ABSTRACT: Although it has become increasingly evident that an adequate theory of obligation must rest on evolutionary biology and human ethology, attempts ...
Obligation and the New Naturalism ROGER D. MASTERS Dartmouth College Hanover, NH 03755 U.S.A.
ABSTRACT: Although it has become increasingly evident that an adequate theory of obligation must rest on evolutionary biology and human ethology, attempts toward this end need to explore the full range of personal, cultural, and political obligations observed in our species. The "new naturalism" reveals the complexity of social behavior and the defects of reductionist models that oversimplify the foundations of human duties and rights. Ultimately, this approach suggests a return to the Aristotelian concept of "natural justice." KEY WORDS: Obligation, altruism, law, human ethology, evolutionary theory, natural justice. I. CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF OBLIGATION
Human social life has biological foundations. Although few contemporary philosophers and political theorists have focused on evolutionary biology and ethology, no theory can hope to explain human duties and rights without considering the life sciences (Alexander, 1979, 1987; Ruse, 1986). To show why "obligation" must be studied as a scientific as well as philosophic question, it is useful to consider the difficulties that have resulted from the failure to do so. In recent social and political thought, human behavior is both literally and figuratively disembodied. Consider the following example from Richard E. Flathman's PoliticalObligation: We will argue that having a political obligation ordinarily presupposes the existence of a rule (whether a legal rule or some other type) which forbids or requires a specified form of conduct ... To say that there is a rule is not just to say that observers have detected that a certain number of people do or avoid doing X regularly or "as a rule." It is to say that at least some people have chosen to do X because they think that there are good reasons for doing so. And to say that B's conduct is governed by a rule is to say that B is one of those who has chosen to do X because he thinks there are good reasons for doing what the rule requires. Now to say that there are good reasons for doing X is to say that X can be distinguished from Y, Z, etc., (which may be merely not-doing-X), i.e., that there are alternatives to doing X over which X is preferred. It is also to say that doing Y, Z, etc., is potentially attractive to B such that there is a point to adducing reasons for doing X rather than Y or Z. In short, the existence of rules and rule-guided conduct presupposes the possibility of a tension in the thought of individuals, and hence in their society, between reasons for and reasons against accepting and choosing to conform to obligation rules. Moreover, the fact that reasoning and Biology and Philosophy 4 (1989) 17-32. © 1989 by KluwerAcademic Publishers.
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ROGER D. MASTERS discussion concerning the rules takes place, and indeed the fact that A sometimes has occasion to use the concept "obligation" in guiding B's conduct, constitute indications that this possibility is realized. (Flathman, 1972: xxiv-xxv).
What are the consequences of this way of asking whether individuals should obey rules and commands? If Flathman's argument is examined, three striking points become clear. First, humans and their actions are treated as undifferentiated abstractions. A and B are presumably any human individuals (or at least any humans capable of thought). There is no specification of whether the resulting theory will apply to children or the mentally ill as well as to preliterate tribesmen who live in a society without formal political institutions, to soldiers in warfare, or to husbands and wives. While one suspects that the theoretical formulations are addressed to the citizens of industrial societies ("civilized" people who resemble "us"), even this is not specified in describing individuals "A" and "B" or actions "X," "Y," and "Z." Second, such a formulation treats obligations as a matter of reason divorced not only from desires, but above all from feelings and emotions. As Flathman put it: "throughout the work we will be concerned to show that leading features of the practice of political obligation, for example, rules, authority, obedience, and disobedience, must be understood in terms of concepts such as intention, reason, purpose, and decision, not in terms of responses to stimuli or drives and instincts - that is, in the concepts characteristic of human action, not of behavior" (Flathman, 1972: xvii). As is illustrated by Plato's emphasis on thymos, Rousseau's analysis of pity, or Hume's discussion of the "moral sentiments," many philosophers in the Western tradition did not adopt such a highly rationalistic mode of discourse, isolating morality from feelings and desires. Third, this treatment of obligation shares the Kantian view that human action can only claim to be moral or ethical insofar as it is based on a "free will." In Flathman's words, "we are concerned with what men do as opposed to what happens to them or what they undergo or suffer; with actions they take intentionally, to achieve a goal or purpose, for reasons, not with movements they are observed to make as a consequence of the operation of forces over which they have no control" (Flathman, 1972: xvi). Actions are only moral, and hence worth describing as "obedience," if they are entirely under the "control" of the individual - and such control is equated with "intentions" based on a "goal or purpose" that can be stated as a "reason." Since Aristotle considered intentionality without divorcing human beings from nature, this way of conceptualizing morality is neither logically necessary nor self-evidently true. Contemporary biologists speak of goaldirected or "teleonomic" behavior, much as the ancient philosophers spoke of a natural teleology, without thereby invoking Christian theology and "free will." Indeed, ethological studies show that the behavior of other
