On the notion of a rule - Springer Link

ON THE NOTION O F A R U L E Thomas Olshewsky U n i v e r s i t y of Kentucky In his "On the Notion 'Rule of G r a m m a r ' " ,

Noam C h o m s k y g i v e s an exposition of the

n e e d f o r a p r e c i s e f o r m u l a t i o n of a r u l e of g r a m m a r .

In so doing, he c a u t i o n s us not to take

too r e a d i l y a g e n e r a t i v e g r a m m a r a s a m o d e l for the s p e a k e r o r the h e a r e r of a language (Chomsky, 1961, Note 16). himself.

T h a t caution h a s not b e e n widely heeded, not even by C h o m s k y

His tone in Language and Mind, a l r e a d y p r e s a g e d in A s p e c t s , is quite d i f f e r e n t .

While noting t h e r e that o t h e r f a c t o r s a r e involved in l a n g u a g e p e r f o r m a n c e , he m a i n t a i n s t h a t l a n g u a g e a c q u i s i t i o n i s a n i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n of a s y s t e m of r u l e s and t h a t l a n g u a g e p e r f o r m a n c e is t h e i r e m p l o y m e n t (Chomsky, 1968, p. 23).

One m i g h t e x p e c t t h i s c l a i m to invite

an e x p l o r a t i o n of the c o n c e p t u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p bet~veen r u l e s of language and p a t t e r n s of v e r b a l behavior.

R a t h e r , m a n y p s y c h o l o g i s t s have t a k e n C h o m s k y ' s l a t e r t h e s i s a s a given f o u n d a -

tion for i n q u i r y , not a s a p r o b l e m to be d e a l t w i t h (ef. McNeill, 1970; M i l l e r and I s a r d , 1963; Saporta, 1967).

I hope t h r o u g h e x p l o r a t i o n s of the notion of a r u l e to r e i n s t i t u t e C h o m -

s k y ' s e a r l i e r caution. B a s e d on C h o m s k y ' s t h e s i s , l i n g u i s t s , p s y c h o l o g i s t s and p h i l o s o p h e r s a l i k e h a v e found a r e n e w a l f o r the contention t h a t v e r b a l b e h a v i o r in p a r t i c u l a r and h u m a n b e h a v i o r in g e n e r a l i s r u l e - g o v e r n e d b e h a v i o r . John S e a r l e (1969) t a k e s a s the t h e s i s f o r h i s book, "Speaking a language is e n g a g i n g iu a r u l e - g o v e r n e d f o r m of b e h a v i o r " .

G . A . M i l l e r (1963)

n o t e s , " T h e question r e m a i n s open w h e t h e r a d e s c r i p t i v e s c i e n c e , s u c h as psychology a s p i r e s to be, c a n i n c o r p o r a t e s y s t e m s of r u l e s into a f r a m e w o r k p r o v i d e d b y the m o r e t r a d itional f o r m of s c i e n t i f i c l a w s " .

I find the o r i e n t a t i o n inviting, but for it to b e c o m e a w o r k -

able one t h e r e i s the n e e d to e x p l o r e not only the r e l a t i o n of language to speaking, but a l s o to u n d e r s t a n d the notion of r u l e - g o v e r n e d

b e h a v i o r in t h e s e c o n t e x t s .

The p r o b l e m s have not

gone u n r e c o g n i z e d (el. Quine, 1970), but p o s i t i v e ways of dealing with t h e m r e m a i n to be devised.

In e x p l o r i n g the notion of a r u l e , I will e x p o s e s o m e q u e s t i o n s I find r e l e v a n t to the

notion of a r u l e in the p s y e h o l i n g u i s t i e e n t e r p r i s e , and s o m e t h e s e s t h a t m a y give s o m e d i r e c t i o n for d e a l i n g with the p r o b l e m s . I

One way of getting a t the notion of a r u l e is to c h a r a c t e r i z e how r u l e s o p e r a t e in d i f f e r e n t c o n t e x t s of a c t i o n and i n q u i r y .

A first general characterization is whatrules are

. Henley (1969) s u g g e s t e d the s t a r t i n g points t h a t I have t a k e n , but they have u n d e r g o n e c o n s i d e r a b l e r e w o r k i n g in m y hands. He is in no way r e s p o n s i b l e f o r - - a n d p r o b a b l y would not a g r e e w i t h - - m u c h of the o u t c o m e . The w o r k of Gumb (1973) is a l s o p e r t i n e n t to t h i s study, but I have not yet had the o p p o r t u n i t y to study it.

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c o n t e x t - d e p e n d e n t . A r u l e is always a r u l e of s o m e t h i n g , a r u l e of c h e s s , a r u l e of etiquette, e t c . , and that s o m e t h i n g d e t e r m i n e s the context in w h i c h the r u l e is o p e r a t i v e .

A rule need

not be l i m i t e d to a single context, but for it to be a r u l e , it m u s t o p e r a t e in s o m e context. This gives a s our f i r s t t h e s i s : T-l:

R u l e s a r e n e c e s s a r i l y c o n t e x t - d e p e n d e n t , and it i s always p o s s i b l e to specify the r u l e - c o n t e x t w h e n e v e r Y'rule" is p r o p e r l y u s e d .

A p a r t of u n d e r s t a n d i n g a r u l e , then, i s to u n d e r s t a n d the context in which it o p e r a t e s . Not only a r e r u l e s c o n t e x t - d e p e n d e n t , but they also s e r v e d i f f e r e n t r o l e s in r e l a t i o n to t h e i r c o n t e x t s .

This g i v e s us our s e c o n d t h e s i s :

T - 2 : R u l e s o p e r a t e a c c o r d i n g to d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e and d e t e r m i n a b l e r o l e s within any given context. The d i s t i n c t i o n of r o l e s r e q u i r e s a typology and any one o f f e r e d will inevitably be s u b j e c t to debate.

The c a t e g o r i e s that follow give at l e a s t a w o r k a b l e typology, and will facilitate our

e x p l o r a t i o n of the notion of a r u l e in p s y c h o l i n g u i s t i c s : A ~ e n e r a l i z a t i o a r o l e i s one in which the r u l e s e r v e s to f o r m u l a t e r e g u l a r i t i e s of the context; e . g . , r u l e s of safe d r i v i n g o r r u l e s of p r o p e r diet.

A r e g u l a t i v e r o l e is one in which the rule s e r v e s to r e g u l a t e o p e r a t i o n s w i t h -

in a context, o r b r i n g o r d e r to a context, e . g . , r u l e s of the r o a d o r r u l e s of table etiquette. A constitutive r o l e is one in which the rule s e r v e s to e s t a b l i s h a context o r define it; e . g . , r u l e s of c h e s s o r of s o m e o t h e r g a m e .

T h i s logically l e a v e s the way open f o r a single r u l e

to play d i f f e r e n t r o l e s in d i f f e r e n t c o n t e x t s .

Indeed, it may be p o s s i b l e for a single r u l e to

play d i f f e r e n t r o l e s in the s a m e eontexL but t h i s r e q u i r e s f u r t h e r e x p l o r a t i o n . Regulative r o l e s for r u l e s p r e s u p p o s e the context as given, and thus the r u l e s a r e d e p e n d e n t upon the context.

F o r g e n e r a l i z a t i o n r o l e s and constitutive r o l e s the e x i s t e n c e of

c o n t e x t s and r u l e s a r e c o - d e p e n d e n t . Regulative r o l e s a r e o r d i n a r i l y developed upon c o n ventioaal foundations, while g e n e r a l i z a t i o n r o l e s d e r i v e f r o m knowledge of the n a t u r e of the context, o r d i n a r i l y b a s e d upon e x p e r i e n c e .

