One Size Fits All? Using Standard Global Tools in ... - Core

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ScienceDirect Procedia Engineering 107 (2015) 18 – 26

Humanitarian Technology: Science, Systems and Global Impact 2015, HumTech2015

One Size Fits All? Using Standard Global Tools in Humanitarian Logistics Marianne Jahrea *, Ozlem Ergunb, Jarrod Goentzelc a

MIT Humanitarian Response Lab, 77 Massachusetts Ave, Cambridge, MA , 02139, USA; BI Norwegian Business School, 0442 Oslo, Norway; bMechanical and Industrial Engineering, Northeastern University, 453 Snell Engineering Center, 360 Huntington Avenue, Boston, MA 02115, USA, cMIT Humanitarian Response Lab, 77 Massachusetts Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA

Abstract

Reporting on a study undertaken in cooperation with International Federation Red Cross Red Crescent (IFRC) the paper contributes to the understanding of using standard global tools in humanitarian logistics. We present three case studies of disaster response in Haiti, Turkey and the Ivory Coast with particular attention to (1) Future requirements to humanitarian supply chains; and (2) IFRC Global Logistics Services’ use of standard tools in different local contexts. A cross case analysis concludes with initial implications for practice and further research. © Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license ©2015 2015The The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/). Peer-review under responsibility of the Organizing Committee of HumTech2015. Peer-review under responsibility of the Organizing Committee of HumTech2015

Keywords: action research; humanitarian logistics; capacity building; standard; supply chain design; local adaptation; tool

1. Introduction and purpose Humanitarian logistics is about preparedness (preparing for disaster including developing competence, prepositioning of stocks etc.), response (during a disaster), and recovery (getting back to normal state). Typical assistance required in the aftermath of a disaster to stabilize a community after search and rescue is temporary shelter, health support, water and sanitation, food and cooking equipment. In total close 22 billion USD was spent in 2013 on international humanitarian response [1]. Logistics account for up to 60-80% of total cost and there is much room for improvements [2]. Lack of funding, particularly for preparedness, makes it difficult for responding agencies to plan and run good operations. A commonly quoted statistic says that 1 dollar spent in preparedness

* Marianne Jahre. Tel.: 857-452-5883; fax: +0-000-000-0000 . E-mail address: [email protected]

1877-7058 © 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license

(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/). Peer-review under responsibility of the Organizing Committee of HumTech2015

