier has moved along, until the end of the year 2002, in four stages: - The town hall had first of all chosen to acquire, after a municipal debate on the subject, an old service station measuring 400 m2, situated at the head of the main street in the district, and then to sign a long lease with the 2AI association. However, this street is also a commercial street which was registered in the programme that was part of the revitalization of the district. So there were divided opinions here, with an equal number of Muslim traders and non-Muslims on both sides. The latter got together in a commercial Union and then drew up a petition against the establishment of the place of worship, officially pointing out the inconsistency of the new use of the service station at the head of commercial street. Many informal discussions took place on this occasion. If the argument, in itself, is completely coherent in the plan of the project seeking to reorganize the district, the persons in charge of the Muslim association perceived the fear on the part of the union of the tradesmen, that the trading done in the street might suffer from the image related to the mosque. They then made another petition in favor of the establishment of the mosque and presented it to the mayor. - In order to protect the different sensitivities at play here, the town hall then chose another place located in the waste land of an old factory site in the neighbourhood. The place was also appreciated by the Muslim association because it bordered the inhabited 219

OUT OF THE CELLAR

area, and was very close to the new landscape park that the town hall intends to create by extending an existing park. The site was so old that the building was earmarked for demolition. But the Muslim association was not discouraged by all this and had every intention of setting up the future mosque in the park - the Municipality was still willing to let it build a place of worship there. The third stage was to open a series of consultations, where the organisation” From one World to Another” was asked by the Municipality, as a qualified structure, to coordinate discussions, under the authority of the mayor of the district, between the association of the inhabitants of the district, the architectural department of the town hall, and the Muslim association. This was the time period that followed the events of September 11, 2001. If the national media was largely responsible for increasing the fear of attacks on French soil, the local and regional press was positive concerning several projects for mosques carried out with the support of municipalities. In the local plan, the aftermath of after September 11 gave rise to much inter-religious consultation between Muslims and persons in charge of associations and institutions. In Roubaix, the Municipality supported the revitalization of an independent project called “Roubaix-Hope” (Roubaix –Espérance), which brought together both religious and lay personalities, and was inspired by the model known as “Marseilles-Hope”. This council brings together personalities from each place of worship in the city, namely Buddhists, Catholics, Protestants, Muslims and people belonging to communities who reflect on these subjects. In a peaceful climate, the challenge however, took on another dimension: this was nature and the architectural aspect of a place of worship located within an open landscape park. The fourth stage was the time to make a political decision. After having initiated a series of consultations with the members of all the religious denominations present in the city, concerned about the inherent needs for the practice of their faith, the mayor wanted to set up a “framework discussion”4 , specifying the commitments

The “framework debate” established the general orientations of the town hall as regards direct or indirect actions for the cult. Later on, each place of worship must be discussed in specific terms in order to establish the exact nature and cost of the commitment. This debate which was prepared in consultation with the elected members of the opposition parties in the municipality was welcomed by all the political groups excepting the Far Right. 4

220


of the city, in the respect of the provisions of the law on Separation dating back to 19055 , for each place of worship requiring, if necessary, an intervention of the public bodies. The decision to grant a plot of land on long lease to association 2AI within the future landscape park in the district of Epeule was ratified.

2.1. A rather long political decision-making process The various moments of consultation initiated by the association “From one World to Another” contributed to the political decision-making. After having organised a series of meetings with the members of the religious traditions present in the city, the mayor drew up the “discussion framework” clarifying the commitments of the city for each place of worship that required the assistance of public bodies. The decision to grant a plot of land on long lease to association 2AI was thus ratified by this debate, during a town council meeting held on December 19, 2002. It was then a question of proceeding to completely demolish the industrial waste land, in order to hand over a plot of land to the association 2AI, by concluding a new long lease agreement during a new debate. This second round of debate was voted on during the meeting of the town council in October 16, 2003 - almost a year after the vote during the initial deliberation. The clauses of the lease remained to be defined, knowing that the waste land, the

In France, contrary to what one might think, the Separation law of 1905 does not seek to “privatise” religion, by making it a practice that is no longer visible in the public domain. It clearly seeks to organise a public manifestation of worship, in an associative form, considering the cult associations as legal entities on an equal footing with other associative structures, even if their specific objective gives them certain advantages. The articles of the 1905 law authorise the State and local communities to act in two ways with regard to the building used for worship: for those structures dating back to before the 1905 law, and where the State is the owner, the latter may take on the maintenance and conservation costs of the building. As regards the other buildings used for worship, the State may participate in these costs, or even take on board all repair costs. These possibilities have not been shored up by precise clauses in the General Code on territorial communities. Case law will therefore decide on the basis of the nature of the building, whether a local community which engages an action on a building used for worship, is responsible or not for the expenses involved in the maintenance, conservation or repairs of the structure. 5

221

OUT OF THE CELLAR

destruction of which would go ahead after a public invitation to tender had been published, has not yet been done. The rather long intervals between the political decision-making and its effective implementation were considered too spaced out by certain members of the 2AI association. The latter, not seeing the start of any clearing work on the industrial waste land since the time the framework discussions took place, began to doubt the good intentions of the municipality. In the first half of 2003, the president of association came up against the insistence of certain faithful who were strongly in favour of buying a house or a shop in order to establish the new place of worship there. But the fact of the visibility that the new mosque would have within the future landscape park has, until now, over-ridden the eagerness of these faithful. In parallel, questions about the long lease seem to have found unanimous favour with the leaders of the association. There could be contradiction, according to them, with the statutes of the mosque which, according to Islam, would be regarded as a waqf or property bequeathed to perpetuity, without the possibility of retrocession. These questions opened up a period of fluctuation within the association, which was further highlighted for a few weeks by the changing professional situation of the president and the vicepresident, key factors in the project. The first one had opened up a trade and the second accepted the management of an association for reintegration where he was employed, which was being fully reorganized. This change had temporarily decreased their personal investment and their presence in the current mosque. Following the framework discussions, the Municipality had fixed three conditions for the leaders of the association: - to comply with the provisions of the law of 1905, in order to guarantee free access to all the faithful; - to guarantee the transparency of the financing, and to avoid finances coming from countries with a“negative” connotation; - to see that the new association would be representative of all Muslims in the district, and in this context, it was particularly a question of the integration of the Algerian Muslims repatriated in the exclusively Moroccan management team. From one World to Another found itself caught up in these various questions and requests, halfway between a qualified structure and an association for mediation. Our first task thus was to help 222


the partners in their thought process by providing them with concrete support structures. This is the reason why, during January and February 2003, we wrote two short reports entitled “the modalities of long lease in French law” (10 pages.) and “To what degree can public bodies influence a question of faith?” (5 pages.). These documents used a cross section of legal and sociological approaches, aimed at giving an idea of the freedom of action granted to each entity – The municipality and the religious organization – in the assumption of financial responsibilities related to the setting up of the future mosque. Association 2AI laid down two objectives. The first was quickly achieved: after having met with the vice-president on January 21, 2003, we contacted the president of the architect who had studied at the school of architecture in Villeneuve d' Ascq and his study progra mme was based on the idea of a big mosque in Roubaix, precisely located in the waste land where the future mosque of the district would be set up. He responded positively to the request made by the association, and began work on an architectural blueprint in keeping with the requirements of the district – this demand was compulsory and was insisted on by the Municipality from the outset. The second objective was to do with the presentation of the complete dossier containing the whole project and the architectural blueprints, and this document would serve as a concrete base during later negotiations with the persons in charge at the municipality. “From one World to Another” completed the file during several work sessions held in May and June 2003, with the architect and the members of the bureau of the association. That contributed to alleviate the tensions within the association which delayed the realization of the document. At the same time, the Municipality decided to entrust the follow-up of the mosque dossier to the Directorate-General of the “Ville Renouvelée”, which supervises all rehabilitation projects in the city districts. They wanted to meet all the parties involved in the project, and we met with them on April 4, 2003 in order to provide them with precise information on the background and the current state of the project. The involvement of each partner and the provision of technical skills made available by the resource centre of the association “From one World to Another” contributed to alleviate visible tensions that were felt at the beginning of the year. That led to the organization of a meeting at the premises of the Management for 223

OUT OF THE CELLAR

the Renewed City on May 20, 2003, called by the chargé de mission where the following were present: the mayor of district, the city council representative in charge of religious questions, two architects from the town planning department, the director for the Renewed City, members of the executive committee of association 2AI accompanied by the architect, and the person responsible for surveys from “From one World to Another”.The abstract discussions which were the norm from the beginning of 2003 now gave place to a formal dialogue during which several decisions were taken: - The Municipality reiterated its formal commitment to grant a place for the new mosque inside the future landscape park; and at the same time, reiterated the stipulations related to the surface area, namely 600 m2 for a neighbourhood mosque, with small possible differences that might be made according to the project to be presented. - The nature of the project, drawn up on land that fell in the public domain, would mean a stricter control of the architectural project by the State, but the granting of the building permit would be quicker as long as requirements were adhered to; a schedule complete with the dates of future meetings was to be worked out for the handing-over of the complete file describing the project for the future mosque, with the architectural scale model and technical advice of “From one World to Another.” - The association’s architect would be in direct contact with the town hall’s planning department to facilitate and exchange information. To overcome these concerns, a decision was taken to circulate a maximum of information and to maintain contact with all the people involved in the project. The Municipality had made a firm contract which was drawn up in explicit terms, but the questions posed by the elected district official on the appropriateness of the cultural component of the project raised fears once again concerning the possible postponement of the file. In fact, Association 2AI had made it known that it intended to continue with the teaching of arab-Muslim culture in an adjacent area not connected with religious matters. This modified the architectural plan, which presented a frame where the spaces devoted to worship and cultural activities were quite distinct. Apparently, the municipal majority seemed largely favourable to the updated project, which was in excess of the initial surface area of 200 m2, but new reactions 224


would be made known at the end of the town council debates in December 2002. 2.2. Progress of the project during the period 2003-2004: An extended negotiation period These debates are significant with regard to “time of negotiation” which was prolonged over the period 2003-2004. The challenge here, both for the Municipality and for the Muslim association, was to have a whole set of conditions accepted, as they were considered to be fundamental for the finality of the project on the future mosque. A few key moments marked the second half of the year 2003. Following the drawing up of the dossier with the complete project concerning the establishment of the future mosque, a meeting was called on July 8, 2003, at the request of the mayor of district, where, apart from the persons in charge of association 2AI and the architect for the project, there were also the director of the Renewed City and members of the town planning department from the town hall. The goal was to evaluate the contents of the project on the basis of the written documents produced by the association. The meeting went ahead on the appointed the date, but in the absence of the district mayor and the person in charge of the Renewed City project, the latter had sent in his apologies in advance. This absence was upsetting for the associative partners. The elected official for the western districts stated that the meeting had not been called at his initiative and that he was waiting for a written confirmation from the association concerned. The first consequence of this failure was to postpone the initial debate on the fundamentals of the architectural project for the future mosque and the feeling of uneasiness among persons in charge of the Muslim association, who received an informal notice stating that the mayor of the district would veto any increase in the initial surface area of 600 m2 and would like to have all cultural aspects deleted from the project, which, if retained, according to him, would contradict the significance of a mosque. With the return to normal after the summer vacations in September, several telephone contacts were made between the persons in charge of the 2AI association, the chargé de mission of the Management of the Renewed City project and ourselves in order to calm the tense atmosphere and to propose elements for the drafting of the next municipal debate which would be voted on at the 225

OUT OF THE CELLAR

end of the year. In fact two deliberations were decided upon by the town council: - On October 16, 2003, a first decision resulting from the framework discussions of December 19, 2002 was voted. It related to the granting of a subsidy for the repair work of the Protestant temple in Roubaix, the granting of a plot on long lease to the Buddhist association of the city and also for the 2AI association. The part concerning the mosque would be written up in a specific way: “It is proposed that association 2AI will have to constitute a new association in keeping with the law of 1905 (compulsory) bringing together the various components of the Muslim community in the district. Its influence will currently correspond to the needs of the project being examined.” Two points resulted from this text. First of all the need to create a new religious organization (same condition stipulated in the text concerning the Buddhist association), to bring together the Muslim populations in the district and their different sensitivities. The town hall thus made an implied reference to the Algerian repatriates who had cobbled together an informal place of worship in the district and now felt slighted by the fact that an association with dominant “Morrocan”elements was given entire responsibility for the project of the future mosque. Then, the text stipulating a maximum area of m2 600 agreed at the beginning, left wide open the possibility of over shooting this surface area if the promoters of the project used the right arguments. But this wording was the source of disagreement between the district mayor and the Muslim association, which has not been resolved to date. - On December 18, 2003, during a second deliberation the modalities for acquisition of the industrial waste land, property of the urban community in Lille were stipulated clearly. The plot would thus be integrated in the communal domain, in order to be able to proceed with the second phase of the extension of the current landscape park of Brondeloire, but the text of the deliberation stipulates that acquisition would be “subject to the realization of soil analysis and absence of pollution.” At the beginning of January 2004, more than six months after their last meeting and the vote taken during the two deliberations, the persons in charge of association 2AI and the mayor of district renewed contacts to discuss the basis of the architectural project. Having observed that no effective action had taken place on the site of the industrial waste land, the vice-president of the Muslim association addressed a letter to the Mayor of Roubaix, on Decem226


ber 10, 2003, to question him on the progress of the dossier. The district mayor rapidly responded and proposed a meeting for the end of January 2004, in order to adhere more precisely to the dates fixed for demolition and the consequent availability of the waste land. Meanwhile, the same elected official invited the lady technician of the town planning cabinet, the chargé de mission of the Renewed City project and ourselves for a technical discussion on January 6, during which the recent progress would be discussed with regard to the estimated dates for clearing the waste land and the question of compliance of the association with the provisions of the law of 1905. During this meeting, just like at the meeting with the persons in charge of association 2AI, on 24 January, the district mayor was intransigent with respect to the surface area initially agreed upon, and questioned the relevance of the cultural part of the project. According to him, it would be more than what the Muslim community the district required. The members of the bureau did not wait to address a letter of to the city mayor, and in a letter dated January 26, 2004, they directly requested his intervention in the matter to resolve the disagreement they had with the district mayor. How can we interpret this hesitation concerning the increased surface area when compared to what was initially envisaged? Apart from the question of principle, and the differences of interpretation on this subject during the municipal deliberation of October 16, 2003, this attitude was perhaps exacerbated to a certain extent, by the convergence of several factors making it so that he wanted to avoid hurting the different sensitivities in the district: - During the last quarter of the year 2003, the district mayor was the subject of several attacks from political and association leaders blaming him for his political work and his moral uprightness as a person. For the first time since the beginning of his mandate, he was obliged to publish a response to these attacks in the press. - During the month of December, it was the turn of the district committee to make an allusion, in its small newspaper, to the mosque project, announcing that the inhabitants were impatient to see their “Muslim Arts centre”built. The district mayor was immediately challenged on the question of the Muslim arts centre, and certain persons in charge of associations and policies thought that they had detected in this wording, a potential or real competition 227

OUT OF THE CELLAR

with the Arts centre of the Arab world, a secular association present in the district which did not have any link with the question of worship. - A third attack was made directly on the entire municipal team. During October 2003, the local press took up the theme of the public discussion following the vote after the initial deliberation, and this was due to a petition launched by the National Front in several districts of the city and the meaning was very clear: “Must our taxes be used to finance a mosque and a Buddhist temple in Roubaix6 ?” During the first six-month period of 2004, the industrial waste land was cleared, and the plot of land on which the future mosque was to be set up was prepared for construction. Preparations are under way to hold a new meeting, and the persons in charge at the municipal level were trying to lay the foundations for a dispassionate debate, by taking note of all the elements related to the needs expressed by the association and by proposing a concrete evaluation of the relevance of the architectural project. 2.3. A project with multi-faceted repercussions The key words “uncertainty” and “repercussions” are completely in line with the realities concerning the evaluation of the situation in Roubaix: uncertainty related to the interpretation and the political goodwill displayed with regard to the project pre-

The Far Right party even threatened to attack the debate on the long lease at the level of the ‘prefecture’ and the administrative court. The vicepresident of 2AI drafted a letter to respond to the allegations of the extremist party which was published in the local press on 29 October. The local press judged it opportune to bring out a dossier on the framework rules governing the exercise of worship in France and we were called upon to give our opinion. Meanwhile, the Extremist party had already, on 24 October, informed the ‘Prefect of these happenings so that he could put an end to the municipal debate on the grounds that it violated the articles on the Separation law. Since the Far Right party received no response whatsoever to its request, it then used the same arguments and took its case to the Administrative Court on 1 March 2004. With regard to the two written documents successively sent in to the Municipality by the Roubaix Extremists stating their case, the Municipality responded by drawing up two dossiers which stipulated the procedure and the legal clauses to be respected on the question of long leases. At the end of August 2004, the administrative court of Lille had not yet rendered its verdict, but the Far Right party will probably be non-suited. 6

228


sented by the Muslim association. On the one hand, the municipal consent came with several conditions, which have been mentioned previously, opening up the possibility of divergent interpretations on the part of the members of the municipal team and the promoters of the future mosque. Viewed from another angle, the members of Muslim association follow each decision making phase with a certain degree of scepticism, the administrative delays appeared to them to be very long and the coherence of the political action quite unfathomable. Also relations between the various participants changed with the events that occurred in local political life, some details of which have been mentioned. The combination of these various factors makes the methods of this research-action very complex insofar as the negotiation progressed, each new repercussion, not specifically related to this mosque project could cause strained relations between one or several actors and this resulted in the project being delayed yet again. In this context we could describe the simple case of the depollution survey discussed during the deliberations in December 2003, which aroused a whole series of suspicions on the state of the industrial waste land and the company dealing in energy matters that set up on this plot of waste land. The residents recently circulated a petition asking to know the exact state of soil pollution, and the extremist party in the city could see the possibility of putting an end to the mosque project while hoping at the same time to see the plot classified as being unsuitable for construction because of its supposed state of unsalubrity. It is also appropriate, at this stage of our study, to place this mosque project in the context of more global challenges related to local life where at least two other challenges were added to the list to make the analysis a little more complex: - First of all the park itself, the importance of which we had underestimated at the beginning of the project. While we are on this subject it should be said that the existing park is closed, and only opened to accomodate sporting events held on the playground located in its centre. Apart from these event slots, the park is almost inaccessible to people from the district, who feel hurt about this, in particular during the summer season. At the beginning, the district committee managed the opening of the park, with daily opening hours that was generally considered by the inhabitants as satisfactory. But then the town hall took over the manage229

OUT OF THE CELLAR

ment of the opening hours, which were reduced to the extreme. The result, for the inhabitants, is that it is practically impossible to walk in the park in good weather. Moreover, certain people living on the edge of the district were accustomed to crossing the park to get to the railway station and to take the train to their place of work. Today, they have to take the long way around. The district committee would like to manage the park again, and the mosque project once again raises the question of having an open park and not a closed one in the district. - Then there is the question of the leadership, internal in this case to the Muslim population in the district. There is indeed another informal place of prayer in the district, attended by whole families of Algerian repatriates, who have very close relations with each other. Until recently, these Muslims had not created an association for the purposes of worship, but after having been informed of the project concerning the new mosque presented by the 2AI association which was perceived as having a dominant Morrocan component, they contacted the Municipality in order to be directly associated with this project. The deliberations in December put forward the idea of constituting a “representative”association for the Muslims in the district. But does the next question ask about who can legitately address the Muslims? The repatriates feel they have been slighted because, until now, they are not represented in the2AI project, but the persons in charge of the association reply that there are already people of Algerian extraction in its leadership, and that it does not have the intention of turning into an ethno-Community association. They respond to the municipal injunction by insisting on their French identity, for those which have the nationality, as well as their religious identity, thus making the repatriates’ argument devoid of all legitimacy. The debates on this multiplicity of factors are far from being closed, and they give rise to questions concerning the uncovering of possible religious discrimination. From this point of view, it is not easy to isolate the elements that are specific to this relocalization project to find a place for Muslim worship nor to explain this to those who participated in the negotiation. Very often, the simple fact of using in-depth analyis to understand one local situation makes it possible to see other angles, certain standpoints or decisions taken by the political and institutional actors which could have been based on discrimination. Moreover, it sometimes takes a long while to understand the role of the various actors and the coherence of interactions between the various protagonists en230


gaged in the project, which is also another dimension of mature interpretation.

3. Contributions made by the research-action Before detailing the elements that are highlighted in this research, it is advisable to state that discrimination whether, effective or potential, which the Muslim communities at the local level can be victims of, can be curbed only if concrete work is achieved at two levels: - The first level concerns the legal aspects and demands precise knowledge of the parameters of the action entrusted to the local communities and the requests in matters pertaining to worship.Many municipalities think they are not covered by the legal framework of the law on Separation dating back to 1905, and that they could, in fact, benefit from real possibilities that should be taken into account. - The second level relates to work on mentalities, both with regard to the authorities, who sometimes have a pejorative image of the Muslims because the latter have difficulties in formulating their requests in an understandable language, and the Muslims who sometimes tend to pose as victims whereas their project is quite simply incomplete and this works against them. The research-action describes a starting situation where one can detect the weaknesses of the project bearers in the case of the construction of a new mosque, with regard to the design of the project and the incapability of being able to develop it so as to convince the municipal team. The current situation leads us to state that the optimum conditions for good results in projects that are presented by Muslim associations must include at least five parameters: - A peaceful local situation, favourable to consultation. On this point, it is clear that the extreme right wing parties generally seek, at the local level, to imbibe all the projects presented by Muslim associations with shades of meaning related to an invasive Islam. But more generally speaking, we understand the term “peaceful situation” to be one where a local councillor does not seek to manipulate a Community project in any way, either to have it controlled by a person close to him or someone known to him, or on a “scratch my back and I’ll scratch yours” basis which makes all the associative actors including the mayor and persons in charge, be231

OUT OF THE CELLAR

come involved in this perverse game that is conditioned by prerogatives. The Municipality of Roubaix has in this context, managed the situation very well, as we have already mentioned, by disseminating clear information to all the municipal partners, even those in the opposition, and by having a vote on the framework debate supposed to refer to all faiths concerned by any public action. - Obvious political good-will supported by openness with regard to the provisions contained in the law of 1905 on separation of the Church and the State. During the time of our research for information on the legal provisions resulting from the law of 1905, we were surprised by the low level of knowledge of the majority of the Muslim associative participants and many municipal elected officials. We are here in a real system of representation where every one has his own idea of the concepts involved which is very important: public and private domains, secularity,, prohibition of granting subsidies to religious entities, etc Many elected officials still think that a faith can be practised only by an association that is in compliance with the provisions of the law on Separation, and conversely, many Muslims are persuaded that being a member of a religious association according to the law of 1905, means being subjected to police control and stricter financial inspections. In the present research-action, we compiled several documents that in clude these different questions and we also organized explanatory meetings so that all the participants could discuss these points on the basis of the same information 7 . - A coherent project, presented by a Muslim association which was given credibility through work done through public relations. When they approach the local authorities, Muslims are not always easily understood by their interlocutors, and two principal reasons In this context, “From one world to another” had, during this period made an analysis of Muslim places of worship in the north of France, which gave rise to a publication entitled “French law on Cults applied to Islam” published by the association in September 2002.The association was requested by the town hall in Roubaix to obtain legal information pertaining to the margin of manoeuvre that the municipality would have when it came to the possibilities for aid in the area of renovation or relocation of a place of worship. As regards the project presented by Association 2AI, several meetings took place with the Director of the Mayor’s cabinet, the Director General of the Renewed City of Roubaix and the Municipal Councillor in charge of Cults with a view to setting out a thought process that would lead to the basis of the framework debate. 7

232


are responsible for this confusion 8 : gaps in the definition of the project, and in the technical and urban planning area.9 Technical supervision for the purpose of negotiation because despite the rather serene atmosphere in which it takes place, it could easily have degenerated as the hopes and expectations of the party concerned could easily be interpreted in a negative or pejorative manner. And, finally the “nonspecific” treatment of the question of Islam, by considering the requests formulated by the Muslims on the same basis as any other request received from any other association on the question of religion. The Muslims feel slighted, and rightly so, when a local councillor tells them that their request is not admissible whereas, at the same time, it is favourable towards requests asking it to intervene in religious matters that are not in its area of competence.. On the other hand, these same Muslims make a mistake by making certain demands with regard to buildIn fact, apart from the language difficulties that arose in the case of certain Muslim officials responsible for the associations, the latter often tended, despite the distinction made in the different activity areas mentioned in their statutes, to utilise terms such as “mosque” or “Islam” to designate a whole series of actions launched in the premises that they occupied, even when speaking about the premises themselves, whereas in the minds of the local community representatives to whom they were speaking, these terms referred to an area where the intervention of public authorities was not possible. In this context, it is therefore necessary for these persons to ask for pertinent explanations so that, apart from the vocabulary used, the precise contents of the demands would also be clarified, and they should also consult the various texts in force to understand the extent of the margin of manoeuvre that the local community has when it intervenes in these matters. 9 Apart from these stumbling blocks that arise when requests are made for the construction of a minaret or specific architecture for an exterior façade, which may not be in keeping with the existing urban framework, certain projects presented by Muslim associations might have inherent weaknesses with regard to security norms, ground occupancy plans, stipulations linked to the architecture of the building, modification of the utilisation of the existing building, access for handicapped persons, or the question of parking close to these premises. However, the reverse could also be true, when, for example, a Municipality is favourable towards a given project, the dossier presented by the Muslim association officials could meet with difficulties later on, if the stipulations made by the town hall are not accompanied by the explanations that are necessary, in clear, simple language, so that the Muslim dialogue partners understand the finer points of the project. 8

233

OUT OF THE CELLAR

ings owned by the local community that will be used for the practice of religious rites. Explanations are still necessary in many cases to avoid injustices on both sides. If it is not always possible to combine all these factors, the work of mediation and technical support will help to achieve progress in the files dealing with the establishment of places of worship. It can help to raise basic questions which are very often overlooked by the persons in charge of these places of worship, like the town halls which do not always give the required attention to these matters. For example, how can a mosque, or a Muslim arts centre represent a qualifying element in a district? Indeed, the creation of a place of worship is not an end in itself. Regarded as equipment of general interest within the meaning of the French legislation on town planning, the place of worship, for Muslims, can be likened to a true arts centre as, apart from canonical prayers that are recited, it offers several types of cultural activities from conferences that are open to the general public, to topics of interest to society, courses on the Arabic language and arab-Muslim culture, while at the same time being involved in the organization of religious festivals or other festive activities. This aspect constitutes one of the factors of suspicion against the mosques, which are generally perceived, wrongly, as being a kind of hiding place open to all kinds of wrong doings. But in order to work on the question of representation, the Muslim associative persons in charge must be encouraged to clarify the functionality of spaces in the development of their projects, and to use a language that will be understood by their non Muslim interlocutors.

3.1. Locating the actors of change In what we describe as “a game involving several partners and several dimensions”, we could try to offer advice on what is considered to be the “actors of change”, i.e. the key people who have a direct influence on the progress and especially on the results of the project. A short typology on the sphere of activities gives us several types of actors: - Political actors; - Administrative and technical or expert actors, generally agents in administrations concerned with the project; 234


- The economic actors, who can weigh in on the choice of policies; - Muslim associative actors; - Associative actors who are non -Muslims. In this range of actors who, at a given point in time, exert a certain influence, directly or indirectly on the project, two transversal categories are of particular interest to us: they are the “qualified actors” and the “legitimate actors”. By qualified actor, we mean any person having a specific skill allowing him to express a relevant opinion at certain key moments in the negotiation or to make a decision influencing the project directly. By legitimate actor, we mean any person who, because of the position he occupies in one of the areas quoted above, is recognized by the other partners in the project as being entitled to deliver an opinion or to make a decision. It is clear that, in this case, as in any negotiation process, the two categories do not inevitably overlap, and there are very perceptible conflicts of legitimacy. We can quote at least four of them: - as regards policies, the legitimacy of the district mayor was challenged several times on the pretext that he was only an elected official of the district and that only the mayor of the city was entitled to take the important decisions; - as regards the agents who play a technical role and have the required expertise, the arrival of a chargé de mission to examine questions on discrimination at the Renewed City of Roubaix throughout the year 2003 and who was elected, inter alia, to work on this file, meant that more meetings were held and relevant information was given to the politicians10 ; - within association 2AI, it will also be noted that the vicepresident was at the heart of all the initiatives taken at the level of However, at the same time, this agent had been a key player in the drawing up of the October debate, which was a prerequisite to the granting of a long lease, as well as the setting up of an association that included representatives of the immigrant population, and despite our reticence in view of the clauses contained in the Separation law, expressly forbidding State representatives to interfere in the internal organisation of religious associations. One question persists: why do political representatives appear, at certain times, to prefer the opinion of one “expert” rather than another. 10

235

OUT OF THE CELLAR

the town hall and the municipal services. He was the person responsible for arranging almost all the work meetings with the leaders of association, the architect or ourselves. He was also an actor who was very involved in local community life. He was thus considered by the Municipality as the most credible interlocutor on this project, second only to the president. That was the cause of great tension between the two men, the second accusing the first of wanting to replace him; - in more general terms, within the Muslim population of the district, the action of the repatriates, on the pretext that access to the new place of worship might perhaps be denied to them, impelled certain municipal actors to have recourse to “ethnic” logic whereas the town hall was simply dealing with a religious organization, knowing full well that any public building used for worship, in France, managed by an association in compliance with the law of 1905, is in fact open to all the public belonging to the faith concerned 11 . This general table would however be incomplete if we omitted to mention certain much more positive aspects of collaboration between qualified and legitimate persons. One can quote for example, the collaboration between the architect of the association, the town planning services of the Municipality and the architect for France. This latter gave a favourable opinion together with some observations on the architectural project for the new mosque, on the basis of the preliminary document provided by the architect and discussed with the town planning cabinet.

3.2. Which strategy/strategies can mobilize the actors? At this stage of our research-action, it is perfectly clear that the result of the discussions and the negotiation itself is played out on the medium term and with many subtleties in the attitudes of all concerned. One of the central aspects of the research-action remains to be defined - that of the positioning of an intermediate association, and the person qualified to lead the study relating to the project on the relocalization of the mosque.

Once again, the question is to know who is authorised to give the correct interpretation of a fact or a legal clause, and what is the meaning of a “representative” association when it comes to the diversity of a population as specified in the debate? 11

236


Let us say right away that sticking to a strictly neutral position is not only perceived as a challenge, but could prove counterproductive in the spirit of a research-action that is supposed to initiate good practices, or at any rate, practices for change. In our opinion, the intermediate association must play a triple role: - information:supervision; - awareness building. In this case, we were able to initiate a mobilization strategy for the various actors. In order to do this, we had to use our legitimacy as sociologists and, then through our knowledge of the problems relating to Islam, and finally by making a concrete contribution to the thought process of the associative and institutional actors by providing them with relevant documents on the legal provisions governing the practice of the religious worship in France. Two elements particularly helped us in this task. The first was the approaching celebration of the centenary of the law on separation, which created a climate of discussion on the institutionalization of Islam. The second was the positive way in which the majority of the French political community considers the question of visibility to be given to the places of Muslim worship. However, it was necessary to avoid falling into the trap of instrumentalisation by the various actors involved in the project, regardless of who they are, and how they perceive the questions of legal integration of Muslim worship and the facilitation of the construction of mosques, in order to avoid biais in the relation. As far as we are concerned, our work took us in two directions, which is relevant in view of the results obtained. The first was the setting up of a network of associative actors in the field. Our interventions at the level of Roubaix-Hope, several meetings held within the district and our insistent attitude with regard to the persons in charge of 2AI so that they include an existing associative network made for a dispassionate debate on the question of the mosque. The second direction is to do with methodology. Coherence needed to be injected in the requests formulated by the Muslim association, by linking them to the “mosque” project, and then translating them into language that would be understood by the town hall, i.e. by using vocabulary familiar to the laity. The skill in doing this work lay in the capacity of the dossier to emphasize the Community dimension of the project while placing it at the same time in the context of existing reality. From this point of view, it seems that the general content of the project is no longer called into question by the Municipality, but the results of this 237

OUT OF THE CELLAR

research-action will ultimately reside in the capacity of the project bearers to secure their credibility and the intermediate association should not interfere but allow them a free hand in the process of negotiation. It is thus necessary to take account of the time factor and to let the persons in charge of the Muslim association take charge of their destiny.

238


Respect, fair treatment and Community power: working with the Muslims of Granada Enrique E. Raya Lozano12 Abstract Towards the end of the year 2001 we started to work out a research-action project with the objective of developing our knowledge about the situation of the Muslim communities which have settled in Granada, to know more about their more or less problematic contacts with the institutions of the local government and the associative fabric of the greater part of society. This initiative was taken in response to an invitation sent to us by our Belgian colleagues who were eager to set up a mainly European transnational network Keywords: Granada, Spain, Muslim communities, equal treatment, respect, Islamophopia. “Europa tendrá que acostumbrarse a la idea de que la cultura musulmana y el Islam no son un referente lejano que España extirpó de sus raíces en los albores a la Edad Moderna, sino a rasgo consustancial de nuestras sociedades” M. Castells 13 (2003).

Enrique E. Raya Lozano, philosopher, is professor in social work and social policy at the University of Granada. Email: [email protected]. Local intervention has been achieved in collaboration with the Municipality of Granada. The work that was coordinated by Enrique Raya and Angeles Blanco and benefited from the contributions made by the following members of the ‘Seminario de Estudios para la Intervencion Social et Educativa (SEPISE) from the University of Granada: Sophie Garaicoechea, Miriam Llorens, Luis Campos Saavedra and Pietro Soddu and the “Association de Médiateurs Interculturels” (ASMIN): El Hadji A. Faye and Mohamed ElHaddad, as well as Farideh Servi and Vanessa Sanchez Maldonado, social workers from the “Association Trabajadores Sociales Sin Fronteras. Translated from Spanish by Sophie Garaicoechea. 13 “Europe should get used to the idea that the Muslim culture and Islam are not remote references that Spain has eradicated from its roots at the dawn of the Modern Age, but a constitutive trait of our societies” Migration Letters, Volume: 2, No: 3, pp. 239 – 265. December 2005 (ISSN: print: 1741-8984 & online: 1741-8992) 12

MUSLIMS OF GRANADA

Towards the end of the year 2001 we started to work out a research-action project with the objective of developing our knowledge about the situation of the Muslim communities which have settled in Granada, to know more about their more or less problematic contacts with the institutions of the local government and the associative fabric of the greater part of society. This initiative was taken in response to an invitation sent to us by our Belgian colleagues (IRFAM) who were eager to set up a mainly European transnational network The attacks on the World Trade Center in New York took place two months before the start of the Granada project. In this “global village”which has received a great deal of media attention, the events had an impact on the conscience of the people and the communities “in real time”; in this globalized world, where everything has an effect on everything, where everything has a more or less obvious connection, where the effects of “here” respond to the causes of “over there”, the local level cannot be explained without the global one. In this permanence and continuity of the processes, the physical and moral safety of the actors, scientific work and the intervention practices must comprehend contingency, that part of the unpredictable and the unsuspected“event”: either the scientist takes refuge in the bureaucracy of academic research and cynically shuns any type of commitment to values, or adjusts himself in one way or another to the multiform and multidirectional requests made by people, groups and communities to have social improvement. One way in which the second option can be adopted is to engage in applied social research applied or even researchaction, in direct contact with the populations and their problems, and with the professionals in social assistance, education, mediation and orientation. In this case, it should be understood that projects have their own logic, not completely foreign to the intentions of the researchers, but which, to a great extent, escape them because of diversification of the partners and because they are linked to the unstable realities of social action, thus transforming, in a certain manner, research-action into a “process without a subject 14 ”. The project undertaken with the Muslim communities of Granada went through several readjustments duringthe course of its realization. We thus had to adjust the first action proposals to the expectations and requests of the actors involved (local Islamic 14

For example, Althusser, 1969.

240

ENRIQUE E. RAYA LOZANO

community, mainly), to the development of the thought process within the team (researchers and mediators who were not experts in Islam, even if they were knowledgeable on “related topics” like social policy, social exclusion, migration, social work, Community action), and finally, to the dynamics of the local government. We also had to modify our research and action strategies and evenhad to resort to tactical measures on the question of the thought process reflection and non-action. Two events that produced multiple effects forced our hand in a way: they were the war in Iraq (2003) and the violent attacks in Madrid dating back to 11 March 2004. These events and their repercussions left their mark on the Granada project staff right from the outset until the very end of the final drafting15 .

1. Granada: socio-urban and historical context The town of Granada belongs to the current autonomous Andalusian Community. This area enjoys a high degree of selfgovernment in a decentralized country like Spain is today the organization which is close to the federal state. It is one of the most important Spanish cities from the historical point of view being given its Hispano-Muslim past. The Nasride Kingdom in Granada was the last Islamic state in Western Europe and it surrendered to the troops of the Catholic Kings of Castille and Aragon. The latter, after having conquered the city, drew up a project “for national unification” based mainly on the Catholic religion thus bringing about one of the first NationStates of modern times, which very quickly became an Empire. The last Muslims of Al-Andalous, the Granadians, had to convert to Catholiscism or leave their country after having occupied it for more than seven centuries 16 . However, the pact for the maintenance of Islamic worship, signed between Isabelle, Ferdinand and On 12 July 2004, in the publication entitled ‘Ideal’ one reads that the head of Al Quaeda in Europe sued for the 11-M and 11-S attacks, lived in Granada during the 90’s. El Pais dated 21 October 2001 published a report entitled “Albaicin in the shadow of Bin Laden: the war in Afghanistan throws doubt on the relations in the Granada neighbourhood dominated by the Muslim community”. 16 The Muslim State of Granada was founded by Zawi ben Ziri, founder in chief of the Ziri dynasty which governed the ‘taïfa’ in Granada from 1013 onwards. The dissolution of the Cordou Caliphate in the tenth century gave rise to the setting up of several similar reigns. 15

241

MUSLIMS OF GRANADA

the Nasride king Abú' Abd Al Muhammad (Boabdil), on November 25, 149117 were the stakes for handing over the city to the invaders 18 after a long siege. The conquerors entered the city after it had been abandoned by the vanquished party on 2 January, 149219 .

Reference is made to the “Capitulations of Santa Fe”for the handing over of Granada, from the name of the village situated close to the city which, today, is integrated into the greater metropolitan area. It is the place where the invaders settled down and the signature of the treaty, as well as the place where Christopher Columbus received the support of Isabella of Castilla for his maritime adventure. 18 In the treaty it is stipulated that the reign of Granada will be integrated into “Las Espanas”a political entity formed by the reunion of the crowns of Aragon (Ferdinand V) and Castilla (Isabella I). The reigning dynasty was to guarantee, under the terms in the “Capitulations Treaty” the right to live and to physical integration of the population, to freedom of worship and practice of religion as well as other personal and communal rights, as, for example, conservation of property and income. The dynasty claimed to maintain the administrative and legal structures as well as Islamic law which were followed by the majority of Muslims in the city. However, a short while after Boabdil and several thousands of Grenadines crossed the Straits of Gibraltar, the agreement was rejected on the pretext that there was resistance on the part of Islamic Grenadines, known as the “Moors”. The ethno-religious cleaning thus went on through the Inquisition tribunals with legal and religious repression, war waged on the rebels and expulsion of those populations to the Maghreb region who refused to convert to Catholicism. The last expulsion of the kind dates back to 1609 (Dominguez Ortiz and Vincent, 1985). 19 Later on, the Spanish State initiated a politico-military celebration in Granada at the local level: “the Day of the Capture of Granada”, a symbol of national unity exalted during the Franco dictatorship by both the army and the Catholic Church. Since Spain became a democratic entity and towards the end of the 70’s, the settling of the first Muslim Sufi communities made up of converts, each year there is an important citizen movement taken up by the medias and sometimes echoed in the streets, where alternative acts are celebrated to oppose this official celebration, questioning the meaning, the symbols and the permanent quality of such events, which are still being organised by the municipality. If we examine the historical significance of the Granada attack, we could agree with Vincent (2002) when he states that: “The European world has lost track of the rupture that the event of 2 January 1492 signified. The disappearance of the last Muslim State in western Europe not only upset the political equilibrium in the Mediterranean world, but also imperilled the future of the minority populations and the transmission of an extremely rich source of knowledge”. 17

242


Thus in this city, where the Catholic Kings are buried, there is one of the monuments of medieval Islam of great international reputation, Alhambra. The political buildings (Royal Palace), urban buildings (Medina), agri-recreational buildings (Generalife) and the defence buildings (Alcazaba) of this architectural structure are both the emblem of national unity (and of nationalist Catholicism) and the last Western bastion of Dar-Al-Islam in the minds of Muslims and Arabs. According to statistics dating back to the end of 2003, 237 66320 people live in the Municipality of Granada (Raya Lozano et Al, 2001). Granada has achieved significant growth over the past twenty years, creating around it a vast residential area thanks to the progressive growth of the municipalities that are situated not very far away and which fulfill a residential function. The overall metropolitan area today has a population of more than 450 000 inhabitants and in the whole of the province there are 828 107 people. Granada is characterized by a “process of intra-metropolitan duality” (Castells, 1987, 49-51): one notes the coexistence of spaces and populations, on the one hand, dynamic and blessed with a certain economic prosperity that owes its existence to certain opportunities (tourism, conferences, university,…), and, on the other hand it is marked by a certain vulnerability, and even exclusion. Granada is thus a city that shares certain characteristics specific to Andalusia21 . Its population is made up of groups that are in the grips of social problems of marginalisation and a particularly high rate of unqualified young people who have failed a great number of times at school and who come from marginal backgrounds resulting from marginal, “racialized”groups, discriminated against like the Gipsies and, more recently, like the Maghrebians. The city has also a very low activity ratio in particular with regard to the female population with abundant numbers of young women without school education and single-parent families. One notes a shortOf which 127 246 are women; 19.84% are young people under 20; 17.30% are persons over 65. There is a total of 5 974 foreign residents, but it would appear that this figure must be multiplied by 4 to include illegal immigrants and those who do not possess residence permits. 21 The most recent data available for the province of Granada (2003) show the following results: a total activity rate standing at 49.82%, with a total unemployment rate of 14.79%. Gender differences show that the activity rate for men is 63.46% and for women 37.12%; the total unemployment rate for men stands at 11.22% and for women, the figure climbs to 20.46%. 20

243

MUSLIMS OF GRANADA

age of educational, economic and social resources for women and there is a permanent incidence of ill-treatment towards them. Granada is city which suffers from a lack of housing and one part of the population is itinerant especially the new immigrants, the majority of whom are Muslims with no official residence documents from the Maghreb and sub-Saharan regions. Granada also has a university with one of the highest attendance rates in Andalusia which greatly attracts students from the European Union and Morocco 22 . However, these students experience great difficulties in finding jobs as is the case with all young people. There is a service economy in the city and one observes the development of an “informal economy” which is rapidly expanding particularly in the field of tourism. The province of Granada has one of the lowest occupation and activity rates in Andalusia, in general much lower than those found in the other regions in Spain. The rate of unemployment is slightly higher here than in the whole of Andalusia. In Granada, the women have lower occupation and activity rates as compared to men. From the demographic point of view, there has been a steady decline in population numbers in the centre of Granada for several years now. This can be explained by the exodus towards the suburban areas and also by the falling birthrate figures, even if these figures are currently slowing down thanks to the fertility of the gipsy population (present in the area since the XVI century) and the new immigrant population essentially made up of extracommunity Muslims. An important change has taken place in the age structure of the local population which is fast ageing. Before 1998, the migratory flows from the provinces were slightly negative but after this date the trend is being slowly reversed. Within this general context, one can easily identify the dualisation of urban space. The northern part of the city is experiencing the gravest difficulties, namely the lack of job security on the labour market, drug dependancy, delinquency, ethnic stigmatization, ill-treatment of old people and women, a high incidence of HIV-AIDS, and the collapse of family units. Three districts in this area are particularly affected: Almanjayar, La Paz and Caseria de Within the European Union, the University of Granada is the one that attracts the highest number of scholarship students who participate in the Socrates-Erasmus mobility programme (in 2002-2003 there were 1 581 out of a total of 59 853 students). 22

244


Montijo. On the whole, it is estimated that 6 000 people in this part of the city have important social problems. They belong to Spanish gipsy families and are not the (“payas”) gipsies. Extreme situations are also found in the districts of Molino Nuevo and Las Parcelas (approximately 2 000 people). The Muslim population in this region (Maghrebian immigrants) lives mainly in La Paz and Caseri de Montijo. Albaicin is the second region that is saturated by social problems, especially in the low lying part known as Zenete, the districts of San Ildefonso, San Pedro, Haza Grande, and in the caves situated on the highlands of Sacromonte where mainly itinerants and beggars have recently taken up residence.There is also a flourishing handicraft import trade, managed mainly by young Maghrebians (students, immigrants and illegal residents), who, together with the Spaniards who have been converted to Islam, have organized a dynamic ethnic trade here (commercial activities, butcheries and “halal”restaurants). These activities constitute tourist attractions and are contributing to a rapid urban restoration of the area. The new Muslim communities, the majority of which is made up of immigrants, are trying to settle here and progress in this urban environment filled with contrasts in the difficult socio-professional environment in Granada.

