PAPERS Assessing the impact of environmental ...

International Forestry Review Vol.9(4), 2007

819

PAPERS Assessing the impact of environmental campaigns against the activities of a pulp and paper company in Indonesia D. GRITTEN1 and P. KANT2 1 2

University of Joensuu, Faculty of Forestry, P.O.Box 111, FI-80101 Joensuu, Finland Institute of Global Warming & Ecological Studies, D-Block, Amity University Campus, Sector-125, Noida-201303, India

Email: [email protected], [email protected]

SUMMARY Deforestation in Indonesia and links with the pulp and paper industry has led environmental groups to campaign against the industry’s practices. This paper focuses on two environmental campaigns against the activities of an Asian pulp and paper company that were widely perceived to be having a strongly detrimental effect on the rainforests of Sumatra, Indonesia. The analysis is based on interviews and questionnaires of those involved in the campaigns, as well as a review of related published and unpublished documents. The results show that the target company has become more sustainable since the campaigns started, though is still failing on certain issues. These findings are supported by some Environmental Non-Government Organisations (ENGOs), although others strongly believe that the company has made no progress at all and is still involved in illegal and unsustainable practices. Despite the increased awareness of the implications and destructiveness of deforestation in Indonesia, and the increasingly dynamic role taken by international ENGOs to halt the forest loss, deforestation continues apace.

Keywords: environmental conflict, environmental lobbying, deforestation, ENGO, Sumatra

Evaluation des campagnes environnementales contre les activités d’une compagnie de pâte et de papier en Indonésie D.GRITTEN et P.KANT Le déboisement en Indonésie et ses liens avec l’industrie de la pâte et du papier a conduit des groupes environnementaux à faire campagne contre les pratiques de cette industrie. Cet article se concentre sur deux campagnes environnementales contre une compagnie asiatique de pâte et de papier dont les activités étaient communément perçues comme ayant un fort effet négatif sur les forêts vierges de Sumatra en Indonésie. L’analyse se base sur les interviews et les questionnaires soumis aux personnes impliquées dans les campagnes, ainsi que sur un rapport sur les documents, publiés ou non, ayant trait à l’affaire. Les résultats font percevoir que la compagnie en question est devenue plus respectueuse de l’environnement depuis que la campagne a commencé, bien qu’elle échoue toujours sur certains points. Ces résultats sont confirmés par des organisations environnementales non gouvernementales ( ENGOs) . D’autres partis soutiennent cependant toujours fortement que la compagnie n’a fait aucun progrès, et qu’elle est encore impliquée dans des pratiques illégales et hostiles à la durabilité. Malgré la prise de conscience des aspects destructifs du déboisement en Indonésie, et de ses implications , et malgré aussi le rôle de plus en plus dynamique pris par les ENGOs pour enrayer la perte de la forêt, le déboisement se poursuit à grande vitesse.

Evaluación del impacto de campañas ecologistas contra las actividades de una empresa de pulpa y papel en Indonesia D. GRITTEN y P. KANT La deforestación en Indonesia y su relación con la industria papelera y de pulpa ha llevado a grupos ecologistas a hacer campaña contra las prácticas de esta industria. Este estudio se centra en dos campañas ecologistas contra las actividades de una empresa asiática de pulpa y papel que se consideraban muy perjudiciales para los bosques tropicales de Sumatra, Indonesia. El análisis se basa en entrevistas y cuestionarios realizados con los activistas, además de una evaluación de documentos relacionados publicados y no publicados. Los resultados demuestran que la empresa en cuestión ha adoptado políticas más sostenibles desde el inicio de las campañas, aunque todavía queda bastante que hacer en ciertos campos. Algunas ONGs de carácter medioambiental apoyan este punto de vista, pero otros creen en cambio que la empresa no he progresado en absoluto y que aún realiza prácticas ilegales e insostenibles. A pesar de la conciencia cada vez mayor de las implicaciones y del carácter destructivo de la deforestación en Indonesia, así como del papel cada vez más dinámico que desempeñan las ONGs internacionales

820

D. Gritten and P. Kant

para impedir la pérdida de zonas forestales, la deforestación continúa a paso acelerado.

INTRODUCTION

APRIL’s corporate and operation history

Environmental Non-Government Organisations (ENGOs), such as WWF and Greenpeace, have become increasingly important in shaping the agenda and policies of corporations and governments relating to the environment (Betsill and Corell 2001, Kuhndt et al. 2004). Campaigns such as that of Greenpeace against Royal Dutch Shell over the planned disposal of the Brent Spar oil storage buoy are examples of the increasingly prominent role played by the ENGOs in encouraging corporations and governments to change their operations and policies. This period of increased influence by ENGOs has also coincided with an improvement in corporate social responsibility (Cairncross 1995, Collier and Wanderley 2005) impacting on the operating practices of corporations (Hellström 2001, Spar and Mure 2003). This paper focuses on campaigns by Friends of the Earth (FoE) Finland (Maan Ystävät) and Friends of the Earth England, Wales and Northern Ireland (EWNI) against an Asian pulp and paper company; Asia Pacific Resources International Holdings Limited (APRIL), and its pulp and paper mill, Riau Andalan Pulp and Paper (RAPP). The ENGOs have long opposed APRIL for clear-cutting forests in the tropical lowland rainforests of Sumatra, which have rich biodiversity and are the habitat of a number of threatened wild animals such as the Sumatran elephant (Elephas maximus sumatrensis). Another impetus for the campaigns is the rate of deforestation in Indonesia, e.g. between 1990 and 2005 the forest area decreased by over 24% (over 28 million ha) with the area of primary forest falling by nearly 31% in the same period (nearly 22 million ha) (FAO 2006a). The World Resources Institute (WRI) believes that one of the leading causes of deforestation in Indonesia in the 1990s was the development of plantations for supplying the pulp and paper industry (WRI 2000). This is reiterated by the fact that between 1988 and 2005 wood pulp production capacity in Indonesia grew from 606 000 tonnes (air dry) per annum to nearly 6.5 million tonnes (Barr 2001, FAO 2006b). There have been numerous campaigns by ENGOs to halt deforestation. Examples of previous research in this area include the examination of campaigns to halt deforestation in Sarawak, Malaysia (Keck and Sikkink 1998) and the impact of ENGOs on the practices of the pulp and paper industry (Sonnenfeld 2002). This paper differs from previous research by focussing on a single forest industry corporation and by using detailed analysis, based on interviews and questionnaires of the concerned parties, of the impacts of the campaigns. The aims of this paper are firstly to analyse the responses of those targeted in the campaigns by FoE EWNI and FoE Finland, and secondly to examine the perceptions, of those directly and indirectly involved, of the impacts of the campaigns.

APRIL, which is headquartered in Singapore, has operations in China and Indonesia. The company is a holding company of the Raja Garuda Mas group, which is controlled by Sukanto Tanoto and his family. The company began establishing plantations in 1993 securing a long term lease for 330 000 ha from the Indonesian Government for harvesting timber and establishing plantations in the rainforests of Sumatra for the production of pulp and paper at its RAPP mill (APRIL 2004a). The company also has access to over 380 000 ha through partner companies and agreements with local communities (APRIL 2006b). The first commercial pulp production was in 1995. Currently the pulp mill has a production capacity of 2 million tonnes per year, whilst the paper mill has a capacity of 350 000 tonnes. Further information is available from www.aprilasia.com.

MATERIAL AND METHODS The aims of the study necessitated gathering data and information from various sources. These sources include those targeted in the campaigns, as well as third parties, such as the Centre for International Forest Research (CIFOR). The methodology for the interviews and questionnaires was dictated by the study’s aims. Consequently, qualitative research methodology was utilised for the interviews and questionnaires. Interviews, both face-to-face and by telephone, were conducted during the period December 2003 to October 2006 with parties relevant to the campaigns (Table 1). To obtain supplementary background data, pre-interviews were also conducted with academics and researchers from Indonesia in addition to campaign leaders from other environmental groups campaigning for improved practices in the pulp and paper industry in Indonesia. The face-to-face and telephone interviews followed a semi-or unstructured format, often using open-ended questions. They were designed and conducted using widely accepted methods (Denscombe 1998, Burns 2000). This format of interviewing allowed the interviewees to speak their minds and elaborate on issues they felt were important regarding the research, thereby enabling detailed and specific information about the campaigns to be obtained. Questionnaires were completed to obtain specific data not collected in the interviews. These were completed by APRIL’s management, paper merchants and the campaign leaders of WWF Indonesia, FoE Finland and FoE EWNI (Table 1). One Indonesian ENGO completed a questionnaire on condition of anonymity. In addition, a literature review of both published and unpublished documents from the above organisations was conducted, as well as a review of academic literature relating to the issues.

Assessing the impact of environmental campaigns

821

TABLE 1 Organisations questioned in the research Interviews

Questionnaires

Pre-interviews

8 (2 of whom also completed questionnaire)

4

1

Paper Merchants - Senior Management or owners.

