Origins theories and historical materialist metatheory of psychology: A historical perspective by. Claude Braun, Ph.D. and. Jacinthe Baribeau, Ph.D.
Origins theories and historical materialist metatheory of psychology: A historical perspective
by Claude Brau n, Ph.D. and Jacinthe Baribeau , Ph.D.
Oral presentation su bmitted to CHEIRON for its annu al convention Vassar College, Pou ghkeepsie, NY. Ju ne 13-16, 1984
C/0 Thomas C. Cadwallader Department of Psychology Indiana State University Terre Haute, Indiana USA 47809
first au thor's address: Departement de Psychologie Universite du Qu ebec a Montreal C. P. 8888 Su ccu rsale 11A11 Montreal, P.Q. CANADA H3C 3P8
Origins theories and historical materialist metatheory of psychology: A historical perspective Abstract The major 11priviledged11 areas of Marxist metatheoretical effort in psychology are initially ou tlined. In decreasing levels of generality these include 1) philosophical issu es 2) meta-science issu es 3) pu rely political issu es 4) indirectly 11 political11 issu es. The paper deals exclu sively with level nu mber 2, and with one particu lar concept which is judged to be central to the Marxist scientific approach --namely the problem of emergence. Examples of a nu mber of 11 origins11 theories proposed by Marxist scientists are then su rveyed. Some su ch examples include Oparin's theory of anticipatory reflection, Spirkin's gestural theory of the origins of langu age, Vygotsky•s and Lu ria's theories of the origins of consciou sness, and Bernstein's theory of the origin of u nconsciou s motor structu re. Finally, the link between the well known historical-materialist conception of u niversal motion and change on the one hand, and the specifically psychological forms of emergence on the other, are briefly explicitated in the conclusion.
1.
110rigins theories11 and historical materialist metatheory of psychology: a historical perspective
There are at least fou r factors which have combined historically to influ ence Marxist scientific psychologists into being preoccu pied with a limited number of problems: 1.
Theoretical problems in the overall dialectical and historical materialist world view - an explicit theory of knowledge for example.
2.
Programmatic problems, issues and controversies raised at the level of metatheory of science by the Marxist classics bu t u nexplored at the level of individual behavior.
Examples of this include the theory of the origins
of langu age, of labor, of consciousness, etc. 3.
Problems of the psychological aspects of political stru ggles for the attainment of state power.
Wilhelm Reich•s analyses of fascist character
structure propaganda and mass mobilization techniqu es, of the authoritarian family, of paternalism and of sexual oppression and repression in pre-Naz i Germany, is an example of this. 4.
Practical problems and struggles concerning particu lar psycho-political issues su ch as class conflict or related issues.
We u su ally find Marxists
involved in these debates defending an interactive model of environmental/ heredit�ry determination of behavior, with heavy emphasis on the environmental factor.
Marxists have always defended egalitarianisiil, secu lar hu manism,
revolu tionary social change in favor of ju stice and against exploitation. Marxist scientists have tried, of course, to su pport these principles by marshalling empirical evidence and scientific theories.
James Lawler has
2.
done an excellent job of this on the IQ debate in his book, IQ, Heritability and Racism as did Hilary and Steven Rose on science policy and sociology of science in their book the Polities of Science. Adorno and his colleagues are well known for their contribu tion to the study of the au thoritarian personality.
Other Marxists like Angela Davis on gender, race and class
relations, David Cooper on family relations and psychiatric oppression, Glenn and Ku nnes on sexu al oppression, etc., have been too close to live stru ggles and insu fficiently involved in u niversity psychology departments to develop scientifically formu lated, empirically based research on these important topics.
They have been, however, important trail blazers
for fu tu re research and have had an immediate consciou sness-raising impact on the reading pu blic which massively consumes the paper back versions of their works.
The first two factors are bou nd to be more important in societies which have already established socialism or where socialist thou ght enjoys the highest prestige-as in France.
The two lastfactors have inevitably been more
important to Marxists who were involved in the problems of dealing with capitalism and stru ggling for the establishment of socialism.
On the other hand,
with the decline of the political influence of Marxism in western indu strializ ed nations, as Perry Anderson has noted in his Considerations on Western Marxism, Marxist intellectu als have withdrawn from the political economic theoretical battlefront and have sought refu ge in the tranqu il z ones of epistemology and other abstract preoccu pations.
The first type of problem is too general to be very much pertinent to ou r u nderstanding and edification of a science of psychology.
The third and fourth
3.
types of problem have been important for Marxists involved in political stru ggles bu t are too specific to serve as a problem-base for a fu ndamental science of psychology.
Race, class, gender, intelligence and sexual preference are
presently primarily pYbblems of differential psychology.
They are not
fu ndamental problems of psychology.
We will deal exclu sively therefore with the second type of problem - ou r pu rpose being to bring ou t and analyz e what we consider to be the central issu e of Marxist metatheory of psychology, namely the issue of emergence.