2. Legal, political and institutional context The political context in which the Granada chapter of the religious and social cohesion project went ahead was constituted, in general, by socio-economic globalisation and its effects on populations (migratory movements, weaknesses), on work (the model of the wage earning society in crisis), on the culture (cultural diversification) and on institutions (loss of importance of the Nation-State, emergence of new political actors). At a secondary level, one notes the recurrent question of identity in the political debates 23 . In the Granada context, this means:

“(…) social and political trends characteristic of the 90’s favours the construction of social and political actions on the basis of primary identities be they historical or geographical in nature or even if they correspond to recent construction in the search for meaning and spirituality. The first steps taken by information societies seem to be characterised by the preeminence of identity as an organisational principle” (Castells, 1998, 48). 23

245

MUSLIMS OF GRANADA

- Ccitizenship which not only has the Spanish State as its reference base but also, on a lower level, Junta de Andalucia (many Granadins are Spanish and Andalusian; some feel rather more Andalusian than Spanish). One also finds the Municipality on the lower rungs of the political hierarchy, and it is called upon to provide more services and skills on a daily basis. And finally, above this entity “with variable geometry” that one calls Spain24 , there is the Union European which brings in new stimuli, discussions and resources. - Serious political tensions exist within the social fabric and in the electorate because of the various ways of designing management strategies for globalisation and its cultural and religious impact. This tension is present between the “conservative right” and the “pluralist left”, without forgetting “democratic nationalism”, even, in a very minority situation, the “terrorist ethno-nationalism” to which we can add, since the 11-March, religious terrorism25 . - There is difficulty of coordination and consolidation among citizens and institutions that are caught in the trap of diversification of identity references. From a legal point of view, the intervention framework is made up of the Spanish Constitution guaranteeing religious freedom (1980), the agreements between the State and the Islamic Community of Spain (199226 ), and the strong administrative decentralization of the State in favour of a regional power (Junta de Andalucia) and a local institution with widening legal and political powers (Municipality of Granada). But these institutions have different and sometimes contradictory ways of designing and interpreting this legal facet: they have, for example, public policies that do not align with the principles of respect, equal treatment and integration of the Muslim communities. Thus, the conservative government of the Popular Party had

The debate on national identity is becoming complicated in Spain owing to the “Basque problem” and also because of the demands made by the nationalists, as is the case in Catalonia. 25 More so because, historically speaking, unity based on regional identity has entered the fight against “infidels” and “barbarians” and in this case, “Christianity” is being pitted against an “infidel Islam”. 26 A Cooperation agreement signed by the Spanish State and the Islamic Commission of Spain (approved by the Law 26/1992 of 10 November, B.O.E. of 12 November). 24

246


maintained a policelike perception of migration and had joined hands with the most conservative sectors of the Catholic Church. It is necessary to bear in mind this background in order to examine the research-action carried out with the Muslim communities to identify their problems and their dynamics, together with the specific type of religious discrimination that they encounter, in a city where conservative Catholicism is predominant and, to a lesser extent, a form of militant secularism. In the light of these statements it is possible to understand how the political and social contexts determine the results of the actors’s work and their interactions. In this local project five principal types actors will be described: - The-target-actors (Muslim people of Granada), immigrants and converts 27 ; - Public (local government); - Actors engaged in social and sociocultural action (associations, non-profit-making entities), mediation professionals; - Communication bodies; - and scientific experts. The target-actors are both participants and beneficiaries of the project. They are organized in “Islamic religious entities” around premises meant for the exercise of prayers (mosque or oratory). We have taken into account the Muslims who manage the mosques and those which take part in all kinds of activities that arise from these places of worship. Men and women, adults and young people were included. These religious entities are: - The mosque “Al-Taqwa” or “Del Al Temor”; - The “Omar” mosque; - The foundation “ Mosque of Granada”; - The “Assalam” or “La Paz” mosque; - The “El Centro islámico oratory of Granada”;

“(…) an adequate analysis of Islam in Europe must take into account the characteristics of the host society and the treatment meted out to the Islamic population. It should not forget to analyse cases where people have chosen Islam and the significance of this choice” (Wieviorka, 2003, 180). 27

247

MUSLIMS OF GRANADA

- The “Masalikal Yinan” or “Jinan”mosque. It will be noted that if several of these institutions were fully consolidated at the beginning of the project (Al-Taqwa and Omar mosques), others were stimulated by the project on “Faiths and Social cohesion” in their structuring (La Paz). In addition, the “Granada mosque”, already known before the period 2002-2004, carried out important architectural work during the duration of the project (inauguration of an important building with a minaret, park and Islamic arts centre in July 2003), this constitutes one of the highlights of the initiative and an international meeting was organised there. Yet others, which existed only as religious organizations, seized the opportunity to become mosques during the process of the research-action. Mezquita de Granada or Mezquita Mayor is located in the upper part of the district of Albaicin, very well known for its medieval Hispano-Muslim origins, was declared a Cultural Heritage by UNESCO. The initiative for its construction - partly financed by the United Arab Emirates – was taken by a local Islamic community the majority of whom were Europeans converted to Islam belonging to a tariqa (Murabitun). The Al-Taqwa mosque has a majority of Maghrebian people even if the director is a converted Spaniard. The Assalam mosque (or La Paz) and the Omar mosque are managed by Arab immigrants (Palestinian and Moroccan respectively); they essentially are for immigrants, especially Maghrebians, even if there are some converts among the faithful.. The most recent is the Masalical Yinan mosque. It is made up mainly of Senegalese immigrants and remains in contact with a Senegalese tariqa. All the mosques follow the Sunnite teachings and almost allof them adhere to malekite jurisprudence. Finally, an oratory deals mainly with prayer (salat) and is used as a place for meetings. It is an informal structure. The project did not take into account other existing places of worship in the city since they were mainly residential places or neighbourhood places, often located in private houses. The public partners in the project are mainly representatives of the Municipality of Granada who supported it officially. At the beginning of the project, the Spanish Workers’ Socialist Party, the United Left and the regionalistic Andalusian party managed the commune. The two municipal departments directly involved in the initiative as a co-financiers were the department of education and the labour and social welfare department. These departments changed their political colours in May 2003, after the local elections 248


gave the majority to the Popular Party. This had repercussions on the work being carried out. The civil society actors were essentially involved in field work. They were associations and non-profit organizations which had direct relations with the Muslim communities or which manifested an interest in the integration of the Islamic religion in Spanish life (ecumenical associations, anti-racist associations, etc). The work with the associative world was very intense at the beginning of the programme, was temporarily neglected later on and was revived finally with the objective that sought to create a system of networking to combat religious discrimination: The Albaicin residents association brought the citizens of this historical district together with an important Muslim presence; The Granada Acoge association belongs to a network of Andalusian support associations intended for immigrants; The Caritas organization is a body for social action of the Catholic Church; - Cruz Roja Española renders humanitarian services (welcome service for immigrants “without papers”, for example), orientation services for immigrants, with offers of socio-professional integration; - S.O.S-Racismo Granada is an association that combats racism; Trabajadores Sociales Sin Fronteras brings together various social workers in the framework of a non-governmental organization which is active in the field of cooperation and development and inter ethnic and intercultural relations. Its origins are to be found in training work in the School of Social Work of the University of Granada. This association was specifically given the responsibility of exploring the roles of social and community action which the mosques and other Islamic entities are engaged in, in the city of Granada; Last but not least, the Asociación de Mediadores Interculturales (ASMIN) was the partner responsible for the concrete management of the project. It is composed of social workers and mediators, the majority of whom are immigrants. Its sphere of activity extends across Andalusia and its objectives are to develop intercultural mediation. Its members hold certificates of expertise in intercultural mediation delivered by the Centre for Continuous Train249

MUSLIMS OF GRANADA

ing of the University of Granada, directed by the Department of Anthropology and Social Work. The local press was regarded as one of the partners of the project. The local media in Granada have a great influence on public opinion. These are especially the television channels (Localia, TVIdeal, Telenieve, etc) and the written press (La Opinion de Granada, Granada Hoy and, especially, the oldest and most influential: Ideal). The media watchdog easily understands that treatment of the questions related to Islam is often marked by ignorance which can be surprising in view of the historical past of the city. One will note for example the confusion between, the words “islamist” and “Islamic”, sometimes even“islamologist”… This increases confusion and becomes the source of prejudice against the Muslim population. Careful attention was therefore paid to these public actors. The final category of actors concerned are the professors and the students studying for a doctorate at the Seminario de Estudios para Intervención Social y Educativa (SEPISE) who are active in the fields of social welfare, migrations and social exclusion as perceived from a practical point of view. This team does not include experts in islamology, even if some had “initial” knowledge of the history of this religion. However, “the new social panorama (defined by ethnic and cultural heterogeneity at the time of the globalisation) must acquire knowledge through research instead of through ideology” (Alsayyad and Castells, 2003, 24). Thus, research becomes essential to social action because the answers to the dilemmas that exist are different for each country, and often, for each region inside a country.

3.

Principles, processes and products

Four major concerns of the research-action Granadian team were thus transformed into basic postulates: - Empowerment of the religious communities. The fight against discrimination and for integration or respect of fundamental human rights (Sennett, 2003) implies the empowerment of people, groups and communities. However, if this action that seeks to liberate those concerned falls within the competence of the people concerned, who are in situations of fragility, institutional and sociocultural discrimination, internal conflicts with groups and there is an unwillingness to move out of one’s own culture, supervision 250


or help from legitimate actors can be a determining factor to increase inter and intracommunity cohesion and to surmount obstacles. Media Visibility of religious aspects. In a context of latent racism, xenophobia or spreading islamophobia, visibility of actions, explanations of practices in worship and the significance of religious worship, as well as cultural practices are of primary importance. Local means of communication must be used. Awareness building as regards religious and ethnic discrimination. In the Spanish situation, it must be pointed out that anti-discriminatory awareness is not very developed within the population. It is not present either in the legislation, or in public policies, or even in the research practices, especially with regard to discrimination of an ethnic or religious nature (the first initiatives of this type date back to the Nineties). An anti-discriminatory project in research-action in the religious field must thus make researchers, field personnel, decision makers and social mediators aware of this, as well as the Muslim communities themselves. In this matter, the dissemination of information on the legal framework and the realities in other countries is necessary, as well as the personal accounts of people who have been victims of discrimination. Social Participation of the religious leaders. A researchaction project for social participation and the non-discriminatory treatment of the Muslim communities must insist on direct participation of the communities concerned, and also the participation of its institutional and religious leaders or Community leaders. This process is complex and difficult, involving dangers of distortion of the scientific work realised during ideological or theological debates bearing on religious dogmas. But these steps are enriching and realizable if a “translation” of the religious principles is done in context making it possible to separate the social and institutional contents if each person maintains his independence of mind in the respect of diversity. From these postulates, the project “Faiths and Social cohesion. The Muslim communities of Granada” developed over a period of nearly three years in various contexts, like the mosques of Granada.

251

MUSLIMS OF GRANADA

3.1. Intervention in the mosques and Community centres: moving towards towards a federation The mosque has a complex function to fulfill as an Islamic institution in the everyday life and the spiritual life of Muslims. In a migratory and minority context, it is, in addition to being a place of worship, an area of social organization, emotional resourcing and Community reinforcement. It offers Muslims the possibility of taking various initiatives and obtaining information without too much difficulty. The mosque can also be a place of representation and mediation, for example, in intracommunity conflicts. In short, it is about an area of socialization and (re) production of ideas and power (Moreras, 1999; Vercellin, 2003). Direct contact with the communities makes it possible to reinforce and clarify these first observations28 . According to our Muslim interlocutors, one should avoid confusion in the terms “Muslim association” and “mosque”. The first can be purely formal: an association exists from the moment it is registered with the Ministry for Justice 29 . The second requires minimal installations, regular responsibilities and an organization which supports a series of varied and continuous activities. Apart from the practical difficulty of identification of mosques and Muslim associations in the city and subsequent clarification of their roles and resources, it is necessary also to underscore the fact that Muslim communities had the feeling, for the very first time, that they were “subjects” of a research project. At the beginning of the intervention, this was an obstacle because it was necessary to overcome mistrust and replace it with respect for the university institutions. But later on, the Muslim institutions participated fully in the project. Convinced of the interest of the project, they could Details of the methodological aspects of the research-action developed in Granada can be found in a Spanish publication shortly to appear in the Maristan editions. The part describing the work done in the context of the Granada mosques is based on the report by Sophie Garaicochea entitled “The Granada Mosques”. 29 Registration is a voluntary act; however, the Spanish constitution and the Organic Law on Religious Liberties, LOLR (7/1980), guarantee freedom of worship and protect the development of religious activities, without insisting that the persons concerned form an association. However, if the activities have to be supported and for the agreements and the conventions to be signed, “Churches and Religious Communities” must set themselves up associations and register with the Ministry of Justice (General directorate of Religious Affairs), in order to acquire a legal personality (article 5, 6 & 7 of the LOLR). This initiative also exempts them from paying municipal taxes. 28

252


be qualified as actors and progressed in the consolidation of Muslim life in Granada, respecting its diversity, like the institutionalization of mosques as components of the urban and socio-cultural landscape. Work was undertaken with each of the mosques and associations, but also collectively, bringing together several mosques at different times for: the purpose of surveys and collecting information; to negotiate with the Municipality; to analyze the economic situation (for example, after the attacks of March 11); to organize Islamic festivals (Id Al Fitr, November 2003) and cultural initiatives (international symposium on“Islam and Secularity” on January 29, 2004; etc). The associative dynamics, the management style of the Community leaders, activities, speeches, objectives pursued and positions taken up with regard to public institutions, as well as the total social fabric were analyzed for a better understanding of Islam in Granada, taking account of the social conditions, the political positioning and the ethno-national origins of the groups. The difference observed between the immigrant Muslims and the Muslim converts thus showed up like a deep dividing line: the analysis emphasises the role of the converts in the future of Islam in Europe. “The idea seems to offer a liberal variety of Islam which appears acceptable to the Muslim immigrants as well as to European civil societies, by the fact of adapting to ideas of secularity and individual citizenship that are in keeping with modern democracy. Saying all this in another way, Euro-Islam is a culturally acceptable religion, adapted to the civic culture of modernity (…). The policy of Euro-Islam would not permit, in any case, a complete assimilation of Muslims, but it would suppose the adoption of forms for a civil society that could produce an illustrated and open Islamic identity, compatible with European civic culture” (Bassam Tibi, 2003, 64-65). The project “Faiths and Social cohesion” also made it possible to legitimise the mosque in the eyes of the local authorities, civil society and the media, as an entity for worship and culture. Paradoxically, it was also necessary to carry out the same efforts of valorization within the Muslim communities. Thus, intercommunity dynamics were created: it raised contradictions and debates within the Muslim communities themselves, which resulted in tensions, but also in reflections on the various roles that Islam could play in Granada, Spain and Europe. If we saw positions appearing which challenged the interference of the Spanish State or civil society which is in a majority position, in the life of the Mus253

MUSLIMS OF GRANADA

lims – or the possibility of Islamization of the host country -, one notes also that there were less “critical” speeches, and a more favourable attitude for the adaptation of Islam to the general institutions in Spanish democracy, within the framework of a policy in favour of citizenship. But, one stresses the importance of the fact that the policy in favour of citizenship must indeed guarantee freedom and support for religious practices. It will be noted that the questions specifically related to religious discrimination took time to emerge at the level of the persons in charge of the Muslim communities: one of them recognized the fact that the researchaction was truly revealing in the matter. At the end of the debates, the Muslim communities concluded that it would be necessary to build the “Granada City Council of Mosques” to benefit from increased assistance and also to increase their visibility as legitimate and qualified actors and citizens. Four mosques thus decided to set themselves up as a federation, creating mechanisms for representation. The Foundation Mezquita de Granada did not accept the idea of formalization, but remains open to the idea of regular meetings with other actors on concrete topics of common interest. This process of Community organization was put forward in the course of the research-action by various factors including co-operation with the Municipality, but also because of the attacks of March 11 and the need to have a representation in the media, in order to prevent islamophobia. One thus noted that there was mistrust among the Muslim associations themselves; the cause of this could be the registration or not of the associations with the one of the two Spanish Islamic federations which form the Islamic Commission of Spain (ICS). It is noted that those which do not form part of it are especially converts from the Foundation “Mosque of Granada”. 3.2. The intervention around the question of the Muslim cemetery30 : towards the recognition of rights The dossier on the question of the cemetery was one of the problems concerning municipal management in the context of Islam and this was taken into account by the initiative. It is about a fundamental set of themes prone to controversies within the MusThis part is based on the report drawn up by Pietro Soddu, who is a doctorate student at the University of Granada and José Antonio Munoz, a lawyer and manager of a municipal firm responsible for the Granada cemetery (EMUCESA) The contributions made by the latter have been of vital importance . We would like to thank him for his collaboration. 30

254


lim communities themselves as well as between them and the Municipality: it has the merit of testing the limits of the degree to which the Islamic difference is accepted or not in Spain. This topic had been discussed at the beginning of the project, but its practical aspects were considered only later on, given the dates of the negotiations between the Muslim community and the Municipality of Granada. It will be noted that the transactions between the Muslims and the municipality in connection with the Muslim rites of burial had already been discussed before the research-action began. The arrival of the University and the mediators as new actors in this dossier showed up the resistance of the Muslim leaders because the appearance of the new actors questioned their capacity as “representatives”. In Granada, there is a secret cemetery that exists since the Franco period. It is situated beside the municipal cemetery, on the hill of Alhambra. Franco had received help from the Moroccan soldiers during the Spanish Civil war (1936-1939). The government which took power after a military coup then built, at the height of the war, together with the municipal decision makers of the “national zone”, several cemeteries for the Muslims killed on the battle field. These facts are the reason for the current demands being made by the Muslims in the city. Thus, the historical and legal examination of this file reveals important facts: according to law 49 of November 3, 1978, for example, “communes' are obliged to see that the burials which are carried out in their cemeteries are done without discrimination of any kind for religious or any other reason” (art 1). Similarly, according to law 26 of November 10, 1992 (art 2-5), “the Islamic cemeteries enjoy statutory rights. It is recognized that the Islamic communities, belonging to the Islamic Commission of Spain, are entitled to use the burial grounds reserved for Islamic burials in the municipal cemeteries, and have the right to have their own Islamic cemeteries. Suitable measures will be adopted for the conservation of the Islamic traditional rites relating to the burial, burial places and burial rites which will be carried out with the intervention of the local Islamic community”. If the Muslim community in the town of Granada insists on its prerogatives on the basis of these historical reports, many administrative obstacles could be raised. For example, only Muslims in the Islamic Commission of Spain or in one of its local representations, in theory, have this right. Thus several representatives of Muslim communities constituted the “Islamic Council” as a local antenna of the Islamic Commission of Spain and signed a convention with 255

MUSLIMS OF GRANADA

the Municipality on October 25, 2002. This agreement envisages the installation of a “patio” that would border the municipal cemetery of Granada where the stated historical burials and the later clandestine burials took place, but the non federated Muslim groups are not included in this scheme. In addition, the local public authority had, for this reason, to modify its rules with regard to the adjudication of territories for burial purposes, bearing in mind the fact that due respect had to be given to the customs, beliefs and rites of the Islamic religion. It was a question of modifying the legislation on the “funeral policies” and public health which depend on the Autonomous Community of Andalusia. The global modifications to the Agreements came about in 1992 between the State and the Muslims, but the local legislative adaptation was carried out in Andalusia after the demands were made by the Granada Muslims to the city Municipality.. This shows how Islam has modified certain aspects in Western societies. It must be noted that the Catholic Church continues to exert its influence on the question of funerals in the cities and must be included in discussions on any modification of this type. However, the cemetery file will start to move forward when the municipal public company EMUCESA will be set up in Granada - its principal objectives are to remove all religious considerations in public administrations thus aligning them with the constitutional norm, showing that the defence of the minorities and cultural and religious diversity can be managed in a non-partisan way, thus setting itself up as an arbitrator for the different groups that make up civil society. It should however be pointed out that there is a disagreement concerning the property rights of the land concerned, because the Alhambra site is laying claim to it acting under the authority of the Spanish State,and so is the Municipality whose Junta Andalucia holds the land in trust. Lastly, the development of this site is linked to the structural financing accorded by the EU. Internal divisions within the Muslim community are part of these obstacles. Initially, the Granadian Muslims have difficulties in understanding the institutional dynamics of a public administration and in particular the emergence of the public company EMUCESA which they wrongly tend to confuse with a commercial undertakers’ business. Secondly, there is a question of symbolic importance which is more bothersome to the converts than to the immigrants. What will be the name of this new burial ground? Will 256


it be autonomous or integrated into the San Jose cemetery where the origin of the name dates back to the time, not so far away, where the Catholic Church managed public cemeteries? It emerges, in the final analysis, that it is difficult to maintain the adenominational character of the State: since the existence of the public enterprise EMUCESA, there is a funerarium made up of rooms and modulable spaces which apply to all types of rites: Jewish, Catholic, Buddhist, etc, but does not offer specific areas for each community. One suspects in view of all this beating about the bush that there is the non-verbal desire on the part of the Muslim community to avoid being influenced by the Muslims of Spanish extraction and to obtain a private cemetery solely for the Islamic community… (AlSayyad and Castells, 2003). 3.3. The social action of the mosques31 : moving towards mutual knowledge Mosques are institutions of worship but, just like certain Catholic parishes, they can become Community centres and therefore a social resource for the districts in which they are established. In addition to this, the zakat which is a solidarity tax, is one of the five pillars of Islam; it concerns the demonstration in religious terms, of the horizontal relationship that exists between a believer and his neighbour, and this bond is apparent in the sharing of goods according to the rules laid down (Vercellin, 2003, 228). The problems of the poor and the down trodden is one of the major themes of what Vercellin (2003, 313 and S.) calls “the Islamic social wellbeing”. The development of this system of religious solidarity in European civil societies appears to be of great importance for the socio-cultural integration of the Muslim communities. In addition, it is also a question of highlighting the work which the mosques and their authorities realise in the ara of resolution of family conflicts, in their being able to guide firstwave-migrants (with or without official residence papers), natives, children under 18 who are in difficulty, or objective services in intercultural mediation and translation which they make available to organizations or to professionals engaged in questions of health, for example. Discussions carried out with persons in charge of mosques, persons in charge of social services, as well as several sessions of focus groups realized with Muslim women have shown that mosques try Contribution from Maria Angeles Blanco, researcher from SEPISE and Director of the Municipal centre for community services for Albaicin, in collaboration, with the Trabajadoras Sociales Sin Fronteras Association. 31

257

MUSLIMS OF GRANADA

to solve a number of problems with meagre resources. One discovers the following problems, among others: - Difficulties of immigration: regularization of residence permits, search for housing and employment, helping in mobility, training in Spanish, etc the Muslim immigrants are numerous among the users. Unadapted or inefficient social services that must be compensated for, establishing trust among the faithful, etc are the factors which reinforce the role of the mosques. - Intra-family conflicts: in cases where families are caught up in a crisis situation or where there is a break in family relations, the mosques are accustomed to intervening actively while offering them legal knowledge necessary to resolve the conflict, according to the Islamic law and jurisprudence. In cases of divorce, for example, the persons in charge of a mosque appoint a judge to intervene in the divorce proceedings, the question of the custody of the children, etc If the person designated as the judge is not recognized by one of the parties, or if the ruling is disputed, the case is then referred to the Spanish legal administration. Some practices thus developed are contrary to those that are in use in Spain and this poses a question particularly with regard to the condition of women. It should be noted that women are never given any responsible post in the mosques, they do not obtain information on the organization and the management of the latter and hardly put across their opinions on any activities, excepting those which are assigned to them: for example, the cleaning of the buildings, the preparation of the festive meals and women’s group meetings for the study of Koran. When they carry out other activities, like teaching, they are relegated to subordinate positions. Curiously enough, it is among immigrant Muslims rather than among the converted Muslims that criticism is made concerning the domination of the men in Community life. This dispute on the question of male domination is strongest among the Muslim university students who, for this reason, do not go to the mosque. At the beginning of the project “Faiths and Social cohesion”, collaboration between public social services and mosques was practically non-existent, except in rare cases. We were aware of the existence of profound ignorance and great mistrust of the Muslim communities with respect to the public network, especially among the immigrant Muslims. In this context, connecting the two worlds required a certain amount of work to be done. Among the professionals engaged in social work, it was necessary to develop skills 258


to establish contact with the multi-ethnic and religious circles. As regards the mosques, it was necessary to identify and develop social services and cultural activities. It was also necessary to develop skills to distinguish the religious aspects from the sociocultural ones. Finally, it was necessary to consider the role of Community and family mediation to be undertaken by the mosques, certainly from the Islamic point of view, but also in the absolute respect of the constitutional laws that govern all the residents. Another major objective was the distribution of public resources for Muslim citizens. It is indeed a fact that the Muslim public immigrant does not possess sufficient administrative knowledge to easily access the services available. Information work was thus completed on the possibilities of public social assistance, as well as in the private and informal sectors of social actions. 3.4. Perceived religious discrimination: Setting up a local platform to combat it Focusing the project on the concept of religious discrimination and anti-discriminatory practices made it possible to progress in the description of this phenomenon and the evaluation of the actions launched to fight against islamophobia. It should be noted that this process was slow and the initiative taken to try and understand the concept of religious discrimination will cristallise only in its final phase, as analytical work is still on going. Progress on this particular question was made possible through a series of talks with persons in charge of mosques and Community leaders. Discussion groups were also created with the faithful, i.e. adult Muslims who regularly went to the mosque. The objective was to create awareness within the group concerned with regard to acts of exclusion and denial. It was also a question of identifying real and perceived acts of discrimination, and their impact in order to alert public opinion and local political institutions to the dangers of such practices. Such discrimination is anti-constitutional and complicates the process of integration of the Muslim minorities concerned. The results thus pointed to the existence of various types of discrimination against the Muslims of Granada, for example, with regard to access to employment and public services. If this discrimination is directly aimed at individuals, the injustices suffered as “a Muslim community” have an impact on the everyday life of the faithful: thus, one is aware of an obvious inequality of treat259

MUSLIMS OF GRANADA

ment in public administration matters against Islam, in comparison to the treatment reserved for the majority who belong to the Catholic Church. The latter itself does not respect the constitutional provisions nor the legislation on the question of religious freedom. We also noted internal discriminations within the Islamic communities: the Muslims do not seem to enjoy the same rights and possibilities according to their gender, their age, their origins or whether they possess Spanish nationality or not. It is quite certain that the problems stem from a major complexity which results from the great diversity of the Muslim communities in Granada and the historical past of the city which gives Islam a significant symbolic negative connotation. This history is marked by the reconquista and more recently by pro-Franco repression and the omnipotence of the conservative Catholic Church in the everyday life of the citizens. The weakness of the public and institutional conscience of the phenomena of discrimination and its incidence on the life of the people strongly contrasts with the current processes of economic globalisation, increased migratory flows from the south to the north coupled with European construction. In addition to this, the fact that many Spaniards and other Europeans recently converted to Islam have taken up residence in the city shows the attraction exerted by the Hispano-Muslim history of the city, an attraction that must be taken into consideration in the framework of greater flows of European populations emigrating towards the south of Europe, in general, and towards Andalusia, in particular. These major sociological changes precipitate the city towards an undoubtedly multicultural and multireligious destiny, imposing a reflection in terms of democratic management of these diversities and the fight against inequalities. In this post-modern constellation of spaces and identities that are inter-connected and ever changing in a ceaseless to and fro movement between the local and global levels, the still vague contours of Granadian Muslim citizenship, hanging between “community” and “locality” are slowly being defined: “(…) the identity of a place emerges from the intersection of its specific implication in a system of hierarchically organised spaces which are due to its cultural construction as a community or as a locality” (Gupta and Ferguson, 1992). Within this general framework, the important contributions made by the research-action network “Faiths and Social cohesion” set in place and managed by IRFAM, Belgium are greatly appreciated. Such initiatives are very useful to understand the processes of 260


configuration of a European Islam in interaction with the way the local or federal institutions look upon it, and the way it is percieved by the majority of the mainly European non-Muslim population. The Muslims of Europe are also building intra-European Islamic networks giving form and visibility to this important religious minority and integrating its development into the project of European construction. Projects such as “Faiths and Social cohesion” are necessary as they offer the possibility of holding meetings and making transnational comparisons which are of help to researchers and decision makers as well as to associative actors of the Muslim faith. As Paul Lubeck (2003, 111) states, “while depending on the localization of its networks and its ethnic and/or national affiliations, Muslims could occupy a number of positions within a given context. The belonging to and/or inclusion in other Muslim globalized networks are due, mainly, to a historical legacy of transnationalism which is invariably expressed as membership to Umma or to world communities of believers”. Just like Turkey, Bosnia, Albania, the remainder of the Balkans, the Cypriot Republic and Andalusia, as well as major regions which attract immigration in the rest of Europe and today are the scene of important challenges for the construction of the identity of a European Islam and for the enrichment of European democracy as a whole, we are of the opinion that all this must be reconciled with its diversity, its past and the multiple religious or secular source of its cultures. So that this awareness can exist and bear fruit, there was a plan in Granada to set up a permanent local platform to combat discrimination against the Islamic religion. The specific approaches used in this dimension of field work were, firstly, sensitizing and informing the political and professional representatives in the Municipality through media initiatives and the creation of events, among them being “ecumenical acts” (a meeting against terrorism and war). Training seminars for professionals in social services were also organized. Secondly, it was a question of cooperating with the non-Muslim civil society. In order to achieve this, the means of action favours the annual organization of a forum against discrimination of Muslims, both men and women. This initiative should gather a broad social and institutional section of Muslims and non-Muslims (NGO’s, trade unions, churches, etc). 4.

Conclusion

The experiment shows that the management and integration of thoughts and ideas of social actors, decision makers and research261

MUSLIMS OF GRANADA

ers into the proposals for anti-discriminatory practices in connection with the Islamic religion is very time consuming… Surprisingly, we can say the same about the Muslim communities themselves. With regard to the non-Muslim actors, “secularity” as a political ideology constitutes a major obstacle with in the light of islamophobic facts. Without this awareness as regards the facts, it is not possible to consider the actions that would serve as antidotes. One thus feels the urgent need to look further into the debate and research on the links between Western society and States on the one hand, and secularity and religious diversity, on the other. There is urgent indeed to adapt the spiritual certainty of some and the philosophical doubts of others to what Habermas calls “delayed modernity” and Castells characterizes it as being the era “of globalisation and information”. Among the Muslims (can we generalize?), the awareness and the practice of Islam (with their cultural, Community and personal dimensions) must be taken into account as such, certainly as inalienable rights and must be defended with the aid of allies of various origins, but also as a modality of possible awareness among others, having the same dignity as the others. In other words, for the religious groups, be they Muslims or not, they must let themselves be impregnated by the “culture” of pluralism and freedom of conscience and religious practice as constitutional laws for ALL. The most important source of friction observed in the field of socio-cultural actions indeed originate in the belief, founded or not, according to which the group “opposite”, which has a different conscience, tries to transform, to Islamize, to evangelise or to secularise the others, becomes inward looking and takes refuge in “its ghetto”. It appears that the Muslim communities of Andalusia must move away from what with the majority of society is saying as it tries to construct from the outside, and try to build their own identity through an “integral” vision of the religious aspects and its correlative factors, specific racism “islamolophobic” or “maurophobic”. We seemed to be able to see, in the case of Granada (can we generalize?) that a certain consolidation of Islamic community life could enable it to be defined as the expression of a religious, heterogeneous but federated minority, especially, protected by the democratic Constitution. The development of this awareness constitutes one of the conditions that are necessary to be able to nego262


tiate its minority religious identities in the eyes of public opinion, and their concrete expressions in the city. Upstream of this sociopolitical reinforcement (empowerment), it would be useful to consolidate the mosque itself as a space of religious and Community construction. It is a question of organizing, of making visible and reinforcing a place of worship, but also as a meeting place, where debates and analyses can be made on the difficulties of being a Muslim in Europe, a space for progressive development of strategies for institutional and political actions to be able to exist as a practising Muslim citizen, taking part in the negotiation of what may be termed “living together”. It is thus a question of thinking up these strategies and of deploying them, for example, through the means of communication, in order to exert a certain control on images and speeches concerning Islam. All these proposals draw out the contours of an identity development calling upon the conscience of a citizen to be capable of opposing discriminatory ideas and practices. If all these prerequisites were attained, the battle against discrimination would manage to extend beyond the offices of some benevolent public managers and some voluntarist consultants. As in the case of many other social problems, sciences dealing in social actions show us to which point they are useful on condition tha t they are governed by an epistemological positioning, bringing together research and social and ethical work, involvinging the actors in the resolution of problems which concern them. References Althusser L. (1969), Lénine et la philosophie, suivi de Marx et Lénine devant Hegel, Paris : Maspero. Alsayyad N. & Castells M. (eds) (2003), ¿Europa musulmana o Euro-islam? Política, cultura y ciudadanía en la era de la globalización, Madrid : Alianza Editorial. Gupta A. & Ferguson F. (1992), « Beyond ‘Culture’, Space., identity, and the Politics of Difference », Cultural Anthropology, février. Castells M. (1987), « Reestructuración económica, revolución tecnológica y nueva organización del territorio », Documentación Social, n° 67, 43-69. Domínguez Ortiz A. & Vincent B. (1985), Historia de los moriscos, vida y tragedia de una minora, Madrid : Alianza Editorial. Barrios Aguilera M. & Vincent B. (eds) (1995), Granada 1492-1992, Del reino de Granada al futuro del Mundo Mediterráneo, Grenade : Ediciones de la Universidad de Granada. Lubeck P. (2003), « El reto de las redes islámicas y la reclamación de la ciudadanía: la difícil adaptación de Europa a la globalización », AlSay-

263

MUSLIMS OF GRANADA

yad N.& Castells M. (eds), ¿Europa musulmana o Euro-islam? Política, cultura y ciudadanía en la era de la globalización, Madrid : Alianza Editorial, 101-129. Michalak L. & Saed A. (2003), « La divisoria continental: el islam y las identidades musulmanas en Francia y Estados Unidos », AlSayyad N.& Castells M. (eds), ¿Europa musulmana o Euro-islam? Política, cultura y ciudadanía en la era de la globalización, Madrid : Alianza Editorial, 195-217. Manço, U. (ed.) (2004), Reconnaissance et discrimination. Présence de l’islam en Europe occidentale et en Amérique du Nord, Paris : L’Harmattan-IRFAM. Moreras J. (1999), Musulmanes de Barcelona. Espacios y dinámicas comunitarias, Barcelone : CIDOB. Raya Lozano E. E. & al. (2001), Exploración sobre la exclusión social en Granada Grenade : SEPISE-UGR. Raya Lozano E. E. & al. (2004), « Espagne. L’islam au 21e siècle : le retour d’un refoulé national », Manço U. (ed.)., Reconnaissance et discrimination. Présence de l’islam en Europe occidentale et en Amérique du Nord, Paris : L’Harmattan-IRFAM, 191-223. Lea H. C. (2000), Los moriscos españoles. Su conversión y expulsión, Alicante : Universitat d’Alacant. Sennett R. (2003), El respeto. Sobre la dignidad del hombre en un mundo de desigualdad, Barcelone : Anagrama. Tibi B. (2003), « Los inmigrantes musulmanes en Europa, entre el Euroislam y el gueto », AlSayyad N.& Castells M. (eds), ¿Europa musulmana o Euro-islam? Política, cultura y ciudadanía en la era de la globalización, Madrid : Alianza Editorial, 55-81. Vercellin G. (2003), Instituciones del mundo musulmán, Barcelone : Bellaterra. Vincent B. (1979), Les marginaux et les exclus dans l’histoire, Paris. Vincent B. (1991), 1492, « L’année admirable », Paris : Aubier. Vincent B. (2002), « La chrétienté à l’assaut de Grenade », Le Monde Diplomatique-Manières de voir, n° 64, 15-18. Wieviorka M. (2003), « Raza, cultura y sociedad : la experiencia francesa con los musulmanes », AlSayyad N.& Castells M. (éds), ¿Europa musulmana o Euro-islam? Política, cultura y ciudadanía en la era de la globalización, Madrid : Alianza Editorial, 177-195.

264


Religious discriminations and public policies: “Muslim burial areas” in Ghent Meryem Kanmaz and Sami Zemni 32 Abstract The goal of this local initiative is to identify through participative, long term observation (1995-2005) that has mediation as its starting point, to try and understand the methods of interaction between the Muslim communities and the local services and authorities, with regard to the needs of the Muslim population on the question of burials. It was necessary to perceive and analyze how the Muslim groups continued to evolve in time and how the city of Ghent and the services concerned reacted (or not) to the groups or the actors whom they recognized as legitimate partners in this dialogue. Keywords: Ghent, Belgium, Muslim burials, local politics. Ghent, a medieval city known for the Saint-Bavon cathedral and its towers, its Belfry and the church of Saint-Nicholas which dominate the panorama, has a population of 230 000 inhabitants, and is the second most important town in Flanders after Antwerp. The Muslim population in the city stands at 17 000 people, that is to say approximately 8 % of the total population. Two thirds of the Muslims in Ghent came originally from Turkey. This presence is the consequence of a “chain migration” from central Anatolia and, more precisely from the areas of Afyon and Konya. The Maghrebian community is made up of 3600 individuals, mainly originating from Morocco and especially in the Berber Rif area. The Algerians and Tunisians are 600 people (Manço and Kanmaz, 2002). The Muslim population is particularly concentrated in the north of the city, in the industrial and harbour area dating back to the 19th century, overlooking the canal which connects Ghent to the estuSami Zemni is an assistant professor at the University of Gand (Belgium). Email: [email protected]. Meryem Kanmaz is a researcher at the Centre for the Study of Islam in Europe at the University of Ghent in Belgium. Email: [email protected]. Migration Letters, Volume: 2, No: 3, pp. 265 – 279. December 2005 (ISSN: print: 1741-8984 & online: 1741-8992) 32

RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATIONS IN GHENT

ary of the river Scheldt. In the sixties, the Muslim immigrants were employed in the textile industry which at one time represented the prosperity of the city and was at the height of its glory between 1800 and 1930. The city has 13 mosques including 7 Turkish, 5 for the Arabic-speaking people and one for the Pakistanis. One of the socio-political characteristics of Ghent is that it is a “secular region” whereas the majority of the Flemings are attached to the teachings of Catholicism. The municipal majority is thus traditionally secular (socialists and liberals) and the powerful Flemish Christian Democrat party is excluded from power. The first structural relations of the Municipality with the Muslim communities were entered into after the riots in May 1991 in Brussels which was the expression of revolt on the part of young people of Maghrebian origin who felt they were socially excluded. Before this date, the specific contacts were especially confined to some coopted organizations, with the municipality choosing its own Muslim interlocutors 33 . A special cell in the communal police force was then charged to maintain a monthly relationship with the persons in charge of the mosques. A municipal service entrusted with integration was also created to deal with the inclusion of migrants with the objective of becoming a meeting and information point between the Muslims and the authorities. Thus, towards the second half of the Nineties, the aspirations of the Muslim citizens were taken into account by the commune and things clearly improved. The change of attitude on the part of the municipal authorities was supported by several factors. As elsewhere in Belgium, the advent of an electorate of Muslim origin undoubtedly played a dominant role here, just like the democratic ideals of a new political generation. It will also be noted that the initiatives launched at the beginning of the Nineties started to bear fruit. Let us point out the creation in 1995 of the Forum for Equal rights and Interaction (FOGI) by secular Ghent intellectuals and teachers 34 of the Islamic religion in order to defend the social, culThe federation of Progressive Turkish Associations, as well as the biggest Turkish mosque in the city, for example; the first association was financially supported by the city, its woman director having become a senator in the Flemish socialist Party in 2001. 34 Teachers of the Muslim religion have always played an important role both locally and nationally, in the institutionalisation and the organisation of Islam in Belgium. Moreover, Belgium has a long tradition of conflicts between the Catholics and Liberals which often took place in the teaching arena; the regulation of Islam in the public sphere in Belgium also went 33

266

MERYEM KANMAZ AND SAMI ZEMNI

tural and religious rights of the Muslims. The FOGI sought to construct a permanent consultative dialogue between the city (or other levels of power) and the representatives of the Ghent Muslims. One of its central objectives was the creation of an awareness that was in step with the social recognition of the Muslims in the city. The FOGI was fighting for the following points (among others), so that the teaching organized by the Municipality: -

could be reformed in favour of an inter-cultural education;

duly grant the right to wear the head scarf for those Muslim pupils who wished to do so; institute a school holiday to mark the end of the Ramadan fast and/or the festival of the sacrifice; exclude the holding of examinations during the month of Ramadan; examine the possibility of providing a choice of halâl food in the school canteens. All these requests were heard by the City which stressed the importance of moving ahead in the matter. But two years of negotiations (1997 and 1999) did not produce any significant results. The failure of the negotiations seemed to be due to the reservations on the part of the Flemish Liberal Party (VLD), one of the partners in the communal coalition. If this situation was discouraging for the members of FOGI, one can say that as of the year 2000, the subjects related to Islam and the relationship with the ethnic and religious minorities appeared to be well placed in the concerns of the local municipal officials. Since 2003, the action of FOGI has links with a study centre at the University of Ghent and there is also the creation of a permanent Forum of all Ghent mosques which especially coordinate the organization of religious festivals (preparation of temporary slaughter houses, negotiation of a possibility of ritual slaughter 35 in residences, collecting the carcasses,

through teaching. Teachers of the Islamic religion who are financed by the Belgian State have thus become leaders of their communities (Boender and Kanmaz, 2002). 35 In 2003 the Muslim population in the provinces of Eastern and Western Flanders protested: despite the strict directives issued by the Flemish Health Ministry forbidding the slaughter of animals in homes, certain communes were tolerant in the matter, during the feast of the sacrifice,

267


information for the residents…). The Municipality which, as of the end of 1990, is in search of a permanent and democratic dialogue with the Muslim groups supported this forum and invited it, in 2003, to participate in exchanges with other non-religious associations. Apart from the FOGI and the Ghent Mosque Committee, these institutions are: - Vereniging voor of Emancipatie in Ontwikkeling van Moslims (VOEM, Association for the emancipation and the development of Muslims); - Unie van de Moskeeën in Islamitische Verenigingen Oost- en West-Vlaanderen (UMIVO, Union of Mosques and Islamic Organizations in Eastern and Western Flanders); - and Centres for Islam in Europe, at the University of Ghent (CIE).

1. General objective and the realisation methods The purpose of the action launched by the FOGI and later on by the CIE was to fight against the most visible forms of discrimination against the Muslim communities, whether they were due to a question of identity or culture or pertaining to faith. Within this framework, the actors were always in favour of a structural and permanent dialogue between the authorities and the Muslim communities, adopting a two pronged approach to include the representatives and the communal institutions. It was a question of encouraging the actors in the city to initiate contacts with the Muslim representatives; the major obstacle being the idea that the mosques would only play a religious role. The various contacts between mosques and local councillors made it possible for these priorities to evolve 36 . Those who were involved in these activities especially played a role of mediation and expertise, trying to generate confidence among the municipal authorities. The willingness to move ahead on the part of certain political whereas others, who were more rigid with the rules, did not offer a sufficient n umber of satisfactory alternatives to the Muslim population. 36 In fact, from 1991 onwards, the city of Ghent opted for the creation of “an immigrant cell” in order to make contact with those officials responsible for the mosques. These contacts were not based on religious questions but rather on the theme of “living together” even if this was not always easy.

268


and administrative actors also facilitated the task of those involved. It should be noted that the subject of immigration plays an important role in public opinion and consequently, in the definition of the policies for the city. Even if much still remains to be done, the town of Ghent is regarded as a pilot city on the subject. For the Muslim public, these steps were of even deeper significance. Certain authorities in the Muslim communities lived in a climate of mistrust as regards the Ghent authorities. The on going work sought especially to improve the capacity for dialogue and communication of the Muslim representatives. It was also a question of explaining the workings of the institutional mechanism, its slownesses, its prerogatives, its limits with regard to legal and political competences, its position between the local, regional and national levels, etc The “traditional” and “nonprofessional”pattern of operation of immigrants’ associations also posed a problem, in particular, in their relationships with the authorities. The work achieved by the FOGI and the CIE at the level of those persons in charge of the Muslim community 37 can thus be characterized as being achieved in the area of information, support, development of capacities or know-how and, finally, exploiting the potential.

