Preconditions for Foreign Activities of European

Preconditions for Foreign Activities of European Regions: Tracing Causal Configurations of Economic, Cultural, and Political Strategies Joachim Blatter*, Matthias Kreutzery, Michaela Rentlz, and JanThielex

This article traces international activities of regional governments in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, and Italy. We describe how intensively the regions are investing in economic, cultural, and political activities, and how broad the different activities are spread. Then we analyze preconditions for strong activities by using the fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis. Two assumptions about causal configurations are confirmed. First, high economic interdependencies in combination with large financial capacities are in most cases sufficient for setting up many promotional offices abroad. Second, a high level of policy autonomy, in combination with strong competencies in foreign affairs, is almost always sufficient for having a well-staffed office in Brussels. In contrast, partnerships with foreign political entities are not a result of a cultural causal configuration.

In Europe, subnational governments have become increasingly involved in international activities. The existence of the European Union (EU) and its strong impact on the autonomy of subnational governments have led to the preoccupation of practitioners and researchers alike on the contacts between subnational governments and supranational actors on the European level (see, for example, Marks et al. 1996; Hooghe and Marks 2001; Jeffery 1997a; Bache and Flinders 2004; Benz 1998, 2000, 2004). Nevertheless, international activities of subnational governments are not solely confined to contacts with the EU as a reaction to processes of political integration on a supranational level. Nor are international activities of subnational governments a peculiarity of European regions. A look at the international activities of subnational governments in North America (e.g., Michelmann and Soldatos 1990; Duchacek 1990; Hocking 1993; Aldecoa and *University of Lucerne; [email protected] y Local government association for managerial topics (KGSt); [email protected] z [email protected] x Department for International Relations of the Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg; [email protected] Publius:The Journal of Federalism, pp.1^29 doi:10.1093/publius/pjp024 ß The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of CSF Associates: Publius, Inc. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: [email protected].

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Keating 1999; Keating 2002; Dyment 2001; Lecours 2002; Fry 1993, 1998; Philippart 1998) show impressively that international activities are not only triggered by political integration. Processes of economic and cultural integration have stimulated a broad spectrum of transnational activities of subnational governments such as government-lead trade missions and transnational partnerships with other regions. These activities perforate the boundary between domestic and international politics, undermine the gatekeeper position of national governments between these two spheres, and might contribute to the restructuring of the Westphalian system of sovereign nation states. In a previous publication (Blatter et al. 2008), we presented an overview on the levels and contents of various activities that eighty-one European regions perform abroad, and we discussed the implications of these activities. The descriptive analysis revealed enormous differences between various kinds of activities and regions. In the following causal analysis, we want to shed light on the necessary preconditions for intensive activities. We start by giving a brief overview of the state of the art, and show that the literature offers quite different assumptions and empirical results on the preconditions for strong foreign activities of subnational governments. Next, we develop a theoretical model and a research design. We differentiate three principal strategies (economic, cultural, and political) as reactions to an integrating world, and treat them as separate dependent variables, since we assume that they are triggered by different forms of supra- or transnational integration, and also because we assume that they depend on different preconditions. We operationalize these dependent variables by assigning specific activities as indicators for the three strategies: (i) offices/representations in foreign countries; (ii) partnerships; and (iii) a strongly staffed office in Brussels. Our theoretical framework starts with the assumption that every foreign activity must be based on a ‘‘motive’’ (the independent variable), and facilitated by specific capabilities or restricted by specific constraints (the intervening variables). Furthermore, we assume that different motives lead to different strategies, and that for every motive there are specific logically coherent intervening variables (corresponding capabilities/constraints, which are especially relevant for specific motives). This reasoning forms the ontological/theoretical background and justification for an epistemological/methodological approach for tracing the preconditions of foreign activities as causal configurations, instead of treating every variable as an autonomous entity. In contrast to basic regression analysis that reveals the ‘‘net effect’’ of each variable on the outcome and assumes independence among the explanatory variables, configurational analysis starts from the assumption that there exist intensive interactions between specific causal factors and is especially sensitive for detecting equifinality, the possibility that different combinations of factors can lead to the same outcome (Ragin 2006, 291; Ragin 2000, 64–119). As a consequence, we apply the technique of fuzzy-set Qualitative

Preconditions for Foreign Activities of European Regions

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Comparative Analysis (fsQCA), which translates these ontological and epistemological assumptions into a formal technique and aligns methodology to ontology (Hall 2003). Since our first goal is to obtain a fuller picture of the intensity and extensity of foreign activities of European regions, we have chosen to study a rather large number of regions (eighty-one). This makes it impossible to empirically identify the interactions and causal mechanisms that bind the causal factors into causal configurations through causal process tracing (George and Bennett 2005). Consequentially, as in correlation-based analysis, these causal links must be deduced theoretically. We, therefore, develop conceptually coherent theoretical approaches ex ante and deduce theoretically ‘‘most-likely’’ causal configurations for every strategy. For example, we expect that strong levels of activities within the economic strategy are motivated by high levels of economic international interdependencies. The corresponding material capabilities/restrictions are the financial resources of the subnational government. Nevertheless, these causal configurations are only theoretically deducted starting assumptions or hypotheses, which are put to be tested against empirical evidence. In consequence, the fsQCA analysis represents a theory test in respect to these a-priori developed causal configurations. In addition, we use the fsQCA technique inductively to search for other causal configurations, which might explain specific activities equally well or better than the originally hypothesized causal configuration. When such alternative configurations emerge, they must be interpreted with reference to theory in order to contribute to theory building. The empirical results for the descriptive analysis show that almost all West European regions have a representational office in Brussels. This means that they pursue a political strategy of foreign activities, whereas economic and cultural strategies are not as widespread. The causal analysis confirms our theoretically derived assumption that the creation of promotional offices abroad is a result of high levels of economic interdependencies and huge financial capacities. We can also confirm our assumption that the setting up of strong offices in Brussels represents a political reaction of those regions, which want to defend their large policy leeway and which have been granted constitutional competencies in European/foreign affairs. In contrast, partnerships with other regions—or even with other nation states—do not correspond to the assumed cultural causal configuration. They seem to be a quite diverse set of phenomena with many different features, motives, and enabling/restricting factors at play.

