Revisiting Social Dominance Theory

Revisiting Social Dominance Theory: Invoking a More Retroductively-Oriented Approach to Systemic Theorizing Norma R. A. Romm

Systemic Practice and Action Research ISSN 1094-429X Volume 26 Number 2 Syst Pract Action Res (2013) 26:111-129 DOI 10.1007/s11213-012-9245-9

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Author's personal copy Syst Pract Action Res (2013) 26:111–129 DOI 10.1007/s11213-012-9245-9

Revisiting Social Dominance Theory: Invoking a More Retroductively-Oriented Approach to Systemic Theorizing Norma R. A. Romm

Published online: 18 September 2012 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012

Abstract Social Dominance Theory, as forwarded by Sidanius and Pratto (Social dominance: an intergroup theory of social hierarchy and oppression, 1999) and as elaborated upon in continuing research by themselves and others, claims to offer a way of exploring the structuring of social systems along the lines of group-based hierarchies. In this article I endeavour to highlight the manner in which this mode of theorizing and of approaching the study of social ‘‘realities’’ might have deleterious social effects, via its potentially selffulfilling claims. I present an alternative way of approaching (co)-inquiries into the social worlds of which we are part––based on an examination of some qualities of retroductive thinking/imagining, which I interpret and extend in order to take more fully into account the impact of our knowing processes on the social worlds being addressed. Keywords Social dominance theory Group-based hierarchy as embedded in systems Retroductive approach Research as imagining alternatives

Introduction In this article I examine Sidanius and Pratto’s way of putting forward social dominance theory (SDT), as a theory expounding the ubiquitous character of group-based hierarchy within social systems. I re-look at their arguments and suggest that their way of presenting their theory can become self-fulfilling, to the detriment of humans considering (and acting in terms of) other bases on which to organize our social life. I concentrate on this theory of theirs in this article, as it has wide currency both in the academic literature (especially literature on intergroup relations) and in everyday conceptions which rely on ‘‘us/them’’ ways of orienting to the world. After outlining some of their arguments developed in their 1999 formulation of SDT, I turn to later work of theirs (2006), where they cite additional research springing from, and supporting, SDT, and they expand on its continuing relevance. N. R. A. Romm (&) Department of Adult Basic Education, University of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa e-mail: [email protected]

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As I examine their theses, I offer a way of criticizing their logic of argumentation. I suggest that they do not rely sufficiently on retroductive logic/imagination, as explored, for example, by certain authors who see Marxism as rooted in this approach and as explored further in my book on New Racism (2010), where I tie retroductive logic to admittedly value-laden attempts to appreciate and cultivate alternative ways of life (not based on us/ them thinking and being). I suggest that part of our theorizing ‘‘about’’ the social world has to involve appreciating the possible effects of our theorizing in the social world of which it is part. Jervis gives an example in relation to the ‘‘discovery’’ of social realities when he notes, for instance, that [journalistic] descriptions of the economic and social health of a neighborhood can be self-confirming because they depend in large measure on the characteristics, attitudes, and behavior of people who live there, which in turn are influenced by the descriptions people believe (and think others believe). Thus media spokespersons are incorrect to claim that they merely report what is happening… . (1997, pp. 148–149) Likewise I suggest that in offering their account of the ubiquitous character of groupbased thinking and acting, Sidanius and Pratto can be said to reinforce this type of social being, as people come to regard it as ‘‘normal’’ behaviour. In the course of the article I suggest that a systemic approach to understanding the social entrenchment of group-based hierarchies needs to take into consideration our way of knowing as being part of, and as capable of transforming, the systems being looked at.

Some Observations and Postulates of SDT Sidanius and Pratto indicate that their theory (SDT) can be called a systemic approach in the sense that it operates at various levels of analysis, attempting to holistically connect ‘‘the worlds of individual personality and attitudes with the domains of institutional behaviour and social structure’’ (Sidanius and Pratto 1999). The theory postulates that we need to connect psychological and sociological understandings in order to recognize the processes leading to the maintenance of hierarchical social systems (which can be seen as having greater or lesser levels of group-based inequality). To begin with, they note that their theory is based on the observation that …all human societies tend to be structured as systems of group-based social hierarchies. At the very minimum, this hierarchical social structure consists of one or a small number of dominant and hegemonic groups at the top and one or a number of subordinate groups at the bottom. Among other things, the dominant group is characterized by its possession of a disproportionately larger share of positive social value, or all those material and symbolic things for which people strive. (1999, p. 31) After making the basic observation (p. 32) that all human societies tend to be structured as systems of group-based social hierarchies, Sidanius and Pratto discuss what they call the trimorphic character of this social hierarchy. They see this as made up of both age and gender systems of social stratification (with older people and men occupying more dominant positions) as well as certain arbitrary-set hierarchies (based on, for example, ‘race’, ethnicity, class, regionalism, etc.). They argue that while ‘‘arbitrary set’’ forms of group conflict are somewhat arbitrary (in that specific forms of racism, ethnic discrimination, caste systems, etc. can vary), these all can nevertheless be regarded as ‘‘different manifestations of the same basic human predisposition to form group-based social hierarchies’’