H e r e we have an echo of the Humean c a t e g o r i e s

for knowledge which lie at the b a s e of s t a n d a r d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of the a n a l y t i c / s y n t h e t i c d i s tinction. W e r e constitutive r o l e s a l s o c o n s t r u e d a s conventional, we would have a n e a t s e t of d i f f e r e n t i a e by which no r u l e could unambigously s e r v e m o r e than one of the t h r e e r o l e s in any given context. move.

So long as we l i m i t o u r s e l v e s to g a m e s for p a r a d i g m s , this s e e m s a safe

The question is w h e t h e r o r not the Kantian m a n n e r of t r e a t i n g c o n s t i t u t i v e r u l e s i s an

a p p r o p r i a t e one. al s c i e n c e ,

To ask waht c o n s t i t u t e s human e x p e r i e n c e , o r even m a t h e m a t i c s and n a t u r -

is not like asking what c o n s t i t u t e s c h e s s o r b r i d g e o r baseb&ll.

The a n s w e r s

cannot be d e r i v e d f r o m conventions, nor g e n e r a l i z e d f r o m e x p e r i e n c e s , but m u s t be found in an exposition of the p r e s u p p o s e d foundations for any p o s s i b l e o p e r a t i o n within the context. is a g a i n s t the b a c k d r o p of t h i s expanded conception of a c o n s t i t u t i v e r o l e that c o n t r o v e r s i e s

It

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o v e r n a t i v i s m and "innate i d e a s " , a s well a s those o v e r l i n g u i s t i c u n i v e r s a l s , begin to make s e n s e . With such a conception of constitutive r o l e s , we can a t l e a s t u n d e r s t a n d the c l a i m that a linguistic m o d e l m a y s e r v e a s a p s y c h o l o g i c a l one.

The c l a i m i s that the r u l e s w h i c h

have a generalization r o l e in a t h e o r y of language will a l s o have a constitutive r o l e in i t s u s e . All t h r e e kinds of r o l e f o r r u l e s have both d e s c r i p t i v e and n o r m a t i v e ( p r e s c r i p t i v e ?) force.

How t h e s e f o r c e s r e l a t e to one a n o t h e r and to p a r t i c u l a r r o l e s f o r r u l e s in c o n t e x t

s e e m s a worthwhile

topic for study unto i t s e l f .

P e r h a p s d e s c r i p t i v e f o r c e d o m i n a t e s in the

g e n e r a l i z a t i o n r o l e , but n o r m a t i v e f o r c e d o m i n a t e s in the constitutive one.

Certainly there

i s a n o r m a t i v e f o r c e to the f o r m u l a t i o n of r e g u l a t i v e r u l e s a s well a s to t h e i r e m p l o y m e n t . W h a t e v e r the d e t a i l s , such a study b a s e d on t h e s e s t a r t i n g points would facilitate M i l l e r ' s c o n c e r n with the status of r u l e - g o v e r n e d b e h a v i o r in s c i e n c e , without getting hung up on the notions of d e s c r i p t i v e vs. p r e s c r i p t i v e m e a n i n g s for r u l e s . L e s t we too r e a d i l y a s s i m i l a t e r u l e s to l a w s , it i s i m p o r t a n t to note that r u l e s can always be broken.

So long a s we deal with the notion of a law in a l e g i s l a t i v e context, it can

be a s s i m i l a t e d to the notion of a r u l e .

Statutory laws a r e r e g u l a t i v e r u l e s and constitutional

laws (presumably) a r e constitutive r u l e s .

To b r e a k a r e g u l a t i v e r u l e i s i n a p p r o p r i a t e within

the r u l e - c o n t e x t , but to b r e a k a constitutive r u l e does v i o l e n c e to the definition of the context itself.

Action b r e a k i n g a constitutive r u l e will be ineffectual o r i m p o s s i b l e within the r u l e -

context, o r it will be judged not in that context at all.

Moving the king m o r e than one s p a c e

in a single move is ineffectual, t r u m p i n g with a king is i m p o s s i b l e , and stacking a king on top of a rook may be a p a r t of s o m e g a m e , but c l e a r l y not a g a m e of c h e s s .

Not all c o n s t i t u -

tive violations a r e so n e a t a s t h e s e e x a m p l e s , and not all c o n t e x t s a r e so neat a s a w e l l c o n s t i t u t e d g a m e , a s constitutional law will so r e a d i l y t e s t i f y .

M o r e difficult e x a m p l e s may

well s t r a i n T - 1 . The r e l a t i o n of g e n e r a l i z a t i o n r u l e s to n a t u r a l laws i s m o r e difficult. R u l e s of p r o p e r diet, for i n s t a n c e , a r e b a s e d upon b i o - c h e m i c a t , physiological and o t h e r n a t u r a l l a w s . In t h i s r o l e , the notion of a r u l e c o m e s c l o s e s t to the laws of the " d e s c r i p t i v e " s c i e n c e s . in t h i s r o l e , r u l e s a r e d e r i v a t i v e f r o m l a w s and not equatible with t h e m .

But

T h e s e r u l e s can be

violated without violating the r e l e v a n t laws; indeed, in the v e r y violation of the r u l e s , the r e l e v a n t laws a r e given negative v e r i f i c a t i o n .

They a r e not r e d u c i b l e to the l a w s , h o w e v e r ,

s i n c e they involve value c o n s i d e r a t i o n s not e n t a i l e d by the laws t h e m s e l v e s .

F o r r u l e s of

p r o p e r diet you n e e d the value c o n s i d e r a t i o n of good health; for the r u l e s of safe driving you need the value c o n s i d e r a t i o n of p e r s o n a l safety.

But it s e e m plausible that g e n e r a l i z a t i o n

r u l e s can be analyzed into the r e l e v a n t n a t u r a l l a w s , t o g e t h e r with the r e l e v a n t value c o n s i derations,

tf so, given the c l a i m s of r e c e n t l i n g u i s t i c s and p s y c h o l i n g u i s t i c s , t h i s cannot be

the notion of a r u l e we a r e seeking.

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W i t t g e n s t e i n and his f o l l o w e r s have made much of t r e a t i n g s u b - c l a s s e s of languages on an analogy to r u l e s of g a m e s .

While this may prove s a t i s f a c t o r y for c e r t a i n a s p e c t s of

s e m a n t i c c o n c e r n , it s e r v e s a s a s i n g u l a r l y i n a p p r o p r i a t e model for a language a s a whole. G a m e s involve a c o n s c i o u s e n t e r i n g into, w h e r e a s a language p r o v i d e s a b a s i s for e n t e r i n g in.

F a r f r o m being the r e s u l t of convention, language is p r e s u p p o s e d by v i r t u a l l y all c o n -

ventional e n g a g e m e n t s .

F o r r u l e s of games~ constitutive r u l e s a s well as r e g u l a t i v e r u l e s

a r e made definite by conventions for s p e c i f i e d p u r p o s e s .

The r u l e s of Hoyte a s well a s the

r u l e s of G o r e n for b r i d g e c a m e into being by human decision~ w h e t h e r e x p l i c i t o r i m p l i c i t , singular or collective.

L i n g u i s t i c s t r u c t u r e s a r e c o n s t i t u t e d by physiological and p s y c h o -

logical a s well a s s o c i a l conditions.

The F r e n c h A c a d e m y may s e t f o r t h r u l e s , but t h e s e a r e

r e g u l a t i v e r a t h e r than constitutive. W h e t h e r positive m e r i t n a t i v i s m m a y have (and I think it has little or none), its negative t h r u s t is that the p o s i t i v i s t i c options of e m p i r i c a l g e n e r a l ization or conventional definition a r e inadequate.

R u l e s of l a n g u a g e s a r e not like r u l e s of

games. While the analogy is thus d e f e c t i v e , it points to a n o t h e r p r o b l e m .