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primates is often difficult if not impossible to understand without reference to individual intentions and purposes (Hinde, 1982; de Waal, 1982; Masters, 1989). It would be easy to show that Flathman's approach is far from unrepresentative of contemporary theories of obligation. A recent philosophic work, for example, discusses "reciprocity" as the "moral virtue" according to which "we ought to be disposed, as a matter of moral obligation, to return good in proportion to the good we receive, and to make reparation for the harm we have done" (Becker, 1986: 3). Becker is concerned with a different kind of obligation than Flathman, but their mode of reasoning has striking features in common. In Becker's view, reciprocity determines "the outline of our nonvoluntary social obligations - the obligations we acquire in the course of social life, but acquire without regard to our invitation, consent, or acceptance" (Becker, 1986: 3). Whereas Flathman emphasized voluntary obedience to political rules, Becker seems most concerned with the reasons for obeying social or cultural norms that arise in the course of everyday life. Despite this difference, the fundamental premises are remarkably similar. Becker's argument is based on a "general conception of morality" namely that "moral judgments are judgments about what rational agents ought to do or be, period" (Becker, 1986: 17). What Becker means by the "general conception of morality" is thus distinguished from "specialpurpose restrictions" and concerns "judgments made, in principle, all things considered" (ibid.). In order to avoid the conclusion that moral obligation is merely conventional, this philosophic theory focuses on a highly rational view of moral rules as "moral action guidance" that "is addressed to rational agents, from rational agents" (Becker, 1986: 30). While granting that the definition of a "rational agent" in this sense may be "somewhat vague (with respect to the status of young children, for example, and some animals)" and that moral reasoning can be addressed to individuals who are not "purely" rational agents because they have passions, Becker seeks "action-guides" that "must be coherent general principles for the conduct of rational agents" (Becker, 1986: 30-31, 59-60). It is not hard to see that Becker's approach to obligation is similar to that of Flathman in all three respects noted above: abstractness, rationalism, and the assumption of a disembodied "free will." The concept of "general morality" establishes, as a definitional criterion, that moral rules be unspecified with regard to the "special" purpose of any type of behavior or the goals of human life. Obligation is most emphatically based upon and limited to "rational" criteria or rules of action. While under some circumstances "what is justified by reason is passionate conduct or unthinking habit" (Becker, 1986: 31) and the situations considered may arise independently of the individual's choice, the moral rule itself cannot be derived in any way from passion and desire.
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For theorists like Flathman and Becker, the alternative to a neoKantian or a priori morality is the psychological theory of "behaviorism," which denied the existence or meaning of goals or intentions entirely (cf. Skinner, 1965). Such writers therefore give little attention to the Aristotelian view that goals or intentions arise in nature and that the quality of moral obligation is shaped by the concrete circumstances in which humans live. While granting that humans have a "social nature," for example, Becker seemingly accepts Locke's "tabula rasa" psychology: "We are, then, social beings in the strong and clear sense that our rational agency is the product of social experience, operating on the plastic and largely undeveloped biological stuff of which we are made" (Becker, 1986: 39).2
Beneath the abstract, formalistic surface of such contemporary discussions of obligation, prevailing beliefs and opinions are often presented as "rational" or "natural" standards of judgment. Becker's view of reciprocity provides a convenient example. When defining reciprocal moral obligations concretely, Becker's first two maxims are: "1. Good received should be returned with good" and "2. Evil received should not be returned with evil." Given the number of human cultures that have based social organization on the lex talionis ("an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth"), one might well ask why the second maxim qualifies as "reciprocity." Becker's answer is revealing: Retaliation is of course a widespread practice, and the desire to retaliate is even more pervasive. If it were universal - perhaps even a species characteristic - and if we could find no reason, on balance for opposing it - then we would have to regard it as grounded, morally. But in fact we have the most decisive reason imaginable, under the general conception, for opposing it. Retaliation, defined as returning evil for evil, is by definition unjustifiable. It is by definition an instance of acting immorally (Becker, 1986: 95).
Because there is a "reason" for viewing retaliation as immoral, it is apparently not necessary to inquire whether the desire to retaliate is a biologically based "species characteristic" - and the reason is merely that retaliation is "by definition unjustifiable." Becker's premises involve a moral condemnation of many human cultures and behaviors that a theory of obligation should consider with an open mind. In the countless pre-literate tribes which have lacked a centralized government and regulated social behavior on the basis of feuds (Lowi, 1961; Harris, 1977; Masters, 1964; Gruter and Masters, 1986: Part III), behavior was by his definition neither rational nor moral. In the arena of international relations, almost all actions in warfare and even in economic retaliation would be immoral on Becker's grounds, though he might claim that they become moral in terms of other virtues beside that of reciprocity. Since what has been called a "TIT-for-TAT" strategy would appear to be a natural ground for social cooperation itself (Axelrod, 1984), it is
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difficult to see why retaliation for harm should be logically distinct from returning benefits. Given the abstractness of his premises, Becker is unable to avoid this arbitrary definition by pointing to the different quality of moral and social obligation in stateless societies based on personal bonds of reciprocity and in centralized States whose laws provide the collective benefit of impersonal standards of behavior. It would seem that Becker's substantive conclusions enshrine our conventional judgments in the name of "rationality" and "moral obligation." Similar charges have been made in discussions of other recent works of moral philosophy, such as John Rawls' widely known A Theory of Justice (Rawls, 1971) or Robert Nozick's Anarchy, the State, and Utopia (Nozick, 1974). Once humans are viewed in the abstract and obligations defined as purely "rational" rules ungrounded in our species' biological heritage, the disembodiment of moral discourse can lead to parochial if not ideological views of human rights and duties. If one is to discover the "nature of obligation," surely it is necessary to consider "nature" in the biological sense of the word.