ORIGINS THEORIES: Marx and Engles were u niversal historians; since everything changes over time, each science mu st be at the ou tset 11historical 11•
Engels devoted much
seriou s thinking to the early cu ltu ral-anthropological history of man in his Origins of the Family, Private Property and the State.
Marx was preoccu pied
with what he thought mu st have been the earliest forms of political-economic relations u nder primitive commu nism in its transition to slavery.
Indeed a Marxist metatheory of any science begins with an 110rigins theory1 1• A general pictu re of this can be gleaned from reading J.D. Bernal•s 4 volu me Science in History.
The importance of 110rigins theories11 is particu larly evident
in the behavioral sciences and the life sciences in general.
An example of this is Oparin•s and Ankokin•s theory of anticipatory reflection.
The term refers to the u niversal property of genes of being pre
programmed to activate organismic motion patterns in isomorphic sequ ence with environmental sequ ences - which are in fact 11 remembered 11 by the genes - su ch
4.
that all life forms appear to actu ally 11anticipate11 sequ ences of fu tu re events.
Another example is that of the Soviet anthropologist Spirkin and his Vietnamese student Tran Due Thao who have developped a theory of the gestu ral basis of langu age.
As Engels had su rmised a half centu ry earlier, labor
probably preceded language and is probably a necessary condition for the social crystallization of an abstract sign system.
Recent western neu ropsychological
theoriz ing is now catching u p with these early theories.
Doreen Kimura has
proposed for example that left hemisphere control over language is a complex sensori-motor dominance which cou ld have been coded in the genes prior to the appearance of abstract langu age.
Vygotsky proposed in the 30s that whereas psychic control develops
·t,r
bottom-u pwards in the neu raxis, it operates top-downward later in life as it becomes mediated and regu lated by langu age.
Vygotsky's student, Alexander
Lu ria su bsequ ently produ ced the first extensive developmental neu ropsychological theory in his book The Working Brain.
The book consists of the integration of
his own research resu lts in the areas of clinical, developmental and experimental neu ropsychology, as well as of those of others (eg. Sokolov•s discovery of the orienting- reaction as ontogenetic precu rsor of volontary attention).
The cu ltu ral-historical school of Soviet psycholo�estab1ished by Vygotsky, considered language the royal rou te by which to u nderstand consciou sness, and in tu rn u nconsciousness.
Lacanian psychoanalysts wou ld
express appropriate hu mility in recogniz ing this.
Vygotsky stated, as did Henri Wallon more explicitely, that hu man infants
5.
are born genetically programmed as social beings.
He recognized, contrary to
the dominant thesis proposed at the time by Piaget, that the child•s speech does not proceed from egocentric or au tistic speech to social speech bu t from social speech ( imitative and self-regu latory) which is overt and expanded to an abbreviated and internal form of speech. made between internal and external speech.
At the time, no distinction was Vygotsky and his students
discovered throu gh experimentation and observation that external speech becomes markedly condensed du ring the process of internalization.
Lu ria fu rther observed
this process and reported that internal speech loses its nominative or 11thematic 11 fu nction and becomes more centered u pon what is 11 new11 and what 11has to be done ... It becomes 11rhematic 11•
We su ppose that this lingu istic property is also
characteristic of the langu age stru ctu re of dreams though to ou r knowledge this has never been signaled.
In addition to the analysis of u nconsciou s langu age, other approaches are more likely to inform u s abou t the origins of the u nconsciou s than the pseudo-clinical approach traditionally u sed in psychoanalysis.
The conditionned
visceral response approach to the study of the hu man u nconscious, Uz nadz e•s experimental approach to u nconsciou s attitude sets, and the cybern�t ic approach are examples of alternative approaches.
Marxist research psychologists have recognized that the hu man u nconsciou s is constitu ted via historically framed consciou s activity ie, practice.
In this
respect they are opposed to the psychoanalytic concept of the u nconsciou s - viewed as a base from which consciousness emerges primarily via su blimation and other mechanata of control over fu ndamental instinctu al drives.
There are many other u nconsciou s phenomena besides, lapsu s lingu ae, neu rotic symptoms and dreams.
Marxist researchers have studied the other
ones, those which, contrary to the above, can be observed systematically, objectively, and even u nder certain circu mstances, manipu lated experimentally.
The Soviet physiologist of motor action, Nicholas Bernstein, chose to study, for example, au tomatic movements.
In particu lar he was interested in
cu ltu rally determined movements (which become au tomatiz ed throu gh learning) such as hand writing etc.
Now the intricate complexity of the motor activity
involved in handwriting, this u nconscious expressive stru cture which u nderlies ou r written produ ction, is recognizable as a style whether a person writes with mouth, hands or feet.
Anokin proposed the notion of fu nctional system as a
metatheoretical physiological concept which applies to su ch phenomena in all physiological systems.
