stakeholder perceptions of the problems, impacts, and ...

BUILDING SEAPORT RESILIENCE FOR CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION: STAKEHOLDER PERCEPTIONS OF THE PROBLEMS, IMPACTS, AND STRATEGIES

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE EMMETT INTERDISCIPLINARY PROGRAM IN ENVIRONMENT AND RESOURCES AND THE COMMITTEE ON GRADUATE STUDIES OF STANFORD UNIVERSITY IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Austin Howard Becker August 2013


ABSTRACT A growing body of research indicates that climate change is having and will continue to have a range of negative impacts on social-environmental systems. Consequently, attention is being given to reducing the vulnerability and increasing the resilience of these systems. This dissertation contributes to the emerging field of climate change adaptation, focusing on assessing potential impacts of storm events on seaport systems and strategies that can help prepare seaports and their stakeholders for the probability of a stormier future. Climate change increases the severity of storms and increases sea levels, making many seaports especially vulnerable to its effects. In addition to the fact that seaports are located in environmentally sensitive, high-risk locations, they also involve a complex network of stakeholders that depend on their functionality. An increasing body of literature suggests that, for planners to be effective in increasing resiliency of socialenvironmental systems to climate change-related events and other hazards, they must understand and incorporate the perceptions and concerns of the stakeholders in their assessment and planning processes; that is, potentially vulnerable populations are an essential component of disaster planning and policy making. This dissertation builds on and contributes to this body of literature as it evaluates seaport planning and policy with respect to climate change impacts, and examines the degree to which stakeholder concerns are considered in current planning processes that address storm impacts to ports. This analysis uses empirical evidence collected through a global survey and case studies of two particularly exposed ports, Gulfport (MS) and Providence (RI), to examine how port stakeholders such as port operators, municipal planners, port

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tenants, coastal managers, and others perceive storm impacts and vulnerability and how their planning and policy address these perceived concerns. Results suggest the following: 1) Globally, port planning practices do not yet address climate change and the resulting storm impacts, even though port managers recognize adapting to climate change as an emerging challenge; 2) Port stakeholders of Gulfport (MS) and Providence (RI) identified a wide range of direct damages, indirect costs, and intangible consequences of a hurricane hitting the port and these would result in costs that would be borne by all port stakeholders as well as society as a whole; 3) In Providence and Gulfport, plans and policies that address storm resilience for the ports did not include the concerns of many stakeholders; 4) Stakeholders in Gulfport and Providence, both internal and external to the port itself, identified a wide range of resilience strategies that could augment port resilience. These results indicate that all port stakeholders perceive increasing yet different risks from the impacts of increased storm activity, and that current planning processes are unlikely to address the full range of stakeholder concerns. Moreover, this research suggests that all stakeholders are poised to implement at least some strategies that would build resilience for the ports.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS First and foremost, I wish to thank my amazing committee. Pam Matson has been such a source of positive support, inspiration, and motivation. She has a unique ability to inspire, challenge, and shine light into the murky waters of interdisciplinary studies. Despite being the busiest of deans, she always made time to meet with me, to provide feedback, and to help keep me on track. I owe a huge debt of gratitude to Martin Fischer who has helped me navigate academic and professional development along the steep learning curve of the PhD process. He supported me in numerous trips to the United Nations where I shared the work of our lab and he and allowed me to take the lead as an instructor for a course that we taught together for 14 quarters. This course and the work we did together was instrumental in helping me define my research path and explore many potential avenues of inquiry with a fantastic team of undergraduate and graduate students and professional collaborators from around the world. His detailed reviews of my chapters and papers have improved my writing skills substantially. Meg Caldwell encouraged me in countless ways, including in the formation of Stanford chapter of The Coastal Society. She kept me grounded in the practical side of policy and climate adaptation and has been such a champion since my first visit to the Stanford Campus. I also thank Stephen Schneider for his guidance in the early days of my studies. Steve was a force in the early days of the climate adaptation challenge and I am honored to be one of many who carry that torch. Mike Mastrandrea, first E-IPER graduate student, was also the first person I met at Stanford. He took over as an advisor for me after Prof. Stephen Schneider passed away. Mike has been a big support in helping me navigate the program and in keeping my research relevant to the exciting work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. I am indebted to Rob Dunbar for his mentorship and his invitation to sail for a quarter with Stanford at Sea. So many thanks to Susi Moser who is truly a leader in this new field of climate adaptation and who read my manuscript and helped me see the forest through the trees. Thanks to Stephen Barley for being an exceptional Chair and for his positive energy and infectious excitement about my work. vi

The E-IPER staff has been an amazing source of structure and support. Jen Mason, with her exceptional organization, has kept me from missing a single deadline. I have many friends and family to thank. Thanks too to my mom, Johanna Becker, and my dad, Christopher Becker who would have been proud to see me follow in his professorial footsteps. Both have helped me to see my true potential. My community has been a pillar of strength for me and helped me to process the many ups and downs and life transitions. Jonathan Boulware, Damion Vania, Karen Miller, Jen Liese, Ted Hannon, Thomas Ambrose, Bean Britton; thank you. My West Coast friends and family: Justin Mankin and Maron Greenleaf, Charlotte Stanton, Lauren Oakes, Elspeth Farmer and Jamie Rapperport, Jimmy Avant, thanks to all of you for your help, motivation, and for being on my team. Thank you to Tiffany Smythe for your great ideas, your encouragement, and your fantastic feedback. Jen Wilcox has been a great friend through thick and thin. She’s an inspiration and has pushed me to be a better runner, a better researcher, and a better person. Thank you to Gordon Peabody, a consistent source of support and wisdom, for always reminding me to see the big picture. Many thanks also to the Stanford University Project on Engineering Responses to Sea Level Rise (SUPERSLR) team, David Newell, Nathan Chase, Ernestine Fu, Suejung Shin, Applied Science Associates (ASA) for help in creating hurricane scenarios, interview respondents in Gulfport and Providence, the International Association of Ports and Harbors (IAPH) and the American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA) for their assistance with the survey. Thank you also, Ben Schwegler, who has served as an insightful and thoughtful mentor at Stanford. Thanks also to my funders: the E-IPER Program and the McGee Grant Program, both in the Stanford School of Earth Sciences, the Woods Institute for the Environment, Disney Imagineering, and the Stanford University Lieberman Fellowship.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS List of Tables ........................................................................................................................ x List of Figures ..................................................................................................................... xi Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 1 Theoretical point of departure ............................................................................................... 2 Key insights on stakeholder engagement and vulnerability assessments for resilience ........................................................................................................................................ 3 Background and motivation .................................................................................................... 5 Climate change adaptation .................................................................................................................... 6 The climate challenge for seaports ................................................................................................... 9 Resilience ................................................................................................................................................... 10 Port stakeholder cluster and its role in port planning ........................................................... 15 Research approach and overview of chapters ............................................................... 25 Survey approach for Chapter 1 ........................................................................................................ 25 Case study approach for Chapters 2-‐5 .......................................................................................... 26 References .................................................................................................................................. 28

Chapter 1 Considering climate change: A survey of global seaport administrators ................................................................................................................. 36 Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 36 Climate change impacts on ports ........................................................................................ 38 Related survey research ........................................................................................................ 42 Methods ....................................................................................................................................... 43 Survey purpose ....................................................................................................................................... 43 Sample ......................................................................................................................................................... 44 The survey tool ....................................................................................................................................... 45 Distribution and responses ............................................................................................................... 46 Overview of responses and port characteristics ...................................................................... 47 Results .......................................................................................................................................... 49 Climate change perceptions and attitude .................................................................................... 57 Discussion ................................................................................................................................... 62 Limitations of approach ...................................................................................................................... 62 Implementing change at the seaport level .................................................................................. 62 Public policy ............................................................................................................................................. 64 International aid ..................................................................................................................................... 65 Direction for future research ............................................................................................................ 65 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 67 References .................................................................................................................................. 69 Chapter 2 Case study description and data collection methods ...................... 73 Case descriptions -‐ Gulfport (MS) and Providence (RI) .............................................. 73 Overview of Gulfport ............................................................................................................... 75 Hurricane risk to the Port of Gulfport ........................................................................................... 76 The plan for restoration ...................................................................................................................... 78 Port elevation – A new resilience strategy .................................................................................. 79 Overview of Providence ......................................................................................................... 83 viii

Hurricane risk to the Port of Providence ..................................................................................... 85 Adaptation planning in Rhode Island ............................................................................................ 86 Data collection and Interview Methods ............................................................................ 87 Selection of interviewees .................................................................................................................... 87 Storm scenario ........................................................................................................................................ 91 Interviews with stakeholders ........................................................................................................... 93 Document collection ............................................................................................................................. 94 Coding method ........................................................................................................................................ 98 References ................................................................................................................................ 100

Chapter 3 Assessing impacts of hurricanes on seaport stakeholder clusters: A case study of Gulfport, Mississippi ....................................................................... 102 Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 102 Impacts of storm events at ports .................................................................................................. 103 Impact assessment techniques ..................................................................................................... 104 Coding of impacts ................................................................................................................... 106 Results ........................................................................................................................................ 107 Direct damages ....................................................................................................................... 107 Indirect costs ........................................................................................................................... 111 Intangible consequences ..................................................................................................... 115 Document vs. interviews comparison ............................................................................. 121 Internal port stakeholders concerned with direct damages, indirect costs, and intangible consequences ..................................................................................................... 121 Stakeholder concerns in port planning documents ................................................... 124 Attitudes toward climate change ...................................................................................... 125 Discussion ................................................................................................................................. 126 Summary of research question results ...................................................................................... 127 Policy implications ............................................................................................................................. 129 Limitations and next steps .............................................................................................................. 129 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 130 References ................................................................................................................................ 131

Chapter 4 Anticipated impacts of hurricanes on the stakeholder cluster: A case study of the Port of Providence, Rhode Island ........................................... 134 Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 134 Review of methods ................................................................................................................. 135 Results of the interviews and document analysis ....................................................... 135 Direct damages ..................................................................................................................................... 137 Indirect costs ......................................................................................................................................... 139 Intangible consequences .................................................................................................................. 141 Discussion ................................................................................................................................. 145 Summary of research questions ................................................................................................... 145 Planning gaps in Providence .............................................................................................. 149 Bridging the gaps .................................................................................................................... 151 Comparative assessment of Gulfport and Providence ............................................... 152 Similarities ............................................................................................................................................. 153 Differences ............................................................................................................................................. 155 Limitations and next steps .................................................................................................. 156 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 157 References ................................................................................................................................ 158 ix

Chapter 5 The role of port stakeholders in building seaport resilience in the face of climate change: A typology of strategies ................................................. 160 Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 160 Strategies for resilience building ...................................................................................... 161 Methods ..................................................................................................................................... 164 Descriptions of the seven strategy categories .............................................................. 167 Discussion ................................................................................................................................. 180 The insurance strategy ..................................................................................................................... 184 Operationalizing existing frameworks from the literature .............................................. 186 Difficulties in planning resilience for the port ....................................................................... 187 Incremental vs. transformational strategies ........................................................................... 187 Recommendations/Next steps ........................................................................................... 188 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 190 References ................................................................................................................................ 190 Chapter 6 Conclusion ................................................................................................... 193 Main arguments (claims) ..................................................................................................... 193 Limitations ............................................................................................................................... 206 Next steps .................................................................................................................................. 207 References ................................................................................................................................ 209 Appendix I Survey materials ..................................................................................... 211 Survey instrument ................................................................................................................. 211 Invite letter for survey ......................................................................................................... 224 Raw data from survey ........................................................................................................... 226 Additional graphs from survey .......................................................................................... 244 Appendix II Case study materials ............................................................................ 251 Interview instrument used in Gulfport and Providence ........................................... 251 Confidentiality agreement for trancribers .................................................................... 260 All organizations interviewed in Providence and Gulfport ..................................... 261 Hurricane scenarios for Providence and Gulfport ...................................................... 262 Table of documents discovered from Gulfport ............................................................ 266 Summaries of documents analyzed from Providemce .............................................. 268 All documents reviewed in Gulfport ................................................................................ 270 Missions of organizations in Gulfport and Providence ............................................. 271 Missions and mandates of individual organizations interviewed ......................... 273 Appendix III All unique strategies identified in Gulfport and Providence 281 Table of strategies from National Research Council report .................................... 287 References ................................................................................................................................ 289

LIST OF TABLES Table 0-1 Examples of impact, risk, and vulnerability analyses .................................. 22 Table 1-1 – Table of respondent membership and region ............................................ 48 Table 2-1 -- Port of Gulfport statistics ......................................................................... 76 Table 2-2 -- Assessed damages to the Port of Gulfport (PEER 2006) ......................... 78 x

Table 2-3 – Organizations consulted in Gulfport’s Environmental Assessment for port restoration ..................................................................................................................... 81 Table 2-4 -- Timeline for port resilience strategies in Gulfport ................................... 82 Table 2-5 -- Stakeholders interviewed in Gulfport....................................................... 89 Table 2-6 -- Stakeholders interviewed in Providence .................................................. 90 Table 2-7 -- Documents reviewed from Gulfport......................................................... 96 Table 2-8 -- Documents reviewed in Providence ......................................................... 97 Table 3-1 -- Direct damages (Gulfport)...................................................................... 110 Table 3-2 -- Indirect costs (Gulfport) ......................................................................... 114 Table 3-3 -- Intangible consequences (Gulfport) ....................................................... 119 Table 4-1 -- Direct damages (Providence) ................................................................. 137 Table 4-‐2 -‐-‐ Indirect costs (Providence) ................................................................. 139 Table 4-3 -- Intangible consequences (Providence) ................................................... 142 Table 5-1 -- "Table of Strategies" for adapting to climate change (from NRC 2010) 162 Table 5-2 -- Examples of strategies from Gulfport and Providence........................... 166