State of the Art Within the literature on paradiplomacy, three types of motives for foreign activities can be differentiated (e.g., Keating 1999, 2002; Kra¨mer 2002): economic, political,

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and cultural motives. Nevertheless, until now we have not found any systematic causal analysis which would prove that specific kinds of foreign activities are the result of specific motives and not others. The differentiated explanatory framework of Soldatos (1990, 1993) provides a list of sixteen factors of influence categorized into three groups: influences from the global, federal/national, and component/ subnational level. Although this framework has been tested within a longitudinal case study (Dyment 2001), its factors and categories are inductively derived and not embedded in theoretical reasoning, making theoretical generalizations difficult. Furthermore, the long list of factors—which Dyment enlarged to twenty-five—is difficult to apply within comparative studies that go beyond a few cases. The literature on international economic activities of subnational governments links these efforts to growing transnational socioeconomic interdependencies and to the expanding strength and policy scope of subnational governments (Fry 1998). Nevertheless, there has not been any systematic test of these proposed causal linkages. Within the literature on transregional partnerships and networks, we find a broad range of factors which seem to have motivated these activities (political, economic, or cultural ‘‘deficits’’ as triggers of the joint activities of border regions; see, e.g., Schmitt-Egner 2000, 2005), but no systematic attempt for testing these propositions has been made. Detailed case studies challenge some of the most common assumptions. It is widely assumed that transboundary cooperation between neighboring regions is a consequence of functional interdependencies (e.g., Hrbek and Weyand 1994; Hrbek 2003; Duchacek 1990). Detailed case studies on cross-border cooperation in Europe and North America have revealed that such a functionalist explanation does not hold. Material interdependencies are neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for cross-border institution building and cooperation. Instead, external factors have been identified as the most important triggers for cross-border cooperation (Blatter 2003). The case study of Eißel, Grasse, and Pa¨schke (1999) provides the same challenge for functionalist explanations in respect to partnerships between regions, which share no common boundary. Economic interdependencies, which have been assumed to trigger these partnerships (e.g., Hrbek and Weyand 1994, 43; Cappelin and Batey 1993), have neither stimulated nor dominated these partnerships. Furthermore, the study of Eißel et al. (1999) reveals that constitutional competencies in the field of foreign relations cannot be seen as a necessary precondition for conducting transregional cooperation. These case studies seriously challenge these important assumptions, but it is not clear how far these findings can be generalized. We find the most sophisticated accounts for explaining foreign activities of subnational governments within the context of research on multilevel governance and the activities of these governments in Brussels. Here, some evidence about the importance of specific causal factors has been collected either through single or


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comparative case studies (Jeffery 1997b; Neunreither 2001; Knodt 2002), literature overviews (Knodt and Große-Hu¨ttmann 2003), deductive reasoning (Jeffery 2000), or through statistical analysis of larger samples (Marks et al. 1996, 2002). Nevertheless, the findings are far from conclusive, primarily because no coherent theoretical approach exists to integrate the empirical findings. All accounts perceive the relative institutional strength of the regions within their nation states as an important variable to explain the variety of regional activities in Brussels. Whereas Jeffery (2000, 12) uses Loughlin’s (1997) typology to differentiate four classes of regions depending on whether they belong to a federal state, a regionalized unitary state, a decentralized unitary state, or a centralized unitary state, Marks et al. (1996, 176) use a more differentiated ‘‘regional autonomy index.’’ Jeffery deduces with reference to some nonsystematic empirical evidence that this kind of constitutional strength is the dominant causal factor that influences the level of regional influence in Brussels (Jeffery 2000, 18). Based on an analysis of the fifty-four regional offices already established in 1995, Marks et al. (1996, 182) also conclude that their regression models show that ‘‘regional political autonomy is very strongly and significantly associated with regional representation.’’ In a later analysis, Marks et al. (2002) provide statistical evidence that regional political autonomy is not only correlated with the existence of an office in Brussels, but also to the goals and the amount of resources of these offices. Further factors that are supposed to influence the level and type of activity of European regions in the EU politics are the type of intergovernmental relations within the nation states, the entrepreneurship of regional politicians, the level of social capital (Jeffery 2000), the region’s resources (Knodt and Große-Hu¨ttmann 2003, 292; Marks et al. 1996, 169), and the ‘‘associational culture’’ and ‘‘regional distinctiveness’’ (Marks et al. 1996, 169, 170). Whereas Jeffrey provides episodic evidence for the factors he mentions, Marks et al. (1996) derive their conclusions from their statistical analysis of the fifty-four offices. In contrast to Knodt, who bases her conclusion about the importance of resources on a qualitative comparison of the German La¨nder activities (Knodt 2002), Marks et al. (1996, 181) find little support for the hypothesis that subnational governments with higher financial resources are likelier to have an office in Brussels. Instead, they propose that ‘‘financial resources are not as important as cultural resources’’ (Marks et al. 1996, 182). They find statistical evidence that associational culture and regional distinctiveness are strongly and significantly associated with subnational representations in Brussels (Marks et al. 1996, 181–185). Overall, there remain major gaps, ambiguities, and uncertainties in our knowledge of foreign activities of subnational governments. Missing are systematic studies which capture the breadth of foreign activities and that compare the various strategies.

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Theoretical Model and Research Design We believe that empirical work should be theory and not data driven. Therefore, our first step is to systematically align the various explanatory factors found in the literature into theoretically consistent approaches for explaining the scope of foreign activities of subnational governments in Europe. A theoretically consistent approach contains assumptions about the basic motivations for foreign activities, assumptions about the corresponding capabilities and constraints which enable or restrict the transformation of these motivations into actual activities, and assumptions about the type of activity which are ‘‘most-likely’’ to be explained by this approach.1 Such a theoretical approach is based on a configurative ontology of causation (Ragin 1987, 2000), corresponds to ‘‘typological theorizing’’ (George and Bennett 2005, 233–262), and leads to the application of fsQCA as an analytical technique (which will be laid out in section 7). Before we can deduce hypothetical causal configurations we have to differentiate and operationalize our dependent variable. Operationalization of the Dependent Variables

We differentiate between economic, cultural, and political strategies because we assume that regional governments have to react to processes of international integration in all of these fields. Economic, cultural, and political forms of interand transnational integration lead to different motives for investing in foreign activities and also to different strategies. For example, economic integration is usually perceived as a global phenomenon and leads to foreign activities on a different geographic scale in comparison to political integration, which is mainly a continental phenomenon. Not only the geographic places, but also the specific actors which are targeted are different: private investors and trading partners in the former case and politicians and bureaucrats in the latter. For our empirical research, we had to concentrate on more specific activities, which represent these three strategic reactions (in other words, they serve as indicators). First, having offices of regional governments in foreign countries can be assumed to represent economic strategies because these kinds of foreign activities are performed also by individual states in the United States, where they are interpreted mainly as an adaptation to the integrating global economy (e.g., Fry 1998). In contrast to other economically oriented activities such as trade missions, they reflect a stronger and a more long-term commitment and can easily be traced and counted. Second, we assume that institutionalized and intensive transnational or cross-border partnerships, as well as networks between regions, such as the Assembly of the European Regions or the Bodenseekonferenz (Lake Constance Conference), represent cultural activities because they are driven by the desire to receive recognition for regional identities, and the selection of partners is based on


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notions of similarity or commonality (evidence for the latter is presented in Blatter 2003). These partnerships embody and represent the idea of a ‘‘Europe of the regions’’ most clearly. Much more so than other international activities they can serve as symbols of mutual recognition, an important element in times when the international order is challenged or in a period of transformation (e.g., Spruyt 1994). Finally, in accordance with the discussed literature on multilevel governance (e.g., Marks et al. 1996, 2002), we assume that the existence of large offices in Brussels are the prime examples of political activities. These activities are certainly not the only ways in which regions pursue the respective strategies, but they are the most important and seem to be the most typical.