4

4

0

UK Government Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs – Senior Civil Servants (Head of Timber Procurement and Eco-labelling).

2

0

0

0 0 0

2 1 1

0 0 0

0

1

0

FoE EWNI - Head of Corporate Campaigns (Including APRIL campaign).

1 (also completed questionnaire)

1

0

WWF Indonesia – Campaigners.

1 (also completed questionnaire)

1

2

1 (Robin Wood)

1 (Anonymous Indonesian ENGO)

2 (The Nature Conservancy Indonesia and Forest Watch International)

0 1

1 0

4 4

1

0

0

Groups targeted in campaigns APRIL (Senior Management - including Vice President Operations, Vice President Forestry and Environment Affairs Manager).

Financial Institutions. Jaako Pöyry – Manager, Operations. UPM-Kymmene Director Issues Management Environmental Groups FoE Finland - APRIL Campaign Leader.

Other Environmental groups – Campaign leaders. Academics/researchers and others Bogor Agricultural University – Forestry Academics. CIFOR – Researchers. Indonesian Government (Ministry of Forestry, Section Head of Forest Planning).

DEVELOPMENT OF CAMPAIGNS BY FoE EWNI AND FoE FINLAND AND RESPONSES OF THOSE TARGETED Initial Positions FoE Finland launched their campaign in 1997 whilst FoE EWNI’s campaign was launched in 2001. Their positions were based on the belief that APRIL was operating in an unsustainable manner; including destroying natural rainforests rich in biodiversity and denying the rights of indigenous communities. FoE EWNI also targeted APRIL’s customers, wholesalers, selling APRIL products in the UK, and financial institutions offering their services to APRIL. They also sought the support of the UK Government through the enactment of policies that would make it harder for APRIL to access markets for their products (Matthew and Van Gelder 2002). Besides APRIL, FoE Finland also targeted UPM-Kymmene (UPM). This was because UPM and APRIL formed a strategic and financial alliance in 1997. The essence of APRIL’s initial response to both campaigns was that it had taken the lease in an open and transparent negotiation with the owner of the land, the Government of

Indonesia, and that it would honour all its commitments under the lease agreement (APRIL 2002). The varying responses of those targeted by the campaigns The campaigns forced APRIL and its associates, including the paper merchants and UPM, to revisit their policies and their association with the company. The recommendations and responses are presented below (all recommendations are from FoE EWNI (Matthew and Van Gelder 2002) unless stated otherwise). APRIL The recommendations covered both environmental and social aspects of APRIL’s operations. Paper Merchants The UK is a minor market for APRIL’s products, nevertheless FoE EWNI targeted the paper merchants to pressurise APRIL into improving its operations.

822

D. Gritten and P. Kant

TABLE 2 Recommendations made to APRIL and the company’s responses Recommendation

Target implemented recommendation?

To halt all logging activity in natural forest areas until an independent, public and comprehensive forest quality assessment has been conducted to identify High Conservation Value Forest (HCVF).

Partially implemented In 2005 APRIL stated that they no longer source timber from HCVF (APRIL 2005). ENGOs are not satisfied as HCVF assessment is not independent (Interview campaign leader WWF Indonesia).

(FoE Finland) To cease all clearfellings in natural forests (Miettinen and Selin 1999).

Not implemented APRIL states that they are operating only in forests that are classified as degraded in accordance with Indonesian law and clearfelling and replanting is the only option in such forests (APRIL 2004a).

To conduct an independent, public and transparent assessment of all land claims affecting all areas where APRIL is sourcing timber and to stop logging in these areas until the land claims have been resolved to the satisfaction of all stakeholders.

Not implemented APRIL believes its practices are adequate, and operates under a policy of maximum tolerance and there is no forced displacement from land (APRIL unpublished document). Land claims resolution procedure audited (ProForest 2004) was positive for APRIL though highlighted lack of transparency. There are also a large number of unresolved claims with over 10 000 land claims pending resolution as of June 2004 (APRIL 2004a).

To reduce RAPP’s pulp processing capacity to sustainable levels. FoE Finland demanded that capacity should be kept below 1.2 million tonnes per annum (pa) (Miettinen and Selin 1999).

To implement an independent, on-going monitoring system to demonstrate that the company continues to operate and source its raw materials sustainably and not through illegally obtained timber.

To stop all forest clearance in Tesso Nilo and support its establishment as a fully protected area.

UK Government The FoE EWNI campaign also focussed on the UK Government, the main aim of which was to get it to exert pressure on the Indonesian Government to take stronger measures to combat deforestation (FoE 2001). UPM-Kymmene In 1997 UPM and APRIL formed an alliance in their development of fine paper operations. Furthermore, in 1998 UPM provided a loan to APRIL. Financial Institutions Eight international and five Indonesian banks, which were financing the operations of APRIL, were asked by FoE EWNI to follow principles that were based on the World Bank’s operational policies (World Bank 1991, 1998), a forerunner of the Equator Principles. Although the financial institutions were not able to provide information concerning their current involvement

Not implemented In 2001 APRIL increased capacity to 2 million tonnes pa. Its plans are to increase capacity to 3 million after 2009 (Interview APRIL Manager 3, Leahy 2006). Implemented (though not according to some ENGOs). Audited three times since 2002 (SGS 2002, 2003, 2004). Audits are supported by WWF. Some ENGOs, including FoE Finland claim APRIL are still using illegally sourced timber (Interview APRIL campaign leader FoE Finland). Implemented After initially refusing to halt harvesting and road building in area, in summer 2002 APRIL ended land clearing and plantation establishment in area (APRIL 2004a).

with APRIL, the company stated that it has significantly reduced its debt burden, and therefore its reliance on the financial institutions (interview APRIL manager 1). The vast majority of the company’s debts are held by Indonesian banks (interview APRIL manager 1), which are less susceptible to the campaign’s pressure (interview APRIL campaign leader FoE EWNI). Western banks are taking active measures to ensure they are not targeted as a result of being associated with a company accused of destroying High Conservation Value Forest (HCVF) (questionnaire Head of Public Policy anonymous UK Bank). This belief is supported by the FoE EWNI campaign leader who felt that the banks are responding to campaigns by ENGOs (interview APRIL campaign leader FoE EWNI). APRIL’s RAPP mill and the local communities A significant focus of both campaigns is on the protection of the rights of the local communities. To determine the impact

Assessing the impact of environmental campaigns

823

TABLE 3 Recommendations made to the paper merchants and their responses Recommendation

Target implemented recommendation?

To stop all purchases of APRIL paper made in Indonesia until APRIL has implemented the above recommendations.

Partially implemented Since the FoE EWNI campaign four of the nine paper merchants, named in report, no longer stock APRIL products. Additionally one of the merchants is no longer in business. (Interviews and Questionnaires Paper merchants).

TABLE 4 Recommendations made to UK Government and its responses Recommendation

Make it illegal to import and sell illegally sourced timber and paper products.

Set target date for supplying all timber and paper for entire public sector from recycled sources and sources independently certified to the standards of the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), or equivalent.

Make the Green Claims Code legally binding.

Introduce a labelling law requiring country of origin to be put on all timber and paper products.

Target implemented recommendation? Not implemented. In April 2002 the UK Government signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Indonesian Government on undertaking to halt illegal logging (MoU 2002). However, there has been no legislation forbidding the sale of illegally sourced timber and paper products. Not implemented UK Government has set a target that 100% of its timber and paper supply comes from legal and sustainable sources, though has not set a deadline. DEFRA (Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs) reported that in 2002-03 all but 1% of the total timber purchased by the Government came from a recognised certified source or from a source with evidence of sustainable and legal sourcing but not certified (SDiG 2004). Not implemented Currently the Green Claims code is not legally binding and there is as yet no plan to make it so (Interview Head of EcoLabelling, UK Government DEFRA). Not implemented Currently there is no labelling law covering this and there are no plans to introduce one in the near future (Interview Head of Eco-Labelling, UK Government DEFRA).

TABLE 5 Recommendations made to UPM-Kymmene and the company’s responses Recommendation Completely end relationship with APRIL unless APRIL stops clearcutting natural forest, respects land rights and compensates losses to local communities from past activities (Miettinen and Selin 1999).

of the campaigns and APRIL’s subsequent operations, academics from Bogor Agricultural University and researchers from CIFOR were interviewed to ascertain their views. One of the CIFOR researchers interviewed felt that the establishment and operation of plantations could provide significant financial rewards for the local communities, both directly and indirectly (interview researcher CIFOR). However, he and academics from Bogor questioned APRIL’s handling of the land dispute resolution procedures, including the apparent lack of transparency (interview researcher

Target implemented recommendation? Partially implemented UPM has been gradually scaling back its links to APRIL (UPM 2000a, 2000b). The only official ongoing cooperation is the repayment of APRIL’s loan to UPM, this is done in the form of pulp. This supply agreement ended in December 2006 and was subsequently renewed.