LIST OF FIGURES Figure 0-1 -- Climate adaptation process (NCADAC Draft) ......................................... 4 Figure 0-2 -- Conceptual frame for resilient seaport systems ........................................ 6 Figure 0-3 -- Map of U.S. ports within 50km of named storm ...................................... 9 Figure 0-4 -- Stakeholder cluster (Based on Notteboom and Winkelman, 2002) ........ 18 Figure 0-5 -- Map of survey respondents ..................................................................... 26 Figure 0-6 -- Map of case study locations .................................................................... 27 Figure 1-2 -- Map of survey respondents ..................................................................... 47 Figure 1-3 -- Climate change discussions at staff meetings ......................................... 50 Figure 1-4 -- Ports' planning horizons in years ............................................................ 51 Figure 1-5 -- Expansion and improvement plans ......................................................... 52 Figure 1-6 -- Design standards and construction plans for all respondents ................. 53 Figure 1-7 -- Climate change considerations................................................................ 54 Figure 1-8 -- Climate change policies in place ............................................................. 55 Figure 1-9 -- Adaptation scores by category ................................................................ 56 Figure 1-10 -- Top three concerns about climate change ............................................. 58 Figure 1-11 -- Sea level rise expectations and concern ................................................ 60 Figure 1-12 -- SLR concern as compared with SLR projections ................................. 61 Figure 2-1 -- Map of Gulfport and Providence ............................................................ 74 Figure 2-2 -- Aerial view of Port of Gulfport (www.portofthefuture.com) ................. 76 Figure 2-3 -- Hurricane tracks near Gulfport ............................................................... 77 Figure 2-4 -- Providence Harbor and its water dependent uses (Becker et al. 2010) ... 84 Figure 2-5 -- Providence and History of Storm Tracks .............................................. 86 Figure 2-6 -- Port of Providence with simulated Category 3 storm surge.................... 92 Figure 2-7 -- Port of Gulfport with simulated Category 4 storm surge ........................ 92 Figure 2-8 -- Method of coding .................................................................................... 99 Figure 3-1 -- Hurricane impacts on port stakeholders ................................................ 104 xi

Figure 3-2 -- Impacts mentioned in interviews vs. document .................................... 121 Figure 3-3 -- Frequency of mentions per respondent by stakeholder group .............. 123 Figure 3-4 -- Number of distinct impacts mentioned in documents ........................... 124 Figure 4-1 -- Distinct impacts and frequency of mentions in documents and interviews (Providence) ............................................................................................................... 146 Figure 4-2 -- Who bears the cost of impacts in Providence ....................................... 147 Figure 4-3 -- # of distinct impacts mentioned in interviews and documents ............. 148 Figure 4-4 -- Number of distinct impacts mentioned in Providence and Gulfport .... 153 Figure 4-5 -- Impacts mentioned by internal port stakeholders in Gulfport and Providence .................................................................................................................. 156 Figure 5-1 -- Number of strategies in each category .................................................. 167 Figure 5-2 -- Building codes and land-use regulations .............................................. 168 Figure 5-3 -- Long-range planning ............................................................................. 170 Figure 5-4 -- Construction and design strategies ........................................................ 172 Figure 5-5 -- Private sector and insurance policies .................................................... 173 Figure 5-6 -- Emergency preparation, response, and recovery................................... 175 Figure 5-7 -- Research ................................................................................................ 177 Figure 5-8 – Networks and new ways of thinking ..................................................... 179 Figure 5-9 -- Stakeholder groups poised for leadership (Version 1) .......................... 181 Figure 5-10 -- Stakeholders poised for leadership (Version 2) .................................. 182 Figure 5-11 -- Summary of stakeholders and strategies ............................................. 183 Figure 6-1 -- Ports with climate adaptation policies in place ..................................... 195 Figure 6-2 -- Level of concern for adaptation amongst survey respondents .............. 195 Figure 6-3 -- Number of distinct impacts mentioned in Gulfport and Providence .... 196 Figure 6-4 -- Cost of impacts for internal and external stakeholders in Gulfport and Providence .................................................................................................................. 198 Figure 6-6 – Number of strategies in each category of resilience strategies from Gulfport and Providence............................................................................................. 202 Figure 6-7 -- Number of strategies stakeholders are poised to implement................. 203 Figure 6-8 -- Categories of strategies by stakeholder group poised to implement ..... 204 Figure 6-9 -- MACDADI overview (Haymaker 2006) .............................................. 209

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INTRODUCTION A growing body of research indicates that climate change is having and will continue to have a range of impacts on human-environmental systems (IPCC 2012; NRC 2010). Attention must be given to reducing vulnerability and increasing resilience of these systems (Patt 2013; Moser and Boykoff 2013). Because the climate-related changes include increased storm activity (Emanuel 2013) and a rise in sea levels (Rahmstorf 2010), seaports are expected to be especially vulnerable (Becker et al. 2013; McEvoy et al. 2013; Asariotis and Benamara 2012), as many ports are -by necessity- located in environmentally sensitive and high-risk locations. Seaports and maritime shipping also play vital roles in global trade and regional socio-economic stability (AAPA 2013; World Bank 2010). With 99% of overseas U.S. trade by weight, carried by ship (AAPA 2013), ports are the backbone of the National economy and provide critical resources for the regions in which they are located. Ports serve not just as profit centers, but are also necessary for the delivery of public goods to a wide variety of stakeholders such as public agencies, community groups, and private businesses (Hall and Jacobs 2007; Notteboom and Winkelmans 2002). Understanding impacts of storm events at ports and the strategies that can reduce vulnerability are initial steps toward building resilience and adapting to climate change (NCADAC Draft; IPCC 2012). Engaging the participation of potentially vulnerable populations is increasingly being recognized as an essential component of disaster management and policy making that reduces vulnerability (Eakin and Luers 2006). This dissertation builds on the theory that stakeholder input is necessary to reduce vulnerability. It uses empirical evidence collected through surveys and case studies to examine how port stakeholders perceive storm impacts to the port, and to evaluate how current plans and policies address these

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perceived concerns. The dissertation addresses the following four questions: 1) How are port operators currently considering climate change and incorporating adaptation into their planning? 2) What impacts from storms such as hurricanes are of concern to port stakeholders? 3) In what ways are stakeholders considering port resilience in their plans and policies? 4) What strategies do stakeholders consider for building port resilience in the face of climate change? The target audience for this study is the constellation of planners, practitioners, and decision-makers in the public and private sector with responsibility for formulation and implementation of resilience planning and policy for seaports. This includes port planners, coastal managers, urban planners, federal agencies, and others. The audience also includes members of the academic community who are concerned with understanding and furthering the efficacy of resilience planning and the stakeholders' engagement. I begin this overview chapter by providing the background and context for the work. This section includes a brief discussion of some of the major concepts that underlie the questions addressed in this dissertation, and the motivations behind the study, including the climate change challenge for seaports, the seaport stakeholder cluster, and seaport resilience. I then outline my approach and methods for the continuing chapters of the dissertation and provide a short summary of each chapter.

THEORETICAL POINT OF DEPARTURE This work contributes to the emerging field of climate adaptation that answers the call for “applied and use-inspired research, linking geographic knowledge to practical 2

concerns” (Moser 2010). Given the early stages of this field, much research emphasis is still exploratory in nature, focusing on problem and solution identification, as scholars and practitioners work to determine what/how impacts will manifest and the potential strategies for addressing them (Moser and Boykoff 2013). However, there is already wide consensus that stakeholder engagement and participation will be an essential component of adaptation (Wilbanks and Kates 1999; Eakin and Luers 2006) and that assessment of impacts should be conducted on a scale that is aligned with the scale at which management occurs (Cash and Moser 2000). This dissertation is an academic exploration of the causes and consequences of harm and loss for particular peoples and places, in this case stakeholders of seaports. It builds on the theory that stakeholder perceptions must be considered for effective assessment and management of such consequences (Eakin and Luers 2006).

KEY INSIGHTS ON STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT AND VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS FOR RESILIENCE Frameworks help to guide the adaptation process, allowing researchers and practitioners to better understand the necessary steps for building resilience of the systems with which they are particularly concerned (NRC, 2010; Moser and Ekstrom 2010; Turner et al. 2003; Allison et al. 2009; Birkmann et al. 2013). I use the framework represented in Figure 0-1 to provide context for my dissertation research because it represents a common and rational approach to planning (Moser and Ekstrom 2010). This framework emphasizes the importance of stakeholder engagement in adaption planning. Researchers and practitioners increasingly recognize stakeholder engagement as an essential component of successful adaptation planning processes and resilience building (Moser and Boykoff 2013; Eakin and Luers 2006). Empirical evidence has shown that without support from stakeholders, coastal management decisions are unlikely to be successfully implemented (Tompkins et al. 2008). Stakeholder input helps assess and identify future socioeconomic impacts (Van Kleef et al. 2006) that can result from hurricanes striking at seaports. Assessment of these types of impacts, as well as the options for adaptation, are the first steps in the 3

adaptation process. Though other research has relied on stakeholder input to assess flood risk (Van Kleef et al. 2006), impacts of sea level rise (Poumadère et al. 2008), and the broader regional impacts of climate change more generally (Shackley and Deanwood 2002), these types of impacts assessments have not been applied for stakeholders of seaports.

Figure 0-1 -- Climate adaptation process (NCADAC Draft)

The adaptation process incorporates steps that may be iterative, though defining the problem and initial solutions through identifying risks, vulnerabilities, and strategies, is generally a first step. In the case of ports and climate change, these steps require an assessment of which stakeholders are at risk and should thus be engaged in the adaptation planning process, what the specifics risks and impacts may be, and in what ways the port system may be vulnerable. Vulnerability assessments help define how risks and vulnerabilities manifest for a given population. Assessing vulnerability has been the subject of a great deal of research in the emerging area of climate adaptation

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(Bierbaum et al. 2013; Preston et al. 2010), though as a field it is still considered to be fragmented (Janssen et al. 2006). The lack of one widely applicable theory or framework to guide research efforts has been considered problematic, resulting in a variety of normative conclusions about how to undertake vulnerability research (Eakin and Luers 2006). Even characterizing how to approach the concept of vulnerability remains a topic of debate in both theory and practice (Eakin and Luers 2006). Some approach it by assessing the risk and hazard (e.g., what is the hazard, what are the impacts), others assess the political economy and ecology (e.g., how are different people and places affected differently, what explains different capacities to cope), and still others focus on ecological aspects of resilience (e.g., what are the underlying processes that control the ability to cope). There is no one right way to approach vulnerability and diverse approaches are often considered complementary and necessary. However, when the problem is still poorly understood, an initial cataloguing of impacts associated with risks and hazards (Lindell and Prater 2003) and strategies for adaptation (Travis 2009), contextualized within the local conditions, can serve as an initial step toward a successful process (Moser and Boykoff 2013). This dissertation focuses primarily on the assessment and cataloguing of storm impacts for port stakeholders in Chapters One through Four, and strategies to help build resilience in Chapter Five. It contributes to a better understanding of the nature of the climate change problem for ports and their stakeholders.

BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION Three main concepts underpin the research for this dissertation (Figure 0-2). First, it was motivated by the challenge of climate change adaptation for new environmental conditions. Second, planning for more resilient ports requires defining the nature of resilience and how it applies to ports and port planning to mitigate the impacts of natural disasters. Third, the process of building resilience for ports and adapting to climate change requires an understanding of who faces the risk and how they engage in building resilience. To address this last concept, I consider the cluster of stakeholders that depends on the long-term functioning of the port. At the nexus of 5

these three underlying concepts is the resilient seaport system, the goal to which this research contributes. Each of these theoretical underpinnings is discussed in the following sections.