doi:10.1016/j.proeng.2015.06.054

Marianne Jahre et al. / Procedia Engineering 107 (2015) 18 – 26

activities is worth 7 dollars in response. Increasing prices of food and fuel, lack of information about needs, lack of coordination, local and international capacity, and competence are some of the causes resulting in high costs and fewer people being helped [3]. Following the response to the Asian Pacific Tsunami and Hurricane Katrina in 2005, research within humanitarian logistics has attracted great interest. Much however, is accused of lacking relevance [4]. In line with logistics in general [5] and other management research [6], it is pointed at the gap between research and practice. Some research laboratories and projects answer the call for more useful research by working closely with the humanitarian sector and directly responding to commissioned projects calls. Disseminating this research in scientific journals is challenging, both because of time constraints and because the scientific community is sceptic, questioning its rigor [7]. Action research (AR), i.e. experiments on real problems designed to assist in solutions is one possible approach. Here the researcher involves highly in an iterative process of problem identification, planning, action, and evaluation intending to contribute to academic theory as well as practical action [8]. AR is a ‘scientific approach to study the resolution of important social or organizational issues together with those who experience these issues directly’ [9]. Through research undertaken during the past 7-10 years, the authors have focused on field studies and development of tools with a high attention to relevance. Among other challenges, we have worked with (a) The importance of understanding of humanitarian needs, i.e. demand, in disaster preparedness and response to improve planning and preparedness and thus efficiency and effectiveness and; (b) How the local community in disaster areas are able to cope, how they can improve, and for what they need assistance, particularly regarding the organizations’ use of standard global tools and how they fit with the local context. In response to (a) A preliminary concept and prototype of a demand-forecasting tool was developed [10]. The International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) tested the prototype when they developed their five-year logistics strategy using the data as a basis to calculate activities with according preparedness and response requirements in each region [11]. IFRC is currently implementing this strategy. In response to (b), the authors undertook case studies, requested by IFRC, of three different disaster responses to analyze present local capacity and alternatives for the future to test conclusions from a general business case developed by IFRC and which also used results from (a) [12]. This paper reports on the latter project. 1.1. Purpose of this paper With the purpose of understanding how disaster prone countries can prepare for disasters by building their own logistics competence and capacity, and for what they need international assistance, this paper focus (1) Main requirements important for design of future disaster response and preparedness supply chains; and (2) Use of standard tools offered by IFRC as a logistics service provider and how these adapt to local contexts. In this study we do not focus on Sphere standards, but on organizational standards developed by IFRC, and in particular those of logistics relevance. 1.2. Research design The study reports on three case studies of IFRC responses to the Turkey Earthquake in 2011, the Haiti Earthquake in 2010, and the Civil Unrest in Ivory Coast in 2011. IFRC selected the three cases to represent different disaster types and sizes, different strengths of National Societies, and different geographical regions. The studies are part of a long-term cooperation with IFRC using action research. Also called design science [13], action research is used in management information systems (MIS) [14], but less in supply chain management. Following recommendations by [15], this study took the following measures to secure rigor and appropriate documentation of the research process: 1) Design: Research questions and the purpose of study were formulated. Key aspects included treating the unit of analysis as an active object, and presenting the case context, i.e. its boundaries. 2) Data Collection: Case study protocols for each study describe how data was collected. Great care was taken in developing interview guides to secure comparable results. We used triangulation with multiple methods for data collection and analysis. The team-based approach used increases reliability of data, provided different skills and

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gave unique opportunities for data collection requiring more than one researcher. Furthermore, the data access and trust developed between the practitioners and researchers was important. Formal presentations to key actors and/or their review of the reports to substantiate the findings occurred during the process. 3) Data Analysis: The cross-case analysis of the three cases provides opportunities for categorization and pattern matching. The cyclical process including joint reflections with the unit of analysis was important. More analysis need to be undertaken with additional data to be collected, particularly on the implementation of the logistics strategy developed. 2. Case description and analysis GLS’ global structure consists of the Geneva secretariat headquarters, zonal logistics units in Kuala Lumpur, Panama, Nairobi, and Beirut, and a GLS office in Dubai [16]. In addition IFRCs 187 National Societies (NS) have logistics resources such as warehouses, staff, equipment, etc. [17]. We describe the disasters and according response briefly for each case followed by a cross-case analysis presented in tables for the sake of limitations in paper length. 2.1. Response to Civil Unrest in Ivory Coast 2011 Côte d’Ivoire has been in turmoil since the contested presidential election in November 2010. A period of political tension, instability and violence culminated in the arrest of Laurent Gbagbo on 11th April, 2011. The weeks of post-election violence led to thousands of deaths and provoked mass population movements within Cote d’Ivoire to neighboring countries, including Burkina Faso, Ghana, Guinea, Mali and especially Liberia, where the majority of Ivoirian refugees had sought protection and assistance. Initial assessments revealed dire humanitarian needs including NFIs, shelter, health services, psychosocial support, livelihoods, potable water and sanitation installations. Because of the conflict situation, IFRC worked with NS in the neighboring countries in updating their contingency plans, leaving International Committee Red Cross Red Crescent (ICRC) to take care of the IDPs within Côte d’Ivoire. By 6th January, 2011, ICRC was working with Croix Rouge Côte d’Ivoire (CRCI) in providing first aid and evacuating the wounded to hospitals. At this point, the Movement coordination mechanism in Abidjan was already working in close consultation with IFRC [18]. From 3rd April to 5th May, 2011, CRCI worked relentlessly to provide emergency relief aid to the victims of the crisis and put up an emergency team which worked in close coordination with the FACT (Field Assessment Coordination Team) deployed on 5th May. After conducting assessments, a PoA (Plan of Action) was published on 6th June [19], followed by the mobilization table launched by Dubai ZLU (Zone Logistics Unit). IFRC launched an emergency appeal on 17th June to assist 60.000 households. In spite of only 11% appeal funding coverage, 50% of the assessed needs in terms of shelter and hygiene kits, water supply and livelihoods were provided with 12.5% more NFIs compared to the original appeal. New needs assessments were recommended, but due to lack of funding most activities had to be put on standby or forwarded to other humanitarian actors and ICRC [20]. In summary, there were many parts of the IFRC organization involved in a majority of the activities with unclear division of tasks and lack of appropriate human, financial and physical resources resulting in an insufficient response from IFRC characterized by huge gaps. A consistent lack of funding, in particular for preparedness, suggests that there is lack of resources to make a step-change. 2.2. Response to earthquake in Van, Turkey 2011 On October 23, 2011, a 7.2 magnitude earthquake struck Van, Turkey. The earthquake caused a wide destruction in the city. The earthquake and its aftershocks were mostly felt in Hakkari, Bitlis, Agri, Igdir, Erzurum, Mus, Bingol, Tunceli, Batman, Sirnak, Mardin, Diyarbakir, Siirt and Sanliurfa provinces. 2,337 aftershocks were registered. 601 people died, 4,152 people were injured. 2,309 buildings completely collapsed and 11,847 buildings were severely damaged. The government mobilized necessary human and technical resources for the immediate deployment to the affected area. The affected area was divided into 71 zones for search and rescue operations (SAR) and was completed in 67 zones by 1st November [21]. The Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (DEMP) under the Prime Ministry, which is the main disaster management authority in the country, sent a team of