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(1999, pp. 37–38).1 They argue indeed that ‘‘most if not all forms of group prejudices, stereotypes, ideologies of group superiority and inferiority, and forms of individual and institutional discrimination’’ serve to produce and also are reflections of this group-based hierarchy (1999, p. 38). Now they argue that while indeed there is a tendency for group-based hierarchies to crystallize, via what they call hierarchy-enhancing forces ‘‘which produce and maintain ever higher levels of group-based social inequality’’, these are subject to counterbalancing influences via hierarchy-attenuating forces, which ‘‘produce greater levels of group-based social equality’’ (1999, p. 38, my italics). In other words, alongside social forces tending to maintain specific hierarchies, there also emerge counterbalancing forces that can result in more equality being produced between the specified groups. They state that one of the mechanisms which operates in society to enhance or attenuate group-based hierarchies, are what can be called ‘‘legitimizing myths’’ (1999, p. 45). These are defined by them (following Marx to some extent) as consisting of ‘‘attitudes, values, beliefs, stereotypes, and ideologies that produce moral and intellectual justification for the social practices that distribute social value within the social system’’ (1999, p. 45). They suggest that while ideologies serving to justify group-based inequality can be regarded as pervasive, countervailing idea systems can encourage the ‘‘exact opposite’’, namely social equality (examples are belief systems such as humanism, socialism, feminism, etc.). They suggest that it is possible to examine their differential potencies in the social system (1999, p. 45). In regard to hierarchy-enhancing belief systems they argue that while fairly obvious examples of these can be found (such as, say, classical racism and sexism), more subtle examples can also be located. As they put it: In contemporary U.S. and western cultures, among the most important of HE [hierarchy enhancing] legitimizing myths are the notions of individual responsibility, the Protestant work ethic, internal attributions of the misfortunes of the poor, and the set of ideas and assumptions collectively referred to as ‘political conservatism’… . From these perspectives, then, particular configurations of the hierarchical social system are fair, legitimate, natural, and perhaps even inevitable. (1999, p. 46) Apart from ideological mechanisms which can serve to reinforce the structural inequality between dominant and subordinate groups, Sidanius and Pratto also contend that the criminal justice system (for example) plays an important role in ‘‘establishing and maintaining the hierarchical structure of the intergroup relations’’ (1999, p. 42). They claim that (from a SDT perspective) on the aggregate, law is often written and enforced so as to favour the interests of dominants, and order is often defined as those social conditions that disproportionately protect and maintain the interests of the dominants. Therefore, contrary to the commonly held assumption that discrimination against subordinates within the criminal justice system is relatively rare, non-systematic, and completely overshadowed by the everyday realities of basic fairness and equity, SDT suggests that discrimination within the criminal justice system is quite systematic and comprehensive in its effects. (1999, p. 42)

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Sidanius and Pratto make the observation that while age and gender systems of stratification appear to be completely universal, arbitrary-set hierarchy seems to be ‘‘restricted to those societies producing economic surplus’’ (1999, p. 36). Their claim is that in societies which generate economic surplus this hierarchy can be considered as ubiquitous, although it can take different forms.

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Having set out some of the social components that function to establish and maintain group-based hierarchical systems, Sidanius and Pratto identify certain psychological components that they consider as also crucial to our theorizing around the maintenance of social dominance. They propose, for example, that at the level of individual orientation it is important to consider how people themselves are inclined toward endorsing unequal relations between groups, that is, the extent of their support for nonegalitarian relationships between groups within the social system. In order to detect this, they put forward the construct of what they call ‘‘Social Dominance Orientation’’ (SDO). They state their position as follows: Perhaps the most psychological component of SDT concerns the construct of SDO. SDO is defined as the degree to which individuals desire and support group-based hierarchy and the domination of ‘‘inferior’’ groups by ‘‘superior’’ groups.2 As a general orientation, SDO pertains to whatever group distinctions are salient within a given social context. (1999, p. 48) They suggest that, all else being equal, one would expect (in terms of the theorizing) that ‘‘dominants and/or those who identify with dominants will have higher levels of SDO than subordinates and/or those who identify with subordinates’’ (1999, p. 49). They also note that SDO can be affected by other factors such as one’s background and socialization, as well as the ‘‘temperamental dispositions and personalities’’ with which one can be said to be born. They indicate that one such disposition is empathy, and that they have reason to believe that the greater one’s empathy the lower one’s level of SDO. Finally, they indicate that across the board, all else being equal, males have higher average levels of SDO than do females (1999, p. 49). In this article I do not go into their argument in respect to the gendered quality of SDO, as their explanation hereof has been subject to much contention (and would take another article to explore). Rather, I am concentrating on their basic argument around the ubiquitous character of group-based hierarchy and the social and psychological processes that serve to reinforce it (against the countervailing forces that can operate to temper it).

Pratto, Sidanius and Levin’s Taking Stock of SDT (2006) In their 2006 article, Pratto, Sidanius and Levin elucidate further their understanding of the contribution of SDT to exploring intergroup relations, also citing additional research in this regard. In the article, they, as they put it, ‘‘take stock and look forward’’.

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Over the years this construct has been refined through the questions that have been used to measure it via questionnaires. Some of the questions, where people are asked to rate their agreement or disagreement with statements, are as follows: ‘‘Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups’’; ‘‘In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other groups’’; ‘‘It’s OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others’’; ‘‘To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups’’; ‘‘If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems’’; ‘‘It’s probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom’’; ‘‘Inferior groups should stay in their place; ‘‘Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place’’; ‘‘It would be good if groups could be equal’’; ‘‘Group equality should be our ideal’’; ‘‘All groups should be given an equal chance in life’’; ‘‘We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups’’; ‘‘Increased social equality is beneficial to society’’; ‘‘We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally’’; ‘‘We should strive to make incomes as equal as possible’’; ‘‘No group should dominate in society’’.

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To begin with they re-iterate that SDT can be considered as being a ‘‘general theory of societal group-based inequality’’ (2006, p. 271). They state the social context of their argument: Despite progress in the extension of civil and human rights to broader segments of the world, the problems of intergroup discrimination, bigotry, genocide, and the oppression of women and sexual minorities are still painfully with us. Regardless of a society’s form of government, the contents of its fundamental belief system, or the complexity of its social and economic arrangements, human societies tend to organize as group-based social hierarchies in which at least one group enjoys greater social status and power than other groups. (2006, pp. 271–272) As in their 1999 argument, they indicate that according to SDT: Members of dominant social groups tend to enjoy a disproportionate share of positive social value, or desirable material and symbolic resources such as political power, wealth, protection by force, plentiful and desirable food, and access to good housing, health care, leisure, and education. Negative social value is disproportionately left to or forced upon members of subordinate groups in the form of substandard housing, disease, underemployment, dangerous and distasteful work, disproportionate punishment, stigmatization, and vilification. (2006, p. 272) They also re-iterate their claim that although the ‘‘severity, and definitional bases of group-based hierarchical organization vary across societies and within the same society over time, the fact of group-based hierarchical organization appears to be a human universal’’ (2006, p. 272, my italics). They thus point to what they see as the factual givenness of hierarchical systems. They indicate that based on this observation, SDT ‘‘was developed in an attempt to understand how group-based social hierarchy is formed and maintained’’ (2006, p. 272).3 Pratto, Sidanius and Levin indicate that what they regard as unique to SDT theorizing around social prejudice and people’s identification with ‘‘groups’’ (including self-categorization) is that social dominance theory assumes that we must understand the processes producing and maintaining prejudice and discrimination at multiple levels of analysis, including cultural ideologies and policies, institutional practices, relations of individuals to others inside and outside their groups, the psychological predispositions of individuals, and the interaction between the evolved psychologies of men and women (e.g., Pratto 1999; Sidanius 1993; Sidanius and Pratto 1999; Sidanius et al. 2004). (2006, p. 272) In regard to the systemicity of their approach, they state: Moreover, because social dominance theory views human societies as systems, it theorizes how processes at different levels work together to produce systemic effects. In addressing the processes structuring human societies, social dominance theory is