Figure 0-2 -- Conceptual frame for resilient seaport systems

CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION Climate change is accepted by the scientific community as an unequivocal fact (IPCC 2007). Impacts of climate change are already being felt by society, and it is likely that impacts will in the future affect all sectors of society and have wide-reaching impacts on human health, energy, marine environments and fisheries, transportation infrastructure, forests, conservation areas, food supplies and global security (IPCC 2007; IPCC 2012; NRC 2010). Adapting to these impacts has become a focus for researchers and the decision makers at local, state, national, and International levels

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(NRC 2010; IPCC 2012). Adaptation, as defined by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), means “any adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities” (IPCC 2007). As represented in (Figure 0-1) the first steps in the adaptation process in general, and for ports specifically, requires an assessment of which stakeholders are at risk and should thus be engaged in the adaptation planning process, what the specifics risks are, and in what ways the port system in vulnerable. The work in this dissertation focuses in Chapters One through Four on identifying the stakeholders of the port and eliciting their perceptions about risk, impacts, and vulnerability of the port with respect to a major hurricane strike. In this first step, the concept of risk may be defined as: The likelihood, over a specified time period, of severe alterations in the normal functioning of a community or a society due to hazardous physical events interacting with vulnerable social conditions, leading to widespread human, material, economic, or environmental effects that require immediate emergency response to satisfy critical human needs, and that may require external support for recovery (IPCC 2012). To simplify, risk is the product of the probability of an event and the damage consequences that result. For ports, the risk manifests primarily as a function of exposure to storms and the impacts that result from a storm hitting the port. Impacts are the effects on natural and human systems of disasters and are a key component of vulnerability. Vulnerability is defined as, “the propensity or predisposition to be adversely affected … including the characteristics of a person or group and their situation that influences their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist, and recover form the adverse affects of physical events” (IPCC 2012). Capacity is defined as “the combination of all the strengths, attributes, and resources available to an individual, community, society, or organization that can be used to achieve established goals” (IPCC 2012). Exposure, in turn, is defined as “the presence of people, livelihoods, environmental services and resources, infrastructure, or economic, social, or cultural 7

assets in places that could be adversely affected by physical events and which, thereby, are subject to potential future harm, loss, or damage” (IPCC 2012). Once the vulnerability of human-environment systems is understood, the adaptation process moves to identification, assessing, and selecting solutions (Moser 2009; Adger et al. 2007; Travis 2009; Kates et al. 2012). This begins the planning process that leads to implementation of solutions and management. Here, again, the perspectives and values of stakeholders help define the context and the potential options (NCADAC Draft). Reducing the exposure to potentially harmful events is difficult in the case of ports, due to the nature of their business and their reliance on coastal locations. Thus, solutions for port resilience include ways that risk and vulnerability may be limited through reducing impacts and sensitivity. This may be accomplished through influencing social or physical conditions that make the port system subject to harm or damage. For example, ensuring adequate insurance, or providing early warning systems, or building specific kinds of infrastructure like seawalls and storm barriers, or maintaining protective coastal ecosystems could each reduce the vulnerability to suffering harm and thus reduce risk. Chapter Five addresses this step in the adaptation process and develops a catalogue of resilience strategies that may be implemented by port stakeholders in two ports (Gulfport, MS, and Providence, RI). The last three steps in this framework (Figure 0-1) are implementation, monitoring, and revisions as necessary; though less work has been done on these latter steps (Moser and Boykoff 2013), since adaptation action is still so new. Some actions may be implemented through the revision of existing plans and processes, known as mainstreaming (Dovers and Hezri 2010). Other efforts may create standalone plans that address specific sectors or regions. These solutions are addressed in more detail in Chapter Five. The final steps of monitoring and revisions have been the focus of very little research, though these are understood to be essential to a successful process as resilience strategies are tested against new environmental conditions, technological advancements, and social norms (NCADAC Draft). This dissertation does not address these steps, as they are still well removed from its focus of identifying the problem

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that climate change poses for port stakeholders and developing an initial understanding of potential solutions.

THE CLIMATE CHALLENGE FOR SEAPORTS Even without climate change related changes in storm frequency or intensity, many ports by their nature face exposure to devastating storm events. Between 1960-2010, 282 U.S. ports have had a named tropical storm pass within 50 kilometers (Figure 0-3). Many ports along the U.S. Gulf and East Coasts have been hit directly by hurricanes, with damages totaling in the billions of dollars (Blake et al. 2011). Hurricane Katrina caused $100 million to Mississippi’s ports (PEER 2006) and Hurricane Sandy generated over $50 billion in damage to the New York and New Jersey region (EQECAT Inc. 2012) and the Port of New York was shut down for over eight days. (PANYNJ 2012).

Figure 0-3 -- Map of U.S. ports within 50km of named storm

(Port and storm data from National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGIA 2011) and Knapp et al. (2010))

Recent global projections suggest sea levels could rise by as much as 1.9 meters by 2100 (Schaeffer et al. 2012; Vermeer and Rahmstorf 2009), which would exacerbate storm-surge impacts and wave damage in many regions (Lin et al. 2012; IPCC 2012) especially if the intensity and frequency of tropical storms also increase as analysts 9

expect (Emanuel 2013; Bender et al. 2010). These extreme events cause coastal inundation/erosion, wind hazards and inland floods that can disrupt entire transportation networks (USCCRP 2008). Some regions will find that the local sea level rise exceeds the global mean, causing additional impacts from business losses due to these natural disasters (Esteban et al. 2009; Hallegatte et al. 2011). Recent projections suggest a potentially crippling increase in asset exposure in each of the world’s 136 port mega-cities during this century (Nicholls et al. 2008; Lenton et al. 2009; Coumou and Rahmstorf 2012). Combined, these new conditions of elevated sea level plus more frequent and intense tropical storms could result in a 10 to 100-fold increase in the likelihood of a major storm event (Tebaldi et al. 2012; Grinsted et al. 2013). These new conditions pose substantial challenges to ports (Asariotis and Benamara 2012; Oh and Reuveny 2010) due to exposed port locations in coastal zones, low-lying areas, long lifespans of infrastructure assets, and their interdependence with trade, shipping and inland transport services that are also climatically vulnerable. The coastal or estuarine location of seaports suggests that mean sea level (MSL) rise, higher storm surges and river floods (Tebaldi et al. 2012; Von Storch et al. 2008; Jonkeren et al. 2013), increased hurricane intensities/destructiveness (Elsner et al. 2008; Emanuel 2005) and potential changes in wave regimes (IPCC 2012) could cause significant damage and operational delays (Haveman and Shatz 2006; EQECAT Inc. 2012; PANYNJ 2012).

RESILIENCE Resilience generally refers to the “ability of a system to absorb disturbance and still retain its basic function and structure” (Walker et al. 2006). A large body of research has focused on the resilience of natural coastal systems (Adger et al. 2005b), due to concerns about the combined pressures of human population growth and threats from natural disasters. Resilience is also topic of growing interest among researchers in areas ranging from architectural systems to institutional systems (Eakin and Luers 10

2006) to ecological systems (Walker et al. 2006) and security studies (Coaffee and Wood 2006). Resilience theory and natural hazards research provides a lens focusing on the problem identification and the implementation of solutions that include disaster response and planning (Godschalk 1999; Birkmann et al. 2008; Collier et al. 2010). The National Infrastructure Advisory Council defines infrastructure resilience as the ability to reduce the magnitude and/or duration of disruptive events (NIAC 2009). The effectiveness of a resilient infrastructure or enterprise depends upon its ability to anticipate, absorb, adapt to, and/or rapidly recover from a potentially disruptive event (O'Rourke 2007). What is seaport resilience? When used in reference to a seaport, “resilience” has many different meanings to different types of stakeholders. In a case study of the Port of New York and New Jersey, for example, Smythe (2013) found wide variation in how stakeholders conceptualized resilience of the port. Some described it in social terms, emphasizing interconnectedness between different sectors. Others thought primarily about physical infrastructure and transportation systems’ ability to bounce back and recover, and others described it in economic terms, emphasizing resilience of supply chains, and others. In general though, a resilient port can “withstand an extreme natural event without suffering devastating losses, damage, diminished productivity or quality of life, without a large amount of assistance from outside the community” (Mileti 1999). For the purposes of this dissertation and its focus on storm resilience, I define a resilient port more specifically as one that, in the face of storm events, may continue to serve its region for the following goals: Business success as a means for individual firms to profit, facilitating trade as a conduit for the exchange of resources, materials, and finished products; an engine for local, state, and/or national economic growth and stability; and a public good that minimizes environmental harm and contributes to residents’ quality of life. Actors may share these goals, but prioritize them differently, as different types of stakeholders have a wide variety of interests in the port. Since a port serves a diverse community of stakeholders and society at large, port 11

resilience may also be considered as a public good from which all stakeholders may benefit. This concept underlies the value of considering all stakeholders’ perspectives when assessing impacts of storm events and strategies to build resilience. A public good is both non-excludable and non-rivalrous, since individuals cannot be effectively excluded from its benefit, and the benefit by one individual does not reduce the benefit to others (Besanko and Braeutigam 2010). Egli (2012) shows how- on a national scale- the U.S. benefits from strengthening the Nation’s awareness and inter-agency coordination around the public good aspects of infrastructure resilience. Although little research has been done on the aspect of public good with regard to seaport storm resilience, some lessons can be drawn from similar work done on port security that underscore the value that planning for the long-term functioning of seaports can have for all stakeholders. Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, much attention has been paid to the role seaports play in facilitating such attacks. Haveman and Shatz (2006) suggest that the loss of port functionality due to these strikes can result in a cascade of impacts on supply chains, port-dependent businesses, and consumers who rely on the goods and materials handled by the port. For the same reason national defense has been identified as a public good that prevents these cascading impacts, seaport storm resilience may be considered a worthy goal, since similar results occur from the impact of a major storm hitting a port. Some of these impacts are quantifiable in economic terms, while others are intangible consequences to quality of life or the environment. Since stakeholders of a port may be expected to bear some of the costs associated with a hurricane strike, understanding the impacts and resilience strategies available can lead to benefits for the port and the port stakeholders. Challenges in seaport resilience planning Due to the projected impacts of climate change, planning for seaport resilience has recently emerged as a unique area of resilience research (McEvoy and Mullett 2013; EPA 2008; Becker et al. 2013), in addition to a variety of other infrastructure sectors such as roads (NRA 2012), airports (Baglin 2012), railways (Baker et al. 2010), and infrastructure as a general concern (NIAC 2009). A new body of work has begun to 12

address a need to shift planning paradigms to include a range of incentives and more stakeholders in the process of creating more resilient ports (Ng et al. 2013b; Becker et al. 2013). However, understanding of the dimensions of port resilience is still in its infancy and the scope of the problem for ports and port stakeholders is still not well understood. Little guidance is available for incorporating long-term resilience (more than 20+ years out) in the port infrastructure planning process in the U.S. or elsewhere in the world. Further, ports also fall outside of the planning parameters that regulate other types of coastal uses. Ports are typically zoned for industrial use and thus are not subject to many regulations that are designed to protect the interests of residents. For example, U.S. Executive Order 11988 (Floodplain Management) requires federal agencies to prevent long and short-term adverse impacts associated with the occupancy and medication of flood plains, and to avoid direct and indirect support of floodplain development wherever there is a practicable alternative (FEMA 2013). However, since FEMA considers ports to be functionally dependent infrastructure that must be located in a floodplain, requirements can often be relaxed for port infrastructure.1 The U.S. has no centralized authority that oversees investment or operation strategies for ports that provides guidance or incentives for resilience planning. Further, oversight is made more difficult due to the fact that port ownership may be any combination of public and private, ranging from those that are 100% privately owned and operated, to public/private partnerships, to those that are 100% publicly owned and operated. Since the port operator has a direct interest in the ongoing functioning of the port, one might expect to find storm resilience addressed in the port’s strategic planning process, which for ports is typically based on the core mission and principles of a port operator (Allen 2012). However, ports generally plan in accordance with 1 Note that this gap is being addressed in part through the recent Presidential Policy Directive 21 – Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience that establishes a national policy to strengthen and maintain secure, functioning, and resilient critical infrastructure.

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three time horizons that do not align well with climate change projections (Dooms et al. 2004): Short-term planning covers a one-to-three year time span with a primary focus on operational issues and current practical problems. Medium-term planning covers three to five years and typically focuses on marketing and financial goals. Long-term planning typically covers a 10 to 25-year time horizon and focuses on the development of the wider port area. It is usually difficult for a port operator to develop concrete plans and strategies for infrastructure development beyond 25 years, since too many assumptions would have to be made about factors such as employment, cargo throughput, and technological advancements. Climate change, and the accompanying increase in risk from extreme events, requires a longer planning horizon. Discussions with port planners have affirmed that resilience issues are not typically a part of the strategic planning process (Pers. comm. Kiernan). This may be in part because of a lack of an appropriate incentive structure. As stated by the National Infrastructure Advisory Council, “Current market mechanisms may be inadequate to achieve the level of resilience needed to ensure public health, safety, and security. Even with a strong business case, there are low-probability, highconsequence events for which investments in resilience by private companies cannot be justified” (NIAC 2009). To raise capital for expansion or improvements, ports rely on a combination of their own profits and public assistance on an ad hoc basis (ASCE 2012). However, even without factoring in climate change, a recent report projected a GDP loss of $697 billion by 2020 unless significant investments are made into the Nation’s marine transportation system (ASCE 2012). Although climate change is already affecting some areas, noticeable changes that will impact infrastructure are not likely to become evident for several decades from the present (USCCSP 2008), a time horizon well outside of strategic planning processes designed to maximize profit. Although port operators clearly play a lead role in the effort to build resilience, my research sought to identify the range of strategies that could be implemented, not just by the port operator, but also by the other stakeholders who benefit from a more resilient port. Many local and statewide planning efforts include a public participation component that solicits input from a wide variety of stakeholders, with a formal public 14

process that requires a period of comment and response before the final approval of a plan. Stakeholders' engagement in port planning, however, varies considerably. In many cases in the US, the port operator is also a public port authority. Many state public port authorities manage assets beyond the port infrastructure itself. For example, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey builds, operates, and maintains seaports, airports, bridges and tunnels, and bus terminals throughout New York and New Jersey, and follow a planning process that often has a public component. Some smaller and medium-sized ports, such as the Port of Providence (RI), are completely private and conduct all the planning internally (Curtis 2013), with little or no public component. Many public port authorities also conduct the bulk of their planning internally, concentrating primarily on strategic plans for port operations and growth.

PORT STAKEHOLDER CLUSTER AND ITS ROLE IN PORT PLANNING Stakeholders of the port Scholars and policy makers have stressed the importance of identifying stakeholders (Bryson 2004) and including a broad range of stakeholders' perspectives in developing adaptive responses to climate change (Few et al. 2007) and for transport planning in particular (Ward 2001). The primary function of a port is the transfer of cargo and/or passengers between a waterway and the shore (Talley 2009), but today’s ports are more than simply a system of channels, wharves, and multi-modal connections. Thus, the stakeholders who depend upon the port functionality are diverse. Ports serve as profit centers for a variety of businesses, including shippers, shipping agents, energy companies, importers and exporters, and port authorities. They facilitate the transport of energy resources, building materials, finished products, and chemicals. Ports also share ecologically sensitive territory with other stakeholders, such as commercial and recreational users. Ports may also be considered a cultural element, embedded within and held accountable for the goals of a larger society (Burroughs 2005).