However limited~

the analogue between r u l e s of a g a m e {say, bridge) and r u l e s of a language (say, English) would lead one to e x p e c t a c o m p a r a b l e analogue on the m o r e g e n e r a l level.

Yet, we a r e

n e v e r inclined to speak of r u l e s of Game in the way so many r e a d i l y speak of r u l e s of L a n guage.

If, indeed~ r u l e s a r e context dependent, we fail to find a context c a l l e d " G a m e " that

i s defined by any s e t of r u l e s .

What i s t h e r e to l e a d us to s u p p o s e that t h e r e i s a context

called "Language" that s e r v e s a s a context for r u l e s of language ? Such a c o n t e x t i s n e i t h e r p r e s e n t f o r o b s e r v i n g r u l e - g o v e r n e d b e h a v i o r n o r for engaging in it.

T-1 s e e m s to make

the notion of a rule of Language an anomalous one. Thus f a r , we have spoken only about r u l e s of language, net about r u l e s for speaking. The shift f r o m of to for s e e m s not an i n s i g n i f i c a n t one.

W h e r e the f o r m e r r e l a t e s r u l e s to a

context, the l a t t e r r e l a t e s r u l e s to g o a l - d i r e c t e d activity. tools.

This invites an analogy of r u l e s to

The h a m m e r i s a tool o f c a r p e n t r y , but is a tool fo_.~doing c a r p e n t r y work.

H e r e , we

m u s t not be h a s t y to a s s i m i l a t e r u l e - g o v e r n e d b e h a v i o r to g o a l - d i r e c t e d activity, or to equate r u l e s with tools.

T h e r e a r e h a z a r d s enough with such m o v e s a s we shall s e e p r e s e n t l y .

Rather~ the point that I would make h e r e is that the r o l e s of r u l e s in language a r e d i f f e r e n t in kind f r o m the r o l e s of r u l e s in s p e a k i n g - - i n d e e d , even the s e n s e s of "in" h e r e s e e m d i f ferent.

Adequate explication of the n a t u r e and r e l a t i o n of t h e s e r o l e s is a condition for m e e t -

ing the c o n c e r n s with w h i c h we began. We m i g h t hope for an explication of r u l e s for speaking in s p e e c h - a c t a n a l y s e s such a s t h o s e of S e a r l e (1969), but r u l e s for s p e e c h - a c t s a r e not equatable with r u l e s for speaking. In s e m i o t i c t e r m s , s p e e c h - a c t a n a l y s e s a r e p r a g m a t i c .

They a r e c o n c e r n e d with what the

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s p e a k e r can do in and t h r o u g h the a c t of speaking.

P h o n e t i c , s y n t a c t i c and s e m a n t i c r u l e s

m a y provide the s p e a k e r with the e q u i p m e n t fo..~rthat doing i n a n d through. as tools treatment seems plausible. well.

So f a r the r u l e s

Yet, t h e r e is the a c t o f s p e a k i n g to be c o n s i d e r e d a s

The doing of the s p e a k i n g i t s e l f c a n n o t so p l a u s i b l y be t r e a t e d a s a g o a l - d i r e c t e d a c t i -

vity a s doing s o m e t h i n g in a n d t h r o u g h t h a t act. l e a d i n g on t h i s point.

Some d i s c u s s i o n s h a v e b e e n h o p e l e s s l y m i s -

F o d o r , for e x a m p l e , m a i n t a i n s t h a t a c h i l d " a p p l i e s " o r " e m p l o y s "

l i n g u i s t i c r u l e s to p e r c e p t u a l input ( F o d o r , 1966, p. 117).

Such m e a n s - e n d s c h a r a c t e r i z a -

t i o n s w h i c h a r e a p p r o p r i a t e to g o a l - d i r e c t e d a c t i v i t y s e e m s i n g u l a r l y i n a p p r o p r i a t e for l o c u t i o n a r y a c t s , while quite s a t i s f a c t o r y for i l l o c u t i o n a r y and p e r l o c u t i o n a r y ones. F o r l i n g u i s t i c s , g e n e r a l i z a t i o n r o l e s s e e m a p p r o p r i a t e for c o n s i d e r a t i o n of r u l e s of a language.

F o r psychology, r e g u l a t i v e and c o n s t i t u t i v e r o l e s s e e m a p p r o p r i a t e f o r c o n s i d e r -

ation of r u l e s for speaking.

A t t e m p t s to conflate g e n e r a l i z a t i o n r o l e s with c o n s t i t u t i v e r o l e s

a r e a t t e m p t s to provide a b r i d g e b e t w e e n l i n g u i s t i c s and psychology. b a s i s for conceptual confusion o v e r the n a t u r e of a t h e o r y of language.

They a r e a l s o the I n s o f a r a s one r e -

g a r d s the r u l e s in g e n e r a l i z a t i o n r o l e s , the conception of a h y p o t h e t i c o - d e d u c t i v e model is a p p r o p r i a t e , s i m i l a r to a n e m p i r i c a l s c i e n c e .

I n s o f a r a s one r e g a r d s the r u l e s in c o n s t i t u -

tive r o l e s , the conception of a n a x i o m a t i c s y s t e m i s a p p r o p r i a t e , s i m i l a r to a f o r m a l s c i e n c e . C o n t r o v e r s i e s o v e r w h i c h conception i s a p p r o p r i a t e to a t h e o r y of l a n g u a g e have b e e n g e n e r a t e d out of the a t t e m p t to have the t h e o r y b o t h w a y s .

T h i s i s not to s a y that we c a n n o t have

it both ways, but how t h i s could be s o r e m a i n s a c o n c e p t u a l p r o b l e m . T h e s e p r e l i m i n a r y e x p l o r a t i o n s of p r o b l e m s with contexts and r o l e s for r u l e s l e a v e us with a t l e a s t two q u e s t i o n s r e l e v a n t to our c o n c e r n s : Q - l : How c l o s e l y knit a f a m i l y is the s e t of c o n c e p t s e x p r e s s e d by " r u l e " ? (e. g . , r u l e of a g a m e , r u l e of t h u m b , r u l e of i n f e r e n c e ; o r r u l e of g r a m m a r , r u l e of l i n g u i s t i c a c q u i s i t i o n , r u l e of action) Q - 2 : How, if at all, do r u l e s of language function as r u l e s f o r s p e a k i n g ? To deal with s u c h q u e s t i o n s we n e e d to m a k e f u r t h e r e x p l o r a t i o n s into the c o n c e p t of r u l e g o v e r n e d b e h a v i o r , and into i s s u e s r e l a t e d to the l a n g u a g e - s p e a k i n g d i s t i n c t i o n r e l e v a n t to a t h e o r y of language. II In h i s d i s c u s s i o n of r u l e s , W i t t g e n s t e i n d i s t i n g u i s h e s b e t w e e n a p r o c e s s b e i n g in a c c o r d a n c e with a r u l e and a p r o c e s s involving a r u l e ( W i t t g e n s t e i n , 1958, p. 14). e x a m p l e is the n u m b e r s e r i e s "1, 4, 9, 1 6 , . . . ".

His

A r r i v i n g a t the next n u m b e r in the s e r i e s

m a y be in a c c o r d a n c e with the r u l e of s q u a r i n g , but it n e e d not involve t h a t r u l e .

I might,

for i n s t a n c e , see that by adding 3 to 1, I g e t 4; 5 to 4, I g e t 9; 7 to 9, I g e t

16; so t h a t

t94

by adding

9 to 16, I will get 25.

This rule works

as well for generating

the series as does

the squaring rule.