II. THE BIOLOGY OF OBLIGATION
Evolutionary biology and ethology can facilitate the understanding of various forms of human social obligation without reducing human behavior to genetic determinism. A purely "rational" view of "action" ignores not only desire, but the feelings and emotions expressed in innate facial expressions and nonverbal cues that form the foundation of social life. A "tabula rasa" or behaviorist psychology, which implies that human rules or social conventions are unconstrained by inherited propensities, can no longer be sustained as an accurate account of human nature. A theory of obligation that takes the existence of the centralized State for granted ignores the historical origins and vulnerability of political institutions, and thus fails to consider some of the most important issues of the 20th Century. Obligation presupposes some form of bond between individuals. Social bonds are, however, observed in nature; if so, the natural foundations of social life should illuminate the moral obligations that emerge in humans capable of speech and of consciously discussing their intentions and desires. Moral and political obligation cannot, of course, be reduced to the sub-rational foundations of social life; humans, unlike other species, have transformed their social and physical environment with the aid of languages that encode and transmit information in ways analogous to genes (Masters, 1970; Dawkins, 1976; Lumsden and Wilson, 1981). In seeking the distinctly human quality of moral obligation, therefore, it is time to bridge the gulf between the view of "nature" as a rational essence and that of "nature" as unthinking instinct.
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Evolutionary theory teaches not only that humans, like other animals, adjust their social behavior in response to the environmental constraints, but that the environment shaping individual responses includes the social setting as well as the ecological niche. In human terms, this means that social institutions matter greatly to the kinds of behavior one might expect to observe. The nature of obligation could hardly be fixed in the abstract if the emergence of the centralized State necessarily modifies the strategies suited to survival. Because social cooperation depends on the likely behavior of others, the nature of obligations needs to be specified relative to a domain of situations: interpersonal obligations in a face-to-face group clearly differ from duties or rights arising from impersonal cultural norms and laws. At least three distinct albeit interrelated domains of obligation seem to be distinguishable on evolutionary grounds. Each corresponds to a category of bonds or social behaviors linking humans. Personal obligation can be defined as the duties and rights arising from the individual bonds in face-to-face groups: families, neighborhoods, work-places, and other informal social settings. Cultural obligations occur insofar as societies evolve norms or practices that are communicated from generation to generation by symbols, cues, or words in an impersonal way. Politicaland legal obligations develop when governmental institutions evolve, particularly in the form of the centralized State which is capable of making and enforcing impersonal rules or laws. Each of these three domains of obligation - corresponding broadly to the difference between kin group, tribe, and multi-tribal or multi-ethnic society - needs to be treated separately, for each calls into question different attributes of human nature. III. PERSONAL OBLIGATIONS: KINSHIP AND RECIPROCITY
Personal obligations seem to arise from the fundamental propensities of humans to bond to others: mothers bond to their infants, sexual partners bond selectively to each other, men and women in local neighborhoods form personal bonds to "friends" or work partners (Fox, 1975: Hamilton, 1975; Gruter and Bohannan, 1983). As Axelrod (1984) has shown, the evolution of social cooperation can be explained as a result of "TITfor-TAT" strategies of reciprocity. When individuals are known partners in the same social setting, such reciprocity is facilitated by the tendency particularly marked in primates - to distinguish other individuals visually and to respond emotionally and cognitively to them in distinct ways. Experimental evidence of the importance of seeing the faces of others (e.g., Masters, 1989: chap. 2) confirms that humans naturally modulate their social behavior as a function of prior experiences within the face-toface group.