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In 2011, Pratto and Stewart summarize (again) that SDT is ‘‘a multi-level theory of how societies maintain group-based dominance’’. Here they state that: ‘‘Nearly all stable societies can be considered group-based dominance hierarchies, in which one social group––often an ethnic, religious, national, or racial one––holds disproportionate power and enjoys special privileges, and at least one other group has relatively little political power or ease in its way of life’’ (2011, p. 1).

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more general than theories that focus only on capitalism, empires, gender, immediate self- or group interest, social identity, or individual differences. (2006, p. 272) They indicate that SDT is ‘‘ambitious’’ in this respect, in that it is aimed at identifying ‘‘the net effects of discrimination across multiple levels: institutions, individuals, and collaborative intergroup processes’’ (2006, p. 275). In putting forward the credibility of the theory, they devote a large part of the article to spelling out some hypotheses that can be considered to be derived from the theory, and they report upon how these have fared in relation to the evidence. For example, in regard to the way in which people from different groups see ‘‘others’’, they note: The fact that people tend to favor their own groups over others has been known since before Sumner coined the term ethnocentrism in 1906, and has been largely confirmed by the voluminous research inspired by social identity theory. However, because social dominance theory considers group dominance to be a dynamic system, it predicts that the degree of ingroup bias differs systematically across levels of status and power. Within stable group-based dominance systems, dominants will usually display more ingroup favoritism vis-a`-vis subordinates than will members of subordinate groups vis-a`-vis dominants …(see Sidanius and Pratto 1999, pp. 233–234; see also Fang et al. 1998). (2006, p. 279) Here they indicate how their hypothesized theoretical prediction that dominant group members tend (more than subordinates) to favor their own group, has been supported by their research (that they cite). They also indicate the consequences hereof for what they call ‘‘self-debilitation’’: When subordinates engage in self-destructive and ingroup-damaging behaviors at significantly higher levels than do dominants, they contribute to their own group’s subordination. We call this process self-debilitation. Self-debilitating behaviors include higher levels of criminality, in-group directed violence, harmful substance abuse (e.g., cigarette smoking, drug and alcohol abuse), truancy, and school attrition (2006, pp. 279–280). Now they connect this with their claims regarding the effects of hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths: From a social dominance perspective, hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths are important not only because of the discriminatory behavior they induce among dominants and the rationales they provide for institutional discrimination, but also because of the debilitating and self-destructive behaviors they induce among subordinates. Stereotypes and other ideologies that subordinates carry in their heads induce them to behave in ways that reinforce these stereotypes, thus becoming selffulfilling prophecies. (2006, p. 280) Another one of their hypotheses that they regard as having been confirmed by research relates to the combination––that often occurs among dominant group members––of high SDO and high in-group identification (where members identify strongly with the group to which they see themselves as belonging). This combination, they note, has the effect of producing ‘‘especially strong derogation and discrimination against subordinates’’. They indicate that their thesis of ideological asymmetry indeed leads us to expect this result. (The thesis postulates a greater compatibility between psychological processes, beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors that facilitate group dominance among dominant group members

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than among subordinate group members––whose belief systems tend not to have a social dominance outcome) They see these claims/predictions as having been supported via the work of, for example, Overbeck et al. 2004; and Sidanius et al. 1994). They also indicate the value of their construct of SDO in terms of its ability to predict socio-political attitudes (such as conservatism, liberalism, etc). As they state: People higher in SDO maintain beliefs and endorse policies and practices that maintain group dominance in a variety of ways, whereas people lower in SDO favor ideologies and practices that ameliorate inequality. (2006, p. 283) They indicate that, apart from survey research where correlations between SDO and endorsement of these ideologies can be detected, experimental research also bears this out. An example from the workplace is as follows: Experimental evidence shows that SDO scores are predictive of how much people discriminate in job allocation decisions. Michinov et al. (2005) told 90 White French university students to assume they were part of an office staff of six employees, plus themselves. Four of these other employees were light-skinned and European, and two of these other employees were dark-skinned and of North African ancestry. Participants placed photographs of the employees in a hierarchical organizational chart in which the top position was labeled ‘‘Group Leader’’. Discrimination was measured by the placement and order of assigning the North African employees. Participants with high SDO scores hired light-skinned applicants first… . (2006, p. 286) All in all, they suggest that they do not wish SDT to be classified as a ‘‘personality theory’’, referring primarily to personality dispositions toward SDO. They cite in this regard the ‘‘robust finding’’ that ‘‘dominants have higher levels of SDO than subordinates’’. For example, ‘‘European-Americans have higher levels of SDO than African-Americans, and people with higher socioeconomic status have higher levels of SDO than those with lower socioeconomic status’’ as reported upon by Sidanius et al. 2000 (2006, p. 288). This to them indicates the importance of social context in influencing people’s dispositions. They clarify how they wish the theory to be understood: …rather than being a strict ‘‘personality theory’’ of prejudice, SDT operates at several levels of analysis, encompassing the level of individual differences (e.g., attitudinal and behavioral predispositions), the level of social groups in context, the level of institutions, and the level of competing ideologies within the social system as a whole. (2006, pp. 288–289) They then turn to expounding their explanation of why men as a rule have higher SDO levels than women. That is, they try to explain why, it can be found that, as they put it, ‘‘gender differences in SDO [are] essentially invariant across nation’’––that is, no matter what geographical context is being considered (2006, p. 299). Space in this article does not allow for a delving into this aspect of their theorizing, as I am concentrating more on their consideration of the ubiquity of the development and sustenance of social hierarchies as such. Toward the end of their article, Pratto, Sidanius and Levin take stock of SDT and summarize what they see as its continuing importance: As a broad theory that addresses the hierarchical nature of societies, SDT incorporates social processes that occur within societies, not just within individuals or groups. In particular, social dominance theory has emphasized the shared nature of