2. Muslim burial grounds in communal cemeteries: a specific action The goal of this local initiative is to identify through participative, long term observation (1995-2005) that has mediation as its starting point, to try and understand the methods of interaction between the Muslim communities and the local services and authorities, with regard to the needs of the Muslim population on the question of burials. It was necessary to perceive and analyze how the Muslim groups continued to evolve in time and how the city of Ghent and the services concerned reacted (or not) to the groups or

Repatriation of the dead is very costly (insurance, plane tickets, stay costs,). A system of “burial funds” exists within the Turkish associations (the members pay 30€ a year). A similar system organised by private Moroccan banks also exists. Repatriation of Tunisian Muslims is paid for by the Tunisian government. In cases where there is no insurance, the family covers the costs but can count on the generosity of the faithful. The estimated cost of a burial in the country of origin stands at 3000€. 37

269


the actors whom they recognized as legitimate partners in this dialogue. Until recently, it was practically not possible in Ghent (as in the whole of the province of Eastern Flanders) to be buried according to Muslim rites. This discrimination is becoming increasingly intolerable insofar as the members of the Muslim communities are beginning to age. The integration of Muslims into Belgian society as full citizens requires also the possibility of being buried according to the rites agreed upon, in the city where the deceased lived for most of his life. This claim is not only religious in nature. The problem of the Muslim burial grounds is truly a humane question that the city understands and admits, in particular in its report dated 2003-2005 concerning the minorities. The death of a Turkish woman on October 31, 2001 will be the occasion to point out certain difficulties. Thus the bereaved family publicly made reference to the absurdity of the repatriation of the remains of the deceased in a context of definitive post-migration installation, more than 30 years after the Ghent migration. The widower of the deceased woman, his children, his grandchildren and his great grandchildren all live in Ghent. The fact that the family vault is in Turkey, leads us to believe that the memory of the deceased woman will be always related to migration and, more pejoratively, to her status as a non-Ghent native. It must be stressed that there is almost no one left in Turkey for whom the tomb would mean something. According to custom, it is traditional that the close relations (family, friends, acquaintances, etc.) escort the mortal remains of the deceased to its final resting place. In concrete terms this means that the people directly concerned by the death are given one day’s leave. But with the need to repatriate the body, the relatives are on leave for up to one week. However, it is not customary for workers to receive one week’s leave apart from the annual holidays. Then there are the additional financial costs of the operation, even if systems of mutual insurance exist within the Muslim community. This brings in its wake tensions and multiple frustrations: only a few of the close relations can be present for the rites. Funerals are universally recognized as being an important link in the psychological process of mourning. The fact that many people are prevented from attending funerals of their close relations makes this process of mourning very complex and generates guilt feelings. It is obviously not possible to imagine that a family is lacking in its duty towards one of its members by having a burial ceremony where the rites are different to those 270


imposed by the Muslim religion. And one can imagine the feeling of absurdity which is increased by a factor of ten when the repatriation of the deceased concerned the mortal remains of a young Muslim born in Belgium38 … The tensions that are present around this question can only develop in time with the increasing numbers of generations born in Europe: the need for structural rules is also made urgent by the fact that many Muslims cannot be repatriated to a country of origin: Belgian Muslims (for whom Belgium is the country of origin), those without official residence-papers, refugees, the destitute, mixed couples where one of the partners is of foreign origin, etc The commune has thus promised to make contact with the Muslim communities, during 2003-2004 (“CIE”period), in order to find a satisfactory religious solution, within the framework of the possibilities envisaged by Belgian law and while respecting the denominational neutrality of the cemeteries. Since such a step was already taken in 1997 (“FOGI” period), it is therefore possible to compare, the two sessions of negotiation for purposes of analysis. At the time of the negotiations that took place between the FOGI and the Municipality, an important point of friction appeared and concerned the setting up of a plot reserved for Islamic burials in a city cemetery. Other Flemish cities were also experiencing similar tensions during the same period. According to Belgian legislation the communes have sole discrimination in questions regarding burials. However, the secular majority in the Municipality, on principle, is opposed to the possibility of religious interference in the management of a public happening: cemeteries are open to all without distinction of any kind; if an Islamic specificity were to be introduced, it would be synonymous with discrimination towards other confessions or philosophies, and would create inequality between citizens. According to the commune, it would be a regrettable backward step flying in the face of the secular neutrality of public institutions: the time when the non-believers, nonbaptized and freemasons were buried in common graves outside The disappearance of Loubna Benaïssa and the subsequent discovery of her remains in 1997, in the wake of the Dutroux affair popularised the theme of Muslim burial grounds. This solidarity (even though it was short-lived) between native and immigrant populations who came together because of the suffering endured by the child martyrs, made the discriminations towards the Muslim populations more visible. In fact, in Belgium there are only four communes where Muslims cans be buried according to their rites. 38

271


the cemeteries is still engraved in the memories of lay persons and therefore the communal management of cemeteries is regarded as progress to be defended at all costs. To this, the FOGI responds that the impossibility of burying Muslims according to their religious rites is in itself, tantamount to exclusion of its people: without a Muslim cemetery, these people would not have the feeling of being integrated and recognised. The refusal on the part of the communes is equivalent to an expulsion of the deceased to his country of origin with the expenses involved to be paid by his close relatives who are thus also deprived of the possibility to meet regularly to visit the graves of their dead. The law on burials and cemeteries dating back to 20 07 1971 stipulates the general conditions for the organization of funerals. A bill issued by the Ministry for Justice envisaged the opening of a debate with the Executive Committee for the Muslims in Belgium in order to find a solution to this problem. Nevertheless, a more recent bill proposed by the Council of Ministers in May 1997 made the question of the Muslim burial plots dependent on the results of a parliamentary debate, even though the recommendations of the Federal Minister of the Interior dating back to October 200039 encouraged the municipalities to consider the question anticipatively. At about the same time in Flanders, the regional Government also sent out a circular to all the communes in the region encouraging them to make arrangements for Muslim burial grounds in their cemeteries. Thus, in the action plan of Ghent for the ethnic and

Following are extracts from it: “The cemetery is neutral in character, no distinction or discrimination based on religion is allowed with regard to the circumstances of death”…”The principle of equality allows Christians, Jews, Muslims, atheists and all others to be buried in communal cemeteries” “It is not contradictory or incompatible with the fundamental principles set out here that the commune provide separate grounds for specific groups, for example, the faithful belonging to one religion, so that graves sharing common characteristics can be grouped together” “Burial of the dead in such a burial ground is possible only this wish is clearly expressed by the defunct during his lifetime, or by his family or by any other person who can legitimately be in charge of the burial”…”The plot cannot be isolated from the rest of the cemetery by any kind of physical partition”…The placing of the body in the coffin and the burial must be carried out in strict accordance with the rules on hygiene and public health”…It is not possible to obtain a burial plot for an unlimited period of time”(translated by the authors). 39

272


religious minorities (2003-2005)40 , it is indeed announced, that the commune hopes to find a solution for Muslim burials. The number of administrative levels being involved in the question is not favourable for a speedy resolution of the problem, even though this indicates the positive attitude of the political decision makers. It will be noted that in this open public discussion which has been ongoing since 1997, the Muslims are never given a formal and systematic hearing. This necessarily creates misunderstandings, more especially so because the various Muslim groups do not have exactly the same practices. Certain intellectuals have also taken up the debate. Thus, on March 11, 1997, Professor Vermeulen, during a radio broadcast, stated that Muslims could not be buried in Belgium because they: wish to be buried “apart”; - wanted to be granted a lifelong burial plot and - do not want to be buried in a coffin. By pointing out the practice of the waqf, Vermeulen states that the islamization of cemeteries implies that this land will forever be lost to the State economy. This Flemish academic thinks he has observed no change of attitude with regard to these questions on the part of the Muslim community in Belgium. However on May 14, 1997, representatives of the Muslim community were able to put forward sufficient solutions from their point of view while respecting the law on burials of 1971, during a meeting in Ghent in the presence of FOGI, the Humanist Union of Ghent, the Municipal Services for Integration, and the Councillor for Social Affairs: burial in a coffin, in a space where the orientation of the graves is respected, the concession not having to be for life, if the descendants have the possibility of renewing it, indeed, the Muslim religious beliefs on death would permit allow the opening of the graves only in specific emergency situations. However, the Mayor and the Councillors disagreed with the proposal to arrange for a Muslim burial ground within the city cemetery, because it would lead to a different interpretation of the laws concerned The observers will however note that there is a divergence of policy between the socialist and liberal partners in the municipal coalition: the principal objections being focused around the interpretation of the principles of neutrality and equality which are inscribed in administrative law. The heart of the argument against the establishment of Muslim burial plots interprets the “neutrality of the State” as being the “secularity of the State”. 40

Available on http://www.gent.be

273


It will be also noted that there is a certain margin between a “theoretical Islam” and the realities that Muslims undergo in a minority situation: the dynamics concerning identity are always present, causing divergences sometimes important ones, even within Muslim groups. Thus, towards the end of the Nineties, associations and Muslim organizations of Ghent increased the number of the meetings that they held to reinforce th eir civic actions and to lessen the impact of their intracommunity differences: the objective is to speak in unison with a strong and coherent voice with the local authorities. This episode coincides with the creation of the Committee of the mosques and the relations between local authorities and Muslim communities are becoming more and more direct, apart from the mediation by a third party like the FOGI, for example. This situation is encouraged by the local councillors. It is also true that the Muslim actors are beginning to understand how the town hall structures function and can thus try to launch an action without assistance. The decade that started in 2000 saw the adoption of a new law on burials which are henceforth “regionalized” and have become the prerogative of the Flemish Region: the time thus appears favourable for a new debate on the subject. Very quickly, (January 16, 2004), the Interior Ministry for Flanders voted a decree seeking to make burials in a coffin optional, whereas this was imposed by the preceding legislation on grounds of public health. In this new decree, one of the wishes of the Muslims was thus taken care of. This law came into effect on July 1, 2004. Information work was undertaken by the CIE before this law came into effect in order to give people the opportunity to go further in the debate on other dimensions of the question and, more generally, to revitalise the dialogue between Muslims and local councillors, so that finally, the implementation of a permanent discussion between the Forum for the mosques in Ghent and the persons representing the authorities might have a concrete and permanent link. This follow-up work which is based on the long term also allowed for the organization of a one day reflection process where the theme was the question of the Muslim burial plots. After a resumption of contact with all the mosques and the public partners who were involved with the question of burials when it was abandoned in 1997, working sessions were organized. It was especially a question of pushing the Muslims in charge to find a 274


consensus and to present a coherent request to the authorities concerning the rites of Muslim burials. Several meetings were necessary during the course of which the representatives of the CIE led the discussions during the meetings, worked out agendas, explained the new Flemish law, and largely took part in the drafting of the dossier while especially helping to transpose the oral observations into writtten form, without however interfering in the contents. Those who took part in the exercise were the “facilitators”, “clarifiers” and “organizers”.With respect to the authorities, they especially played an expert role as regards anti-discrimination: if the concerns expressed by one of the communal authorities in connection with what became known as “apartheid after death” were legitimate, it should be understood that as long as the decisions are not applied, discrimination still exists with reference to the law of January 2004. In addition to the communal authorities, three actors were particularly monitored and supported by the process: the president of a federation of Islamic associations, the spokesman of the Maghrebian mosques and the spokesman of the Turkish mosques. These people played a key role in all th e negotiations: they received and transmitted information, done the ground work for the meetings, responded to questions, etc.The majority of the meetings were informal, thus making it possible to build confidence wih regard to civic questions and to maintain a constant dialogue among the various partners. The organization of a common event on April 3, 2004 is one of the highlights of the project: it is a study day on the subject of Muslim cemeteries which was honoured by the participation of the Flemish Minister for the Interior and the president of the Executive of the Muslims of Belgium. The objective of this day was to describe the problems in their complexity and to provoke an open debate thus making it possible to include the question of the cemeteries in the political agenda of the City. At the beginning it was a question of differentiating the various levels of the problem: - questions of a theological and/or cultural nature or what exactly do the Muslims want? - questions that were practical and legal in nature or what is feasible with regard to what is required? - questions of a political nature or how to behave with regard to the municipal coalition? 275


The representatives of the Muslim communities thus wrote out a memorandum making a case for theological reasoning. The document was precise and clear, clarifying what the Muslims intended to request from the municipal services in terms of adjustment of Muslim burial plots (tombs facing in the direction of Mecca, which is the distinction between Muslim and other graves) and the religious rites to be carried out with regard to the deceased during the time the body is carried to the cemetery,… The objective of this exercise was to see that the religious request came as close as possible to the laws in force 41 . The new decree and also certain old directives facilitated the task of adjustment of Muslim burial plots in the cemeteries. However the communes remain responsible for the cemeteries and the Muslim communities feel dependent on the goodwill of the local authorities, despite the existing legal apparatus. These regulations and laws are interpreted differently by the various ideological currents present in the city centre. The concept of “neutrality” still poses problems and is strictly interpreted within the framework of separation between the Church and the State. According to the director of the integration services in the city, the debate is stalemated. This is in line with the general political concept on “the edification of a secular State”: one of the tendencies present is to perceive separation between religion and State as being absolute, and therefore any religious concept must be relegated to the private sphere, or even the individual one. The Seen from the Muslim point of view, separate burial plots in cemeteries are preferable for the members of different cults and beliefs. But as to how this can be done is a question that is open to debate: if some want a small wall, others talk about a plot that is quite separate from other plots, hedged in by bushes. However, all the Muslims who took part in the debates were clearly in favour of a clear separation between Muslim and non Muslim tombs. According to one of them: “We prefer a place that is clearly marked out where we can say our prayers without bothering others” However, some Muslims, especially those resident in Europe think that Muslims who live on this continent are in a situation of ‘darura’ or necessity and can therefore make exceptions to Islamic laws. This opens the door to possible concessions on the part of Muslims, even though the Muslims of Europe have the right to benefit from structural solutions with regard to their needs in the context of their faith. They should be able to decide for themselves which exceptions are acceptable and which are nonnegotiable, as they see it and not based on the classical interpretation of their faith. What is impossible to change, are, for example, the rules concerning the preparation of the body and the ritual prayers of the janaza. 41

276


alternative vision is to regard the State as being responsible for organizing the management of differences, particularly religious differences. The problem of cemeteries cannot consequently be solved without a consensus on the definition of local governance which is secular. Within this framework, the Muslim community finds it difficult to understand that the perception of certain decision makers remains linked to Flemish historical facts which has always been the slow recognition of the rights of the secular group, as, for example burial in cemeteries which were essentially catholic until the 19th century. Consequently, it is a question of explaining to the decision makers that the request for a separate burial ground is not a question of apartheid but a question of religious sensitivity and equality 42 .

3. Analyses and recommendations In Ghent, as in several other towns of Europe, the Muslims were and still are victims of various forms of discrimination. There are various factors involved here, including the functioning of public institutions. One notes thus, amongst the administrative staff in charge, there is a certain tendency to deal with the files concerning religious matters in a strictly technocratic way: the agent will organize the ritual of sacrifice from a technical point of view and according to the law, but there is no sacredness involved here, which shocks the Muslim communities since they attach a very great importance to this rite. The personal convictions of the political actors also seem to carry great weight in the resolution of problems relating to the management of the prayer gatherings. This observation is particularly important in the Flemish political context which is aware of the fact that an extremist party (Vlaams Blok/Belang) is beginning to gain more and more importance in public life. The Blok already condemned for racist remarks, is popularising an openly

This difference in viewpoints came up once again during a meeting with the woman official from the registry office in charge of civil status and the representatives of the CIE on 8 November 29004. The woman official stated her position at the outset: the organisation of a Muslim burial plot was, in her eyes, discrimination towards the other citizens and a contravention of the law on the separation of Church and State. The request to be buried facing in the direction of Mecca and the rituals associated with the inhumation (ablutions, transport of the defunct…) did not pose a problem. 42

277


islamophobic attitude 43 . On the basis of the Muslim burial grounds and despite the existence of permissive legislation in this regard, there is resistance at the local level: the concept of “burial grounds with particular characteristics” is confused with the idea of segregation. Other factors responsible for these blockages are related to the way the Muslim associations operate. If the changes hoped for take a great deal of time to be realised, the low level of involvement and partipation of the Muslim associations in “civic” activities is one of the reasons for this established fact. These groupings have difficulties to understand the laws and the regulations that govern Belgian public institutions. Moreover they find it difficult to accept the fact that rules on land planning and safety are more important than the rites and the sacredness of rituals in everyday life. These reports must be analyzed bearing in mind the slow but visible changes that are occuring within the local leadership of Muslim communities. Thus, the traditional leaders, who are rather old men, who have a certain charisma and prestige within their group, are currently yielding their Community functions to a younger generation, educated and socialized in Belgium, who better understand the risks of local, regional or national policies. Another important process for the effectiveness of an intercommunity dialogue is the setting up of federations at the local and supra local levels: this structure makes for a better channelling of requests from Muslim communities taking into account the regulatory framework and political opportunities. Even if a great deal still remains to be done in Ghent, particularly with regard to the question on cemeteries so that Muslim religious rights will be fully recognised as they should be, the following table shows us that a great deal of progress has been realised to date: the work done by organizations like the FOGI, the VOEM or the CIE will certainly have borne fruit. The Muslim representatives are better acquainted with the workings of the city institutions, those in the Flemish Region and even those at the federal level. They have found interlocutors and sometimes even partners in these places.

This extremist party claims to have measured the cost per inhabitant in Ghent for slaughter of animals during the feast of the sacrifice… 43

278


Situation

Situation

Situation

before 1995

1995 - 2002

after 2002

Muslim representation by co-option only

Coaching of Muslim associations by various organizations

Specific dialogues only

Coaching of the local decision makers

Confirmation of new political dynamics towards the minorities

Lack of interest for the minorities

Appearance of a new willingness among decision makers

The un-organized Muslim Community Introduction of a permanent intercul tural dialogue

Political socialization of the Muslim communities

Reduction in the need for mediation by third party organizations Creation of the “Forum of Ghent mosques” Muslim representation to the more democratic and permanent city bodies

The experiment has allowed us to note the need for the Municipality to mobilise all the groups of inhabitants, through specific and local networks, as in the case of the Muslim group. The presence of elected officials and persons in charge of public services in the districts or areas where Muslims reside also seems to contribute to achieving better relations with this population. There is also the need for the Muslims to organise themselves and to look beyond their internal divisions, in order to be able to more effectively negotiate with the authorities. Within this framework, the role of mobilization and the example of the Community leaders and Imams must be developed in order to justify a greater invlovement in civic actions in general, and as citizens of the European Union, involved in the management of the public actions, in dialogue with the inhabitants of all philosophies and religions.

279


Receiving and institutionalising Islam at the municipal level: the case of the Turkish community of Schaerbeek Ural Manço 44 Abstract In the Brussels region, the case of Schaerbeek was particularly exemplary in this context between 1970 and 1994. Within the framework of the project “Faiths and Social cohesion” (2001-2004), this community was observed. We therefore propose a closer look at the relations between the Muslims and the Schaerbeek Municipality by focusing on the history of the Turkish community that is resident in this locality.The setting up and the progress of the Fatih mosque will be the objective here. Keywords: Schaerbeek, Brussels, Belgium, Visibility o f Islam, municipal level. A faith which is not institutionalized as the law requires, will not be able to claim the same advantages as those relegions which are recognized both at the national and local levels. Since Islam is not as yet completely regulated at the federal level in Belgium by an organization that is officially recognized and fully operational, a group of Muslims, even with a strong presence at the municipal level, will have difficulties to make itself heard by the communal authority. The legislation concerning the practice of religions and the freedom of worship could be re-interpreted by the municipal administration. Cases of abuse of power or arbitrary application of the legislation are far from being exceptional in the case of Muslims in Western Europe (Frégosi, 2001a, 14-16). Certain municipalities, which had a significant number of Muslims on their territory, did not hesitate to intervene in the organization of the Islamic religion, when they were not seeking to block its development, however legally justified this might have been. Many municipalities that were concerned by this particular problem managed and still Ural Manço is a lecturer at Sociological Studies Centre of Saint-Louis University in Brussels. Email: [email protected]. Migration Letters, Volume: 2, No: 3, pp. 280 – 307. December 2005 (ISSN: print: 1741-8984 & online: 1741-8992) 44

INSTITUTIONALISING ISLAM AT THE MUNICIPAL LEVEL

manage the dossier on the Islamic religion, where the objective is clearly based on security matters. In the Brussels region, the case of Schaerbeek 45 was particularly exemplary in this context between 1970 and 1994. Within the framework of the project “Faiths and Social cohesion” (2001-2004), this commune was observed. We therefore propose a closer look at the relations between the Muslims and the Schaerbeek Municipality by focusing on the history of the Turkish community that is resident in this locality.The setting up and the progress of the Fatih mosque46 will be the objective here. The analytical model developed by F. Frégosi (2001a, 23-24) used three interdependent criteria for this purpose: (1) The way Islam and the Muslims are perceived by the communal authorities, i.e. the philosophy which is inherent in the methods of management of Islam at the local level, and the quality of the Muslim interlocutors chosen by the Municipality; (2) The mode of action itself, i.e. the practical provisions implemented by the local authority with regard to how the Muslim presence must be treated and its needs as regards practice of the faith; (3) The mode of inclusion of the Muslims, i.e. relational capacity and the behaviour exhibited by the local Muslim community. The results of the analysis of the situation as revealed by each criterion would be presented successively: first, the administration of the mayor (burgomaster) Roger Nols and his collaborators, 1970 to 1994; then that of the current municipal authorities, which have declared themselves to be in total rupture with the previous period. The analytical process will not fail to reveal a certain number of “good practices” as regards relations between the municipalities By the size of its population (108 000 inhabitants in 2002), the commune of Schaerbeek is the second of the 19 municipalities in the Region of Brussels-Capital. Nearly 35 000 Muslims live in Schaerbeek (32% of the population). Half of them came originally from Morocco and 40% came from Turkey. Since the 70’s the Muslims formed the majority of the foreign population in the commune. In 1975, nearly 29% of the Schaerbeek population was of foreign extraction (Bastenier, 1981, 107). Thirteen of the 79 mosques in the Brussels region are found here (8 of them are Moroccan, 3 are Turkish and 2 are Albanian). 46 The mosque has been named after the sultan Mehmet II (1432-1481) known as the Conqueror (Fatih) after the taking of Constantinople in 1453. 45

281

URAL MANÇO

and the groups of Muslims, in the fight against discrimination in the context of religious freedom. 1. Islam in Schaerbeek and the policy of the Municipality until 1994 The personality that undoubtedly marked the relations between the Muslims of Schaerbeek and the rest of the local society, was Roger Nols (1922-2004), elected for the first time to the post of communal councillor in 1957 on the ticket of the Liberal Party (right wing). In 1964, he became a member of the democratic Francophone Front (FDF), which was in favour of linguistic nationalism and defended the interests of the French-speaking inhabitants in Brussels in the face of rising Flemish nationalism (Dutchspeaking). His election to the post of mayor of Schaerbeek and his subsequent term of office dates back to 1 January 1970. He was reelected four times to this post, which he occupied until 1989. He was also a member of the Belgian Parliament from 1971 to 1987. Schaerbeek, initially under the influence of Nols, from 1971 to 1989, and later, under the influence of his associates, from 1989 to 1994, stood out as being the most xenophobic and islamophobic of all the Belgian communes. It would not be an exaggeration to say that during these years, the Muslims in this locality lived through a situation of quasi-apartheid, often with the indifference of the government and the legal authorities. Mayor Nols gradually became the person who inflamed political life and public opinion of the inhabitants in Brussels. He is the person who introduced an islamaphobic political current in Belgium, which was successful to a certain degree in the Eighties and Nineties (Rea, 1997, 56). The exaggerated ideas launched by Nols were of primary importance in the stigmatisation of the immigrant question through the media and the negative image that was given to Islam (Vandemeulebroucke, 1997, 211-212 and 218). 1.1. Perception of Muslims and Islam At the beginning of his mandate, Nols wrote up xenophobic lead articles in the municipal monthly magazine,” SchaerbeekInfo”, where since 1973, he had been incessantly clamouring for an immediate halt to immigration 47 . His argument was based on a Nols’ xenophobia seemed to go back much further: in an article signed in 1968 which appeared in a monthly publication known as the Revue nouvelle, he was worried about the “tidal wave” set off by the massive arrival of Moroccans and Turks (Bastenier, 1981, 104). He also published a 47

282


controversial concept, imported from American sociology, known as the “tolerance level” (Stroobants, 1984, 44-46), and on rhetoric which expressed the feeling of being invaded by the Muslim immigrants (Vandemeulebroucke, 1997, 208). In 1974, in another leading article, he clearly denounced the Muslims who came under his jurisdiction because of their particular type of clothing and their ritual slaughter of sheep, “which disturbed the neighbourhood” (Vandemeulebroucke, 1997, 206). The immigrant question was used by him as a springboard to gain votes. During these years he took advantage of a morose socio-economic climate and an international context where the rise of a political Islam in the Muslim world was becoming apparent, which did a great deal to feed incomprehension and fear in the Western world. In September 1979, he published an article in the magazine “Schaerbeek-Info” entitled a “Letter to the immigrants”, which was also translated into Arabic and Turkish: “Countless letters (…) addressed to me by my Schaerbeekois compatriots complain about a lack of integration on your part and they are asking for measures to be taken. The press, in addition, speaks about the participation of some of your children in delinquent acts by organized bands (…) to the point where our fellowcitizens do not feel safe any more. You have generated in our country a very careless attitude as regards the cleanliness of our streets. While they say they are neither racists nor xenophobes, our correspondents who are also taxpayers, do not quite understand why, in these times of economic crisis and unemployment, your presence is maintained in our midst.” This text and other statements that followed contributed to a first mediatization on Muslim immigration. Nols was defended by Antoinette Spaak, the president of the FDF party: “It is a question of alleviating the Belgian population. It is both a warning and proof that our elected officials do serious work” (the “Soir” newspaper dated 2. 10. 1979). However, the mayor left the FDF party to create his own communal political group: it was called “Nouvelles Orientations pour les Libertés Schaerbeekoises” or, in translation, New Orientations for Freedom in Schaerbeek (NOLS). At the national level, Nols joined forces with the liberal reform Party (PRL, right wing) and, under this banner, he gained nearly 100 000 preference votes at the European elections in 1983 (he did not take book: Nols R. (1987), “Belgium in danger. The truth about immigration, Brussels: Publishers: Ligne Claire.

283

URAL MANÇO

office). This result can only testify to the sympathy which his speeches aroused in certain sections of the Belgian electorate. In 1986, the mayor took part in a televised broadcast organised by the French-speaking Belgian television (Striptease) to present his New Year's greetings. He was filmed in front of the building of the Schaerbeek commune, sitting on a camel and clothed in a Moroccan djellaba. He declared: “Everyone knows that Ecolo [the environmental party] would like to grant voting rights to the Muslims in Brussels. So, in a few years time, if this came to pass, this is how the mayor of Schaerbeek would come to present his New Year wishes to the population of Schaerbeek!” Nols and his entourage perceived the Arab and Turkish populations as being potentially dangerous. Muslim culture and Islam seemed to them to be disturbing and incompatible with Western life and civilization (Rea, 2001, 62-63). Considered to be impossible to integrate and intolerant, the presence of the Muslims was comparable to a foreign occupation. The root cause of unemployment, urban neglect and juvenile delinquency was attributed to them. In the Eighties, an electoral poster showed a Hercules C-130 aircraft belonging to the Belgian army declaring that Nols would repatriate the immigrants to their native land. Another electoral poster (PRL, right wing) showed in 1991 a North African group of persons and the text proclaimed: “Nols: priority for security. Stop the invasion”. The mayor and his close relations were of the opinion that the Muslims were seeking to impose their traditions, practices, customs and their values concerning birthrate, the status of women and the pre-dominance of religion in the public arena. Mosques were likely to attract “radical” militants. They perturb the neighbourhood (intimidation, noise, mobs, problem of carparks, and lack of cleanliness of the buildings that had been transformed into mosques). B. Guillaume (Reform Movement, right wing), one of Nols’ former lieutenants, and deputy mayor of Schaerbeek, declared in a leaflet at the time of the local elections in 1988 (Rea, 1997, 62): “This is not racism, but the simple objective observation of a situation created by a sudden surge of persons from abroad who are impossible to integrate and who because of their culture and their religion in particular where the great majority seeks to impose its political and cultural values on all to the detriment of the traditional cultural values of its host country.” The refusal to consider Muslims differently, other than as foreigners on a temporary stay in the land without the least right to citizenship, put the municipal authorities in a comfortable position 284


and requests on religious matters or any other were quite simply ignored. The Municipality looked for “guardians” for its Muslim population. It made it a point of identifying the “good” docile Islam, the kind which is under the control of governments in the countries of origin. It is known that during the Eighties, the municipal authorities were in contact with the Morrocan and Turkish consulates. 1.2. Actions undertaken by the municipal powers The “counter”affair was what propelled the turbulent mayor for the first time into the glare of the media headlines in 1975 (Lesthaeghe and Neels, 2000, 132). On the pretext that it was difficult to find communal employees who were bilinguals, speaking both French and Dutch, as the law required, and the small number of requests in Dutch that were made to his administration, Nols made arrangements at the commune for a separate counter for the Dutch-speaking population. Two other counters were set up by him to deal exclusively with foreigners. This administrative racial segregation, which was something new and anti-constitutional very quickly gave rise to protests. It was only in 1980, after a court judgement, that these counters that made a distinction on the basis of ethnic origin were done away with. But true to his method of going about the management of communal business by stigmatizing one part of the population, the mayor was preparing to make his anti-immigrant Muslim policy even more radical. In September 1981, the commune illegally prohibited the registration of foreigners in the population records, which could block the family regrouping or the possibility of moving house. Other Brussels communes followed the example of Schaerbeek: the xenophobic populism which was directed at the Muslims was now being expressed with more legitimacy, since it was supported by local councillors of all the traditional political tendencies in the country. Complaints were lodged at the court in Brussels, but Schaerbeek and the other communes stubbornly refused to change their policy. The practice of forbidding the registration of newly incoming foreigners was finally legalized by the government in 1984 under pressure from the mayors in Brussels. The clause in the legislation that conferred the right on the mayors to refuse the registration of newly arrived foreigners in their Municipality was abolished in 1991. Far from preventing the creation of ethnically formed districts, it contributed, on the contrary, to the permanence of this phenomenon and the consequent stigmatization of the in285

URAL MANÇO

habitants. For years, the Schaerbeek Municipality did not maintain the roads, the urban infrastructures and the communal services of the districts that were inhabited by Muslims. The elementary schools in the immigrant districts were under invested in financial and teaching terms. Between 1989 and 1994, the Municipality did not apply to the national and regional authorities which allocate funds to the local authorities to finance extra-curricular activities for those districts that are in the grips of socio-economic difficulties. Nols is the main culprit in the dualisation of Schaerbeek which is divided into the beautiful areas in one part of commune with an affluent Belgian population, and the other part which is called the“ trash can area” of Schaerbeek, inhabited by a disadvantaged mainly Muslim population (Manço and Kanmaz, 2002, 82-85). Municipal authorities prohibited the gathering of more than two people in the evening in order to “prevent the disturbance of the peace at night and juvenile delinquency”. The xenophobic acts of the police force in Schaerbeek during this period (harassment, provocations, strong-armed interventions, unfair treatment of tradesmen) against the Muslim immigrant population, who were perceived and “classified as being dangerous”, are regularly criticized (Bastenier, 1981, 125). The communal administrative services create problems of all kinds regularly and treat the requests coming from Muslim inhabitants in many different ways: slowness, loss of documents, intentional errors in the spelling of Muslim names, restrained access to administrative buildings. At the beginning of the 80’s, Schaerbeek stood out because of cases of abuse of power as regards freedom of worship. The in struments used to give life to this policy were the operating licence (for a building to be used as a place for worship) and the licence to build or renovate delivered by the communal authorities (Lesthaeghe and Neels, 2000, 133-134). The Municipality of Schaerbeek was among the first to use these means in order to block projects concerning the opening or restoration of mosques - the objective was to limit the visibility of Islam in public areas (Dassetto, 1990, 188-189). In the second half of the Eighties, a Moroccan mosque close to the Tabligh movement was prohibited from having any activity by the municipal authorities. In 1989, the local Turkish mosque involved in the Milli Görüs movement was taken to court by the commune because of illegal restoration work. If mosques were inaugurated in Schaerbeek under the Nols administration, they were discreet, without distinctive signs on the façade. Officially they were religious organizations which included an “inci286


dental” place of worship! They were established in dilapidated or unadapted buildings, whose administrative status was often unspecified, even illegal, in the eyes of the law. From the Eighties onwards, the Schaerbeek administration adopted a rule for its schools where the wearing of any head covering was prohibited as a sign of religious or philosophical affiliation. It is possible to consider Mayor Nols as the person who initiated the ban on the wearing of the head scarf. Another mayor in the Brussels region, Mr. C.Piqué (Socialist Party) in the commune of Saint-Gilles, introduced another measure, emulated by Schaerbeek, which were the courses on the Islamic religion, which though imposed by law, were not organized between 1986 and 1991 (Vandemeulebroucke, 1997, 211). This ban was lifted only when a group of Muslim parents went to court in 1989. Though there are many policies of this type, the policies put in place in Schaerbeek are discriminating towards Muslims. They generally are in line with rejection and strong mistrust towards the Muslim immigrants (Bastenier, 1981, 120-122), and could even be a way of harassment to try and push this population to return to its origins. Sometimes, these policies are introduced according to an electoral programme or are a reaction to events related to national happenings, or to what has taken place in the Muslim world (Frégosi, 2001a, 21-22), or even connected to obscure facts. (Dassetto, 1990, 189-190). However, these are not the only kind of relations that exist between the communal authorities and the Muslims. At the end of the Eighties, Nols did not hesitate to inaugurate, in the presence of Moroccan diplomats, a prayer room installed inside the “House for Morrocan Youth” (Association of independent Youth), closely connected to the government in Rabat. During the same period, a group of Albanian Muslims did not just receive from Nols an operating licence for a new mosque, but a letter signed by the mayor himself requesting departments concerned not to block the activities of the place of worship (Mosque for the Albanian Muslims). According to the Imam, this act of favoritism came about in exchange for a promise to vote for the mayor’s list (the Albanian population, the oldest of the Muslim communities in Belgium, is mainly naturalized). 1.3. Mode of integration of Muslims in local lifeand the beginnings of the Fatih mosque Between the beginning of the Sixties and that of the following decade, the first Turkish immigrants settled in Schaerbeek and 287

URAL MANÇO

Saint-Josse, the neighbouring Municipality. Some had initially settled in another Belgian region (in Ghent, in Hainaut or in Limbourg) and had worked there as miners or labourers in the textile industry. In Brussels, they also were unqualified workers employed in particular in the construction industry, public works, the cleaning of offices or railway equipement. Schaerbeek, located in the north of Brussels, allows for rapid access to the industrial area of Vilvoorde, which is a few kilometres to the north of the Capital. One of the characteristics of the Turks of Schaerbeek is that they come mainly from the villages that lie side by side in their country of origin: the sub-region of Emirdag in the province of Afyon (south-west of Ankara): “They first arrived here in the Sixties, but it was between 1970 and 1974 that the most important immigration took place because of the limitations imposed on poppy cultivation, which was, together with cattle breeding our traditional trade [restrictions imposed by the Turkish government under pressure from the United States]. Then we benefitted from the request made by the Belgians, who recruited people in Ankara. At the beginning the Belgians treated us well. They needed us. We wanted to save some money and return home. The savings were used to bring our families to live with us and then we remained… To want to return, was to lie to oneself. The only ones who returned were those who were dead in their coffins! In Brussels, we settled in areas near the North Station which was our arrival point. This district was appropriate for us because housing was abundant there and the rents were cheap. The houses were abandoned and in bad condition, but we must acknowledge the fact that our own houses in the village were not better. We gradually did work on them so that they were fit to accommodate the family. Then, it was understood that it was to better become owners, and then we started to buy up the houses that we occupied. In each street there was at least one older Turkish immigrant who could inform us about important things. There was always somebody who could advise us on the question of administrative papers, work or even help us to translate documents. We, the people of Emirdag, are very attached to each other. We always act as a group. There was no question of going it alone. This is why, even today, we live close by to the others. In a street you have a majority of people who come from a certain village; in the next street, there are people from another village, etc We did not return, but gradually we rebuilt Emirdag in Schaerbeek! Did we need a grocery store? A bakery? A hairdresser? A dressmaker? … At the beginning, the mosque was something we needed for moral comfort. We felt the need more to say our prayers here than we did when we were in our own country. Abroad, you know nothing. You fear you might be on the wrong path and that you may come to grief. The 288


first times when we prayed in houses, in carparks and in the park [the Josaphat Park in Schaerbeek] it was prayers we said on feast days when time permitted it. Then, thanks to God, we had this mosque. With time everything fell into place. Each time a politician or somebody famous in Turkey goes through Brussels, he also visits the Turkish district. (…) Today, we are rich compared to what we would have been in Turkey. But we lost many things here. There is no longer the honesty and sincerity that we had in the village Young people do not respect old men any more, and parents do not recognize their young people any more. While we seek to earn our living, our children remained without supervision. They adopted the bad manners from here. How can you educate them in the morality and the faith of our tradition? Fathers found themselves in court, before the judge [due to ill-treatment] because they tried to put their children on the right path. We are regarded as second class citizens, but it is still better than in Turkey! Over there, one is considered even less than one is here. As soon as it is known that you are emigrants, they try to swindle you.” (An old person we met in the Fatih mosque in 2001). The question of the practice of Islamic worship had worried the Municipality even before Mayor R. Nols took office, given that in 1964 it had proposed the ownership of a house to be converted into a mosque for the token sum of one Belgian franc. The proposal was addressed to the Albanian community who were not very numerous, who had come to Belgium throughout the Fifties because they were fleeing the communist regime in Tirana, and they were concentrated in Schaerbeek. Moreover, the Schaerbeek administration accepted the erection of the statue of Skanderbeg (1403-1468) who was an Albanian national hero, in the municipal park. The house to be handed over, which can be regarded as the first mosque in Belgium, was to be acquired by the religious dignitary of the Albanian community, Ibrahim Hoxha, who could also speak Turkish. The following year, in order to respond to the demands that came about because of the growth of the Muslim population, four Turkish emigrants originating from Emirdag and one from Istanbul joined hands with Ibrahim Hoxha and bought an old movie theatre, situated in the vicinity of the first house-mosque, which became the white Mosque (Ak camii). The ownership of the building was in the hands of Ibrahim Hoxha, but since 1975, the activities of the mosque were organized according to the Belgian law, in the form of a non-profit association (law of 1921). It was the first mosque which requested this status in Belgium. Today, all mosque associations in Belgium, which are founded with the objective of managing places of worship, have this status. This legal status is granted by the Ministry for the Interior and is an automatic admin289

URAL MANÇO

istrative procedure (Dassetto, 1990, 188). It guarantees to the members of association a democratic operation and the security of a management that is inspected on an annual basis. It is also a guarantee of continuity, since an association can acquire real estate. Between 1965 and 1980, this mosque, one of rare ones at that time in the region of Brussels, attracted a community that was 90 % Turkish, under the supervision of an Albanian Imam; an unusual situation for the Anatolian immigrants. In the Seventies, Ibrahim Hoxha refused to bequeath the ownership of the property of the white mosque to the association and sought financing from the Saudi Embassy. The faithful of Turkish origin suspected him of being sympathetic towards wahhabism and rejected the idea of Saudian subsidies. It was also during this period that a minority of Turks started to become members of various Islamic political movements, which were developing in Turkey48 . These movements questioned the legitimacy of the State to organize the practice of worship and in particular to intervene in Islamic dogma in with a view to transform Turkish Islam into a nationalist religion disconnected from the rest of the Muslim world. These internal divisions within the Turkish population were also probably due to regional solidarity: the majority of the immigrants in Schaerbeek who owed allegiance to the Turkish authorities originated from Emirdag. On the other hand, the majority of the members of the minority protest group hailed from other regions in Turkey. It is in this context that a certain number of requests were registered with the Turkish consulate for the government in Ankara to contribute to the organization of Islamic worship. The first Counsellor for Religious Affairs came from Turkey and took up his post at the Embassy in Brussels in the middle of the Seventies. The mission of these religious civil servants, who tried to take up the spiritual life of the immigrants and the organization of worship, was to keep the Turkish immigrants away from “Arab” Islam, and at the same time to “keep the flame of nationalism burning brightly” for the Turks. The competition that was started by the Islamic movements with regard to the official Islam encouraged the Turkish authorities to spring into action. The Consulate spread the idea within the community of a collective departure from Ibrahim Hoxha’s mosque to then create the first exclusively Turkish mosque in Brussels. The consular authorities insisted on having the On the subject of politico-religious currents, especially the Milli Görüs movement, within the Turkish immigration in Europe: Manço, 1997. 48

290


title deeds of the future mosque. In exchange, they said that that a religious civil servant (an Imam) from the Turkish State would be sent to officiate on religious questions. The dispute between the majority of the Turkish community and their Albanian Imam ended in 1980 when the Turks rented one part of a church in Schaerbeek, which was an unoccupied building near a catholic secondary school. The mosque association which was at the origin of the current Fatih mosque set up because of this separation from Ibrahim Hoxha. The installation of a mosque in a rented building is in some way considered to be precarious and unworthy of a place of worship. The objective was to settle in a place that was bought, and where the property would be, as it was understood, bequeathed to the representative of the official Islam in Belgium, which was “La Direction des Affaires Religieuses” or the Management of the religious Affairs of the Turkish government. The community found a house on the Chaussée de Haecht, in the middle of the Turkish district, which seemed appropriate for conversion into a place of worship. Ten men, all of them heads of families pooled the money to buy it in 1982: this is how the Fatih mosque was born. On this occasion a new quarrel broke out. A minority group of the Turkish population broke away from the rest on the pretext that it wanted to further organize its own teaching classes on Islamic catechism (“courses on the Koran”) for children in a house called “medrese” (medersa) located some streets away. The minority group, which defended the colours of the political islamopopulist movement called Milli Görüs, could no longer tolerate the dominance of the Turkish government in the organization of worship. The members of this movement thus created their own association in 1983 and, after a short stay in another place, they chose to set up their association on the Chaussée de Haecht, the principal artery of the Turkish district. The Belgian branch of the Milli Görüs movement (which is currently called the Islamic Federation of Belgium/Belçika Islam Federasyonu) has its headquarters in an old commercial building which lies within fifty metres of the Fatih mosque. The Fatih mosque will no longer suffer any more important scissions. The Association includes practically no members other than those who originated from the villages of Emirdag; the mosque building belongs to the official religious organization; the latter provides for the appointment and remuneration of an Imam. 291

URAL MANÇO

The administrative expenditures and renvoation costs of the building are financed by the contributions of the members. It is in theory possible for them to launch any socio-cultural activity which could help community life and integration in the civil society of the host country. However, nothing of the kind was done until the end of the Nineties. It goes without saying that the nature of the communal powers hardly encourages any initiative of this nature. However, two other problems have hindered the evolution of the association of the Fatih mosque: Turkish nationalism which is apparent in many members of the association, and historical quarrels that arise among the villages of origin. The members of association position themselves (still) according to their village of origin. Sometimes these villages are caught up in enmities that date back to hundreds of years in time ( an old vendetta, an old theft of cattle or pastures that were unlawfully occupied) or some sterile clash (“parochialism”) which goes far back in time. The general assemblies of the association are held still in the spirit of “village against village”. These old memories block mentalities and set attitudes in stone. One member of the community stated that since 1982, the presidents, vice-presidents and treasurers of the association have never been elected for their competences or the projects which they propose, but because they come from a certain village… Under these circumstances, the appointment of young Muslims educated in Belgium to the post of head of the association, who are ideologically not too attached to their village of origin which would make them capable of entertaining less superficial relationships with the communal authorities, was probably prevented or delayed. In the whole of the Muslim population in Schaerbeek, the first generation immigrants seem, as far as the majority goes, to be resigned to the hostility of the municipal authorities. Some seek to prove their docility in order to gain the confidence of the communal authorities, as in the case of the Morrocan Friendship Circle and the Albanian Mosque referred to earlier on. Others, in particular the Turks, approve the ideology and the policy of Mayor Nols, as can be read in an article which appeared in the daily newspaper “Le Soir” of October 2, 1979. Since they do not think that they are living “on their land”, the first generation Muslims in Schaerbeek adopt a low profile. In spite of many internal conflicts, the religious life of the community proceeds discretely with respect to outside. The Muslims lack the means to mobilize Belgian public opinion in their favour. They have a limited linguistic capacity in French and are unaware of Belgian sociopolitical realities, as well 292


as their rights. In the face of rising islamophobia, it is better to be invisible and ask for nothing. Except for an active catholic minority of philanthropists or leftist militants, few Belgians are interested in the fate of the Muslims in Schaerbeek. An anti-racist associative network started in Schaerbeek thanks to the actions of this milieu during the second half of the Eighties which sought to alleviate the discriminative effects of municipal policy in schools and the sociocultural sphere. Before the development of these associations, groups of Muslims, including the one that founded the Fatih mosque, organized social activities, such as help with school homework and French courses for adults. Volunteers who help in this sphere are neighbours or retired Belgian teachers. These activities are somewhat in the nature of a smoke screen which is used to hide the true social objective of association from the communal authorities: which is the practice of religion. Indeed, in order to avoid having to ask the municipal authorities for an operating licence, the mosques of Schaerbeek were made to pass off as cultural organizations.