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Stakeholders of a port may be defined as any group or individual who can affect or are affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives (Freeman 2010). As described by Notteboom and Winkelman (2002), the principal stakeholders of the port include the port operator (often a public port authority) and the firms that are directly engaged in the transfer of cargo or passengers. However, many stakeholders of the port share a wide variety of goals and missions with respect to the long-term functioning of the port, including business success, facilitating trade, economic growth, and public goods and services. In a sense, stakeholders of a port may include almost anybody (Mitchell et al. 1997), numbering in the tens or hundreds of thousands or more, -- if one includes all neighbors, residents depending on goods shipped through the port, and the customers throughout a supply chain. However, climate adaptation and building resilience to storm events at ports will most likely be carried out by those individuals and groups who will be directly affected, and who may assume responsibility for implementing and sustaining adaptation measures over time (NRC 2010), thus for the purposes of this dissertation, I limit the stakeholders to the port stakeholder cluster discussed in the following section. The port stakeholder cluster Though ports have been previously considered in academic research, most studies have confined analysis to the port authority itself or the supply chain, of which the port forms one component (Hall and Jacobs 2010; Goss 1990; Haezendonck 2001). However, as Hall and Jacobs (2007) noted, numerous other organizations must be considered within the port context. Port systems incorporate numerous independent firms and multi-modal transportation connections in order to provide services that would lead to economic growth and stability to their regions. Due to the complexity of port systems and the variety of ways that stakeholders depend upon port functioning, a representative sampling of stakeholder concerns is necessary in order to develop a richer picture of the impacts beyond the concerns addressed by port operators. Strategic management scholars use cluster analysis to understand the “actors that can

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affect or are affected by the achievement of a firm’s objectives” (Freeman 2010). Although clusters have traditionally been defined as “spatially concentrated groups of firms competing in the same or related industries, that are linked through vertical and horizontal relationships” (Porter 1998), De Langen (2004) expanded this definition from “all economic activities related to the arrival of goods and ships,” to include “populations consisting of business units, associations, and public or private organizations”. Since de Langen employed the cluster concept as a lens through which to understand the economic performance of the port, the actors that make up the cluster consist primarily of firms. For the purposes of the present work, I expand the definition of cluster further to place a greater emphasis on stakeholders who have interests beyond the profit motives that drive the port-related firms. Thus, the cluster in this research loosely binds the group of organizations that have a stake in the long-term resilience of a port. Placement of absolute boundaries around this cluster is difficult or impossible, due to the global nature of the transportation network in which ports participate. Therefore, the port stakeholder cluster concept here includes the key stakeholders that have an interest in the resilience of a port and can play some role in planning or decision-making. The port stakeholder cluster (De Langen 2004; Haezendonck 2001) may be divided into two primary categories: internal and external stakeholders (Figure 0-4). Those stakeholders that are part of the port authority organization (e.g., the port operator, shareholders, managers, and employees) may be considered as internal stakeholders and

are

generally

most

concerned

with

the

return

on

investment,

shareholder/stakeholder value and/or the creation of wealth. A diverse array of actors and organizations fall into the broader category of external stakeholders.

17

Figure 0-4 -- Stakeholder cluster (Based on Notteboom and Winkelman, 2002)

These external stakeholders include economic/contractual stakeholders that are involved in certain port operations such as stevedoring companies, shipping agencies, insurers, ship repair services, port tenants, and the like. These stakeholders tend to have profit-oriented missions and many have the agency to shift locations should a major storm strike at the port. For example, a shipping company can divert its cargo to a different port in the event of a disaster at its original destination. Public policy stakeholders include government agencies responsible for transport and economic affairs, as well as environmental agencies, planning departments, and emergency management agencies. These can be local (e.g., city planning and zoning commissions), state (e.g., coastal management programs and departments of transportation), and federal (e.g., the U.S. Coast Guard, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers). These stakeholders have responsibility for facilitating commerce, protecting the environment, and other aspects of public welfare.

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Community/environmental stakeholders consist of community groups, neighboring residents, the general (tax paying) public, environmental groups, and others. These types of groups typically advocate on behalf of a particular cause (e.g., water quality) or population (e.g., a residential neighborhood around a port). These community stakeholders may not always recognize their role until some event brings their dependence on the port to their attention. This may include a disaster at the port, plans for the development of port facilities, or a shift in the type of business being conducted at the port. Though not explicitly included in Notteboom and Winkelmans' typology, academic research stakeholders can also play a role in port planning development. These may include academic organizations or non-governmental groups that conduct independent work or are contracted by another stakeholder. Particularly with regard to resilience or economic development plans, researchers can provide information to the port’s planning process. For example, weather forecasting, climate projections, and economic models may be used to inform the decision-making process. In Providence, the University of Rhode Island’s (URI) Coastal Resources Center provides facilitation and communication expertise that aids in the development of statewide policy. The port stakeholder cluster in vulnerability assessments and climate adaptation As articulated by Adger et al. (2005a), scale has emerged as part of climate adaptation planning because the risks associated with climate change encompass many entities (Wilbanks and Kates 1999), from the individual property owner whose land may be inundated by the rise in sea level to the global transportation network that may be crippled through the shutdown of an airport, railway, or seaport by a storm or other extreme event (IPCC 2012). Adaptation processes tend to focus on some particular subset of the human-environment system, ranging from one specific organization (Berkhout et al. 2006) to a nation as a whole (NCADAC Draft). On every scale, however, adaptation will involve multiple actors, policies, and practices and require communication and public engagement to ensure success (Moser and Boykoff 2013).

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Individuals can be expected to take action to protect their own interests; businesses make decisions to generate profits for their shareholders, while governments and public bodies act on behalf of society as a whole. Many researchers have discussed the value of relating guidance in decision-making to the appropriate scale for resource managers (Dilling and Romsdahl 2013), however few studies begin with one particular piece of infrastructure (e.g., a seaport, airport, or power plant) and then proceed to define the scale by identifying the cluster of stakeholders that benefit from that facility. Along with the national, global, and local scales, a cluster scale approach can serve decision makers who wish to better understand the specific risks faced when a piece of infrastructure is lost or damaged in a storm event. As noted above, a first step toward adaptation and resilience planning generally consists of problem identification through a risk and/or vulnerability assessment. However, most vulnerability assessments for ports have not focused at the stakeholder cluster scale that would include an appropriate range of port stakeholder perspectives for planning. Instead, they tend to focus at either a community-wide or regional scale, though a few have looked at individual firms or commercial facilities (for more on scales see Birkmann 2007). Table 0-1 provides examples of a number of assessments that have been used to better understand port or port-region vulnerability and risk. Those conducted at the port scale tend to focus on the port as a business, either by assessing the economic damage caused by a previous storm (MSPA 2005), assessing the cost of various resilience strategies that would mitigate certain risks (Omer et al. 2012), or by estimating the impact that port shutdowns could have on GDP for the nation (Esteban et al. 2012). For the port stakeholder cluster, these types of assessments provide relevant information, but are not designed to provide insights into the wide range of impacts that result from damage to or the shutdown of the port. An exception is a pilot study by Ng et al. (2013a) that solicited input from a sample of stakeholders to assess their perceptions of risks to the port. Though this study did not assess potential impacts, it did set up a research agenda designed to be implemented on a stakeholder cluster scale. The next steps up in scale are the community, county, or regional scale. These assessments provide more nuanced information about the 20

various indirect costs and intangible consequences of storm events, but are too coarse in scale to capture the specific impacts that result from damage at the port and the ways they affect the stakeholders of the port This dissertation provides foundation information that may be used for the future development of vulnerability assessments at the port stakeholder scale that positions the port as the hub, but considers the perspectives of the external stakeholders in the design and implementation of resilience and adaptation strategies that benefit all.

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Table 0-1 Examples of impact, risk, and vulnerability analyses

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Previous seaport resilience research This dissertation work focuses on identifying problems and solutions for climate adaptation for ports and builds on the critical need for stakeholder engagement. Recently, other studies have emerged that have also addressed these issues. These are noted and briefly summarized in this section, so as to help provide additional context for this work. First, a study by Mansouri et al. (2010) proposed a framework for resilient port infrastructure systems utilizing decision tree analysis for assessing the cost-effectiveness of various strategies. This method works well for assessing threats to which probabilities and monetary values can be assigned, and for potential resilience strategies that can be likewise quantified and assigned to a particular stakeholder. In reality, however, both sides of this equation are extremely difficult to estimate, especially when the full group of stakeholder concerns is considered. Perhaps most closely aligned with the focus of the work in this dissertation, the Port of San Diego (California) initiated a multi-stakeholder effort, The Climate Mitigation and Adaptation Plan, that proposed sharing responsibility between surrounding communities for emergency response, critical utilities protection, and storm water drainage (Port of San Diego 2013; Messner and Moran 2013). The adaptation planning study included stakeholder input from all parts of the stakeholder cluster (Figure 0-4), including: the county, cities, port business leaders, port commissioners and staff, environmental non-governmental organizations, academic researchers, and the local utility provider. The assessment methodology included a risk evaluation framework that considered the likelihood and consequence of impacts, prioritized according to risk classification (very high, high, medium, low, and N/A).

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Another recent report examined 17 U.S. ports and found that the greatest challenges facing the ports included: emergency communication, personnel retention after an event, and coordination of recovery initiatives with government agencies (USGAO 2007). The report recommended stronger stakeholder engagement in disaster planning, though its primary focus was on emergency planning and response as opposed to reducing risk through long-range resilience planning. The International Finance Corporation and the Port of Muelles el Bosque (Cartagena, Colombia) also conducted a climate risk study for that port, assessing the financial, environmental and social impacts that are projected to result from climate change (Stenek et al. 2011). The study analyzed projected changes in sea level rise, storm surge height, precipitation, temperature, and wind patterns, as well as their direct and indirect effects on port assets, operations inside and outside of the port, the surrounding environment and communities, and on the transport of goods through the port. Where applicable, the effects of impacts were incorporated into the company’s financial model, using the company’s usual discount rate, allowing further assessment of cost effective adaptation options. Based on the conclusions of the study, the company announced plans for USD 30 million in adaptation investments in the two ports it operates (Stenek et al. 2011). Finally, in Australia, the National Climate Change Adaptation Research Facility and RMIT University developed a framework for studying the risk, vulnerability and resilience of the country’s ports (McEvoy and Mullett 2013; McEvoy et al. 2013), which highlighted that seaport adaptation to climate change involves the development of practices in a range of areas. These include: technology and engineering (e.g., cranes that operate safely under stronger winds, and raising of connecting roadways/rail lines to respond to flooding); design and maintenance (e.g., accommodation of projected precipitation changes into future building designs); planning (e.g., planning of resilient logistic hubs in partnership with supply chain logistics infrastructure providers/local authorities); insurance (e.g., quantitative determination of unavoidable climate risks for appropriate insurance); and systems

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management (e.g., introduction of climate change considerations into environmental, logistics and risk/emergency management systems). Though the studies discussed above provide much needed research in the area of risk and vulnerability assessment for ports, they do not include the identification and categorization of the impacts that concern stakeholders, nor the range of strategies available to the stakeholder cluster as a whole.

RESEARCH APPROACH AND OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS In this dissertation, I combine the use of surveys and case studies to provide insights into the climate change challenge for seaports, from the perspective of stakeholders of the ports. The survey was used to examine issues on a global scale, while the case studies focused on the local scale to provide more nuanced information.

SURVEY APPROACH FOR CHAPTER 1 Chapter One presents the results of a global survey of port authorities (Becker et al. 2012) that addresses the first of the four key questions -- How are port operators currently considering climate change and incorporating adaptation into their planning. The survey results help define the problems faced by ports, and describe the perceptions, plans, and concerns reported by respondents with respect to climate change. I designed the survey together with co-authors (Satoshi Inoue, Martin Fischer, and Ben Schwegler) and with support and input from the world’s two largest port associations, the International Association of Ports and Harbors (IAPH) and the American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA). The AAPA and IAPH distributed the survey to member ports in August 2009 through Survey Monkey, a web-based software product designed for conducting surveys through the Internet. Survey Monkey allowed for a wide distribution at low cost. The survey gives a broad picture of the current state of the world’s ports with respect to climate change (Figure 0-5). The methods and the results of this study are also 25

provided in Chapter 1.

Figure 0-5 -- Map of survey respondents

CASE STUDY APPROACH FOR CHAPTERS 2-5 The results of the survey indicate that although climate change will be a problem for port operators, they are not yet addressing the issue. Yet, respondents cited increasing storminess and sea level rise as being high concerns. This work, carried out in 2008 and 2010, set the stage for the case study work that took place between 2010 and 2013. Since the port authorities are just one of the stakeholder groups that comprise the stakeholder cluster, these results motivated me to look deeper into how increased storminess and sea level rise could affect the other members of the stakeholder cluster. As Yin (2008) states, “The distinctive need for a case-study approach arises out of the desire to understand complex social phenomena.” The cascading impacts resulting from hurricanes have economic, social, and environmental affects on numerous stakeholders. Key questions two-to-four focus on these stakeholders, how they might be impacted by storm events, and what options they have for building resilience. To provide insights into these questions, I undertook case studies in two ports (Gulfport, MS and Providence, RI, see Figure 0-6) and present the results in Chapters Two-to-

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Five.

