Measurement Techniques, Vol. 55, No. 2, May, 2012
RADIO MEASUREMENTS THE PRESENT STATE AND PROBLEMS OF STANDARDIZATION IN THE PROTECTION OF THE CIVIL INFRASTRUCTURE FROM POWERFUL ELECTROMAGNETIC INFLUENCES
K. Yu. Sakharov,1 Yu. V. Parfenov,2 L. N. Zdukhov,2 B. A. Titov,2 and V. A. Turkin1
UDC 006.013
The results of work carried out by the SC77C subcommittee of the International Electrotechnical Commission to produce a system of standards on the protection of the civil infrastructure from high-power electromagnetic influences are analyzed. The main approaches to the development of foreign and Russian standards are compared. Keywords: high-power electromagnetic influences, electromagnetic compatibility, standards.
A system of international standards on the protection of the civil infrastructure from high-power electromagnetic influences is being developed at the present time. This work is being carried out by the SC77C subcommittee of the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). The initial purpose of this work was to compile and produce a system of standards designed to ensure the protection of civil systems from the electromagnetic impulse of high-altitude nuclear explosions. In 1999, the work of the subcommittee was extended in order to take into account other high-power electromagnetic threats to civil systems and to standardize methods of protection. The area of standardization includes high-power artificial pulsed electromagnetic fields with amplitudes of greater than 100 V/m and 100 V, for radiation and conductive actions, respectively. Drafts of the standards on this subject are being developed in the 61000 series of publications of the IEC (parts 1, 2 and 4–6). Part 1 (61000-1-X) contains standards, which include information on the terminology, the effects of influences, protection principles, etc.; part 2 (61000-2-X) are standards which consider the main characteristics of powerful electromagnetic influences; part 4 (61000-4-X) are standards on testing and measurement methods; part 5 (61000-5-X) are standards describing the concept of protection from certain forms of powerful electromagnetic influences, protection methods and systems, and also the characteristics of the latter; and part 6 (61000-6-X) are standards devoted to the requirements of the stability of various types of electrical and electronic apparatus. The development of the standards involves several stages (Table 1). At each stage of the project, the standards were distributed to all the countries participating in the operation, to analyze and prepare comments and proposals, which were then unified and again distributed to all the participants. In the case of disagreement between any of the countries, consultations and revisions were carried out until an agreed text was developed. As a rule, it takes two years from the beginning of the development for an IEC standard to be registered. 1 2
All-Russia Research Institute of Optophysical Measurements (VNIIOFI), Moscow, Russia; e-mail:
[email protected]. Joint Institute of High Temperatures, Russian Academy of Sciences (OIVT RAN), Moscow, Russia.
Translated from Izmeritel’naya Tekhnika, No. 2, pp. 49–53, February, 2012. Original article submitted November 10, 2011.
0543-1972/12/5502-0183 ©2012 Springer Science+Business Media, Inc.
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TABLE 1. Stages in the Development of the Standards Name
Content
PWI
Consideration of the proposals for the development of a new standard
NP
Assumption of the development of the project
WD
Preparation of the preliminary (rough) version
CD
Consideration of the preliminary version of the standard by the national committees
CDV
Registration of the project and voting on its approval
FDIS
Consideration of the final version of the standard by the national committees
PUB
Publication of the standard
TABLE 2. International Standards on the Protection of the Civil Infrastructure from the Electromagnetic Effects of a HighAltitude Nuclear Explosion Standard
Name
61000-1-3
Action of the electromagnetic influence of a high-altitude nuclear explosion on civil systems and equipment
61000-2-9
Description of the electromagnetic situation when there is a high-altitude nuclear explosion – radiation interference
61000-2-10
Description of the electromagnetic situation when there is a high-altitude nuclear explosion – conductive interference
61000-2-11
Classification of the electromagnetic situation when there is a high-altitude nuclear explosion
61000-4-23
Methods of testing instruments for protection from the electromagnetic influence of a high-altitude nuclear explosion and other forms of radiation interference
61000-4-24
Methods of testing systems for providing protection from conductive interference, produced by the electromagnetic influence of a high-altitude nuclear explosion
61000-4-25
Methods of testing equipment and systems for resistance to the electromagnetic influence of a high-altitude nuclear explosion
61000-4-32
References on simulators of the electromagnetic influence of a high-altitude nuclear explosion
61000-4-33
Methods of measuring the parameters of powerful pulses
61000-5-3
Ideas on providing protection from the electromagnetic influence of a high-altitude nuclear explosion
61000-5-4
Requirements on systems for providing protection from the radiation interference from a high-altitude nuclear explosion
61000-5-5
Requirements on systems for providing protection from the conductive interference from a high-altitude nuclear explosion
61000-5-6
Reduction of the external electromagnetic influences
61000-5-7
Degree of protection of screens from electromagnetic interference
61000-5-8
Methods of providing protection for distributed systems of the civil infrastructure from the electromagnetic influence of a high-altitude nuclear explosion
61000-6-6
Stability of internal equipment to the electromagnetic influence of a high-altitude nuclear explosion
Note. This is a translation of the titles of the standards.