That they have proved to be logically equivalent only assures

work

Clearly,

equally well.

my

calculations

me that they

using the one rule will be a different kind of

operation from what it would be with the other, even though my activity in employing or another,

or none (on the implausible

ly be characterized

as being in accordance

to speak in accordance speaking.

basis of persistent lucky guesses) with both.

In like manner,

either,

wou~d appropriate-

it is plausible for me

with the rules of a language without those rules being involved in that

If our sense of rule-governed

behavior

is to be behavior

tain rules, then we would have a clear, but innocuous

in accordance

sense of how to answer

with cer-

Q-2.

It would

j u s t a s c l e a r l y be inadequate to the c o n c e r n s of the r e l a t i o n of linguistic t h e o r y to p s y c h o logical inquiry.

By the s a m e token it would r e c o n c i l e r u l e - g o v e r n e d b e h a v i o r to n a t u r a l l a w s

s i n c e any r e g u l a r i t y could be counted as in a c c o r d a n c e with a r u l e . A p r o c e s s involves a r u l e , a c c o r d i n g to W i t t g e n s t e i n , if "the symbol of the rule f o r m s p a r t of the c a l c u l a t i o n " .

But this s u g g e s t s that the p r o c e s s u n d e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n i s a g o a l -

d i r e c t e d a c t i v i t y in which r u l e s a r e tools, in which the r u l e s of language a r e m e a n s to the end of a p r o c e s s of speaking.

We can h a r d l y say that a s p e a k e r u s e s his language to s p e a k

( r a t h e r , we say he s p e a k s inn his native language).

The alien may indeed use his knowledge

of the r u l e s of a f o r e i g n language as a m e a n s to speaking it, but the m a r k if the native is that, i n s o f a r as he i s c o m p e t e n t in speaking, this m e a n s / e n d s d i s t i n c t i o n is a b s e n t f r o m his p r o c e s s of s p e a k i n g - - t h a t it is not a calculation.

W h e r e " a c c o r d i n g to a r u l e " p r o v e d too weak

f o r r u l e - g o v e r n e d b e h a v i o r , this s e n s e of "involving a r u l e " p r o v e s too s t r o n g . The notion of following a r u l e s e e m s t r a p p e d ambiguously between t h e s e two. Suppose the s p e a k e r is following a r u l e without knowing it.

This s t r a i n s our m e t a p h o r of

following, and l e a v e s us with nothing m o r e than acting in a c c o r d a n c e with a r u l e .

On the

o t h e r hand, to explicitly know he is following a r u l e puts us back with g o a l - d i r e c t e d activity, this t i m e with the r u l e a s analogous to a guide t o w a r d a goal. s a m e s o r t s of counts as the tool analogy.

The guide analogy f a i l s on the

If we appeal to s o m e s o r t of t a c i t knowledge about

following a r u l e , we have made no gain until the c h a r a c t e r of both the knowing and the f o l l o w ing a r e s o r t e d out.

Thus, in s e e k i n g an a n s w e r to our initial q u e s t i o n s , we have picked up

another: Q-3" What s e n s e of "involving a r u l e " o r "following a r u l e " is i m p l i e d by " r u l e governed behavior" ? T h e r e is a s e n s e in which this whole m a n n e r of t r e a t i n g the p r o b l e m m i s s e s the m a r k . R u l e s that s e r v e a s tools o r a s guides in r u l e - g o v e r n e d b e h a v i o r a r e o r d i n a r i l y r e g u l a t i v e r u l e s , not constitutive o n e s .

They s e r v e , t o make the activity m o r e e f f e c t i v e o r m o r e efficient

o r m o r e a p p r o p r i a t e , but they do not s e r v e to make the activity what it is as an activity.

The

195 c o n s t i t u t i v e r o l e in r e l a t i o n to a c t i v i t y within i t s c o n t e x t i s u s u a l l y one of s e t t i n g l i m i t s on a c t i v i t y within the context, r a t h e r than p r o v i d i n g guidance for action.

This provides a basis

for a new t a c t with a new t h e s i s : T - l : R u l e s a c c o u n t for opposition by s e t t i n g l i m i t s for action. T - 3 p r e s u p p o s e s t h a t r u l e s a r e f o r m u l a t i o n s in action r a t h e r than f e a t u r e s of r e a l i t y . f e a t u r e s of r e a l i t y a r e the o p p o s i t i o n s c o n f r o n t e d in action.

The

It f u r t h e r p r e s u p p o s e s t h a t t h e

f o r m u l a t i o n s will, i n i t i a l l y a t l e a s t , be n e g a t i v e , s e t t i n g l i m i t s on a c t i o n within the context of t h a t r u l e - g o v e r n e d b e h a v i o r .

Thus the r u l e s g o v e r n the b e h a v i o r by r e s t r i c t i n g its scope

and c h a r a c t e r , A c o m p a r i s o n to m o r a l c o n t e x t s m a y be helpful. into t e l e o l o g i c a l and deontological t h e o r i e s .

M o r a l t h e o r i e s a r e u s u a l l y divided

The f o r m e r a r e c o n s t r u e d in t e r m s of e n d s o r

goals, the l a t t e r in t e r m s of r u l e s o r m a x i m s .

T e l e o l o g i c a l t h e o r i e s invite f o r m u l a t i o n of

o b l i g a t i o n s in t e r m s of what one ought to do; deontological t h e o r i e s i n v i t e f o r m u l a t i o n of o b l i e a t i o n s in t e r m s of what one ought not to do.

It is in t h i s way t h a t r u l e - g o v e r n e d b e h a v i o r

h a s a q u a s i - m o r a l or deontologieal c h a r a c t e r .

R u l e s tell u s what we m a y not do.

T h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of r u l e - g o v e r n e d b e h a v i o r r u n s c o u n t e r to the r o l e s r u l e s play in the f o r m a l s c i e n c e s .

T h e r e , the r u l e s a r e both c o n s t i t u t i v e and t e l e o l o g i c a l .

They both

c o n s t i t u t e the s t r u c t u r e of the s y s t e m and s e r v e a s e x p l i c i t m e a n s for new f o r m u l a t i o n s , by formation or transformation.

However, i n s o f a r a s t h e s e s y s t e m s a r e c o n s t r u e d l o g i c i s t i c -

ally, the r u l e c o n t e x t s a r e d e t e r m i n e d c o n v e n t i o n a l l y a g a i n s t the b a c k d r o p of p u r p o s e s beyond the s y s t e m (cp. Carnap~ 1950).

On an i n t u i t i o n a l i s t u n d e r s t a n d i n g , the r u l e c o n t e x t s a r e

d e t e r m i n e d by the l i m i t s of r e a l i t y , giving again a deontological b a s e , e x p r e s s e d n e g a t i v e l y as limits.

However one c o n s t r u e s the foundations of m a t h e m a t i c s , t h e s e a l t e r n a t i v e s r e v e a l

d i f f e r e n t u n d e r s t a n d i n g s of the c o n s t i t u t i v e r o l e for r u l e s .

E i t h e r the c o n s t i t u t i v e c o n -

s t r a i n t s a r e f o r m u l a t e d t e l e o l o g i e a l l y by convention, o r they a r e c o n f r o n t e d deontologically a s l i m i t s to action.

W h a t e v e r o n e ' s m e t a p h y s i c a l c o m m i t m e n t s , the f o r m e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n

h a s m a n y h e u r i s t i c v a l u e s for m a t h e m a t i c s .