Deducing Most-Likely Causal Configurations

As a starting point for the causal analysis, we deduce ex ante theoretically coherent causal configurations for each of the three strategies. In Figure 1 we visualize the three dependent variables: (i) economic; (ii) cultural, and (iii) political foreign activities of European regional governments. Also, the figure contains the causal configuration, which we assume corresponds to strong activities within these strategies. In the following, we explain why we assume that these causal configurations are theoretically ‘‘most-likely.’’2 We introduce specific labels (materialism, culturalism, and rationalism) to indicate the principal theoretical framework that provides the conceptual coherence for each causal configuration. Furthermore, we justify the specific indicators that we have chosen to represent the independent and intervening variables.

Dependent Variables (Indicators)

Foreign Strategies (Activities) of European Regions Economic (International Offices)

Cultural (International Partnerships)

Political (Personnel in Brussels)

Intervening Variables (Indicators)

Resources (Budget)

Norms (Competencies in F.A.)

Rules (Competencies in F.A.)

Independent Variables (Indicators)

Interdependencies (Exports)

Identities (Regionalist Parties)

Interests (Budget)

Materialism

Culturalism

Rationalism

Figure 1 Causal configurations for different kinds of foreign strategies/activities.

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Materialism The first coherent explanatory approach can be labeled ‘‘materialism,’’ because in such an approach the material realities and interests in the socioeconomic system take center stage: economic interdependencies as motives, financial resources as capabilities, and international offices as trade- and investment-promoting instruments for an economic strategy. This approach contains the two resourceoriented causal factors, which are included in the analysis of Marks et al. (1996, 168). They have found no evidence to support a resource-driven hypothesis in explaining office buildings in Brussels (Marks et al. 1996, 178). We do not assume that regions are primarily looking to Brussels for attracting economic resources; rather, we assume they turn to ‘‘world cities’’ as the control centers of the international economy. Therefore, we connect material preconditions not with a strong presence in Brussels, but with many offices around the world. We assume that the motive for this kind of foreign activity is rooted in socioeconomic flows across borders. According to functionalist reasoning, it is plausible that socioeconomic interdependencies trigger political activities. High levels of exports in itself can stimulate growth-oriented politicians to go or invest ‘‘abroad’’ in order to promote economic prosperity for their region. Furthermore, we assume that in regions with high export rates there are strong organized business interests pressing regional governments to promote their exports abroad and to lure investments into the region. Within such a ‘‘functionalist-materialist’’ account, the most important aspects allowing or hindering foreign activities are the resources that can be invested in these endeavors. We have chosen the financial capabilities of subnational governments (as expressed by the size of their budget) as the adequate indicator for the intervening variable within this approach. It is theoretically more consistent within a materialist approach than, for example, legal competencies and it can be more easily obtained than other aspects of organizational capacity (e.g., the number of personnel). We use the size of the overall budget as a measure and not the portion of the budget over which the regional government has autonomous decision-making power. This is mainly due to practical reasons because it is very difficult to disentangle budgets in this respect. Furthermore, the entire budget corresponds to the size of the regional bureaucracy. This size can be assumed to be a decisive factor for developing organizational slack, which can be used for pursuing self-centered activities (we provide further arguments for using the entire budget below). Culturalism The cultural approach focuses on identities and norms. It is based on the assumption that strong regional identities are the motivating factors for foreign activities of subnational governments. A feeling of distinctiveness or discrimination within the nation state is the most crucial element in the process of identity


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formation in our field of research. We will use regionalist political parties as indicators of a strong regional identity. Since we are focusing on the foreign activities of regional governments as corporate actors within the politicaladministrative system, and not on the transnational activities of regionalist movements, we think that regionalist parties are more adequate as an indicator for the level of regional identity than ‘‘social capital’’ (Jeffery 2000) or ‘‘associational culture’’ (Marks et al. 1996).3 When regionalist parties are part of the regional government, they can use their influence directly for governmental activities abroad. Even if they form only a small opposition party, it is very likely that the government reacts to regionalist challengers. Forging international partnerships provides the perfect opportunity for governmental leaders to present themselves as incorporations of regional self-esteem. Within a cultural approach the most relevant intervening factor supporting or restricting the will of regionalist governments to pursue their own foreign activities are the legal norms (usually laid down in constitutions) prescribing the competencies of subnational governments in foreign affairs. These constitutional norms define the appropriate behavior and acceptable range of foreign activities of subnational governments. From a cultural perspective, these norms express the historically developed relationship between national and regional entities—they reflect the accepted role which regions play within a nation state and are enabled mainly through socialization and internalization. This culturalist approach seems ‘‘most likely’’ to explain the institutionalized partnerships that subnational governments have set up with foreign governments, because we start with the assumption that these partnerships are primarily the means to defend and expand the recognition of regional identities and institutions.

Rationalism The third theoretically consistent approach for explaining foreign activities of subnational governments is labeled rationalism. This is because it starts neither with the material nor the cultural features of the region, but with the interests of regional politicians resulting from their institutional position in the political system. Such reasoning stresses the same factors as scholars in the field of multilevel governance, but it puts these motivational and enabling/restricting factors in a broader theoretical context. The interests of regional politicians are geared toward maintaining or expanding their autonomy in policymaking, or maintaining or expanding their influence in external decision-making processes. In accordance with the literature, we assume that regional politicians with high levels of policy autonomy and influence are much more strongly motivated to invest in foreign activities when they are faced with having to defend their policy autonomy and influence than those with a low level of autonomy/influence.