Figure 0-6 -- Map of case study locations

The case study selection, background, and methods are provided in Chapter Two, which also sets the stage for the remaining chapters. Chapter Three addresses questions two and four – what are the impacts of concern to stakeholders and in what ways are stakeholders considering port resilience in their plans and policies. The chapter begins with discussing the concept of impacts in the literature and describes the typology defined by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which includes direct damages, indirect costs, and intangible consequences. It goes on to detail the specific impacts noted in stakeholder interviews and a review of planning and policy documents in Gulfport. Findings suggest that many impacts result in costs to both external and internal stakeholders of the port and that many stakeholder concerns were not addressed through the formal planning and policy documents in Gulfport. Chapter Four describes findings from Providence (RI). It picks up on the themes of Chapter Three, but provides additional background on risk and vulnerability

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assessment techniques, noting that in Providence the prior assessments conducted in the State did not capture the full range of impacts that stakeholders described in interviews, nor did existing planning and policy documents. The results of interviews and document analysis suggest that there is a mismatch between stakeholder concerns and more formalized planning and policy in Providence. Results further suggest that, though the specific impacts anticipated in the two case studies are quite different, in both cases stakeholders had a higher concern for intangible consequences than any of the other types of impacts resulting from a hurricane at the port. Finally, Chapter Five addresses the question what strategies do stakeholders consider for building port resilience in the face of climate change. This chapter describes the potential resilience-building strategies that stakeholders identified in both Gulfport and Providence. Analysis indicates that the implementation of strategies may be shared amongst all sectors of the stakeholder cluster, though incentives for stakeholders to assume leadership are still unclear. The Conclusion of this dissertation summarizes the main arguments, provides discussion concerning limitations of this approach, and outlines the next steps for this work.

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Mileti DS (1999) Disasters by design: A reassessment of natural hazards in the United States. National Academy Press, Mitchell RK, Agle BR, Wood DJ (1997) Toward a theory of stakeholder identification and salience: Defining the principle of who and what really counts. Academy of management review 22 (4):853-886 Moser S (2009) Whether our levers are long enough and the fulcrum strong? Exploring the soft underbelly of adaptation decisions and actions. Adapting to climate change: Thresholds, values, governance:313-334 Moser S, Boykoff M (2013) Successful Adaptation to Climate Change: Linking Science and Policy in a Rapidly Changing World. Routledge, Moser S, Ekstrom J (2010) A framework to diagnose barriers to climate change adaptation. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 107 (51):22026 MSPA (Mississippi State Port Authority) (2005) Hurricane Katrina Damage Assessment Report. NCADAC (National Climate Assessment and Development Advisory Committee) (Draft) National Cimate Assessment. http://ncadac.globalchange.gov/. Accessed July 25 2013 Ng A, Yang Z, Cahoon S, Chen S, Becker A, Fischer M (2013a) Analyzing Risks Posed by Climate Change on Ports: A Fuzzy Approach. Paper presented at the International Association of Maritime Economists, Marseill, France, Ng AKY, Chen SL, Cahoon S, Brooks B, Yang Z (2013b) Climate change and the adaptation strategies of ports: The Australian experiences. Research in Transportation Business & Management NGIA (National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency) (2011) World Port Index, 21st Edition. http://msi.nga.mil/MSISiteContent/StaticFiles/NAV_PUBS/WPI/wpi.zip. NIAC (National Infrastructure Advisory Council) (2009) Critical Infrastructure Resilience: Final Report and Recommendations. Nicholls RJ, Hallegatte S, Corfee-Morlot J, Chateau J, Muir-Wood R, Hanson S, Herweijer C, Patmore N (2008) Ranking Port Cities with High Exposure and Vulnerability to Climate Extremes. OECD. doi:10.1787/011766488208 Notteboom T, Winkelmans W (2002) Stakeholders relations management in ports: dealing with the interplay of forces among stakeholders in a changing competitive environment. In: IAME 2002, International Association of Maritime Economists Annual Conference, Panama City, Panama, 2002. NRA (National Road Administrators) (2012) Stakeholder benefits and road intervention strategies. NRC (National Research Council) (2010) America's Climate Choices: Adapting to the Impacts of Climate Change. America's Climate Choices. Washington, DC O'Rourke TD (2007) Critical infrastructure, interdependencies, and resilience. Bridge Washington - National Academy of Engineering 37 (1):22 Oh CH, Reuveny R (2010) Climatic natural disasters, political risk, and international trade. Global Environmental Change 20 (2):243-254 Omer M, Mostashari A, Nilchiani R, Mansouri M (2012) A framework for assessing resiliency of maritime transportation systems. Maritime Policy & Management 33

39 (7). doi:10.1080/03088839.2012.689878 PANYNJ (Port Authority of New York and New Jersey) (2012) Press Release (1832012). 4 November 2012, Patt A (2013) Climate risk management: Laying the groundwork for succesful adaptation. In: Moser SC, Boykoff MT (eds) Succesful adaptation to climate change: Linking science and policy in a rapdily changing world. Routledge, London and New York, pp 186-200 PEER (Joint Legislative Committee on Performance Evaluation and Expenditure Review) (2006) The Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Mississippi’s Commercial Public Ports and Opportunities for Expansion of the Ports. http://www.peer.state.ms.us. Accessed 15 January 2013 Port of San Diego (2013) The Climate Mitigation and Adaptation Plan of the Port of San Diego. http://www.portofsandiego.org/climate-mitigation-and-adaptationplan.html. Accessed 10 June, 2013 Porter ME (1998) Competitive advantage of nations. Free press, New York, NY Poumadère M, Mays C, Pfeifle G, Vafeidis AT (2008) Worst case scenario as stakeholder decision support: a 5-to 6-m sea level rise in the Rhone delta, France. Climatic Change 91 (1-2):123-143 Preston BL, Westaway RM, Yuen EJ (2010) Climate adaptation planning in practice: an evaluation of adaptation plans from three developed nations. Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change 16 (4):407-438. doi:10.1007/s11027010-9270-x Rahmstorf S (2010) A new view on sea level rise. Nature Reports Climate Change:4445 Schaeffer M, Hare W, Rahmstorf S, Vermeer M (2012) Long-term sea-level rise implied by 1.5 degrees C and 2 degrees C warming levels. Nature Climate Change 2:867-870 Shackley S, Deanwood R (2002) Stakeholder perceptions of climate change impacts at the regional scale: implications for the effectiveness of regional and local responses. Journal of Environmental Planning and Management 45 (3):381402 Smythe T (2013) Assessing the Impacts of Hurricane Sandy on the Port of New York and New Jersey’s Maritime Responders and Response Infrastructure. Stenek V, J.C. Amado R, Connell O, Palin S, Wright B, Pope J, Hunter J, McGregor W, Morgan B, Stanley R, Washington D, Liverman H, Sherwin P, Kapelus C, Andrade J, Pabon D (2011) Climate Risk and Business: Ports. International Finance Corporation Talley WK (2009) Port economics. Routledge, NY Tebaldi C, Strauss BH, Zervas CE (2012) Modelling sea level rise impacts on storm surges along US coasts. Environmental Research Letters 7 (1):014032 Tompkins E, Few R, Brown K (2008) Scenario-based stakeholder engagement: Incorporating stakeholders preferences into coastal planning for climate change. Journal of environmental management 88 (4):1580-1592 Travis WR (2009) Going to extremes: propositions on the social response to severe climate change. Climatic Change 98 (1-2):1-19. doi:10.1007/s10584-00934

9661-8 Turner B, Kasperson RE, Matson PA, McCarthy JJ, Corell RW, Christensen L, Eckley N, Kasperson JX, Luers A, Martello ML (2003) A framework for vulnerability analysis in sustainability science. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 100 (14):8074 USCCSP (United States Climate Change Science Program) (2008) Impacts of Climate Change and Variability on Transportation Systems and Infrastructure: Gulf Coast Study, Phase I. Transportation Do. http://www.climatescience.gov/Library/sap/sap4-7/final-report/. Van Kleef E, Frewer LJ, Chryssochoidis GM, Houghton JR, Korzen-Bohr S, Krystallis T, Lassen J, Pfenning U, Rowe G (2006) Perceptions of food risk management among key stakeholders: Results from a cross-European study. Appetite 47 (1):46-63 Vermeer M, Rahmstorf S (2009) Global sea level linked to global temperature. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 106 (51):21-27 Von Storch H, Gönnert G, Meine M (2008) Storm surges—An option for Hamburg, Germany, to mitigate expected future aggravation of risk. Environmental Science & Policy 11 (8):735-742 Walker B, Salt D, Reid W (2006) Resilience thinking: sustaining ecosystems and people in a changing world. Island Press, Washington, DC Ward D (2001) Stakeholder involvement in transport planning: participation and power. Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal 19 (2):119-130 Wilbanks TJ, Kates RW (1999) Global change in local places: how scale matters. Climatic Change 43 (3):601-628 World Bank (2010) The Costs to Developing Countries of Adapting to Climate Change: New Methods and Estimates. In: Global Report of the Economics of Adaptation to Climate Change Study. The World Bank Group, Washington, DC, Yin R (2008) Case study research: Design and methods. Sage Publications, Inc, California

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CHAPTER 1 CONSIDERING CLIMATE CHANGE: A SURVEY OF GLOBAL SEAPORT ADMINISTRATORS1 INTRODUCTION The nature of their business locates seaports in one of the most vulnerable areas to climate change impacts: in coastal areas susceptible to sea-level rise (SLR) and increased storm intensity or at mouths of rivers susceptible to flooding. 90% of the world’s freight moves by ship (IMO 2008). Thus, seaports play a crucial role in the global economy as transportation hubs for the vast majority of goods transported around the world. Given shipping’s efficiencies and its smaller carbon footprint relative to other modes of transport,2 as well as forecasted increases in world freight volumes, demands on ports are likely to grow in the coming century (Transportation Institute 2008). To remain efficient and resilient, seaports must anticipate the impacts of climate change and proactively prepare for SLR, increased flooding, and more frequent extreme storm events (Hallegatte 2009; PIANC 2008; UNCTAD 2008; EPA 2008). National and international organizations have identified that climate impacts on maritime infrastructure is an area of great concern in which little work has been completed (PIANC 2008; UNCTAD 2008; USCOP 2004; EPA 2008).

1

Note: Unlike the remainder of this dissertation, I use first person plural for this chapter to acknowledge the co-authors and the IAPH and AAPA. A shorter version of this paper, without full background materials as found in appendices, has been published in the Journal of Climatic Change. Please cite as: Becker A, Inoue S, Fischer M, Schwegler B (2012) Climate change impacts on international seaports: knowledge, perceptions, and planning efforts among port administrators. Climatic Change 110 (1-2):5-29. doi:10.1007/s10584-011-0043-7

2 Carbon calculations estimate: Air cargo -- 1.7739 lbs. CO2 per ton-Mile; truck -- 0.3725 lbs. CO2 per ton-Mile; train -- 0.2306 lbs. CO2 per ton-mile; sea freight -- 0.0887 lbs. CO2 per ton-mile. See www.carbonfund.org/site/pages/carbon_calculators/category/Assumptions

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To assess the current state of knowledge, we sent surveys to 342 port authorities from around the world to ascertain how administrators feel climate change might impact their operations, what sea level change would create operational problems, and how they plan to adapt to new environmental conditions. Specifically, we aimed to discover what policies ports already have in place to address adaptation issues. 63% of the 93 respondents reported that they had at least one policy that specifically addressed potential climate change effects or that they discussed adaptation in staff meetings. We also asked questions to check whether certain categories of ports were more or less proactive. The survey responses showed few significant differences between ports of different sizes or regions, but indicated that U.S. Gulf Coast ports appeared to be the most prepared. This higher level of preparedness is probably due to the large number of recent storms in the Gulf. The design lifetime of port infrastructure is 30-50 years, but often infrastructure like roads, bridges, piers, and rail yards will last much longer (UNCTAD 1985). Much infrastructure built today will still stand as climatic conditions change over the course of the century. As these projects compete for resources with other business or community needs, long-range implications of today’s choices often have less of a sense of urgency than more immediate priorities. Our survey results indicate that capital planning cycles at ports are typically 5 to 10 years. This mismatch between planning cycles and infrastructure lifetimes may be at the root of many structural organizational difficulties in addressing this complex issue. We hope that this survey will stimulate discussion in the academic, policy, and practitioner communities about climate adaptation. Should there be a global policy to prescribe longer planning horizons than currently practiced? Or, a unified design standard storm resistance? Do we need a better database of historical storm events and their impacts in order to better understand risks and vulnerabilities? Should policies be global? By GDP? By risk of exposure to storms? How can the scientific community tailor research and communication about climate change and its likely impact to the various functions of a port? These questions and others require data that the results of

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our survey begin to provide. Results show that the world port community is very concerned with impacts of climate change, but generally feels the need for more specific information from the scientific community to make good decisions. This situation must be resolved if decisions are to be made that will protect both the port infrastructure itself and the economic systems that depend on a resilient and efficient maritime industry.

CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS ON PORTS The evidence that the climate system is warming is unequivocal. Projections of climate change suggest new problems for the world and for coastal communities in particular (IPCC 2007; GCRP 2009; EPA 2008). Coastal communities face direct threats to urban areas and indirect ramifications due to impacts of extreme events on the global economy and linked environmental ecosystems. The nature of these threats depends on how much and how quickly climate changes, what steps are taken to limit climate change, and what actions are taken to reduce vulnerabilities and increase resilience. The uncertainties in future projections, together with the potentially serious impact on the oceans, lakes, and river systems of the world, create new demands for assessing and adaptively managing risks. As noted in a recent National Academy of Sciences report, “The parameters of the new climate regime cannot be envisioned from past experience … Decision makers will need new kinds of information and new ways of thinking and learning to function effectively in a changing climate” (NRC 2009). Climate change will require adaptation strategies for waterborne commerce and coastal infrastructure, the backbone of the global market economy. Additionally, seaports are generally located in estuarine areas where fresh-water rivers meet saltwater harbors. These fragile and critical nurseries for marine life demand a high level of protection from the effects of contamination and toxic-material release. To keep this sector efficient and resilient and coastal waters free from the devastating effects of

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catastrophe-induced pollution, seaport decision-makers must anticipate the impacts of climate change and proactively prepare for SLR, increased flooding, and more frequent extreme storm events (Hallegatte 2009; PIANC 2008; Roger A. Pielke 2007; EPA 2008). Research shows that proactive adaptation to reduce vulnerabilities is far more cost-effective than mitigation or reactive strategies (Roger A. Pielke 2007; Stern and Britain 2006). Current forecasts range from one-half to two meters of SLR by 2100 and project an overall shift toward meteorological instability including changes in storm frequency and intensity (IPCC 2007; Nicholls 2007; Rahmstorf 2007). One recent study projects a doubling of category four and five hurricanes in the Atlantic basin by 2100 (Bender et al. 2010). Other climate change impacts include temperature extremes that could affect how cargo is handled (i.e., more refrigeration or air-conditioning units may be needed). More extreme precipitation events could cause localized flooding and changes to sedimentation loading that could increase dredging requirements. SLR, storms, and flooding create interruptions and bottlenecks in the flow of products through ports and, as witnessed in Hurricane Katrina, can devastate a regional economy and environment for months or even years after an event and have national impacts (Esteban et al. 2009; Hallegatte 2008). That storm caused $1.7B of damage to southern Louisiana ports and over 200 onshore releases of hazardous chemicals or petroleum products (Santella et al. 2010). Port shutdowns in Mississippi impacted commerce in 30 states (PEER 2006). The Port of Gulfport, for example, experienced total devastation. Containers from the terminals washed up throughout the downtown area. Piers and warehouses were destroyed. Customers relocated and five years later the port operates at 80% of its pre-Katrina volume. Gulfport now plans to build new facilities at 25’ above base-flood elevation. In another event, Hurricane Ike caused $2.4B of damage to Texas ports and waterways (FEMA 2008). In recent decades, an average of 130 ports were hit or brushed by a tropical cyclone each year (Figure 1-1).

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Figure 1-1 -- Map of tropical storm tracks 1990-2008

In a 2007 study, Nicholls et al. analyzed 136 port cities around the world to quantify current and future exposure to a 1-in-100 year flooding event. Their findings suggest that many of these areas have significant percentages of their GDP in areas that are at high risk today and climate change will increase that risk significantly. By 2070, for example, the combined effect of climate change, urbanization, increased population, and land subsidence could put 150-million people and U.S. $35,000 billion (9% of projected global GDP) of assets at direct risk (Nicholls 2007). Though their study focused on port cities, as opposed to the ports themselves, the results indicate the urgency of climate-change adaptation for the ports that are economic engines for these regions. Even outside of catastrophic damages, ports can expect downtime to increase with climate change. Larger storms in Japan, for example, could lead to more port shutdowns. Esteban (2009) shows that without taking proactive steps toward adaptation, the increased frequency of wind events could reduce the potential Japanese GDP by between 1.5 and 3.4% by 2085. Hallegate (2007) looked more specifically at the impact of hurricane intensity and found that just a 10% increase in storm intensity would increase annual hurricane damages in the U.S. by 54%, from $8 billion to $12 billion per year. Another recent study found that surrounding port lands at 35 of 44 40

Caribbean ports would be inundated by 1m of SLR, unless protected by new coastal structures (Simpson et al. 2010). Climate change will disproportionately affect ports and port-based economies, depending on their geographic location and the adaptive capacities of the ports themselves and the communities in which they are located. For example, ports in lowlying areas in a hurricane belt will face different physical challenges than those on emergent coastlines far removed from storm-impact belts. Ports in developing nations will have a different suite of options available to them than those in developed nations (Dasgupta et al. 2008; Nicholls 2007). Ports located in estuaries that provide nursery environments for marine life have an even greater responsibility to protect coastal waters. The complexity and potential risks require the scientific community, policy makers, and the port authorities themselves to take an active role to understand better when and how to implement proactive adaptation strategies. Ports fulfill a wide variety of functions for the local, regional, and global economy. They provide jobs, they facilitate trade, and they serve as critical links between the hinterlands (region from which goods come from) and the forelands (the region to which goods are destined). Ports range in specialization from massive container ports (i.e., Los Angeles/Long Beach), to small niche ports that serve one type of freight (e.g., petroleum, coal, grain, or fishing) (Hoyle and Knowles 1992). Ports can be categorized in numerous ways, but ultimately are difficult to compare. Size may be measured by throughput, cargo value, land footprint, or other measures. Similarly, operation and ownership vary widely from port to port, with some being fully privatized and others being entirely public entities. Ports generally fall into one of four categories in terms of operations and management. Service ports are predominantly public. Generally a port authority owns the land and all assets and manages all cargo handling operations. The tool port divides responsibility between the port authority, which owns and maintains the infrastructure, and private firms, which handle the cargo. In a landlord port, the port authority owns the land and infrastructure, but leases it to private operating companies. Finally, the private service 41

port is entirely owned and operated within the private sector (Brooks 2004). Since 2006 the International Association of Ports and Harbors (IAPH) and the American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA) have placed climate change high on their agendas. The IAPH has been working mostly on projects to mitigate climate change, such as the development of the IAPH Tool Box for Port Clean Air Programs and ISO/IEC technical standards for on-shore power supply. The IAPH launched the World Ports Climate Initiative (WPCI) in 2008. Presently, seven WPCI projects are in progress, all of which aim to reduce CO2 emissions from port-related activities.3 In 2009, the IAPH tasked a technical committee to study adaptation measures to help ports prepare for risks of climate change. A technical report on the subject is expected sometime in 2011. The AAPA also has focused on the mitigation of climate change. One recent conference showcased numerous efforts by many ports to reduce emissions by electrifying trucks and cranes and installing on-shore power supply to ships, thus reducing emissions from shipboard power plants while in port (AAPA 2010). However, as found in a recent United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) report on climate impacts on seaports, “most [US] ports do not appear to be thinking about, let alone actively preparing to address, the effects of climate change” (EPA 2008). To meet these challenges, decision makers must understand the nature of the problem, how it will impact local conditions, and what options may be considered. Policy makers, insurers, the international community, and the ports themselves will all play a role.

RELATED SURVEY RESEARCH We believe this is the first survey to address this sector of the global economy on climate change adaptation. We hope it can serve as a model for studying seaports and

3 See http://www.wpci.nl/home/index.php.

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other economic sectors such as airports, energy infrastructure, and intermodal freight systems. At least two similar surveys have been conducted on a smaller scale. A group from Texas A&M conducted a survey in 2005 and 2006 entitled, “Port Planning and Views on Climate Change.” The survey focused on the central question, “Is planning for climate change on the radar screen of the U.S. seaport industry?” This survey targeted only U.S. ports and found that about half of the 27 respondents felt climate change would affect their ports. Of those, a slight majority was taking at least initial steps to plan for it (Bierling and Lorente 2008). The State of California conducted a survey of its major coastal facilities. Results indicate that marine facilities in California are generally not considering climate change or SLR, which is projected to reach 1.4 meters in the State by 2100 (CSLC 2009). Another survey focusing on coastal managers in California found similar results (Moser and Tribbia 2006). Other surveys have been conducted to ascertain perceptions amongst wider audiences with regard to climate change (Leiserowitz 2008). Our survey focused on how port administrators are treating climate adaptation at their port, as opposed to the level of belief they had in the issues or the accuracy of their knowledge about climate science.

METHODS

SURVEY PURPOSE In developing next steps to address the needs of the ports community, ground truthing assumptions can help focus further research efforts. As a first step toward this goal and to ascertain if/how port authorities plan to adapt to climate change impacts on operations, this exploratory survey ascertained current perceptions and strategies around the impacts of climate change on future international port operations. We set out to address the following questions: 1. What are ports’ planning horizons in terms of infrastructure development, timelines, and incorporating climate changes?

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2. What assumptions are they basing long-range plans upon? How is climate change discussed at the port and amongst the port community? 3. What do port directors think the local and regional impacts will be? What types and scale of changes in this century would be problematic to their operations? The survey focused primarily on adaptation issues for ports. It was explained in the survey instrument itself that mitigation refers to ways a port might reduce its impact on climate change through reducing CO2 emissions, while adaptation refers to how a port might adapt to anticipate the impacts of climate change such as SLR and storm surges.

SAMPLE The survey targeted a wide variety of port authorities in an attempt to sample ports in developing and developed nations, and ports in geographic areas with varying amounts of risk to ocean storms. It is difficult to generate a precise count of ports in the world. Marinas, fishing harbors, jetties, river ports, and others could all be considered “ports.” As of 2010, the database “WorldPortSource” contained 4,235 entries from 195 countries. We focus only on those ports that are engaged in facilitating the transport of cargo. WorldPortSource included 1,056 entries as “seaports” ranging in size from “small” to “deep-water.” This database includes inland ports, like those on the Great Lakes, in the seaport category. Though we first attempted to generate contact emails from a sampling of these 1,056 ports, this task proved to be wrought with difficulties. Identifying the appropriate ports, locating email addresses for port directors, and concerns with language limitations led to a refinement of the sample to the membership of two leading port organizations. The IAPH and AAPA memberships together represent 342 ports from around the world which are likely the largest and most important ports in terms of global marine commerce. IAPH, for instance, represents only a small part of the world’s ports, with its membership being 208 ports from 90 countries, yet its member ports combined

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handle more than 60% of the world maritime cargo and 90% of the world container traffic. The IAPH is recognized as the only international organization representing the voice of the world port industry. It was granted Consultative Status as Nongovernmental Organization from five United Nations specialized agencies and one intergovernmental body (IAPH 2010). Most ports that play a critical role in international trade and are interested in global issues are likely to be members of one or both of these groups. Additionally, this sampling approach makes the results more useful to the individual organizations and their members and improved the response rate.

THE SURVEY TOOL The online survey was designed with input from the two port associations. The 30 questions were easy to complete and appropriate for an international audience that speaks and reads English. Representatives from the Environmental and Engineering Committees of the AAPA, as well as from the IAPH, the World Port Climate Initiative (WPCI), and others reviewed and pretested the survey tool. This helped insure that the questions and response options were easily understood and the questions were appropriate for the audience. The survey should have taken about 10-15 minutes for most respondents. Questions covered four categories. “Port Planning Horizons” asked questions about plans for expansion, length of planning frames, and how climate change adaptation and storm impacts are addressed in long-range plans. “Climate Change Information” explored how respondents treat the topic of climate change in their community. For example, one question asked how frequently climate change adaption is discussed in staff meetings, either formally or informally. “Local and Regional Climate Change” asked questions about respondents’ perceptions of climate impacts in their regional context. These questions asked about specific impacts, like how often flooding is already a problem, as well as thoughts on how much SLR could be a problem in the future. Finally, a section on “Port Characteristics” ascertained some basic information 45

about size, location, and types of cargo handled at each port. The full survey may be found in Appendix I.

DISTRIBUTION AND RESPONSES The survey was distributed by the AAPA and IAPH to member ports in August 2009 online through Survey Monkey, a web-based software product designed for conducting surveys through the Internet. Survey Monkey allowed for wide distribution at low cost. Port directors were invited to participate in a letter from the AAPA and IAPH (see Figure 1-2). AAPA’s membership included 160 ports and IAPH membership represented 208 ports. There was some overlap, as some ports were members of both organizations, though this was minimal. We received 108 responses to the survey, 93 of which were usable. We deemed responses with no questions answered and completed surveys that appeared to be exact duplicates of one another to be unusable. We retained and included in our analysis answers from partiallycompleted surveys. Non-response was an issue, though response was more than adequate for the purposes of an initial survey (Alreck and Settle 1995). Non-response may have a number of causes. Port directors are very busy. They may not see climate change as an area of concern. Language barriers may also have been an issue. Though most member ports use English, some may have been reluctant to fill out a survey written in English if it was not their first language. Response rate was likely improved by obtaining the endorsement of the AAPA and IAPH port organizations and having invitations to participate sent out ahead of time. Reminding participants that the results would be used to determine international research agendas also helped. The original response deadline was extended and numerous reminders were emailed to ports by both organizations.

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OVERVIEW OF RESPONSES AND PORT CHARACTERISTICS

Figure 1-2 -- Map of survey respondents

Ninety-three port directors, engineers, environmental managers, and planners representing 89 ports responded to the survey giving a broad picture of the current state of the world’s ports with respect to climate change (Table 1-1). In four cases, multiple respondents responded on behalf of a single port. These were retained as unique responses and the analysis was conducted using all 93 responses. The ports themselves were binned into a variety of categories for some parts of the analysis. Ports were assigned to a region based on the UN’s definition of macro-regions (UNSD (United Nations Statistics Division) 2009). In the UN framework, North America and Latin America & Caribbean are together in the macro-region “Americas,” but since the majority of survey responses came from North America, the two sub-regions were treated distinctly in this analysis as “North America” and “Latin America/Caribbean.”