1 CIFOR and interviews academics Bogor Agricultural University). Another researcher at CIFOR felt that it is the corporate culture at APRIL that requires changing, as not enough attention is paid to social issues (interview researcher 2 CIFOR). He continued that he felt APRIL was responding to the pressure from ENGOs by funding community development projects but questioned whether this was sufficient. The campaigns pressured APRIL to be more transparent in its operations; this includes the company commissioning

824

D. Gritten and P. Kant

TABLE 6 Recommendations made to the financial institutions Recommendation Not to finance any further development of pulp and paper operations in Indonesia or Malaysia unless they are supported by independent, public and comprehensive sustainability plans which ensure no High Conservation Value Forest is destroyed and all local community rights are respected To adopt and fully implement a Forests Policy which ensures that no financial activities destroy High Conservation Value Forest and that the rights of local communities are respected Improve capacity to fully assess the financial risks involved with the forestry sector and to ensure that funds are not being provided for illegal or unsustainable practices Financial institutions responses Out of the eight international financial institutions four, Barclays, ING Barings, Fleet Boston Financial Corporation and Hermes, have adopted the EP either directly or through their merger with other banks that had already adopted them (EP 2005). While SBC Warburg and Credit Lyonnais are signatories of the United Nations initiative the Global Compact1 (Global Compact ND). The remaining two non-Indonesian banks (Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken and Nordea) have since endorsed the UNEP Financial Initiative for the Environment and Sustainable Development which is a global partnership between the United Nations Environment Program and the financial sector set up with the express purpose of encouraging sustainable development through public and private investments in economic development (UNEPFI N.D.). Of the Indonesian banks, Bank Nasional/Dagang Negara has also endorsed the UNEP Financial Initiative (UNEPFI N.D.). The other remaining Indonesian banks, that still operate (Bank Mandiri and Bank Niaga), have general environmental policies but are not signatories of the three international financing agreements mentioned above. 1

The Global Compact is a purely voluntary initiative which seeks to encourage the financial sector to adopt more ethically responsible and sustainable practices. The ten principles of the Compact covering the environment do not specifically mention forests, but the rights of local communities are respected (Principle 1) and logging in HCVF is actively discouraged (Principles 7 and 8).

independent research by the Universities of Singapore, Riau and Indonesia as well as research conducted by Taylor, Nelson and Sofres (TNS) on the company’s role in the community. The findings of the TNS survey showed that those surveyed had a more positive perception of APRIL compared to other industries in the province, and that the views of the company regarding various issues, including providing job opportunities for locals and outsiders, supporting education and economic welfare, has improved compared to research previously conducted by TNS in 2003. Overall the majority questioned were more positive towards APRIL and its operations than negative (TNS 2004). However, the research by TNS highlighted the negative perceptions that some locals have over APRIL’s handling of land dispute problems. Furthermore, the report also pointed out that locals had poor perceptions of APRIL’s operations regarding forest conservation and maintaining biodiversity (TNS 2004). The positive perception by local communities of employment creation by APRIL is supported by research by the University of Indonesia (LPEM 2005) which states that in the period 1999-2004 RAPP contributed between 7.828.21% of the jobs in Riau province, whilst the household income contribution from APRIL in the province, over the same period, was 4.9-6.4%. APRIL themselves estimate that over 24 000 people are employed by the company (APRIL 2004d). However, most of the workers are non-locals (Jensen 2007). The company also state that they invest over US$4 million a year in social projects (APRIL 2004a), including their Community Development (CD) project, that cover some 100 000 people (Jensen 2007). APRIL’s relations with the local communities have

often been strained. For example in May 2006 there was a clash, according to the ENGO APRIL-Watch, between APRIL employees and villagers in Gading Permai over the company’s plans to establish plantations in the area. APRIL on the other hand claims that its employees were attacked by workers of a company illegally using APRIL’s concession (APRIL 2006a). Furthermore, the company still has a significant area (over 16 000ha) of its concessions where ownership is disputed (APRIL 2006b). Pulp and paper companies need to respond to social conflicts that arise from their practices by involving local communities in, for example, company-community partnerships (Nawir and Santoso 2005). APRIL has done this through such initiatives as its CD programme and partnerships in plantation establishment, whether through community or joint venture partnerships, which are anticipated to provide up to 50% of RAPP’s fiber needs in 2009 (APRIL 2004a). However, the benefits of pulp and paper companies’ (such as APRIL) CD projects and community partnership are questioned by CIFOR (Maturana et al. 2005). Timelines of the impacts of the campaigns Though the focus of this research is primarily on the FoE EWNI and FoE Finland campaigns, to understand the significance of the campaigns it is important to consider them in the context of other campaigns against APRIL. These include campaigns by Robin Wood (Germany), WWF Indonesia and WALHI (FoE Indonesia). This allows a comparison of tactics, for example between WWF Indonesia and FoE Finland, as well as comparing the action taken

Assessing the impact of environmental campaigns

by the ENGOs and the responses made by APRIL. These are presented in the form of timelines (Figs. 1 and 2). The timelines examine the responses of the target groups to the specific actions by FoE EWNI, FoE Finland and WWF Indonesia. The example of Tesso Nilo (TN) not only shows the impact of the campaigns (Figure 2), but also how APRIL responded differently to each ENGO and their campaign styles. TN is one of the most biodiverse forests in the world

825

(Gillison 2001, Prawiradilaga et al. 2003). APRIL initially defended its operations in TN when criticised by FoE EWNI and vowed to continue to operate in accordance with their agreements with the government (APRIL 2002). However, when WWF utilised the influential medium of CNN for raising the issue, APRIL reacted quickly to end forestry operations in the area. Subsequently APRIL, the local Government and WWF have worked together to combat illegal logging in the area and have shared resources and expertise to protect the

FIGURE 1 Timeline of actions of Friends of the Earth (EWNI and Finland), and responses of UPM-Kymmene and the paper merchants (PM)

FoE EWNI publish report criticising APRIL, and naming paper merchants, financial institutions linked to the company

FoE Finland call for boycott of APRIL paper products

FoE Finland publish report criticising UPM for links to APRIL

1997

FoE EWNI publish briefing criticising APRIL, makes recommendations to paper merchants, financial institutions and UK Government

1999 1998 2000 UPM invest in UPM announces will APRIL and stop selling APRIL paper provide loan in Europe

APRIL and UPM announce alliance in developing their fine paper operations

2001 UPM buys APRIL’s share of mill in China. Mill will continue to source pulp from APRIL mill until end of 2006 (part of loan repayment)

2002 2003 Spring –Summer PM 2,6 & 7 stop stocking APRIL products

UPM cancels alliance UPM announces will not with APRIL in fine exercise its loan option to paper operations convert loan into shares of Riau mill

Tesso Nilo National Park (APRIL 2004b, 2004c). The timeline presented in Figure 2 shows not only the obvious action-reaction of FoE, WWF and APRIL, but also presents APRIL’s shift towards increased transparency. This transparency includes not only the audits of its log tracking system, and land dispute resolution, but also the publication of Sustainability Reports (APRIL 2003, 2004a, 2006b), which are independently verified by Bureau Veritas. According to Cerin (2002) this kind of increased transparency is partly as a result of a desire to show that they have nothing to hide. One of the managers felt that one of the main reasons for APRIL’s increased transparency is in order that the company can defend itself against ENGO campaigns (interview APRIL manager 1). FoE EWNI and WWF Indonesia agree with the fact that APRIL has become more transparent and that this transparency is necessary for them to deal with the issues raised in the campaigns, though they believe that the company still has some way to go (interviews campaign

2004

PM 5 stops stocking APRIL products, reason given: price

leaders FoE EWNI and WWF Indonesia). Princen (1994) underlines this by stating the importance of ENGOs in enhancing the transparency of corporations. This increased push for transparency within the company combined with the need for improved public relations resulted in APRIL’s cooperation with WWF on certain projects including combating illegal logging. This increased transparency also requires the company to ensure that it minimises any illegal practices, including corruption and use of illegally sourced timber (Palmer 2000).