So long a s we c l a i m to be w o r k i n g w i t h n a t u r a l

l a n g u a g e s , the f o r m e r is c l e a r l y i m p l a u s i b l e both t h e o r e t i c a l l y and p r a c t i c a l l y for s t u d i e s of language and of speaking. With T - 3 as a s t a r t i n g point, we have a b a s i s for u n d e r s t a n d i n g r u l e - g o v e r n e d b e h a v i o r in the w e a k e s t p o s s i b l e s e n s e : Rule-governed behaviorl=Df"

Habituated a c t i v i t y within a d e l i m i t e d context,

w h e r e the h a b i t u a t i o n i s d e t e r m i n e d n e g a t i v e l y by t h e s e l i m i t s , but c a n be d e s c r i b e d a s b e i n g in a c c o r d a n c e with a s e t of r u l e s t h a t m a k e the l i m i t s definite. On t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , it is p o s s i b l e for d i f f e r e n t s e t s of r u l e s , l o g i c a l l y e q u i v a l e n t , to define the context for action.

It i s a l s o p o s s i b l e f o r m a n y p a t t e r n s of action to be g o v e r n e d

196

b y t h e s e r u l e s , without t h e s e a c t i o n s e v e r confronting the l i m i t s of the c o n t e x t for which the r u l e s give an accounting. involving a r u l e .

Thus, it is p o s s i b l e for a c t i o n s to be c o n s t r a i n e d by l i m i t s without

This m a k e s the n o n - s m o k e r " g o v e r n e d " in his actions by the r e g u l a t i o n of

a n o - s m o k i n g r u l e , s i n c e the act of smoking would be p o s s i b l e for him independent of the context, and the r u l e s of the context would p r o h i b i t that action.

Still, while we might be

willing to concede that he w a s g o v e r n e d by the r u l e in t h i s weak s e n s e , we would find it odd to say that he was obeying it~ and l u d i c r o u s to say that he was following it. In the light of such c o n s i d e r a t i o n s as t h e s e , Saporta, 1967, p. 22) r e j e c t s such a weak s e n s e of r u l e - g o v e r n e d b e h a v i o r .

He m a i n t a i n s that "in any c a s e w h e r e the s i m p l e s t s i m u -

lation of the o r g a n i s m r e q u i r e s c o m p u t a t i o n s that appeal to the r u l e , it follows that the o r g a n i s m w h o s e b e h a v i o r i s s i m u l a t e d m u s t know the r u l e . "

This would at l e a s t be a plausible

c l a i m , w e r e a given s e t of r u l e s uniquely a p p r o p r i a t e to a given context. the example of the s q u a r i n g and additive r u l e s , this is not the c a s e ,

But as we saw in

To s i m u l a t e the p r o c -

e s s e s r e q u i r e d to develop that n u m b e r s e r i e s does r e q u i r e c o m p u t a t i o n s that appeal to a r u l e , but not to a uniquely d e t e r m i n e d one.

If the p s y c h o l i n g u i s t finds his own r u l e s uniquely

d e t e r m i n e d , it i s b e c a u s e they a r e so d e t e r m i n e d by the t h e o r e t i c a l s y s t e m in which he o p e r a t e s , not by the activity c o n t e x t in which his s u b j e c t o p e r a t e s .

This t h r o w s us back to the

p r o b l e m s of i n f e r r i n g f r o m the g e n e r a l i z a t i o n r o l e of linguistic r u l e s to the constitutive and r e g u l a t i v e r o l e s of r u l e - g o v e r n e d b e h a v i o r in speaking.

Even if we concluded on s o m e

ground o r a n o t h e r that the s q u a r i n g r u l e i s t h e o r e t i c a l l y p r e f e r a b l e , the s u b j e c t would not have to know it in any s e n s e of "know" to c a r r y out the activity r e q u i r e d .

That he would have

to know s o m e rule in s o m e s e n s e s e e m s to be r e q u i r e d for t r e a t i n g p a t t e r n e d b e h a v i o r a s r u l e - g o v e r n e d , and this does r e q u i r e a s t r o n g e r s e n s e of r u l e - g o v e r n e d b e h a v i o r than our f i r s t , weak s e n s e . A s t r o n g e r s e n s e of r u l e - g o v e r n e d b e h a v i o r is one in which the o r g a n i s m knows w h e r e

the limits are, though he may not know what the limits are. Rule-governed

behavior2=Df"

Habituated activity determined

negatively by the

limits of the context and deriving its patterns from confrontation with those limits. The limits are learned by breaking the rules in the sense of activity exceeding the limits of the context, and thus proving in a variety of possible ways unsuccessful text.

action for that con-

This need not involve the formulation or "internalization" of rules for the context, but

only an accommodation

of action to its limits.

Such a trial and basis for habituating action

to the limits of a context is for a variety of reasons both inefficient and inadequate. individual's society cooperates with him in the development positive reinforcement the organism

may

But an

of his action patterns, both by

and by derivative negative reinforcement.

By such social constraints,

be habituated to certain patterns of action in accommodation

to derived

197

l i m i t s i m p o s e d by his s o c i e t y .

Such c o o p e r a t i o n would not r e q u i r e the o r g a n i s m to know the

u l t i m a t e l i m i t s of the context, m u c h l e s s r u l e s that g o v e r n action in r e l a t i o n to t h e m ; but i n s o f a r a s i t w e r e i n t e n t i o n a l , such c o o p e r a t i o n would r e q u i r e his s o c i e t y to know what the l i m i t s w e r e and s o m e s e t of r u l e s t h a t would a c c o u n t for t h e m . N e i t h e r of the s e n s e s offered so f a r gives us a b a s i s for talk about i n t e r n a l i z i n g , knowing, e m p l o y i n g o r applying r u l e s . R u l e - g o v e r n e d behavior3=Df"

F o r t h i s , we n e e d a yet s t r o n g e r s e n s e . Habituated a c t i v i t y u n d e r s t o o d by the a c t o r a s in

a context d e t e r m i n e d by r u l e s a c c o u n t i n g for the l i m i t s of t h a t context.

Such

r u l e s m a y be e m p l o y e d by the a c t o r as guides for f u r t h e r activity. T h i s is the f i r s t s e n s e which s e e m s adequate to the i n q u i r i e s of l i n g u i s t i c s , m a t h e m a t i c s and c o m p u t e r s c i e n c e ; it i s s t r o n g enough to s u p p o r t c o n c e r n s with e x p l a n a t i o n , p r e d i c t i o n and i n f e r e n c e ; it is too s t r o n g , a s we have s e e n , to i m p u t e to the s p e a k e r / h e a r e r a s a c o n dition for his c o m p e t e n c e , and i t is s t r o n g e r than n e c e s s a r y for a s o c i e t y to a c c u l t u r a t e i t s m e m b e r s to p a t t e r n s of a c t i o n s within r u l e - o r d e r e d c o n t e x t s .

B e c a u s e m o d e l s for l a n g u a g e s

in l i n g u i s t i c s , m a t h e m a t i c s and c o m p u t e r s c i e n c e p r e s u p p o s e s o m e t h i n g like t h i s u n d e r s t a n d ing of r u l e - g o v e r n e d b e h a v i o r , they a r e c l e a r l y i n a p p r o p r i a t e for m o d e l s for p s y c h o l o g i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t and p e r f o r m a n c e .

None of the s e n s e s o f f e r e d give an adequate u n d e r s t a n d i n g of

r u l e - g o v e r n e d a c t i v i t y for the s p e a k e r / h e a r e r ;

and if we had such, we would s t i l l n e e d an

a c c o u n t of how the o r g a n i s m m o v e s in h i s d e v e l o p m e n t f r o m r e a c t i o n to action to r u l e - f o r m a tion to r u l e - e m p l o y m e n t .

In t e r m s of T - 3 , t h i s l a t t e r q u e s t i o n b e c o m e s :

Q - 4 : How does an o r g a n i s m develop in i t s o p e r a t i o n s f r o m c o n f r o n t a t i o n with l i m i t s to f o r m u l a t i n g l i m i t s a s r u l e s for use in s u b s e q u e n t a c t i v i t y ? III While the n a t i v i s t would a g r e e t h a t t h e r e is d e v e l o p m e n t , he would m a i n t a i n t h a t the r u l e s t h e m s e l v e s a r e not the c r e a t i o n s of h u m a n a c t i o n , but a r e in s o m e s e n s e built into the o r g a n i s m f r o m the o u t s e t .