When creating new standards, the SC77C subcommittee uses existing IEC standards in the area of electromagnetic compatibility to the greatest extent, primarily, in the region of the protection of civil systems from the electromagnetic effect 184
TABLE 3. International Standards on the Protection of the Civil Infrastructure from Powerful Electromagnetic Influences of Non-Nuclear Origin Standard
Name
State of development
61000-1-5
Effect of powerful electromagnetic influences on the civil system
PUB 2004
61000-2-13
Powerful electromagnetic influences – radiation and conductive
FDIS 2005
61000-4-33
Methods of measuring powerful transients
PUB 2009
61000-4-35
Handbook on simulators of intentional electromagnetic influences
PUB 2009
61000-5-9
Estimate of the sensitivity of systems to electromagnetic pulses from powerful electromagnetic influences
PUB 2009
TABLE 4. Operating Plan of the SC77C Subcommittee on the Revision of Standards Standard
Purpose of the revision
Year of publication
61000-1-3
Supplement taking new data into account
2014
61000-1-5
Supplement taking new data into account
2016
61000-2-13
Revision to the section on conductive electromagnetic influences
2016
61000-4-23
Supplement to the material on the reverberation chamber
2014
61000-4-24
Supplement to the section on tests in the “Power on” mode of operation
2012
61000-4-25
Revision taking standard 61000-4-18 into account
2012
61000-4-32
Supplement to information on new simulators
2012
61000-4-35
Supplement to the section on conductive electromagnetic influences
2012
61000-5-3
Improvement of terminology
2012
61000-5-4
Suitability of combining with 61000-4-23/61000-4-24
2012
61000-5-5
Suitability of combining with 61000-4-23/61000-4-24
2012
61000-6-6
Revision taking standard 61000-4-18 into account
2012
of a nuclear explosion. Below we present an analysis of the content of these standards, and we also compare them with Russian standards [1–3]. Table 2 shows a list of the standards developed to ensure the protection of the civil infrastructure from electromagnetic influences of a high-altitude nuclear explosion. Standards were similarly produced in the area of the protection of civil systems from powerful electromagnetic influences of non-nuclear origin. A list of these standards, developed up to the present time, is presented in Table 3. Standard 61000-1-5 is published in the form of an IEC technical report, in which typical forms and action characteristics (radiation interference) are given, and also electrical supply and communication lines (conductive interference), and the effects of their actions on typical civil infrastructure systems are discussed and general methods of protecting these systems from a new threat are illustrated. The standard 61000-2-13 describes the forecasted characteristics of powerful electromagnetic influences, which are a threat to civil systems at any given instant of time and the short-range prospects. This standard is fundamental for choosing appropriate protection methods. 185
Standard 61000-4-33 considers methods and instruments for measuring powerful electromagnetic influences when testing equipment and systems using apparatus which simulates the actions regulated by standard 61000-2-13, and also other powerful electromagnetic influences (lightning discharges, electromagnetic pulses from high-altitude nuclear explosions, etc.). Standard 61000-4-35 includes information on different types and characteristics of simulating apparatus, which it is convenient to use to estimate the stability of equipment and systems to intentional electromagnetic influences. Standard 61000-5-9 contains the recommended procedure for estimating the sensitivity of systems to powerful electromagnetic influences of nuclear and non-nuclear origin. Testing methods and instruments are proposed, their advantages and disadvantages are considered, and examples are also given of the use of standard methods for estimating the sensitivity of electronic systems. As new information appears, the SC77C subcommittee carries out constant revision of the content of its standards. Table 4 shows the operating plan of the subcommittee in revising certain standards. At each session of the SC77C subcommittee, the state of affairs in developing planned standards is considered, and also the subjects of future publications. The priority problem for the subcommittee at the present time is to produce standards on methods of protection and testing. In particular, it is proposed to develop the concept of protection of civil structures from new electromagnetic threats and to include it in the next version of the 61000-5-6 standard. This standard contains information on methods of setting up screens and other forms of protection. Its development was first considered in subcommittee SC77B, but a few years ago it was