ANALYSES OF IMPACTS OF CAMPAIGNS Interpretations of the situation An important issue when analysing the impacts of the campaigns is the validity of each group’s claims. The ENGO

826

D. Gritten and P. Kant

FIGURE 2 Timeline of actions of FoE (EWNI and Finland) and WWF and the responses of APRIL FoE EWNI publish report CNN report based on WWF calls on APRIL to halt finding on APRIL destroying logging in Tesso Nilo, Tesso Nilo intro. auditing of its log supply, and audit land conflict resolution procedures

WWF and APRIL form alliance to combat illegal logging

WWF publicly calls on APRIL to adopt policy: Of procuring timber only from legal and non-HCVF Of respecting rights of local communities

2002

2003 2004 2006 2005 APRIL end APRIL meet with APRIL Independent 3rd timber tracking 2nd audit of APRIL further road FoE EWNI and achieves LEI timber audit by SGS and announces building, land auditors SGS Australia. certification audit APRIL Acacia chain of tracking by no longer clearing and APRIL for its Meet with UPM and timber tracking SGS custody sourcing plantation publishes 1st plantations paper merchants assessment timber from establishment to ensure no Sustainability regarding FoE illegal logs APRIL writes to UK HCVF in Tesso Nilo report report used Environment ProForest review Minister “regarding APRIL’s land recent attacks on APRIL publishes 2nd dispute resolution Indonesian paper Sustainability report. APRIL respond to FoE EWNI report procedures products by UK Acknowledges that move refuting all allegations. Including defending based NGOs to corporate transparency its operations in Tesso Nilo takes time

campaigns can be described as a battle for the support of APRIL’s stakeholders, where the ENGOs and APRIL have to persuade them of their legitimacy. As part of this each group presents data and information as fact, even though the sources may not be based on empirical analysis. APRIL, for example, has increasingly used researchers from universities or independent bodies such as TNS and SGS to conduct independent research for them in order to verify their claims. However, the company also uses in-house researchers in other areas which brings into doubt some of their other claims, for example on assessing whether a forest is of high conservation value. APRIL’s claims on determining the biodiversity value of the forests is questioned not only by ENGOs, such as WWF, but also in a report commissioned by the International Tropical Timber Organisation (ITTO) where one of the conclusions was that the HCVF and conservation areas set aside by the company are too small and fragmented and are also surrounded by plantations that offer little to encourage biodiversity (Jensen 2007). The ENGOs also use a mixture of research by independent bodies as well as in-house studies. For example, FoE EWNI based a substantial amount of the report that is the centrepiece of their campaign (Matthew and Van Gelder 2002) on a CIFOR publication (Barr 2001). However, it also relies on field work by other ENGOs which is not independently verified. Although both sides seldom criticise the other for the source of their data they do, however, openly criticise each other for the way they interpret certain issues, for example laws regarding plantations and natural forest (e.g. APRIL 2006c). The issue of the use of illegal logs by APRIL shows the

complexity of interpreting the information presented by each organisation. APRIL has a policy that it will not use illegally harvested timber. To verify this APRIL employs the independent auditors SGS to audit their wood tracking, with the audit being observed by WWF (APRIL 2004a). Furthermore, APRIL, in their 2006 sustainability report, claimed that Eyes on the Forest and WWF have conducted investigations and found that no illegal logs are used by the company (APRIL 2006b). Eyes on the Forest, however, which is an umbrella ENGO including WWF, found that APRIL was using illegal logs (Eyes on the Forest 2006b). APRIL claims that Eyes on the Forest’s investigations were “wrong, unfair and even malicious” claiming that the operations in question were approved by both local and national governments (APRIL 2006c). This example highlights the complexity of the issue where claim and counter claim obscure the reality and, therefore, make the task of determining the impacts of the campaigns even harder. Perceptions of impacts of campaigns The parties’ perceptions of the campaigns’ impacts vary significantly, not just from the environmental groups to APRIL, but also within the groups themselves. Despite low expectations, FoE EWNI felt that APRIL has made significant progress, but are still failing in various areas (interview and questionnaire APRIL campaign leader FoE EWNI). Successes included APRIL no longer using illegally sourced timber, halting operations in TN and supporting the establishment of a National Park in the area and introducing a no felling policy in HCVF. However, the campaign leader

Assessing the impact of environmental campaigns

expressed unease at the lack of transparency in this area. The World Rainforest Movement (WRM) highlighted weaknesses in the identification and monitoring of HCVF, for example though APRIL claims it is not felling in any HCVF, this is not being monitored and it has in fact been logging in these areas (WRM 2006). Other concerns of FoE EWNI included potential shortfall in timber supply to meet the mill’s current capacity, a concern that is supported by CIFOR (Pirard and Cossalter 2006). The campaign leader also expressed apprehension concerning APRIL’s plans to expand pulp production capacity which would certainly require felling more natural forest. This is also a worry of WWF Indonesia, Robin Wood, WALHI and CIFOR (interviews campaign leaders WWF Indonesia, Robin Wood and CIFOR researcher). These ENGOs and CIFOR also had serious concerns regarding APRIL’s relations with local communities. FoE Finland believes that APRIL has made no progress and that the company is still involved in illegal logging, infringing human rights, corrupt practices and generally operating in an unsustainable manner (questionnaire APRIL campaign leader FoE Finland). These criticisms are also supported by other ENGOs such as Down To Earth (DTE) (DTE 2006). FoE Finland’s targeting of UPM was aimed at either getting UPM to withdraw its support (financial and strategic) of APRIL, or to work with APRIL improving their operations. Though the campaign leader feels that it failed on both levels (questionnaire APRIL campaign leader FoE Finland), in reality it did work to a certain extent; with UPM significantly reducing its links with APRIL, and also UPM and APRIL working on improving the latter’s operations. An example of UPM exerting pressure on APRIL is shown by the Finnish company agreeing to extend the deadline on the loans that APRIL owed but only under certain conditions, one of which was APRIL improving its operating standards (UPM 2002). In 2007 UPM renewed their pulp supply agreement with APRIL because they believe that APRIL made significant improvements in its operations which have been verified independently and by its partners (questionnaire Director Issues Management UPM-Kymmene). APRIL’s management felt that the campaigns had little, if any, short or long term impact on the company (questionnaire APRIL managers 1–4). Whilst the general view of the paper merchants was that the campaign by FoE EWNI, caused limited damage to their companies in the short term (questionnaire and interview paper merchants 1–5), stating that sales were not affected. It should be underlined, however, that four of the eight paper merchants still in business, no longer stock APRIL products. The reason they gave was cost. The views of both the paper merchants and APRIL are understandable in that they would not wish to admit to giving into pressure from an outside group, thereby admitting that the ENGOs were successful. One of the APRIL managers when asked about the motivation for APRIL improving its operations responded that it was a combination of customers, including UPM, pressurising the company to become more sustainable and also working and having dialogue with WWF on various issues (interview APRIL manager 1). One

827

could interpret this as market pressure coming to bear on APRIL as a result of the campaigns. Wright (2000) and Jordan and van Tuijl (2000) believe that a successful campaign is built on achieving a high profile in the mass media. A good example of this is the highly successful Greenpeace-Brent Spar campaign, whose success was built on attaining significant media coverage (Löfstedt and Renn 1997). FoE EWNI’s campaign was covered by national media (The Guardian newspaper and the BBC) and FoE Finland’s campaign was covered by national (including Helsinki Sanomat) and local media, and was felt to be successful from this point of view (questionnaire APRIL campaign leader FoE Finland). Whilst WWF Indonesia went on CNN to highlight APRIL’s operations in TN, this coverage was significant in both increasing the pressure on APRIL and its partners, and in raising awareness of the situation in Indonesia. To gain the support of the stakeholders, one of APRIL’s responses in the media battle, was to increase its transparency which included employing a former Greenpeace Director of Communication to be a consultant. This signalled an attempt by APRIL to take the initiative and move from being defensive to being proactive in its dealings with claims by ENGOs, for example joining the World Business Council for Sustainable Development as well as the Global Compact. As APRIL is not a public listed company it does not disclose its financial figures, therefore, it is difficult to assess the influence of the campaigns on the company’s profits. It is certainly possible, however, to see the relative financial strength of the company, compared to the dark times of the Asian financial crisis when it had to postpone the construction of a second paper production line. This coincided with the peak of the criticism by ENGOs. Since then the company has been growing in strength, for example announcing plans to increase pulp production as well as being able to significantly reduce its debt burden (Slater 2006) in addition to acquiring a pulp and paper mill in Shandong, China in 2005. The financing of the pulp and paper industry was central to the FoE EWNI campaign. Increased pressure has borne some results. The campaign leader felt that certain banks, for example HSBC and Barclays, were being more careful as a result of pressure from ENGOs (interview APRIL campaign leader FoE EWNI). This is also reflected by one of the banks stating they did not wish to be associated with stories of rainforest destruction, and that this belief is behind their policies towards the pulp and paper industry in Asia (Head of Public Policy anonymous UK bank). This fits with the idea of Ogrizeck (2002) and Hildyard (2005) that increased focus by ENGOs has resulted in more corporate social responsibility in the financial sector. The attitudes and practices of the financial sector are improving; for example signing up to initiatives that guarantee certain social and environmental safeguards when providing their services, however, there is still some way to go as unsustainable mills can still obtain financing (Spek 2006). The Equator Principles, for example have little application to the vast majority of financing for pulp mills as the Principles are currently limited to investments structured as project finance, which is rarely