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We use budgets of the regional governments as the indicator for the level of policy interests that regional governments try to defend abroad. We use this indicator instead of those used by Jeffery (2000) and Marks et al. (1996) for several reasons. First, we want to have an indicator that is clearly focused on the policy dimension (in order to be distinct from the culturalist approach, which corresponds more with the polity dimension of regions). Second, within a rationalist account, we want an indicator that comes close to measuring the real policymaking power of regional governments instead of a pure analysis of formal competencies. We combine these two goals with insights from policy implementation research that has revealed plenty of policy discretion for the levels of government responsible for the implementation of policy programs formally decided upon at another level. As a result, we are convinced that the size of the regional budget comes closer to measuring the amount of policy autonomy/ influence a regional government possesses in comparison to other indicators. A third argument takes into account the recent pleas for more differentiated approaches to explaining regional mobilization in the EU (e.g., Bauer 2006). The political autonomy index used by Marks et al. (1996, 176) leads to the assumption that from a structural point of view, all regions within a specific country have homogenous interests, with only a few deviations, such as Wales and Scotland in Great Britain. In contrast, using the budget as the indicator for policy interests leads to quite a different perspective on the policy interests of regional entities within a nation state—an assumption that is in line with recent findings (Bauer 2006). The constitutional distribution of competencies within the field of foreign policy can be conceptualized as the most important intervening factor in a rationalist account for explaining foreign activities of subnational governments. Within such an account, we do not interpret constitutional regulations as the norms for appropriate behavior, but as the formal rules that structure the institutional context in which rational actors pursue their interests. Regional governments accept these rules because they can be sanctioned through court rulings, and accordingly, they adjust their strategies for defending their policy interests to follow these rules. Strong foreign activities are therefore much easier to perform for those regions within countries where rules prescribe a strong role for the subnational governments in foreign affairs, as opposed to regions where the national rules are restrictive. The rationalist approach is the ‘‘most-likely’’ explanatory approach for elucidating the differences in regional investments in their respective offices in Brussels. This is because a high level of personnel in these offices indicates an aim to exert political influence in the EU policymaking (Marks et al. 2002). It is important to realize that we use the two indicators—the regional budget and the constitutional competencies of regions in foreign affairs—within two


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different causal configurations and interpret the same indicators differently, depending on which role they play and in which combination of causal factors they work. This might seem odd for variable-centered research, but it is fully in line with configurative ontology and methodology (Blatter et al. 2007). If it turns out that large budgets in combination with a high level of exports leads to many offices abroad, we can use this empirical finding to make the theoretical inference that budgets indeed should be seen as an enabling/restricting factor for socioeconomic motivations of foreign activity. In contrast, cases with large budgets, in combination with strong regional competencies in foreign affairs and a large office in Brussels provide evidence that large budgets indicate strong regional policy-autonomy, which in turn leads to strong political motives to be active abroad.

Case Selection and Analytic Method Since we wanted to know how far the foreign activities have developed, and because the descriptive-comparative analysis was a major goal by itself and not just a first step for a causal analysis, we were looking for regions from which we could expect high levels of foreign activity. Therefore, we decided to restrict our sample to subnational governments on the first tier below the national level (e.g., excluding municipalities), and to select regions from countries which are either federal states or regionalized states. This could generate a serious problem of ‘‘selection bias’’ if we wanted to generalize findings about the relative strength of our variables toward the entire population of regions in Europe. Nevertheless, the main goal of an analysis with fsQCA is not to generate conclusions about the strength of an explanatory variable for a broader population, but to identify the existence of necessary and/or sufficient causal configurations, which lead to high levels of foreign activity. Therefore, selecting countries where we can expect this outcome of interest is the appropriate strategy if we want to identify these causal configurations (Collier, Mahoney, and Seawright 2004; Ragin 2004, 128–130).4 In order to be able to concentrate on a few central variables, we have chosen only those regions which have rather similar socioeconomic backgrounds and which have not witnessed any fundamental change in their political system in recent times.5 These considerations lead to the exclusion of East European regions. As a consequence, we included all regions from Germany, Belgium, Austria, Great Britain, France, and Italy.6 We used the technique and algorithm of fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA), developed by Charles Ragin (1987, 2000) for our causal analysis. As already described, this technique conceptualizes the relationship between causal factors in a different way than correlation or regression analysis does. Whereas regression analysis tries to reveal the strength of a specific factor in explaining

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a certain outcome in comparison to the strength of other factors (on average in a specified population), fsQCA attempts to reveal which specific combinations of factors lead to a specific outcome. Such an epistemology, which envisions cases as consistent configurations and emphasizes causal heterogeneity, corresponds to our conceptual approach. It is important to realize that this case-centered method does not emphasize how often a causal factor is relevant to a positive result as much as the correlation/regression analysis does. Instead, every single causal configuration, even if we find it only once, receives attention.

Intensity and Extensity of Economic, Cultural, and Political Activities In this section, we provide a brief overview of the results of the descriptive analysis. This analysis is based on a comprehensive collection of information (usually by contacting the regions directly), and about the extension and content of the foreign activities of the eighty-one regions.7 Ranking tables which reveal how much each region invests in the various activities can be found in Blatter et al. (2008). Economic Activities

The intensity by which European regions perform economic strategies abroad differs significantly. We calculated a standard deviation of 16.89. The number of offices abroad that the Belgian regions maintain is outstanding: Wallonia: 100; Flanders: 93; and Brussels: 61. Interestingly, some French and many British regions (e.g., Brittany: 41; Scotland: 21; but also East Midlands: 12) keep up with the strongest German and Austrian La¨nder (e.g., Bavaria: 18; Vienna: 15).8 Nevertheless, overall the regional investments in foreign offices are limited. The bulk of regions have between zero and ten offices (see table 2 in Blatter et al. 2008, 476–477).9 The fact that almost half of the regions do not have an office abroad at all, or just one in Brussels, makes it clear that not all European regions are motivated or able to react to the changing economic contexts with a promotional office abroad. This holds true for almost all Italian and most French regions. Besides Brittany, Alsace, and Rhoˆne-Alpes, with over nine offices in foreign countries, all other French regions only have between zero and two offices abroad. Some (East) German La¨nder also seem incapable of such investments. Nevertheless, these findings reveal that the majority of the European regions do perform economic activities abroad in some capacity. Even if we take into account that our selection of regions from only the federalized or regionalized countries might lead to a conformation bias, we can conclude that at the beginning of the twenty-first century many European regions promoted and defended their economic interests abroad.