T h i s d i s c u s s i o n b a s e d on T - 3 i s thus c l e a r l y a n t i - n a t i v i s t i c .

does not i m p l y t h a t it is therefore~ a s so m a n y would i n f e r , b e h a v i o r i s t i c . has t h r o u g h o u t p r e s u p p o s e d that a c t i o n is i n t e n t i o n a l action.

This

This exploration

The e m p l o y m e n t of " b e h a v i o r "

in psychology is u s u a l l y a s l i p p e r y one, s i n c e it c l a i m s h o n o r i f i c a l l y to be e m p i r i c a l , and yet s e r v e s to r e f e r to a c t i o n i n t e r p r e t e d a s i n t e n t i o n a l .

For most purposes this is harmless

enough, but will not do when the notion of b e h a v i o r i t s e l f is in question.

Philosophers, work-

ing on the concept of action, usually d i s t i n g u i s h action f r o m b e h a v i o r , only to be left w o n d e r ing how to u n d e r s t a n d intention, and how to r e l a t e the notion of a c t i o n to t h a t of b e h a v i o r . One p a t e n t m o v e i s to r e d u c e action c a t e g o r i e s to b e h a v i o r c a t e g o r i e s .

Such a t t e m p t s i n e v i -

t a b l y r e s o r t to s o m e d i s p o s i t i o n a l c o n c e p t s ( " b e l i e f " , " a t t i t u d e " , o r m o r e g e n e r a l l y " h a b i t s " ,

198

"propensities")

as reduction devices.

tions require ana analysis in terms

Work

with reduction sentences has shown that disposi-

of contrary-to-fact

conditionals,

tionals cannot be completely reduced to perational considerations T-4- Reduction of dispositional statements to observation

and that these condi-

(cp. Hempel,

1965).

statements is systematic-

ally impossible. With such a conclusion,

it should become

clear that the "behavior"

erned behavior" is not strictly speaking observational,

spoken of in "rule-gov-

but requires interpretation as

intentional action or dispositions to action. I am inclined to maintain a stronger thesis than T-4; namely, only be understood as potentials for actualizations of some with in a teleological framework clude the development

Even this stronger version would not pre-

of the conceptual complexities

involved.

to call for,

To deny that such

takes place would require that we posit either dispositions or intentions as

starting-points. some

ends, and must therefore be dealt

of intentions from dispositions from events, as Q-4 seems

but it does expose something development

of explanation.

that dispositions can

Pe~:haps this is what is embedded

explanation.

in the nativist claim, but that too requires

In the end, I think we need an adequate understanding

to get at the notion of a r u l e in r u l e - g o v e r n e d activity. d i r e c t e d action is inadequate. n e c e s s a r y one.

of intentional action

To say that intentional action is g o a l -

G o a l - d i r e c t i o n i s a sufficient condition f o r intention, but not a

It is quite a p p r o p r i a t e to call an action intentional even when it is not done

"on p u r p o s e . " Indeed, it was j u s t a t this point that we found our a n a l y s i s of " g o v e r n e d " i n adequate.

F o r a r u l e to be "involved" does not r e q u i r e it to be a tool o r a guide to activity

any m o r e than intention r e q u i r e s p u r p o s e .

The s e n s e in which " r u l e - g o v e r n e d " activity i n -

volves a r u l e , but not as a tool for calculation, is just the s e n s e in which a c t i v i t y i s i n t e n t i o n al, but not g o a l - d i r e c t e d .

It i s in t h i s a s yet inadequately e x p l o r e d r a n g e of m e a n i n g that the

s e n s e of a notion of a rule r e l e v a n t to c o n c e r n s in psychology of language l i e s .

IV So f a r , q u e s t i o n s and t h e s e s r e g a r d i n g r u l e - g o v e r n e d b e h a v i o r have been exposed by

treating "rule", "governed"

and "behavior" in turn.

Another tact of exposition might be to

e x a m i n e o t h e r s e t s of c a t e g o r i e s r e l e v a n t to p s y c h o l i n g u i s t i e s with which r u l e s and action s e e m to have s o m e a f f i n i t i e s .

T h e r e is s o m e t e m p t a t i o n to draw analogies along the l i n e s of

rule/action = structure/function = competence/performance = explanation/observation.

The

extent to which such equations of the r e l a t i o n s of c a t e g o r i e s can be run would make an i n t e r e s t i n g c o m c e p t u a l e x p l o r a t i o n in itself.

We can e x p l o r e the m a t t e r h e r e only so far as the

v a r i o u s s e t s of c a t e g o r i e s s h e d s o m e light on the notion of a r u l e .

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S t r u c t u r e s s e r v e a s a b a s i s f o r function a s r u l e s s e r v e as a b a s i s f o r a c t i o n s . s t a t e m e n t is patently f a l s e , but invites f u r t h e r exploration. be d i s t i n g u i s h e d .

The

F i r s t , kinds of s t r u c t u r e s m u s t

Social, linguistic and p h y s i c a l s t r u c t u r e s d i f f e r in kind f r o m one a n o t h e r

p r e c i s e l y with r e f e r e n c e to the r o l e played by r u l e s .

The s t r u c t u r e s of language and s o c i e t y

a r e d e s c r i b a b l e in t e r m s of r u l e s f o r the formulation of s t r u c t u r e s and of r u l e s for the o p e r ation of functions within t h o s e s t r u c t u r e s .

P h y s i c a l s t r u c t u r e s by c o n t r a s t can be d e s c r i b e d

without r e c o u r s e to r u l e s , and it m a k e s no s e n s e to s p e a k of the r u l e s of f o r m a t i o n f o r physical structures.

P h y s i c a l functions a r e d e s c r i b e d in t e r m s of l a w s , not r u l e s .

How like

laws r u l e s may be and to what extent the l a t t e r can be r e d u c e d to the f o r m e r a r e s a l i e n t p r o b l e m s in philosophy of s c i e n c e , and on t h e m t u r n many of the q u e s t i o n s about how s o c i a l and b e h a v i o r a l s c i e n c e s a r e r e l a t e d to p h y s i c a l and biological s c i e n c e s .

But taws a r e not r u l e s .

An a n a l y s i s of how laws d i f f e r f r o m r u l e s might be v e r y r e v e a l i n g for how c o n c e p t s of s t r u c t u r e and function and the r e l a t i o n between s t r u c t u r e and function d i f f e r between a p h y s i c a l and a social context. In a quite d i f f e r e n t m a n n e r , linguistic s t r u c t u r e s differ f r o m social s t r u c t u r e s .

In

the s e n s e that f o r m a t i o n and function r u l e s for s o c i a l c o n s t i t u t i o n s can be changed by human d e c i s i o n and action, they a r e conventional. same sort.

On a TG a n a l y s i s , l i n g u i s t i c r u l e s a r e not of the

The p r e v a l e n t t h e s i s is that they a r e built in; built into the o r g a n i s m for b a s e

s t r u c t u r e and into the language for t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s to s u r f a c e s t r u c t u r e .

The s e n s e s of

s t r u c t u r e h e r e s e e m a m e n a b l e n e i t h e r to the p h y s i c a l m o d e l n o r to the s o c i a l one.

Language

s t r u c t u r e s a r e analogous to p h y s i c a l s t r u c t u r e s e x c e p t that they r e q u i r e r u l e s for t h e i r description.