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cultural belief systems and their links to social structure and psychological processes in its subtheory of legitimizing myths. It also incorporates an analysis of institutional discrimination because institutions play such a large role in perpetuating or changing social structure. (2006, p. 308) They take pains to emphasize that in conducting their research in relation to SDT, they have adopted an empirically-based methodological approach, which involves ‘‘testing particular hypotheses derived from a well specified theory’’ (2006, p. 309). They do not see this as their having adopted an epistemological position. As they state: ‘‘Social dominance theory is neither an epistemology nor a political ideal. Social dominance theory has integrated theories from across the social sciences’’ (2006, p. 309). They end their article with some possible avenues for further research. For example, they suggest that it is worth empirically investigating the mechanisms (social processes) whereby ‘‘gender interfaces with numerous kinds of power’’––that is, the ‘‘intersection between gender hierarchy and arbitrary-set hierarchy’’. Furthermore, they suggest that we need ‘‘more detailed research on the processes of how ideologies get transmitted, on the different consequences of ‘knowing’ versus ‘endorsing’ a legitimizing ideology, and on how conflicts between alternative ideologies are resolved’’. And they suggest that another important avenue of research is based on recognizing the important differences in the degree to which societies are hierarchically structured, and hence to ‘‘identify and systematically investigate the factors that determine these differences’’ (2006, p. 310). In addition they propose the need to empirically investigate the power relations between societies, between groups belonging to different societies, and the dynamics of newly emerging power hierarchies in transitional societies (e.g., South Africa after apartheid). This also involves considering how different groups can change their positions by using new forms of power, and how external dynamics (outside specific countries) affect internal politics.

Some Avenues for Revisiting/Reconstructing Pratto, Sidanius, and Levin’s Social Dominance Theorizing In this section I revisit Pratto, Sidanius and Levin’s style of theorizing as such––and point to some alternative approaches. As indicated above, they admit that in their theorizing they consciously follow an empirically-oriented route to studying social systems, which consists in deriving hypotheses from their theory and subjecting these to the tests of ‘‘the evidence’’ (as they elucidate in their 2006 article). They pose this as an obvious way of proceeding with scientific inquiry––using hypothetico-deductive reasoning (deducing hypotheses from theory and seeing if they withstand the test of the evidence). This approach to theorizing, as well as the underlying hypothetico-deductivist logic, has been criticized by a number of authors––in particular those who have argued that Marx’s mode of theorizing does not follow this kind of logic. These authors––sometimes called scientific or critical realists––suggest that Marxist theorizing implicitly uses a logic which can be called (following Hartshorne et al. 1958; Peirce 1989; Hanson 1958) retroductive reasoning. It is claimed that this type of reasoning is based on drawing inferences by explaining observed occurrences in terms of underlying mechanisms that can be argued to have given rise to them (albeit that they may not be able to be predicted in advance). Sayer for instance argues that we can reconstruct the logic of Marx’s Capital (1965) by reading it in terms of the retroductive mode of developing theoretical explanations. He

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elucidates that the use of retroductive logic implies that one is oriented to postulating (albeit conjecturally) the existence of underlying mechanisms or structures in reality as part of the process of explaining discernible phenomena. This is because retroductive logic proceeds by ‘‘postulat[ing] mechanisms which should they exist would explain how the phenomena under investigation come to assume the forms in which they are experienced’’ (Sayer 1979, p. 40). In terms of retroductive logic, the logical link between ‘‘H’’ (causal mechanism) and ‘‘P’’ (observable phenomena) consists in the fact that ‘‘H’’ posits a mechanism which, ‘‘if it existed, would offer an explanation for P1, P2, P3, and so on’’ (Sayer 1983, p. 116, my italics). In other words, the logic is used to postulate mechanisms whose posited existence helps us to make sense of the events (phenomena or appearances) as we experience them in their observable form. Sayer’s reference to retroductive logic is used by him to suggest that Marx proceeded, via retroduction, to generate theoretical accounts of, for instance, the causal power of capitalist social structures and mechanisms that, once theorized, help to explain experienced phenomena. One advantage of this approach is that it allows us also to consider that the repetitive links that can be ‘‘seen/observed’’ using hypothetico-deductive logic, are capable of transformation once the underlying structures/mechanisms are transformed. Retroductive approaches thus involve a critique of hypothetico-deductivist empiricism as well as the political consequences of assuming the inalterability of the predicted relationship between ‘‘variables’’ which are given attention within a hypothetico-deductive approach. Joseph and Kennedy make the point that a crucial consequence of Marx’s use of retroductive reasoning toward an understanding of social structures, is that it points to the historization of these structures (2000, p. 514). In contrast, theories that are unable to theorize the socialization and historization of specific modes of social organization become ‘‘trapped in the realm of fetishized relations’’––unable to imagine their transformation.4 In the field of what is called Critical Race Theorizing (CRT), certain authors have likewise criticized the political consequences of a narrowly defined empiricism (while not bypassing the need for empirically-based research). In excavating what is involved in adopting a realist position within CRT, Parks indicates that CRT itself has been criticized for ‘‘struggling to define its substantive mission, methodological commitments, and connection to the world outside of academia’’ (2007, p. 70). He tries to provide a methodology that is based on: • exposing racism where it may be found; • identifying its effects on individuals and institutions; • putting forth a concerted attack against it, in part, via public policy arguments. (2007, p. 70) 4

This ties in with Layder’s argument (1993) in relation to his critique of ‘‘middle range theorizing’’ as an approach to scientific inquiry. Layder’s suggestion is that besides testing specific hypotheses about relationships between variables, space should be made for theory-constructing approaches that go beyond looking for such relationships (1993, p. 31). Theorizing should also not, however, be confined to the emergent theorizing suggested by certain more qualitatively oriented researchers––because, he argues, the attendant view of structure still does not allow us to assign analytic weight to structures beyond the ‘‘immediate environment of actors’’ (1993, p. 56). Layder refers in particular to those following Strauss’s grounded theorizing approach, which shies away from making claims about the way in which structural conditions necessarily become relevant to the ‘‘interactional/processual phenomena under study’’ (Strauss 1987, p. 80, as cited in Layder 1993, p. 56). As I explained in my book on New Racism (2010, Chapter 5), Essed (1991, 2001) has developed an approach that incorporates analytic induction with structural deliberation, as a way of moving beyond what Layder would criticize as ‘‘middle range’’.