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20 experts to Van to facilitate effective rescue and relief operations. In addition, 200 experts from various provinces were dispatched to Van to conduct a rapid assessment of the damage caused by the earthquake. The Van earthquake can be considered a mid-sized disaster occurring in a prepared country with a strong and independent national society, namely the Turkish Red Crescent Society (TRCS) that works closely with DEMP. Two factors that made the operation challenging were the cold weather conditions together with the harsh geographical characteristics of the district and the intense aftershocks. As soon as the earthquake erupted, the TRCS established the Crisis Management Desk in the Disaster Management Center in its headquarters, Ankara, and made all its emergency response units fully operational. In addition, 6 other Regional Disaster Management Centers, and 2 other Local Disaster Management Centers of TRCS participated in the operations. The IFRC provided assistance to the TRCS from its Europe Zone Office in Budapest, backed by the Geneva technical team. TRCS is an example of a Resilient National Society (RNS) defined as “a national society, which has the ability when exposed to hazards to withstand, to support themselves and respond to the hazard in a timely and effective manner with or without external support.” [22] When an RNS is responding to a small-medium sized disaster, involvement of GLS is somewhat limited. Having its own logistics resources on the ground, TRCS declined using an IFRC logistics team for dispatch from the airport to Van. TRCS’ vast experience, sufficient funding, good supply processes, and own domestic logistics network meant little help was needed from GLS. However, due the approach of the winter, TRCS called upon GLS to assist with mobilizing resources internationally amounting to 31.7% of the total in-kind donations (IKD). 2.3. Response to earthquake in Haiti 2010 On January 12, 2010, a 7.0 magnitude earthquake struck Haiti. Port-au-Prince (PAP), the capital city, experienced widespread destruction. In Léogane and Gressier 70 per cent of homes were destroyed or damaged. Overall, three million people were affected. This included 222,570 deaths, 300,572 injuries, and 1.5 million people left homeless [23]. The earthquake in Haiti can be considered a mega disaster. Several factors made the humanitarian response especially complex. Haiti is one of the poorest countries in the world frequently struck by disasters. The infrastructure was significantly affected with damage to the port which was closed for two weeks and many blocked roads. The airport in Port-au-Prince (PaP) was initially closed and then overwhelmed by humanitarian assistance and cargo. The central government was crippled with the presidential palace and other government buildings destroyed and coordination was hampered by power and communication outages. More than 1000 humanitarian organizations responded, many newly formed [24]. Fifty-nine NS, many already active in the country participated [25] and the response included 21 Emergency Response Units (ERUs) such as field hospitals, water treatment plants, logistics bases, portable operations centers, emergency telecom infrastructure, and sanitation supplies. The response saw both multi-lateral and bi-lateral engagements between NS and Haiti Red Cross (HRC). While the multi-lateral can be seen as challenging in large-scale disasters such as this one, the many bi-lateral efforts created lack of coordination with additional costs, duplication, reduced ability to make strategic decisions, such as prioritization, and inefficient logistics due to lack of pipeline visibility. GLS, on the other hand, was perceived by some as inflexible, sometimes arrogant, and lack of priority in terms of customer service, GLS not taking responsibility for supplier failures, and with long response times if items had to be procured. Overall, after the first few weeks there was a lack of joint planning between programs, and IFRC and PNS [26].The transitions from emergency to recovery occurred late. After one year there were still over 1,000 camps with approximately 680,000 IDPs. 2.4. Cross-case analysis The project undertaken by IFRC GLS, within which the three case studies were done, concerned alternatives of providing international logistics services managed and operated outside the responding NS’ own capacity when preparing for and responding to natural and complex disasters. Two main overall elements that affect the management and delivery of international logistics services are the funding (ability to deliver) and the demand (the needs to be fulfilled). Overall findings concluded that in general future supply chain design should account for aspects such as increasing need. However, relative funding