SpeaMng functions a r e analogous to s o c i a l functions e x c e p t that t h e i r c o n s t i t u -

tive foundations a r e not c l e a r l y conventional. between p h y s i c a l laws and social n o r m s .

L i n g u i s t i c r u l e s hang in conceptual d i s c o m f o r t

J u s t a s t h e i r s t a t u s r e l a t i v e to the f o r m a l / e m p i r i c a l

divide is p r o b l e m a t i c , so is it, r e l a t i v e to the p h y s i c a l / s o c i a l divide.

However the analogue

between r u l e s / a c t i o n and s t r u c t u r e / f u n c t i o n may w o r k out, the notion of a r u l e a s a p s y c h o linguis tic phenomenon will r e m a i n p r o b l e m a t i c . T h e r e is one c l e a r s e n s e in which s t r u c t u r e s a r e like, r u l e s .

Both s e t l i m i t s to

function.

But, a s we have s e e n , t h e r e a r e r u l e s in and f o r action a s well a s action a c c o r d i n g

to r u l e s .

R u l e s , a s human f o r m u l a t i o n s , s e r v e a s tools a s well a s l i m i t s .

differ f r o m physical s t r u c t u r e s and f r o m physical l a w s .

As such, they

As such, they a l s o differ f r o m l i n -

guistic r u l e s , a t l e a s t f r o m that notion of r u l e that we have been s e e k i n g . A l s o like r u l e s , c o m p e t e n c e s e t s l i m i t s to action, and in its r e l a t i o n to p e r f o r m a n c e s e e m s to have a s i m i l a r r o l e to that of s t r u c t u r e in r e l a t i o n to function.

The c o m p e t e n c e /

p e r f o r m a n c e c a t e g o r i e s a l s o s e r v e a s a conceptual bridge between l i n g u i s t i c s and psychology. The p r e v a i l i n g analogy between c o m p e t e n c e / p e r f o r m a n c e and l a n g u e / p a r o l e i s a m i s l e a d i n g

200

one, h o w e v e r .

C o m p e t e n c e , unlike s t r u c t u r e , i s aa action c a t e g o r y .

Competence is a con-

dition f o r p e r f o r m a n c e in d i f f e r e n t w a y s f r o m s t r u c t u r e a s a condition for function, and f r o m language a s a condition for speaking. (presumably) s t r u c t u r e is not.

C o m p e t e n c e i s t e l e o l o g i c a l l y defined in ways

C o m p e t e n c e can only be u n d e r s t o o d in t e r m s of the p e r f o r -

m a n c e it is the c o m p e t e n c e for, while s t r u c t u r e can be u n d e r s t o o d independent of function. So too with language and speaking, but in a d i f f e r e n t way. does not p e r f o r m a c o m p e t e n c e .

One s p e a k s a language, but one

One m u s t s u r e l y have c o m p e t e n c e with a language in o r d e r

to have the p e r f o r m a n c e of speaking it, but t h i s d o e s not w a r r a n t equating the r e l a t i o n of language to speaking with that of c o m p e t e n c e to p e r f o r m a n c e .

W h e r e we can speak of r u l e s

of language and r u l e s for speaking and p e r f o r m a n c e , we cannot speak of r u l e s for c o m p e t e n c e . A n o t h e r p r o b l e m with the r o l e of " c o m p e t e n c e " on p s y c h o l i n g u i s t i c d i s c o u r s e i s a s y s t e m a t i c ambiguity between i t s c a p a c i t y - s e n s e and its a b i l i t y - s e n s e (the d i s t i n c t i o n h e r e i s

a technical one~ since "capacity" and "ability" are used interchangeably in most discourse, which facilitates the ambiguity). "Capacity" has a passive connotation and "ability" an active one. Capacities are "built in" to the organism, but abilities are developed.

One may have

the capacity to speak Language, but he acquires the ability to speak a language, and it is in the acquisition of this ability that he is said to acquire a language.

Insofar as competence

sets limits in the capacity-sense, it is related to performance just as structure is to function. But this is so just so far as we can say that physiological structure determines the capacity for speaking, and the structures involved here are not linguistic; nor does a notion of rule in any way come into play. While there may be some sense in which the acquisition and employment of abilities for speaking is rule-governed, the sense is not clear, nor is it clear that such psychological rules are of the nature of linguistic ones. An understanding of how the

competence~performancecategories serve as

then, requires some sorting out of these issues.

a bridge between linguistics and psychology, Far from illuminating the role of linguis-

tic rules in the act of speaking, the presuppose an understanding of that role. I noted at the outset G.A. Miller's concern with the role of rules in descriptive science. The contrast of descriptive/normative motivated his concern, since it is in the context of the normative that discussion of rules most readily appears. We might equally well ask about the role of rules in an explanatory gcienee. Is "rule-governed behavior" an explanatory term in psyeholinguistics to give an account of observed and predicted acts of speaking? This seems a specification of the broader question of analogues between explanation/observation and rules/action. To pursue the matter, we need an additional thesis: T-5: Explanation influences description and is not reduceable to it. The thesis is necessary because unenlightened neopositivists and neobehaviorists have continued to maintain a descriptivist view of theories (i. e . , that theories are shorthand deserip-

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t i o n s of o b s e r v a t i o n s ) , and this h a s r e m a i n e d m o s t p r e v a l e n t in psychology, of all the s c i ences.

The move away f r o m such a view, i r o n i c a l l y , has been led by s u c h logical p o s i t i v i s t s

a s C a r n a p (1936) a n d Hempel (1965) t h e m s e l v e s .

The l a t t e r p o r t i o n of T - 5 i s but a c o r o l l a r y

to T - 4 , s i n c e a n a l y s i s of t h e o r e t i c a l t e r m s i n e v i t a b l y r e s u l t s in d i s p o s i t i o n a l f o r m u l a t i o n s . The f o r m e r portion is but a c l a i m t h a t o b s e r v a t i o n s t a t e m e n t s t h e m s e l v e s a r e t h e o r y - l a d e n , and r e q u i r e for t h e i r u n d e r s t a n d i n g s o m e t h e o r e t i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n on the p a r t of the o b s e r v e r . Once t h i s t h e s i s is g r a n t e d , d i s c o m f o r t with h y p o t h e t i c a l c o n s t r u c t s , i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s , m e c h a n i s m s and the like n e e d no l o n g e r d o m i n a t e c o n c e r n with the r o l e of l i n g u i s t i c r u l e s in psychology of language.

The a i m is no l o n g e r to m a k e " r u l e " o b s e r v a t i o n a l o r e v e n o p e r a -

tional, but r a t h e r to u n d e r s t a n d i t s r o l e in the u n d e r s t a n d i n g of psychology of language. L e a v i n g d e s c r i p t i v i s m behind, we a r e s t i l l not out of t h e woods.

R e a l i s m and

i n s t r u m e n t a l i s m r e m a i n v i a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e s for ways of u n d e r s t a n d i n g the r o l e of t h e o r i e s in s c i e n t i f i c explanation.

On a r e a l i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , t h e o r e t i c a l e n t i t i e s m a y not be o b s e r v a -

ble, but they a r e n o n t h e l e s s r e a l (e, g . , s u b - a t o m i c p a r t i c l e s a r e not d i r e c t l y o b s e r v a b l e , but t h e y a r e t h e r e ) .

It i s t h i s s o r t of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h a t has l e d to c o n t e n t i o n s by p s y c h o -

l i n g u i s t s t h a t l i n g u i s t i c r u l e s a r e i n v o l v e d in v e r b a l d e v e l o p m e n t and b e h a v i o r . guistic r u l e s a r e r e q u i r e d to give an adequate a c c o u n t of v e r b a l b e h a v i o r .