828

D. Gritten and P. Kant

applicable to the pulp and paper industry (Spek 2006). Focus on one area of APRIL’s development - LEI certification APRIL attained LEI (Lembaga Ekolabel Indonesia) certification for its RAPP fiber plantation operations in 2006. The certification process requires evidence of the benefits of the plantations for local communities, including the availability of non-forest products, forming business partnerships with local people and compensation for utilisation or damage to forests owned by local communities. The certification also covers other concerns of the ENGOs including damage by fires on account of the activities of the company (LEI ND). Part of the reason for APRIL seeking LEI certification was to minimise the risk of being targeted in further campaigns (interview APRIL manager 4). Furthermore, certification will give the company a market advantage (Jensen 2007). LEI certification provides a good example of the divisions amongst the ENGOs and scientific community on the validity of the certification process and also its endorsement of APRIL’s operations, with some viewing the process akin to greenwash. WWF Indonesia, for example, sees it as an encouraging sign that APRIL is managing its plantations sustainably (WWF 2006c). There is support for the certification itself from other ENGOs such as The Nature Conservancy (TNC) and from the scientific community (Hinrichs 2005). There has been, however, strong condemnation from ENGOs as a result of the certification (DTE 2006). The main criticism of the ENGOs of the LEI certification scheme in general and of APRIL achieving certification is the failure to consider the past activities of those achieving certification. Other criticism is centred on the belief that certification legitimises not just the activities of APRIL but also of the concession system itself which many believe to be a driver in deforestation (Hinrichs 2005). Conversely there is also opposition from the scientific community towards a certification process that rewards a company which has cleared significant areas of pristine forest and has poor relations with indigenous communities (interview researcher CIFOR). This is supported by a report prepared by the ITTO which stated that RAPP’s plantations would be unlikely to be certified by FSC, not just for principle 10.9 (establishment of plantations after November 1994) but also on other criteria in principle 10 (plantations), specifically on issues such as biodiversity in the plantations (Jensen 2007). The ITTO report went on to highlight the many problems that APRIL has concerning conflicts with local communities over land tenure rights, also highlighting weaknesses in criteria and indicators regarding social functions, particularly with indigenous peoples. The differences between the ENGOs on certification are highlighted by a report by TNC, WWF and CIFOR on the issue of certification in Indonesia. One of the findings of the report is that some tactics by ENGOs, including opposition to certification, actually exacerbates attempts to make forestry operations more sustainable (Jurgens 2006). WWF,

for example, supports the certification process as a major step forward believing it to be an important tool for utilising the market to increase pressure on forestry companies to improve their operations. Whilst other ENGOs such as WALHI, believe that the certification process is not the way forward, as the market based efforts through certification actually impede the necessary forestry governance reforms (Jurgens 2006). Aims and strategies of the ENGOs The differences between the ENGOs on the issue of certification are also present in other aspects of their campaigns. Princen et al. (1994) believe that ENGOs are in the business of monitoring, exposing, criticising and condemning. Both WWF and FoE certainly fulfil these roles, though employing differing methods. APRIL clearly has a warmer relationship with WWF compared to with FoE. The value of the closer relationship between APRIL and WWF is underlined by the conclusions of the 2005 Conference “Ethical Corporation/NGO partnerships and engagement” which stated that both business and NGOs stand to gain from partnerships, but only if there is mutual trust and respect (Saha 2005). This fits with the theory of Kuhndt et al. (2004) that ENGOs can be rated concerning their tactics and attitudes to companies. To achieve its aims FoE is clearly taking a confrontational approach, whilst WWF is applying a more collaborative method. An example of this is WWF Indonesia not directly targeting the paper merchants named in the FoE EWNI report as the campaign leader believed it was of more value to present the merchants with evidence of APRIL’s failings to get them to pressurise the company (interview APRIL campaign leader WWF Indonesia). FoE EWNI chose the option of naming the merchants. The feeling of the campaign leaders of FoE EWNI and WWF Indonesia was that the campaigns complemented each other on many aspects, though they do not agree on all methods, for example on the calling for the boycott of the paper merchants (interviews APRIL campaign leaders FoE EWNI and WWF Indonesia). Both groups claim credit for certain actions by APRIL, for example halting operations in TN and acknowledge the role played by other ENGOs in these achievements (interviews APRIL campaign leaders FoE EWNI and WWF Indonesia). Both the confrontational and collaborative approaches are needed to ensure that sustainable progress is made (Murphy and Bendell 1999). The belief of FoE Finland that their campaign had achieved little, seemed to offer no compromises, whilst WWF Indonesia with their more conciliatory approach believe that significant progress has been made by APRIL. The collaborative approach that WWF takes is not without its detractors; including the APRIL campaign leader for FoE EWNI who felt that there is a danger of greenwash (Strecklow 2006). Additionally, Robin Wood felt that ENGOs should stop working with APRIL whilst it continues to fell natural forests (Jikalahari 2006). Furthermore, in 2002 WWF accepted significant funding (US$ 18.4 million) from HSBC. HSBC has been criticised

Assessing the impact of environmental campaigns

by FoE EWNI for funding projects involved in deforestation in Indonesia (FoE 2003). However, WWF believes that its tactics pay off, not only with APRIL, but also, for example, in the promotion of sustainable purchasing policies in Japan, which is an important step in closing the market to illegal timber (Jurgens 2006). The differences between WWF Indonesia and FoE Finland could also be on whatever route the organisations choose to use to achieve their ultimate goal of ensuring that Indonesia’s forests are managed in a sustainable way. According to Jurgens (2006) WWF follows a stepwise approach on such issues as certification and this is reflected in their tactics. It is willing to acknowledge progress and understand that companies like APRIL need time to make their operations as sustainable as possible and, in the meantime, should be encouraged when progress is made. WWF perceives corporations as being part of the problem and also the solution and, to achieve progress on sustainability issues, partnerships between companies, governments and themselves are required (WWF 2007). FoE Finland on the other hand takes the view that it is all or nothing - in other words the small concessions made by APRIL should not detract from the bigger picture which shows the company is failing on many other issues, ones that could be forgotten or glossed over if the company is praised for, for example, achieving LEI certification for its operations. FoE EWNI and FoE Finland’s differing recommendations to APRIL are important when considering the tactics and aims of the campaigns. FoE Finland called on APRIL to halt clear-cutting in all natural rainforests (Miettinen and Selin 1999), whilst FoE EWNI were pushing APRIL to halt operating in HCVF (Matthew and Van Gelder 2002). APRIL had significant debts to repay and therefore needed to maximise production. Failure to do so threatened the company’s survival, fitting with the situation described by Pirard and Rokhim (2006) regarding the pulp and paper industry throughout Indonesia. Therefore APRIL’s compliance with FoE Finland’s recommendation was not possible, whilst applying FoE EWNI’s recommendation was clearly more attainable. Though they differ regarding the recommendation on felling in natural forests, FoE EWNI’s ultimate goal is similar to FoE Finland’s. APRIL should halt all felling in natural forests. It is apparent that FoE EWNI sees the ultimate goal as being achieved more through a stepwise approach. The differences between the ENGOs go beyond the targets of the campaigns and questioning of how far APRIL have developed, but also in how plantation establishment is viewed. WWF Indonesia appear supportive of plantations being established by APRIL on degraded land (WWF 2006c), FoE Finland on the other hand believe that the plantations, even if established on degraded land, bring benefits only to APRIL at a cost to the local communities (questionnaire APRIL campaign leader FoE Finland). The FoE EWNI and Finland campaigns were organised based on cooperation with each other as well as with other ENGOs. For example, Robin Wood, WALHI, FoE EWNI and Finland as well as other ENGOs in Indonesia are working together to halt APRIL’s operations in Sumatra’s

829

peat swamp forests. This can also be seen in the targeting of the campaigns. FoE EWNI’s primary focus was on paper merchants in the UK, the UK Government and financial institutions (primarily European). Whilst FoE Finland’s focus was clearly on Finland, not only that the book central to the campaign was published in Finnish, but also that the campaign was targeting APRIL through applying pressure on UPM. WALHI’s primary focus on the other hand is within Indonesia. This coordination enabled the application of increased focus on APRIL, both at home and abroad, through pressure coming to bear on its customer base, its lenders, strategic partners and so on meant that the campaigns covered most aspects of APRIL’s operations, in other words blanket campaigns. This cooperation, in terms of both resources and knowledge (for example FoE Finland hosted a visit to Finland by a representative of the Indonesian ENGO Jikalahari), is vital for the campaigns to achieve results (Keck and Sikkink 1998, della Porta and Rucht 2002). The relationship between the FoE partner organisations also shows elements of Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) boomerang effect, specifically that southern ENGOs (i.e. WALHI) provide information for their northern partners to use in pressuring their national governments (and partner companies such as UPM). The response in the political arena can be seen in the UK Government’s Memorandum of Understanding with Indonesia in 2002, which was positively received by the campaign leader at FoE EWNI. However, one APRIL manager sees the Memorandum as unethical as it creates a barrier to Indonesian forest products, whether legally sourced or not. He also felt this was effectively the only result from the FoE EWNI campaign (interview APRIL manager 1). The UK Government is interested in further developing this, as demonstrated by its commitment to the European Union’s Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade Action Plan (FLEGT). However, it is also constrained by the need to abide by World Trade Organisation’s (WTO) rules and, therefore, is unable to introduce a ban on timber of questionable origin, as well as the fact that it would be very difficult to implement (interview Head of Timber Procurement, UK Government DEFRA). Comparison with other campaigns The findings that the campaigns achieved mixed results is similar to that of Cartwright’s (2003) examination of campaigns against the forest policy of the Ontario provincial government and Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) analysis of campaigns regarding deforestation in Sarawak, Malaysia. They both highlight how difficult it is to clearly determine a campaign’s success as it involves many dimensions. Many ENGOs, each with differing agendas and goals, were involved in the campaign to halt deforestation in Sarawak. The conclusion of Keck and Sikkink (1998) was that the campaigns were both a total failure for those wishing to halt tropical timber logging in Sarawak, and a remarkable success in raising awareness and significantly reducing the use of tropical timber in Europe. This can also be applied to the campaigns by FoE Finland and FoE EWNI, APRIL