2. Muslim Citizenship: municipal policy since 1994 Mayor Nols resigned in 1989 due to health reasons, but his majority following and their philosophy continue to reign supreme. Having become a simple communal councillor, Nols continued to exert his influence within the municipality. In 1993 for example, he arranged for the appointment of a police officer, J. Demol, known for his hard methods, to be the chief of the police force of Schaerbeek. This person had to resign in 1998, when his past as an extreme right activist came to light (Jacobs, 2000, 297-298). However, since the communal elections of October 1994, the communal majority has changed. The Municipality is governed by a mixed coalition of parties. With the departure of Nols, the Schaerbeek political chess-board exploded in a multitude of unstable formations. Contrary to what is noted in the majority of the municipalities in Brussels, there is no dominant party any more. An important challenge for the major political parties in the Brussels region (the Reform Movement – right wing, formed by the federation of the FDF and the PRL, the socialist Party and the Green Party) is to conquer the electorate in Schaerbeek. Because of its dilapidated districts, its over stretched finances and a high rate of unemployment, and as the second most important Municipality in the Brussels region considering the number of inhabitants, it has very high economic 293

URAL MANÇO

potential in terms of employment, public works and real estate speculation, which is why it is so important for the regional political community 49 . In addition to this, further to the successive reforms that were introduced throughout the 90’s, the Belgian naturalisation rules have become one of most liberal in the world. The number of Schaerbeek foreign nationals who have acquired Belgian citizenship has grown quickly. Under these conditions, all the votes count and mentalities become easier to change. At the time of the elections on October 8, 2000, a coalition similar to the one formed in 1994 was once again in place (liberal reform party, Socialists and the Greens) under the direction of a young economist, Bernard Clerfayt (Reform Movement. right wing). Today, a certain number of Nols’ former buddies are still active in policy making in Schaerbeek, but they rub shoulders with the eleven Muslims who are elected officials to the Commune administration (out of 47 seats), which includes seven of Moroccan origin and three of Turkish origin. Three of these elected officials were appointed as the mayor’s deputies. 2.1. Perception of Muslims and Islam From 1994 onwards, and this was even more clearly defined after 2000, the new majority managed to overcome the annoyance and irritation related to the presence and the visibility of Islam and the Muslims in the commune. The calming down of the situation supposes that it could be due to a political legitimisation of the cultural and religious differences (Frégosi, 2001b, 94). Islam is from now on, an ordinary everyday reality which is rooted in the existence of the commune. The willingness to locally institutionalize the Muslim presence as demanded by a State of law and democracy requires equal treatment to be meted out to all the actors. The Municipality no longer tries to seek out a “good” flexible Islam. Officially, there are no appointed interlocutors anymore. The Municipality deals with all those who request something. The Muslims are looked upon as citizens just like the others.

Nols is once again elected municipal councillor on the PRL ticket (right wing), but h refused to take his place beside the first elected members of foreign origin and he resigned. Despite a debt of 20 million euros, the Brussels press referred to a Schaerbeek Eldora do when describing the largest land reserve of the region (up to 94 hectares) – the railway station for training and sorting – which lies side by side with the territory belonging to the Municipality: The Vif/l’Express dated 25.10.2002 and the Vlan dated 7.4.2004. 49

294


This new attitude on the part of the Municipality came about through a dramatic event. On May 7, 2002, an 82 year old fanatic, known for his racist ideas and his sympathy towards the extreme right party, broke into his Moroccan neighbours’ home. He killed the father and the mother.On the following day, the commune called a crisis meeting in a Moroccan mosque in the district in order to clear up the misunderstandings (the witnesses on the scene of the crime accused the local police force of passiveness) and to limit the risks of a riot breaking out (there were incidents that occurred on May 8 and 9). At the time of the funeral ceremony of the victims on May 10, the politicians from Schaerbeek and many representatives of the regional and federal governments were present, as were many persons who were well known in the sphere of Belgian socio-policy. Before the Islamic religious rites took place, the Mayor, Mr. B. Clerfayt addressed the 6 000 Schaerbeek inhabitants present: “Our walls exude hate (…) I know that you hope that the situation will return to a state of calm and serenity which is necessary at a time like this. All citizens are equal. They have the same rights, the same duties. We must guarantee the same privileges to all and accord the same attention to all.” Since December 2002, a dialogue has started at the initiative of the authorities in Schaerbeek between the bereaved family, the inhabitants of the district and the regional authorities in Brussels in order to transform the building where the crime took place into a space for meditation and exchange among the different cultures. 2.2. Mode of action of the municipal powers Many things have changed in Schaerbeek since the second half of the Nineties. It is impossible to give a full account here of the policies that have been introduced in the following areas: urban, social, school and cultural led by the communal powers in favour of the inhabitants in the underprivileged districts (and therefore for Muslims) and to encourage harmonious co-habitation among all sections of the population. Only certain facts related to mosque associations and the practice of the religion are indicated. Since 1995, the local sections of various political parties as well as the majority and the opposition, started to organize meetings with the Muslims in certain mosques in Schaerbeek. At the time of each election campaign (municipal, regional or legislative), their representatives (sometimes high ranking officials) no longer hesitate to visit the Turkish and Moroccan mosques. During one of these visits to the Fatih mosque, the faithful raised the question of the lack of an Islamic cemetery in the area and the difficulties that the Mus295

URAL MANÇO

lims experienced because of this. From 1996 and on a continuing basis, the commune began the preparation of a project for a Muslim burial ground in the Schaerbeek cemetery not without however, meeting with resistance from the former close relations of exmayor Nols. However, the project grew in dimensions in 2000, because under the influence of the Schaerbeek administration six other Brussels communes joined in the project. The project came to fruition in 2002 with the inauguration of the first multifaith cemetery in the Brussels region. In October 1996, during the official launching ceremony of the project, the municipal college solemnly declared: “We wish to offer all religions a burial place worthy of the name. This is a gesture which we have made with regard to the Muslim community. It is a sign which shows our desire to facilitate as far as we possibly can, their integration in our commune. These people were born here, have grown up here, live here and will die here. And they will be buried here.” Since the end of the 1990’s, at the time of each festival of the sacrifice (aïd Al-adhâ), the municipal authorities arrange for the necessary to be done where the professional butchers are at work, with bin liners and bags for waste and containers to deposit the sheep carcasses. Between 1997 and 2000, the mayor’s deputies for town planning services and the future mayor, Mr. B. Clerfayt, started a systematic operation for regularization of the administrative status of the 13 mosques in Schaerbeek. The administration also benefits from the informal but effective mediation on the part of an Islamic teacher of religion of Turkish origin, Halis Kökten. There is now no distinction made as all the mosques are contacted when necessary, certain are visited (Mr. Clerfayt visited a mosque for the first time in 1999). It is an official recognition at the local level coupled with a learning process, since the administration and the mediator explain the urban procedures to the mosque associations. Following this regularization procedure, seven mosques in Schaerbeek, among them, the Fatih mosque, obtained a renovation permit. After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the mayor’s deputy in charge of the religious issues, Mr.E. Noël, officially took the initiative to organize meetings in the context of interreligious dialogues among the local representatives of the three monotheist religions. Some of these meetings are held in the Moroccan and Turkish mosques 50 . In December 2002, E. Noël participated in the celebration of the festival which ends the

50

Right until March 2003, these meetings were a regular feature.

296


Ramadan fast which was held in a Moroccan mosque (Kobaa) in Schaerbeek. This event was broadcast live by a local Morrocan radio station. 2.3. Mode of integration of Muslims in local life and the Fatih mosque during the new period The reasons for the change in mentalities and communal policies are not specific to Schaerbeek alone, but for the most islamophobic Municipality that existed in the recent past, these changes are more noteworthy. According to the data available on the municipal administration from 1991 to 2001, nearly 20,200 Schaerbeek residents acquired Belgian nationality. The great majority of them are Muslims. Today, all the democratic parties have Muslim candidates on their lists when there are communal, regional or legislative elections, and this includes right wing parties which had Nols and his close associates on their lists. According to our calculations on the results of the communal elections on October 8, 2000, in Schaerbeek there were 35 Muslim candidates and 235 non Muslim candidates on the lists of the democratic parties. The Muslim candidates (eleven of whom were elected) received on an average 360 preference votes, against an average of 297 preference votes for the non Muslim candidates, some of whom are very well known stars in the local and even national political sphere.… This comparison, which has not escaped the attention of the strategists in the different parties, shows that the Muslim electorate is particularly active and that it is necessary from now on to take it into account. Mentalities are therefore evolving in parallel with the more positive approach implemented by the municipal majority on the question of the Muslim presence. Feeling that the new municipal authorities were more open to their requests, seven of the thirteen mosques in Schaerbeek have, since 1997, applied for renovation permits. However, the Fatih mosque51 is the first to act, since its The number of members of the Fatih Mosque association varied greatly during its history (between 200 and 500). It is possible to note a dwindling in numbers because according to the present President of the association, the number of subscribing members had gone down to 200 persons. A reduction in the numbers attending Islamic catechism classes and the lack of interest on the part of the parents for this particular course was also pointed out by the mosque official. A member is usually the father who represents all the family, which in theory means that the community is made up of 1 500 to 2 500 individuals (out of about 14 000 inhabitants of Turkish origin in Schaerbeek in 2002). The monthly subscription is 10 51

297

URAL MANÇO

first contacts with the Municipality date back to 1995. The house on the Chaussée de Haecht where the Fatih mosque was initially set up has only a narrow and dark space. The building itself is in a bad condition. The place gives the impression that this tenancy is provisional, in line with the image of the particularly old Muslims who frequent the place. Contrary to what is obvious now, these first generation immigrants have not grown accustomed to the idea that they are now forever resident in Belgium. Thus no attempt is made to change the layout of the premises, even if it is only to repaint the frontage, which has not been done from 1982 till 1995, a period of 13 years! In 1994, the management of the association of mosque changed. This date coincides with the advent of the new municipal majority. The new president, Osman Duran, is a worker in the building trade who has taken early retirement. He views his new responsibilities from this angle, in terms of renovation and space utilisation. He contacted the new communal management to ask for a building or an adequate plot of land for the construction of a new mosque. In spite of the rapid refusal of the commune, the president understands that a new period is opening up: “The refusal to give us land or a building did not discourage me, since my real project was to work over our current mosque. The “old curtains” were beginning to tear since 1994. One can talk about experience, acquired through the years, which has matured us all. The Belgians saw that they were going to have to live with us. And we looked deeper into the question of our integration and our bonds with this country. We finally learned how to accept ourselves. During the time of Nols’ term of office, certain Turks were not even allowed at the communal offices! Then, the number of naturalized persons started to increase. The Belgians of Turkish origin who started out in politics are of great help to us. Now, it euros. Apart from the ordinary collection every Friday, an exception collection can be organised to cope with unexpected expenditure. The monthly operational budget for the Fatih mosque was around 2 800 euros in 2004. The association which manages the Fatih mosque is directed by a Board of 11 members (this includes the President), elected every two years. The number of faithful who regularly frequent the mosque is much greater than the subscribing members. The mosque can hold up to 1 000 male members of the congregation. This number is constant during feast day prayers (aïd al-adhâ and aïd as-saghir). Then it becomes the biggest Islamic prayer community in Belgium. The Fatih mosque is the biggest in Brussels. Its geographical situation is central with regard to both the Turkish neighbourhood and the Brussels region as a whole.

298


is sometimes necessary to wait, but we always obtain the desired appointment. Our presence from now on is regarded as legitimate 52 . ” In 1995, O. Duran managed to collect the sum necessary to buy the house neighbouring the mosque and succeeded in obtaining a building permit from the commune – his plan was to link the two buildings and to install the central heating unit there. This allowed for the enlargement of the place of worship, and together with a hall which would make it possible for the community to take tea there and for the association to increase its financial income in this way. “The Municipality was unaware of the lack of place and finances which was a source of suffering for us. Until the present time we have not received any financial assistance from a Belgian authority. After the first purchase, we were able to buy two other houses (out of the three that we coveted) in the street perpendicular to the Chaussée de Haecht. Thus we obtained the final square area that we currently own – it is “L” shaped, because of the way the four buildings were joined together with their gardens. We could finally develop the grand project with interior decoration thanks to material and the earthenware imported from Turkey. (…) After my first failure in 1995 [refusal of the request to grant us a building or a plot of land], I think I have implemented a three step strategy in our relationship with the Municipality. Initially, it was a request for renovation [enlarging and central heating], following the purchase of the adjacent houses; then, in the second stage, in 1997 we applied for the permit to construct a cupola and a minaret, as in the case of the permit for interior decoration. It took me six months before I obtained an appointment with the deputy mayor for town planning [the current mayor is B. Clerfayt]. The 1997 project obviously had more visibility from the outside than the 1995 one. Perhaps that bothered the administration more. I was told that it would be impossible to build a minaret in the heart of Brussels! At this stage, the intervention of the professor of religion H. Kökten as a mediator had the desired effect. It is true that the teacher speaks French and I can’t really. Administrative documents were missing in our file and I was unaware that we needed them. The communal civil servants never took the trouble to explain all this to me. The Councillor for Religious Affairs at the Turkish Consulate helps us, but obviously it is not sufficient with regard to the administrative and technical aspects of the dossier. I also think that the communal elections were approaching and that the chances of Mr. Clerfayt to become mayor were increasing. The mediation and the elections were perhaps the two reasons for which the dossier was finally sanctioned. We however were not entitled to the cu52

Interview with Osman Duran in the Fatih mosque in February 2003.

299

URAL MANÇO

pola. We had to be satisfied with only one minaret 12 metres in height and not 18 metres as initially envisaged and we were forbidden to hold prayers there on the public highway. The administrative status of the minaret is in fact similar to that of an advertising signboard. It was to be built in a light metal structure. The permit for the minaret must be renewed after inspection every nine years. The renovation, interior decoration and the minaret cost nearly 62 000 euros. Half of this sum was financed from the reserves of the mosque and the other half was obtained through the gifts given by the Muslims of the district, and we must not forget the voluntary work done by many of the faithful. Lastly, the third stage of my strategy will be the purchase of a plot of land out of the greater Brussels area, possibly along a highway, where we can build a really large mosque there, for 4 to 5 000 faithful designed in the Ottoman architectural style with cupolas and minarets, which must serve the entire Brussels region. My objective is the appreciation of the Muslim presence by the Belgian population; this is why it is possible to consider an “intercultural” Belgo-Turkish architectural style. This mosque would also have an arts centre, a park and a carpark. This final project can be carried out only over a period of several years. At the moment we are on the look out for an adequate plot of land. We will contact the authorities only after acquisition. From now on, we must negotiate with the Municipality about the means of improving the religious services which we render to our community. For example, we should be able to say the funeral prayer service at the Fatih mosque before the burial of the deceased in the multiconfessionnal cemetery in Schaerbeek or before repatriation to Turkey. We are also taking part in the official project to beautify and redevelop the Chaussée de Haecht, since we applied for and obtained the permit for the future widening of the pavement in front of the Fatih mosque in order to embellish the front façade.” The Islamic religion teacher, Halis Kökten 53 , who proposed his services as a mediator, gives the following personal account concerning the initiation of the relations with the mosques and the Municipality: “I was just starting out in communal politics. As a very new member of B. Clerfayt’s political party, in August 1997 I contacted the municipal authorities of Schaerbeek at the request of the Milli Görüs community, which was taken to court in 1989 by the old municipal administration. It Mr. Kökten lives in the neighbouring commune of St. Josse. He is a member of the same political party as the mayor of Schaerbeek, Mr. B. Clerfayt (Reform Movement) and during the 2000 communal elections; he was elected councillor in his commune. Interview realised in December 2002. 53

300


wanted henceforth to comply with the rules in force, but the new dossier sent in several months before did not seem to progress. I met the civil servant responsible for town planning at the communal offices. To my great astonishment, I realized that the files containing the application for a renewal permit made by the two Turkish mosques situated on the Chaussée de Haecht (the Milli Görüs mosque and the Fatih mosque) had got mixed up through carelessness! The civil servant was unaware of the existence of the two Turkish mosques situated at a distance of just a few metres from each other. We spent some time to put the two dossiers in order. Faithful to my commitment, I initially dealt with the file on the Milli Görüs mosque. It was regarded as an “islamist” mosque not co ntrolled by the Turkish government. The fact that this file was passed before all the others astonished many people. However the problem was by no means political. The administration only seeks to serve all the members of its population, but the rules must be respected. All the files that were sent in by the various mosques in Schaerbeek were incomplete because one or another document was missing. Then, linguistic difficulties and the annoyances and irritations dating back to the time when Nols was in power complicated the channels of communication.… As far as documents go, the association which manages the mosque must be legally established and have the status of a non-profit association and this information must be published in the Belgian Monitor [Official Journal]. For the permits concerning matters dealing with renovation and installation of equipment, a plan signed by an architect is indispensable. This plan must be inspected by the firemen for safety requirements. Moreover, a project which includes external transformations cannot contravene the urban regulations in force. It is also necessary to have a thorough check of the neighbourhood area and this must be done within 15 days. Finally, the work must be carried out by recognized companies and not by amateurs. Documents must attest to the fact that all these requirements have been adhered to. It is rare that a mosque file is complete. They are often haphazrdly put together. It is always necessary to chase documents and shake up the administrators of associations so that they get on with the work. It is true that no mosque receives public financing of any kind which is the case for all religions that are recognized and are aided in this way to provide for the operational needs of their places of worship. In addition, the municipal authorities have their own calendar of activities. And all the applications that are received take time to process. The other problem, apart from the administrative questions, is the ignorance of the communal authorities about Islam as a religion and a culture. It is understandable. One should not suspect any automatic rejection of requests in these cases. Certain blockages or malfunctionning is due to lack of comprehension or a misunderstanding, and personally I am of the opinion that they are primarily caused by the recurrent incapacity on the part of the Muslims to 301

URAL MANÇO

present their faith and their cultural practices in terms that would be understood by the Westerners”. According to H. Kökten, the restructing project outlined by the president of the Fatih mosque did not, at the outset, make reference to the construction of a minaret54 : “The origin of the project concerning the embellishment of the frontage by a minaret is more to do with description. The Imam of the White Mosque, the Albanian Ibrahim Hoxha, had placed a plywood board measuring two metres in height which represented a minaret. The old Turks who see this refer to the ancient quarrel with the Albanian imam and demand that the president of the Fatih mosque do likewise for a minaret to be put in place. President O. Duran discussed this with a Belgian friend, a draftsman. The friend is delighted by the idea and immediately suggests that a real minare 55 t measuring eighteen metres in height be built on the frontage with its base constructed on the pavement. The idea appeals to all concerned. Al though this is not a religious obligation, because even in Muslim countries there are mosques without minarets, it is however an architectural detail and an identity feature which is very symbolic, which unabashedly points to a permanent presence which is blending into the native landscape in the public area. The height of the minaret however is exaggerated and the documents that were attached did not include any expertise on the resistance of material to the wind force. The height of the minaret was the real reason for the blocking of this file before I stepped in at the request of president Duran. Finally, to prove its goodwill, the commune resolved the problem. Technical specifications that apply to luminous commercial signboards were used to build the minaret in co mpliance with these standards. This is how the only popular mosque in Brussels with a minaret became a living reality. As regards the call to pray announced from the top of this minaret, I formally advised the persons in charge of the mosque not to ask the question. One should not unnecessarily provoke negative reactions. Later on, it will be always possible to ask for permission on an exceptional basis to be able to do this for feast days or at the beginning of the month of Ramadan.” The Fatih mosque that was renovated and decorated with its minaret and earthenware imported from Turkey was inaugurated during a special ceremony that took place at the beginning of the month of Ramadan on, November 16, 2001. The communal authorities and the Turkish consular dignitaries were present at the

On the subject of the minaret read Le Soir dated 3.7.2001 and 3.11.2001. The term “minaret” comes from the Arabic “al-manâr” meaning guiding post or lighthouse. 54 55

302


time of the event, which was highlighted by the Belgian media. The president of the association of the Fatih mosque was interviewed on television: he invited the public to come and visit the building56 . According to Mr. Duran the Fatih mosque had become “presentable” and was now recognised as a place where interesting meetings are held. One of the multifaith meetings organized by the Municipality in the aftermath of September 11 was held there. Since spring 2002, the mosque organized several open days for the Brussels public. School visits are arranged and Islamic worship is explained to the pupils by French-speaking persons in charge of the mosque. During the month of Ramadan in November 2002, two evenings of breaking the fast were organized there in the presence of political leaders and Muslim and non-Muslims associations. Belgian neighbours 57 and catholic and orthodox priests from Schaerbeek started to come to the mosque to have tea there.

3. Conclusion: “good practices” which are the basis of integration The sudden appearance of a new faith in the public area that belongs to a municipality can certainly create disturbances. The municipal authorities whop are caught unawares and are ignorant of the realities of this population and its religious rites, can be tempted, in the interests of security, to resort to a populist or xenophobic type of management, as was the case for Islam and the Muslims in Schaerbeek over a long period of time (1970-1994). The way in which Islam was dealt with by the Schaerbeek Municipality can also be largely explained by the personal convictions or the personality of the mayor himself (Frégosi, 2001b, 114). The formation of the Muslim communities must thus also be perceived through the vision of the world that was exclusive to mayor Nols.

O. Duran condemned the 11 September attacks during this interview. The president confided in us saying that for months he feared an antiIslamist attack since his mosque has been thrown into the glare of publicity because of its inauguration. For several months, those persons who were carrying a briefcase or a bag were denied access to the mosque for security reasons. 57 Mr. Duran specified that after the inauguration and the subsequent publicity that the mosque received, a Belgian neighbour remarked: “before, the building was dark. We did not really know what was going on there. I never wanted to go into it. Since it has been renovated, your mosque is much more attractive and the cafeteria is more welcoming”. 56

303

URAL MANÇO

His actions could have prejudiced the integration of the Muslims into the local population. However, the relational model, marked by mistrust and hostility towards Muslims, which prevailed until the first half of the Nineties, was finally replaced by another one. The new relational model is characterized by the effective recognition of the freedom of worship for Muslims and for the valorization of their identity. According to the new municipal rhetoric, citizenship for Muslims is being discussed as well as the desire to pull Islam out of institutional underdevelopment. The attacks of September 11, 2001 and the international conflicts which have arisen since have not blocked this process of “local citizenship” for Muslims. Even if the willingness on the part of the communal authorities could be tinted with more prosaic objectives of an electoral nature, the requests for social and religious recognition coming from the Muslim population are gradually being taken into account. The practices that we observed have contributed to a wider mutual comprehension and a qualitative co-habitation in the locality. In conclusion, we could summarise them in the following way: - listen to the Muslims. The municipalities should seek to mobilize and include as far as possiblet the various categories of inhabitants, including the Muslims so that they participate in all projects of collective living. The mosques or various associations that are representative of the local Muslim population should be explicitly invited to join in the different aspects of communal life (district councils, urban projects, assistance to the most deprived members of the population, local festivals and activities, etc). It is highly desirable that the communal authorities visit the mosques in a spirit of co-operation to encourage harmonious relations. It is particularly recommended that the authorities visit the mosques during Muslim religious festivals. The municipalities could verify the administrative status of the mosques without causing friction, and, if necessary, launch the necessary procedures to regularize them. It is necessary to precisely explain municipal powers as regards worship, to the Muslim persons in charge. Regular contacts between the municipality and the mosques offer a serious guarantee for the integration of Muslims in local life. They could also be a means of preventing the emergence of radical groups or ideas within this population. The recruitment of Muslim workers to fill posts that are vacant within the municipality can contribute to a policy of openness. 304


- To invite people to train as mediators. The weakness in the relationship of the Muslims with the rest of society and the scarcity of competent interlocutors is something we have noted for a long time (Dassetto, 1990, 206-207). It is therefore necessary to promote and encourage mediators be they Muslims or not, who will gain the confidence of the various local groups. These mediators should be able to play a dual teaching role: (1) to explain what Islam is about and the needs of Muslims to the municipalities; (2) to explain the regulations and procedures in force, as well as the challenges at communal level facing the Muslims. The following actions must be taken care of by these intermediaries: popularization of the legislation as regards freedom of worship and conscience (including its implications at the municipal level) with regard to the communal officials in charge, the associative Muslims, and any other organization in charge of promoting intercultural relations, social and human rights, and fighting against racism. The appearance of Muslim politicians (of both sexes) is also desirable: present in the local political life and anchored in the Muslim community, they are potentially good mediators. They legitimise participative citizenship in the eyes of the Muslims and the Muslim presence is consequently legitimised in the eyes of the natives. Another factor which encourages the taking into account of Muslims at the local level is the appointment of new directors as heads of mosque associations. The new leaders of mosque associations who have the nationality of the country of residence and who speak the language of the country of origin are preferable. Compared to their predecessors, they are generally better trained and more conscious of socio-political realities in European countries and in their locality. The dialogue between local authorities and the Muslim community is vital for such leaders to be engaged in, so that they are legitimately accepted within their community (Yalçîn-Heckmann, 1997, 95 and 101; Frégosi, 2001b, 127 and 129). - To invest in communal life. If it wishes to succeed in its attemps to gain recognition, the local Muslim community should structure itself so as to transcend national, ethnic or doctrinal memberships. Ideally, it should be able to speak with one voice. The Muslim community must follow up on the work of its representatives through democratic and disciplined methods (of its administrators of mosque associations), whose responsibilities must be clearly spelled out and recognized by all. The community and the persons in charge must take care to respect the laws and regulations within the framework of a transparent management system 305

URAL MANÇO

set up within their association. The Imams must try to bring people together, because it helps to develop a sense of active citizenship and responsibility for the Muslims, as well remaining open to the fellow-citizens who are non-Muslims thus respecting the values of the country of reisdence. The development of the Muslim community and the development of its Islamic spirituality closely depend on the intellectual quality of the interaction. The Muslim persons in charge (preferably a common delegation representing the various mosques and/or Muslim communities that are ethnically different and are present on the municipal territory) could take the initiative to contact or invite the communal authorities in order to explain little known facts about Islam, to create durable bonds and to expose their own problems and put in their requests. This invitation should be sustained by patience and respect for the authorities: diplomatically, at the beginning of the relationship, the ignorance of the political and administrative personnel communal about Islam should be tolerated in order to understand the reasons for its possible maladroitness. It is up to the Muslims and to them alone to explain their faith and clarify their values and requirements in cultural and religious matters. The Muslims must resort to professional staff in order to obtain information, prepare negotiations with the authorities and conclude their projects: lawyers (freedom of worship and communal responsibilities on the matter, litigations); architects (construction or renovation of places of worship); veterinary surgeons (ritual slaughter); intercultural and anti-racist associations (methods of negotiation, lobbying, Community development); journalists (to present itself to the public). The Muslims should develop strategies in their relationships with the authorities: (1) to support and accelerate the process of naturalization and active citizenship; (2) to establish alliances between Muslims and non Muslims; (3) to develop integrated and hierarchical projects (in the long run, in the short term); (4) to propose several alternative solutions to avoid the dead ends; (5) to ask for more than they require so as to guarantee the satisfaction of a reasonable number of claims; (6) to develop and explain architectural projects, as well as cultural activities and those pertaining to worship in the Muslim community, which are concrete contributions to the social and cultural life in the commune and to local and urban embellishment; (7) to take part regularly in the sociocultural and festive activities organized by the commune.

306


References Bastenier A. (1981), « Quand Bruxelles découvre ses immigrés », Actes du colloque « Le présent et l’avenir de l’immigration à Bruxelles » (28-29 mars 1981), Brussels : Commission française de la culture de l’Agglomération de Bruxelles, 103-127. Dassetto F. (1990), « Visibilisation de l’islam dans l’espace public », Bastenier A. & Dassetto F. (eds), Immigrations et nouveaux pluralismes. Une confrontation de sociétés, Brussels : De Boeck Université, 179-208. Frégosi F. (2001a), « Les régulations locales du pluralisme religieux : éléments de problématique », Frégosi F. & Willaime J.-P. (eds), Le religieux dans la commune. Les régulations locales du pluralisme religieux en France, Genève : Labor & Fides, 11-26. Frégosi F. (2001b), « ’Droit de cité’ de l’islam et politiques municipales : analyse comparée entre Strasbourg et Mulhouse », Frégosi F. & Willaime J.-P. (eds), Le religieux dans la commune. Les régulations locales du pluralisme religieux en France, Genève : Labor & Fides, 92-137. Lesthaeghe R. & Neels K. (2000), « Islamic Communities in Belgium. Religious Orientations and Secularization », Lesthaeghe R. (ed.) Communities and Generations : Turkish and Moroccan populations in Belgium, Brussels : NIDI CBGS Publications, 36, 129-163. Manço U. (1997), «Des organisations sociopolitiques comme solidarités islamiques dans l’immigration turque en Europe », Les Annales de l’Autre Islam, 4, 97-133. Manço U. & Kanmaz M. (2002), « De la pathologie au traitement. La gestion municipale de l’islam et des musulmans de Belgique », Cahiers d’études sur la Méditerranée orientale et le monde turco-iranien, 33, 57-88. Rea A. (1997), « Mouvements sociaux, partis et intégration », Coenen M.-T. & Lewin R. (eds), La Belgique et ses immigrés. Les politiques manquées, Brussels : De Boeck Université, 56-71. Rea A. (2001), « Délinquance et immigration : usage politique d’une association symbolique », Brion F. & al. (coord.), Mon délit ? Mon origine. Criminalité et criminalisation de l’immigration, Brussels : De Boeck, 59-76. Stroobants M. (1984), « Actualité du biologisme dans l’interprétation des faits sociaux. La notion de ‘seuil de tolérance’ », Critique régionale, 1011, 22-69. Vandemeulebroecke M. (1997), « Sous le regard des médias », Coenen M.T. & Lewin R. (eds), La Belgique et ses immigrés. Les politiques manquées, Brussels : De Boeck-Université, 205-220. Yalçin-Heckmann L. (1997), «The Perils of Ethnic Associational Life in Europe : Turkish Migrants in Germany and in France », Modood T. & Werbner P. (eds), The Politics of Multiculturalism in the New Europe, Londres-New York : Zed Books, 95-110.

307


Cheratte-Visé: a Muslim village in Wallonia Christophe Parthoens, Dina Sensi and Altay Manço58 Abstract This article aims to describe the processes leading to social integration of a Turkish community at the beginning of the sixties who were resident in a mining region in Belgium. The stages through which this immigrant working population had to go through are described here: and how it managed, within a third of century, to become established in the district, to structure itself in associations, to be recognized by the local authority and the institutional fabric of the host country, and finally, to sit down at the same table with the local councillors. Keywords: Cheratte, Visé, Wallonia, local integration, Muslim communities, social participation. This article aims to describe the processes leading to social integration of a Turkish community at the beginning of the sixties who were resident in a mining region in Belgium. The stages through which this immigrant working population had to go through are described here: and how it managed, within a third of century, to become established in the district, to structure itself in associations, to be recognized by the local authority and the institutional fabric of the host country, and finally, to sit down at the same table with the local councillors. We are going to explain this to show how the population originating in Turkey and settled in Cheratte (commune of Visé, district of Liege) went through various phases of installation and integration: which were the factors which allowed these projections? What were the obstacles? How were they overcome? Which problems still persist? We explain in greater detail Christophe Parthoens is the former head of Social Actions for Visé Town Council, and he runs the Basse-Meuse “Reliance” Aid in Open Environment Department. Email: [email protected]. Dina Sensi is currently heads research and training at IRFAM. Altay Manco is scientific director of IRFAM. Email:[email protected]. Email: [email protected]. Authors acknowledge the contributions of Spyros Amoranitis and the support of the Ministry of Social Affairs of the Walloon region. Migration Letters, Volume: 2, No: 3, pp. 308 – 344. December 2005 (ISSN: print: 1741-8984 & online: 1741-8992) 58

A MUSLIM VILLAGE IN WALLONIA

how a mosque was organized by the immigrants and how it claims to have become a partner in the launching of social actions and educational projects within a network of local actors, in the industrial suburbs of Wallonia (federal French-speaking part in the South Belgium). This written account has been realised thanks to the work of many actors and observers, social workers, researchers, teaching staff, students, ordinary citizens, who worked or lived in Cheratte at the beginning of the Eighties. They have put down their initiatives in writing as well as those of other workers or have summarised their observations. Thus, this text represents, to a very great extent, the collecting, compilation, synthesis and linking up of reports, official reports of meetings, newspaper cuttings, statistical data, scientific accounts, articles relating to local history, notes and various brochures and folders. It was initiated by observers who had to be physically present in Cheratte and consequently they are the authors of a great number of these documents. Analytical work was then realised on the contents of these papers and further discussed by various witnesses in the locality and other researchers. The process made it possible to validate the summarised work and to enrich it. Some of these consultations were carried out in groups during thematic meetings that brought together political representatives, the inhabitants, persons in charge of the association and the social workers in the unit, as well as observers and students. In the locality of Cheratte, which lies to the north of the Province of Liege, close to the Dutch border, the principal partner was the Association for Mutual Aid to the Turkish Families of Cheratte (AEFTC) which houses and manages the “Mimar Sinan” Mosque. The mosque has links with the Turkish diplomatic mission in Brussels. Since 1982 it has been the place of prayer for the majority of Turkish Muslims in the locality. The main part of its financing comes from the faithful who regularly proceed to elect the executive committee of association. AEFTC is currently represented in a local coordinated body, which is the Integrated Projet for Cheratte (PIC), and negotiates the means for the launching of socio-cultural actions which it tries to develop so that they will be recognized by the local decision makers. In this locality, there are two other mosques and several other religious organizations that have been created by the immigrants. The city of Visé is represented within the observation framework, by its Mayor, a deputy of the Reform Movement for the 309

CHRISTOPHE PARTHOENS , DINA SENSI AND ALTAY MANÇO

French Community of Belgium and the Walloon Area. The Mayor is personally in charge of the files related to teaching issues (in particular religious) and the relations in the area of worship. The city has approximately 18 000 inhabitants including 10 % of Muslims of Turkish extraction. The population resulting from Muslim immigration is mainly settled in the southern peripheral area of the city since the middle of the Sixties, in an old coal mining site which is currently closed. Many problems of schooling, employment and integration are particularly preoccupying for the young people belonging to the Muslim community. The city of Visé and its Public Centre for Social Aid (CPAS) are members of the PIC which also brings together representatives of associations and socioeducational institutions of the entity. The goal of this local, participative observation of long duration is therefore to identify and support the methods used for the recognition of a mosque association as a legitimate partner within the framework of coordination of socio-educational and cultural actions carried out by public and private institutions. This collaboration supposes the recognition, the financial support and the integration of the immigrant Turkish structure in its cultural and religious dimensions into the decision making networks for organization and concrete implementation of local socio-cultural actions. If there are many attempts to obtain such participation from the associations created by immigrants, it seems that this participative integration is not yet total or optimal from the point of view of the interested parties. One indeed observes many inequalities in fact, in the treatment of the associations created by the migrants both in the area where they live and elsewhere. Thus, churches legally receive financial assistance from the commune, but the three mosques in the locality have only very recently been given regular, specific aid which is equivalent to approximately one hundredth part of the endowment granted to the church. The Muslim faith is recognized by the Belgian Constitution as is the Catholic religion, but no satisfactory legal framework has yet been set up to guide the work of the local decision maker on the matter. There is also an element of suspicion which certain members suffer in immigrant associations and the mosques as compared to other actors in local life which marginalises them. The local action launched in Cheratte will have achieved its goals if, thanks to dialogue and cooperation, members of the public and local parastatal institutions, as well as the members of the local Muslim community develop the following: 310


- a greater comprehension of the respective positions, complementary roles and positive contributions of the local social institutions, on the one hand, and religious and cultural organizations created by the immigrants on the other; - a higher level of mutual confidence which will allow them to overcome marked attitudes of “reservations”, in particular with regard to the concrete organization of socio-cultural activities organised in Cheratte and in the negotiations which precede the distribution of financial means which are allotted to the parties concerned; - a certain discipline to be observed in functioning (sectoral dialogues, negotiations, collaboration in the thematic sense, etc) which requires the co-operation and solidarity among the cultural and religious organizations set up by the immigrants and the public institutions as well as the private Belgian ones present in the area; - a documented report highlighting this spirit of positive cooperation to be publicly disseminated for purposes of comparison with similar experiments. This document would include, in particular, details of the meetings, events and briefings with the population and written work of various types.

1. Arrival, installation and integration of the Turkish community in Cheratte/Visé The Belgo-Turkish agreements for the import of labour exist since 1962; the Turkish authorities officially agreed to send a quota of mine workers to Belgium. The organizational structures for this recruitment in Turkey began in 1963. This event was duly publicised in the country of origin and organized by the Belgian and Turkish authorities. However, the need for labour in the mines was so high that the Belgian State was willing to use unofficial practices of recruitment i.e. regularization of the residence status of clandestine immigrants if they had work contracts. It was also possible for the family in the country of origin to join the worker in Belgium after he had worked for one month in the mine; however, the miner was required to have adequate housing in order to be able to accomodate his family. In this context, the worker could request the coal mining company or an institution in charge of social housing to give him adequate family accomodation. 311


These first arrivals are revealing as they tell us what the real priorities were for the two contracting States and what they were willing to do for reasons of financial profit to the detriment of the wellbeing of workers and their families; thus, while it was said that the families were welcome, only the men, in other words, the mine workers were transported to the mine in vehicules. However, the workers did not intend to remain in Belgium, and imagined returning to their country after two or three years of work. It is undeniable that this absence of personal investment in a new life in Belgium retarded the integration of the Turkish families in Belgium by at least one generation. Indeed, the majority of the families remained in their country of origin; the children grew up there over a period of several years and at the earliest, when they were 6 years of age, one could say that they were really exposed to Belgian society. This second generation thus paid dearly for this lack of foresightedness and the means to help it to integrate. Thus, the immigrant worker generally settled in a dwelling managed by the coal mining industry, which provided the workers with full board and lodging for which a certain amount of money was deducted from his pay; the miner was not obliged to follow this system – he was free to choose another possibility. However, lodgings were difficult to find, were more expensive, or unfit to live in. Various studies and surveys dating back to the period 19601970 point up to the difficulties that miners living alone experienced at many levels, in particular in terms of health. They often preferred to share a room than to take up more comfortable accomodation in order to save a maximum of their salary. That created a concentration of workers in bad quality accomodation. This initially allowed for the integration of the mining community via its many contacts, but later on, it slowed down, when it came to their adaptation to the wider Belgian community. Training in language skills was also organized from the shortterm point of view:, for the employer it was a question of teaching the miner the rudiments necessary for the realization of the work that he was expected to accomplish and, for the employee, to meet the requirements of the employer and learn the language sufficiently to be able to do the “temporary” work during the short period of time that he would spend in Belgium. Obviously therefore, the first generation of immigrants speak very little French even after having lived for several decades in a French-speaking milieu. This is easy to understand if one takes into account the lack of willingness to teach this generation to read and write, the illiter312


acy of immigrant populations, the family regrouping, the fact that they lived in concentrated groups, etc Another important point to bear in mind is that the majority of the Turkish immigrant workers had never gone down into a mine before they came to Belgium and many did not really have any industrial or urban experience in the matter. The insularity of the Turks was in parallel with the lack of interest on the part of the native population as far as they were concerned: very few sources reported their arrival and their subsequent settling in Belgium. One of the rare references made to this event, for example, can be found in”Les rendez-vous de l’histoire” a review of the local history of Visé, on the people of Turkish and Maghrebian origin which is an account that mentions the Polish and Italian festivals and the processions organized by the catholic church and goes on to explain that: “as for the Muslims, our neighbours in the city, that is another mentality, another culture”. In the same way, when one notes the names of the elected officials at the time of the trade-union elections in Cheratte since 1963, one finds Italian sounding names, but there are no names of Maghrebian or Turkish origin, and this remained so until the closing of the coal mines in 1977: logically, therefore, from the start, the integration of the persons who came in last was more difficult to achieve than it would have been with the first waves of immigrants. The end of the Sixties stands out in the whole of industrial Europe because of an economic situation in which petrol consumption exceeded that of coal. The agreements of the ECSC envisaged the reduction of this commodity at the end of the 50’s and, in the long term, the phasing out of coal production. Consequently, since 1968, various coal mines in the region of Liège were already closing down. A period of reorganization just before closure of the mine had also started for Cheratte. One can imagine the feelings of many Turkish and Moroccan families who had arrived just a few years before to work in these mines. The closing of their source of livelihood would leave them stranded in a foreign country where they had been invited to settle with their families on a long term basis… However the year of the closing of the Cheratte coal mines also corresponded to the administrative merger of the communes; the entity of Cheratte, hitherto autonomous, was now part of the city of Visé. Within this rather rural and commercial geographical unit that could not really be called industrial, Cheratte seemed to be the most marginal locality judging by its inhabitants, who were mainly of foreign origin. Communication between the various 313


parts of the extended municipality proved to be difficult; services and administration were now set up in the centre of Visé, leaving the inhabitants of Cheratte with the feeling that they had been abandoned. The political community in Visé knew little at the time about the popular realities in the entity of Cheratte. But the political leaders were forced to take note of the situation during the first months following the merger of the communes. Indeed, in spite of the closure of the coal mining industry, many workers continued to live in Cheratte. However, in these circumstances, the former industrial land gave way very quickly to waste land. The neighbouring trades closed down too, the surroundings became dilapidated, and the city of the miners now became public property and its inhabitants had neither the means nor the motivation to maintain it. The Belgian State, ex-canvasser of labour abroad for the benefit of the mining industry, gave very little support to the efforts being made by the local, community made even weaker because of its heterogeneity, caught up in a period of total economic recession. Many miners were given early retirement or were declared unfit to work; others took advantage of their unemployment benefit payments. If many of them found intermittent employment in the building and construction sectors, the ratio of men who were in work was low, and they were heads of immigrant families with very little education so this was another source of problems at the beginning of the Eighties. Observations carried out at the end of this decade and in the following decade, in the schools in Cheratte, showed that two thirds of the children of Turkish extraction had a father who was out of work. The story of the arrival of the first foreigners from abroad who came to work in the mines in Cheratte is typical of the way in which most of the industrialised States assumed responsibility for immigrant workers. At the beginning of the process, “ghettos” began to spring up; the men coming from abroad lived together in lodgings far away from the Belgian families. Later on, the majority of the miners’ families of foreign nationality lived together in the same street. Thereafter, at the end of the Sixties, the immigrant population had become very numerous and spread outwards to the city where the miners lived. However, this area is geographically isolated from the rest of Cheratte: it is hemmed in by highways, a railway, a wet dock and a low wall which closes in the main entry point. This type of land planning and insularity can partially be explained by the fact that the mining company of le 314


Hasard was a long time owner of the city as it used to house its employees there, close to their place of work. The coal industry thus modified not only the physical landscape but also the human landscape in certain localities, and it organized, in collaboration with the Belgian State, the arrival and the settling in of workers coming from abroad, who were necessary for the economic development of the country. Moreover, since this property was privately owned, only the regular mine workers could live there: by isolating them from the rest of the population, according to the logic of “stock” management, the coal industry also favoured a particular mode of integration for immigrant populations. Forty years after their arrival and subsequent settling in Belgium, these men and women are still in the area which they thought they would leave three or four years after their arrival. They are still there within a few feet of the mine where they used to work. It will be noted that, in the case of the Turks in Belgium, the factors that contributed to the maintenance of the families in an immigration situation are multiple: - The family regrouping that encouraged the long term installation of the Turkish workers was rapidly carried out in 1964-1965 for many families and peaked during 1970. However, housing conditions, employment for women, education of children, the right to the freedom of worship, food customs and habits, burial rites, etc were not given much thought and the constant demographic growth of the immigrant community made it so that it had to be satisfied with the space that was allotted to it. The schooling of the children in Belgium generated a host of problems disenfranchizing the parents and loading the children who had been educated with unexpected responsibilities, like having to assist their parents in different, complex situations, for example administrative or medical. - This vacuum created by the Belgian State which had not anticipated certain situations is thus one of the reasons for which the Turkish community resorted to self-organization to meet its needs for education and security. Thus, the immigrant families had to invest in and generate individual and collective initiatives, such as associative and religious structures, for example, to secure their long term installation in Belgium. The concentration of the Turkish community in a restricted territory also makes it possible for the immigrants to weigh the choices offered by the local authorities and the social services; isn't this demographic concentration and 315


the subsequent structuring of this community a demonstration of their desire for integration? For example, after the communal elections in 2000, a first elected official of Turkish extraction took office as a councillor in the commune while another was appointed to advise on questions relating to social assistance in the Public Centre for Social Aid in Visé. Others work on the Committee for tenants in social housing and participate in the management of public affairs through various bodies… If the absence of open confrontation with Belgian cultural realities incites the immigrant families to maintain an organization on a daily basis that could be termed “Turkish”, it is often so because the minimal conditions that are necessary to maintain this type of lifestyle are unavailable. Then, the immigrant families are inclined to reproduce these conditions: creation of trade, colonization of waste grounds in order to improvise a family kitchen garden there, a poultry yard, etc maintenance of the matrimonial rites, organization of a local social structure, maintaining former food habits, reorganization of family networks, the protective tontines,… are “edifices” which make it possible to exist culturally when in exile. This “village” aspect of social life in Cheratte was a positive factor which also helped the Turkish community in their longterm settlement here. Obviously, all persons of Turkish origin did not participate in the collective initiative that was launched in the area, neither did the native population but they undoubtedly ben efitted from this closeness that is the hallmark of small entities, to the point where they felt motivated to participate partially in the local social and political life. It should be remembered that in many cases immigration is an irreversible process: in the sense that the place that has been vacated in the country of origin is, in general, quickly filled by non-migrants, thus ruling out any possibility of returning. There is a kind of equilibrium that settles between the families who have migrated to Europe and their near and dear ones who have remained behind – this equilibrium is made up of relations based on solidarity, loyalty and allegiance etc…each person is called upon to maintain his particular place in these relations at a distance of 4,000 kilimetres. The advantages linked to the country of origin, in this case, the Republic of Turkey which is a candidate for membership to the European Union and one of its important economic partners is an element worthy of consideration….The EU has every 316


interest in maintaining an important Turkish colony in Europe, one which is very integrated, prosperous, numerous and politically influential, able therefore to defend Turkish arguments and to develop initiatives that would benefit the country of origin, the “fatherland”. Seen from the host country’s point of view, that is Belgium, the question of the return of the immigrants would appear to be a senseless policy for political and moral reasons (at the outset, immigrant families were invited to stay permanently in Belgium) as well as economic and demographic considerations. If one examines the age pyramid of the Belgian population, especially of West European descent, one can perceive the absolute necessity of maintaining immigrant populations in this country at all costs, and even, in the future, authorising fresh immigration. However, certain questions such as economic integration and socio-cultural recognition still are open ended to this day with regard to the populations whose forefathers were immigrants. In fact, the case of young people born in Europe of immigrant parents, a group that is commonly known as “second generation” immigrants should be put into a separate context because these persons often have Belgian nationality (or even hold the nationality of the country of origin) have no experience of exile. The notion of “the country of origin” is different for them when compared to the connotation it has for their parents. For young Europeans of Turkish origin, Turkey is (only) “their parents’ country of origin”. Finally, the question of the social action that is included in the Belgo-Turkish labour transfer agreements, that was intended to help to integrate Turkish workers should be highlighted here. First, it is a question of commitment on the part of social workers who were supposed to help in the professional and social adaptation of the Turkish miners. Their mission was to smooth out adaptation difficulties and to ensure that this Turkish labour force was included in the social context especially as regards linguistic interpretation. However, this mission was given to these social workers essentially by the employers and they were therefore responsible to them and their demands, on a priority basis. Later on, in Cheratte, in the eighties, a series of social initiatives were launched in the context of children’s education for those who were immigrants. Turkish families were thus able to benefit from literacy courses, help with homework, sports clubs, and folklore dance groups as well as women’s activities. All this work that was done for and by 317


the Turkish community has no doubt contributed to strengthen the institutions in Cheratte and the immigrants themselves.