Respiration for example is normally primarily taken
care of in men by the diaphragm.
If this particu lar organ fails the intercostal
mu scles will step in to do the job.
Finally if both of these fail, the larynx
will be u sed to gu lp air and feed the lu ngs.
The point of this example is to
demonstrate that a fu nctional system, be it a grou p of organs or of brain stru ctu res, is characteriz ed by an invariant task and by variable u se of organs, ie, interchangeable components.
Bernstein knew that the complexity of human motor activity cannot be explained by learning theory alone.
He drew extensively from biology and
genetics to pu t together a systems model of complex action.
He recogniz ed for
example the pertinence here of Oparin's metaconcept of anticipatory reflection. Bu t his own specific substantive contribu tion to the field was to have introdu ced probability theory into the theory of central motor control.
He
proposed that central motor systems are organized into hierarchical levels
7.
with each level characteriz ed by its own degrees of freedom.
Lu ria later
demonstrated the applicability of these concepts in the u nderstanding of brain stru ctu res involved in the highest of human cognitive activities.
Vygotsky had already shown from a cognitivist and developmental point of view how in children fu nctions become automatiz ed by means of external regu lation provided by adult speech.
Luria and his colleagu es later contribu ted extensive
research into the neu ropsychology, the cultu ral-historical stru cturation, of these 11 kinetic melodies11 in the hu man brain.
The process by which functions
become au tomatized, Lu ria recognized, is also the process u pon which new constru ctions, goals, actions can ben based.
The anatomical, cultural,
cognitive study of these processes carried ou t by Lu ria and his colleagues have served to establish what cou ld be called the general Marxist theory of the origins of consciou sness.
Conclu sion The theoretical effort which Marxism has put into elu cidating the intricate connections between phylogenetic, ontogenetic, and historical development in psychological organisms is not a coincidence.
It is an effect of the theory
and practice of historical materialism.
There are of cou rse, no su ch things as 110rigins11• intersecting nexi of patterns.
There are however
The life sciences, and particu larly psychology
- the most interdisciplinary of all the sciences-- are rich in such connections. Historical materialism was ready before the existence of scientific psychology to generate psychological metatheory.
8.
Nearly a hu ndred years later, we must recogniz e historical materialism as a specific and important contempora�y contribu tor to the field of psychological metatheory, thou gh the historiography of this process remains to be laid ou t -- at least, as far as we know, in the French and English langu ages.
9.
REFERENCES
Adorno, Theodor, Frenkel-Bru nswik Else, Levinson, Daniel Sanford Nevitt. The Au thoritarian Personality. New York: John Wiley & Sons 1964. Anderson, Perry, Considerations on Western Marxism, NLB, 1977, London. Anokhin, Peter K. , Cypernetics and the Integrative Activity of the Brain in Contemporary Soviet Psychology, (eds) Michael Cole & Irving Maltzman Basic Books, New York, 1969 pp. 830-856. Bernal, John, D. , Science in History 4 Vols. , London, Penguin, 1973. Bernstein. N. A. The coordination and regu lation of movements Pergamen Press, 1967. Oxfor . Cooper, David, The Death of the Family London, 1971 Pelican Books. Cooper, David, Psychiatry and Anti- Psychiatry, New York, 1971, Pelican Books. Davis, Angela, Women, Race and Class. Random House, New York, 1983. Engels, Friedrich, Origine of the Family, Private Property and the State. (1881-1891). New York: International Pu blishers. 1973. Glenn, Michael & Ku nnes, Richard. Repression or revolution Harper, 1973. KimUra, Doreen Neuromotor mechanisms in the evolu tion of hu man commu nication. In H. D. Steklis and M.J. Raleigh, eds., Neu robiology of Social Commu nication in Primates: An Evolu tionary Perspective. New York: Academic Press. 1979. Lawler, James, IQ, Heritability and Racism, International Pu blishers, New York, 1980. Lu ria, Alexander Romanovitch. The working brain. Pengu in Books, 1976, New York. Lu ria, Alexander Romanovitch. Language and Cognition. Washington, 1982.
John Wiley & Sons,
Marx Karl & Engles, Frederik, The German Ideology Progress Pu blishers, Moscow, 1976. Oparin, Alexander, Life, Its Nature, Origin and Development, New York, 1964. Rose Hilary, & Rose, Steven, The Political Economy of Science, MacMillan Press, London, 1976. Sokolov, E. N. Perception And the Condition ed. Reflex, New York: MacMillan, 1963. Spirkin, Alexander. La formation de la pensee abstraite au x premiers stades du developpement hu main. Recherches Sovietiques, No. 1, 1956. Tran Du e Thao, Recherches su r l'Origine du Langage et de la Conscience, Editions Sociales, Paris 1977.
10. Wallen, Henri, Les Origines du Caractere Chez 1•Enfant, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1934