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availability has decreased due to increasing commodity costs (e.g. oil and food increased by 30% and 35% respectively from 2007-2010). The demand for aid is relatively predictable with the same 20 countries received the bulk of the funds over the last 10 years. Finally, the study concluded that donors will require improvements in logistics; and that changing delivery mechanisms with more use of cash will require different logistics capabilities compared to the present [28]. 2.4.1. The disasters, the operations, and their context Table 1 shows some major differences in the context and of the three operations when comparing the cases. Table 1. Comparing the three cases, their context, and the operations on some main dimensions Dimension Type of disaster Region Size Complexity Host country vulnerability Strength Host National Society Number of actors involved Needs for international assistance Available funding Transition to recovery Availability of data Amount of GLS services used Amount of bilateral donations Local preparedness

Ivory Cost Civil Unrest Africa Medium Large High Low Relatively many High Very low Slow Low Medium Low Very low

Van Earthquake Europe Medium Medium Low High Relatively few Low High Quick High Low Medium Very high

Haiti Earthquake Americas Mega Large High Low Very many High High Slow High High High| Low

2.4.2. Requirements for design of future preparedness and response supply chains At present GLS supports NS in five main logistics activities of which GLS handles strategic planning and logistics standards, the Host National Society (HNS) manages its own demand and information management, while supply management can be carried out by GLS, the NS itself, commercial service providers, or other humanitarian organizations [27]. Hence, GLS uses standardized tools and processes in their own activities as well in the provision of support to NS in their demand- and information management and whoever is responsible for supply management. Table 2 shows main requirements’ importance for design of future preparedness and response supply chains and GLS’ capabilities as identified in our studies in 2012, i.e. how the respondents perceived the standardized support provided by GLS at the time of the operations in 2010 and 2011 compared to what they think is most important. Table 2. Requirements (A: critical; B: very important; C: important) & GLS capability (0%: fail; 50%: fail if A or B, OK is C; 100%: OK) Ivory Cost

Logistics activities

Requirements

Type

Importance (I) and perceived GLS capability (GLS)

I

GLS

I

GLS

I

Security Neutral and credible logistics service provider that meets donors’ criteria To be used as a fundraising and advocacy tool but be cost neutral Local knowledge - ability to assess the logistics infrastructure Management of a significant volume of logistics response services Provide adequate/state-of-the-art expertise, tools and delivery information Ensure up to date supply chain delivery mechanisms to handle cash/in-kind Develop NS logistics capacity in line with the national role Ability to use funds to develop supply chain in NS Work with internal NS resources Collaborate with the Logistics Cluster and other humanitarian supply chains Security Clear focal point, list of logistics services, consolidate demand Ability to estimate demand and put in place pre-agreements when possible Ability to inform and manage user/customer expectations/reasonable lead times to allow for order fulfillment