2. Description of the cultural and religious situation in Cheratte/Visé Any immigrant population searches for points of reference from the past in order to construct the stages of their insertion in foreign surroundings which are, from then onwards, imposed on them. In the case of the Turkish Cheratte population, this process has been complicated by their being excluded from the job market, due to the closure of the work for which the immigrant workers, accompanied by their families, had been imported in large numbers. When, overwhelmed by a social disqualification, they raise the question of the heritage to bequeath to their children; they turn towards collective educational behaviour in order to collectivize the risks of assimilation and the cultural extinction of their children in exile. The first institutions that they set up where thus mosques that were familiar to them, in order to meet the cultural needs and a need for gathering together and social control, as well as to meet their desire for cultural expression. The poorly educated immigrant population was helped in this process by the diplomatic structure in the homeland, which was anxious to maintain strong economic and cultural ties with its expatriates. In fact, in Cheratte and in the homeland, the true “social glue”, the religious rites and associated customs govern the year, set the social relations and give meaning to the acts. In fact, religion plays a prescriptive role in various areas of life, such as the rules of purity, behaviour, diet, etc. For the believer, it is also important from a socio-cultural point of view, insofar as it constitutes one of the major distinctive markers of the community. In short, religion plays a structural role: it provides an infrastructure where the most diverse social interactions can be interpreted. Without being the only social organiser, religion, together with the patriotic values that are equally cherished by Turkish immigrants, have the advantage of responding to the feeling of guilt that dogs the immigrant, the guilt of having abandoned his homeland and his people, a guilt that makes him feels that it is his duty to remember the important values of his native society, even decades after emigrating. Paradoxically, the same national and religious values paraded by the young second generation immigrants – who have never lived in the homeland of their parents – at specific moments and charged 318


with emotions, such as during the religious holidays, also become a driving force behind their insertion efforts in the host country, even if they evolve in a different way than in the homeland. Therefore, from the first month of their presence in Belgium, the immigrant Turkish population desire to practise the Muslim religion led to a need for prayer areas to be set up in the collieries boarding houses. They were generally improvised and not very suitable. In Cheratte, a room was reserved for prayers in the bachelor accommodation. The lack of planning and the spontaneous respect of the customs and everyday habits of the workers called to help the mining industry were noted. It was not until a Fédéchar circular was sent to the colliery director that a place to pray would be made available for the Muslims, that pork would be banned, that Turkish baths would be provided, together with a source of water for the ablutions. However, these favours were accompanied by certain restrictions in order to guarantee the productivity of the worker. Therefore, for example, the Federation contacted the Turkish Embassy in Brussels in order to obtain religious dispensation for the mine workers with respect to the ritual fasting during the month of Ramadan. This situation forty years ago has surprising similarities with that of today where premises are always needed to meet the demands linked to the practising of the Muslim religion and the response was rather improvised, when they did not decide to imply ignore them. And yet, the freedom to worship, included in the Belgium Constitution, and the Islamic religion has been officially recognised by the Belgian State since 1974. Islam is now the country’s second religion in terms of number of worshippers. The same type of improvisations would be seen regarding the funerals of the miners that died while at work. These conditions were the reason for a strike by the indignant Turkish workers, who were demanding that their compatriots who died in the mine be repatriated. Other claims, such as the right to celebrate religious festivities, for example, were also supported to a greater and lesser extent depending on the towns59 . The importance of these religious and cultural claims should not be underestimated with respect to the other political claims made, in particular, by the trade unions, such as, for example, the access to the political rights for the immigrants. Respecting the community rights is as impo rtant as respecting the individual social and political rights, without their positive impact on the integration process of the foreign populations with 59

319


Since the 70s, the Cheratte Turks have had a mosque and it is, together with the cafés that are more recent, a place to meet and talk for the men of the Turkish community. The men are in charge of, according to the traditional distribution of social functions, the “public sphere”. The women develop among themselves a parallel social network in private and, it is true, on community premises. When they arrived in this town, the Turkish workers set up a de facto association (1966). These first moves towards structuring the Cheratte Turkish community meant that certain difficulties inherent to being far away from their homeland could be offset, such as financing the return of some miners to their country, as they were unsuitable for mine work. Another of the objectives was to fund the repatriation of the bodies of the Turks who died in Belgium. The heads of families still pay their contributions in order to ensure that the bodies are buried according to the Muslim religion and a collection is made to help the families in mourning – but the risks are currently mutualized on the bases of larger communities, covering several federations of Turkish associations in Europe. An initial attempt to set up the Turkish cultural association occurred in 1975. The structure of the association had its own leadership. This included a seven-member board (Mosque Committee), made up of a chairman, a deputy chairman, a treasurer, a deputy treasurer, a secretary, a deputy secretary and a spokesman. There were also three substitute members who also controlled expenditure. The board was elected for two years and the ten candidates who obtained the most votes during the general assembly held the aforementioned posts. Only the members could stand as candidates and vote: these were Turkish men, heads of the household, living in Cheratte or nearby. At the start of the 80s, the association would become a non-profit association (ASBL) which gave it an official legal status in the eyes of Belgian Law. It would be called the Mutual Aid Association for Families and the Turkish Community (Association d’Entraide des Fa milles et de la Communauté torque), commonly known as the “Cheratte Turkish Cultural Assotheir specific religious and cultural characteristics. Currently, if the attribution of political rights to Non-EU immigrants comes with a series of limitation, it is planned for the forthcoming coming local elections, certain cultural claims are also on the political agenda and are the subject of federal and local adjustments and subsequent negotiations. However, during recent years, these requests have taken on another level of importance as they are being made by naturalised Muslims or even converts, in other words Belgian citizens.

320


ciation”. In 1982, as the first site in the housing development had become too confined, the association moved to a house located in Rue de Visé, and the building was mainly financed by contributions from the faithful and outside help. This building houses the cultural centre on the ground floor and a prayer area on the first floor. It is the “Mimar Sinan” mosque and is name after a famous ottoman architect. The mosque is supported by contributions from the members and also by donations collected on certain occasions in other Belgian mosques and elsewhere, in the same way as the association can come to the help of other ones. This solidarity is partly explained by the relative financial self-sufficiency of the Turkish associations in Europe. More recently, the Turkish community has built an extension to its building, which is used as a multipurpose meeting room. The association was provided with administrative help by the Turkish embassy to help with tasks such as the foundation or purchasing property. This is normal practice in the case of all the immigrant mosques or associations in Europe that have agreed to join a confederation close to the Ankara government. In Belgium, this is the Turkish religious Foundation located in Brussels. It is in charge of coordinating the mosques, the arrival and funding of the imams in Belgium, the mutual insurance company in charge of repatriating the dead, the pilgrimage to Mecca, etc., which are the main reasons that drove a number of immigrants to come together around a collective life. The creation of the “Mimar Sinan” mosque in the heart of an associative structure meets the pressing need for the Sunni Muslims who have to pray together. It should be noted that in the Liege province, there are thirty or so mosques, most of which are in confined premises that have not been adapted. On religious holidays, for example, some of them are not large enough to hold all the worshipers. The Muslims are then forced to meet in sports halls. Theoretically, the recognition of the Muslim religion means that it could be funded by the State following the example of other recognised religions and in line with the secular philosophy. Even if this funding has so far only been rather limited, Islam is taught in the schools. However, the Imam, the religious leader, is still not paid by the Belgian state (December 2004). There is an agreement that allows the Turkish Republic to send religious leaders to officiate in

321


the mosques located in Europe and serving the Turkish immigrant population, as in Cheratte 60 . The Mosque plays a fundamental role 61 . It is the place to meet and pray. The Muslim men have to go there at midday on Friday. The women only go there on religious holidays and during Ramadan. A room is reserved for them. The prayer is lead by the Imam, but, previously, with the help of a loud speaker, he calls the Muslims to prayer. His call rings out three times a day in the Cheratte workers’ residential development – in reality, the rule is five calls for the five daily prayers, but the early morning and night calls are left out as the result of an agreement with the neighbours and in order to respect the peace and quiet of the local residents. A decibel level that should not be surpassed has also been set. On entering the mosque, there is the community room where the men can meet, chat, read outside the prayer times, have a cup of tea, watch a video or use the computer. The association, includThe imam is in charge of calling the faithful to prayer, to lead the prayers, to preach, to teach the readings of the Koran and to coordinate the burial rituals. He lives in an appartment adjoining the mosque. 61 There are two other mosque-associations in Cheratte. In particular, a place of prayer used by the North African population. The Cheratte Moroccan community has recently got together to build a new mosque in this neighbourhood. The plans were approved by the Town Planning Department at the start of 2004 and the work has started. The “Aya Sofya” mosque, Sainte-Sophie, is situated in Cheratte and only welcomes Turkish families. It is a place of worship that belongs to a different federation to that of the “Mimar Sinan” mosque. This federation, “Milli Görüs” (Confessional Vision), is close to an important Turkish traditionalist religious movement. Between a quarter and a third of the local Turkish population attend this second Turkish mosque in Cheratte, which is also located on the main way through the village. Even though some families may go from one to the other of the mosques, there seem to be little visible collaboration between these two structures, even if the leaders of the two mosques invite each other to the services. The “Aya Sofya” also offer cultural activities to its faithful, such as initiatives aimed at groups of women and young girls, support sessions, etc. This is also a tea room in the co mpound of this association and occupies commercial premises on the ground floor. This meeting place also allows the mosque to earn income that held to pay for the upkeep of the building. The Visé local authorities has been working with the “Mimar Sinan” mosque for a long time, in the same way that it symbolically supports the Moroccan mosque in Cheratte. However, the formal relations between the local authorities and the “Aya Sofya” mosque are very recent and can only be traced back to the Spring of 2004. 60

322


ing the mosque, is, in principle, a place that is open to everyone whether or not they are Muslims, men or women. Managed by the committee of Muslims, it also has other roles: it deals with problems relating to migration (procedures with embassies and consults, the Belgian authorities, etc.). It also acts as the “tenants association” for the Turkish inhabitants in the housing development. Beyond its religious role, the Mosque committee therefore becomes a de facto spokesperson for the Cheratte Turkish community, as well as being a place that organises cultural and sports activities for young people. As can be seen, the mosque-association concept is not comparable to the “pure” religious places which may exist in the homeland. In fact, apart from the religious aspect, the association performs very important socio-cultural functions for the immigrant community. For all these reasons, proximity and confusion are clear among the mosque committee and the other structures that act as a “cultural centre”. This collusion first of all exists in the head of the creators of these structures, in other words the immigrants themselves, as they only identify one type of educational and community needs and only one type of possible community responses, where the religious element is predominant. The confusion is maintained in the way that the community refers to this place as the “camii”, which means “Mosque”. In short, the sign on the building only refers to it being the “Mimar Sinan” mosque. This confusion is also to be found among the local resident representative committees and the heads of the autochthonous associations or institutions. It curbs their desire to cooperate with the cultural dimension of this association as it too close to the religious role. Therefore, the organisation of a French course for adults in the Turkish community premises was, for example, deemed to be inappropriate as these premises were not considered to be sufficiently neutral. When it first began operating, the mosque-association commi ttee was, in fact, co-opted by the members. They were mainly men in their fifties, pious and whose “wisdom” and “attachment” to the religion and the community were well known. It would be clearer later that this choice modelled on the “committees of the wise men” in the Anatolian villages was not the best formula to ensure the role of the community spokesperson in a context that needs the person to know French and Belgian law. As a general rule, these “wise men” are respected in the housing development, but their relative inefficiency was recognised and the “second generation 323


young people” put it down to their age, their lack of knowledge of the language and the rules of the host country, as well as the fact that their volunteer status did not motivate them to act and to take initiatives. Finally, these people, who had taken early retirement from the mine, spent a large part of their time in Turkey. This meant that they were often absent when the community needed them. Many Cheratte Turks criticised their committee during the 80s and 90s of sitting on the money from the contributions instead of dealing with the urgent matters. The “young” community put that down to the “anxiety about death” of the older people. In fact, if one of them died, there needed to be sufficient money in the mosque’s coffers to repatriate the body to the country. This led to disagreements about paying the member fees. However, a certain social pressure meant that the money was paid: thus, the list of the people who had not paid their annual fee used to be posted in the mosque. According to a local study of 20 households conducted in 1989, sixty per cent of the adult Cheratte Turks strongly approved of the Muslim associations in their towns. Yet 40% of the adults only considered, in 1989, that it had a symbolic role, and that it was not really very effective. Driven by this assessment, a group of “young people” (around thirty), and not belonging to the group of primo-migrants, sought, from 1989, to replace the “committee of the elders” in managing the associative life in Cheratte. But this proved to be difficult: the feelings of the elders had not to be hurt. In fact, the desired evolution has already been underway for several years. The “reformers” proposed changes in the makeup of the committee and in its policy of action. They wanted to have somewhere to have a “social association” where indoor games can be played (table football, billiards, ping-pong). They also wanted to build meeting rooms in the mosque’s garden and make the “young branch” of the committee (for adolescents and young adults) independent. In short, the “youths” saw the association and the mosque as “a cultural activities and meeting centre”. But some of the “elders” were against the mosque becoming a “café”. The young members also proposed that the power of representation and the financial power of the association be used to solve the problems regarding accommodation, facilities in the district (effective negotiations with the region) and schooling (fighting against school failures, not obtaining the primary school certificate, perfecting the information given to the parents, education in Turkish and the religious education of the children, developing French courses for adults, …). In short, a 324


team of the young managers won the trust of three-quarters of the members of the association during the elections and were thus able to take over the mosque-association committee from 1990 onwards. It was an innovation insofar that, for the first time in the history of this structure, a French-speaking person was chosen to be spokesperson (6/10), who had studied in Belgium. Even though they had lost their factual power, the Cheratte elders continued to have a symbolic power (the deputy chairman continued to be an elder). Moreover, are not the “youths” the children of the “elders”? The aim was to innovate in the sense of a better service to integrate the population while ensuring that the internal cohesion of the community was preserved. The mosque-association committee, in which new blood was again injected during the 2004 internal election, continues to want to honour the elderly as the pioneers of immigration by means of organising events that stress their experience. Certain effects of this team change were quickly seen. Since 1991, Turkish parent committees were set up in the Cheratte primary school and the parents become involved in the education of their children: funds were raised to buy new books in Turkish and religious books. A new imam increased the number of pupils in the Koran reading courses. But, the parents were also represented on numerous occasions, at the Cheratte local school, at the homework support group and at the adventure playground. With respect to the activities organised within those structures, this in volvement of the community would experience highs and lows, but it would always remain even if the specific initiatives, such as the parents committee, would finally disappear. A “Turkish Cultural Club” (bringing together a dozen young people under 30 years old) was set up. This “Club” was allocated some premises by the Visé Local Authorities where a series of changes were made by the young people themselves. A coffee shop (tea, coffee), games, a video and a small library were set up. These young people spent a year trying to find the ways to organise a French course in their club without success. Many adolescents spent time at the club. Several cleaning operations of the areas around the Darse were organised by this club. Several years later, the premises would become a community centre organising youth activities under the aegis of the Social Aid Public Centre. A transaction process with the local authorities was then put in motion. The demands related to safety on the public highway (speed bumps, protection against the railway and the branch of the 325


Meuse), the environment (felling trees, noise barriers along the motorway,) and the leisure infrastructure (a football pitch for the young people and a children’s playground in the centre of the housing development). Initially by mail and informal meetings, the negotiations continued with the help of a legal adviser who the Committee organised before there was a school boycott in September 1990. Asserting their desire to be recognised, this conflict coincided with a games unit being installed in the district. Different work, depending on different departments, such as the speed bumps, the noise barriers and the felling of trees, etc., were also carried out from 1991 onwards. These various events mark the start of a collaboration process between the local authorities and an organisation set up by the immigrants. From 1991, the “Mimar Sinan”/Turkish cultural association would thus be invited as a member of an educational and social actions local partnership. Besides, various members of this association would develop specific partnerships with local political parties. The “IslamicChristian Friendship” Association would also emerge with the help of the Turkish mosques that bring together the residents of the Basse-Meuse region in debates about beliefs and philosophies 62 . However, these developments, which have a strong influence on both the professionalization or the systematisation of the associative life of the immigrants and their gradual integration in the environment where they have settled, have not been easy for the young volunteer leaders of the association to bring about, as they often are organising the initiatives on top of their work and family life. These difficulties are also clear in the case of Cheratte, as nearly the whole team of the leaders of the association is changed

It can also been seen that the members of the mosque-association have always been very actives in various federations that bring together the Turkish popular initiatives in Belgium. Several leaders of this structure have played leading roles in the Turkish Association Federations, since the start of the 90s. According to the heads of the Cheratte Turkish associations, they are involved in larger federation to in order to develop an interknowledge between Turks from different entities; implement cultural activities in several entities (computer courses, art activities…); develop partnerships with the local authorities of the entities in question; organise the solidarity between the members, put forward proposals regarding the needs of the young people (orientating them towards higher studies and help them to find a job, etc.); organise solidarity with the homeland or other companies, reinforce the philosophical or religious meetings. 62

326


every two years, as most of the elders are exhausted by the initiatives taken. Besides, the collaboration between the Turkish association and the Visé authorities is not obvious. It is difficult for the public service personnel to envisage a spontaneous and smooth collaboration with the changing members of specific communities that are moreover also religious groups. The funding of the activities directly organised by the Turkish groups is in fact totally relative compared to the support generated by the very initiatives of the local district and of its authorities. Furthermore, the Turkish volunteer leaders do not have either the professional culture, or the training or the availability of salaried agents. The emergence of multi-cultural associations, bringing together people of every origin, is therefore an alternative that nevertheless does not meet all the sensibilities existing in the territory. Another study carried out without the Cheratte Turkish associations investigated the possibility of setting up a new “intercultural” association that would be totally independent of the mosque and the organisation of the religion. Even if it set up by the Turkish population, it will be open to the entire town’s residents and the aim will be to break the suspicion generated by the confusion between the management of the religious and cultural aspects. The analysis allowed the communication and management difficulties linked to religion in general to be highlighted. That is why it was decided in 2004 to set up an “inter-religion and interphilosophical platform”. On the one hand, the goal is to gather the opinions, the good will and the comments of the professionals involved regarding the ties between religions, spiritualities and insertion of the young people: What can the churches, mosques and associations, together with religious and moral teachers, contribute to the dissemination of social values and standards among young people? On the other hand, it also involves assessing why these association and religious entities are or are not working with the public institutions in charge of the education and activities for young people? How to make the partnership between the churches, mosques and other associations, on the one hand, and the professional services to welcome, educate and insert the services, on the other hand, more positive and above all more efficient? What are the problems that arise at this level? Of course, there was also the question of the relations between these various philosophical and religious structures themselves, together with the coordination between the various secular moral and religious teachers. A desire to produce an orchestration module for the moral and religious teachers as a way of fighting against xenophobia emerged from this movement. In particular, the families and their associations 327


will be more involved in the initiatives of the schools. It will also involve closing the gap between the world of training and of insertion, reserved for professionals, and the world of religions and convictions, reserved for families, to show that they all share a certain number of common values with which a social cohesion can be built. Eventually, this collective orchestration commission may become, if that is what the participants want, a committee to reflect and comment on the faiths and the philosophies inside religion. Religion, in general, and Islam, in particular, will therefore be able, through this intermediary structure, to better plan their relations with the public services and institutions.

3. Socio-political interactions between immigrant populations and local institutions How to work for the social integration of an immigrant community such as the Cheratte Muslim and Turkish community without thinking about the setting up of a democratic management of differences? Forgetting this political dimension is to ignore that the host societyimmigrants, autochthonous-immigrants, immigrants-homeland relations and the relations between these relations are power relations in the intercultural conflicts with an uncertain outcome. In other words, can the “integration of the other” be achieved with him or, worse, despite him? These are the major methodological, political and ethical problems that arise from the interactions between the Visé political and socio-educational agents and the immigrant community in Cheratte. These interactions take place at different levels: First, in the field and during the practical sociopedagogical activities. The community is then involved according to various modalities in function of the institutional schemes, characteristics of the social workers, the proposed activities and the specific audience affected. Then, interactions are observed at the level of the coordination between institutions and associations in the field. Finally, a third level is that of the political decision. It can currently be seen that people from the Muslim and Turkish immigrant minority are beginning to get involved. During their interactions, the religious or associative institutions of the Turkish community are presented to the authorities of the host society with a desire to participate and be recognised. It 328


will also be noted that if each sees the intercultural contact also through their indirect or direct personal experience, more or less in line with the fabric of their life in all its interactions mentioned regarding the groups of individuals. The importance of the interindividual dimension must not be undervalued, above all in entities such as Visé where “where everyone knows each other”… In a similar context, if the local political leaders, the heads of the local governments and institutions decide to sound out the point of view or cooperate with the immigrant populations – a democratic attitude which has not always been current in the history of immigration in the Belgian regions -, two major governance choices are possible in view of the variety of interactions listed: either, the autochthonous institutions ignore the spontaneous structuring of the immigrant group and decide to cooperate with the “representatives” of their choice which, in their eyes, appear “more positive”. The risk is then to loose contact with the base of the immigrant population and to marginalise these individuals selected within the foreign origin community or, the autochthonous institutions decide to cooperate with this (these) spontaneous structuring(s) that have the advantage of being “representative”, at least provisionally and in certain areas. The danger is then to set in motion an official recognition process of certain organisations which, in the last analysis, can have an exclusive community role, preventing the minority or marginal members from expressing themselves within the immigrant group. In the absence of an ideal solution, it is one or another of the two alternatives that were found in Cheratte due to of a large number of factors and in various proportions. One of the origins of the intercommunity exchanges and the social coordination involving the Cheratte Turkish population can be traced back to the opening, in 1983, of the new Cheratte middle school and its multi-purpose spots hall. The construction of this infrastructure is without doubt a pivotal date in the relations with the Turkish community, as the ties but also the frictions were felt around and from the building. The new public school was threatened on several occasions by the Turkish population: there was first a flow of a group of 50 Turkish pupils towards the local Catholic school in 1986 which, contrary to the legislation at the time, organised Islamic religion courses. Specific mention should be made of the boycott of the local school in 1990. The new school building and other older premises in Cheratte were continually the 329


target of vandals and thefts. From the media impact in the press, these extreme situations perfectly show the lack of communication and understanding between the population and the services (lack of mediation, triangulation and information), with the (immigrant) population often preferring direct contact with its mayor (in fact, 40% of the visitors of the mayor’s social department are Turks). But this is not taken into account in many of the cases (use of the private land, building a bridge over the railway, etc.). He is required to act as arbitrator with respect to the some contradictory expectations of the various residents groups. In certain types of cases, the population has also rarely felt as if it has obtained satisfaction, even if, from their point of view, the local council and its various partners are working harder on integrating the population with Turkish roots: help with the duties, district coordination, literacy and French classes, etc. A better example of long-term social coordination developed at Cheratte, the Cheratte/Visé Coordination Committee (CCCV) is a place for discussion where contacts can be made between the various partners committed to the social action and to meet the demands of the population. It involves coordinating the social-education services offered to the population in order to develop an intercultural dynamics that encourages the integration of the immigrant families. The experience thus accumulated in Cheratte is supposed to affect the whole of the region. It also involves coordinating the search for new means for common initiatives. The CCCV was also one of the first entities to witness the official participation of representatives of the Turkish community and later the participation of other associations of residents from different roots 63 . The goal of This committee was set up in 1989, under the aegis of the International Health and Guidance Association. It was initially made up by professional field agents: Vottem Family Education and Training Centre, Visé Mental Health Department, Visé Life Framework, Social Services and Training Regional Centre (Echevinats), Visé Social Welfare Public Centre, branch of the National Childhood Office at Cheratte, Visé Royal Branch, General Pedagogy Department of the University of Liege, together with coordinators and teachers from Cheratte. A representative of the Cheratte Turkish community then joined this assembly, at the request of the local authorities, as well as sporadically, various local departments and institutions, such as the Police. The actions coordinated by the CCCV at the start of the 90s were focused on literacy (French courses for adults), homework classes (after school help with primary and secondary schooling), nursery schools, holiday and leisure camps, etc. The thoughts of this committee were sent to the field by two consultations with the people involved, on the one 63

330


this permanent committee is to ensure the cooperation between the partners, but also to manage the conflicts during the crisis situations. The themes tackled during the dozen or so years that it has been operating are mainly linked to the integration of the Cheratte Turkish population. The participation, since 1991, of the representatives of the Turkish community on this committee, whose roles are to question the decision makers and to inform that about the realities and expectations of the immigrants and their groupings, was one of the first displays of the political desire to recognise and support an association set up by the Turkish residents. A community development dynamics can then be initiated, even it is dependent on the participation of the representatives of the Turkish communities that change every two years. Furthermore, it is not easy to ensure that women or second-generation immigrations are included in these changes. The problem of “the integration” is thus implicit in nearly all the Committee debates, as the global and positive goal of all the coordinated efforts. This matter is particularly dealt with by means of the concerns raised by certain participants. Thus, the leaders stress the “impervious” nature of the miners’ housing development at Cheratte, where the majority of the residents are from the Turkish community. At various moments of Cheratte’s history, tension has therefore arisen between certain elements of the Turkish community and the Belgian administrative, education or political representatives. These frictions reveal the reciprocal expectations and concerns of each of them. They illustrate the need for the intercultural and inter-religious aspects to be linked to politics in the general sense of the term. The end of the 90s would thus be the scenario of a series of changes in the configuration of the local partnership under the effect of various institutional factors. In 1998, the Visé partners began a methodological support experiment under the supervision of the IRFAM which included the partnership during four years. This would be the start of the “Cheratte Integrated Project” (PIC), whose goal would be to develop new strategies to encourage intercultural and inter-institutional communication. The idea would also be for the local population to be more and better involved in the projects affecting them. In fact, the limits of collaboration with one single immigrant association would be noted. Moreover, the difficulties of a partnership be-

hand, by activities in the different homework schools and, on the other hand, by offering professional and social insertion/French classes.

331


tween the volunteers from a residents association and the social action professionals would be assessed. In fact, objections were identified between the institutions and the immigrant groupings according to the secularism/religious inclination axis, but also according to the cultural universality/ethnic uniqueness axis. Other tensions were also mention by the players both between certain associations and certain public services, and between various public services themselves: No organisation alone can tackle a social integration goal. It is essential to design a coherent and collective project capable of bringing together all the public and private good will. The population that is Belgian born and bred is concerned about this project. We have to make sure that they are not excluded. The population that was not born in Belgian is also concerned about the project. However, we have to make sure that they are not stigmatised. Beyond their specific characteristics, the immigrant populations experience the same frailties as other populations, even if this group often lives them more intensely. However, if their specific characteristics are not taken into account, the feeling of frustration may generate violence among these populations. The policy therefore needs to intervene in order to satisfy their need for recognition. One of the recent situations that have thus arose from the tension between the Turkish population and local institutions regards the naming of a road in Cheratte after Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish Republic. The Cheratte Turkish population saw this gesture, a first in Europe, as a recognition and honour. However, at the request of the non-Turkish residents, the local authorities were tempted to rename the road, which lead to a state of tension among of the Turkish community. The solution found was to name the main square of the housing development as “Place Atatürk” and to change the road back to its original name. However, the granting (a ceremony had been organised for the naming ceremony with the presence of Turkish officials), followed by the withdrawal or the transformation of this act of recognition upset the local Turkish population: nobody could understand the attitude of the local authorities and people began to think that any past agreement could be questioned at any moment. Furthermore, the important figure of Atatürk, the secular leader, generally worshipped in Turkey nearly 70 years after his death, is being ques332


tioned. In fact, a minority of Turkish public opinion, in particular in the migratory context, is increasingly developing a critical reading of the Kemalist political heritage where it is believed that he imposed secularism in an authoritarian way on a population that was largely and deeply Muslim. The place of a Kemalist symbol in the heart of a district inhabited by people of Turkish origin and Muslims is in itself a fact that is worth debating. We would be wrong to think that everybody of Turkish origin approved of this. Some people were therefore against the reminder of the authoritarian secularism of the Turkish Republic in the place where they were living as immigrants. Other still regret this naming as they fear that the stigmatisation that they suffer in Belgian society as immigrants is accentuated: “I already have a Turkish name and my address will be Avenue Atatürk! Who will employ me?” It should be noted that this type of symbolic initiative is of great importance in the eyes of the local populations. It comes within marking territory and the desire for cultural promotion. It is also not astonishing that similar attempts lead to rejection by part of certain residents who are not part of the communities so honoured. The point of view of the Visé mayor, one of the driving forces behind the naming of the road, is totally different: he wishes to promote each immigrant community with a road name honouring the important figures representing each homeland. In the case of Atatürk, he willingly accepted the proposal coming from several people from the Turkish cultural association. According to the mayor, the modern and secular figure of Kemal Atatürk was also a reason to highlight the “western” dimension of the Turkish identity. Starting from the good will on either side, the symbolic gesture is complicated and needed to be rethought. This tension would have been able to be avoided by better information from the residents before the decision was taken. A consultation of the people could have been carried out either by their associations or by the local authorities. A good occasion to discuss secularism and the place of religious beliefs in society, as well as the socio-cultural identity of the immigrant populations was therefore missed. This “Religions and Social Cohesion” project (2001-2004) represented a new period of cooperation between local communities and the municipal authorities. The observations and field work carried out has thus highlighted a certain number of specific problems experienced by Cheratte Muslim community:

333


At an individual level, the grievances could be seen of certain members of the Cheratte Muslim Turkish community, who had experienced rejection and scorn from the representatives of the public institutions. For example, there were comments about the number of children in a family asking for council housing or discourteous remarks about the habit of intra-family marriages that can currently be found in the Turkish communities. Some comments also revealed that the Belgian socio-educational agents sometimes have inappropriate expectations with respect to the immigrant families and children that never occur with respect to Belgian families who do not have to “ prove their degree of integration”… Humiliations have also been experienced with, for example, the proceedings brought by a woman against the town that forbid her, despite a permissive administrative regulation, to wear a headscarf in the photo on her identity card. At a philosophical level, it can be seen that in Belgium, the struggle by the public institutions to be secularised is still very important on the one hand for certain political groups and on the other hand, for the social agents (teachers, educators, social workers) put in place by the public authorities. One of the values of this struggle is to tolerate the religious and spirituality at an individual level by insisting on the private nature of the commitment of each person. Religion that is too visible or too practiced is devalued. At an institutional level, a reaction of mistrust and suspicion could also be seen with respect to the religious representatives in general. When it comes down to Islam, this feeling has obviously been strongly rekindled and for numerous reasons, which include the current world context and the impact of the media that result in a frequent association between Islam and terrorism. At the religious level, even though positive negotiations have allowed certain problems to be resolved, such as the call to prayer or the picking up of the carcasses during the Sheep Festivity, target discriminations have been identified. This situation is part of a more global context where the recognition of Islam is not entirely regulated at a national level. Part of the difficulties listed can be traced back to the perceptions that the various political and socio-education agents have of the immigrant Muslim spokespersons in Cheratte. This mental perception is in line with the general perception of Islam in the world. We can be influenced by our media environment and our imagination. The religious, linguistic and ethnic mono-culturality 334


followed by the Turkish community as a whole stands in the way in this case of the secular mono-culturality sought by most of the political and social action agents in the host country. This is the most important aggravating factor in the production of ghosts that is detrimental to the mutual integration of the autochthonous and immigrant groups. Numerous socio-educational actions are imagined with ingenuity and generosity by numerous agents both at Visé-Cheratte and elsewhere in the country. Yet a true meeting has only rarely taken place between the expectations of the institutions organising these actions and the immigrant communities designed as target. A whole community is rarely targeted and the devised actions are mainly limited and by sectors They target certain audiences deemed to be interesting for the integration and the evolution of the immigrant communities (women, young people, …) by avoiding others considered to a problem (adult men, representatives of the self-organisation of the immigrant communities). Possible failures then reinforce the frustrations and stereotypes on either side, by contributing to a deadlock situation occurring. Therefore, despite an impressive quantity of good will put in during decades, the actions in Cheratte have not succeeded to produce a feeling of satisfaction and effectiveness shared by all. This picture is complicated by the presence of a multitude of integration agents in the Belgian institutional scene. The structure and institutions are sometimes in competition with each other for the survival of the actions that they have initiated. In Belgium, this competitive situation is accentuated by the presence of public and catholic private networks (schools, activities, social services, etc.). The effects of this competition are harmful to the target audiences. It contributes to a weakening of means and information by reinforcing the ghost of the “threatening other”. The situation is aggravated in situations where there is a growing shortage of public resources for social action. The analysis of these observations has allowed different factors to be released, which can be used to positively transform the situation and therefore define the action goals: With respect to the factors linked to the functioning of the Belgian institutions, it should be noted from the outset that the Federal State has not been capable of regulating the full integration of Islam, even though this religion has been officially recognised after 1974. This situation generates and legitimises the discriminations at other levels, mainly within the local authorities. At a local level, specifically, the cooptation processes results in a democratic perception in the strategic decision bodies, such as the coordination 335


committees, for example, not being respected. Furthermore, most of the French-speaking Belgian public institutions are characterised by a militant secular identity. They are instrumentalised by local political forces which have vote-catching relationships with the members of the immigrant community. If the local authorities can be considered as being close to the citizens, the other powers, such as the French Community, the Walloon Region and, a fortiori, the Federal State, are seen as being very distant. Therefore, this leads to problems of understanding, representation and applications for the neophytes of the Belgian institutional system who are, in general, the immigrant communities, without being the only possible victims of this obstacle. Furthermore, the application procedures to obtain the subsidies are complicated and need writing skills that are generally not held by people from foreign roots. The factors linked to the running of the local Muslim religious institutions are also numerous. The weakness of the visible and formal partnerships between the three mosques can be noted. Furthermore, due to the lack of notably linguistic skills and due to the lack of social insertion, but also due to the lack of resources, time and quite simply motivation, the Muslim community leaders do not develop the communication and partnership with the important institutions of their environment, such as the schools, social services, intercultural associations, etc. They seem to stay in the background and only wish to give priority to the marginal networks or networks of the people of the same origin. The representatives of the host society are also sceptical with respect to possible partnerships with immigrant associations. The analyses highlight the fears and the mistrust regarding religions, in general, and Islam, in particular. They are always largely seen to be under-informed about the realities of Islam (Belgian) and the anti-discriminatory laws and directives, the legislation regarding the freedom to worship, the personal experiences of the discriminations suffered, the needs and demands of the various communities, the useful role of religion in the psychological integration of immigrants and second-generation immigrants. It is true that this information has to first of all be produced so that they can use it. Furthermore, the skills of certain social contributors seem to be relatively limited in terms of mediation, conflict management, needs analysis in a diversity perspective (gender, age, religion, …), setting up exchange speaking/listening places and structures that bring together the various points of view, coherence between the political discourse, budgetary decisions and social actions, integra336


tion policies of the diversity in the public institutions (school, health, social services, leisure, …). With respect to the factors linked to the representatives of the Cheratte Muslim Turkish community, in the training and perpetuation of the discriminations, the mistrust and fear that these persons feels about the host country institutions will be able to be seen on a social-emotional level. These feelings push them towards a type of isolation or lack of social participation. The representatives of the community, moreover, have little knowledge about law and regulations, as well the administrative procedures of the Belgian institutions. They have a difficult relationship with the administrative writing and language. In short, they are proof of a weak capacity to manage the diverse aspects inside their own community (women, young people, competition between families), to find good solutions, to prepare, implement projects, to organise themselves, to deal with external and internal conflicts, distinguish between what comes from the collection action and what is from the more private or family domain, to communicate a positive image of themselves, of their group, of their community, their religion, their history, their values and their culture. As part of the “Faiths and Social Cohesion” project, the action on which the greatest time and energy has been spent is undoubtedly the memory work. This investment is linked to a hypothesis according to which, the transmission of the history and knowledge helps to change the life skills. In fact, the transmission of this memory to the key players of the local authorities may allow them to draw up a balance sheet, to appreciate the presence, the contributions and the difficulties of the immigrant communities. On the other hand, a memory work allows these groups to appropriate and understand the past and also to legitimise the Muslim presence in Europe in their eyes. This awareness contains a real possibility of internal mobilisation. Thus, the youngest elements of the immigrant community, for example, which were particularly approached during the meetings to validate and disseminate the results, develop a new awareness of the efforts of their elders to adapt to Belgium. This action is part of the desire of the leaders of the local associations to see the young people become more aware of the history of their community and to recognise/respect the efforts of their elders. The whole community thus develops a better understanding of the wealth and difficulties of the collaboration with the Belgian private and public structures. At the very least, a debate has been started on the legitimacy and difficulties of an 337


association with religious roots, run by an immigrant community, at a time that coincides with the anniversary of the fortieth anniversary of the presence of the Turkish workers in Belgium. The support role pursued by the administrative and political leaders is a second aspect of the “Faiths and Social Cohesion project”. However, without an explicit approach to training and working on their attitudes, it is difficult to change the people, even if the usefulness of this support might have been highlighted by an inverse effect: when the IRFAM agents were no longer on the PIC project management committee, a phenomena of space could be seen which is expressed by a substantial reduction of the budget directly or indirectly granted to the mosque-association. Ongoing support therefore seems to be necessary in the current context to ensure that there is no decrease in relation to the gains. It can be acknowledged that the support in question does not necessarily come from isolated and external agents. The intervention process of this project has therefore envisaged establishing new local spokespersons and launching new alliances in order to further anchor the community associations in the management of the state. Thus, the support of the representatives of the Muslim community leads to sometimes quick and sometimes extremely slow reactions, provoking contradictory feelings among the spokespersons. However, among the results obtained, the following can be identified: improving the image of the mosque (opening the doors and shutters which seems to have been positively noted by certain people in the district); improving the management of the association (separating the religious and cultural aspects of the associations), rejuvenating the leaders, etc. Another of the solutions envisaged by the IRFAM team to allow sustained supported by the agents in the anti-discriminatory surveillance would likewise be to set up an advisory, observation and action entity, whose embryo could be the working committee on philosophical and religious teaching that is already organised by the Visé teachers. Eventually, by opening up to other agents of the local authorities, this working commi ttee may be transformed into an arbitration commission, a sort of anti-discrimination watchdog that could be consulted and which would meet regularly. But even there, a pilot project only can give an impetus: the outcome of the initiative is up to the local agents, to those who wish to bear the problems and to the balance relationships that they are able to forge. 338


In this new dynamics, another strategy would still be to bank on the elected Turkish, or more widely the Muslim, representatives who are part of the privileged contacts of the approach. At various levels, there are already several of them and with the forthcoming local elections (2006), they will only increase in number according to the demographic importance of the Belgian population of foreign origin. The effectiveness of their action will depend on their ability to grant the demands of the other members of their religion in line with their elected roles. Their capacity to bring together various Muslim populations, or better, the connections that they will be in a position to create between the demands for cultural recognition, on the one hand, and the socio-professional insertion demands from various groups excluded from the job marker, on the other hand, will certainly contribute to defining their importance in politics. Even more so, the listening to and defence of the minorities is not only a democratic issue, but also a simple political issue for a large number of Belgian politicians with respect to an electorate that barely changes. The emergence in this fixed arena of a new contingent of around 10% of “new Belgian” voters is good reasons to whet the appetites. In fact, the support of the social agents, such as educators, social workers and teachers, provides very variable results according to the people. These agents are also seeking a valorisation and the opportunity of better recognition of their action in the eyes of the target audiences. Above all, it involves calming the fears and costs of certain players and to provide them with the keys to “win-win” solutions. If it is possible to progressively work on the knowledge and on some opening attitudes, it however seems to be difficult with only a support strategy of setting up professional skills. These observations underline the need to use flexible, informal and discrete support strategies, based on individual contacts, in fa vour of the minority group, all the more so when the development is at a local level where it seems that the judicialization and the media coverage have counterproductive effects.