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Theories of social obligation must therefore distinguish between the domain of reciprocity in dealings between known individuals and the domain which concerns impersonal cultural norms. This is not to endorse Kohlberg's theory (1981) that the abstract or rational norm is a "higher" level of morality; while impersonal social rules and laws evolve as cultural practices that have only indirect analogues among other animals (Bonner, 1980), it would be an error to assume that cultural obligations are always "higher" or "better" than personal ones. On the contrary, as Gilligan (1982) has shown, women tend to analyze moral dilemmas in terms of social obligation embedded in a concrete context whereas men are more likely to focus on abstract rules - a difference which is, in fact, predictable on evolutionary grounds. This point is of considerable importance. While there are important cultural differences in gender roles and behavior, human females - like those of other primates - tend to invest more in social bonds than males; these differences can be reflected in differences in the characteristic cognitive styles of men and women (Schubert, 1987; Birke, 1986). There is an element of plausibility in the feminists' charge that many social and philosophical theories have a "male" bias (Sayers, 1982). Paradoxically enough, however, an evolutionary approach reveals the neurological and ethological reasons for different interpretations of similar events by men and women (Masters, 1984, 1987). Personal obligations dependent on the concrete circumstances and personalities of the participants (which are the characteristic focus of female judgments of moral dilemmas) have as natural a status for humans as do cultural norms expressed in abstract or universalistic verbal injunctions (which are more typically given priority in male judgments of the same events). An evolutionary perspective confirms the natural differences between these domains of obligation. Personal obligations correspond to the elementary types of behavior which many biologists call "nepotism" and "reciprocal altruism" (Trivers, 1971, 1974, 1981). In addition to bonding and cooperation that improves the reproductive success of close kin, natural selection should produce a willingness of organisms to incur some cost while aiding others whenever the probability of a role reversal, and hence a return of the benefits, is sufficiently high. Personal obligations can, in principle, take at least three forms. First, there are duties to kin - i.e., others who are known or presumed to be genetic relatives or to have marital ties creating a shared reproductive interest. Second, there are duties to specific individuals based on reciprocity and ultimately producing mutual benefits: in abstract terms, these duties arise in circumstances where A helps B because it is expected that, in the future, B will help A or A's kin. Finally, there are cases that have been described as "indirect reciprocity": formally speaking, A helps B because C is watching - and it is C (or others informed of the event by C) who will ultimately help A or A 's kin (Alexander, 1987).
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While neo-Kantian philosophers would not call such behavior "altruism," but merely long-range self-interest, 3 it should be noted that the resulting cooperation produces a form of reciprocity not entirely unlike the principles based on a rationalist view of human nature: while the golden rule ("do unto others as you would have them do unto you") is not consistent with evolutionary theory for the reasons outlined in questioning Becker's definition of reciprocity, the "silver rule" of reciprocity ("do unto others as they have done unto you") is often expected to evolve as a stable behavioral propensity (Hirshleifer, 1985).
IV. CULTURAL OBLIGATIONS: MORALITY AND CUSTOM
Cultural norms transform this elemental pattern of social behavior, found in face-to-face groups among other animals as well as in our own species, into a uniquely human attribute. By giving verbal labels to behavior, it becomes possible for humans to think about, plan, justify, punish, and discuss reciprocity. Moral norms become visible, and not merely a "performed" phenomenon. The truth in Kant's philosophy points to this radical transformation of the human condition due to language. Once speech emerged, moral dialogue and disagreement became possible if not inevitable, most particularly because of the utility of speech as a mode of deceiving others concerning one's intentions and behavior (Lockard, 1980). Cultural obligation is a double edged sword. For the individual, it has the immense benefit of expanding the scope of the reference group whose behavior is predictable. This expansion occurs in space, as tribal groups using the same cultural practices grew to populations larger than those of any other mammalian group; the expansion also occurs in time, as the living bequeath recipes for social behavior and techniques of survival to their offspring and to future generations. This benefit must clearly have been an extraordinary means of enhancing reproductive success, facilitating the spread of the human species from a miniscule population in Africa to the dominant life form on the planet. But the benefits of culture have been purchased at a cost. When norms of behavior have been formulated in symbols and verbal rules, there are new possibilities for individuals to cheat while pretending to obey. The cost of being the "sucker" whose obedience is exploited by the "free rider" is greatly increased when the identity of potential cheaters is unknown and unknowable. Social choice theories today focus on this issue, as did Plato in presenting the "ring of Gyges" in the Republic (Masters, 1989: ch. 5). Obligation takes on a different form when rules have been formalized, creating the attraction of loop-holes and the delight of deception. Although social and cultural obligations overlap, cultural