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Cultural Activities

In order to trace cultural strategies, we counted international partnerships. We also differentiated between intensive and moderate partnerships. Intensive partnerships are characterized by strong institutionalization (e.g., a formal agreement or a standing committee), a broad set of joint projects, and an involvement of actors from both the public and the private/nonprofit sectors. The Belgian regions of Wallonia and Flanders are extremely active in setting up and maintaining transnational partnerships. We counted nineteen intensive and thirty-three moderate partnerships for Wallonia, and for Flanders, we found seventeen intensive and fifteen moderate partnerships. Most German and Austrian La¨nder are also intensively investing in this form of foreign activity. Furthermore, in France, Great Britain, and Italy, we found a few regions with a large number of partnerships (Ile de France, Rhoˆne-Alpes, London, Emilia-Romagna, Piedmont). There are only three (British) regions in our sample that do not maintain partnerships to other regions. Most regions possess between five and fifteen partnerships. Therefore, we can conclude that partnerships are a very common phenomenon among European regions for both federalized and regionalized states. Nevertheless, the differences between the various regions are especially strong (see table 3 in Blatter et al. 2008, 478–479 for the full picture).10 Political Activities

The regions which have the largest offices in Brussels are all German La¨nder: Bavaria, North-Rhine Westphalia, Baden-Wu¨rttemberg, and Lower Saxony, each of which has more than twenty employees. The next four regions with large offices in Brussels are also German La¨nder, but with considerably smaller staff numbers. The first non-German regions in our ranking list are Scotland and Wales, followed by the Italian regions of Lombardy, Sicily, and Veneto. The Belgian regions provided data, which show that they have created specific offices for their contacts to the EU and have staffed these offices above average. The French, almost all British regions, and also most Austrian regions only have small offices in Brussels. Only five regions do not have any personnel in Brussels at all. Most regions maintain between two and nine employees in Brussels (see table 4 in Blatter et al. 2008, 480–481).11 In order to judge the intensity of the regional investments in Brussels, it is interesting to compare staff numbers of the regions’ offices with the amount of personnel that the nation states have in their embassies at the EU. We collected data about personnel numbers of the national representations (Austria: 60, France: 102, Germany: 162, Great Britain: 86, Italy: 86), and assigned the regions an amount of personnel in the national representation that is proportionate to their part of the national population. Doing this reveals that many regions have more

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personnel in their regional representation in Brussels compared to their ‘‘share’’ in the national representation.12

Preparing for fsQCA: Data Transformation into Fuzzy-Set Values We use a rather fine-grained fuzzy-set scale with six values (e.g., for the fuzzy set of the three dependent variables: 1 ¼ very strong activity; 0.8 ¼ strong activity; 0.6 ¼ moderate activity; 0.4 ¼ minor activity; 0.2 ¼ low activity; 0 ¼ no activity). Since we could not deduce thresholds from theory, we therefore proceeded inductively. For example, when we look at data where the regions are ranked according to the number of staff in their office in Brussels, we can detect a clear difference between the first seven regions. Each of these has twenty employees or more in Brussels, and the eighth region has just fifteen. Thus, the first seven regions received an fs-value of 1, and the regions that have between ten and fifteen were assigned a value of 0.8. The fs-value of 0 was given to those regions where no activity could be detected.13 This procedure was used in the same way for all the indicators of the dependent and independent variables where quantitative data exists. The assignment of fs-values to the variables ‘‘identity’’ and ‘‘competencies’’ followed a different logic. As argued before, we use the existence and strength of regional parties as the indicator for regional identities. We do not consider the quantitative strength of regionalist parties only (as measured by the percentage of votes they got in regional elections), but their ideology as well. We differentiate between regionalist parties that only demand more autonomy, and those that fight for independence. The more radical ideology led to an upgrade of 0.2 in the fs-value, which was primarily determined by the electoral strength of the party. The variation of thresholds and fs-values in the case of regional identities was determined by considering further factors beyond regionalist parties that might have an influence on the cultural motivation of regional governments for foreign activities.14 In order to decide whether a region should be included in the set of regions with strong competencies in the field of foreign relations, we take into account two different aspects. First, how much is a region allowed to conduct an autonomous foreign policy? Second, what formal role do the regional governments play in the conduct of national foreign policy? Detailed answers to these questions can be found in Blatter et al. (2008, 470–474) and the resulting fs-values, together with all other fs-values in Appendix A of the Supplementary Data online.15

Necessary and Sufficient Conditions of Strong International Activities In this section we present and interpret the results of the causal analysis according to the logics and terminology of configuration causation. Since this kind of


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reasoning and analysis is not yet widespread, it seems necessary to clarify some basic terminology and the quality measures that are used in evaluating causal configurations. With fsQCA, we try to answer the following two kinds of questions: First, which specific causes or combinations of causal factors (e.g., interdependencies and resources) constitute necessary conditions for the outcome (high levels of international activity) in the sense that they are always, or almost always present if we can observe high levels of activity? Second, which specific causes or combinations of causal factors constitute sufficient conditions for the outcome in the sense that they represent one of several possible paths, which always or almost always lead to high levels of international activity?16 Two measures, consistency and coverage, are used in order to evaluate whether the data confirms to the formulated answers to these questions and/or to indicate potential answers to these questions (inductively generating hints of causal configurations). When we search for necessary conditions, consistency assesses the degree to which instances of an outcome also display the causal condition thought to be necessary. When we look for sufficient conditions, consistency assesses the degree to which the cases sharing a given causal factor or combination of causal factors all display the outcome in question. In other words, consistency judges how correct the causal statement is. In contrast, coverage gauges empirical relevance, or importance. When we search for necessary conditions, coverage assesses the degree to which instances of the causal condition are paired with instances of the outcome. When we look for sufficient conditions, coverage assesses the degree to which a causal factor or combination of causal factors ‘‘account for’’ instances of an outcome (Ragin 2006, 292). Our following interpretation of the results adheres to the original emphasis of QCA as a ‘‘case-centered’’ method and discusses the relevance of causal configurations always with an eye on the relevant cases.17 Preconditions for Strong Economic Activism18

We could not identify a single factor, or any combination of factors as absolutely or almost absolutely necessary for strong economic foreign activities of the European regions. A large budget comes closest to being such a factor, but a consistency score of 0.73 is not high enough for making a strong statement that a large budget is a necessary condition. There are however, four different combinations of explanatory factors which are sufficient for strong economic activities, but only two have an acceptable level of consistency. Clearly, the most relevant configuration is the existence of high levels of exports and a large regional budget (consistency 0.77). This causal configuration is relevant for numerous and diverse cases, such as five German and three Austrian La¨nder, two Belgian regions and the Emilia-Romagna in Italy. Furthermore, for six regions it is the only relevant causal configuration (see table 1). The other causal configuration with a

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Table 1 Causal configurations for regions with many offices abroad (OA) Causal Configuration

All regions which correspond to the causal configuration

Regions which only correspond to this particular causal configuration (unique coverage)

Large budget (BU) and low level of regionalism (reg)

Baden-Wu¨rttemberg (GER) Bavaria (GER) Emilia-Romagna (I) Hamburg (GER) Hesse (GER) Rhineland-Palatinate (GER) Saxony (GER) Vienna (A) Wales (GB) Baden-Wu¨rttemberg (GER) Bavaria (GER) Emilia-Romagna (I) Flanders (BE) Hamburg(GER) Lower Austria (A) North Rhine—Westfalia (GER) Rhineland-Palatinate (GER) Styria (A) Upper Austria (A) Wallonia (GB) Emilia-Romagna (I) Scotland (GB) Vienna (A) Wales (GB) Brussels capital (BE)

Hesse (GER) Saxony (GER)