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Table 1-1 – Table of respondent membership and region

Region

World ports*

IAPH/

% Member of

AAPA

IAPH/

Member

AAPA

Respondents as # of

% of

Respondents as % of

Respondents

IAPH/AAPA

world ports

membership

Oceania

43

10

23%

4

40%

9%

Africa

82

19

23%

5

26%

6%

101

61

60%

7

11%

7%

Europe

274

51

19%

17

33%

6%

Asia

394

104

26%

17

16%

4%

155

97

63%

43

44%

28%

1049

342

33%

93

27%

9%

Latin America/Car ibbean

North America Total

*World ports from www.worldportsource.com database

The IAPH and AAPA emailed the survey link to the port director of each member

port, as the knowledge and perceptions of the port director serve as a reliable indicator of how seriously the port staff as a whole considers these issues. Though there may be others at the port with a deeper understanding or different perspective, ultimately the port director generally makes the final decision on long-term strategic plans (Mike Christensen, personal communication, February 2009). Although we hoped that the port director would answer the survey personally, responses were accepted from any staff member deemed appropriate by the director. Thus, actual responses were received from various departments within the port. The largest response categories were Port Director (26%) and Environmental Team (23%). Engineers, policy makers, safety department, and planners made up the remainder of the respondent roles. Respondents were fairly seasoned and 53% had over 16 years of experience in the maritime industries. We divided ports into categories based on ownership and operations. There is no established and universally accepted framework for port classification, so two questions were designed that follow often-used conventions (Bichou and Gray 2005). The first question asked how ports were owned and operated, with 50% reporting as public, 42% as public/private, and 5% as private only. The second question classified 48

ports as landlord, tool, service/operating, and private. 41% of respondents identified as “Landlord Ports,” that is, they are port-authority owned, but terminals are operated by private leaseholders. 15% identified as “Service/Operating Ports” in which terminals are owned and operated by a public port authority. 22% were “Tool Ports” in which infrastructure and superstructure is publicly owned, but cargo is handled through private operators. 5% were fully privatized and the remainder did not answer this question. Since proximity to ocean storms or coastal areas might influence preparation, attitudes and plans for climate change, we categorized ports as “within a storm belt” and “outside of a storm belt.” These factors were teased out of the data through a GIS analysis and a question about port location with respect to sea routes.4 44% were located in an area that has been within 150km of a hurricane, cyclone, or typhoon in the past 150 years. Finally, ports were divided into categories based on their geomorphology. Some ports are on rivers or lakes and others are exposed to open ocean. Of those that answered a question about their location with respect to the coast, 84% reported to be within 50km of the coast. So, most will therefore see some impacts from SLR and storm surge.

RESULTS Results describe how port authorities were considering adaptation strategies, what science they considered for their long-range plans, and the information they found necessary to plan for facility maintenance and growth, while addressing likely climate change impacts in the coming century. We will first provide an overview of the responses and characteristics of the ports surveyed. Next we will discuss port-planning horizons and climate change planning that is currently being implemented or considered at ports. Finally, we will discuss respondents’ attitudes and perceptions about climate change adaptation. Generally, we found that most results showed little 4

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variation between regions. We note the regional differences, where we found them (See Appendix I). Many respondents were considering, or at least discussing, climate change impacts. We assessed how ports discussed adaptation and mitigation measures within their organization by asking how often the topics came up in staff meetings (Figure 1-3). Respondents reported a higher frequency of mitigation meetings over adaptation meetings. Those who reported meetings that focused exclusively on mitigation also had meetings exclusively dedicated to adaptation. However, outside of the 8 respondents that fell on the extremes (frequent or never discussed), most reported that they did not discuss either topic with much frequency.

Figure 1-3 -- Climate change discussions at staff meetings

When answers were analyzed by region, distance to storm belts, and proximity to the coast, no clear pattern emerged that indicates ports were discussing the issue of adaptation differently. However, privatized ports and tool ports appeared to be discussing these issues less frequently, as did Asian and European ports when 50

compared to those from other regions. To establish a general sense of how ports plan for future expansion and development of their infrastructure and cargo-handling facilities, we asked about planning horizons and specific plans for future projects. Though, of course there are various “planning horizons” for different types of projects and outcomes, the survey asked specifically about plans for capital improvements, expansion, and maintenance. We found that most ports plan on a 5-10 year horizon Figure 1-4) and the majority are planning for some level of expansion of their facilities.

Figure 1-4 -- Ports' planning horizons in years

Those with planned projects indicated that most plans were for more terminals and berths or for land acquisition (Figure 1-5). Only a small percentage of ports have upcoming projects like new breakwaters or storm barriers that would increase their defenses against flooding and wave damage. The specific risks associated with climate change are no different in nature than historic risks. Most ports face some amount of wind, wave, and flooding risk already and have already built infrastructure to protect port operations. However, the degree of risk will likely change as storms become more intense and sea levels rise. Only three ports (3.2%) planned to build only protective structures. 22% had no plans

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to develop within the next 10 years.

Figure 1-5 -- Expansion and improvement plans

Since most respondents represent ports that are in coastal areas prone to storm events, they will likely design new structures with a particular extreme event threshold in mind. Survey results indicate that most ports in Europe, North America, and Oceania followed this 100-year return period planning standard (Figure 1-6). This means that a structure will be designed to withstand a storm that has a one-percent chance of occurring in any given year. However, 30% of Asian ports and 43% of ports in Central/South America planned with the most recent storm in mind. A few ports planned for a much longer return period, with one port answering that they planned for a 1-in-1000 year storm event. It should be noted that storm forces are different in different areas of the world. For example, a 1-in-1000 year event in the Netherlands has roughly the same forces as a 1-in-100 year event in New Orleans. Thus, there is no universal storm period standard for designing structures to withstand storm events and it may not be feasible for all areas to implement such a high standard as the 1–in– 1000-year event (Peter Wijsman, personal communication, May 15, 2009).

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% with construction plans (n=93)

Design standards and new construction plans in the next 10 years*

80%

Design standard used

70%

Better than 100-‐year historic Xlood event

60%

100-‐year historic Xlood event

50% 40%

Less than 100-‐year historic Xlood event

30%

Not sure/no answer

20% 10%

Does not consider historic storm events

0%

Figure 1-6 -- Design standards and construction plans for all respondents

The survey also asked how respondents thought about impacts on their port facilities and what measures they already had in place to address climate change concerns (Figure 1-7). The first closed-answer question asked which issues are currently considered at the port with respect to climate change. We generated the list to cover issues that we expected some ports to already have begun to address with input from the IAPH and AAPA. The majority (57%) considered air pollution/air quality issues and 47% thought about potential impacts on the surrounding community and environment. These two concerns fall on the “mitigation” side of climate change issues and indicate that about half of the ports have already started to consider ways to 53

address their contributions to climate change. The longer-term ramifications of climate change, such as market shifts or equipment needs, were generally not being considered at the time of the survey. These could be considered to fall more on the “adaptation” side of climate change.

Figure 1-7 -- Climate change considerations

To get a better sense of what policies had already been actually implemented at the port, we developed a list of seven policies that we felt might reasonably have been adopted. We combined the answers from these two questions to sum up the “climate change related policies in place” shown in Figure 1-8 below. Many respondents either did not know or said they were not addressing these issues at this time (47%). When asked about protective measures currently in place at the port, we found only 22% of respondents have a storm plan in place and only 23% carried specific storm insurance. We found no correlation between a port’s location relative to the storm belt and its

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plans to develop new protective structures in the next 10 years, nor between insurance coverage and protection plans.

Climate adaptation policies in place Has speciXic climate-‐change (CC) planning Adaptation funded as a line item in the Other climate change adaptation policy Climate change addressed in port strategic Carries speciXic climate change insurance Climate change part of design guidelines or Holds regular staff meetings to discuss 0

20

40

60

% with policy (n = 93)

Figure 1-8 -- Climate change policies in place

To make some comparisons, we developed a rough scoring system based on the answers to questions about policies in place and frequency of staff meetings devoted to climate change adaptation. We assigned a point for each answer selected from the list of choices and tallied the points for each port. The highest “score” was a five, meaning that the respondent indicated that the port had five of the potential seven options in place. The lowest score was a zero and the mean for all ports was 1.18 (1.24 standard deviation). Although this scoring system is not perfect, it enables us to make some rough comparisons between ports. We compared ports by size, World Bank status, location, and other categorizations. Figure 1-9 shows this analysis, with the number of ports in each category indicated in parenthesis and the average score indicated on the y-axis. Most comparisons showed little or no significant difference. However, ports that carried standard insurance averaged 1.5 points, a bit higher than those that were self-insured (1.17), carried co-op insurance (0.7), or carried no insurance at all (1.3). Geographically, ports located in high-income nations averaged 1.3, 1.0 in upper and middle-upper income averaged 1.0, 0.75 in low income (0.75), 55

and 0.5 in lower-middle income nations. Number of responses for each category indicated by number in parenthesis. Score indicated on vertical axis.

N = 93 Max score = 5 Min score = 0 Mean score = 1.18 Std. Dev = 1.24 Figure 1-9 -- Adaptation scores by category

This scoring system offers insights into how ports compare relative to current climate preparation. In most cases, scores were within a standard deviation (SD = 1.24) of each other. Our finding that high-income nations have more policies in place could be 56

an initial step in discovering which ports have already thought about adaption problems and could provide models for those wishing to develop similar programs. Additionally, further investigation should be directed at the difference we found between ports with standard insurance versus ports with other types of insurance in place. Perhaps, for example, insurance companies are requiring ports to implement new policies. The highest scoring category was Gulf Coast Ports (with an average score of 2). Gulf Coast Ports have faced numerous hurricanes in the past decade. Land subsidence is also considerably greater on the Gulf Coast. These factors may contribute to the higher scores of these ports.

CLIMATE CHANGE PERCEPTIONS AND ATTITUDE An open-ended question asked respondents to list the top three impacts climate change might have on their port’s operations. This question was designed to elicit a wide range of responses, both positive and negative. The “word cloud” (Figure 1-10) represents the number of times a particular concern was listed by the size of the font. The more often a concern was listed, the larger the font.

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Larger font indicates response was listed with higher frequency. www.wordle.net

Figure 1-10 -- Top three concerns about climate change

SLR was the chief concern among respondents. It was listed 27 times. Other impacts of note included storms, flooding, shifts in markets, wave and wind impacts, environmental regulations, and dredging. Given the average score of 1.18 climate policies in place, we were surprised at the level of concern for SLR and storm related issues. When respondents were asked if they felt “informed” about climate change, the majority (66%) answered negatively. “Informed” of course, is subjective, so this question was designed to assess the respondents’ own perception of their knowledge around the issues. On a department or job function level, respondents who were planners tended to feel the most informed about climate change (60% of planners), while other departments either did not feel informed at all (marketing, public relations and policy departments) or only about a third of respondents felt informed (CEO/port directors, operations, safety/security, environmental departments).

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While it is telling to see how respondents felt about their own knowledge, it is also revealing to see that most respondents considered climate change adaptation to be an important topic that they should know more about. 86% of respondents agreed that, “climate change should be addressed by the ports community as a whole”. The few minor exceptions were from engineers (29% disagreed), CEOs (24% disagreed), and environmental managers (17% disagreed). We also asked respondents their opinions about climate change and how it might impact their port. Interestingly, about half thought climate change would bring new opportunities. The open-ended responses represented in Figure 1-10 give some indication of the types of opportunities: changes to sea routes and shifts from landborne to sea-borne freight movement. 42% of respondents foresaw direct negative consequences and 67% felt that the ports community has a role to play in reducing emissions. As represented in Figure 1-10, respondents were very concerned about SLR. We asked two questions specifically about SLR. The first asked how much rise was expected by 2100. The second asked how much SLR would be a problem if no new protections were built. 38% expected a SLR of 0.5-1m by 2100 and 15% expected 1m or more. When asked what would be a problem, 39% felt that .5m – 1m would be a problem, 58% felt that 1m-2m would be a problem, and 83% felt that over 2m would be a problem (Figure 1-11). While most respondents were concerned with a rise in sea level, those from the Great Lakes were very concerned with a drop in lake water levels. The two sets of figures were compared to reveal that 69% felt their port would be able to handle the rise expected at their port without building additional protections.

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Figure 1-11 -- Sea level rise expectations and concern

46% of respondents who thought SLR would not be a problem at their port cited “SLR” as one of their three top concerns. Maybe respondents were not confident in their estimations of SLR, or perhaps their concern is only with a rise that occurs beyond 2100. This contradiction indicates that more research is needed to help develop local projections for SLR. Most models are global in scale and utilize the “bathtub approach” of adding a uniform rise to all coastal areas (Bernstein et al. 2007). SLR and storm surges, however, will result in different threats to different areas (Mearns et al. 1999). Local SLR will vary with ocean circulation patterns, gravitational effects, land subsidence and other factors. Further knowledge would help seaport decision makers prepare their ports better for the rise expected in their region. Figure 1-12 illustrates the concern about SLR, as revealed in the survey, against a variety of projections for SLR based on different emissions scenarios. The various scenarios show a range of .8 to 1.8 meters of rise projected by 2100 (Vermeer and Rahmstorf 2009). At the 2060 mark, 39% of ports would have a problem if the projections follow the mid to upper curve. The red dashed line at the bottom shows the 60

typical lifespan of infrastructure that is built today.

58%$of$ports$feel$they$would$have$a$problem$

39%$of$ports$feel$they$would$have$a$problem$

12%$of$ports$feel$they$would$have$a$problem$ 2010$

2060$

2085$

Expected$life$of$infrastructure$(50B100$years+)$

Vermeer M , Rahmstorf S PNAS 2009;106:21527-21532

Figure 1-12 -- SLR concern as compared with SLR projections

Respondents were asked who at their port knows the most about climate change adaption. The answers to this question give a sense of where the responsibility for climate change planning probably lies. Although climate change mitigation would most logically lie with the environmental departments, adaptation might fall to the engineers, the environmental team, the planning departments, or not have a clear leader. About a third felt that the environmental planner knew the most, closely followed by the chief engineer and port director. With a few exceptions noted above, we found no significant difference in responses to perceptions and attitude questions between ports in and out of storm belts, or those close and far from the coast.