A A A A B A A A A A B A A A

ok fail fail ok fail fail fail fail fail fail fail ok fail fail

NA A B NA C A B C C C C NA A B

NA ok fail NA ok fail fail fail ok ok ok NA fail fail

NA A C NA B A B C C C C NA A B

GL S NA ok ok NA ok fail ok ok ok ok ok NA fail ok

A

fail

B

ok

B

fail

STRATEGIC PLANNING

LOGISTICS STANDARDS

DEMAND MANAGEMENT

Van

Haiti

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SUPPLY MANAGEMENT

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

Provide a viable alternative from the WFP UNHRD service Fast quotation for services, accurate invoices, and prompt resolution of errors Security Specify immediate availability when required for all development and disaster types Delivery to agreed timings, pro-active information order status and problems Help NS coordinate and manage engagement with other logistics providers Up front agreements for fast engagement when required Allow framework agreements and flexible payment methods (consignment stock, etc.) Understand/develop local market Open communication on service / product development and performance Ability for flexible pricing based on lead times To act as a supplier of transport and warehouse services Capability to provide supply chain services to external organizations Contractual arrangements based on joint rewards rather than penalties Timely, clear and well specified requirements and reports on use of contributions Have a designated person (reporting delegate) (either from NS or IFRC) Evidence based cost efficient and effective movement wide supply chain Active support for writing appeals/support pro-active funding strategies Proper coordination and management of information flow among Movement partners Proper infrastructure (both hardware and software) Prove competitive logistics service cost to the NS or Zone

C

fail

C

ok

C

ok

C

fail

A

fail

A

fail

A

ok

NA

NA

NA

NA

A

fail

A

fail

A

ok

A

fail

A

fail

A

fail

A A

fail fail

C C

ok ok

C C

ok ok

A

fail

C

ok

C

ok

A B B C C C

fail fail fail fail fail fail

NA C C B C C

NA ok ok fail ok ok

NA C C B C C

NA ok fail ok NA fail

A

fail

A

fail

A

fail

A A A

fail fail fail

NA C C

NA fail fail

NA C C

ok ok

A

fail

NA

NA

NA

NA

A N A

fail

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

B

fail

B

ok

3. Discussion Table 2 shows that in particular requirements’ importance vary between Ivory Coast on the one hand and Van and Haiti on the other. The respondents in the Ivory Coast case thought the majority of requirements were more important and they also pointed out additional ones (compared to the initial interview questions) including security, local knowledge, and support for additional activities such as reporting, fund-raising, and coordination. Possible reasons for this difference include disaster type (security more important in a complex disaster involving conflict such as in Ivory Coast), in HNS’ strength such as (lack of) local preparedness and funding, and the number of actors involved (may require more coordination and more support for coordination from GLS if NS is weak). Accordingly, what types of support a NS would request from GLS and how well they can use the standardized tools seem to differ depending on a number of factors. Further, the answer to the question of who should undertake supply management depends not only on the standards provided by GLS, but also on their adaptability to local needs and how well they fit with how HNS undertake demand and information management. If HNS lacks access to information technology, funding, human resources, etc. it may be very difficult to make use of sophisticated supply chain management tools and processes. This will change over time as and when (logistics) capacity building occur. Accordingly, the service offerings and the tools IFRC offers through them, may have to vary over time even to the same HNS. This comes in addition to the adaptability required to fit different NS and operations. In general, there is a lot of potential for improvement as seen in the significant ‘fail-rate’ of GLS. In particular all three cases point at failures in availability of (1) State-of-the art tools, expertise, and delivery information; (2) A clear focal point and demand consolidation; (3) Good quotation and payment processes; and (4) Accountable reporting on the use of funding. Depending on who is in charge of supply management these should be undertaken or supported by GLS. Ivory Coast has a much higher fail-rate than the other two which is related both to their requirements’ importance rating (all the ‘As’, see table 2), and to the lack of resources; their own and what was provided by GLS or others. Again, the NS and country’s own capacity will have an impact on the needs for (sophisticated) standardized tools and processes. Furthermore, referring to table 2 the GLS logistics standards’ inability in developing NS logistics capacity in line with their national role indicates a need for; (1) Tools that can

