ICAO Travel Document - Doc 9303 Core Specifications set by the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) NTWG / SC17 collaboration Supplemented by BSI ASM for eMRTDs (EAC) Authenticated eMRTDs provide identity verification of eMRTD holder Issuing Authorities in nation states or Int’l bodies e.g. INTERPOL as enhanced identity security documents Commonly issued eMRTDs include national ePassports and eID Cards but also Seafarers documents, Biometric Residence Permits use same specifications
Encoded photograph to ISO Standard to ensure quality of data image Access is protected by Basic Access Control Images encoded in JPEG or JPEG2000 formats Photographs are standardised to ensure visual comparison and automated biometric verification Images to overcome interoperability challenges (different biometric verification algorithms)
Fingerprints and Iris are a second generation feature of eMRTDs Sensitive Data protected by EAC as an enhancement to BAC Access is protected by Extended Access Control (separate PKI authorisation scheme) Images encoded in JPEG or JPEG2000 formats to overcome biometric interoperability problems No International Standard yet
Contains a map of the tags, lengths values present in the file Is not protected (digitally signed) by issuing authority Cannot be trusted unless authenticated to EF.SOD
Contains the hash values of all the data groups Hash values signed by a document signing authority with private key (SOD = Digital Signature) May contain the Document Signer Certificate (DSC) that corresponds public key element used the create the SOD or reference to DSC. Can be trusted provided the Document Signer Certificate is validated
Part of the Passive Authentication process Verify the ASN.1 Structure Verify the hash values present Verify the signature against the public key element contained in related Document Signer Certificate Authenticate the Document Signer Certificate • •
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Verify the certificate chain of the DSC against the CSCA Certificate dynamically Pre-validated DSCs in protected Certificate Cache Store
Global repository of certificates used to validate eMRTDs Relies on Issuing Authority subscribers uploading data to the PKD Regularly updated with • • • •
Physical Checks Check that the document has not been tampered with Check the document under various wavelengths of light Check that the document has not expired
Passive Authentication Check the validity of EF.SOD Check the hash values of the datagroups Check the signature of SOD Check the chain of the document signer certificate Check against null and non null CRLs ICAO PKD Maintains Certificates for subscribers
A CSCA is a trust anchor and can identify the eMRTD Issuing Authority Inspection System Integrity and Performance Security controls must ensure that bogus CSCAs cannot be inserted during the verification process Inspection System Architecture designed to requirements (not one fits all) – depends upon operating environment, devices, key management strategy, network reliability
Mutual authentication between the chip and the terminal Some indication of the issuer of the eMRTD Privacy of the fingerprints on the passport
3M Security Systems
Second Generation Features
EAC requires the implementation of the EAC infrastructure to ensure verification EAC Protects the privacy of the fingerprints on the ePassport EAC proves the issuer of the ePassport EAC Ensures that only authorised terminals can read fingerprints
Fingerprint matching DG3 Contains the fingerprint 0 – 10 digits can be stored depending on the country where fingerprints are captured Fingerprint image contained (not a template)
Counterfeit (not PA has failed) Falsified (not Digital Signature is not verified) Cloned (not Active Authentication has been subverted) Access denied (Terminal Authentication does not have appropriate CV chains)
Simplicity by design • • •
User Interface design aligns with tasks Clear feedback on processing State of device (security)
eMRTDs are complex documents and need to be verified appropriately Partial checking of some features is not enough to guarantee that the document is authentic Various designs and physical layouts of documents from various countries can easily lead to confusion although the electronic features are standardised and the same User interface design for eMRTD verification apps should provide a result in a clear and concise manner