830

D. Gritten and P. Kant

has clearly made progress, though still has significant work to do, whilst on a larger scale the decline of primary forests in Indonesia continues apace with FAO stating that rate of deforestation of primary forest in Indonesia during the period 2000-2005 was over 1.45 million ha per year (FAO 2006a), hence from that perspective the campaigns have failed. APRIL’s continued role in the deforestation should also be noted, though they claim not to be felling in HCVF and to be reforesting significant areas (with exotic species) they are still relying on felling large areas of natural forest to feed their mill and will continue to do so especially if, as reported, they increase production capacity (Pirard and Cossalter 2006). FoE EWNI and WWF Indonesia have also been campaigning against the operations of another pulp and paper company in Indonesia, Asia Pulp and Paper (APP). Like APRIL, APP has its principal operations in Riau. There were many similarities in the FoE EWNI campaigns against APP and APRIL including targeting paper merchants stocking APP products and financial institutions offering their services. When asked to compare their campaigns against APP and APRIL, both campaign leaders felt that APRIL had made more progress on such issues as ending the use of illegally sourced timber (interviews campaign leaders WWF Indonesia and FoE EWNI) and sourcing timber from HCVF (WWF 2006a). The WWF campaign leader felt that APRIL responded to the campaigns in a more pragmatic way than APP. According to him APP made promises it could not keep, whilst APRIL was only willing to set public targets with which it could comply. He felt that both companies were committed to improving their operations, it is just that APRIL has dealt with the pressure resulting from the campaigns (including from buyers and ENGOs) better than APP (interview campaign leader WWF Indonesia). Further evidence of the differences between APP and APRIL can be seen in the current relations between the two companies and the ENGO. WWF effectively ended cooperation with APP in 2004 as the company failed to live up to its commitments made to the ENGO (WWF 2006b). On the other hand, APRIL and WWF cooperate on the protection of TN, as well as on monitoring APRIL’s commitment to non-felling of HCVF (WWF 2006c) and working together in combating illegal logging (APRIL 2004a). Spar and Mure (2003) believe that corporations respond in three different ways to NGO pressure: 1) Resistance, 2) Capitulation or 3) Pre-emption. The research has found that APRIL is employing all three methods. APRIL’s initial response to the FoE campaigns was resistance. Then as pressure grew they started to capitulate in certain areas, by halting operations in TN to developing pre-emptive measures to placate ENGO opposition, for example achieving LEI certification and cooperating with WWF. This is similar to the response of MacMillan Bloedel (MB) who initially resisted pressure from ENGOs to halt clear-cutting in Clayoquot Sound, then capitulated by halting clear-cutting when pressurised by ENGOs including Greenpeace and then took pre-emptive measures by creating an eco-friendly logging company, Iisaak Forest Resources, which is jointly

owned by local indigenous groups. Further parallels can be drawn between the campaigns against APRIL and the campaign by Greenpeace against MB over the company’s clear-cutting of old-growth forests in Clayoquot sound in British Columbia. Greenpeace employed numerous tools to get MB to improve its operations, including pressurising companies associated with MB such as merchants stocking MB products. As the campaign progressed Greenpeace’s relationship with the company changed from one of hostility to cooperation as MB ended clear-cutting in Clayoquot (Zietsma and Vertinsky 1999). WWF Indonesia’s relationship with APRIL mimics this as APRIL gradually improved its operations, including halting operations in TN, the rapport between the two improved to the level of cooperating on certain issues, though WWF also continues to highlight the company’s current failings. Combating deforestation Rose (2005) believes that campaigns have both short and long term objectives; in this case the short term objective is APRIL adopting the recommendations put forward by both FoE groups, whilst the long term target is to halt the destruction of Indonesia’s natural forests. It is apparent that the deforestation is continuing with governmental and nongovernmental organisations highlighting the problem. The ENGOs and APRIL agree that central to the problem is weak governance, with the Indonesian Government failing on many levels. For example, though the Government has announced a ban on the use of natural forest trees by the pulp and paper industry by 2009, this was met with a great deal of scepticism by the ENGOs as they felt the Government lacks the ability or willingness to enforce the ban. The campaigns by FoE EWNI and FoE Finland focus on a more visible and accessible target, APRIL, compared to illegal loggers, for example, who would be much harder for northern ENGOs to target. This could be a failing of the campaigns as FoE EWNI and FoE Finland are not focussing on, according to Palmer (2000), the main threat to the remaining forests namely illegal logging. This view was supported by one of the APRIL managers who questioned why ENGOs are not doing more to combat illegal logging, including failing to support APRIL’s initiatives on this (interview APRIL manager 1). Whilst Smith et al. (2003) believe that the focus needs to be more on combating corruption. Both corruption and illegal logging are partially facilitated by weak governance. Thorburn (2004) believes that pressure by ENGOs on the Indonesian Government has forced it to introduce a more sustainable dimension, both socially and environmentally, to its legislation. The problem, however, has been in the implementation and enforcement. The Indonesian Government, for example, admits that it is unable to adhere to its international commitments such as the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) because it lacks the appropriate means to combat the causes of deforestation (Chrystanto and Justianto 2003). One APRIL manager felt that the only solution to end the deforestation was through the cooperation of the Government

Assessing the impact of environmental campaigns

(national and provincial), companies (such as APRIL) and ENGOs in such areas as combating illegal logging (interview APRIL manager 1). An extension of the cooperation in TN where the sharing of resources and expertise would not only be mutually beneficial for those involved, but could ensure that areas that are designated as HCVF are protected using all necessary means (Bruner et al. 2001, Sánchez-Azofeifa et al. 2003), though the cost of protecting such areas is high (James et al. 2001). However, despite the cooperation between APRIL, WWF and the local government on the issues of illegal logging and protection of biodiversity in TN these issues are still of serious concern (WWF 2006a, Jakarta Post 2007). A similar recommendation is made by Schroeder-Wildberg and Carus (2003) and by the multi stakeholder group, The Forests Dialogue (TFD 2005), that ENGOs and companies need to cooperate to reduce illegal logging and protect forests. WWF are also willing to work further with APRIL and do not see cooperation between the two organisations as hypocritical, pointing out that APRIL should be praised where they are progressing and criticised where they are failing (interview campaign leader WWF Indonesia).

CONCLUSION This paper set out to examine the impact of various environmental campaigns against the operations of APRIL, an Indonesian pulp and paper company. Analysis of related documents shows that the campaigns, whether relating to specific or general aims, show mixed results. APRIL has made progress on certain issues regarding illegal logging and the company’s impact in the local community, both of which are independently verified. However, it is failing on other issues such as land rights which are highlighted by the ITTO. There are significant differences of opinion between the ENGOs on APRIL’s progress as well as the route to encouraging sustainable forest management in Indonesia; the mixed views regarding LEI certification being a case in point. Part of these differences of opinion is based on the strategy employed by the groups; with WWF willing to accept a step wise approach to the company improving its operations, whilst FoE Finland seeks an all or nothing method. The blanket campaigns by FoE EWNI and FoE Finland targeted many associates of APRIL such as paper merchants, financial institutions, UK Government and UPM to magnify the pressure on the pulp and paper company. This was clearly a successful tactic as these associates responded to the campaigns, wishing to distance themselves from the spotlight of the campaigns, including the negative media coverage. Though APRIL’s managers stated that the campaigns by both FoE groups had a negligible impact on the company, it is clear that significant pressure was placed on the company by its partners and associates. This is partially as a result of the ENGOs taking measures to ensure that the partners and associates were tainted by association. The international

831

nature of the campaign was also vital in motivating APRIL to improve its operating practices. Furthermore, the tactics of the ENGOs from being confrontational to collaborative saw APRIL being pushed in the more conciliatory direction of WWF in an attempt to reduce the pressure on the company. Some ENGOs, however, fear that this strategy by WWF encourages APRIL to greenwash its activities, pointing out that APRIL is still felling large areas of natural rainforest and failing on other issues, and yet attains LEI certification. Nevertheless APRIL’s progress will give it a market advantage (Jensen 2007) which will force its competitors (e.g. APP) to respond and improve its operations and, therefore, its image. In other words though the progress is slow and patchy it is movement in the right direction.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The authors would like to thank Olli Saastamoinen, Paavo Pelkonen, Reijo E. Heinonen, Alan Pottinger, Wu Shuirong and Antti Erkkila for their advice in the formulation of this paper. The valuable suggestions made by anonymous referees are gratefully acknowledged. The authors are extremely grateful for the financial support from the Finnish Cultural Foundation (Suomen Kulttuurirahasto).