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In this way, he suggests, the theorizing can proceed to approach an understanding of the mechanisms in reality that can be said to produce racism (in cases where this is being examined) and their observed effects. However, as I explored in detail in my book on New Racism (2010), Parker and Lynn (2002)––drawing on a more constructivist-oriented epistemology––suggest that Critical Race Theorizing (CRT) is more perspectivally rooted. They consider that it ‘‘relies on the importance of perspective and context in assessing truth claims’’. In Parker and Lynn’s epistemological and political conception of CRT, the ‘‘validation’’ of research is to be understood not in terms of its striving to offer accounts of a posited reality existing outside of the knowing process, but in terms of the way it can be argued to forward the project of developing a more just society––albeit that conceptions of justice may still be contestable. What can be called a non-realist interpretation of retroductive logic is made by McIntyre-Mills when she defines it as a mode of inference that allows people to trace the connections across institutions in society and demonstrate how society shapes life chances …It also involves understanding what the terms mean and why, in terms of the different stakeholders’ assumptions and values (2006, p. 391). In McIntyre-Mills’s account, retroductive logic need not go hand in hand with striving to develop a more or less value-free understanding of the workings of social systems (as ‘‘objects’’ to be disclosed). Value-full understanding (and discussion around different values that may be brought to bear) is catered for in her approach. She links retroductive logic to Churchman’s argument (1979) concerning the need to sweep in a range of felt concerns and values as part of the process of defining systemically issues at stake to be addressed. As she explains in the context of her book exploring Indigenous ways of life in Alice Springs (Australia): This book is about ‘‘unfolding’’ and ‘‘sweeping in’’ …the issues that can be explained retroductively as historical, economic, intergenerational violence associated with marginalization, alcohol and poverty. An economy that supports the class/ culture system is [considered as] written in the socio-demographic patterns of disadvantage (educational outcomes, unemployment and incarceration), morbidity and mortality and life chances. That is why the intervention to break the interlinked cycles has to be at the level of regional governance [promoting citizenship rights and responsibilities]. (2003, p. 11) She indicates that the challenge for retroductive thinking in this case was linked to the policy goal of ‘‘addressing power, empowerment and governance needs of people marginalized in terms of conceptual, geographical and cyberspace/time’’ (2003, p. 12). The results of a history of colonization and marginalization––spelt out in alcoholism, cultural despair and a sense of real powerlessness––needed to be addressed by ‘‘breaking the cycle’’, through Indigenous people ‘‘refocusing the direction of development’’ (2003, p. 14). She points out that refocusing this direction involved moving away from ‘‘the market rules’’ philosophy, toward exploring the liberative potential of other frameworks for living (2003, p. 14). In this way, she offers an account of how the historical contextualization via a form of retroductive reasoning offered a route for enabling people to become more equipped to ‘‘co-create the designs of their …futures’’ (2003, p. 16). In relation specifically to Sidanius and Pratto’s approach, Tungen (2010) likewise considers the importance of making theoretical provision for the historical alteration of what may seem ‘‘ubiquitous’’––so that people can become more forward looking. He criticizes the generalization made by Sidanius and Pratto from what they regard as the

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tendency and the predisposition of human societies to form group-based hierarchies, to the claim that this need carry forward to the future. He summarizes the structure of this logical argument (which he sees as fallacious): The reverse of X has not been observed so far in history; thus X [group-based social dominance] will be observed in the future as well (2010, p. 2). He avers that this is tantamount to ‘‘supporting a belief or practice by citing the fact that it is traditional’’ (2010). He pleads for SDT to be able to reconstruct itself via a different starting approach, that is, by trying to find out which factors resulted (in specific instances) in the alteration of dominance relations. He suggests that the framework used to guide SDT thus far does not focus on transformations that might be taking place––and hence misses these (due to its initial guiding theorizing) As he puts it: From the viewpoint of SD theorists which is criticized in this paragraph, it is much more probable that one will comprehend the mechanisms as never-changing and thus miss the transformations that take place. (2010) In short, the mode of theorizing, and the ‘‘observation’’ of past tendencies and patterns, stifles possibilities for professional theorists as well as lay people (theorists) to imagine alternatives (just as the perceived ‘‘fact’’ of tradition can stifle looking at cultural alternatives). Tungen argues that Sidanius and Pratto’s (and colleagues’) manner of accumulating research results that support the trimorphic structure (of gender, age, and arbitrary groupbased hierarchies) is not explanatory enough to address the social systems being investigated (2010). The level of explanation falls short of relating the observed tendencies back to mechanisms which may indeed be historically alterable (with sufficient will and with people believing/imagining that this is possible). He expresses the overall problem that he identifies with the SDT manner of theorizing (despite its having some strength): SDT can be a good guide for researchers examining how the societal relationships are maintained and reproduced, once they are constructed. In doing this, SDT analyzes the history and evolution of the social behaviors in order to form a background. However, SDT fails to capture how certain systems are formed in the first place and what factors cause changes within these systems. (2010, p. 4) The view of ‘‘causality’’ as evoked by Tungen when he refers to the possibility of creating changes is clearly not the hypothetico-deductive view of causes as predictors of (linear) effects. Rather, it can be said to refer to the totality of events that come to make up a given social formation (as seen by different actors), where we can try to determine which factors are more influential in creating outcomes, and which therefore might provide leverage in effecting transformation. In some sense Sidanius and Pratto’s attempt to work at a multitude of levels of analysis can be said to offer a more systemic view than a focus only on certain sets of ‘‘variables’’. However, I have tried to suggest above––by expanding on the views of other cited authors––that Pratto, Sidanius and Levin’s hypotheticodeductive logic in particular is not equipped to offer scope for people imagining anew, and working toward reconstructing, the basic fabric of social life. The notion of ‘‘causality’’ as referring to possible routes to influence structural change, is well expressed by Christakis and Bausch in their book Co-laboratories of Democracy: How People Harness Their Collective Wisdom and Power to Construct the Future (2006)