4. Summary and analysis of the observations The town of Visé, its public social welfare centre and the region's notable forces of socio-cultural action are linked since 1984 as part of an evolving and active partnership aimed at constructing social cohesion. This coordinated social-educational work has first of all affected school help and literacy in order to lead to an activi339


ties policy for young people (youth groups and houses, sports activities) and including the development of extracurricular actions (trips, inter-cultural exhibitions, adventure playground, etc.). The current goal of the Cheratte/Visé partners is to consolidate and develop all their actions and, in particular, the social participation and activities work for different audiences. It should be noted that, in this set of interactions, the introduction of the Muslim difference in the day-to-day life of the town is one of the important areas of “friction” between the original or second-generation immigrants and the administrative or political leaders, together with the nonMuslim local residents. A progressive and negotiated project, the intervention model developed in Cheratte has been “pragmatically” constructed, based on the local facts and the professional practices, with each of the partners in question, even if the often alarming influence of international current affairs has not been non-existent. Such research-action methodology imposes a necessarily “inter-cultural” point of views, which involves articulating professional cultures from the different specialists present (teachers, activities monitors, nurses, social workers, elected representatives), or to play – sometimes in a crisis situation – the mediators between the services and their audience, fundamentally the Muslims from an immigrant background. The successive Cheratte and Visé activities do not bring together people on the sole basis of their hierarchical status, as is the case with respect to bureaucratic cooperation. The presence of “interface-people” close to the real living conditions of the population in question sometimes allows information and means of action direct to the heart of the community. It is also essential to consider the degree of autonomy and expression that such representative committees guarantee to the families and to the collective in the management of their existence. The question of the democratic rights of the people and communities therefore is raised together with the pressing need of a direct consultation of these people as part of the representatives committees that surround their lives. In 1997, the IRFAM played the role of coordinator-facilitator within this local representative committee. Budgets coming from the regional authorities were then freed for integration actions. The IRFAM played an arbitration role by allowing the representatives of immigrant community to become part of the decision taking body and also to finance the activities that they deemed to be im340


portant (French course in the premises located in Cheratte, a five-aside football club, folk dance group, etc.). The fundamental issue could be made out regarding the legitimacy of certain players to supervise young people from the point of view of integrating immigrants or global social cohesion. The nature of the models and values to be transmitted, the capitalisation of the social action from a public or private institution are questions that are important in the eyes of the Visé-Cheratte partners. One of the recurrent methodological difficulties in social work is being able to realistically assess the effects of long-term actions. The assessment work that does not take into account the evolution in time of the target communities as a result of the actions implemented often have limited or biased visions of the psychosociology of these groups, visions affecting the feelings of failure. The monochromatic reading of the situations linked to the insertion and integration of the immigrant populations focuses on the admissions of failures of the so-called integration policies. The absence of an assessment policy thus highlights the ghost of the Other: to extend the analysis to the intimate view of the immigrant groups would result in notably different results showing how, in his way, the immigrant benefits from the social action undertaken and in turn constructs his own “integration” on the basis of his own intentions. Is not one of the largest indicators of this “integration” seeing how the transplanted population takes its new space? The setting up by the immigrant community of a social structure, meeting places such as businesses and mosques and the access to ownership are tangible signs of this appropriation. The occupancy of the space can also be seen from the setting: a sound setting, first of all, for that Muslim community who are called to prayer several times a day, but also a visual setting, an appropriation written on the walls, on the road signs translated into Turkish… The identification of the territory is notably the work of the youngest members of the community as can be seen from the graffiti on the walls of the garages: “Cheratte boys”. Appreciating the way in which an immigrant population invests in its new territory and allow in vestments to be made by new realities with which it is crammed is undeniably an indicator of greater psychological integration and, consequently, one of the important places in the construction of the social cohesion between different populations, beyond their cultural diversities. Thus, a numerous immigrant population who is developing the project to remain as a community may take unexpected ways of 341


integration and appropriation of its new cultural and sociogeographic space. It is impertinent to expect them to necessarily take the exact insertion routes as those that the previous immigrant populations did, in the same way that it would be an illusion to believe that it will be assimilated in exactly the way as the autochthonous population would wish, even more so as the socioeconomic theatre of this integration changes from period to period and provides a backdrop that is sometimes favourable and sometimes produces exclusions. This doubly inappropriate expectation is the source of frustration among certain of the people from Cheratte and Visé, Belgians “born and bred” or children of European immigrants, social contributors, decision-takers or just local citizens. As proof of the gap between the socio-cultural paths of the Polish, Italian or Greek immigrants, for example, on the one hand, and the Turkish immigrants, on the other hand, it is normally to hear some of them complain that “The Turks do not want to integrate”. Is then not necessary to question the concept of integration that they develop? It is in fact difficult for the social players to understand and/or accept as legitimate the needs for intimacy and homogeneity of the immigrant group without their feeling excluded. “Being among your own, in family…” is however an expectation in every group and precisely contributes to constructing the identity of this group. The fear of the homogeneity of the “Other” group often has the equal of the ignored homogeneity of the group itself. Furthermore, the compensation process or the identifying balance is only rarely understood by the players in contact with immigration. The identifying compensation allows the individual a differentiated management of his identity fragments or his multiple belongings. Everything happens as if what is externally identified as an “identifying withdrawal” in such a subject cleared (or made negotiable) that can be felt as a voluntary cultural assimilation in such another area: “Yes, I am religious and that is why I am open to people from anywhere… I do not know how to hop, I have to find myself again and at the same time go towards the others…”. The divisions and sometimes the dissentions within the immigrant groups, for example, the various ways of experiencing Islam (the Islam of the Turks and the Islam of the Moroccans, the Islam of the “Mimar Sinan” mosque, the Islam of the “Aya Sofya” mosque, the Islam of men, the Islam of women, etc) are not always understood and offend, in some cases, the outside observers: “Why do we have three mosques in a such a small town like Visé?”. However, 342


it should be noted that the perceptible homogeneity in certain immigrant groups authorises in a way the interiorised heterogeneity of each of the members of these groups, at the price of an apparent identity ambiguity. That is still a new source of possible lack of understanding between the immigrants and certain social players. In short, the valorisation of the difference of the other and his sincere welcome seem to be one of the first conditions for integration. It should be remembered that the cultural minorities from working class immigration expect such an important recognition that legitimises their final settlement in the host country. It so happens that the cultural immigrant groups, in particular the religious associations, try to present their culture, faith and religion to the other inhabitants and invite them to share their festivities, meals and communions. This impetus, which is sometimes badly understood, can lead to rejection reactions such as considering the reading the Koran at the opening of a meeting to be a fundamentalist act or being upset by the use of the native language as well as French, etc. The diversity of the other certainly meets another reception than: “We are in Belgium!” Connective and thematic spaces need to be designed that will allow the populations to “rub” together and to support and appreciate each other. Another important act of recognition that has so far barely been used to Cheratte will undoubtedly be the opening of a Muslim cemetery in cooperation with all the members of the population in order to allow families that have clearly lived the majority of their lives in Belgium to bury their dead there with dignity. However, in fact, can the immigrant possibly full identify with a land if he does not have the possibility of being buried there? In turn, the foreign population and, in particular, the associations or the mosques have to continue to work towards being more open to young people and women, as well as all the population and institutions of the town, in the framework of collective and various activities. In certain cases, these initiatives could show everyone the usefulness of religious morality or, at the very least, of a community link (religare) compared to current social goals such as guaranteeing the safety and serenity of everyone, ensuring that the elderly have their place in society, offering young people positive behaviour models and values, showing solidarity with the poor and with the less development parts of the world, etc. However, religion is undoubtedly not an easy way to make contact in a secular world, in particular when it involves Islam. Therefore, the spontaneously constructed alliances between believ343


ers of different religions in Cheratte-Visé offer a series of interesting regular activities, but do not rally a central part of the population. With respect to the strategy of the Turkish cultural federation to form an association with other Turkish structures, it no longer is serving the goal of social cohesion within the town, even it these internal collaborations in the Turkish community allow local associations to reassert themselves. Paradoxically, the setting up of unions between Turkish immigrant associations is mainly aimed at developing the more effective collaborations in the long terms with local authorities of the entities in question. However, the more competent the leaders of the Turkish associations show themselves to be in their work to mobilise the community, the more they upset the Belgian counterparts as they are strengthening the homogen eity of the Turkish community. In this process, the social players feel unrecognised in their professional work to open up the situation and intercultural project. On the other hand, the heads of the working class immigrant associations lack the institutional and linguistic tools to enter into a relationship on the same footing with the Belgian social structures, such as administrations, foundations. They are therefore often inadequate for this type of interactions. The nodal problem that is now raised then shows the lack of a suitable communication channel that could reassure each of the parties present and allow the vicious circle: the consolidation during the period of the project for a local mediation and community intervention structures – Actions en Milieu Ouvert « Reliance » - with notably the presence of young professional staff from various cultures is therefore one of the lasting outcomes of the “Faiths and Social Cohesion” local action.

For further information see Ch. Parthoens & A. Manço (2005), De Zola à Atatürk : un « village musulman » en Wallonie. Cheratte-Visé, Paris : L’Harmattan, coll. « Compétences interculturelles ».

344


Muslims and Social Participation in Rome Giuliana Candia64 Abstract The European ³Faiths and Social Cohesion² project was conducted in Italy by the Parsec association. The question of Islam in this country has just begun to be considered (Candia, 2004) and the establishment of this religion is still rarely being considered at a local level and in a way that would allow the specific characteristics and qualitative aspects to be understood, and in particular, the actions aimed at eliminating the religious discrimination towards Muslims. Here's the case of social participation of Muslim immigrants in several neigborhoods of Roma. Keywords: Rome, Italy, social participation, Muslim immigrants, Islamophobia. The European “Faiths and Social Cohesion” project was conducted in Italy by the Parsec association. The question of Islam in this country has just begun to be considered (Candia, 2004) and the establishment of this religion is still rarely being considered at a local level and in a way that would allow the specific characteristics and qualitative aspects to be understood, and in particular, the actions aimed at eliminating the religious discrimination towards Muslims. Both the size and the profile of the Muslim immigrant population have rapidly increased in Italy over recent years. This can be seen to be taking place at a faster rate than that described for the “Muslim Migratory Cycle” stages (Bastenier et Dassetto, 1993) that have been observed in other regions of Europe. During this period, Islam in Italy has being significantly transformed, as the direct Giuliana Candia is a member of the PARSEC association in Rome, where she heads the research. Email: [email protected]. This article was written in Italian based on the study by Federica Dolente of the Moroccan and Egyptians in the Cinquina district and by Giuliana Candia of the Al Huda mosque in the Centocelle district. Samia Kouider has translated it into French. Migration Letters, Volume: 2, No: 3, pp. 345 – 365. December 2005 (ISSN: print: 1741-8984 & online: 1741-8992) 64

GIULIANA CANDIA

result of the tension caused by the international political situation. On the one hand, the tensions results in prejudices being disseminated in the collective imagination and, on the other hand, deadlocks to a certain degree in the integration and dialogue processes between the Muslim organisations and the Italian civil society. In such a climate of generalised suspicion, religious discrimination towards Muslims can mainly be traced to the lack of agreement between the State and the representatives of Islam in Italy. Without such an agreement, Islam remains outside the Italian constitutional framework that regulates the relationships with non-Catholic religions. Among the various reasons for this lack of dialogue, the main one is the lack of a unified representation of Islam in Italy as this representation is considered to be essential for this religion to be officially recognised. The Italian Muslim organisations can be seen to be divided between three different centres of interest: the ones that give priority to the interests of the Muslim immigrants, the organisations that give priority to the relationships with their homelands and, finally, the ones for Italians who have converted to Islam. Despite the encouragement of inter-religious dialogues, after the Vatican II Council, Islam remains a direct competitor of the dominant religious culture in Italy due to the extent of its presence: it is already considered as the country’s second religion in terms of the number of the faithful. It should be stressed that in a country where religion is not at all restricted to the private aspect, the hostility fuelled towards Islam is not aimed at the religious expression as such, but is rather saddled by old and new stereotypes and Islamophobic prejudices. Even if various studies show that the majority of the country’s Muslim residents do not consider their belonging to the religion as an essential aspect of their identity, it is undeniable that Italian Muslims are victims of Islamophobia which can be broken down in terms of prejudices, suspicions and denial of needs and cultural specificity. Islamophobia becomes more specific and explicit at a local level, mainly in the negative attitudes regarding places of worship (Rivera, 2003). The associations asserting to be Muslim attract tensions, or even conflicts, and in any case, various security investigations aimed at fighting against Islamic terrorism. The local level is where the realities of everyday Muslim life are first formed. It is also essentially at this level that the relations and 346

MUSLIMS & SOCIAL PARTICIPATION IN ROME

negotiations are woven that affect the needs of the people and group that claim to represent Islam. In large cities, such as Rome, where a strong Muslim population is already present and visible, the Muslim associations that develop inter-community negotiations and communication initiatives are undoubtedly a place of intercultural convergences and instruments of social cohesion, while respecting the religious specific characteristics of the individuals or groups. 1. Islam in Rome The Muslim presence in the city of Rome is calculated to be 52,729 people (Caritas, 2004) out of a total population of 2, 800, 00 and an immigrant population of around 300,000. However, the illegal immigrants are excluded from this number as it is impossible to calculate how many there are. Even though this is a significant number, the Muslim places of worship are very recent and rare: there are only seven registered by the Christian humanitarian organisation, Caritas (2004). There are a greater number of mosques in the towns in the north of Italy (Casolo, 1992). The immigrants from countries with a majority Muslim population are scattered throughout the Rome urban area, although our empirical study shows a recent trend to concentrate in certain districts. In fact, the research carried out in Rome has allowed us find several examples of Muslim religious places among the best-known and frequented. The following panorama emerges: The most important building is the Islamic Cultural Centre, referred to as the “Great Mosque of Rome”. It is run by the embassies of certain Muslim countries. Initially founded for the needs of the diplomats and businessmen, this mosque is located in the upper part of the city, near to the residential districts and far from the areas where the majority of the immigrants have settled. It has beautiful, huge spaces that are considered to be in line with its mission as a place of worship and to represent the institutions of the Muslim countries. The small mosques founded by the Muslims in the working class districts are more numerous. The Muslim immigrant presence in these districts is numerically significant and can be considered as being partly stabilised. These mosques are also places of cultural integration that help the immigrants to deal with the day-to-day difficulties of settling and adapting to their host 347

GIULIANA CANDIA

country. The establishments used for these places of worship are totally financed by the faithful: they are confined spaces and insufficient in terms of the public demand. In fact, these mosques are really centres of aggregation, solidarity and socialisation for the people that go there. Nearly all of them offer a religious, cultural and social service, and they therefore help to make up for the deficit in the lack of public welfare. There are also small prayer rooms in the places of residence of the Muslim immigrants. This is particular true in the squats. This clandestine occupation of space is part of a collective defence strategy implemented by immigrants who believe that they are enforcing their rights to a dwelling and insertion, together to their right to practise their religion. These mini-mosques are also true back shops of self-organisation of immigrants from various origins. After several years, Rome City Council announced that it wanted to promote the different religious identities of the city’s multi-ethnical population by means of cultural initiatives, which included the activities of the Tavolo interreligioso (inter-religious board), a commission set up with the Department for Schooling and Educational Policies, and the Consulta delle religioni (Council of the Religions), under the aegis of the director to the City Council for the policies on multi-ethnicity. The inter-religious approach is a hands-on methodology that allows the current hegemony of the Catholic religion, in particular in the schools, to be reduced and balanced. Furthermore, the inter-religious action is the opportunity to positively highlight the value of the extensive experience and religious tradition as important elements in the day-to-day life of the populations living in Rome. Religion is one of important meeting points for coexistence between the populations of different faith and cultures. The activities of the Tavolo interreligioso65 are aimed at bringing the education in line with the religious culture in the secondary classes. The partners take part in debates and meetings in the schools. The aim is to learn about the different religions and, therefore, to encourage the schools to deal with themes such as IslamoThe parties signing the protocol to set up this board are: the Jewish Community of Rome, the Representative Committee of the Valdesi, Methodist, Baptist, Lutheran, Salvationist Churches of Rome, the Italian Islamic Cultural Centre, the Maitreya Foundation of the Italian Buddhist Union, the Italian Hindu Union, the Congregation of the Jehovah’s Witnesses. 65

348


phobia or religious fundamentalism in particular: given the current international scenario, these subjects are always an area to which the teachers and students can relate. In fact, the search for a fairer understanding of this phenomena has encourage the schools to develop and study important religious issues in greater depth, while ensuring that various sensitivities and religious are always represented in order to respect the universalist nature of the initiative. The aim is to make it possible to educate about the coexistence of religious differences. In fact, very little time in the school system is spontaneously reserved for programming activities relating to the fight against racism or religious discrimination. There has been significant support for this project from the Roman schools: not less than 40 schools and 160 classes are involved each year. However, it can be seen that this initiative only rarely allows an in-depth study that goes beyond the dissemination of formal information about religious doctrines. The local religious communities feel there is a need for more frank meetings, exchanges or dialogues (Parsec, 2004). In fact, the case of Islam, for example, is, in this context, a “theoretical” subject of discussion and debate, as it remains distant in its expressions, its roots and how it is transformed in the host country (Allievi, 2003a). A “reallife” expression of Islam lacks appeal. It will be noted that within this initiative, as in many others, the Islam Cultural Centre (the Great Mosque of Rome) is recognised as a privileged spokesperson by the municipal institutions while the faithful from the “district mosques” disapproves of its functions: “they have everything in the Great Mosque, but they do not do anything… for example, after September 11th, the mosque played a very important role, organising meeting with journalists, intellectuals… We ourselves, with far fewer resources, organised the debates even though we were just volunteers, unlike the civil servants of the Great Mosque”. The lack of respect is mutual: the representatives of the Islamic Centre see themselves as the only representatives of a “European Islam” transcending the various cultural traditions of the immigrant populations. According to one of the centre’s representatives, “Islam needs to be separated from these traditional expressions that characterise the mosques run by immigrants. (…) The immigrants are doing everything to hang on to the faith and culture of their country. That is a sort of ghetto life” (Camilletti, 2004, 143-146). However, considering that the discriminations suffered by the Muslims are not only religious, but are due to many other political 349

GIULIANA CANDIA

and socio-economic factors, it was decided to focus the observation and action part of the “Faiths and Social Cohesion” project on the small associations of the faithful: a similar level of involvement is only able to reveal the close links between religious discrimination and the general social vulnerability of the immigrant groups. The participant observation work carried out in Rome was focused on the following: Religious practices and the difficulties for a group of recently immigrated Moroccan and Egyptian families to gain citizenship, transferred from a residential complex where they were squatters (Capo delle armi) to housing allocated by the City Council (Cinquina). The activities of a religious association founded by a group of immigrant Muslims who, after 10 years, run a place for prayer in the working class Centocelle districts. 1.1. From Capo delle armi to Cinquina: immigrant families and religious expression In 1994, the Rome Representative Committee for the Right to Housing occupied three buildings being built near to Ostia, a small coastal town in the metropolitan district of Rome, 30 km to the west of the city centre. Over 200 families, in other words nearly a thousand people, took over the empty apartments, including 80 immigrant families, the majority of whom were Moroccan or Egyptian. The isolation of the place in relation to the service and transport networks, the high density of inhabitants and great insecurity inside these abandoned buildings caused serious problems which drove the occupants to create a management committee. During 8 years, this committee not only has provided internal support for the residents, but has also managed to create a huge solidarity movement promoted by the local association and by the neighbourhood parish. When the city perceived and considered the squatter complex and its residents as a “foreign body”, that was likely to cause problems, the internal committee was structured and strengthened not only to maintain order, but also to ensure the coexistence and participation of everyone. In this context, when the Muslim families expressed their need for relating to collective worship, it was welcomed as another initiative which could facilitate the socio-cultural integration of the residents, who were living in a marginalization situation. The Muslim group therefore organised a prayer room, an Arabic course for 350


the children and a small shop with hallal products. The volunteers of those associations and the neighbourhood parish ran a playroom, opened a library, and provided schooling support for the children, together with various recreational activities. The neighbourhood school also organised different initiatives to welcome the Italian and foreign children living in the squats. The social networks created inside and outside the housing complex offered support through vocational counselling, looking for jobs, information about how health and social services operate, etc. In short, the community approach developed by the group of squatters, in collaboration with certain local players, has allowed the whole of this population to break away from their situation of living in the extreme fringes of society. The experience thus concluded positively in 2002, with all of the families being allocated local authority housing. All the families were therefore transferred to various areas in the suburbs or outside Rome, but they were not allowed to choose their destination. Some families, in order to avoid totally becoming rootless, preferred to give up the housing offered and move to other parts of the town. The Capo delle armi population was therefore broken up, even if a notable group, including Muslim immigrant families, was transferred to the Cinquina district, to the extreme northern suburbs to the city. The study was therefore moved to Cinquina, in order to analyse the way of religious expression of these families in the new housing context. Therefore, 40 families, half of whom were foreigners, were re-housed in a new residential complex where 65 other households from various zones had also settled. The district was also new and therefore lacking in services. While this situation was obviously an improvement for all the families with respect to being treated as citizens, it also constituted for some of them a significant loss of the landmarks and networks that were previously set up. In fact, a single bus operates from the city to Cinquina where the buildings that were not maintained by the management entity quickly deteriorated. Furthermore, the loss of the community dimension drove certain families into even more difficult conditions than when they were squatting. In particular, the arrival of the new Muslim residents only increased the feeling of suspicion to be found after the arrival of these tenants. This atmosphere was partly fed by the effects of September 11th, to such a point that the local malicious gossip had 351

GIULIANA CANDIA

it that one of the terraces of a building was being used to store weapons. According to the former part-time imam of Capo delle armi, the first attempts by some Moroccans to collectively organise the Muslim religion in Cinquina had to be aborted due to the negative reaction of the Italian neighbours. He believed, an opinion that was shared by other Muslim immigrants that “it is a difficult situation for all of us and in particular for the Muslims that are the victims of a negative view disseminated by the television that also speaks about the evil Muslims”. Muslim immigrants therefore pinpointed communal premises that could be used either as a prayer room or for giving Arabic courses to children. Nonetheless, in the absence of a tenants and an organisation to liaise with the council flats office, that was managing the property, the request to use the communal spaces has failed. In addition, another request to host Arabic courses for children, an initiative backed by the neighbourhood parish, was also rejected. The teachers at the neighbourhood primary school which all the children attend, were the first to be involved in the “Faiths and Social Cohesion” project, even though they maintain that the Muslim families tend to want to make too much of belonging to their religion. This comment is mainly linked to the presence in the classes of young 13-year old girls who wear the yashmak. Another critical fact highlighted by the teachers was the request in writing from a father who asked for his daughter to be able to study the architecture of basilicas and of mosques… The new social context of the families links practising Islam to forms of fundamentalism, unlike the self-management environment of the previous district. This attitude affects the public expression of freedom of the Muslim families. The most obvious example is that of practising religion being confined to the family environment when the Muslim wishes to pray in a group: by arguing the lack of suitable spaces for the Friday prayers or as a meeting place during Ramadan, the housing managers prevent any community expression of Islam. Another example is that of the children who deny or who hide the signs that could indicate their religious faith, stigmatised by the environment, in particular at school.

352


1.2. Centocelle, multi-cultural working class district Centocelle is a district to the south-east of the city. It is a highly built up area and within easy reach of the city centre. It is a district which, as far back as the 50s, has witnessed the en masse arrival of migrants. From the 90s, the availability of reasonably priced housing has attracted foreign immigrants, who now account for nearly 3,500 people out of a population of 60,000 inhabitants. There is a significant number of immigrant families and the ratio of minors among the foreign population is 20%, one of the highest in the city. It should be noted that the rapid increase of rents over recent years has not slowed down the immigrant settlement process and the arrival of new households, thanks to the operating of the migratory channels. The Muslim population has left its mark on the neighbourhood, in particularly thanks to a mosque being founded in 1994: the Al Huda mosque. Numerous shops run by Muslims also exist in this highly populated area. Therefore, numerous Muslims from other districts shop here and the area is witnessing the increase of the linguistic and cultural landmarks or the informal places that are as a greater reference point for the Muslim population. However, the living conditions of the immigrants are modest in Centocelle: there are many illegal immigrants and certain immigrants live on the real fringes of society, such as a hundred or so travelling salesmen who live in groups of huts together with the Rom nomads. The residents work in a variety of jobs: the men have jobs in the service sectors and the shops that they run into other areas of the city; the women are often happy in a less stable job in the sector working for families or cleaning, and long-term unemployment is common in their category. When explaining female unemployment, it is however difficult to precisely define which part is due to family traditions and which part to the derisory offer available on the job market (Jabbar, 2000). According to the local social workers, the unfavourable social conditions of the immigrants echo the equally difficult one of all the local residents. Nonetheless, there is an absence of a popular network offering information, solidarity and support that could combine the ties of family, neighbours or proximity that are woven in the neighbourhood. The residents offer use the local charity and aid associations and, in particularly, those that refer to the parish by way of “safety valves” in the case of a pressing need for basic items, clothes, help with schooling for the children, etc. The ab353

GIULIANA CANDIA

sence of registered and/or recognised neighbourhood associations, created by/and for the immigrants is in fact a handicap towards specific needs being met. Nevertheless, a city council representative spoke about “quality immigration” in this district when referring to the satisfactory insertion rates of the workers and the lack of cultural conflicts in the neighbourhood, public spaces, schools and other cultural activities. The key element of the presence of Muslims in the district is the Al Huda mosque, the most popular in the city after the Islamic Centre (around 700 attend Friday prayer). This building was founded and run by a group of Tunisian refugees who formed an association: The Islamic Cultural Association in Italy (ACII), founded in the same year as the mosque itself, as a religious group. This “religious” status does not in fact reflect any legal status according to current Italian legislation: in fact, there is no recognition for Muslim associations. The people attending the mosque are very mixed, but mainly consist of Arabs, with over half being local residents. The mosque is particularly appreciated for the activities that it organises for children, but also because it has an area reserved as a meeting place and for commercial activities such as selling typical food products, for example. The space that is available for the mosques is a large hangar where there is a large prayer room, part of which is reserved for women. There is also an office, classrooms, a barber, etc. The main activities of the mosque are the religious and cultural training of adults and children, with multiple courses, as well as running a website whose main goal is to improve knowledge about Islam and to contrast the negative perception and image of Islam disseminated by the media. The mosque also organises a social secretariat that helps the indigent families thanks to the zakat collection or the calls for the solidarity to be shown by the faithful on Fridays. The weekly council meetings of the imam or the president of the association deal with theological issues or internal conflicts in the community. The Islamic Cultural Association also tries to act as the liaison between the Muslim families and the host society, mainly by acting on two fronts: on the one hand, by urging the faithful to encourage the insertion of their families and their children and on the other hand, by collaborating with all the initiatives organised by the schools, institutions and any type of entities, relating to the interreligious dialogue or knowledge about Islam. The mosque is therefore open to anybody, experts, press, citizens, etc, who wish to receive information and documents about Islam or about Muslims 354


in general. It is run by volunteers and donations from the faithful. The leaders of this mosque are seen to find it difficult to carry out the different normal activities of their association at the same time as promoting other one-off initiatives, including those that would provide their institutions with a higher profile and participation in the life of the city. The lack of financial resources is an obstacle to acquiring more suitable premises and to allowing a minimum salary for the leaders so that they can dedicate more time to their work. We can see that despite the local respect that the mosque of the Islamic Cultural Association receives, its contribution to what is sometimes referred to as “social peace” does lead to any financial or material support from any private or public institution. Worse still, all the applications submitted to institutions, such as the request for classrooms to teach Arabic to the children, for example, are systematically refused. According to the leaders of the association, “no “citizenship” is recognised by Italian institutions in their case”… 2. Dynamics and problems of Roman Islam in the light of the observations The activities of the project have highlighted the question of religious discrimination towards Muslims in Italy, in general, and in Rome, in particular. This discrimination is supported both by the absence of a legal recognition of Islam, unlike other religions present in Italy, and by the difficult cultural and social conditions of the majority of the Muslims living in this country. The convergence of these two facts led us to measure the degree to which the specific cultural and religious characters of the Italian Muslims are not recognised. The goals of the “Faiths and Social Cohesion” local action were re-worked as we learnt more about the situation of Islam in Rome. Therefore, the religious dimension was sometimes very obvious and, at other times, confused with other types of discrimination, mainly cultural ones. This difficulty to unearth religious discrimination as such was also observed during the comparisons with the other European countries belonging to the “Faiths and Social Cohesion” network where Islam benefits from a constitutional recognition. However, in Italy, the local situation of the Muslims appears to be very affected by the lack of political clarity about recognising the Islamic religion, with this issue being further compli355

GIULIANA CANDIA

cated by the alarmist treatment of international current affairs in the popular media. In the spirit of the population, but also of numerous social agents and teachers, the Islamic issue is now largely associated to the idea of terrorism and religious fundamentalism. According to certain witnesses in the school field, this hotchpotch seems to already be interiorised by certain members of the target population: therefore, children from secular Muslim families do not join in with their schoolmates who consider themselves to be believers and/or practising. This division leads, for example, to girls who wear the yashmak being stigmatised… In addition, Muslim institutions are always under suspicion. Thus, the “official mosque” of Rome had to replace its imam following the publication in the press of an article about the violence that he was alleged to preach on Fridays 66 . With respect to the small mosques, the pervading idea is that they are “closed places that are detrimental to the social integration of the communities that go there”. This view detracts from all the activities they however organise to help the families to socialise in their host country. At Centocelle, as in other mosques, the religious and association leaders play down the difficulties that they come across as a religious community. They focus on the more positive aspects of their experiences and their steadfast desire to make a contribution to Italian society. In fact, the support of the project interlocutors (institutions, associations and Muslim leaders) to identifying the difficulties and problems linked to belonging to a religion has not been immediate. It was only with the increase in the activities organised with the Muslim partners that they have been able to identify and see the problems for themselves as the result of the discrimination regarding their religion, together with the links between these discriminations and their living conditions. The interaction between the living conditions and the religious status of the Muslim migrants is an interesting point to develop. While in Cinquina, the immigrants, in general, and the Muslim immigrants, in particular, were perceived as “a foreign body” to the pervading social fabric, in Centocelle, the Islamic population enjoys a certain acceptance because they bring cultural diversity and contribute to the local commercial fabric. In the two cases, however, forms of religious discrimination have been seen, which, 66

Allam M., La Repubblica, June 7th 2003.

356


however, occur in different ways according to several variables: mainly, the size of the Muslim group, how well established it is, its level of organisation as a community of believers, etc 67 . 2.1. “Way of the cross” of the needs and rights of the Mus lims at Cinquina The Cinquina case represents a typical case where the identity of the individuals and families, as well as their spiritual values, suffers from the indifference to the other populations in the same social context. It is a common situation, not only where the Muslims are in the minority, but also where their status as citizens is insecure. It is in this sense, that it is pertinent to highlight the links between religious discrimination and social exclusion. It is important to appreciate these nuances and interactions in order to avoid simplifying the problems of the Muslim populations in Italy, by only considering one or other variable. The Muslim population does not only suffer from discrimination linked to its specific identity, but also from a marginalisation that links it to a much larger immigrant population. Any action aimed at emancipating this minority has to take these many facets into account (Jabbar, 2002). In Cinquina, the small Muslim community has not obtained adequate answers to its requests, such as adapting the public transport system to its needs. This fact has particularly imposed on the local Muslim women a drastic limitation on their being able to travel and their mobility being subordinate to that of their husbands, as hardly any of them hold driving licences and very few households have a car. This has only contributed to strengthen, in the mind of the local residents, the stereotype of the Muslim women, who is culturally dependent, while the reason is contextual (Jabbar, 2000). In another area, teachers coming up across communication difficulties with immigrant parents have quickly interpreted these problems as being a sign of the impossibility to integrate Muslims. However, the school has never taken into consideration the difficulties of the parents who barely speak Italian. In these conditions, and not supported, for example, by the local parish, the Muslim resident have rather quickly abandoned the desire to create a space for collective prayer, as Mustapha Elhaboub, one of the leaders of this group, stressed in June 2003: “It will be impossible to create another mosque because nobody would look Such observations are transposable to other areas of Rome: Torre Angela, Viale Marconi, del Pigneto, etc. 67

357

GIULIANA CANDIA

after it. They all live in housing where they have to pay the rent and they have no money. They have even less resources to look after the mosque as when we were staying in the squats in Capo delle armi”. The few people behind the Cinquina mosque project believe that their new environment denies their right to religious expression and the collective practice of their religion. The “Faiths and Social Cohesion” project has shown that this feeling of exclusion and other frustrations exacerbate the religious identity of the interested parties (Kouider, 2003). The social conditions should therefore need to be restored that would allow the resident to define their communal needs and a communal initiative in the framework of dialogue with the residents from any origin. The general goal of the project in this district has therefore been to insert the religious needs of the Muslim families in the framework of the right to citizenship, by mobilising the different local resources to obtain their recognition and taking them in charge following the example of other needs expressed by the residents: Highlighting the presence of immigrant families, the specific nature of their personal situation and their needs in terms of socio-cultural integration; Raising awareness among the representatives of the local associations and institutions in order to recognise to the cultural different by getting rid of the “practising Muslim = fundamentalist hostile to the host society” equation; Promoting the participation of the Muslim families by reinforcing their capacity to define their needs and identify suitable and competent spokesperson; Creating meeting spaces to promote dialogue and mutual knowledge The schooling of the Cinquina foreign children had to be considered as a common problem for the different people involved: the very families, the schools, the local associations. An analysis of collective needs led to a training cycle for the teachers of the primary and infant schools. The goals were to provide the teachers with intercultural communication and education tools and notions, together with greater knowledge of cultural specific characteristics of the North-African immigrant families. The intervention team has above all targeted facilitating the relations between the Italian teachers and immigrant parents. A Moroccan mediator took part in the experiment during which the school teachers have had the 358


opportunity to express their perceptions of Islam and their feelings about their relationships with the families and the pupils. The discussions also covered the means for a better approach to the cultural and religious differences and their use within the schooling system. At the end of the session, the teachers themselves request to be provided with methodological and professional support, in the framework of a series of meetings to be organised with the families in order to define the measures that will allow greater participation of all of them in educational aspects. At the same time, the neighbourhood’s mutual aid associations and the local parish were involved in the study. Discussions were organised about the neighbourhood and the arrival of immigrant families with the help of the father of a family who offered to open a child-minding facility near to the council flats to look after the children after school. This proposal was positively welcomed: the City Council’s social services supported it and the parish provided premises where, once a week, the children of the volunteers of the “Time Bank” would be looked after from then onwards. Furthermore, another local association, working with the City Council, offers the children the option of staying on at school one afternoon a week for a range of leisure activities mainly aimed at developing their Italian language skills. After several months of similar turmoil, a notable positive change would be noted in the view that the local social services had about the presence and realities of the Muslim immigrant families, realities that had previously been classified as “explosive”. This change is due to their direct confrontation with the families and therefore better knowledge about the living conditions of this group. This reflection that has emerged from this time of coming in contact with the realities has allowed the city council professionals to become aware of what these families need and to develop the idea of organising various activities aimed at the children and in particular at the women, who have been equally identified as having notably more difficulties in being in contact and socialising with the people outside the family (Ceccarini, 2004). This very method of “contextualising” and progressive awareness has allowed the issues of the use of the currently vacant communal spaces to be studied collectively. In this framework, the heads of the Muslim families offered to circulate a petition for premises which they could use as a place to pray. This request has not been rejected as has always been the case previously, but has led to a 359

GIULIANA CANDIA

new debate with the non-Muslim residents. If this issue has still not been settled to the satisfaction of everyone, there is nonetheless the feeling of a slow evolution in attitudes, even if the right to a place of worship seems to still have to an inroad in the minds. 2.2. Constructing a positive profile in Centocelle The resources invested in Centocelle, as part of the “Faiths and Social Cohesion”, including a series of semi-structured interviews with the leaders of the local mosque, the health and social service staff, teachers and, finally, with certain local families. The considerations relating to the status of the local mosques in Italy have also been the subject of comparative interviews conducted in other Roman places of worship. Nonetheless, the most extensive information on the running of the associations and institutions, together with their mutual interactions were obtained from the observations made throughout the project. In the neighbourhood, none of our different spokesperson expressed a negative opinion about the Al Huda mosque-association. However, the interviews revealed a form of indifference and the absence of a willingness to discuss this. If it is common knowledge throughout the neighbourhood that there is a mosque, there is a lack of awareness of who the leaders are and what their objectives or activities are 68 . The only exception is worth mentioning: there are two schools adjoining the mosque, which after nearly 5 years, are trying to set up, not without difficulties, a collaboration with the Muslim leaders by inviting them to speak about Islam in class and to organise visits to the Mosque in order to get to “know each other better”. Is Centocelle not proof of a reality that few people wish to discover and above all recognise that this is in their neighbourhood or in city? The recognition of a community organisation governed according to Muslim rules seems in fact to raise problems 69 : despite the signifi-

A televised documentary by Liliana Cavani about the Centocelle neighbourhood shows the monk of the neighbourhood church going to visit the imam at the mosque. As the documentary stresses, it is the first time that these two people, so close to each other, have met. We can add that it was also the last time: there have been no other meetings after the camera went away. 69 Even it represents the only immigrant association in Centocelle, its “religious” nature is seen by certain spokespersons as an elements that reinforces the “ghettoisation” of the immigrants, while, normally, the immi68

360


cant number of the faithful that worship there and its presence in the neighbourhood for over ten years, the mosque still does not appear among the partners involved in the local events, even those relating to inter-religious dialogue 70 . When it is necessary, the reaction is to turn to the Great Mosque of Rome 71 . This aspect reveals the lack of knowledge about the Muslim religion and the confusion made with the organisation of the Catholic Church: great importance is granted to the hierarchical positions compared to the grassroots management of the religion. In fact, some claim that a “correct” interpretation of Islam does not envisage the obligation to pray at the Mosque, which therefore repudiates the need, for a territorial community, to have a place of worship, however modest, close to where they live. If there are various reasons for certain people to question the legitimacy of a neighbourhood mosque, it is however clear that the fear of terrorism and religious fundamentalism is what frequently underlies this attitude. The sharp increase in the police investigations into the mosques and the negative and arguable analyses published by the press are among the major vehicles for the profile of the El Huda mosque in Centocelle. This type of profile is disastrous not only for the relationships with the local institutions, but also for the faithful themselves where dozens of them have already given up going to the mosques as they are frightened of being a victim of the security services (Gustinchich, 2004). The maximum percentage of adult Muslim men that go to the mosque on weekdays is estimated at 10%. If certain believers show a preference for the Great Mosque of Rome, the only place of worship in the town that seems to be recognised by the institutions and where the Muslims are comfortably settled, certain studies and the large crowds on Fridays tend to show that function of a local mosque is specific for the Muslim immigrants. For example, even grant associations are appreciated for helping insertion in the host country. 70 Therefore, the Guide des quartiers published by the City Council makes no mention of the mosque, neither in the “Places of Worship” section nor in the “Associations” section. Therefore, the El Huda association is totally excluded from the City Council information network, including information about public tenders for cultural and social activities. 71 Certain local schools have organised visits to the Great Mosque of Rome, but not to the ones used by the parents of their pupils.

361

GIULIANA CANDIA

the Muslims who do not use the prayer room send their children there to attend the Arabic courses and listen to the readings of the Koran. Neither do they hesitate to go there for help, meet up with their fellow countrymen or for a wedding: which illustrate the identifying and social role that the mosque-association plays for the neighbourhood Muslims. In the framework of the “Faiths and Social Cohesion” project, the key objective of the attendant actions at Centocelle was to eliminate the factors that slow down the relationships of the local structure with the Mosque. These factors include the lack of the internal organisation in the Mosque, the difficulties to plan the actions, to strategically manage the communication with the outside and to propose partnerships with other social players. At the same time, a second goal was set of raising awareness of the Centocelle institutions and associations in order to organise exchanges of opinions with the leaders of the mosque. The town’s teachers were also encouraged to learn about the cultures and religious in order to be able to discuss the points of interest and above all the communal action projects. Right from the start, the action has benefited from the partnership with Rome City Council’s Department for Educational Policies. The focus has been on the educational establishments. Particular emphasis has been placed on supporting the creation of mutual knowledge relationships and collaboration between the various educational institutions and the parents or their associations. The organisation of a cycle of meetings about the mutual prejudices and mistrust between the teachers and the mosque leader has therefore resulted in a list of positive actions being drawn up to implement during the following academic year in order to answer the question: “what collaborations should there be with respect to the education of the immigrant children?”. If the initiative was initially motivated by the individual attempts of single teachers (“to react to concerns”), the action has been able to be orientated towards a durable availability of the latter for an effective cooperation with the Muslim families, with each stating his point of view and, where applicable, their needs. In this new configuration, the local partners thus working together have requested a more stable cooperation with the organisers of the action-research and the public institutions involved in order to more effectively bring the families closer to the educational structures and help them to organise discussion groups with, for exam362


ple, the Muslim mothers. In addition, the teachers have deepened their knowledge about the Mosque, its objectives and resources to the point that during the last meeting that took place in the prayer room, they all complained about the confined quarters and asked Al Huda to demand a more suitable space and offered to be volunteers to collect the signature of the local residents to support this request. Several “coaching” actions have also been given to the leaders of the Al Huda mosque: organisation of meetings with the Deputy Mayor for Social Services and the local associations, preparing a request for funding and an action project to promote the identity of the Arabic-Islamic young people, etc. “Visible” initiatives were also set up in collaboration with the local association: first meeting of the Rome group of the “Young Muslims of Italy” Association, In particular, the need was noted for training on how to prepare projects and requests for funding, as well as the importance of working on the external communication skills of the Muslim religious leaders. In fact, in order to mark its ten year anniversary, Al Huda planned a public meeting. This meeting organised on a formal basis with the involvement of various partners was well attended and was the opportunity for the profile to be established. During the meeting, the mosque leaders reiterated their undertaking to work on opening up more to the outside. The direct outcome is that the Mayor personally undertook to find a more suitable site in the neighbourhood for the needs of the mosque. Finally, the latest type of interventions has affected the “second generation” of Muslims. After the Province of Rome had expressed their interest, roundtables were set up to discuss the needs of Muslim adolescents and their relationship with the mosque. This led of a list being drawn up of possible necessary actions that could led to a request for a subsidy. Unfortunately, as the ACII-Al Huda association did not meet the formal selection criteria (in particular being registered among the associations looking after immigrants, no project could be filed. But the initiative has allowed a collective work method to be popularised and has clarified, in the eyes of the heads of the association, the administrative subsidy rules. The ACII officials are now considering amending their statutes in order to be able to benefit from subsidies from the local authorities for projects to promote the cultural and social integration of the immigrants.

363

GIULIANA CANDIA

3. Final considerations In keeping with the results of other recent studies (Allievi, 2003b, Saint Blancat, 2002), this initiative shows that, in the Italian institutional context, the first steps should be taken for a nondiscriminatory management of the religious diversities, together with a fair affirmation of their values. The keys that facilitate the social recognition and the access to citizenship for everyone, beyond the religious difference, are to be found both in the transformation of the running of the Muslim organisations and in establishing spaces where the people in charge of various philosophical and religious norms can come together to debate and work. In this setting, the public institutions, such as the schools or local authorities, for example, has to be stimulated to find the other in the expression of its diversity. Thus, one of the most conclusive results of the “Faiths and Social Cohesion” project in Rome is undoubtedly the setting up of the cooperation networks backed by common and durable interests for integration and peace. If the strategy set up within the project is in accordance with the general principles of the recent Social Welfare Act 72 which envisages actions being planned on the basis of a needs analysis involving all the private and public agents in the area, it can be seen that only a critical reflection by the social players of their own interpretations of the Other and their relations with the Other can lead to an effective work of exchange and working together, even more so as the autochthones and immigrants, Muslims and non-Muslims, legal or illegal immigrants, etc. do not enjoy the same situation of equality in the political, cultural and social arena. In such a complex context, only a long-term, programmed and sustained contact can allow the mistrust to be transformed into real participation.

References Allievi S. (2003a), « Islamofobia? Nuove forme di definizione e stigmatizzazione dell’alterità », dans: Razzismo e modernità, n° 2. Allievi S. (2003b), Islam italiano. Viaggio nella seconda religione del paese, Turin: Einaudi. Bastenier A. & Dassetto F. (1993), Immigration et Espace public : la controverse de l’intégration, Paris : CIEMI et L’Harmattan. Act 328/2000: Legge quadro per la realizzazione del sistema integrato di interventi e servizi sociali. 72

364


Camilletti O. (2004), « Che cosa vogliamo dall’Italia ? », Limes, n° 3, 143146. Candia G. (2004), « L’émergence rapide d’une réalité sociale islamique sans reconnaissance officielle », Manço U. (ed.), Reconnaissance et discrimination. Présence de l’islam en Europe occidentale et en Amérique du Nord, Paris : L’Harmattan. Caritas Diocesana di Roma, Fondazione Migrantes (2004), Immigrati a Roma, luoghi di incontro e di preghiera, Rome : Terza edizione. Casolo A. (1993), « Immigrazione e pluralità religiosa : la città dello spirito », Allievi S. (ed.) Milano plurale, l’immigrazione tra presente e futuro, Milan : IREF. Ceccarini E. (2004), Da Ostia a Cinquina: percorsi di accompagnamento di una comunità musulmana nel suo radicamento, Tesi di laurea, Università degli studi di Roma La Sapienza, Corso di laurea in Servizio Sociale. Gustinchich F. (2004), « Islamofobia e radicalismo, una coppia perfetta », Limes, n° 3, 195-201. Jabbar A. (2001), «Tracce femminili nell’islam », Afriche e oriente, v. III, n° 2, 81-83. Jabbar A. (2002), « Islam : la complessità negata », Rivera A. M. (ed.), L’inquietudine dell’islam, Bari : Ed. Dedalo, 2002, 151-141. Kouider S. (2003), Rencontres de formation et d’évaluation des approches de lutte à la discrimination, internal document. Parsec Associazione (2004), Gestione della diversità religiosa e mediazione per lo sviluppo della coesione sociale, Rapporto di ricerca per l’Assessorato alle politiche educative e scolastiche del Comune di Roma. Rivera A. M. (2003), Estranei e nemici. Discriminazione e violenza razzista in Italia, Rome : Derive Approdi. Saint-Blancat C. (2002), L’islam in Italia. Una presenza plurale, Rome : Edizioni lavoro.