REFERENCES APRIL. (No date). Land rights and collective labour agreement. APRIL (Unpublished document). APRIL 2002. APRIL management’s comments in response to “Paper tiger, hidden dragons 2” APRIL (Unpublished Correspondence from APRIL to Friends of the Earth EWNI) APRIL 2003. 2002 Sustainability report: Building for sustainable growth. APRIL (Available from www. aprilasia.com) APRIL 2004a. 2004 Sustainability report: Moving forward. APRIL. (Available fro m www.aprilasia.com) APRIL 2004b. Letter from Nazir Foead, WWF Indonesia. Reprinted. CSR Update 2nd Quarter 2004. APRIL (Available from www.aprilasia.com) APRIL 2004c. WWF’s bid for Tesso Nilo National Park gains ground. CSR Update 3rd Quarter 2004. APRIL. (Available from www.aprilasia.com) APRIL 2004d. Survey cites positive community perception of APRIL. CSR Update 3rd Quarter 2004. APRIL. (Available from www.aprilasia.com) APRIL 2005. APRIL stands firm in protecting forests through responsible management – Moratorium will cause further environmental degradation. AP RIL (Available from www. aprilasia.com) APRIL 2006a. Official statement on the Gading Permai case. APRIL. (Available from www.aprilasia.com) APRIL 2006b. 2006 Sustainability Report: Driving a sustainable culture. APRIL (Available from www. aprilasia.com)

832

D. Gritten and P. Kant

APRIL 2006c. APRIL letter to Editor of Eyes on the Forest. October 12th 2006. http://eyesontheforest.or.id/eofnew/ RAPP_responseMay.JV.EoF.16.1.09.06.pdf Acce ssed: 20/09/2007 BARR, C. 2001. Profits on paper: The political-economy of fiber and finance in Indonesia’s pulp and paper industries. In C. Barr (ed.): Banking on sustainability: structural adjustment and forestry reform in post-Suharto Indonesia. Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) and WWF Macroeconomic Program Office. Washington, DC. Chapter 4. BETSILL, M.M. and CORELL, E. 2001. NGO Influence in international environmental negotiations: A framework for analysis. Global Environmental Politics 1(4). 65-84 BURNS, R.B. 2000. Introduction to research methods. (London Sage Publications). BRUNER A.G., GULLISON R.E., RICE R.E. and DA FONSECA G.A.B. 2001. Effectiveness of parks in protecting tropical biodiversity. Science 291. 125–128. CAIRNCROSS, F. 1995. Green, Inc.: A guide to business and the environment. (Earthscan, London). CARTWRIGHT, J. 2003. Environmental groups, Ontario’s land process and the Forest Accord. Environmental Politics 12(2).115-132 CERIN, P. 2002. Communication in corporate environmental reports. Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management. 9(1). 46-65 CHRYSTANTO, S.Y. and JUSTIANTO, A. 2003. National Forest Policy review Indonesia. In: Enters, T. Qiang, M and Leslie, R.N. (eds.). An overview of forest policies in Asia. Information and analysis for Sustainable Forest Management: Linking national and international efforts in South and South East Asia. FAO Bangkok. COLLIER, J. and WANDERLEY, L. 2005. Thinking for the future: global corporate responsibility in the twenty-first century. Futures 37. 169-182 DELLA PORTA, D. and RUCHT, D. 2002. The dynamics of environmental campaigns. Mobilization: An International Quarterly. 7(1). 1-14. DENSCOMBE, M. 1998. The good research guide: for small-scale social research projects. (Buckingham: Open University) DTE. 2006. Certification Controversy. Down to Earth No.69, May 20 06. http://dte.gn.apc.org/69for2.htm Accessed: 20/06/2006 EQUATOR PRINCIPLES. 2005. Institutions which have adopted the Equator Principles. http://www.equatorprinciples.com/ Accessed: 10/05/2005 EYES ON THE FOREST. 2006. Eyes on the Forest December 2005 Investigative Report. http://www.eyesontheforest. or.id/investigation/Des%2005%20update%20report.pdf Accessed: 25/08/2006. FAO 2006a. Global forest resources assessment 2005. www. fao.org/forestry/site/32185/en/idn Accessed: 15/07/2006 FAO. 2006b. Pulp and paper capacities survey 2005-2010. Rome: FAO FoE 2001. Briefing: Paper tiger, hidden dragons 2: APRIL fools. Friends of the Earth England, Wales and Northern

Ireland. February 2001 Friends of the Earth. FoE 2003. Media briefing: UK plc. HSBC Holdings plc. Friends of the Earth England, Wales and Northern Ireland. May 2003 Friends of the Earth. GILLISON A.N. 2001. Vegetation survey and habitat assessment of the Tesso Nilo forest complex. Prepared for WWF-USA by the Centre for Biodiversity Management, Queensland, Australia. WWF-USA GLOBAL COMPACT. No date . Participants and stakeholders. www.unglobalcompact.org/participantsandstakeholders/ search_participants.html Accessed: 23/04/2006. HELLSTRÖM, E. 2001. Conflicting cultures – Qualitative comparative analysis of environmental conflicts in Forestry. SILVA FENNICA Monographs 2 2001: pp. 109 HILDYARD, N. 2005. Holding funders and companies to account – Litigation and standard. Paper Presented to American Anthropological Association Annual Meeting Washington DC, 3rd December 2005 HINRICHS, A. 2005. Lembaga Ekolabel Indonesia – Introduction and implementation of forest certification in Indonesia. In: BURGER, D., HESS, J. and LANG, B. 2005. Forest certification: An innovative instrument in the service of sustainable development. GTZ Germany. JAKARTA POST. 2007. Tesso Nilo park under constant threat. Jakarta Post July 6th 20 07. http://www.thejakartapost. com/Archives/ArchivesDet2.asp?FileID=20070706.G05 Accessed: 20/09/2007 JAMES A., GASTON K.J. and BALMFORD A. 2001. Can we afford to conserve biodiversity? Bioscience 51:43– 52. JENSEN, O.B. 2007. Consolidating Sustainable Forest Management Certification in Indonesia – Ex-post evaluation report (ITTO Project PD 80/01 Rev. 6(M). www.itto.or.jp/live/Live_Server/3328/Ex-post-PD-8001-R6.doc Accessed: 20/09/2007 JIKALAHARI. 2006. Sumatra’s peat swamp forest threatened with coll apse. http://www.jikalahari.org/en/ lihat.php?key=29 Accessed: 20/09/2007 JORDAN, L. and VAN TUIJL, P. (2000). Political Responsibility in Transnational NGO Advocacy. World Development 28(12) pp. 2051-2065 JURGENS, E. 2006. Learning lessons to promote certification and combat illegal logging in Indonesia: September 2003 to June 2006. CIFOR, Indonesia KECK, M.E. and SIKKINK, K. 1998. Activists beyond borders: Advocacy networks in international politics. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press KUHNDT, M., TUNÇER, B, SNORRE, ANDERSEN K., and LIEDTKE C. 2004. Responsible corporate governance: An overview of trends, initiatives and state-of-the-art elements. What sort of globalisation is sustainable? Wuppertal Papers 139. LEAHY, J. 2006. APRIL set to become paper tiger. FT Business – The Australian. 22nd Februa ry 2006. www. theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,1822754336375,00.html Accessed: 24/04/2006. LEI. (No date). Lembaga Ekolabel Indonesia – Certification system for plantation forest management. http://www.lei.