Certain lin-

Since the notion

of a r u l e i s r e q u i r e d for such explanation, t h e r e m u s t r e a l l y be s u c h a r u l e o p e r a t i n g in the d e v e l o p m e n t and p e r f o r m a n c e of the s p e a k e r / h e a r e r .

On m y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of T - 3 , " i n v o l v e -

m e a t of a r u l e " is a n o m a l o u s for the r e a l i s t , since I r e q u i r e d denying the " r e a l i t y " of a r u l e , j u s t w h e r e he r e q u i r e s a f f i r m i n g it.

Even if m y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n can be gotten a r o u n d , the

r e a l i s t s t i l l has the p r o b l e m of t e l l i n g us j u s t what s o r t of t h e o r e t i c a l r e a l i t y a r u l e i s . linguistic, psychological, or physiological? other?

Is it

Can one o r a n o t h e r of t h e s e be r e d u c e d to a n -

With t h e s e q u e s t i o n s we a r e c l e a r l y thrown back upon e a r l i e r q u a n d i r e s . My i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of T - 3 i s c l e a r l y i n s t r u m e n t a l , t r e a t i n g r u l e s a s h e u r i s t i c d e v i c e s

of i n q u i r y f o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g , p r e d i c t i n g and planning.

The r o l e of r u l e s in e x p l a n a t i o n a r e

thus s e e n a s the tools of the i n q u i r e r , not the r e f e r e n t s of the i n q u i r y .

T h i s l e a v e s the

question of the r e l a t i o n s of v a r i o u s c o n c e r n s of l i n g u i s t i c s , psychology and physiology r e g a r d i n g r u l e s still in question.

It does, h o w e v e r , show t h a t the q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r they a r e

r e l a t e d i s a n open one, and it a l s o shows t h a t the q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r t h e y a r e r e d u e e a b l e to 1 one a n o t h e r Ks a n u n n e c e s s a r y one. But if it so a l l e v i a t e s s o m e of the p r o b l e m s of a r e a l i s t 1

Something of t h i s l a s t point has a l r e a d y been s e t f o r t h in J o h n L a m e n d e l l a ' s c o n t r i b u t i o n to this c o n f e r e n c e , although we m a y d i f f e r in the d e t a i l s of f o r m u l a t i o n and i m p l i c a t i o n . An i n s t r u m e n t a l i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e o r i e s r e q u i r e s no s i n g l e u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the s a m e o b j e c t s and e v e n t s , but allows f o r a v a r i e t y of e x p l a n a t i o n s a c c o r d i n g to a v a r i e t y of c o n c e r n s . The r e a l i s t r e q u i r e s r e d u c t i o n , for e c o n o m y of i n q u i r y and s i m p l i c i t y of ontology.

202

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , it b r i n g s with it p r o b l e m s of its own.

If " i n v o l v e m e n t of a r u l e " a p p e a r s

a n o m a l o u s f r o m a r e a l i s t p e r s p e c t i v e , " i n v o l v e m e n t of a r u l e " a p p e a r s m y s t e r i o u s f r o m an instrumentalist perspective.

If the notion of a r u l e i s r e q u i r e d for e x p l a n a t i o n of the p s y -

chology of l i n g u i s t i c d e v e l o p m e n t and p e r f o r m a n c e , to say t h a t it is only r e q u i r e d for the u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the i n q u i r e r s e e m s to deny t h a t he is r e a l l y getting at what is going on in the s p e a k e r / h e a r e r situation.

A r e r u l e s involved f o r the a c t o r s a s well a s the s p e c t a t o r ?

If so, the question of how they a r e i n v o l v e d r e m a i n s .

That they a r e involved d i f f e r e n t l y for

the a c t o r s f r o m t h e i r e x p l a n a t o r y r o l e for the s p e c t a t o r only a c c e n t s o u r e a r l i e r q u a n d r i e s about how r u l e s a r e i n v o l v e d in speaking. We u n d e r t o o k t h i s e x p l o r a t i o n of s t r u c t u r e / f u n c t i o n , c o m p e t e n c e / p e r f o r m a n c e , and e x p l a n a t i o n / o b s e r v a t i o n , w i t h the hope t h a t exposition of s i m i l a r i t i e s and r e l a t i o n s to r u l e s / a c t i o n would a l s o r e v e a l a m o r e adequate u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the notion of a r u l e in p s y c h o l i n quistic c o n c e r n s , and with that a n s w e r s to o u r e a r l i e r q u e s t i o n s .

W h a t we have found a r e

new q u e s t i o n s , m a n y of which s e e m to be r e f o r m u l a t i o n s of the q u e s t i o n s e x p o s e d in o u r e a r lier explorations.

Indeed, an a d e q u a t e e x p o s i t i o n of the notion of a r u l e s e e m s to be r e q u i r e d

for an adequate u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e s e s i m i l a r i t i e s and r e l a t i o n s . V In this p a p e r , I have p r o d u c e d no m o r e t h a n I p r o m i s e d .

In e x p l o r i n g the notion of a

r u l e , I have offered a few q u e s t i o n s t h a t give s o m e o r i e n t a t i o n to c o n c e p t u a l p r o b l e m s , and a few t h e s e s that give s o m e d i r e c t i o n for f u r t h e r e x p l o r a t i o n .

Negatively, we have found t h a t

it m a k e s no s e n s e to talk of r u l e s of L..anguage; that t h e r e is a shift in r o l e s f r o m r u l e s of language to r u l e s fo__rs p e a k i n g and t h a t t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p r e q u i r e s e x a m i n a t i o n ; t h a t the notion of a r u l e is without an e s t a b l i s h e d conceptual home within l i n g u i s t i c and p s y c h o l i n guistic discourse.

P o s i t i v e l y , I have p r e s e n t e d s o m e t h e s e s a n d s o m e e x p l o r a t i o n s of " r u l e -

g o v e r n e d b e h a v i o r " t h a t s u g g e s t t h a t an a d e q u a t e notion of a r u l e in t h e s e c o n t e x t s m u s t wait upon a m o r e adequate u n d e r s t a n d i n g of i n t e n t i o n a l action.

The notion of a r u l e p r e s e n t s s o m e

e x c i t i n g p r o s p e c t s in t h e s e c o n t e x t s , a m o n g t h e m a b r i d g e between the f o r m a l and e m p i r i c a l s c i e n c e s (but unlike e n g i n e e r i n g ) and between the n a t u r a l and social s c i e n c e s (but unlike physiological psychology).

F o r such b r i d g e s to stand, h o w e v e r , we m u s t u n d e r s t a n d the

notion of a r u l e on which they a r e b a s e d . References C a r n a p , Rudolf,(1950), " E m p i r i c i s m , S e m a n t i c s , and Ontology", Revue I n t e r n a t i o n a l e de P h i l o s 0 p h i e , 4 , 20-41. R e p r i n t e d with r e v i s i o n s in h i s Meaning and N e c e s s i t y ; A study in s e m a n t i c s and modal logic, 2nd E d . , Chicago: U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s (1956) and in Olshewsky, T ( e d . ) , P r o b l e m s in the P h i l o s o p h y of Language, New York: Holt, R i n e h a r t and Winston (1969).

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Carnap, Rudolf (1936), "Testability and Meaning", Philosophy of Science, 3 , 419-471. Carnap, Rudolf (1937), "Testability and Meaning", Philosophy of Science, 4, 2-40. Chomsky, Noam (1961), "On the Notion "Rule of G r a m m a r ' ", Proceedings of the Twelfth Symposium on Applied Mathematics. Reprinted in Fodor, J . A . and J . J . Katz (eds), The Structure of Language; Readings in the philosophy of language, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall (1964). Chomsky, Noam (1968), Language and Mind, New York: Harcourt, Brace and World. Fodor,

J. (1966), "How

to Learn to Talk: Some

Simple Ways",

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