High level of exports (EX) and large budget (BU)

Large budget (BU) and low level of competences in foreign affairs (co) Low level of exports (ex) and small budget (bu) and strong regionalism (REG) and strong competencies (CO)

Lower Austria (A) North Rhine—Westfalia (GER) Flanders (BE) Upper Austria (A) Wallonia (BE)

Scotland (GB)

Brussels capital (BE)

high level of consistency (0.76) only applies to one case: The capital region of Brussels has many offices abroad despite low economic interdependencies and a low budget (in absolute terms). Instead, Brussels shows a high level of regionalism and strong competences. This represents a culturalist causal configuration. Two other configurations are also sufficient for high economic activities— nevertheless, they are relevant only for a few and very specific cases. In addition and more important for our conclusion, these configurations have low levels


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of consistency. The combination of a large budget and a low level of formal competencies in foreign affairs is the only sufficient causal configuration that accounts for Scotland’s many offices abroad. Nevertheless, this combination often does not lead to strong economic activities (consistency: 0.70). The combination of a large budget and low regionalism is the only relevant causal configuration for Hesse and Saxony, but has an even lower level of consistency (0.66).19 These results confirm our theoretical expectations by highlighting the crucial relevance of ‘‘material’’ factors. Furthermore, they show that a high level of economic interdependency with the international economy alone is not sufficient for high levels of economic activities abroad. Only in combination with a large budget is this motive a sufficient condition. Furthermore, a large budget alone is only sufficient for one single case (Hesse). Finally, there is one exception to the rule. The Belgian city-region of Brussels shows that materialist factors are not exclusive in producing high economic activities abroad. A ‘‘culturalist’’ combination of rather strong regionalism and high competencies with low export levels and a small budget can also lead to many offices abroad. Nevertheless, a detailed look at the activities of the foreign offices of the Belgian regions revealed that they are not only focused on economic activities, but serve also cultural and political functions (Thiele 2006, 144). In consequence, we would interpret this last finding not as undermining our causal theory, but as a case in which the indicator of the dependent variable does not fully correspond to the theoretical concept. Preconditions for Strong Cultural Activities

We could not identify any factor or configuration which is absolutely necessary for cultural activities either. Nevertheless, the calculations revealed high values in respect to the quality measures for two explanatory factors. The explanatory factor ‘‘large budget’’ shows a high measure of consistency (0.81) and a medium coverage value (0.73), meaning that a high value of this factor is a good predictor for many partnerships, but it is not the only causal factor that leads to many partnerships. A further explanatory factor, ‘‘strong competencies,’’ has a good coverage measure (0.86), but only a medium value in its consistency (0.76), which makes it less acceptable to interpret this factor as a necessary condition. Overall, we conclude that a large budget is ‘‘almost always a necessary condition’’ for cultural activities. The centrality of a large budget is confirmed when we look at the sufficient conditions for strong cultural activities (see table 2). The combination of a high level of exports and a large budget has a very high level of consistency (0.91), and is consistent with strong activities of regions from diverse countries and is the only causal configuration viable for ten very active regions. Furthermore, the combination of a large budget and strong competencies (and a low level

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Table 2 Causal configurations for regions with many partnerships (PA) Causal Configuration



Large budget (BU) and low level of regionalism (reg) and strong competences (CO)

Baden-Wu¨rttemberg (GER) Bavaria (GER) Berlin (GER) Brandenburg (GER) Bremen (GER) Hesse (GER) Lower Saxony (GER) North Rhine—Westfalia (GER) Baden-Wu¨rttemberg (GER) Bavaria (GER) Bremen (GER) Emilia-Romagna (I) Flanders (BE) Friuli-Venezia Giulia (I) Hamburg (GER) Lower Austria (A) North Rhine—Westfalia (GER) Piedmont (I) Rhineland-Palatinate (GER) Styria (A) Upper Austria (A) Wallonia (BE) Lombardy (I) Trentino-Alto Adige (I)

Berlin (GER) Brandenburg (GER) Hesse (GER) Lower Saxony (GER)

High level of exports (EX) and large budget (BU)

Large budget (BU) and high level of regionalism (REG) and low level of competences (co) Low level of exports (ex) and Brussels capital (BE) Small budget (bu) and strong regionalism (REG) and strong competencies (CO)

Emilia-Romagna (I) Flanders (BE) Friuli-Venezia Giulia (I) Hamburg (GER) Lower Austria (A) Piedmont (I) Rhineland-Palatinate (GER) Styria (A) Upper Austria (A) Wallonia (BE)

Lombardy (I) Trentino-Alto Adige (I)


of regionalism) is almost always sufficient for the numerous and intensive partnerships of many German La¨nder (consistency: 0.87). The strong activities of four of them can only be explained by this configuration. This means that the combination of factors which we deduced as forming a ‘‘materialist’’ account and the combination of conditions which we have interpreted as a ‘‘rationalist’’ account show up as explanatory combinations highly


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consistent with many international partnerships. On the other hand, the factors which we assumed to be the most likely to explain strong cultural activities—a high level of regionalism and strong competencies—are only relevant in a few cases. Such a ‘‘cultural configuration’’ of explanatory factors is, once again, only relevant for the case of Brussels. In two other cases—Lombardy and Trentino-Alto Adige—a rather large budget seems to allow a regionalist motive to materialize as strong investments in international partnerships, even though the constitutional norms do not encourage this kind of activity.20 So, how do we interpret these findings? A first interpretation would challenge our assumption that international partnerships are expressions of regional attempts to defend their cultural and institutional peculiarities by forging alliances with similar regions and exporting their cultural heritage through partnerships. In light of our in-depth descriptive analysis (Blatter et al. 2008), this can be part of a convincing explanation for the findings. Partnerships must indeed be interpreted as regional activities aiming to adapt to cultural, as well as to political and economic challenges. Another interpretation is to modify our concept of the cultural explanatory approach. In accordance with more recent cultural theorizing, which focus not so much on the socializing power of a coherent culture but on the mobilizing power of dominant norms and identities, which minority groups perceive as oppressive, we point to the ambiguity of constitutional norms in the field of foreign relations. In the case of Germany, strong constitutional competencies of the La¨nder in foreign/European affairs are an expression of the federal culture and the established praxis of cooperative federalism. In this case, the federal tradition functions as a norm, which makes the forging of international partnerships an appropriate behavior for the La¨nder. In the case of Italy, for some regions, their low formal role in foreign affairs might have been a special motivation for forming international partnerships in order to enhance the pressure to reform these norms. This seems to have worked already. In recent years, the Italian regions have been successful in obtaining legal reforms which grant them leeway for autonomous foreign activities without strengthening their stance in national foreign policymaking (Blatter et al. 2008). To find out whether these interpretations are accurate, a more qualitative and process- and discourse-oriented research would be necessary. A final conclusion to be drawn is to emphasize the importance of financial capacities as an enabling/restricting condition for all kind of motivations to pursue international partnerships. Preconditions for Strong Political Activities