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help in assessing capacity to identify gaps compared to the needs and; (2) Tools for supporting the development of the HNS required local logistics capacity. 3.1. Use of standardized tools The results are somewhat mixed in terms of how well the standards offered by GLS are perceived regarding local adaptability. From table 2 we see that Haiti has 7 ‘fails’ which are only half as many as Van who has 14 while Ivory Coast points at as many as a total of 31 ‘fails’. The literature suggests that standards function as coordination mechanisms on the one hand [30] and as a basis in new product and technology design on the other. In the latter case, standards are often linked with modularity in terms of modular products and pre-assembly [31]. The concept of modularity is also used in relation to organizing [32], and more recently to services: ‘Platform thinking can be used to identify and use the shared, i.e. modular, structure and logic of activities and customer offerings in service production’ [33]. Tassey [34] focus on physical standards saying that they can specify acceptable product or service performance (quality/reliability), help provide scientific evaluation (information standards), specify properties that a product must have for it to function with complementary products (compatibility/interoperability) or limit a product to a certain range of characteristics (variety reduction). Brunsson and Jacobsson [35] focus on organizational standards such as defining companies’ behaviour towards their customers in terms of service and whether they have clear goals’. They include guidelines, rules, and specifications for common and repeated use for the purpose of obtaining order or uniformity in a given context, discipline, or field [36]. Taking modularity into account when developing standards can provide both efficient (e.g. economies of scale, i.e. cost reduction) and effective (e.g. customized solutions, i.e. flexibility) solutions [37]. From the study we see that IFRC and GLS use standards both of physical and organizational nature. Strategic planning and logistics standards offered by GLS include physical standards like prepositioning of standardized family packages of basic relief items, and kits for hygiene and cooking. We see that while Haiti made much use of this, the demand from Van was less, at least in the beginning. Organizational standards include fixed service fees, payment rules, global supplier framework agreements and emergency catalogues with item specifications. We see that the operations had challenges in relating to these standards. Furthermore IFRC offers processes, formats and manuals for mobilization, procurement, and pipeline reporting. Rosters with and standardized training of logistics experts that can be deployed through the IFRC global response tools such as FACT, ERU, and RDRT (Regional Disaster Response Team) are also part of the GLS services. We see that there are big differences between the three cases regarding use of these. Looking at the results from the Ivory Coast in particular, it seems that use of the standardized tools require a certain level of capacity in the NS, i.e. they need to know what to request as well as having the adequate funding in order to use GLS’ services. As such the local adaptability of the global standard tools offered by GLS is not as high as would be ideal, even what could or should be expected. It seems that at this point the standards offered by GLS do not sufficiently support the NS’ own work in demand and information management, particularly in situations where the HNS is weak or has been weakened because of the disaster. The results indicate that while GLS has come quite far in developing standards, there is potential and a need for more modular thinking both of organizational and physical types. 4. Concluding remarks and implications for practice and further research Reporting on a study undertaken in cooperation with International Federation Red Cross Red Crescent (IFRC) this paper contributes to the understanding of using standard global tools in humanitarian logistics. Three case studies of disaster response in Haiti, Turkey, and the Ivory Coast have been presented as basis for a cross-case analysis. The main conclusion from the study is that the ‘one size fits all’ approach may have to be modified: x With regards to future requirements to humanitarian supply chains their perceived importance vary between the operations that have been studied.

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The standard tools offered by IFRC Global Logistics Services can to varying degrees adapt to local contexts. While standards seem to be much needed in humanitarian logistics, a more systematic modular approach would contribute both to efficiency and effectiveness and flexibility. In terms of practical implications, organizations should work more with developing, refining and informing about their global standardized tools, but simultaneously keep a strict eye as to the needs for local adaptations. For example they could consider using a modularized approach so that standards can vary depending on needs, available funding, local capacity, and the general context. Considering future research, more work is needed on the development and use of standards in humanitarian logistics in particular and in international humanitarian assistance in general. When is a standard needed? When does it create unnecessary complications? Who should take the lead in creating standards? See for example the reluctance and discussions in developing standard specifications for equipment and clothing in the Ebola-epidemic. This study is based on one organization and case studies of three different operations. While the cases are interesting and represent different disaster types, size, and complexity, additional case studies are required for the purpose of generalizing the results. x