365


General Evaluation and cross analyses Assessment of the “Faiths and Social cohesion” Project: What one can learn in the fight against discrimination Dina Sensi73 Abstract The European action named “Faiths and Social cohesion”. Building up Social Participation in Religious Difference: Local Muslim Communities in Europe » was assessed during the last six months of the project. The objective was to assess the impact of the actions taken. Keywords: Fight agains discrimination, religious discrimination, local actions assessment methods. The European action named “Faiths and Social cohesion”. Building up Social Participation in Religious Difference: Local Muslim Communities in Europe » was assessed during the last six months of the project. The objective was to assess the impact of the actions taken. Although one of IRFAM’s recent members carried this out, it can still be considered as having been done independently as the researcher had taken part in no project activity of any kind before. Several data collection methods were used: - Content analysis of all the partners’ reports from September 2002 to March 2004, and of other project documents; - Semi-structured interviews of researchers on the main project sites: Cheratte, Gent, Rome, Roubaix and Granada;

73

Dina Sensi is currently heads research and training at IRFAM. Email: [email protected]. This article is a simplified and abridged version of the full assessment report (Sensi, 2004). It avoids repeating parts of the former chapters where one can get an overview of local initiatives. The idea is for the reader to have access to the crosscutting analytic dimension made possible by the assessment. Migration Letters, Volume: 2, No: 3, pp. 366 – 382. December 2005 (ISSN: print: 1741-8984 & online: 1741-8992)


- Informal talks with some mosque representatives from Roubaix, Rome and Granada; - Participants’ observations during the project closing conference held in September 2004 and at the preparatory meetings in Liege and Brussels; - Semi-structured interviews of the international project coordinators’ team.

1. Overall intentions and success indicators The “Faiths and Social cohesion” project is all about the fight against religious discrimination against Muslims in Europe at municipality level. From the word go partners have had a great many indicators to assess the quality of their actions: - Concrete impact on how discrimination and treatment or recognition differences according to what part of the population one belongs to are understood by political and administrative staff, by the media and by European states’ public opinions, - Concrete impact on the same population by making social exclusion and psychological tension caused by religious discrimination better known, - Discrimination or treatment differences decrease or disappearance in intensive action sites. - The number and quality of negotiation mechanisms of dialogue, mediation, etc. set up so as to prevent religious or community tensions, -

The results of the above actions,

-

Their duration and the duration of their effects,

- The project’s products being welcome and resulting in peoples’ mobilisation: meetings attendance rates, publications and public feedback, ject,

New practical perspectives to continue and enhance the pro-

- Finally, partners have expressed the wish to go on acting together and to increase their number, beyond the project’s first years.

367

DINA SENSI

These objectives, however, are not always expressed in terms of identifiable results and they remain essentially process centred: to fight religious and cultural discrimination by means of identifying and developing peoples’ skills, by supporting their efforts, by modelising and spreading good practices etc. Two types of stakeholders will be particularly supported: municipality representatives and communities’ religious associations’ delegates. Recommended performance indicators seem rather vague: they have to do with knowledge, understanding for very large populations, negotiation mechanisms, prevention and erasing of discrimination or treatment differences without mentioning which ones. The project has therefore not been written according to strategic rules. It sets its targets on the basis of a problem tree and in terms of tangible results. Courses of actions to take have to be set on the assumption that, firstly, the production of knowledge and understanding stimulates change and, secondly, that community mediation and intercultural negotiation are necessary to decrease religious discrimination, and, thirdly, that people need to change before institutions can do so too. The initial project does not mention a structured plan of actions. Instead, it has a list of actions to take at local and international levels: - Set up negotiation, information, coordination, consultation, dialogue, awareness, and mediation mechanisms at the service of Muslim populations and of their delegates, and at the service of local decision makers, whether elected or employed at municipality administration offices or at social and education bodies in the widest sense. - Give these mechanisms new impetus where they already exist so as to deal with religion related conflicts between communities and institutions. - Help set up unions among Muslim communities to let new interlocutors to be identified out of that community. - Issue and distribute professional information papers for all audiences (brochures …), including wishes, claims, and opinions coming from Muslims as well as local political and association decision makers. - Launching events that promote minority Muslim citizens: exhibitions, etc. 368


- Encourage people to get through and out of situations where locally identified Muslim populations are discriminated against and treated differently. - Launch training sessions and actions to ease intercultural communication by letting the parties state their opinions. This should make it possible to find targets and stakes that are common to both communities and institutions, i.e. work together towards improved living conditions in the municipality. - Set quality indicators according to the given context to assess actions together. This would make it easier for people to express their opinions, it would reveal new skills and enhance the old ones, it would improve social and cultural welfare, etc. - Issue common international publications that deal with the history of Muslim populations in various countries, their daily lives, their feelings, some analytical articles, along with action plans, achievements, conclusions and perspectives of the project in terms of good practice in the fight against local religious discrimination. - Widely distribute these publications to the media and by means of conferences and public presentations, thereby facilitating an open debate. - Identify incidents where the target population are discriminated against, in the historical background of Muslim presence in Europe ; produce a common analysis and vision of the mechanisms that are behind that type of discrimination and issue practical recommendations to be validated and applied al local level. - Draw the attention of European, national, and local decision makers, public opinions, media, and European citizens on the issue. This list makes it possible to see more clearly the setting up of mechanisms and of meeting places (that tend to have an institutional dimension), as well as the identification of indicators that implies the will to have changes assessed on an uninterrupted basis. Hence the presence in this project, albeit implicitly, of practically all the components of an overall anti-discrimination strategic plan. These components can be represented by the circular graph below, inspired by Lederach (1997), Sensi and al. (2003) and Sensi (2000).

369

DINA SENSI

Diagnosis phase and context analysis (I) Crisis management or management of ongoing files Discrimination prevention by means of information, awareness raising and people training actions Setting up a monitoring and follow-up indicators system Making a strategic plan with an action timetable on several years Changing under-systems and systems by means of new and long-term institutional mechanisms New anti-discrimination legal framework Diagnosis and context analysis phase (II) Etc. The diagnosis phase, the critical situations resolution, awareness raising and training are related to people oriented actions whereas system transformation action plans and the monitoring system are more related to institutions. In order to implement long-term changes, both courses of action are necessary. However, it takes time for all actions to be carried out simultaneously. What matters is to realise that each one is a door which, when opened, leads to other ones. The « Cults and Cohesion » project’s intention is to be open to all these phases except to a strategic plan that would include an action timetable for the fight against religious discrimination spread over several years.

2. What local strategies are best suited to what types of religious discrimination? The table below summarises the strategic choices made by local teams whose actions are described in the previous chapters. It shows that all teams chose to work “bottom-to -top” rather than “topto-down”, and rather “bottom” than “top”. Most efforts focussed on the first three courses of action that take place essentially where the stakeholders lead their daily lives and the institutional dimension has so far not been particularly emphasised.

370


Strategic.

Diagnosis

Crisis solution

Awareness campaign, coaching and training

Sites

Stimulat. or setting up of stable mecha nisms

AntiMonidiscrim. toring action system plan and follow-up indicator

Cheratte

yes

yes

yes

yes

no

no

Gent

yes

yes

yes

yes

no

no

Granada

yes

yes

yes

yes

no

no

Rome Centocel.

yes

yes

yes

yes

no

no

Rome

yes

yes

yes

no

no

no

yes

yes

yes

no

no

no

Cinquina Roubaix

Diagnosing or identifying discrimination acts and their causes is the first strategic step to take: as stated by Scharf (2003, 9), religious discrimination is a relatively recent theme and it has been little documented. This is why project leaders decided to start it by launching a detailed research plan about the part played by Muslim communities in various backgrounds and about the religious discrimination they face. This analysis was done on two levels: each team was asked to carry out a local survey and an international team of experts was asked to produce more general conclusions on various themes. The results of these have been collected in books and articles that were published during the project. 371

DINA SENSI

The observed discrimination acts can be classified into five groups as follows: 1. The « identity » dimension that, in the case of Islam, includes all what it means for each person to “be a Muslim every day” (clothing, food, health, hygiene, education, public vs. private life, etc). Examples of discrimination acts experienced individually and collected by the projects are, among others: denying, rejecting, suspicion, disdain, humiliation, indifference and indolence, unavailability of the interlocutor, verbal and physical violence, administrative harassment, etc. 2. The « social organisation» dimension is the backbone of relations between people and groups (male/female relations, age relations, family relations, the community, associations, organisation or mosques organisation …). Acts of discrimination include: den ying the existence of the community, not taking on board the communities diversity, forcing some communities to gather when th ey are in fact incompatible, not recognising or validating representatives as such, Muslim families being devaluated by social, education and health care institutions, blockings due to the confusion between cultural and social functions of the mosques-associations, the difficulties, and even the impossibility to organise language, culture, and religion classes etc. 3. The « values, beliefs, and spirituality » dimension has to do with the definition of good and evil, the relationship with God and with the spiritual world, denial of Islam or public attempts to make it be perceived as evil, its systematic association with terrorism, … 4. The « cultural practices» dimension has to do with daily and weekly prayers, rites of passage (births, marriages, deaths, festivals,), etc. Examples include financial discriminations (state funded cults being attributed or not, discrimination to do with facilities and equipment (lacking spaces, run down or inadequate, …), administrative and red tape related discrimination (licence applications being turned down, extremely slow and complex procedures, …), freezing political decision making processes, frequent amendments in local/municipal regulations, not taking account of the religious practices specificities, etc. 5. The « institutional » dimension (concerning the status of imams, places of cults’ managers, and opinion leaders, etc) has

372


examples such as the absence of recognition, consultation and support for the cult’s delegates. The documents analysis and meetings with the researchers made it possible to identify three types of causes for the abovementioned discrimination; they are of institutional, organisational, and individual nature. - Discrimination can be partly attributed to the host community’s institutional framework. This directly involves the responsibility of European states that do not find solutions to the problem of recognising mosques. Here are a few examples: little known or little publicised anti-discrimination legislation in local public services, absence or ignorance of legislations concerning the Muslim cult at various levels of public administration… Besides, applications and formalities to get subsidies for cult places or associations are tedious and complex and require writing skills that are usually not well developed in the immigrant populations, of which Muslims in Europe are often part. Administrations offices sometimes tend to deal with religion related files in a purely technocratic manner and tend not to associate with them any sense for the sacred, which in turn is perceived as denial among Muslim communities. - One has to say that treatment differences at the expense of Muslims can also be attributed to the very functioning of the Islamic associations or of the mosques. The observations have shown a lack of professionalism in managing the said associations, which can discredit them with public services. There can also be significant internal disputes within and among the Muslim associations and communities. Identifying interlocutors and representativescan sometimes be made difficult. It should be noted that in the cities in question there are no real Muslim federations and the existing federative structures are not really representative of the various communities or of the various feelings. - The individual mentality of the representatives of local public services can also be at the root of religious or islamophobic discrimination phenomena. Behind this emotional fact, there is mistrust or paternalism on the part of some influent local agents. However, discrimination sometimes has its origin in poor knowledge of the anti-discrimination legislative framework, as is the case for cult management, or a poor knowledge of the needs and the diversity of the Muslim communities. Some observations have also shown that some decision makers, some administrative staff members, or 373

DINA SENSI

some social workers lack skills in mediation and conflict management or diversity management. - Finally, the functioning of people from Muslim communities is also a source of discrimination or self-discrimination. Again, on an emotional level, fear of the other, closed attitudes and mistrust can be found. The above-mentioned people do not have sufficient knowledge of rights, duties, and administrative regulations that can be of use. As far as skills are concerned members of the Muslim immigrant communities sometimes find it hard to manage associations, to solve internal conflicts, to communicate about the richness of Islam, about its history… All these causes can be observed on all visited sites with however specificities those are essentially attributable to the history and to historical disputes. In Northern countries such as France and Belgium, the relations of the public services with the mosques associations are heavily influenced by the fight for state secularisation and sometimes, secularity has become synonym with the fight against all forms of religion whatsoever. In Southern countries, in Rome (and particularly in the Vatican) and in Granada (last Islamic stronghold for the Catholic kings who won back Spain); the space made for Muslim presence in the city depends mostly on the outlet of the battles. The above analysis is only a very short synthesis of the diagnosis made by the project researchers. However, it shows very well how fully relevant the project is as it indeed meets the needs that were considered in the very framework of the activities. Many months and much energy have been spent in order to carry out this stage and in order to write the publications. This investment seems to us fully justified as far as few surveys have been made on this subject. Besides, the first rule of an efficient fight against discrimination is for the discrimination to be recognised, named, identified, analysed… Discrimination can go undetected and undenounced for centuries (in the part of both those discriminated against and those that are not discriminated against), simply because it is necessary to allow the dominant social system to function without having to change, whatever the inequalities may be. Gender inequalities are in this field a major example. The first stage for change to come about is therefore wording and quantifying the issue to get an objective view of the injustices experienced by the groups that are discriminated against. Religious circles are often still reluctant to admit the idea of discrimi374


nation. Even some project researchers were reluctant to do so! During each site visit, the first assessment action was to identify with them what specific types of discrimination were present. Much to our surprise, particularly after we had read reports that, for their part, were quite clear, all parties expressed that they had found it difficult to identify precisely the types of discrimination they were working on, arguing that discrimination acts experienced by Muslim communities were more linked to their status as disadvantaged immigrants than to religious practices and toi the thought of Islam as being a dimension to be considered as part of all the other ones as a whole, as if, in the project title, the wording « social cohesion » were more important than the word « cult ». Researchers clearly stated that the idea behind this was to put the issue in its broader context. This approach is indeed important, but it goes hand in hand with the risk of loosing focus in the research-action and of diluting the religious aspects in a wideranging study, albeit easier to accept or more « politically correct » in the current geopolitical context. The table below shows the various types of religious discrimination looked at during each of the actions that were visited during the assessment. It makes it possible to identify which discrimination dimensions were worked on in particular on every « Faiths and Social cohesion » project site. We can see that the two most recurrent dimensions are community aspects and cultural practices. One should note however that « the cult » was dealt with at once in Gent, Roubaix, and Granada, as the community dimension had been worked on so as to speed up the queue of administrative files. On the contrary Cheratte and Rome had worked mostly on the « social cohesion » front and cult related problems were dealt with indirectly. Here we are talking about two different doors and deciding which one to open first is probably based on the reasons below: -

Researchers’ position and experience in the field,

History, presence, democratic strength of the communities and associations in the area, Negotiation and openness context in which public services and Muslim communities interact, It can also be noted that the institutional representatives that come into play vary according to which door was opened. In 375

DINA SENSI

Cheratte and Rome social and education services are the ones that were most involved along with some representatives of the partner mosque or of the Muslim community. In Gent, Roubaix, and Granada institutional involvement seems to have been wider ranging: city council services whose specialised task is to deal with cult related issues. It was necessary to involve a wider network of Muslim institutional stakeholders.

Dimensions

Site

Cheratte

Identity

Community, Spiritual- Cultural Institurelations and ity practices tional social links and reli- systems gious rites Poor recogni tion of the mosqueassociation and financial discrimination

cemetery

Gent

Roubaix

Rome Centocelle

Rome Cinquina

Granada

376

Poor recognition of religious diversity

Devaluation of the mosqueassociation

New place of cult being built

Invisibile and isolated community and mosque Invisible and denied community

Worthy religious practice impossible

Invisible and denied community and associations and mosques

No place Problem of cult or with the cemetery validity of represen tatives


3. Lessons one can learn from the « Faiths and Social cohesion » project 3.1. The analysis of the cases here above has tought us several things concerning crisis management. Let’s start by saying that all stakeholders and participants that were met said that it was necessary to have a first stage were the people involved were to be identified. The duration of that stage has often been underestimated because field situations are too complex and too little known. This first stage has also made it possible to understand that it was important to spend time on emotional issues, that, in turn, had also often been underestimated. On the sites quite a long period of time had to be spent on confidence building with public authorities and Muslim communities alike. To gain the collaboration of civil servants the researchers had to show their expertise, their knowledge of the legislative framework or their skills in terms of intercultural relations. They set fears and fantasies about the Muslim cult and about daily family life into context, they made them objective, they relativised them and defused them. To become trusted with communities and mosques associations, researchers came to visit on a regular basis, they showed empathy, they recognised the problems that were experienced on a daily basis and they even got to know Islam better as some of them are of Muslim or immigrant origin, and some became actively involved in the writing of some files. The trust building process took more or less time according to whether researchers had been on the sites before or not. For exemple, in Belgium and France, the teams had been interlocutors for several years with mosques and public services, unlike Rome and Granada where communication started with the project. The researchers’ expertise was being recognised as well as their institutions in the various themes have been strong points in finding sotutions to the problems. Mediation and intercultural negotiation seem to have been at the centre of all actions taken by the teams. In some particularly sensitive areas, it is sometimes a good idea to use an indirect entry, such as children’s schooling, in order to start talking about religious issues. It seems that files have been made easier to treat when visible public events were held and because the action has a European character. In terms of results and depending on the researchers it has indeed been possible with these two approaches to unlock the files concerning cemetaries (Gent and Granada) and the building of the 377

DINA SENSI

mosque (Roubaix) and to make them move on towards solution finding. It has also been possible to enhance visibility and to enhance the role of the associations in all the cities involved in the project. 3.2. Awareness raising and training people working on site was done by a support and coaching system based on the learning by doing method. Approach specificities between coaching representatives of public services and coaching mosque associations cannot be identified because differences are linked to the teaching contents. As far as civil servants are concerned, the work seems to have focused on the knowledge and the mastering of legislative frameworks, on attitudes such as listening and looking, on the ability to negotiate in a multicultural context. As far as associations’ leaders are concerned, the focus was set on strengthening the ability to communicate, expressing requests in such a way that they could be understood by public services, creating and developing files and managing and organising the association. On all sites the teams trained stable relays : teachers, social workers, an intercultural mediator, representatives of the mosque group, leaders of intercultural associations … They too were coached, albeit in a more structured way and with more follow-up, as it was first necessary to identify those concerned, to motivate them (sometimes financially), to entrust them with responsibilities on precise tasks. The most structured training programme took place in Rome and was addressed to teachers; another one took place towards the end phase of the project at Visé-Cheratte. Talking with the teams gave us the impression that they had not defined very clear strategies in the training process and that this may be where the improvised most. This deficit in target and method setting does in no way mean that coaching was inefficient. However, its results are hard to pinpoint because the training programme was not formally assessed. Most people that were met agree to say that there have been significant changes in openness. On the contrary, it has been more difficult to identifiy with them what skills had been developed, particularly as some researchers admit that, for reasons to do with efficiency or impatience vis-à-vis some reluctance they were faced with, they sometimes tended to do things themselves rather than to limit themselves to being coached. 378


Researchers were more assertive when commenting on what they had learned. The project appears to have allowed them to improve significantly their knowledge and their skills in a new field, where expertise is still quite scarce. It also prompted each researcher to reflect on their own relation with religion, with their reference framework and with their own prejudices and stereotypes. 3.3. Stimulating or creating institutional mechanisms is without doubt the first strategy that can guaranty durability in the fight against religious discrimination. It was part of the projects’ intentions and most teams paved the way in this direction. Two mechanism stimulation approaches can be identified: in Gent there is the Gent mosques forum and in Rome there is the intercultural commission of the education system. The project made it possible to set up a mechanism that gathered mosques associations in Granada. Meeting and dialogue places or spaces were set up too: in Cheratte/Visé, there is now an inter-religious and inter-philosophical forum where teachers and youth workers can meet. In Gent there is a permanent round-table where mosques and public services meet. No site has considered the idea of setting up a committee or an anti-discrimination observatory within the public services. The Muslim cult national federations were not consulted during this research-action except when taking part in international conferences. 3.4. The idea of setting up an action plan againt discrimination acts that would include a multiannual actions schedule in favour of the fight against religious discrimination has not been suffitiently considered. Similarly to the former strategy, setting up a plan is of utmost importance to make actions last in time but this has not been stated in the projects’ intentions list. However, one can assume that this sort of plan can be made in the future, based on the recommendations to be found at the end of the process. The « Faiths and Social cohesion » project is but a first step on the way to building an international and multidisciplinary network that wishes to pursue its action. There is more: at all local sites partners wish to go on working together after the European project is finished and efforts are being made to find various types of financial support. 3.5. Setting up a monitoring and follow-up system is the last strategy to be considered. It was part of the projects’ intentions but none of the teams on the field worked towards that goal. However, 379

DINA SENSI

the international experts’ recommendations on this issue, among other incentives, may pave the way for a breakthrough in this area.

4. Conclusions In its intentions the project has virtually all the stages for a strategy of fight against all forms of discrimination (diagnosis of discrimination acts, crisis management, discrimination prevention, systems transformation and monitoring system). However, it lacks one of the important stages that are necessary for anchoring changes on an institutional level: that of setting up a strategic plan that would include a multiannual action plan. On all sites, most energy was spent on the first three approaches: diagnosis, conflict management, and coaching. The dominant perspective was to work first and foremost at grassroots level. Since the institutional aspect was not chosen as the main entryway the time limit of the project was such that this dimension could not be developed extensively. The idea that leads the initiative was to create a list of religious discrimination indicators based on the international experts’ work. Several publications on the diagnosis of the situations and the discrimination acts experienced by Muslim communities have been issued locally and internationally and they show how fully relevant the project has been. The problems that were pinpointed by the researchers reflect five types of religion related discrimination: individual discrimination acts experienced as an identity attack, acts experienced by the community, cult related administrative and technocratic discrimination, discrimination linked to spirituality and to institutions. Ground level actions focussed essentially on the fight against community discrimination and cult practice linked discrimination: - In Gent, Roubaix, and Granada the cultural aspect was the main entry way (cemetaries and new mosque), and community aspects were worked on in order to make files move ahead. - In Cheratte and Rome, the community dimension was mostly morked on and cult related problems were dealt with indirectly. None of the files was fully solved during the project. The exploratory action mostly resulted in identifying the problems and 380


helped them move on in the right direction. Three types of discrimination sources were highlighted in this process: Individual causes (fears and mistrust, deficient knowledge of the other and of their reference framework, lack in intercultural competences, etc); Public institutions related causes (failure to apply antidiscrimination or cult management legislations strictly, complex administrative procedures …); Cult associations related causes (poor professionalism in management and organisation, difficulty to gather into a federation, etc.). The preferred approach to help change people has been coaching or a systematic accompaniment of some people working on the ground. In Rome teachers were trained according to a structured programme, but in other places coaching was not done according to a formalised strategic plan. It was done according to people’s intuitions and deductions and according to opportunities. Because of this informality it is impossible to identify and quantify what people have learned and how much they have changed. However, the people that were interviewed say that there have been significant changes in attitudes (trust, look and listening quality), in knowledge in various themes and in communication, negotiation and file-building skills in the field of religious diversity management. Systems and associations transformation is just as hard to measure because the changes at stake have not been precisely defined beforehand. However, the people that were interviewed say that partner institutions now seem more open, more flexible, and more expert. In the same way partner Muslim associations and mosques seem to speak with more satisfaction about their feelings about openness, communication, management, organisation and networking.

References Lederach J. P. (1997), Building peace: sustainable reconciliation in divided societies. Rapport. Sensi D. (2000), Mécanismes et indicateurs de suivi du mainstreaming de l’égalité des genres, Rapport d’étude réalisée pour la Commission européenne, Université de Liège, SEDEP.

381

DINA SENSI

Sensi D. et al. (2003), Mettre en œuvre le mainstreaming de l’égalité des genres, guide de bonnes pratiques, Charleroi : FOREM. Sensi D. (2004), Evaluation du projet « Cultes et cohésion sociale », Rapport soumis à la Comision européenne, Liège : IRFAM. Sharf M. (2003), Conviction et exclusion, lutte contre la discrimination religieuse en Europe, Brussels: ENAR.

382


Ostracism, Tolerance or Recognition: Muslims in Europe Denise Helly and Jocelyne Cesari 74 Abstract In the case of present day Muslims, one can note that discrimination is both direct and indirect and that it often comes from public institutions. This is the sign of a very tense general climate and of an inability or a refusal on the part of the political bodies to cancel these tensions. Keywords: Muslims of Europe, Ostracism, tolerance, recognition. 1. Religious standards in modern societies According to the theses of modernisation and political neoliberalism, people are supposed to be motivated by materialism. A whole part of Western history, i.e. the important part played by religion in social and public life, is ignored. However, the status that hes been granted to religious standards is, along with the ideals of citizenship, equal opportunities, social solidarity, one of the pillars of all modern states. Historically, debates and conflicts around the religion issue and around the state versus church relations and separation are an integral part of the European political heritage and they give the tone yo present day life. Religious freedom is the first fundamental freedom to have been invented and it existed before democratic political systems. In the 16th century, the protestant Reform questioned Catholic supremacy over European states; it questioned the supremacy of monarchies of divine law. The conflicts caused by this uprise were so acute that they forced the parties to a compromise / the granting of the liberty of conscience and of cult to all Protestant streams.

74

Denise Helly is professor at the National Institute of Scientific Research of Canada. Email: [email protected]. Jocelyne Cesari is research director at the National Centre for Scientific Research (Sociology Group of Religions and Secularism) in Paris and associate professor at the University of Harvard (United States). Email: [email protected]. Migration Letters, Volume: 2, No: 3, pp. 383 – 407. December 2005 (ISSN: print: 1741-8984 & online: 1741-8992)

DENISE HELLY AND JOCELYNE CESARI

In the following centuries, the compromise was ratified by all European and North American states and religious freedom spread to to other minotities, such as the Jews, in the first place. They have no centralised hierarchy, such as links to a particular state, and they were therefore a direct opposition to the Catholic archetype. The creation of the liberties of conscience and of cult, as a basis to the concept of fundamental freedom, had two aims: protect the state and public institutions from the power of one or more religions, protect religious beliefs and institutions from a negative state intervention but it failed to clearly state how the separation should proceed. According to each countries historical and religious specificities, the relations between state and religion were codified step by step and this give rise to four main types of relations between state and religion: 1. National church or religion of state (England, Scotland, Greece, Scandinavian countries 75 ); 2. Privileges by means of cartels or arrangements given to one or several Christian streams whether it be major particular rights such as the right to institute a church tax, tax relief or the teaching of religion in public schools (Germany, Austria, Spain76 , Italy, Luxembourg) or minor particular rights (Canada77 ); 3.

Equality of cults (Netherlands, Belgium) ;

4. Lay system that excludes religious standards and legal pluralism (France) or on the contrary that includes the former and protects the latter (United-States); This variety of systems mustn’t let us forget basic differences in the relations between state and religion: religious freedom can be defined either as a negative right or as a positive right.

2. Religious freedom: negative right or positive right? Religious freedom as a negative right means that people are free to act without anybody having the right to interfere (Berlin Scandinavian countries were then the only countries not to recognise such supremacy 76 Islam is by 1992 act and the clauses of that act have not been impl emented. 77 Catholics in English-speaking provinces and Protestants in Quebec. 75

384

OSTRACISM, TOLERANCE OR RECOGNITION: MUSLIMS IN EUROPE

1959). Religious freedom has two individual prerogatives solely limited by the rights of the others, general interest or public order. The freedom of conscience allows people to demonstrate their faith and its precepts publicly and to spread them and to teach them without obstruction or damages. The freedom of cult implies that people are allowed to carry out the rites of their cult in public and private manner: gathering to officiate and having places to practice the cult. In this system, it is forbidden for people or for groups to intervene in the expression of a religious belief and it is forbidden for the state to do so except for security or public order reasons. Few lay Western States have adopted the negative conception of religious freedom: the United States, France and Mexico. Besides French secularity and American secularity are opposed to pluralistic standards. France has often been out of order with the lay principle in order to control the civil society more easily (state funded religious sector) or in order to cater for its international interests (respect of the personal code of the immigrants’ countries), whereas the American Supreme Court has so far always made sure that the State’s non-intervention in favour of religious streams has always been strictly respected. Both the French and the American states can not support or establish a religion. There is however a major difference: the United States must protect the autonomy of intermediary bodies, communities, associations, and churches that create their own standards and that thereby reduce the state’s cultural leadership. Subsequently it guarantees the right of any community of belief to exist and to multiply. This is why the Amish community has got particular rights such as a separate education system and no military obligation. Religious freedom has a positive right that doesn’t just mean that people are allowed to demonstrate and to practice their faith publicly and privately. It is also the right to act in all areas of life according to the values of the said faith and to demand a positive action from others or from the state in order to do so. It means that believers have the right to respect their values in social life. The state must, according to varying modalities, help maintain these institutions (place of cult, education network, charities, media, etc.). This standard status is supported by a social and by a political argument. In compliance with the social argument, belief and religious practice are community facts, not just individual facts and they form a socially useful and a legitimate system of thought and 385


way of life. The political and democratic argument was summarised by the Luxembourg minister for religions as follows: “There are States like ours that are neutral and welcoming towards religious communities because they believe that religions play a public opinion part and that they must express themselves and I think it is normal that religious communities should be allowed to play an opinion part just as anybody else (entrevue, 30 January 2003).” This diverging approach to religious freedom is significant for accepting and accommodating minority religions. Knowing how important distribution is for the survival of a cultural universe there always are diverging views among supporters of one or the other system: teaching religion at public schools and the status of the religious private education. Adopting the positive approach to religious freedom means accepting that each majority or minority religion has the right to have its doctrine taught at public school. This would be unacceptable in a lay system where only the history or the culture of religions is allowed to be taught. It always means that a religious minority can oppose itself to an unequal treatment of its cult and to social and cultural ostracism that it might be a victim of in the name of its faith and if need be it could launch a legal action for discrimination. If one has a lay negative vision of religious freedom and if one ignores cultural and legal pluralism, the above mentioned possibilities are out of reach and public debates around religion can easily become negatively influenced by political interests. As we shall see in this book, this is the case in France where funding for decent places for praying was put into question because of the Muslim community low budget and where this has led to a conflict situation regarding the secular basis of the Republic. The study has shown that a positive approach to religious freedom has led to a better insertion of Muslim minorities. In the 80’s and 90’s Belgian, Danish, Dutch and British Muslims were allowed to demonstrate publicly and to practice their religion more easily than in other countries because many places of cult were opened, sometimes with public funds or with the help of a national church (Netherlands) because the visits of Imams from foreign countries were facilitated, because Islamic schools were founded, and because Islam started to be taught in public schools.

386


3. From Eastern Islam to the Islam of Europe However, State versus religion relations are not the only cause to a possible symbolic and social rejection of a religion. In the case of today’s Islam, in the area of the Western world where Muslims constitute the largest immigrant population, that is to say Europe, several processes help understand why some streams in favour of the native populations started targeting immigrants and Muslims, in the 80’s in particular. In these processes, the image of Islam in the population at large changed. What used to be a colourful image of Eastern Islam and what used to be a complacent image of its followers as poor immigrants changed into the image of an archaic Muslim religion and culture that are glued in traditions from another era unable to conceive the person as an individual modernity and democracy. This political and moral stigmatization has become the background that explains and legitimates discrimination against Islam. It justifies and supports the reactionary theories. There are four main processes in this theory: changes in industry and in the work market as a consequence of stock exchange and trade globalisation, unemployment, and changes in the middle classes are all part of the rise of ethno-nationalist movements. The social classes that had been the backbone of welfare states in the aftermath of World War II have become symbolically, economically and politically fragile and destabilized. This took place precisely when new Muslim generations started appearing on the public arena. These were born and socialised on European soil : this macro-sociological weft is somehow linked to the rise in vulgar animosity against Islam in the past twenty years. This new visibility is not only due to there being more European Muslims; it is mostly due to their becoming present on the public arena. The sudden arrival of minorities in ideological worlds that had been defined by a national set, the legitimization of their requests, and their becoming new consumers and new objects of state intervention are political facts of the 1970-80’s in North America and in Great-Britain but they didn’t reach political circles and public opinions on the Continent until the 1980-90’s, which is when a population of immigrants’ children who were socialised in the west was able to use the precept of equality. Besides, this new development was taking place at a time when immigration was growing. This immigration was of humanitarian origin, it was illegal and/or uncontrollable. These three facts happening together at a time of economic reform has not made it easy 387


for public authorities to manage cultural pluralism, it hasn’t made it easy for the losing social classes to accept religious and cultural diversity. The failure of social and political democratisation in Muslim countries and the situation in Palestine have led in the 1970’s to an increased power of Islam in civil societies, to an increase in the number of Muslim streams in favour of political violence and state control, and to the brain drain of the most Westernized people towards North America and not towards Europe. In the name of the rule of competitiveness, of ethno-nationalism and notions of incompetence, mass media and other media largely contributed to public opinions’ animosity towards illegal immigrants, also called the minorities, the “Muslims” and to the confusion in understanding Muslim countries’ political drift. This counter-information contributed to Islam’s negative image. Finally, terrorist and Muslim terrorist attacks on American soil in 2001 finished off the image of Islam as the problem file in Europe and they made the image of Islam visible in North America and in Australia, where it is not very present. Islam has become “the” security and civilisation file in the West and it has an alive and popular image being the third one-god religion and of having three emblematic facets of incompatibility with modern times: confusion between political and religious powers, denial of individual rights and in particular women’s rights, and religious intolerance and violence. In the face of amalgamations, stereotypes, omissions, is it necessary to remind the reader of the forms and bases of any type of discrimination in order to define ways of fighting it? Is it necessary to remind the reader that, if religious tolerance is a Western secular value, recognising all residents as fully-fledged members of the society where they live is a superior value and that it is socially and politically more efficient? This is the case in Canada. Canada is by no means “the” Western model for immigrants’ insertion but since the aftermath of World War II, Canada has never experienced any violence related to immigration nor has it had any far right xenophobic movement that has been allowed to exist publicly even though this country is originally one of the most racist Western cultures- that of the British Empire - even though it receives large quotas of newcomers 78 every year among which Muslims for the

78

About 230,000 per year against a 30 million population.

388


past fifteen years, and even though it has a large immigrant population percentage (19% in 2001).

4.

Forms and sources of discrimination

Discrimination means making a distinction between people based on illegal criteria, whether intentionally or not. Today, there are several characteristics that constitute the personal traits of a person or a group of people phenotype, national or ethnic origin, religion, language, age, physical or mental handicap, and sexual orientation. Discrimination imposes upon a person or a group of people obligations and disadvantages that are not imposed on other people or that impeach or restrain their access to possibilities that it are advantages made available for other members of society. It is a denial of equality and it challenges the right to equality. Discrimination can take three forms: direct, indirect, or veiled. It can have two sources: a person or an institution, whether private, public or stately. These forms and sources can criss-cross but according to the basis and the stake of discrimination (employment, freedom of cult, symbolic acceptation, etc.), one or the other form and source are more intense. Discrimination is direct when one or more illegal criteria are explicitly evoked to deny a right or a freedom. This form is the easiest to identify and to sanction, and therefore it is the least spread except at times when animosity against cultural, religious or racialised groups rises. Employment denials, or physical assaults, or attacks on goods explicitly perpetrated in the name of an illegal criterion are examples of direct discrimination. Any type of direct discrimination, whatever its reason may be, should give rise to a legislation that forbids it and that sanctions it, to periodical and targeted information campaigns on every citizen’s rights in the face of various forms of ostracism, and to support by public authorities in favour of NGO’s that help victims. Discrimination is indirect when a measure has an unequal effect on a group of people that can be identified according an illegal criterion without the author of the measure having explicitly wanted that effect (Helly, 2004a). This is called discrimination by prejudicial effect. A good example for this is the request of a particular weight or size to get a job as a police officer or fireman: this prevents many immigrants from East Asia from getting that kind of jobs. 389


Finally, discrimination is veiled and free floating when frequent and recurrent practices in the civil society give an inferior status or a closed social space to groups of people, with for example, an over-representation in some areas in schools, associations, clubs and social networks (work, neighbourhood, friends, intermarriages). These practices are difficult to prove and to quantify and they have more to do with the right to choose one’s own way of life and one’s own social relations. One can also mention that type of discrimination according to its source whether it is a person, a group of people or an institution, a company, a public or state agency. Institutional discrimination is direct when laws, public measures, corporate, organisations regulations intentionnally exclude people from the enjoyment of a right that others have. This form of discrimination by a state might seem absent from democracies but is indeed present. Laws that were adopted in 2001 for reasons of public safety and the fight against terrorism often proved this and the high number of legal disputes on this issue in North America show that some groups are victims of aggressions in their fundamental freedoms. There are other forms of direct discrimination by the state such as restricted access to foreigners to some professions in France and in the field of religious discrimination. We shall see some examples of religious discrimination by European States below. Systemic discrimination is a particular example of discrimination. It in volves all forms and sources of possible discrimination and it refers to the sum of individual or collective acts of individual measures whether past or present which are together the only factors able to explain the inferior status given to some social categories with in the first place cultural minorities 79 .

Black and feminist movement in the 1950-1960 has showed how behaviours in the civil society such as racism and sexism were giving inferior statuses and unequal opportunities to black Americans and to women. They stated that racism or sexism didn’t originate in some isolated individuals but that it was a structural process that was part of the American society and that criminalizing them would not be enough to diminish and compensate equality deficits and marginalization among the black population. Today let us just think about the consequences for the ostracised groups of the middle classes choosing to live in the outskirts of cities in order to avoid the less advantaged neighbourhoods or to register their children in cultural homogenous private schools. In order to diminish the 79

390


Systemic discrimination has to do with controlling legal, social, and economic inequality factors, i.e. human capital: age, education, professional qualifications, work experience and knowledge of the official language or languages in the case of immigrants. When these traits of personal merit, considered as legitimate sources of inequality, do not explain the statistical distribution of social ranks, employment, business branches, places of industrial sectors, places of residence, school registration such as detained by categories of people spotted by illegal discrimination criteria (gender, religion, ethnical origin, phenotype, …), then this is a case of systemic discrimination. Women or people from immigrant minorities being underrepresented in some occupations compared to men or people from a majority group are a case of systemic discrimination when differences of merit between people do not cater for that particular distribution. Nepotism, inter-group avoidance, sexist, racist, xenophobic recruitment, evaluation, workforce and management practices, protectionist fellowship, etc. all seem to be the only possible causes for status differences. Surveys on systemic discrimination are totally unrelated to a simple statistical comparison of traits of populations from various religions or ethno cultural origins such as a residential concentration, a stronger represen tation at the bottom of the salary scale, a strong proportion of school dropouts and over presentation in unskilled employment, high unemployment or morbidity rates. This type of comparison doesn’t make it possible to conclude that the deficits experienced by some groups are due to discrimination. To assert this, the human capital factor would have to be checked first. In Canada, such research taking account the auto-identification of the registered population has shown that racialised minorities’ income is by 8 to 10% lower than it should be. This deficit is entirely due to discrimination (Pendakur, 2000). Inter-generational social mobility and residential segregation surveys could show the effects of a systemic discrimination based on religious differences. Legislations or state programs aim to reduce the impact of systemic discrimination. The most efficient and most well-known are political and social promotion historical deficit, black Americans have demanded that the state take measures (Myrdal, 1944; Pard. 1950; Moynihan, 1965; Parsons and Clark, 1965; etc.).

391


the Affirmative Action Programs that were adopted by the Lyndon Johnson administration in the 70’s in order to improve female presence and racialised minorities presence in colleges and universities in the federal public administration 80 .

5.

Discrimination against Muslims

Religious discrimination is a trespass to the liberty of conscience or to the liberty of cult. This trespass is most of the time not distinguishable; it can take three forms and it can originate in the two sources that were mentioned above. Direct religious discrimination against Muslims has two main forms that have also been experienced by other religious minorities in Western history particularly by Jews. These are hate crimes and denial of places of cult. In Europe there is in addition of this the absence of respect of governmental agreements or of laws concerning Islam. This shows that hostility against Islam converts is well present in the “highest” spheres of European societies. No one knows the real scope of job refusals, grade advancement, accommodation, administrative office services, refusals for reasons of religious belonging – that are direct trespass to the liberty of conscience in the case of any religious group and whatever the country. The only thing that is known is that it exists and this is attested by testimonies and some claims with tribunals. Surveys that show rejecting of Muslims are neither forms nor reliable indicators of direct discrimination. They deal with attitudes, they do not deal with behaviours, and the current impact on social desirability or respectability when people were asked to answer questions to do with racism, xenophobia or intolerance gives a distorted idea about the recorded answers. 5.1. Hate crimes Hate crimes based on the rejection of a religion are perpetrated by people. They trespass the liberty of conscience and the liberty of cult and in addition to this they trespass the rights to dignity, security, integrity, and quiet enjoyment of goods. When they are denounced, they are easy to sanction and they are indeed sanctioned 80

Some programs of historical preparation or positive discrimination have been adopted in Canada, in Great-Britain and in the Netherlands in order to increase egalitarian access of the members of racialised or linguistic minorities to education and to employment in public institutions.

392


in many Western countries. They consist in behaving in hostile manner towards a person or a group, in publicly abusing, in publicly inciting to hate, in physical assaults. All these are direct denials of the liberty of conscience. In addition, they are actions of vandalism against mosques and in this case they are to be considered as trespass of the liberty of cult. In the case of Muslims, hate crimes nowadays are mostly abusive language, attacks against people in the street and vandalism against mosques. However the United Nations’ special report (Diène, 2003, 2 and 4) on forms of hostility towards Arabic people and Muslim people in general after September 2001. noted recurrent facts in some countries : physical assaults in Great-Britain and Germany, and in particular against women wearing the hidjab; increased number of disputes on various issues between “Muslims” and the rest of the population in Denmark; attacks against places of cult in the Netherlands (90 from 11th of September to 2nd of October 2001, Association of Anti-discrimination Centres); bomb attacks against mosques in Australia, increased number of malice actions against people, tombs and buildings in France (169 were declared in 2002 with one third in the North of France and in Ilede-France, Zappi, 2003); defamatory harassment, attacks against people and hostile graffiti on the walls of mosques in the UnitedStates. In Canada (Helly, 2004a), hate crimes mostly consisted in verbal threats in the street and attacks against places of cult. In addition, since 2001, hate crimes in the shape of diatribe against Islam are no longer the prerogative of extreme right movements. Nowadays, intellectuals, journalists, men and women alike express their repulsion for Islam without inhibition (Geisser, 2003). In an interview in the magazine Lire in September 2001, the writer Michel Houellebecq said : “The most stupid religion after al,l is Islam”. A pamphlet by Oriana Fallaci entitled La Rage et l’orgueil, sold more than one million copy in Italy and in France. It is yet another compilation of insults against Islam and against Muslims. Its author was sued for racist abuse in October 2003. On the 24th of October of the same year the founder of the newspaper Le Point said that he was “islamophobic” and associated Islam with a “debility of various archaisms” (Cesari, 2004, 100-133). The amount of denounced hate crimes is a useful indicator of discrimination against a religious group but it is done at random. Hate crimes are only rarely reported by their victims and their witnesses do not report them 393


According to a recent survey on the subject carried out in 2002 in France, 48% of the French people who were surveyed said they were willing to report racist behaviour to the police 81 . In addition, compiling hate crimes is not obligatory in all countries and when it is, it is most commonly done according to different and inadequate procedures within the same country. Two conditions are necessary for the compilation of hate crimes to be reliable and to serve the qualitative indicator of a growing, stable, or regressive religious discrimination climate. One of the two conditions is obvious but is not admitted in some countries: the right for the police to identify victims according to their religion. The second condition is the imposition of similar claims recording procedures and standards every year in every city and possibly in every country in order to make reliable comparisons (mentioning the reason for discrimination, the type of aggression, etc.) In order to be meaningful the compilation of hate crimes requires yet another condition: that the members of the discriminated group trust the police. This implies regular relations between the police and the community sectors and the sanction of any bad treatment or ethno-religious discrimination by the police force. The example provided by the FBI in recording hate crimes against Muslims shows how important it is to set terms and conditions when reporting discrimination to official agencies. For a number or years Muslim organisations have urged Muslim victims of hate crimes to report these to the police or the community associations. This worked well after the September 2001 attacks: in 2001 the FBI reported for 481 crimes whereas the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR) reported 1,700 hate crimes from September 2001 to February 2002 (Abdelkarim, 2003). It can be deducted from these results that it is useful to grant public funding for the compilation of hate crimes by ethnic associations linked to a religious group and defending individual rights on the condition that these associations are also provided systematic standards for data collection. There being such standards mustn’t hide the fact that any increase or decrease in the number of registered claims for hate crimes can only be considered if other external factors are checked and measured such as an information

81

Zappi S., « 2002 : racism progresses, anti-Semitic acts are becoming more numerous », Le Monde, 29 March 2003.