The results of the fsQCA calculations largely confirm our expectations. They point to the crucial importance of a large budget as a precondition for a strong involvement in Brussels. A large budget has a consistency value of 0.87 for being

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a necessary condition, which is by far the highest value in all our calculations. We interpret this finding as a strong confirmation of our assumption that a high budget is more than just an intervening factor that enables or restricts economic or cultural motives for foreign activity. The high consistency of large budgets with strong efforts in Brussels serves us as a first argument to bolster our assumption that it is a good indicator for a strong regional influence in policymaking that regional politicians want to defend against external restrictions, and that it is therefore a motivating factor in itself. This assumption is further strengthened by the following findings which point to the central relevance of a political causal configuration for explaining large offices in Brussels. A large budget alone is not a sufficient condition for an extensive staff in the regional office in Brussels. Table 3 reveals that the combination of a large budget and a high level of competencies in foreign affairs allow most German La¨nder to try to influence policymaking in Brussels. The activities of five of them can only be explained by this (political) causal configuration. The two larger Belgian regions, Flanders and Wallonia, share these conditions but posit additional causal factors. Only for two regions that are very active in Brussels—Lombardy and Scotland— there exists a quite different configuration of causal factors. These regions feature strong regionalism as an additional motivation for political activity together with a large budget as a second motive for political activities and/or as a means to realize these ambitions.21

Summary and Conclusion Our study provides a more comprehensive and more differentiated view of the phenomenon of foreign relations of subnational governments in Western Europe, and a more solid understanding on causal preconditions than we had before. Establishing an office as an antenna or lobbying instrument in Brussels is not the only activity West European regions currently perform in order to adapt to an integrating world. Most regions also invest in foreign activities as reactions to economic and cultural transformations. Our descriptive analysis confirmed our assumptions that regional offices in other countries serve mainly economic purposes and, that partnerships with other regions, and sometimes with nation states, often—but not always and not only—have a cultural foundation and are dominated by cultural contents. Nevertheless, a look at the activities of eighty-one regions from federalized and regionalized countries in Western Europe reveal that there are huge differences between these regions in respect to these cultural and economic activities, whereas almost all regions are present in Brussels. Although almost all regions have set up an office in Brussels, only about a fourth have staffed these offices strongly enough that we would assume that serious


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Table 3 Causal configurations for regions with a large staff in Brussels Causal Configuration



Large budget (BU) and low level of regionalism (reg) and strong competences in foreign affairs (CO)

Baden-Wu¨rttemberg (GER) Bavaria (GER) Brandenburg (GER) Bremen (GER) Hamburg (GER) Hesse (GER) Lower Saxony (GER) North Rhine—Westfalia (GER) Rhineland-Palatinate (GER) Saxony (GER) Saxony-Anhalt (GER) Schleswig-Holstein (GER) Baden-Wu¨rttemberg (GER) Bavaria (GER) Bremen (GER) Flanders (BE) Hamburg (GER) Lower Saxony (GER) North Rhine—Westfalia (GER) Rhineland-Palatinate (GER) Wallonia (BE) Flanders (BE) Lombardy (I) Scotland (GB) Wallonia (BE) Lombardy (I) Scotland (GB)

Brandenburg (GER) Hesse (GER) Saxony (GER) Saxony-Anhalt (GER) Schleswig-Holstein (GER)

High level of exports (EX) and large budget (BU) and strong competences in foreign affairs (CO)

High level of exports (EX) and large budget (BU) and high level of regionalism (REG) Large budget (BU) and high level of regionalism (REG) and low level of competences in foreign affairs (co) Low level of exports (ex) and Brussels capital (BE) small budget (bu) and strong regionalism (REG) and strong competencies (CO)


attempts to influence EU policymaking are occurring. On the other hand, almost half of the regions in federalized and decentralized countries have more staff in their own office in Brussels than we could assign to them in their national representation.

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Our theoretical reasoning and empirical findings created a clearer picture on the necessary and sufficient preconditions for strong foreign activities. Concerning economic and political activities our theoretically derived hypotheses were confirmed. In most cases the motivation and ability to react to economic interdependencies by setting up promotion offices abroad depends on the combination of two factors: a high level of exports and a large budget. Our analysis reveals that a large budget in combination with strong regional competencies in foreign relations is the main pathway toward a strongly staffed regional office in Brussels in order to influence EU decision-making. Nevertheless, we detected a few cases where strong regionalism combined with a large budget leads to equally strong efforts. Our theoretically developed hypothesis was not confirmed in respect to cultural activities. Forming many and/or intensive partnerships with foreign political entities is almost never the result of strong regionalism combined with strong competencies in foreign affairs. Instead, materialist and rationalist causal configurations usually lead to many partnerships. Nevertheless, strong regionalism does lead in some cases to many partnerships, but usually not in combination with strong regional competencies in foreign affairs; partnerships occur despite weak competencies. These findings make it clear that the features and causes for partnerships are too diverse to treat them as one specific type of foreign activity. Given that fsQCA is not yet widely used, it might be appropriate to end with a word on the ramifications of this technique. Our tables reveal the ‘‘strength’’ of specific causal configurations by exposing how many active regions fit to a specific causal configuration and for how many regions their strong activity can only be explained by a specific configuration (unique coverage). With fsQCA we are not able to say anything about the causal strength of individual variables. Although we firmly belief that good theory-oriented research (whereby theory has to be understood in a comprehensive lens and not just as an argument for a specific causal connection) has an obvious affinity to a configurational epistemology and methodology, we take this as a stimulus for future work in which we will use our data for comparing correlation-based and configuration-based methods. Two comparative strengths and weaknesses can already be spelled out. The findings of fsQCA are not as dependent on selecting representative cases for a clearly specified population as they are when we apply correlation-based methods. On the other hand, even more than statistical analysis, fsQCA has to be complemented by process- and discourse-oriented research in order to find out whether there is really an intensive connection among the elements of a causal configuration.

Supplementary Data Supplementary data can be found at www.publius.oxfordjournals.org.