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obligations have a quite distinct character from those that can only be enforced on the basis of reciprocities in the face-to-face group. Two rather different forms of obligation emerge once cultures have produced collective benefits that can be exploited by the potential free rider; while both are possible in other species, neither is likely in a population without human language and the verbal rules that simultaneously define duties and permit deception. The first is "pure altruism"; the second "noblesse oblige." A word on each type of cultural obligation will indicate how it expands on the natural possibilities found in the domain of personal obligation. Pure altruism has been at the center of religious thought and philosophy since antiquity. Abraham's willingness to sacrifice his only son as a sign of faith in God and God's Law (Genesis, 22. 1-18) is, in biological terms, a case of pure selflessness. So is Plato's image of the perfectly just man who has a reputation of being perfectly unjust (Republic, II). Unlike "nepotism" or "reciprocal altruism," nothing can outweigh the immediate costs of such an individual's good deed because no other human can see it and return the benefit to kin or to future generations (cf. Trivers, 1971). Biologists find that such altruism is quite rare in other species since a purely altruistic trait or behavior would usually disappear as a result of natural selection. When an "altruistic" trait like a warning cry or defense of the group does arise, it is in situations of reciprocity that generate benefits outweighing its costs to the altruist's inclusive fitness; without reciprocity, such behaviors tend to be directed only to selected individuals with whom social bonds have emerged. This is why mechanisms of kin recognition and individual affiliation have such a great role in the emergence of social cooperation among animals - and it explains why human language, functioning as a means of recognizing and communicating with others sharing a cultural world, greatly enlarges both the possibility for purely altruistic behavior and the demand for it. On theoretical grounds, the spread of an altruistic response to a substantial proportion of any population can overcome the natural selection against pure altruism (Martinez-Col, 1986). Cultural symbols and language add impersonal norms to the dynamics of face-to-face groups; particularly when directed to an infinitely large audience, as is the case for world religions and classic moral philosophy, the image of pure altruism articulates a cultural obligation extending beyond reciprocal social obligations. The lex talionis of the stateless society based on kinship and feud can be replaced by the injuction to "love thine enemy." When this occurs all members of the population gain as long as the expectation of altruism is not destroyed by actual evidence of others' selfishness. A second form of cultural obligation is less widely discussed. Only recently have biologists begun to notice that where resources are stratified and reusable, the properties of social structure make possible an indirect
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but powerful mechanism of collective benefit. Described as a "vacancy chain," this system is illustrated by resources as different as the empty shells occupied by crabs and the houses or jobs in contemporary industrial society. When a system of such resources exists, the discovery of a new shell on the beach or the addition of a new job to the market permits a sequence of adjustments as individuals successfully acquire a "better" resource and thereby leave behind their old shell or job to be used by those lower in the hierarchy (Chase and DeWitt, 1987). In this "trickle down" system, the discovery or creation of new resources at the top of a "vacancy chain" benefits not only the first user, but many others. Statistically, the new shell for a large crab or new house for a rich family can generate even greater gains for others or for the population as a whole than for the first user. What is a convenience or marginal benefit in the highest social strata may produce resources that are a matter of life and death at the bottom of the hierarchy. As a result, the benefits to the user initiating the chain may be dwarfed by benefits accruing to reproductive rivals of lower status. When Hamilton (1964) introduced the concept of inclusive fitness, he pointed out that the reproductive success of evolutionary importance is, in theory, relative rather than absolute. Most humans, of course, focus on the material resources controlled by the individual and on the absolute numbers of viable offspring. Because the evolutionary process depends on relative reproductive success rather than such absolute measures, however, a selfish behavior that benefits kin while also producing even greater benefits for nonkin will usually be opposed by the pressure of natural selection. It follows that a new term is needed to describe behaviors such as efforts to discover new resources and to coordinate the social behavior of other group members when the initiator thereby incurs a relative disadvantage compared to genetic competitors. Since Trivers' term "reciprocal altruism" has gained currency in describing interpersonal helping that evolves due to expected role reversal, perhaps one could speak of "hierarchical altruism" to denote helping behaviors by high status individuals which cause relative declines in their own reproductive success. Unlike reciprocity, the benefits to reproductive rivals cannot be directly returned to the first users in subsequent events (since there is a hierarchy of users of noncomparable size, needs, or status); unlike pure altruism, there is some benefit to the first user. In most models of natural selection, behaviors creating a resource that is ultimately exploited by others will not evolve if the subsequent users gain more than the first user. In this case, even if the first user benefits from expending energy to discover or create the new resource, this net gain is outweighed by the relative advantage conferred on reproductive rivals. In nature, therefore, most vacancy chains seem to be generated by
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resources that are not produced, like shells abandoned on a beach and simply found by crabs; except for social insects, hierarchical altruism is probably rare in other species. In human cultures, social stratification makes possible a vast expansion of this form of behavior. Noblesse oblige. Oddly enough, virtually no recent theories of obligation have even mentioned the duties of high ranking individuals, whose gains from their status are sometimes far smaller than the benefits they generate for those of lower status (cf. Aristotle, Ethics). Egalitarian theories and resentment to great inequalities of wealth have obscured situations in which individuals generate extensive social benefits through their own activity. In pre-literate societies without government, inequalities of wealth are often signs of obligations and duties (Lowi, 1961; Bohannan, 1963; Harris, 1977). Similarly, a man's "standing" in a traditional South Indian village "will be affected by the number of people he is able to feed. A really great man ... is expected to feed everyone" (Beals, 1963: 30). In