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and also in further discussion that has been continued via a wiki site that has been set up to invite deliberation around the dialogical design of futures (cf. http://dialogicdesignscience. wikispaces.com/message/list/Axioms?%287%29). In essence, the idea behind trying to set up structured dialogical processes (SDP) is to enable stakeholders from all walks of life to democratically explore ‘‘influence relationships’’ among observations that have been made, and construct hereby a ‘‘tree of influence’’ that expresses a collective view (at the time) of what factors are likely to exert most leverage when seeking social change. Christakis and Bausch indicate that after participants have constructed an initial tree of meaning––aided by the Cogniscope software that is used in the dialogical design sessions––they continue, as a group, to analyze the cross-impacts existing among the observations they have made. If there is a need to amend the preliminary pattern of influences after the interpretation, they can do this efficiently again with computer assistance, and produce a new version of the tree pattern. (2006, p. 72) They state that in many cases in which they have used the SDP methodology, participants share their experiences, via, for instance, ‘‘storytelling’’, thus contributing to the ‘‘richness of the dialogue’’ (2006, pp. 72–73). In this way, step-by-step, the SDP dialogue ‘‘progressively clarifies the situation [for participants] and opens the way to greatly enhanced decision-making and action planning’’ (2006, p. 72). In Christakis and Bausch’s view, the trees of meaning that are co-produced have the status of ‘‘sparking ideas for action’’ (2006, p. 62). That is, they have a practical bent in that they are not intended to provide (perspective-free) ‘‘knowing’’, but to help people together to devise new ways of being and acting. This, in any case, is the interpretation that I have given to their argument (Romm 2010), and that also is expressed by many of the participants taking part in discussions on the wiki site dedicated to such discussion (see again http://dialogicdesignscience.wikispaces.com/message/list/Axioms?%287%29). Flanagan also points out that seeing the results of discussions as ‘‘scripts’’ is a way of reminding participants that any narrative that emerges should be interpreted as an evolving one––because ‘‘living stories are more compelling than static stories’’ (2008, p. 83). The Cogniscope software is supportive of evolving narrative construction because it ‘‘provides the capacity to weave new information into and around the more familiar information’’ (2008, p. 83). Like Christakis and Bausch, Flanagon indicates that an initial ‘‘tree of meaning’’ can be revised in the light of people’s additional experiences/stories that they may wish to add. But he makes it clearer than they do that the maps (expressing influence patterns) are indeed themselves ‘‘read (interpreted) by participants in the design group in the form of a story’’ (2008, p. 85). The decision to consider any statements that are made about ‘‘reality’’ as being stories, is one that follows a range of theorists who have argued that this is a way of circumventing the hold of ‘‘science’’ in presenting its stories as (more or less) authoritative accounts of ‘‘what is’’. Writing from a Critical Race Theoretical perspective, Ladson-Billings points out that although there is no set of ‘‘doctrines or methodologies’’ to which all CRT scholars can be said to subscribe, they all consider that CRT as an analytic tool is equipped to inject into our discourses new worldviews as well as new ways of knowing itself (2003, p. 411). One way of doing this is by showing how storytelling, which enables, inter alia, the perspectives of the ‘‘dispossessed and marginalized’’ to be seen as ‘‘legitimate in the process of knowledge construction’’, can be capitalized upon in the inquiry process (2003, p. 411). This in turn implies revisiting the criteria for defining what counts as ‘‘knowing’’ within social life.

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Ladson-Billings explains that already through trying to create a science that is directed toward offering an ‘‘apolitical authority’’ (as Collins 1998, puts it) mainstream epistemology serves to de-authorize that which is deemed as less ‘‘objective’’ as a way of knowing (2003, p. 423). And she indicates that it is for this reason that an alternative epistemology, where people are asked to reflect further on the political implications of all of our ways of knowing, is called for. Reviewing History (and Possible Futures) I have suggested in previous sections that despite Pratto, Sidanius and Levin’s suggestion (2006) that SDT is not an epistemology (a way of knowing) we can consider it indeed as such––because it credentializes theoretical approaches which define hypotheses and proceed to supposedly test these against ‘‘the evidence’’, while failing to consider that there may be other viable ways of approaching our inquiries into the social world. Furthermore, their suggestion that SDT is not a political ideal too can be questioned––due to its arguably having political consequences that they have not accounted for. Although SDT does not posit as valuable the ‘‘fact’’ of group-based dominance, it poses this as somewhat inevitable, thus according it the status of having to be accepted in some form.5 The very way in which SDT approaches its research questions does not encourage people (including themselves) to explore histories of co-operative links being established between people, where ‘‘us/them’’ ways of being can be argued to have been less ‘‘in existence’’ (or not at all in existence). Such an exploration has been undertaken by, for example, hooks in her book All About Love (2001), by Lewis, Amini and Lannon in their book A General Theory of Love (2001), and by Wilkinson and Pickett in their book The Spirit Level (2010). All these books offer the view that emotional outlooks that create an ‘‘enemy’’ and/or an ‘‘other’’ to be exploited and diminished are culturally taught. Lewis, Amini and Lannon consider that at its extreme, the psychological goal of preparing soldiers for combat is achieved by ‘‘severing mental bonds between us and them, while simultaneously strengthening intragroup ties’’ (2001, p. 216). Wilkinson and Pickett for their part suggest that looked at historically, humans can be seen as having a ‘‘dual inheritance’’ (2010, p. 206). On the one hand, we have inherited (via evolution) ‘‘mental took kits’’ that equip us to operate in ‘‘dominance hierarchies’’ (as in the kind examined by Sidanius and Pratto). On the other hand, we have also developed tool kits to operate in more egalitarian societies. In other words, as they see it, ‘‘both dominance and affiliative strategies are part of our deep psychological make up’’ (2010, p 206, my italics). According to them, despite the seeming ‘‘permanence and universality of inequality’’ it is indeed the current creation of vastly unequal societies that are the exception. They contend that ‘‘for 90 % of our human existence we lived, almost exclusively, in highly egalitarian societies’’ (2010, p. 208). They refer, for instance, to reciprocal gift exchange as a custom. (See also Harris and Wasilewski’s reference to this in their article, 2004.) And they refer furthermore to the custom of ‘‘vigilant sharing’’––with people watching that a fair share is obtained by everyone (2010, p. 208). They also point to counter-dominance strategies that have been 5

Interestingly, they note (1999, p. 46) that one of the hierarchy-enhancing beliefs that is pervasive in ‘‘contemporary U.S. and Western cultures’’ is the belief that ‘‘configurations of the hierarchical social system are fair, legitimate, natural, and perhaps even inevitable’’. I would suggest that ironically, their own theorizing can be said to tap into this kind of belief system, due to its implications that group-based hierarchies are ‘‘here to stay’’––albeit that their form and degree of severity may alter.