Assessing the impact of environmental campaigns

or.id/english/download.php Accessed: 18/10/2006 LÖFSTEDT, RE. and ORTWIN, R. 1997. The Brent Spar Controversy: An Example of Risk Communication Gone Wrong. Risk Analysis 17 (2), 131–136. LPEM 2005. Economic Impact Analysis of Riaupulp on Riau Economy. Lembaga Penyelldikan Ekonomi dan Masyarakat, Fakultas Ekonomi Universitas Indonesia. Executive Summary (Available from the Faculty of Economics, University of Indonesia) MATURANA, J., HOSGOOD, N. and SUHARTANTO, A.A. 2005. Moving towards company-community partnerships: Elements to take into account for fast-wood plantation companies in Indonesia. Working Paper 29. CIFOR MATTHEW, E. and VAN GELDER, J.W. 2002. Paper tiger, hidden dragons 2: APRIL fools: The forest destruction, social conflict and financial crisis of Asia Pacific Resources International Holdings Ltd APRIL, and the role of financial institutions and paper merchants. (Friends of the Earth, London) MIETTINEN, O. and SELIN, T. 1999. The calculated risk - UPM-Kymmene in Indonesian rainforests. (Translated excerpts from the book ”Harkittu riski - UPM-Kymmene Indonesian sademetsissä”) http://www.maanystavat.fi/ april/book/ Accessed: 31/01/2006. MoU. 2002. Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and The Government of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on cooperation to improve forest law enforcement and governance and to combat illegal logging and the international trade in illegally logged timber and wood products.http://www.illegal-logging.info/papers/1_ Indonesia-UK_MoU.pdf Accessed: 24/04/2006 MURPHY, D.F. and BENDELL, J. 1999. ‘Partners in time? Business, NGOs and sustainable development’. UNRISD Discussion Paper No.109, August 1999. pp.72 NAWIR, A.A. and SANTOSO, L. 2005. Mutually beneficial company-community partnerships in plantation development: emerging lessons from Indonesia. International Forestry Review 7(3). 177-192 OGRIZEK, M. 2002. The effect of corporate social responsibility on the branding of financial services. Journal of Financial Services Marketing. 6(3). 215-228 PALMER, C.E. 2000. The extent and causes of illegal logging: An analysis of a major cause of tropical deforestation in Indonesia. CSERGE working paper. Centre for Social and Economic Research on the Global Environment, London, England. PIRARD, R. and ROKHIM, R. 2006. Asia Pulp & Paper Indonesia: The business rationale that led to forest degradation and financial collapse. Working Paper 33. CIFOR. PIRARD, R. and COSSALTER, C. 2006. The Revival of industrial forest plantations in Indonesia’s Kalimantan Provinces: Will they help eliminate fiber shortfalls at Sumatran pulp mills or feed the China market? Working Paper 37. CIFOR PRAWIRADILAGA, D.M, SUYANTO, A, NOERDJITO,

833

W.A, SAIM A, PURWANINGSIH, RACHMATIKA, I, SUSIARTI, S, SIDIK, S, MARAKARMAH, A, MUN’IM, A, SINAGA, M.H, CHOLIK, E, ISMAIL, MAHARANI, M, PURWANTO, Y, and WALUYO, E.B. 2003. The summary of biodiversity assessment in Tesso Nil o. Research Centre for Biology LIPI and WWF Indonesia. http://eyesontheforest.or.id/doc/summary_ bio_assesment.pdf Accessed: 24/04/2006 PRINCEN, T. 1994. NGOs: Creating a niche in environmental diplomacy. In: Princen, T. and Finger, M. 1994. Environmental NGOs in World Politics. (New York Routledge) PRINCEN, T., FINGER, M. and MANNO, J.P. 1994. Transnational linkages. In: Princen, T. and Finger, M. 1994. Environmental NGOs in World Politics. (New York Routledge) PROFOREST 2004. A review of RAPP’s Land Dispute Resolution Procedures. ProForest 06 February 2004. p.10. Unpublished document. ROSE, C. 2005. How to win campaigns: 100 steps to success. London: Earthscan pp. 160 SAHA, P.M. 2005. Europe: Transparency, communications and trust key to successful partnerships. Ethical Corporation http://www.ethicalcorp.com/content. asp?ContentID=3496 Accessed: 16/05/2005. SANCHEZ-AZOFEIFA, G.A., DAILY G.C., PFAFF A.S.P. and BUSCH C. 2003. Integrity and isolation of Costa Rica’s national parks and biological reserves: examining the dynamics of land-cover change. Biological Conservation 109. 123–135. SCHROEDER-WILDBERG, E. and CARUS, A. 2003. Illegal logging, conflict and the business sector in Indonesia. Berlin:InWEnt SDiG 2004. Sustainable development in government: Third annual report 2004. Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. http://www.sustainable-development. gov.uk/publications/report2004/partf.htm Accessed: 09/02/2006 SGS Malaysia 2002. Timber tracking – Legal forest management concessions assessment report. SGS (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd. Forestry Division. Unpublished company document SGS Malaysia 2003. Timber tracking – Legal forest management concessions assessment report. SGS (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd. Forestry Division. Unpublished company document SGS Malaysia 2004. Timber tracking – Legal forest management concessions surveillance 02 Report. SGS (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd. Forestry Division. Unpublished company document SLATER, D 2006. Why is Sukanto Tanoto laughing? FinanceAsia.com. 26/10/2006. http://www.financeasia. com/article.aspx?CIaNID=41198 Accessed: 26/10/2006 SMITH, R.J., MUIR, R.D.J., WALPOLE, M.J. BALMFORD, A. and LEADER-WILLIAMS, N. 2003. Governance and the loss of biodiversity. Nature 426. 67-70 SONNENFELD, D.A. 2002. Social movements and ecological modernization: The transformation of pulp

834

D. Gritten and P. Kant

and paper manufacturing. Development and Change 33(1) 1-28 SPAR, D.L. and LA MURE, L.T. 2003. The power of activism: Assessing the impact of NGOs on global business. California Management Review. 43(3). 78-101 SPEK, M. 2006. Financing pulp mills: An appraisal of risk assessment and safeguard procedures. Centre for International Forestry Research (CIFOR). STRECKLOW, S. 2006. Environmentalists, loggers near deal on Asian Rainforest. The Wall Street Journal March 1st, 2006. TFD. 2005. The Forests Dialogue Review: Practical actions to combat illegal logging. A summary of multi-stakeholder dialogue on best practice for business and civil society. TFD Number 2. New Haven THORBURN, C.C. 2004. The plot thickens: Land administration and policy in post New-Order Indonesia. Asia Pacific Viewpoint .45(1). 33-49 TNS. 2004. Executive Summary: Perceived impact of RAPP to community. Taylor, Nelson and Sofres. (Unpublished report). UNEPFI. No date. Signatories of UNEPFI. www.unepfi.org/ signatories/index.html Accessed: 23/04/2006 UPM. 2000a. UPM-Kymmene does not exercise the APRIL loan option. Press Release (03/01/2000) http://w3.upmkymmene.com/upm/internet/cms/upmcms.nsf/($all)/ 3283cd97076ac739c2256d3a00322acd?OpenDocument &qm=menu,0,0,9 Accessed: 19/04/2006 UPM. 2000b. Ownership of the Chinese fine paper mill to UPM-Kymmene. Press Release (01/09/2000) http:// w3.upm-kymmene.com/upm/internet/cms/upmcms.nsf/ ($all)/b2eb436f0fd83052c2256d3a00322af0?OpenDocu ment&qm=menu,0,0,9n Accessed 19/04/2006. UPM. 2002 UPM-Kymmene and APRIL to agree on loan repayment terms and higher environmental standards. Press Release (10/04/2002) http://w3.upm-kymmene. com/upm/internet/cms/upmcms.nsf/($all)/c611738ad04 b83bcc2256d3a00483a21?OpenDocument&qm=menu,0 ,0,9 Accessed 19/04/2006. WORLD BANK 1991. The World Bank operational manual. Operational directive: indigenous peoples. September 1991 OD 4.20 p6. World Bank http://wbln0018. worldbank.org/Institutional/Manuals/OpManual.nsf/ tocall/ 0F7D6F3F04DD70398525672C007D08ED?Ope nDocument Accessed 14/04/2006 WORLD BANK 1998. The International Finance Corporation. Operational policies: Forestry. November 1998 (Revised 08/2004) OP 4.36 p2. World Bank http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/Institutional/Manuals/ OpManual.nsf/tocall/C972D5438F4D1FB78525672C00 7D077A?OpenDocument Accessed: 14/04/2005 WRI. 2000. Trial by fire: Forest fires in Indonesia’s era of crisis and reform, World Resources Institute, Washington DC. WRIGHT, B. 2000. Environmental NGOs and the DolphinTuna Case, Environmental Politics, 9(4) pp. 82-103 WRM. 2006. The HCVF application in Indonesia. WRM Bulletin No.114. January 2006. http://www.wrm.org.uy/

bulletin/114/Indonesia.html Accessed: 20/09/2007 WWF. 2006a. The eleventh hour for Riau’s forests: Two global pulp and paper companies will decide their fate. WWF Indonesia June 2006. (Available from: www.wwf. or.id) WWF. 2006b. WWF monitoring brief June 2006: Asia Pulp & Paper (APP). WWF Indonesia June 2006. (Available from: www.wwf.or.id) WWF. 2006c. WWF monitoring brief June 2006: Asia Pacific Resources International Holdings. WWF Indonesia June 2006. (Available from: www.wwf.or.id) WWF. 2007. Does WWF greenwash companies? http:// www.panda.org/ab