societies with governmental institutions, high office can entail costs to the official that exceed the benefits (as becomes obvious when one considers the assassination of American Presidents like Abraham Lincoln and John F. Kennedy). When cultural systems evolve unequal economic or social strata, those in high position can general material resources or social benefits that originate the analogue of natural "vacancy chains," benefitting nonkin more than the leader and his family. The global population growth that has marked the last four generations suggests that the inventors and entrepreneurs of the nineteenth century - while benefitting privately may also have disproportionately enhanced the reproductive success of nonkin. This form of behavior is particularly central in human politics. The hero - or his kin - often receives rewards of prestige not to mention wealth and power. Heroism is therefore sometimes debunked as self-interested behavior. This would extend to genetic measures of reproductive success were it not for the generalized benefits to the entire community that are created by the hero or leader. From Achilles to George Washington and Napoleon Bonaparte, the rewards to the political hero have typically been dwarfed by the benefits that leadership and bravery produce for everyone else in the society. 4 Martin Luther King knew the risks of leading the fight against segregation just as Gandhi knew the dangers of his strategy for achieving Indian independence: the willingness of a great leader to risk death has often confirmed his altruistic devotion to collective benefits. If leadership in large, impersonal social groups can have results contrary to the principles of natural selection, why do some individuals actively compete for status and fill leadership positions? An explanation
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depends on the way our primate heritage of living in face-to-face groups has combined with the emergence of human culture to produce somewhat paradoxical effects. Among nonhuman primates, indirect reciprocity can account for the selection of behaviors associated with dominance and subordination and for such socially beneficial behaviors of the dominant male as dispute settlement, vigilance, or defense against predators (Kummer, 1979; de Waal, 1982; Alexander, 1987). Humans, having evolved for millenia in face-to-face groups, share the characteristic primate repertoire of dominant and submissive nonverbal cues (van Hooff, 1969; Masters, et al., 1986). And because active dominance produces physiological changes in the leader - such as enhanced serotonin levels - that are adaptive and physically pleasurable (McGuire and Raleigh, 1986), humans can be expected to compete for dominant status within the groups in which they belong. When large-scale societies based on a common culture emerge, competition for dominance can focus on culturally based symbols rather than other material or social objects of control. As a result, leadership in human cultures may become dissociated from the criteria of reproductive success typically found in other species (Campbell, 1980). This phenomenon, while widely understood with reference to the emergence of complex societies, has paradoxical effects for the leader as an individual. Effort and risk are entailed in order to gain and hold positions of social dominance in complex societies. In the pursuit of the pleasures and perquisites of power, human leaders may sometimes be deceived into helping reproductive rivals more than their own kin. While natural selection operates against such outcomes when the dominant male plays a leadership role in groups of nonhuman primates, culture expands the scope of cooperation and increases the probability of such an outcome for human leaders. If so, the term "hierarchical altruism" may be peculiarly apt. The tendency of power and wealth to be corrupted, and the outrage that is felt when those of high status seem to gain disproportionally, will be thought to contradict the existence of "hierarchical altruism." Actually, the reverse is the case. The persistence of selfishness within culture is predicted by all theories of natural selection; like "pure altruism," noblesse oblige is a cultural norm that is perpetually undermined by the primary tendency of humans to seek to maximize their individual benefits. V. POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS: LAW AND STATE
Political and legal obligation differs from either social or cultural obligation. Cultural norms come into existence long before the State, but those who obeyed them before the State ran the risk of being the "sucker"
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whenever selfish individuals could escape the costs of informal punishment or bad reputation. A formal government appears to counter these difficulties by providing those who initiate altruistic behavior with the promise that "free riders" will be punished. The State is particularly effective as a means of generating collective goods and reusable resources that have large multiplier effects. The most notable of these benefits were the common irrigation systems of the early Empires, which increased and stabilized food supplies by coordinating labor and resources beyond the scale of the prior social units. Earlier and less complex states produced similar collective benefits by means of conquest of rivals, increased security, or the common exploitation of new technologies and resources. Because those who organize the State are typically rewarded with status and wealth as well as power, a hierarchy of authority capable of producing collective benefits also generates a vacancy chain of desirable bureaucratic offices. When individuals are asked to obey written laws that are enforced by specific "authorities," the cost of obedience goes down - but the benefits of successful cheating go up. In the face-to-face societies where primitive law was enforced by self-help, there was a limited scope for free-riders; with the expanded resources made possible by the State and the power generated by its system of authority, a "ring of Gyges" permits its possessor to seduce the Queen, kill the King, and become a self-interested tyrant (Republic, II). Theories of obligation tend to focus on those who must obey the rules, commands, and laws. It is also important, however, to consider the obligations of those who enforce the rules, issue the commands, and make the laws. Once the dynamics of pure altruism and hierarchical altruism have become formalized into law and government, political duties emerge as distinct from and often in tension with familial, personal, and cultural obligations. Within the State, selfishness still undermines duties to kin, to neighbors, and to others sharing the same cultural norms. And although the State can punish criminals, the legal rules enforced by the government often contradict obligations to kin, to social partners, or to those who share religious and social customs.5 Each level of human activity has its own properties. The reality of civilized life is deformed by abstract discussions of rights and duties that ignore the complex dynamics of selfishness, personal obligations to kin or to friends, cultural obligations defined by religious belief, custom, or social class, and political obligations established by law and enforced by governments. Often what is good by one standard is wicked or illegal by another. Obligation often requires a choice between competing claims. An adequate theory of obligation therefore needs to focus on the distinct characteristics of the rights and duties generated by personal bonds, by cultural norms, and by political institutions. Each of these levels