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exercised as ways of ‘‘deposing’’ those trying to assert dominance. For example, these can involve anything from ‘‘teasing and ridicule to ostracism and violence, which are turned against anyone who tries to dominate others’’ (2010, p. 208). So they see as indeed historically exceptional the so-called psychological hard-wiring to sustain inequality along with status and power distinctions. How one reads our historical heritage thus seems to be a function of the theoretical framing that we bring to bear in asking the research questions that become asked. Clearly, these authors do not have the same starting assumptions vis-a`-vis our dispositions to develop group-based hierarchy as do Sidanius and Pratto––and this in turn affects the way they create stories in relation to our heritage. An extract of a conversation between McIntyre and Wilson––held between them at Flinders University in Australia––offers another angle on ‘‘us/them’’ thinking and how it can be viewed as pathological rather than ‘‘normal’’. They consider this largely in relation to us/them thinking across nation states, but also within defined states. (This extract of conversation occurred in July 2010 when I invited them to speak about racism with a view to including this in a book which was being prepared.) Bevin Wilson has worked at Yungurrendi––a department catering specifically for Aboriginal students, offering, inter alia, studies in Aboriginality as well as providing (mentoring) support for Aboriginal students. In addition, he has worked as a public health researcher. Janet McIntyre (cited in the previous section) works in the Department of Social and Policy Studies, and also undertakes systemic research and supervision with colleagues in Public Health, Education, Law, Development, International Studies, Informatics and Engineering, and the Resilience Institute (cf. McIntyre-Mills & De Vries, 2011). They concentrated in their conversation on the kind of thinking that they saw as reproducing racism (which, as they iterated, is linked to what Bevin calls a global platform of inequality). In the extract below I abbreviate Bevin Wilson as BW and Janet McIntyre as JM: BW

JM

BW JM BW

[The challenge with racism] is to change the way globally how people think, because it is to a certain degree how we think (how academics might think about it, how governments think race and race relations and things like that)––but also about the wider/broader sector It is about global thinking and that is what frightens me because the nation state has always had this idea that if we look after ourselves––for example, we can shift pollution elsewhere, and not let asylum seekers into a nation state, etc. (considered to be legal practice); whereas Aboriginality is based on the sense that the land has to be cared for by this generation for the next––the stewardship notion. We have lost that sense of stewardship for others and the environment. That is tragic. Also the notion of ‘‘diversity’’ can feed into the notion of us and them––these systems; those others who are not recognized as legitimate refugees. This is all around that point we made initially about duality [in an earlier ipod that they had created between them, as a trigger for later dialogues]. We need to see the connectedness of us and the planet How do we get people to think globally about that? That’s what I am getting at Indigenous people the world over have thought about that but now we have forgotten it That is why I try to get back to that basis of what we talked about before––I want to go back to the fundamental basis of racism in itself––in terms of competition. How do we rethink about that sort of thing globally?

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JM

…

BW

JM BW

JM

BW

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I believe that people think [incorrectly] that if we have resources in our nation state at the expense of others [other nations] or at the expense of people within it, that will lead to them having more. They do not realize that every decision has a boomerang effect. Poverty and pollution feed back as conflict; and climate change to erosion and poisoning of the food system; or there is mental breakdown of people who are overstressed because they are treated like commodities. People think they can get away with us/them and categorization; they do not understand we are part of one great web; and what we do to others we do to ourselves….. [The conversation then moved to Bevin and Janet speaking about the welfare state and Sweden; and the indigenous people in Sweden––the Sami. Janet mentioned that as she understood it, ‘‘there is still conflict in Sweden in terms of the attitude towards strangers coming into access welfare as a result of the global financial crisis. And the economic crisis is engulfing Europe’’. Bevin continued the conversation by stating that this all cannot be separated out from the fundamental basic platform of inequality. The conversation proceeded as follows.] I was trying to get back to that fundamental basic platform [the imbalance in the global economy]. …. What is happening is that that platform is being perpetuated. It going to be difficult even for this project that we are doing because a lot of people are at the poor end of scale. There are still a considerable number of people in most countries in this position Yes there is immense poverty America is a developed country. But think how Barack Obama had to fight so hard to get health cover for the poor. He has been trying to close this gap of inequality. Those that had a good lifestyle and good money––could come out and say things like accusing him of being communist. You can’t defend the poor! You can’t help the poor like that. In Australia we are further down the track, for example, in terms of health cover, etc. We are further down the track; we are more prone to closing the gap But the Labour Party are at the brink of ousting Rudd as leader before the general election. Possibly we will get a new and more conservative government. That is a worry. But globally what outraged me is the fallout of BP oil––poor Obama having to deal with this––and the head of BP says he wants his ‘life back’! The oil spillage was 30–40 times worse than originally admitted. Once it is accepted that the ocean is part of the global commons, BP could not pollute a common resource for the next generation. But the head of BP had the temerity to allow its corporate heads to say ‘‘don’t get all worked up’’ (as they said to Obama); and say we need to confine the terms of reference of our discussion to talking about economic issues and not see it as a corporate crime [in relation to] Obama and the oil spill …this would connect to Norma Romm’s theory of racism. Is this a new form of subtle racism in the sense that people could say that due to Obama’s handling of this it shows that we can never have another Black president in America again?… Some people could think it is good because it makes him look bad enough due to the way he deals with it––so therefore that supplies a reason for why we should not have another Black president again! You can never discount something like that. There are probably people thinking this in America now. People can find ways to exploit this––any disaster can be exploited