Acknowledgements The authors would like to thank IFRC GLS for providing the opportunity and co-funding granting access to respondents and sites, as well as providing each case team with support from a National Society. Our respective universities also deserve acknowledgements for co-funding. Finally, we thank the Norwegian Research Council through SMARTRANS and IS-BILAT (Leiv Erikson Mobility Grant) and the Fulbright Visiting Scholar Program for funding making this project possible. References [1] http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/report/gha-report-2014, accessed 2nd February 2015. [2] Logistics 2015 – Strategic Plan 2011-2015: Providing Services to deliver Strategy 2020, January 2010, International Federation Red Cross Red Crescent Societies, Geneva, Switzerland; Van Wassenhove, L.N., Humanitarian aid logistics: supply chain management in high gear, The Journal of Operations Research Society 2006, 57,7, 475-896; Everywhere, Jahre, Marianne & Navangul, Kaustubh, A. Predicting the Unpredictable - Demand Forecasting in International Humanitarian Response”, NOFOMA-Proceedings 2011, Harstad University College, June, Norway [3]Thomas, A. and Kopczak, L. From logistics to supply chain management. The path forward in the humanitarian sector, 2005, http://www.fritzinstitute.org, accessed Jan 11, 2007; Majchrzak, A., Jarvenpaa, S.L. and Hollingshead, A.B. Coordinating Expertise Among Emergent Groups Responding to Disasters, Org. Sci. 2007, 18, 147-161; Jahre, M. and Heigh, I. Does the Current Constraints in Funding Promote Failure In Humanitarian Supply Chains?, Supply Chain Forum: An International Journal 2008, 9, 44-54; Jahre, M. and Jensen, L-M. Coordination In Humanitarian Logistics Through Clusters, International Journal of Physical Distribution and Logistics Management 2010, 40, 657-674; Balcik, B., Beamon, B.M., Krejci, C., Muramatsu, K.M. and Ramirez, M. Coordination in humanitarian relief chains: Practices, challenges and opportunities”, International Journal of Production Economics 2010, 126, 22-34; Interagency real-time evaluation in Haiti: 3 months after the earthquake, 31st August 2010, accessed 26th November, http://www.urd.org/IMG/pdf/HaitiIASC_RTE_final_report_en.pdf [4] Heigh, I. & Jahre, M. Humanitarian Supply Chains, editorial, Supply Chain Forum: An International Journal 2010, 11, 2-3; Oloruntoba, R. The analysis of Cyclone Larry emergency relief chain: Some key success factors, International Journal of Production Economics 2010, 126, 85-101; Kovács, G. and Spens, K.M. Trends and developments in humanitarian logistics – a gap analysis, International Journal of Physical Distribution and Logistics Management 2010, 41, 32-45. [5] e.g. van Wassenhove p.342 in Schmenner, E.W., van Wassenhove, L., Ketokivi, M., Heyl, J. and Lusch, R.F. Too much theory, not enough understanding, Journal of Operations Management 2009, 27, 339–343 [6] Starkey, K. and Madan, P. Bridging the Relevance Gap: Aligning Stakeholders in the Future of Management Research, British Journal of Management 2001, 12, 3-26.; Hodgkinson, G.P. and Starkey, K. Not Simply Returning to the Same Answer Over and Over Again: Reframing Relevance, British Journal of Management 2011, 22, 355-369. [7] Näslund, D., Kale, R. and Paulraj, A. Action research in supply chain management – a framework for relevant and rigorous research, Journal of Business Logistics 2010, 31, 331-355. [8] Argyris, C., Putnam, R. and Smith, D. Action Science 1985, Jossey-Bass, San Franscisco, CA; Eden, C. and Huxham, C. Action research for management research”, British Journal of Management 1996, 7, 75-86; Van de Ven, Andrew. H. Engaged Scholarship: a guide for organizational and social research, 2007, UK: Oxford University Press. [9] Coughland, P. and Coghland, D. Action Research for operations management, International Journal of Operations and Production Management 2002, 22, 220-240, p.223.

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