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of human obedience needs to be discussed separately. Far from "reductionism," the biology of obligation is both more complex and more concrete than the approaches of contemporary philosophers and social scientists who have treated obedience in the abstract and rationalist manner exemplified by the citations from Flathman and Becker. Evolutionary theory provides an appropriate basis for exploring the origins and complexities of human social coooperation. Biology not only shows how other animals adapt in varied ways to their social environment as well as to the ecological setting, but also clarifies the nature of human social bonds and the constraints in which cultures and States evolve. When the perspective of the life sciences is adopted sine ira et studio, the new naturalism leads to a theory of obligation resembling the traditional concept of "natural justice" among the ancients rather than to ideological extremism, relativism or nihilism (Masters, 1989). NOTES This criticism does not concern the formalization of models of social behavior as such, but rather the absence of possible empirical referents for the abstractions A, B, etc. Indeed, the defect of Flathman's formalization is precisely that it cannot easily be related to the models used by game theoretists and biologists alike (Hamilton, 1964; Maynard-Smith, 1976; Axelrod, 1984; Masters, 1989: Ch. 5). For an illustration, see the discussion of the concept of "indirect reciprocity " (Alexander, 1987 and above, p. 23). 2 In fairness to Becker, it should be noted that he is aware of the literature of evolutionary biology and therewith of the possibility that human obligation has a natural foundation. Oddly enough, after citing criticism that sociobiology suffers from ideological bias and restating the response that can be made to such charges, Becker concludes that "critics are not likely to be soothed" by a theoretical defense of evolutionary biology "since it operates at such a general level, and many of the criticisms and fears about the political implications of sociobiology have to do with its more particular implications with regard to racism, sexism, hierarchical social structure, and aggression" (Becker, 1985: 353-354). Unless this is an esoteric remark, it is difficult to understand Becker's conclusion in the light of his insistence on presenting a "general conception" of morality. 3 On terminological grounds, some evolutionary theorists would agree that helping behavior is not purely "altruistic" if it results in increasing the frequency of an organism's genes in future generations of the population. Discussion of this issue has been complicated by the need to distinguish between outcomes and motives (Alexander, 1979; Barash, 1977; Hinde, 1982). Because the term "altruism" often implies a motivation to help at a net cost to the phenotype, the metaphorical description of genes as having motives (e.g., Dawkins, 1976) introduces confusion in the delicate analysis of intentionality and consequences for both phenotypical and genetic "reproductive success" (Masters, 1981). Perhaps the best way of avoiding error in this regard is to return to the Socratic distinction between those things which are good for their consequences, those good for themselves (but not their consequences), and those good for both intrinsic and extrinsic reasons (Republic, II). 4 See Machiavelli, Discourses on Titus Livy, I, ix-xii and Prince, Chap. 6, 15, 18. On the effects of the centralized State in changing breeding potentials for large numbers of nonkin in the society - and especially for lower status males who benefit from a monogamous mating system, cf. Alexander, et al., 1979 with Dickemann, 1979.
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5 For a striking example, see Gruter's analysis of the conflict between Amish tradition and American law (in Gruter and Masters, eds., 1986). Such contradictions were nowhere more striking that at the origins of the Mosaic Law (Exodus, 32: 25-29).
BIBLIOGRAPHY Alexander, Richard D.: 1979, Darwinism and Human Affairs. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Alexander, Richard D.: 1987, The Biology of MoralSystems. N.Y.: Aldine de Gruyter. Alexander, Richard D., et al.: 1979, Sexual Dimorphism and Breeding Systems in Pennepeds, Ungulates, Primates, and Humans. In N. Chagnon & W. Irons, (eds.), EvolutionaryBiology and Human Social Behavior. N. Scituate, MA: Duxbury Press. Pp. 402-435. Axelrod, Robert: 1984, The Evolution of Cooperation.New York: Basic Books. Barash, David: 1977, Sociobiology andBehavior. New York: Elsevier. Beals, Allan R.: 1963, Golapur:A South Indian Village. N.Y.: Holt Rinehart, &Winston. Becker, Lawrence C.: 1986, Reciprocity. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Birke, Lynda: 1986, Women, Feminism, and Biology: The Feminist Challenge. N.Y.: Methuen. Bohannan, Paul: 1963, SocialAnthropology. N.Y.: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Bonner, John Tyler: 1980, The Evolution of Culture in Animals. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Campbell, Donald T.: 1980, Social Morality Norms as Evidence of Conflict between Biological Human Nature and Social System Requirements. In G. Stent, (ed.), Morality as a Biological Phenomenon.Berkeley: University of California Press. Pp. 67-82. Chagnon, Napoleon and Irons, William, (eds.): 1979, Evolutionary Biology and Human Social Behavior: An Anthropological Perspective.Scituate, MA: Duxbury Press. Chase, Ivan and Theodore de Witt: 1987, Vacancy Chains in Human and Nonhuman Animals. Social Science Information, in press. Dawkins, Richard: 1976, The Selfish Gene. N.Y.: Oxford University Press. de Waal, Frans: 1982, Chimpanzee Politics.London: Jonathan Cape. Dickemann, Mildred.: 1979, The Ecology of Mating Systems in Hypergynous Dowry Societies, Social Science Information 18, 163-195. Flathman, Richard E.: 1972, PoliticalObligation.N.Y.: Atheneum. Fox, Robin: 1975, Primate Kin and Human Kinship. In Robin Fox, (ed.), Biosocial Anthropology. London: Malaby. Pp. 9-36. Gilligan, Carol: 1982, In a Different Voice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Goodall, Jane: 1982, Order without Law Journal of Social and Biological Structures 5, 353-360; reprinted in M. Gruter and P. Bohannan, (eds.) Law, Biology, and Culture. Santa Barbara: Ross Erikson. Gruter, Margaret and Bohannan, Paul, (eds.): 1983, Law, Biology, and Culture. Santa Barbara: Ross-Erikson. Gruter, Margaret and Masters, Roger D., (eds.): 1986, Ostracism: a Social and Biological Phenomenon.N.Y.: Elsevier. Hamilton, William D.: 1964, The Genetical Evolution of Social Behavior. Journal of Theoretical Biology 7, 1-52; partly reprinted in A. Caplan, (ed.), The Sociobiology Debate, pp. 191-209. Hamilton, William D.: 1975, Innate Social Aptitudes of Man. In R. Fox, (ed.), Biosocial Anthropology. London: Malaby. Pp. 133-155. Harris, Marvin: 1977, Cannibalsand Kings. N.Y.: Random House.