394


campaign against discrimination by public agencies, a famous cause come to a happy end, an NGO campaign, etc. All States should have a legislation that defines hate crimes and that allows them to be combatted and to target the disclosure of racial and religious hate particularly on the World Wide Web. Hate crimes are one of the most traumatizing and violent forms of discrimination. In the absence of efficient legislative and administrative measures, the impunity of their perpetrators shows the indifference of a society and of its political agencies towards the victimisation of entire categories of the population, in this case Muslims and Jews, main victims of present day hate crimes. 5.2. Refusal of Mosques Refusing the funding of mosques or of their renovation, forbidding Muslim squares in cemeteries, denying licences for spaces for prayers on work and education places, in hospitals and in prisons for example, are all forms of direct trespass of the liberty of cult and they are often perpetrated by institutions. This book reports cases of more or less strong illegal resistance to the building of mosques or to their renovation in Cheratte in Belgium (A. Manço and collaborators), in Schaerbeek in Belgium (U. Manço) and in Roubaix in France (Marongiu), and to the licence to erect Muslim squares in Gent in Belgium (Zamni and Kanmaz) and in Granada in Spain (Raya Lozano). The presence of a mosque, unlike anonymous or invisible halls of prayers is an apparent sign of Islam community life in the urban landscape. The distinction between these two types of place of cult is not so much due to its size; rather it is linked to their visual impact. An open hall for prayer in back shops or in flats can be ignored by non-Muslim neighbours and by the authorities but mosques ostentatiously show religious belonging and they are the scene for cultural, social, educational and religious activities. They are also are the living proof of the presence of Islam in a neighbourhood or in a city. What used to be an invisible Islam has now often become an unwanted problem when applications for mosques are made. Any project to build a mosque implies negotiations with various categories of non-Muslim interlocutors and the islamisation of the urban landscape has often been confronted to resistance per se. Whatever the justification or ever the claim expressed by Muslims, the first step in a file for the building or for the furnishing of a 395


mosque has often been rejected by communal interlocutors or by neighbourhood associations. This resistance however, follows a cycle that is related to the degree of acceptation of Islam in a local and national context and this cycle depends on a number of factors that leave no space for generalization. For example, in countries where immigration started a long time ago such as in France, Great-Britain, Belgium and the Netherlands, resistance to mosques has faded since the 80’s. The situation seems stable in France and in Great-Britain but the recent rise in popular hostility against Muslims in Belgium and in the Netherlands heralds no similar development in those countries. In France mosques have been built (Lyon, Evry, Mantes-laJolie), others are being built and negotiations were engaged between the municipality and the associations’ delegates. The mosque projects in Marseille and Toulouse are examples that show that the resistance of the local authorities to the building of a mosque is no longer on the agenda; the current reasons for construction delays are a power struggle between Muslim associations. The struggle has been exacerbated by the French policy on Islam. In Great-Britain, in the case of Bradford, Sean McLoughlin (2005) highlights the absence of conflict in the building of mosques and the insertion of Islam in the urban space. He says that Muslim population concentrations in Bradford is one of the reasons however the non conflict aspect of a mosque project is always the result of communication between neighbours, public authorities, delegates and Muslim leaders. For that matter, a new generation of educated association leaders, particularly in France and Belgium, have improved their negotiation skills compared to those of the first immigrant generation. This explains why it has been possible to have mosques projects licenced. The social peace around the mosques that have been built also explains why more projects are now more accepted by neighbourhoods and by the authorities. Muslims inevitably use this argument in their talks with the political authorities. By contrast, in countries where Muslim immigration is a recent phenomenon such as Spain or Italy, resistance is still strong. For example, the mosque construction project in Lodi in 2001 gave rise to resistance from the local population and decision makers. This shows the overall attitude towards most mosque projects in Italy. In Spain there is a ten year deadline and the Spanish Andalusia 396


and Granada authorities have been hesitating and delaying on and on the Alhambra Muslim square project (Raya Lozano, in this book; Cesari, 2002, in the printing press). This indeed shows that the animosity against Muslims is still very alive in this country. Germany is a different story. Turkish immigrants have been in Germany for a long time but they have only been recognized as permanent residents for a short time. Mosque projects still face many obstacles. In 2001 the Municipality of Berlin did not allow the construction of the “Mevlana” mosque in the Kreutzberg part of the city. The refusal to let mosques built has rarely been expressed as such. However, the arguments put forward at local level to justify the refusal of the building of a mosque are everywhere the same : noise and traffic nuisance, incompatibility with existing urban planning projects, non-compliance with safety standards, etc. One fact is revealing on the content of the refusals. Beyond technical obstacles, refusals everywhere are linked to a generalized reasoning over Islam that tends to systematically associate Islam with threats to domestic order. In Europe, this reasoning is linked to Islam being considered as a religion and a civilisation that have direct impact on the negotiations between the authorities and the Muslim groups in the urban space and this attitude against Islam was strengthened after the September 11 2001 events. Islam as a national threat and as an international problem became an international threat. The municipality of Berlin refusing the building of the Mevlana mosque in 2001 shows that Islam is associated with national safety and international problems and that this justifies the resistance to the presence of Islam in the urban landscape. Resistance is always justified by the Muslims’ marginal social and economic condition which makes it more difficult for them to get funds in order to build mosques and which often prompts them into looking for funds abroad. This constraint is yet another cause for the refusal or mistrust on the part of the public authorities. The social and economical marginality of Muslims has yet another consequence: the building of mosques in the urban outskirts on less costly and less desired plots of land. This constraint is often considered by Muslims as yet another sign of their being considered as second class citizens. Finally, let’s note that the resistance to building mosques expressed whatever the nature of the project at stake. Four examples (in this book, among others) show that Muslims have been willing 397


to negotiate the architectural feature of mosques such as minaret or the modes of functioning (call for prayer). These examples also show that no ongoing project ignores the constraints tied to the immediate urban environment. But the islamisation of urban space is not limited to the simple technical questions. A recent trend that was identified in parts of Rome, Granada, Roubaix or Cheratte shows this. We are talking about a relatively new and often in comprehensible fact in secularized European social spaces; we are talking about the organisation of cultural and social activities proposed to all of the neighbourhood population that are often part of mosque association project currently under consideration (Cesari, 2005). In Berlin, for example, the organizers of the Mevlana mosque project have been trying to get state funds to set up social services and education services for all residents in the neighbourhood. 5.3. Violation by the state of agreements and acts on the status of Islam Direct institutional discrimination against Islam by governmental agencies is even more serious and incoherent when legal acts that were adopted or signed by the state are not implemented. This is often the case in Europe. When such an event occurs, it should be followed by a claim to legal agencies because in a democracy rights of minorities are not electoral gadgets but unavoidable and granted rights. It is inconceivable that minority groups should spend energy and human and financial resources to make their constitutional right to equality of treatment respected by the state. However, in Europe, the conflicting relations between cultural minorities and majorities is so much in favour of the latter and the spirit of defence of fundamental freedoms is still so much in its infancy that these denials of rights are frequent and often marred by politics. In countries where religious freedom is indeed considered as a positive right or where the equality of cults is deeply settled, the denial of equality of Islam with majority cults is frequent. Here are two present day examples of this: in Belgium, the freezing of financial funding for Islam since 1974 is a serious trespass of the equality of cults. The same goes for the violation, in no way justified by obvious security reasons, of the 1998 agreements establishing the rules for setting up the national body that represents Belgian Muslims and for the interference since May 2004 of the central govern ment in the election of that body. Both trespass the principle of the liberty of cult and put Islam in a situation of inequality in relation to other organized religions. This type of 398


interference in the management of other recognized cults in Belgium would be unthinkable. The start to the year 2005 leaves hope for changes albeit slow and partial, but positive in the first reported file. The violation of the 1992 governmental agreements clauses that recognise Islam in Spain is yet another example of direct denial of rights by a state. The January 26, 1992 Spanish law has recognised the Muslim cult through the Islamic Commission of Spain (CIE) which consists of the Spanish Federation of the Islamic Organisations (FEERI) set up in 1989 and the Spanish Islamic Community Union (UCIE) set up in 1990. These federations were made up of the first associations of converts from Ceuta and Melilla and people from the Middle-East, all members of liberal professions or diplomatic staff. The 1992 act grants tax relief and legal advantages to Muslim places of cult and it recognises that they are assured and certain. However it fails to be respected by the Spanish state or by municipal and regional administrations. Having said this, the exacerbated divisions between converts and Muslim immigrants do not favour its enforcement (Cesari, 2004; Helly, in printing). 5.4. Indirect discrimination, conflicts of standards and obligation to make reasonable adjustments In terms of systemic discrimination as a reliable indicator of the status granted to a particular social category, nothing can be asserted as for Muslims or as for any other religious groups. There are no statistical surveys about the social, occupational or residential status according to the human capital of people and their religious orientation. By contrast, a form of indirect discrimination that is little recognised by law and yet very active in the case of religious minorities is visible and that is the strength of cultural majorities. When interacting socially, people continually implement cultural, moral, religious standards and on the basis of these they create distinctions between people and groups and they create skewness and hierarchies between people that generate inequalities. The expression of a minority cultural choice is therefore constrained by the choices that are shared by the majority of a popula-

399


tion, a group or an institution. The terms cultural 82 majority, charter groups, dominant culture are used to describe these interpretations as a whole that are rarely explicit, that are taken for granted and that determine daily relations among people in the main aspects of their social lives. This explains why employed people from a religious minority are ignorant in this matter in most companies. The managers of these companies belong to a majority culture. Another example illustrates the situations created by this “cultural blindness”: it has to do with the various possible interpretations of this principle of separation between the state and the Church by the American Supreme Court. This separation may simply mean the fact that it is forbidden for the state to allocate funds to religious institutions or it can also mean that it is forbidden to fund religious institutions and that it is forbidden for any public building to have symbols or to have practices that refer to a majority and historical religion (cross, crib, bible, etc.). In the first case an abstract non historical general rule defines the scope of the law; in the second case, the interpretation takes account of a sociological reality and the pregnance of Christian traditions and considers religious minorities and majorities equally. Today the issue is no longer just to tolerate and to protect the expression of a religious belief and of a cult but to allow without prejudice the expression of minority beliefs, to erase the stigma around them, and to correct any indirect discrimination created by a majority Christian standard. Recognizing that minority religious groups are an integral part of society and admitting that they have the right to be visible on the public arena is the issue today. In the case of Muslim followers, the different standards that cause a discrimination are related to practices that are easily managed by adopting adjustment measures : diet for hospitalised patients, for children at school, for prisoners or for fostered children, creation of a hall for prayers on the workplace and in education institutes, children punishment methods that include youth protection laws and parental authority protection laws, different outfits for girls, particularly during physical education classes, the respect

82

Constructed on the basis of various concepts (culture, language, religion, sexual orientation, agenda, national origin and therefore they are numerous and changing inside the society.

400


of religious festivals by students 83 or the respect of burial practices. These particular standards do give rise to conflicts because accepting them means recognising religious plurality in a society and then to a leadership of a particular religion and a particular culture said and believed to be unique and national. The precept of equality is central and the new religious minorities originated in the immigrant population are large. Therefore, legislation in all countries should force people to adopt adjustments that would allow minority religious and cultural standards to be respected as long as, obviously, these have no negative impact on the rights and liberties, or security or public order. Cultural adjustment should not be a compromise or a type of tolerance. It should be a legal obligation in line with the democratic principle stating that no cultural standard other than those of the respect of liberties and human rights and democracy should prevail (Helly, 2000a). The obligation of adjustment should go along with buoys that take account of the constraints of people, companies, institutions that have to follow them. For example, the Canadian Supreme Court stated that when adopting an adjustment aimed at reducing indirect culturally motivated discrimination actions, no excessive constraints should be imposed on the person on or the incriminated institution, such as too high costs or substantial disadvantages (safety standards) or a trespass on rights of other people or of collective bargaining84 . Hence, the Court judges invented the notion of reasonable adjustment stating that such adjustment was a “minimal disadvantage and that it was the price to pay for the liberty of religion in a multicultural society”. 5.5. Indirect discrimination and the fight against terrorism In all Western countries, the fight against terrorism has given rise to measures that have shown to be trespasses to the liberty of conscience of Muslims. All antiterrorist laws or measures that have this objective and that were adopted before or after 2001 trespass the fundamental freedoms of all, given that police and counterintelligence agencies now have increased powers when searching for By setting up, for example, mobile learning days, which would allow children of the orthodox, copt, muslim, christian and other faiths to celebrate their main festivals on their respective dates. 84 Ontario Commission for the Rights of the Individual c. Simpson Sears Ltd, (1958)2, R.C.S., 536. 83

401


information and when controlling citizens. However, they are mostly targeted at Islam followers and at those that are mistakenly assimilated to Islam followers such as Copts, Maronites and Melkites and they caused strange confusions85 . This shows in the French law on “daily safety” that was adopted on November 15, 2001. It was adopted at the National Assembly debates. It includes a list of points on the fight against terrorism that amalgamates inland safety delinquency and terrorism and that intensifies ostracism against young people in the outskirts, young people often being of Muslim culture. Two measures of this law in particular bear no relation with terrorism and major delinquency and will have no impact (Cesari, 2004, 59-60) in the matter. These are the measures to do with quietness in collective building staircases and those to do with a maximum six-month imprisonment sentence for the people who compulsively fail to pay public transports.

6.

Symbolic recognition and cultural change

The forms of discrimination described above are caused by the negative perception of Islam by a significant portion of Western populations. It is the result of an accumulation of stigma connected with this religion particularly in Europe where this minority has historically been part of the lower classes and where it is prejudiced by its class, unlike Muslims who settled in North America. These stigma come from a less privileged immigration past, where people used to be poorly educated and live on low incomes, used to have a religious difference negatively perceived over the past century, a colonial history in many countries, a little-educated religious staff, where they were marked by the impact of the conflict in the Middle-East, and by Islamic fundamentalism. Besides, in Western Europe, the socialization of populations by schools, public institutions, the mass media and the political elites to a national specificity of the history of their country and of the vocation of their state has given the tone over the past twenty years but it has left traces behind. The most virulent of these traces is the xenophobia against classes that are stepping down the social scale. This xenophobia is exacerbated by far right parties in GerIf in North America the situation is similar, critics and militants in organisations for the defence of freedoms and Muslim organisations are explicitly and actively against local police and border officials paying particular attention to “Arab” and “Muslim” types. 85

402


many, Austria, France, Flanders, and in the Netherlands. The European enlargement to countries with a strong national tradition and religion (Poland) and where anti-semitism is still part of the political arena (Hungary) is yet another side of the difficult recognition of the Muslim difference as a component of European societies. The recognition of Islam followers as full members of the society where they live means that the public authorities have to interfere with a view to transforming, on the one hand, the definition of social belonging and, on the other hand, the public institutions’ culture. These interventions can be classified as follows: Stating clearly and explicitly in public speeches that the Muslim population has a legitimate place in society ; Training public services staff to accept religious plurality and professional sanction of any discrimination behaviour; Training teachers and adding education to religious plurality to the curriculum; Training staff in social control bodies such as the police and tribunals to implement discrimination laws or measures; In schoolbooks, systematically eliminate stereotypes regarding Islam, revising colonial history regarding Muslim and other countries, including a description of current international relations and of the most widespread religions; Recruiting by the state of immigrants and of their children in the form of a positive action program or special programs in order to enlarge the means of social mobility for the new generations of Muslims and in order to break their real or perceived imprisonment in some industries and in order to diminish their complaints on this issue; Negotiating with the media and with large organizers of campaigns of fight against discrimination and of recruitment measures of people from Muslim origin; Defining standards in order to facilitate the opening and the enlargement of prayer halls and the size increase of existing places of cult, the building of burial sites, and contributing to a just funding of minority cults where legally allowed; Enabling minorities to defend their rights by giving public support to their community. It is not necessarily about funding 403


religious organisations. It is possible to subsidise non-religious associations that operate various social educational cultural activities held in Mosques. These interventions in favour of the ethnic community were adopted by Canada in the 80’s. They have so far been successful. They were implemented by federal programs such as “Multiculturalism” by means of provincial and municipality programs. They helped reduce racism and xenophobia in one of the societies that is most marked by the “white civilization” superiority and they helped change it into a society that accepts cultural plurality (Helly, 2004b). Given the psychological background behind any intolerant attitude 86 and the pregnance of socialization over nationalism, it wouldn’t be possible to try and eliminate cultural discrimination and in particular religious discrimination. However, one can try to control it by criminalizing it and by making it socially wrongful. This is why the role played by the State in its symbolic values and in its actions is central. In a democratic society, it is up to the citizens’ initiative and responsibility to defend their rights. Discrimination becomes an allpowerful handicap when people of groups that are its victims do not have the means to respond to it. Therefore, it is a central democratic measure to enable cultural and/or religious minorities to have their rights respected. State funding to ethnic and non-ethnic associations that train their members to defend their rights has been one of the important chapters of the Canadian Multiculturalism Program. One should be wary of any argumentation against this particular forms of support in the fight against violation of democratic regulations or of human rights by ethnic organisations. Any public funding can and must follow ethical and accountancy regulations and it is easy to allot human resources to the monitoring of the implementation of charters, of yearly or biannual elections, and of the control of their activities. Once again, Canada is a good example of this as 10% of the immigrant population are members of one or the other association. In particular, identity security due to the loss of collective sets of references, with, among others, the weakening of social protection in the nineties, cheaper immigrant labour, the non-equivalence of citizenship and civil and social rights, since immigrants have been granted these rights, the new rights of social classes that question secular hierarchies (women, homosexuals, etc.). 86

404


7.

Reducing social and economic inequalities

One shouldn’t talk of religious discrimination as racism or xenophobia without looking at all the immigrants’ social conditions and those of their children. Comparing the conditions of integration of immigrants and their children in Europe and in North America brings to light some basic processes, whether these conditions are social, economical, symbolical or institutional. The keys for immigrant integration are their insertion on the workplace in conditions of equality and the social mobility of their children at the same level as that of the other members of the society. Both conditions go hand in hand and the State and political reasoning on the social equality is inefficient if it is not possible to install an equal insertion capacity on the work market and at school. Besides anti discrimination measures, positive action programs or programs that target immigrants and their children, useful measures are well known: they are part of the common law social policies aimed at improving the fate of any underprivileged social category: - School support for children with learning difficulties; teaching of the mother tongue of the immigrants with the view to its impact on subsequent learning processes; study grants for children from low income families; etc; - Mixed social accommodation programs in order to avoid the formation of poor ethnic neighbourhoods; -

Vocational training and adult education programs.

8. Conclusion In the case of present day Muslims, one can note that discrimination is both direct and indirect and that it often comes from public institutions. This is the sign of a very tense general climate and of an inability or a refusal on the part of the political bodies to cancel these tensions. The legislations that forbid discrimination and that criminalize it are not enough to control the impact of this climate because they belong to a formal conception of rights. They are based on the idea that religious affiliation is a free personal choice because the law protects it. Typically they seem to ignore the abstract universalism 405


of rights, they seem to ignore prevalent processes in any given society, such as that of the predominance of cultural majorities that are responsible for many veiled denials of rights and for systemic discrimination. Equality of rights has four forms: equality before the law, equality when the law is implemented, equality of protection by the law, but also equal enjoyment of the law. The notion of equal enjoyment of the law is central when inserting Muslim minorities and any group in a social, political, and cultural position of inferiority. It makes it possible to counteract inequality impacts of the formalist and abstract conception of the universalism of rights and equality. This identical treatment for all by the law can cause inequalities and respecting true equality often requires that distinctions be made between people. After twenty years of university and legal arguments trigged by the book by J. Rawls (Theory of Justice, 1971) and the reply by M. Sandel (Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 1982), one can only admit that this is the case (Helly, 2000b, 2002). The conclusion is that any public policy aimed at really integrated Muslim populations along with other populations that do not belong to the European cosmogony has to follow two paths. It must introduce or strengthen measures and laws that protect these populations as residents in a country; it has to adopt programs aimed at reducing their stigmatization and educating the population at large so that a new social conformism that values social cultural plurality comes about. Invoking the abstract universalism of rights in order to reduce deficits in the insertion of socially and economically underprivileged and victimised categories is not very useful. Given that the number of unskilled or little-skilled jobs has steadily decreased since the 80’s as a result of globalization and given the increased competition among qualified workers, refusing programs that target the new Muslim generation in order to widen their possibilities to move up the social ladder and not responding to their legitimate request to have their beliefs and their cult respected, can only increase their economic marginalisation and their political and cultural alienation. In some countries, the religious criteria is an illegitimate criterion of public intervention but the criterion of the country of origin, or the cultural reference, or the crisscrossing of criteria (social and economical status, mother tongue, place of residence, …) can be useful.

406


References Abdelkarim Riad Z. (2003), « Surge in Hate crimes Followed by Official U.S. Targeting of Muslim, Arab Men », Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, Avril, 51. Berlin I. (1959), The Crooked Timber of Humanity, french version (1992), Le Bois tordu de l’humanité, Paris : Albin Michel. Cesari J. (2004), L’Islam à l’épreuve de l’Occident, Paris : La Découverte. Cesari J. (2005 sous presse) (ed), « Mosques Conflicts in Europe », Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, numéro spécial. Diène D. (2003), Special Report. Situation of Muslim and Arabs peoples in various parts of the world in the aftermath of the events of 11 September 2001 (ECN4/2003/23), New York : Nations Unies. Fallaci O. (2002), La Rage et l’orgueil, Paris : Plon. Geisser, Vincent (2003). La nouvelle islamophobie, Paris : La Découverte. Helly D. (2004a), « Are the Muslims discriminated against in Canada ? », Journal of Canadian Ethnic Studies v. XXXVI (1), 24-47. Helly D. (2004b), « Canadian multiculturalism : Lessons for the management of cultural diversity ? » Thèmes Canadiens - Canadian issues, Summer/été, 4-9. Helly D. (2002),: « Cultural Pluralism : An Overview of the debate since the 60’s », The Global Review of Ethnopolitics, v. II (1), 74-95. Helly D. (2000a), « Les limites du multiculturalisme canadien », Wieviorka M. & Ohana J. (ed.), La différence culturelle. Une reformulation des débats. Colloque de Cerisy. Paris : Balland, 414-427. Helly D. (2000b), « Pourquoi lier mondialisation, citoyenneté et multiculturalisme? » Elbaz M. & Helly D. (ed.), Mondialisation, citoyenneté et multiculturalisme, Sainte-Foy & Paris : Les Presses de l’Université Laval/L’Harmattan, 223-256. McLoughlin S. (2005 sous presse), « Mosques and the Public Space : Conflict and Cooperation in Bradford » Cesari J. (ed.). « Mosques Conflicts in Europe », Journal of Ethnic Migration Studies, numéro spécial. Raya Lozano E. & Pasadas del Amo M. (2004), « L’islam au 21e siècle : le retour d’un refoulé national », Manço U. (ed.), Reconnaissance et discrimination : présence de l’islam en Europe occidentale et en Amérique du Nord, Paris : L’Harmattan, 191-222.

407


Conclusions “Faiths and Social cohesion”: political recommendations and “good practices” Altay Manço, Spyros Amoranitis, Dina Sensi, Ural Manço and Guillaume Logez 87 Abstract The “Faiths and Social cohesion” network research has made it possible to question both the idea of “social cohesion” and that of “good practices” that, together, are supposed to produce this harmonious communal life - with reference here to philosophical and religious diversities observed on the local and municipal field. Keywords: Social cohesion, good practices, Muslim faith, European Union, political actions. The title of this initiative establishes a link between cults – singularly the Muslim cult – and Western societies’ social cohesion. This implies that recognizing these cults gives them value, sets them in their right place in the jigsaw of the institutions that form a Community – and singularly the European Union, melting pot of migrant populations – and helps social cohesion for the integration of that very Union. By contrast, the title also refers to the idea that exclusion or discrimination based on cultural and therefore religious criteria against parts of a population harms “harmonious

Altay Manco is scientific director of IRFAM. Email:[email protected]. Spyros Amoranitis is managing director of the Institute of Research, Training and Action about Migrations (IRFAM). Email: [email protected]. Dina Sensi is currently heads research and training at IRFAM. Email: [email protected]. Ural Manço is a lecturer at Sociological Studies Centre of Saint-Louis University in Brussels. Email: [email protected]. Guillaume Logez, post-graduate student in urban sociology and director of the “D’un Monde a l’Autre” resources centre. Email: [email protected]. Migration Letters, Volume: 2, No: 3, pp. 408 – 420. December 2005 (ISSN: print: 1741-8984 & online: 1741-8992) 87

POLITICAL RECOM-MENDATIONS AND “GOOD PRACTICES”

communal life” because of institutional violence and of the frustrations that it creates. The “Faiths and Social cohesion” network research has made it possible to question both the idea of « social cohesion » and that of « good practices » that, together, are supposed to produce this harmonious communal life – with reference here to philosophical and religious diversities observed on the local and municipal field. The interest for a reflection in terms of social cohesion coincides with the assertion of social and cultural diversity in Western societies in favour of sociological and geopolitical facts that have mostly to do with industrialisation followed by cultural and economic globalization such as the volume of migration during the 20th Century. This interest shows that the members of a society need to integrate around common values: it is important to maintain evolutionary and fragile balances between the rights and the duties of everyone, between justice and social peace etc. These social relations develop through negotiation and through confrontation between a dominant culture that either integrates or doesn’t integrate the set of other cultural frameworks and backgrounds on the basis of its own criteria. When thinking about the place of the Muslim difference in European municipalities, one has to explicitly take into account both these perceptions which are opposed and yet complementary of life in society. If managing religious diversities is an issue that needs to be addressed particularly in today’s society, it also shows the development of the situations of populations that have come from immigrants between integration and discrimination. One cannot tackle the issue of ethno-religious discrimination without raising the idea of “harmonious communal life”. This idea leads to the idea of social relations based on dominance and hierarchy as the basic analysis grid. The analyses that were made by the « Faiths and Social cohesion » network have led us to draw conclusions presented in this book. They have also led us to make political and practical recommendations and we are going to state these in the conclusions of our work.

409

A. MANÇO, S. AMORANITIS, D. SENSI, U. MANÇO & G. LOGEZ

2.

“Social cohesion” and “ good practices”

On the whole, the project has made it possible to reconstruct the notion of social cohesion as a framework of social participation that best guarantees the disappearance or the limitation of discrimination and exclusion suffered by the minority groups using cooperation and expression of solidarity between various social and cultural categories and layers. Let’s note that this definition categorically and systematically refuses the easy and regrettably too common trend that consists in constructing social cohesion of some people at the detriment of others. « Good practices » are initiatives of a certain scope and that have a certain length of time. They are validated by the assessment methods and by inter-sites comparison processes. In our case, these practises are deemed “good” because they help elaborate social participation democratic contexts and correction in discrimination in favour of religious minorities. They can be transferred to other places in return for adaptations. Good practices must always include significant social changes based on the principle of treatment equality and of acquired advantages. The experiences that were made during the “Cult and social cohesion” action have shown that practices and results are strictly tied to circumstances: success depends on its evolution conditions, including the characteristics of its social and geographical situation and the characteristics of its main participants whether they are people or institutions who are their trustees or their partners, that is to say the stakes which mobilize these participants, the skills that they use, the structures that support them, etc. Hence, the transferability of observed good practises in a particular place to other places is a difficult question: transfer never happens by itself. By contrast, « pilot projects » and « new practices » experiments, along with initiatives taken by individual participants or by groups of social participants in touch with observed or experienced troubles, productive dialogues that consolidate democracy, etc. are all things that make actions more conscious and more awareness rising, with a real hope to change mentalities. However, the sustainable aspect of these emergent initiatives depends only on their being taken over by the legislations and structural frameworks that alone can validate them. A good practice of change in terms of a positive action and responsabilisation of cultural diversities must come from an institutional and structural strategy and 410


must come from a change in conceptual backgrounds and attitudes in people.

3.

Political and practical recommendations

Political orientations and ideas of concrete actions derived from the « Cult and Social Cohesion » action are still to be further studied in future actions, yet they make it possible to address the decision makers in distinctive ways whether they be local, regional, federal or European and to address other social participants among whom Muslim religious leaders. If decision makers or people with responsibility in administrations of all kinds play a major part in constructing social participation beyond differences in particular religious differences, the recommendations also concern Muslim associations themselves. Muslim community associations and religious leaders in Europe are the basis of a historical evolution that the “Muslim culture” is now becoming more stable, more assured, more pacific, and more truly mixed to the links in chains of western society. Recommendations are also addressed to researchers and professional participants on the field, cultural and social participants, and education participants who try to get positive effects by means of intercommunity contacts established on the field. Recommendations for the media are still in the pipeline. 3.1. Muslim citizens and participants All the observers that were made in the past few years on the “Faiths and Social cohesion” project sites say that it is advisable for Muslim citizens of Europe to form federations beyond their internal differences around platforms. The idea is also to open mentalities and to seize all opportunities of social participation that exist at local level in the European society: neighbourhood associations, housing associations. Muslim citizens should make themselves known and mark their presence with a seal of lawfulness, of their difference and of their ability to live together with their non-Muslim neighbours. Inter-religious and inter-community convergences are very useful and must integrate local delegates of the Muslim cults but most often they should be preceded by inter-knowledge and dialog initiatives (social link) about what is shared concretely and daily by various populations in their common areas. 411


The idea is for Muslims to be present at all levels of political life in order to find collective and pragmatic responses to the problems that are often important to Muslim citizens and that are most often shared by other populations: followers of other minority discriminated cults, people socially excluded in under-privileged neighbourhoods, etc. On e can learn from the experiences that were carried out among others in Belgium and in France during the “Faiths and Social cohesion” project that the exercise of political citizenship and the quality of the voters are major tools in recognizing Islam both at local and supra-local levels. The cooperation of Muslim associations or of associations created by Muslims with political and administrative decision makers in their area of residence is a sine qua non condition to the recognition and to the public expression of Islam as a normal thing in areas such as youth leadership, social aid, etc. If a political indifference harms the will of Muslim populations to play a part in these areas, If political indifference hinders the willingness of the Muslims to play a role in these areas along with other churches and religious groups one should also regret the difficulty experienced by opinion leaders of various Muslim groups in Europe to envisage a pragmatic form of cooperation with administrations and other institutions that depend on political administrations. 3.2. The local participants and decision makers In addition, the search and the actions that we have been carrying out for the past three years in seven European cities and a similar observation process that is carried out in Montreal, Quebec, have shown that places of dialogue dedicated to local management of religious and philosophical diversity are often strikingly absent. Therefore, we think that it is urgent for municipalities to set up permanent institutions to allow the people in their constituencies with different beliefs and different philosophies to “rub against one another” and to allow the development of new cohesions. These flexible structures can take the form of municipal councils, gathering all cults and philosophies; they can also be basis for popular actions and for festivals, and for events that aim at valuing and enhancing everybody at increasing everyone’s trust beyond differences. These are groups with projects or places where political proposals can be made and where politicians, decision makers, leaders and participants can meet and produce a common reflection: the fi ght against discrimination can then begin.

412


3.3. Professional social workers Some recommendations are addressed to social workers on the field and have to do with social, educational and cultural actions and with the fight against discrimination. It is interesting that in this group there are teachers whose role is particularly important as far as they are in touch with tomorrow’s adults and beyond today’s parents. This has been shown by the experiences of the project around Liège and in Rome. The idea of these teachers is to train, inform and accompany families, Muslim communities associations, and municipality decision makers because it is not easy for any of these participants to understand and to interact with people’s difference especially in political contexts where the interests can be totally divergent. The idea is therefore to develop 88 a project of mediation or of triangulation. Here, from now on, it will be necessary to request more precision in the action and more precision in the objectives of change in order to better balance and better target initiatives and expectations and in order to better assess: According to whether one wishes to develop one or several strategies proposed in the integrated fight model against all forms of discrimination; According to the various dimensions identifying discrimination (individual and /or institutional); According to the various levels of aggression (people organisations, public institutions) and to the expected changes for each of these levels; According to the targeted audiences: associations’ leaders or mosques’ leaders, political and administrative decision makers, relay participants, etc. Each strategy should, moreover, be more proactive, better planned, in order to avoid too much « improvisation » in reaction to events. It is difficult to plan crisis resolution in detail but it is advised to better structure all coaching and training abilities. Within the framework of the “Faiths and Social cohesion” project the progress of the files and the improvement of the crisis situations have shown the good practices below: Social workers and teachers have, in turn, the right to benefit from coaching and training in order to fulfil their tasks as mediators and facilitators. 88

413


Time needs to be spent to identify participants and to improve their feeling of trust. The expertise of researchers and participants, of their institutions, their direct implication on the field and finally the European dimension of the project have been of the utmost importance to strengthen their trust. A good knowledge of anti-discrimination legislation, of the cult management related legislation, and of the intercultural negotiation and mediation skills is necessary to foster the progress of files. The organisation of visible public events speeds up crisis management. The relation to the media however must be looked at cautiously: the press must also be accompanied in their approach of the religious discrimination question. Of course, the method of this psychosocial accompaniment and of this social and cultural mediation remains to be determined in its details and this should be done in the framework of another project. However, a number of examples of possible initiatives can be presented usefully. Writing brief technical documents to be read by local decision makers or by the press in dealing with positive management of various aspects of the Muslim diversity or more generally the religious diversity in secularized European municipalities is an initiative that meets the defined expectations and recommendations. Similarly, we recommend setting up a “summer university” with the aim to teach local decision makers the know-how that has been produced by experiences of fight against religious discrimination and the fundamental rights and the public responsibilities in the legal field in relation to the liberty of cult. This pragmatic information method can also be accompanied by a system of study trips in “pilot” sites in the field of positive management of religious diversity for “pairs” of local decision makers/local religious leaders. This would allow them to see by themselves what progress has been made in the field of recognition and citizen participation of (immigrant) Muslims and it would enable them to develop team building skills. 3.4. Researchers in social sciences Practice has shown that the religious discrimination question has been very little studied. Therefore, it is still necessary to launch 414


surveys, conferences and publications on a wide scale. The idea of religious discrimination is till faced with a lot of resistance. The fight against this phenomenon is recent and it is often involved in the whirl of the geopolitical current affairs; this is quite remote from the history of the establishment of immigrant Muslim communities in European areas. Sometimes it is necessary to accept that processes are slow and to let time do its work but it will also be necessary to better understand the settling and evolution processes of these communities as well as the functioning of municipalities towards them in order to identify blockings and everybody’s claims in order to identify good practices for living together and public management methods that take account of cultural diversity. It would seem useful to extend the observations that are laid out in this project to other religions and spiritualities and to the general situation of cultural associations set up by migrants in the European countries because it would help this type of study projects to become more widespread. As a complement to this extention it would also be useful to study specifically the situation across all the European countries of one single ethno-national and religious community because it would be possible to compare local contexts. This would be an alternative method that would enlighten our understanding of the phenomenon that we are studying. In this case populations coming from Turkey, for example, seem rather relevant as Turkey is currently trying to become a member of the European Union. Turkey is secular but Muslim. In the same vein, there is another field that has not yet been sufficiently investigated and that is for example that of sub-Saharan African populations: the links between immigrants and religious beliefs and practices and the social and economical integration in the host country and their contribution to the development of their area of origin. With time, this study could lead to the development of completely new social and educational techniques that would consist in giving more value to “the civil and intercultural skills” of the inserted immigrants who have managed to be somehow recognised beyond their differences in European countries. These skills are the defence of the fundamental rights for everyone, political pluralism, inter-culturalily, inter- religiousness, etc. They are integral parts of democracy and their transfer into most of the migrant countries of origin is a major stake for democracy. By contrast, one of the scientific and social stakes that remains to be developed is without doubt to approach the notion of Islam pho415


bia in its links with other ostracisms and particularly the other phenomena of cultural, religious and ethnic stigmatization. The determinism of history in European societies in their relations to cultural differences needs to be measured in order to move away from the complacent aspect of those historical reflexes. So far, our work has shown effectively how complex the discrimination situations are as they mix individual community and institutional situations. It would seem legitimate for us to speak of systematic discrimination and of alliance quite often with the economic exclusion of the mostly immigrant working class population, at least originally. It is time to disentangle the knots and to make room for a two-sided approach89 : focussing on the cultural aspects while having a general action on the equality of rights taking account of diversities. (Equality of rights is overall mainstream). 3.5. European Union authorities Systemic discrimination: aren’t we talking here of a European competence since the Union has equipped itself with a legal arsenal to help develop fundamental rights? Allowing the international development of the research projects and interventions surely is the job of the European Union in partnership with the member States and the regions of Europe. These projects have a necessary comparative and international dimension. They are also necessary in order to define a common legal and pragmatic base in the fight against religious discrimination. The European level, the political lever farthest from local interests, might be the best placed to mobilize our intelligence This dual approach has proved to be most efficient in the fight against gender discrimination. The “Faiths and Social cohesion” project also seems to be an example of this efficiency in the fight against releigious discrimination: in Cheratte or inRome, for example, the research action focused on the mainstreaming aspects of equality; religious discrimination was not treated as the openly declared main theme and no tangible change could be identified in this field during the project. Moreover, one could fear that, faced with many types of relectance, the religious dimension could be smothered in the ùmass of other problem areas. Conversely, when cultural aspects were treated directly (Ghent and Roubaix and Granada) equality mainstreaming was, of course, the necessary background, but the results linked to the practice of a cult are easier to identify and make more tangible. Hence, the need to be more audacious in expressing the objective of the fight, as it could be better accepted if translated in terms of ‘management of religious diversity’ rather than ‘fight against a particular type of discrimination’. 89

416


when it comes to grasp the positions towards difference serenely and dispassionately, beyond old-fashioned imperialist mentalities quite often inherited from the past. In this complex background, it is necessary to have an excellent knowledge and wide range spreading of anti-discrimination legislation and of cult management legislation. However, there being a legislation in the matter is far from sufficient in combating inequalities. According to Habermas, it is not anti-discrimination laws that need to be considered but their value when they are used and in particular their intensity of implementation and their concrete ability to be implemented. The transfer to our learned practical skills sector in the fight against other forms of exclusion such as gender-related exclusion can be useful. Similarly, the transfer of learned knowledge in the fight against other forms of religious discrimination such as the fight against anti-Semitism can bring an interesting insight in the understanding of what needs to be done in the fight against Islam phobia and in particular : all in all, the idea is to start thinking of Islam as an intrinsic European fact. It could be said that « Islam enters Europe » but it would be just as appropriate to say that “Islam is becoming more European”. This can be observed in the fact that some minorities within the Muslim minority start to express themselves. There are now feminine associations or homosexual Muslim associations. This can also be observed in the developing and in the cooperation between majority Muslim communities (Sunnite Turks associations) with minority Muslim communities (Alevia Turkish community). European Islam expresses itself in a wide range of diversities and internal dissension. Now, in addition, it also expresses itself in European languages in the mouth of young European believers originating in the immigration population or in that of native Europeans converted to Islam. Finally, in the first stage, this local expression is increasingly structuring itself into federations and confederations of Muslims of Europe; it becomes more professional and more systematic in the various social categories. This can be seen in Muslim engineers’ associations, Muslim investors’ associations, Muslim students’ associations, etc. Muslim identity, in the European space, creates associations more easily than in its spaces of origin. These associations are made with other parts of secular identities and the challenge is for it to accept to look at its internal diversities in a democratic way and to look at the spatial, temporal and cultural relativity of the 417


beliefs and of the religious practices. Paradoxically, Europe allows Islam to quietly unfold the infinite richness of its internal diversity and Europe is thereby forced into (re)considering the place that it in turn makes for Muslim diversity and, beyond this, for the public statement of a religious belief. This could be the very lesson to learn from this cultural convergence project: transform one another by being in contact with one another. Finally, this aspect brings us to the last major consideration derived from the very centre of our debates of society. For the European Union which is undoubtedly enlarging towards the Eastern world, the challenge is to reopen the dialog on the links between religion and secularity: the aim is to advance towards a new identity and a new alliance, a new social and philosophical contract that makes clear distinctions between the points below: Secularity is a form of governance of society and it isn’t a way of life which should be imposed on any person living in that society; Concrete secularity can only exert itself in a society where some groups like those coming from the immigration are often less secularized than other groups or follow other paths of secularization; Muslim religious organisations or other religious organisations also organize secular activities that need to be appreciated and possibly encouraged; Finally, secularity does not forbid dynamic and visible pluralism; it does not forbid diversity through which each particular group has an equal value and expression of its diversity.

3.6. National or regional political authorities It is a clever idea to think that (trans)forming a human being is something that guarantees long life to anti-discrimination actions, it would be a mistake to think that this would make it possible to save having to invest in institutions. Training people is a necessary condition but it is not enough to make sure that cultural and religious diversities are managed positively. This is why the ongoing actions should be pursued with possible training sessions and by strengthening the institutional aspect thanks, for example, to creating dialogue mechanisms or thanks to an explicit political commitment expressed by the public authorities in a planned anti418


discrimination action program or a pro-diversity plan which would define among other things the success indicators for a religious diversity management at local level. There is still much to do at various levels of administration such as the federal level (Belgium) or the regional level (Spain). The role of these agencies would be to support local actions concretely at the level of the municipalities voluntarily taking part in a plan of integrated fight against all forms of discrimination. These political programs will also have to translate into legal mechanisms and into administrative and regulatory dispositions in order to set an example at more local levels. The objective of this fight is not always to make room for “linear” treatment equality in as far as the needs and approaches may differ. It is possible to compare the established “Christian” majority with an immigrant Muslim minority that constitutes a mostly poor population? Everyone acts according to their needs … for an equality of the levels of recognition… And the regional, national or federal levels would be the right ones to launch a high quality i nter-religious and inter-philosophical dialogue. We are living times of unbridled extremism. Isn’t it therefore particularly necessary to remind people that the first role of any religious teaching and of any humanist philosophy is to transmit a message of relationship, peace, and love beyond our differences? Concrete proposals and initiatives have already been made and are in line with recommendations in the field of creating “agencytype structures” both in local areas and at European level and whose task will be to define discrimination and religious violence indicators against religions and beliefs. We need places where discrimination is monitored, indeed, but we also need places where extremism is monitored; otherwise how might it be possible to move towards such a social cohesion? These structures must gather specialists and delegates from public authorities, elected members or religious delegates, philosophical and main cult delegates. The advantage of this move will be to establish a mutual citizen monitoring system without giving the bad impression that “some people are being monitored by others”. This will make it possible for the democratic dialogue to exist and to become better known in the field of the relations between religions and states and between religions and philosophies.

419


3.7. The media The authorities and the participants, when trying to ease and relax the general climate, really need the help of the media. Their duty is to support the social and political agenda, to enhance initiatives, particularly local ones, and to illustrate the actions of fight against discrimination or in favour of diversity in order to make the example and the inspiration known … in other places.

420

About IRFAM The Institute of Research, Training and Action about Migrations (IRFAM) is a resource entity founded by field workers and university researchers, for professionals working in the fields of social action, education, etc. Using a multidisciplinary approach, the Institute aims to construct links between research in psychology and work in the field of integration and development, together with the fight against discriminations. The goals of the institute are: - To provide information about discriminatory mechanisms as factors of exclusion and violence; -To promote intercultural relations as instruments of quality integration; - To trigger a positive identity development among the victims of exclusion and violence; - To contribute to the setting up of democratic mechanisms aimed at encouraging positive management of the socio-cultural difference and durable development. The resources of the IRFAM are raising awareness, training and working with social workers and political decision takers, as well as implementing research-development processes and publications on the problems of the socio-economic development, exclusion and the management of socio-cultural conflicts. The fields of intervention of IRFAM are: - The evolution of the immigrant communities and, in particular, the observation of the psycho-social integration processes and the dynamics of cultural identities; - The development of intercultural and socio-pedagogical intervention methods and policies: training, working with and assessing the field teams, practical experiments, etc. Working on the international stage, the IRFAM is backed by the European Union and various levels of authorities in Belgium. The Institute has three centres in Belgium (Liege, Namur and Brussels) and representative committees in France, Togo, Benin, Turkey and Greece. Partnerships link the IRFAM to numerous entities in Europe, Africa and Canada.

www.irfam.org

VOLUME 2 – NUMBER 3 – December 2005 Special Issue: Recognition of Islam in European Municipalities Actions Against Religious Discrimination Altay A. MANÇO & Spyros AMORANITIS (eds.)

This special issue presents the results of the action “Faiths and social cohesion” supported by the European Commission from 2001 to 2004. These are actions for identification, validation and transnational exchanges of “good practices” and information in the field of the fight against religious discrimination in the case of the local Muslims communities in Europe. The international network coordinated by the Institute for Research, Training and Action on Migrations (IRFAM), included partners from Belgium, France, Great Britain, Italy, Spain, Canada and the United States. The global objective of the action is to highlight the effective practices in local governance to manage religious diversity and combat religious and cultural discrimination against the Muslim communities. The contributions analyse the cases observed at the intervention sites and they were designed in a comparative and transnational context in order to identify and illustrate, through all the cases that have been dealt with, the concept of religious discrimination against the Muslim population in Europe, and also to contribute to the construction of a typology of indicators relevant to this type of discrimination. Careful attention was paid to the identification, illustration, analysis and evaluation of local initiatives set up to fight against religious discrimination with a view to systematize the knowledge and the know-how acquired during the realization of the project. Political recommendations and examples of “good practices” complete the volume and are detailed in the conclusions. Supported by the European Commission, Directorate-General “Employment and Social Affairs”

Institut de Recherche, Formation et Action sur les Migrations Institute for Research, Training and Action on Migrations

MIGRATION LETTERS

The first ever letter-type journal in population studies

www.migrationletters.com ISSN 1741-8984 (print), 1741-8992 (online)