transferred to the SC77C subcommittee in order to take into account all forms of powerful electromagnetic threats. The development of the IEEE P1642 D3 standard has been started, in which examples are given of known cases of the use of technical means of electromagnetic disturbances in order to solve destructive problems, and the potential characteristics of forms of intentional electromagnetic influences, and information is given on the conditions for the stability of samples of electronic equipment and information systems to radiation and conductive influences, and methods of protection, testing and monitoring are described. In particular, it is noted that, at the present time, powerful radiation interference can originate from sources with a quality index rE = 1 MV (r is the distance to the radiation source and E is the electric field strength), while the maximum levels of action on electric power lines of typical buildings amount to 5 kV. At radiation interference levels of 4–5 kV/m, serious breakdowns and damage occur in equipment and systems, while surge pulses of microsecond duration in electric power lines of the order of a few kilovolts may lead to damage to equipment and interfaces. Considerable attention is being devoted in this project to analyzing possible consequences of the action on information systems of periodically repeating nanosecond pulses. In the last sessions of the subcommittee, in 2009–2011, the advisability of carrying out a project to estimate the applicability of devices for providing protection from lightning strokes and electromagnetic pulses of a nuclear explosion to protect objects in the infrastructure from intentional electromagnetic influences was discusses. Moreover, it was proposed to develop a standard on methods of testing (IEMI immunity test methods). In the Russian Federation, in 2007, a standard was accepted [4], in 2009, another standard [5] was approved and introduced, and in 2011, projects were developed for two more standards on methods of providing protection from intentional destructive electromagnetic influences and instruments for detecting them. In this connection, it is possible to compare the practice of the development of standards in the areas considered abroad and in Russia, which will enable a number of conclusions to be drawn on the basic differences in the approaches to the development of international and domestic standards. As already noted above, the process of developing standards by the IEC is a multistage and systematic process, which includes the distribution and analysis of projects, the preparation and revision of comments (statements) by all the participants. As regards the domestic standards mentioned above, the development and acceptance suffered from the same lack of openness as occurred when introducing the IEC standards. In producing the standard [4], specialists from a comparatively small number of departments and organizations participated. In developing the two new standards, produced in 2011, the range of interested specialists was even narrower, and hence their decisions and its introduction into the Russian Federation gives rise to considerable misgivings. It is extremely important that the development of the IEC standards should begin with documents of general form, containing information on the history of the problem, existing data on the consequences of the action of powerful electro186
magnetic fields and pulses of high voltage on specific technical systems; it should contain an analysis of modern presentations on the physical mechanisms and behavior of the interaction of the above-mentioned factors with the components of electrical apparatus, and also contain information on the trends in developing techniques for generating fields and voltages, and forecasts of their characteristics in the case of the intentional use of this technique to solve destructive problems. The information mentioned above has become basic for developing reasonable requirements on the stability of electronic systems, the development of effective methods of protection, and adequate methods of testing. The Russian standard [5] establishes the main ideas in the area of activity connected with the influences of electromagnetic fields, and is undoubtedly useful. It is a practically accurate translation of the IEC 61000-1-5:2004 standard and contains information on forms and modes of electromagnetic influences, employed abroad. However, in Russia there are also results of experience in the area of research on mechanisms by which pulsed electromagnetic fields, currents and voltages act on computers, video systems, devices for monitoring access to guarded rooms, etc. [6–15]. Hence, recognizing the need to harmonize the Russian and IEC standards, domestic standards must take into account not only foreign but also