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Hinde, Robert A.: 1982, Ethology. Glasgow, Scotland: William Collins. Hirshleifer, Jack: 1985, The Expanding Domain of Economics. American Economic Review 75, 53-68. Kohlberg, Lawrence: 1981, The Philosophy of Moral Development. San Francisco: Harper and Row. Kummer, Hans: 1979, On the Value of Social Relationships to Nonhuman Primates: A Heuristic Scheme. In Mario von Cranach, et al., (eds.), Human Ethology. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 381-395. Lockard, Joan S., (ed.): 1980, The Evolution of Human Social Behavior. N.Y.: Elsevier. Lowie, Robert H.: 1961, PrimitiveSociety. New York: Harper Torchbooks. Lumsden, Charles J. and Wilson, Edward O.: 1981, Genes, Mind, and Culture. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. McGuire, Michael T. and Raleigh, Michael J.: 1986, Behavioral and Physiological Correlates of Ostracism. In M. Gruter and R. Masters, (eds.), Ostracism: A Social and Biological Phenomenon. N.Y.: Elsevier. Pp. 39-52. Martinez-Col, J. C.: 1986, A Bioeconomic Model of Hobbes' "State of Nature". Social Science Information 25, 493-505. Masters, Roger D.: 1964, World Politics as a Primitive Political System. World Politics 16, 595-619. Masters, Roger D.: 1970, Genes, Language, and Evolution, Semiotica 2, 295-320. Masters, Roger D.: 1981, The Value - and Limits - of Sociobiology. In E. White, (ed.), Sociobiology andHuman Politics.Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. Pp. 135-165. Masters, Roger D.: 1984, Explaining "Male Chauvinism" and "Feminism": Cultural Differences in Male and Female Reproductive Strategies. In M. Watts, (ed.), Biopolitics and Gender. N.Y.: Haworth Press. Pp. 165-210. Masters, Roger D.: 1987, Gender and Political Cognition: Integrating Sociobiology, Ethology, and Political Science. Paper presented to Annual Meeting of American Political Science Association, Chicago, Ill. September 5, 1987. Masters, Roger D.: 1989, The Nature of Politics. New Haven: Yale University Press (forthcoming). Masters, Roger D., Sullivan, Denis G., Lanzetta, John T., McHugo, Gregory J., and Englis, Basil G.: 1986, The Facial Displays of Leaders: Toward an Ethology of Human Politics, Journalof Social and Biological Structures 9, 319-43. Maynard-Smith, John: 1978, The Evolution of Behavior. Scientific American 239, 176-192. Nozick, Robert: 1974, Anarchy, State, and Utopia. N.Y.: Basic Books. Rawls, John: 1971, A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Ruse, Michael: 1986, Taking Darwin Seriously. Oxford: Blackwell. Sayers, Janet: 1982, BiologicalPolitics. London: Tavistock. Schubert, Glendon: 1987, Sexual Politics: Some Biosociopsychological Problems, Political Psychology 8, 61-94. Skinner, B. F.: 1965, Science and Human Behavior. N.Y.: Free Press. Trivers, Robert: 1971, The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism. Quarterly Review of Biology 46, 35-57. Trivers, Robert: 1974, Parent-offspring Conflict, American Zoologist 14, 249-264. Trivers, Robert.: 1981, Sociobiology and Politics. In E. White, (ed.), Sociobiology and Human Politics. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. Pp. 1-43. van Hooff, J. A. R. A. M.: 1969, The Facial Displays of Catyrrhine Monkeys and Apes. In D. Morris, (ed.), PrimateEthology. N.Y.: Doubleday-Anchor. Pp. 9-81.