In this conversation, Bevin and Janet thus consider the problem of racism as perpetuated by a (not to be seen as ‘‘natural’’) orientation to us/them thinking. This way of thinking and

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being leads to people failing to join together to recognize everything as interconnected–– and this nonsystemic view also implies an approach that does not appreciate the land and oceans (nature) as something to be revered as ‘‘part of us’’. They thus urge a turnaround in such patterns of thinking/being––and a serious embracing of more Indigenous understandings of connectivity––with the earth that should be revered (and cared for). Another example of seeing us/them thinking (and attendant hierarchical structures) as pathological is given by Mugabushaka in his doctoral thesis (2012), in which he explores hierarchical relationships in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. He pleads for a review of the habitus where people seem to accept the exercise of dominative power in social relationships––from domestic ones, to work-related ones, to government-citizen ones, etc. He tries to pit this habitus against an alternative by showing up its pathological quality. As he states: Competition for scarce resources within the household visibly aggravates human rights abuse therein [in the form of domestic violence]. This form of [domestic] abuse occurs in all countries world-wide …. No matter what it is named, it is a pattern that reproduces itself in ascending institutions in the community, the state, and markets.… The system of governance in the Congo is …based on completely vertical relationships in which there is an imbalance between the powerful elites… who control access to resources, and the powerless. (Mugabushaka 2012, p. 250). He considers this abuse as connected to the maximum profiteering of capitalist-oriented enterprises, which, as he sees it, with the help of self-serving government officials extend the colonial exploitative practices in the extreme. He summarizes the root of the problem as he sees it: The problem is always to think in terms of superior/inferior, powerful/powerless, the winner and the loser paradigms instead of thinking in terms of acquisition of equal rights before the law and grounding the society and the community on egalitarian principles [and reciprocal relationships]. (Mugabushaka 2012, pp. 289–290). Despite his pessimism concerning prospects of turning around the basic habitus, Mugabushaka feels that it is possible to create some kind of change. Toward this end he believes that stories of people trying to set up alternative, more humane ways of human relating (as in some of the examples he offers in his text, 2012) need to be told. Such stories point to, and at the same time call forth, possibilities for developing social and economic relationships based on a sense of reciprocity. I will now close my own storying in this article by citing a post-script to the UNESCO Courier (2011) offering tribute to the universal thought of three writers––Tagore, Neruda, and Ce´saire. The authors of the article––Antony and Sopova––point out that the article is meant to ‘‘inspire reflection, in both academic and artistic milieus, on the universal values of human society’’ (2011, p. 53). The authors thus stress the importance of creating inspirational words when writing––whether ‘‘academically’’ or ‘‘artistically’’. One of the works that they cite is of an interview with Ce´saire, entitled ‘‘the liberating power of words’’ (as cited in the UNESCO Courier, May 1997). Here they point out that words themselves when written by people can ‘‘make a difference’’ to the unfolding of outcomes in our social worlds. That is, they can be said to have social and political effects (2011). (See also, in this respect, Romm 1995, 1996, 2001, 2002). I have suggested that one of the problems with SDT as forwarded by Pratto et al. (2006) is that the potentially self-fulfilling quality hereof has not been sufficiently reflected upon by them in their stance of purportedly ‘‘showing up’’ the ubiquity of group-based hierarchy (in societies producing

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economic surplus). I have argued that an alternative methodological and epistemological orientation could well lead them (and us) to re-assess the way in which we develop our claims about our social potential.6

Conclusion My exposition in this article has concentrated on highlighting the ways in which the logic of inquiry utilized within SDT can be reviewed. I suggested that a more retroductivelyoriented approach provides the space for us as inquirers to take part in tracing the ‘‘influence patterns’’ that might result in lesser life chances being afforded to some (groups of) people, while at the same time encouraging a more future-directed––and imaginative–– orientation than provided for within SDT as it stands. Such a future-orientation can direct its focus on activating our human potential for human co-operation and relatedness, rather than on our apparent tendency to think and act in terms of our identification with defined ‘‘groups’’. It is worth mentioning that a research approach that relies on our capacity to re-construct our ways of seeing and being can broadly be categorized under the banner of action research, considered as an approach that appreciates the socially interventive quality of all ‘‘knowing’’ (see also Romm 1995; Midgley 2000; Flood 2001). While I have not dwelled on the pragmatic, action orientedness of retroductive thinking/imagining in this article (and hence its link to action research), a full account hereof can be found in Romm 2010 (Chapter 7).7 Briefly put, my suggestion is that the process of (critically) considering how theorizing can be reconstructed along the lines of retroductive imagination to offer more scope for social transformation, can be considered as ‘‘action research’’, or at least ‘‘active research’’ in orientation.8 Relating this to my understanding of SDT, I propose that social dominance theorists (who may wish to consider re-labeling their approach!) would do well to take on board as part of their theorizing the action component of any processes of knowing and thereby take more into consideration the likely effects of ways of framing research questions on the re-construction of unfolding social worlds.

6

Pratto and Stewart (2011), turn their attention to prospects for non-violent peace to be effected where, in the absence of balances of power, possibilities exist for ‘‘extremely violent civil warfare’’. They suggest that ‘‘the least oppressive kind of peace that societies can realize would result from reducing social inequality and from recognizing the rights of all groups to be empowered to obtain what they need’’ (2011, p. 4). However, the problem with this conclusion of theirs is that it seems not to tally with SDT’s theoretical statements about the apparent inevitability of certain groups not being afforded ‘‘what they need’’ (as they state on page 1 of their article). Hence I have suggested that a re-orientation of SDT theorizing as such, where provision is made for re-considering the status of any claims about ‘‘social dominance’’ is called for. 7

In trying to locate the origins of action research as an orientation to inquiry, Reason (2006) indicates that these are broad–they lie in the work of Lewin (for example, 1946) and other social science researchers around at the end of World War II; in the liberationist perspective that can be exemplified in Paulo Freire (1970); philosophically in liberal humanism, pragmatism, phenomenology and critical theory; and practically in the work of scholar-practitioners in many professions… . (Reason 2006, pp. 187–188) In this article the approach forwarded can be considered as a pragmatic critical-theoretical one, thus falling under the banner of Reason’s (2006) understanding of action research.

8

See McKay and Romm (2008) for an account of the qualities of ‘‘active research’’ as we see it.

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