Russian developments in this area. The refusal to have wide discussions and to reach agreement on projects for standards with all the interested countries has led to controversial recommendations in the standard [4]. Here are some of these: 1) the list of field test influences includes a monopolar pulse, which has an amplitude of up to 10 kV/m and a length of 100 nsec. No requirements are imposed on the length of the pulse edge, although it is precisely this parameter that determines the effectiveness of the action on the majority of systems, with the exception of long lines (hundreds of meters), for which the important parameter is the pulse length. No less important is the fact that such pulses are not, in principle, radiated, since the main fraction of their energy is at the zero frequency. Hence, to show the destructive influence the potential violator must place the apparatus, subject to the influence, inside the field-generating system, which is absurd; 2) the proposed methods of tests on an influence, carried out on electrical supply and communication lines, in the majority of cases are based on the assumption that the single action of a high-energy (up to 200 kJ) and high amplitude (up to 300 kV) pulse is most effective and simultaneously practicable. This assumption gives rise to a number of objections. First, there is a direct relationship between the power capacity of the simulator and its mass/size characteristics. It is hardly possible to construct a compact autonomous pulse generator with a power of 200 kJ for such an application. Second, delivering a pulse with an amplitude of 300 kV directly to the input of the apparatus is practically impossible, since the power supply line of the buildings and, all the more, the data lines, are not designed to transmit voltages of this level. Experimental investigations of Russian and foreign specialists have shown that the voltage, injected into these lines to solve destruction problems, must not exceed 5 kV; 3) the erroneous opinion exists that, by periodic closure of a ~220 V electric power line one can generate, at the input of the apparatus connected to this line, bunches of current pulses of amplitude 0.5–1 kA. Assuming that the transient that occurs as a result of shorting the line is essentially itself a wave, and the wave impedance of the electric power line is not less than 100 Ω, the amplitude of the current pulse, which propagates in this line, is approximately 2 A, which is considerably less than the value stated in the standard; and 4) the opinion exists that it is most convenient for a violator to produce an electromagnetic influence on apparatus, placed inside a building, by injecting high-voltage pulses into the metal structure of this building. Certainly, such a channel for electromagnetic fields to penetrate inside buildings and equipment exists. But, compared with other known channels it is somewhat ineffective, and is hardly likely to be used in practice. At the same time, the tests specified in the standard [4] for such actions involve considerable costs. Hence, we can state that the rate of development and the quality of basic Russian national standards in the area of powerful electromagnetic influences seriously lag behind the rate of publication and quality of the IEC standards. This fact hinders the modernization and technical development of an important sector of economics. Conclusions. Active work is being carried out abroad to draw up a set of standards in the area of the protection of the electronic infrastructure from powerful electromagnetic influences. The serious attention that is being devoted to this problem is due to the potential danger of critical infrastructures of the state suffering serious damage if measures are not taken to protect them. Practically all developed countries whose specialists participate in the SC77C subcommittee of the IEC par187
ticipate in this work. About twelve standards have been developed at the present time, which should ensure stability of important systems to predicted electromagnetic threats. To develop similar standards in Russia, it is necessary to accelerate and take steps to increase their quality, primarily, from the point of view of harmonizing them with similar foreign standard documents. To do this, it seems best to set up a subcommittee, similar to the SC77C, the aims of which should be: to develop terminology, to describe the physical processes that accompany powerful electromagnetic (electrical) influences, to describe and classify the electromagnetic (electrical) environment, to develop general requirements on the stability of the electronic infrastructure of the state, to describe typical methods of testing and measuring, to make recommendations on their protection, etc.
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