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Notes 1. ‘‘Most likely’’ refers to Eckstein’s famous guidelines for selecting theoretically important cases for case studies (Eckstein 1975). Here, we apply his logic to predetermine a specific combination of preconditions theoretically most consistent with a specific type of international activity. 2. We prefer to speak of theoretically most-likely causal configurations instead of hypotheses in order to indicate the distinct ontological and epistemological background of our analysis. 3. Furthermore, compared to the indicators Marks et al. (1996, 177) used to measure ‘‘regional distinctiveness’’ (a. the relative regional identification based on EuroBarometer data from 1991 and calculated by subtracting attachment to the nation from attachment to the region; b. the political divergence of regional voters based on EuroBarometer data throughout the 1980s and calculated by taking the average proportion of voters in each region who supported opposition parties), regionalist parties are much more adequate for representing a clear-cut culturalist approach. A distinct regional identity is strongly based on an antinational identity and not just a higher level of regional attachment in comparison to national attachment. Furthermore, the feeling of regional distinctiveness does not have to be connected to different ideological or policy preferences. It has to be interpreted primarily as a wish for autonomy and selfdetermination and not as an indicator for different policy preferences. In other words, a polity- rather than policy-oriented indicator for regional identity is most adequate within a culturalist approach. 4. It should be mentioned, though, that we cannot fully foreclose on the possibility that an analysis of regions from centralized states would reveal other causal configurations, which also lead to high international activities, but this is rather unlikely since we won’t find many regions with high levels of activities in these countries. 5. This corresponds to a ‘‘comparable cases strategy’’ (Lijphart 1975), but not to the Most Similar Systems Design (Przeworski and Teune 1970). Within the latter, not only should contextual factors be similar, but we should hold constant all variables except one. 6. Unfortunately, we had to exclude the Spanish regions because of language restrictions. Attempts to approach the Spanish regions in the English language failed to generate any substantial feedback. 7. The data for the German, Belgian, British, and French regions were collected by Thiele during the year 2004 and are extensively documented in his PhD thesis (Thiele 2006). The data for the Austrian and Italian regions were collected by students during a university course conducted by the first author in the winter-term 2005–06 (Kreutzer and Schwarzkopf 2006; Stepan 2006). We received direct information from all regions, except fourteen Italian regions. Furthermore, we did extensive Internet and literature research. In respect to the foreign offices of the fourteen Italian regions, we could not find any information and concluded that they do not have any offices. 8. It should be mentioned that there exists a broad variety in respect to form and capacities of these offices abroad. Whereas the Belgian offices are usually staffed quite well, the

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English regions especially have set up these offices on a much less expensive basis by contracting with local companies (Thiele 2006). 9. The statistical average (mean) is 7.7 offices per region, but it drops to 4.7 if we exclude the three Belgian regions. 10. The statistical mean in respect to the sum of the points for the moderate and intensive partnerships is 16.44, with a standard deviation of 20.21. 11. The statistical mean of the number of employees is 6.3 with a standard deviation of 6.4. 12. This comparison is only introduced in order to compare the efforts/investments. We are careful not to overinterpret these data in respect to the effects of these rather strongly staffed offices. 13. Since we could not always find clear-cut intervals in the empirical data for setting the thresholds, we produced a second fs-value for every region based on different thresholds, and later controlled for whether the results were sensitive for the different thresholds (see Appendix B in the Supplementary Data available at Publius online, tables 1D, 2D, 3D). 14. For example, in our second round, we assigned the Austrian Land of Carinthia a fs-value of 0.2 although no clear-cut regionalist party exists. Nevertheless, Carinthia is the home base and stronghold of the populist leader Jo¨rg Haider, who uses his position as leader of the regional government for a strong involvement in national politics and for spectacular international activities—such as his meetings with Saddam Hussein before the Second Iraq War. 15. The qualitative descriptions (i) of the competencies to maintain autonomous foreign relations and (ii) of the rights to influence the national foreign policy are each summed up with a specific value on a scale with five ranks (very strong, strong, moderate, weak, and none) (Blatter et al. 2008, 474). Both aspects were taken into account equally when we transferred these values in a single fs-value. Since we had to translate a scaling with five ranks into one with six, we counted ‘‘moderate’’ as 0.5, thereby fusing two fs-value categories, whereas, for example, ‘‘very strong’’ was counted as 1, ‘‘strong’’ as 0.8, and so forth. 16. Since necessary conditions can exist without being sufficient, the set of cases where the necessary condition exists is larger than the set of cases where the outcome exists and the latter is a subset of the former. Since sufficient conditions can exist without being necessary the set of cases where the sufficient condition exists is smaller than the set of cases in which the outcome exists and they form a subset of the set of cases with the outcome. In consequence, the analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions is based on an asymmetrical relationship between the dependent and independent variables, whereas correlational analysis is based on a symmetrical relationship. Those who want to understand the ‘‘set-theoretical’’ foundations of fsQCA should turn to Ragin (2006) or Ragin (2008), where the conceptual basics and the specific techniques are laid out in detail. 17. The more Ragin changed his method from ‘‘crisp’’ set (dichotomous coding of variables) to ‘‘fuzzy sets,’’ and the more he introduced probabilistic elements into his algorithms,


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the more his method changed from a holistic case-centered approach to a variablecentered approach. The differences show up, for example, in respect to the meaning of the quality standard called ‘‘unique coverage.’’ In our textual analysis, we use this term in the sense of pointing to the (number of) cases with high values of the dependent variable that can only be explained by one specific causal combination. In other words, if a causal combination has many cases for which it is the only consistent causal configuration, it is strong in its ‘‘unique coverage.’’ The algorithm provided by Ragin and his colleagues, in contrast, calculates the ‘‘unique coverage’’ for every causal configuration by taking into account all cases (and not just the one with high values of the dependent variable). Many thanks to Claudius Wagemann for explaining this and other specifics of the fsQCA algorithm. 18. A more detailed presentation of our fsQCA calculations with all regions and all values of the quality measures (consistency and coverage) may be found in Appendix B of Supplementary Data available at Publius online. 19. In the case of Saxony, we could adjust our coding of Saxony as a case with low regionalism (because there exists no regionalist party) into one with high regionalism (since Saxony tries hard to mimic Bavaria in its emphasis to be a ‘‘Freistaat’’), which reduces the relevance of this causal configuration further. 20. Nevertheless, when we modified the thresholds of our fuzzy-set values, we found more cases and causal configurations in which ‘‘regionalism’’ plays a major role, whereas the role of ‘‘competencies’’ decreased (see Appendix B, table 2D of Supplementary Data available at Publius online). 21. We do not give much weight to the high level of exports, which show up as an additional necessary factor in two sufficient configurations. At first sight, we could interpret this as another motive for being active in Brussels (securing the liberal thrust of the Common Market), but when we look at the regions which have a high level of membership in causal ideal types we doubt that this is an adequate interpretation for all of them. This factor might be spurious and we, therefore, do not put much emphasis on its role. Furthermore, we ignore Brussels, which again is the only case in which a combination of small budget and low export levels, together with high levels of regionalism and strong competencies, leads to strong activities. This causal configuration shows up only because we upgraded the staff numbers for the Belgian regions since we assume that spatial proximity allows them to use their ‘normal’ personnel in their attempts to influence policymaking in the EU.

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