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DISCUSSION

LIMITATIONS OF APPROACH We believe that this was the first international survey of port authorities with respect to climate change adaptation. As such, there was no model upon which to base the current study. We limited our sample ports to members of the two leading port organizations. Within this sample frame, 26% of ports responded. This gives a good indication of how IAPH and AAPA members consider the issues, but leaves out many ports that are not members. Additionally, ports that responded may be more interested in climate change than ports that did not respond. As such, responses may be skewed toward port directors who are already concerned with these issues. We designed the survey with the port director in mind, realizing that the task of responding to the survey might be passed on to another employee at the port. The survey could not be designed in a way that would be ideal for an engineer, an environmental manager, a planner, and any others who might end up filling it out. The survey ascertained perceptions, not actual knowledge of climate change. Although a broader sample would provide interesting results for comparison, we feel that this survey helps ground future research, identifying some key concerns, and verifying a clear need for more work in this area. We also note that ports themselves are but one actor in a system of diverse actors that will need to collaborate to meet the challenges of climate change impacts. As such, similar surveys of port engineers, port regulators, port insurers, and other stakeholders would give a better-rounded overview of the range of concerns and perceptions that ought to be considered with respect to seaports.

IMPLEMENTING CHANGE AT THE SEAPORT LEVEL The results of the survey show climate change adaptation as an issue of concern to the ports community. Of the 73 respondents with an opinion on the matter, 53% felt that 62

climate change would have negative consequences on their operations. 86% (of 88 respondents) agreed that the port community needs to better understand how to address these issues. Although some ports have begun to create or implement new policies, the majority has not. The port community has already taken steps to address the “mitigation” side of climate change, but has not yet begun to consider the implications of climate change on their own continuing operations. Many ports are actively working to reduce the impact of their operations on CO2 emissions. Both IAPH and the AAPA have sponsored workshops to help their members proactively respond to new regulatory changes that will require cleaner, greener operations. A 2008 AAPA ‘Climate Change Workshop,’ for example, focused on cutting greenhouse emissions and new regulations (AAPA 2008). The IAPH reports that its Port Planning and Development Committee will begin to explore the topic of adaptation in the coming two-years (Fer Van de Lar, personal communication, 2009). Given the uncertainties in the scientific models with regard to SLR and future storm event trends, it is not surprising that ports are not yet fully considering these impacts on their own operations. It is in each port’s own selfinterest to protect its operations if severe impacts are forecast for its given region. At this early stage of adaptation, ports around the world can work together to address impacts of climate change. IAPH launched the WPCI last year to urge ports to address mitigation and share their experiences among ports. A logical next step would be for WPCI to cover both mitigation and adaptation of climate change. Ports are expanding and building new infrastructure. For example, about 69% of the ports surveyed say they will complete some major infrastructure project within five years. 75% of ports are designing these projects for the 1-in-100 year storm event. These projects are often on a large scale and incorporate a design life of several decades. Climate change is likely to make the 1-in-100 year storm event occur with much higher frequency and potentially greater strength, making the 1-in-100 year storm design inadequate for the life of this new infrastructure. As an initial step, the 78% of respondents that indicated they did not have a storm response plan should

63

assess their specific needs in this area and create appropriate response plans. And, if it is indeed the case that storm damages are not covered under 77% of respondents’ port insurance policies, those policies should be reviewed and revised if necessary. These results highlight one of the most challenging aspects of planning for climate change. Given that the capital-facilities planning horizon is short relative to the most widely accepted predictions of sea level change, the rational planning solution is to omit sea-level change as a major driver of those plans. However, we see a significant opportunity to develop incremental strategies that do not inadvertently complicate or prevent future planning for climate change. Planning for climate change demands a rethinking of a variety of paradigms. Impacts will occur beyond infrastructure design life and beyond the length of the average port administrator’s career. In addition, uncertainty will always be an element that needs to be addressed through planning. Historical data are no longer adequate when planning for the coming century.

PUBLIC POLICY 92% of ports represented in these results were public or public/private entities. Many are owned or operated by government port authorities. Since ports serve a critical role in the local, regional, and global economy, there is a high societal demand that ports remain efficient and functional in the coming century. Additionally, extreme events lead to devastating consequences for the surrounding environment. Petroleum, chemicals, or other cargo stored at a port can end up in the surrounding estuary when a port is inundated by flood. A rise in sea level also affects littoral drift and sedimentation patterns around a port, making its channel and basins unstable in depth and configuration. Hinterland transportation and intermodal systems could also be seriously affected. Policy makers take responsibility for protecting the public interest in a functioning economy and a healthy environment. Adaptation cannot be left to the ports themselves to implement alone. New policy on a local level could require ports to enhance resilience by engineering protective structures, elevating storage of pollutants, or simply creating better storm preparation strategies. In the case of 64

extreme SLR, it might be necessary to relocate port facilities or even whole port cities. On a national level, funding will be required to assist ports in making necessary improvements. Because ports tend to operate on relatively short time horizons, policy makers need to ensure that the long-term measures for resilience are implemented. Assistance can be provided through, for example, the regulation of setbacks, design standards, and insurance requirements.

INTERNATIONAL AID Both developed and developing nations face high risks from climate impacts. However, developing nations generally lack the same levels of adaptive capacity that richer countries enjoy. As the World Bank recently reported, adaptation costs of developing countries alone are estimated to be between $75 billion and $100 billion a year from 2010 to 2050, even if global warming is limited to around 2°C (World Bank 2009). Low adaptive capacity of developing countries is likely to impose a serious burden for these countries’ economies and trade. Ports in developing countries require international technical and financial assistance to implement proactive adaptation strategies that ultimately protect the global economy and environment. As evidenced by the scoring system outlined above, ports in low or lower-middle income countries had fewer climate policies in place at the time of the survey. This is an opportunity for ports in higher-income countries to share some of their climate planning tools and knowledge with those who have not yet taken steps toward adaptation. Organizations like the AAPA and IAPH could serve as appropriate facilitators for this kind of knowledge sharing. Additionally, guidelines for the development of National Adaptation Plans of Action, required for least developed nations to be eligible for certain UN funding, could specifically address strategies for building resilience.

DIRECTION FOR FUTURE RESEARCH Results of this survey point to common ground, common terminology, and a starting point to help ports begin to create strategies to become more resilient in the coming 65

decades. There are a number of opportunities for the scientific community and the ports community to engage in information sharing. It is striking to note that the vast majority of ports considered climate change adaptation to be something that the ports community should address and yet only 34% felt sufficiently informed. Scientific information on localized impacts of climate change is still quite limited. For instance, any reliable prediction of SLR for a specific port or coast cannot be found today. The same applies to local temperatures and storm patterns. Without scientific information, it is difficult for decision makers to take any specific action beyond raising awareness. Given the difficulties of accurately predicting localized impacts of climate change, we consider it practical to embark on a risk-analysis approach to climate change. With the current level of port/coastal engineering knowledge and technical methodology, it is possible to simulate different scenarios of likely impacts to identify how vulnerable a port is to such risks. However, a port should be able to predict fairly accurately what will happen to it with different scenarios of climate change risks. It should then be able to study alternative measures to cope with predicted impacts and develop its own strategic long-term program to prepare for climate change. Drawing the explicit link between a port’s planning and operating assumptions, the state of climate science, and the port-community’s awareness of this science highlights the need for finer granularity in climate models. On a global scale, most ports are in the beginning stages of considering adaptation to climate change. There is an opportunity for the scientific community to engage with this sector to create the knowledge base needed to understand and improve the resilience and efficiency in the coming century. Finally, the insurance sector must play a role in building resilience. We have found that this area is much more complicated than anticipated. Our survey question about insurance policies in place may have been a difficult one to answer. There is a wide range of insurance policies that govern and shoulder the risk to the “port.” The cargo, the port employees, the various shippers, the infrastructure, and many other facets of port operations often carry different types of insurance from different firms. Insurers and reinsurers can incentivize risk-reducing strategies in advance of climate change

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impacts. The insurance industry itself has argued that it is “moving from being a passive climate change sufferer that has to sustain some very expensive consequences to becoming a proactive shaper of the future” (Geneva Association 2009).

CONCLUSION This paper presented the results of a survey to answer the following four broad questions. 1) What are the characteristics of the ports and respondents? Based on these characteristics, how might we begin to divide ports into different categories of risk and vulnerability? Results of the survey show only small differences in adaptation planning for ports across the world. In general, most ports had made few preparations for climate change. For most units of analysis, adaptation scores were very similar, with an average number of 1.18 policies per port. There were a few minor exceptions. For example, ports carrying standard insurance policies tended to have slightly more climate change policies in place. World Bank status was a good indicator of preparation, as ports in developed (high and middle income) countries had more climate change policies in place than those in developing (lower and lower-middle income) countries. We also found that within the US, ports in the Gulf Coast were better prepared than those in other regions of the US. As storm patterns change, ports that are in or near a storm belt will face more damages than those outside of a belt. We expected to find ports closer to storm belts having a higher level of preparedness. However, results show very little difference between these ports and others that are not near a storm belt. Likewise, we expected to find that ports influenced by tides, which face additional risks from SLR, would have more policies in place. Again, the survey results did not bear this out. We did, however, find that ports on the Great Lakes were quite concerned with dropping lake levels and how new conditions would impact dredging schedules and navigation.

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2) What are ports’ planning horizons in terms of infrastructure development, timelines, and responding to climate changes? Ports are rapidly expanding. Almost all respondents were in the process of developing new infrastructure within the next five years. Most were not planning for climate change and have few policies in place that specifically address climate change adaptation. The American Continental regions reported the most policies already in place. 3) Upon what assumptions are ports basing long-range plans? How is climate change discussed at the port and amongst the port community? Though building infrastructure that will last for many decades, most ports’ planning horizons were less than 10 years. Planning today should consider the possible impacts of SLR, increased flooding, and more intense hurricanes and cyclones. Designing infrastructure for an historical 100-year storm return period may no longer be appropriate. In general, ports were not discussing adaptation to climate change in staff meetings or in the ports community as a whole. The vast majority felt under-informed, but also felt that this is an important issue for their community. 4) What do port directors think the local and regional impacts will be? What climate changes would be problematic to their operations? Respondents reported concerns with SLR, increases in storm events, waves, flooding, and other damages to their operations. Although SLR was noted as a top concern, most respondents also felt that their ports were adequately protected from the rise they expect to see in the next 100 years. Climate change requires the ports community to come together to find solutions to complex problems. It is not only the port administrators who must take responsibility. Policy makers on every level, insurers, and NGOs need to find ways to share information and collaborate in creating a more resilient port system for the coming

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century. The results from this survey will be used in on-going research to better quantify the challenges seaports face due to climate change impacts, the adaptation strategy options they may employ, and the potential policy responses that may be designed to promote resilient ports. Though 2100 may feel like the distant future, adapting to climate change requires informed planning and a better understanding of when ports should begin implementing proactive adaptation strategies.

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the USEPA. Esteban M, Webersick C, Shibayama T (2009) Estimation of the economic costs of non adapting Japanese port infrastructure to a potential increase in tropical cyclone intensity. IOP Conference Series: Earth and Environmental Science 6 (32):322003. doi:10.1088/1755-1307/6/2/322003 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) (2008) Hurricane Ike Impact Report. Washington, DC GCRP (United States Global Change Research Program) (2009) Global Climate Change Impacts in the United States. Cambridge University Press, http://www.globalchange.gov/publications/reports/scientific-assessments/usimpacts,Accessed January 1, 2009 Geneva Association (2009) The insurance industry and climate change – Contribution to the global debate. The Geneva Reports - Risk and Insurance Research No. 2. . The Geneva Association (The International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics), Geneva, Switzerland Hallegatte S (2007) The use of synthetic hurricane tracks in risk analysis and climate change damage assessment. Journal of Applied Meteorology and Climatology 46 (11):1956-1966 Hallegatte S (2008) An Adaptive Regional Input-Output Model and its Application to the Assessment of the Economic Cost of Katrina. Risk analysis 28 (3):779799. doi:10.1111/j.1539-6924.2008.01046.x Hallegatte S (2009) Strategies to adapt to an uncertain climate change. Global Environmental Change 19 (2):240-247. doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2008.12.003 Hans Moser PJH, Øivind A. Arntsen, Pierre Gaufres, France Stephan Mai, Gernot Pauli, Kathleen D. White, (2008) Envicom – Task Group 3: Waterborne transport, ports and waterways: A review of climate change drivers, impacts, responses and mitigation. http://www.pianc.org/downloads/envicom/envicomfree-tg3.pdf. Hoyle B, Knowles R (1992) Modern transport geography. Belhaven Press, West Sussex, England International Association of Ports and Harbors (2010) NGO Consultative Status // IAPH. http://www.iaphworldports.org/about/ngo.html. Accessed 12/15/2010 International Maritime Organization (IMO) (2008) International Shipping and World Trade Facts and Figures. Maritime Knowledge Center. http://www.imo.org/KnowledgeCentre/ShippingFactsAndNews/TheRoleandIm portanceofInternationalShipping/Pages/TheRoleAndImportanceOfInternational Shipping.aspx. Accessed 02/10/2009 IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) (2007) Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge, UK Leiserowitz A, Maibach, Edward, and Roser-Renauf, Connie (2008) Six Americas: An Audience Segmentation. http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/SixAmericas.pdf. Mearns LO, Bogardi I, Giorgi F, Matyasovszky I, Palecki M (1999) Comparison of 70

climate change scenarios generated from regional climate model experiments and statistical downscaling. J Geophys Res 104 (D6):6603-6621 Moser S, Tribbia J (2006) Vulnerability to inundation and climate change impacts in california: Coastal managers' attitudes and perceptions. Marine technology society journal 40 (4):35-44 Nicholls RJ, S. Hanson, C. Herweijer, N. Patmore, S. Hallegatte, J. Corfee-Morlot, J. Chateau, and R. Muir-Wood (2007) Ranking Port Cities with High Exposure and Vulnerability to Climate Extremes: Exposure Estimates. OECD Environment Working Paper 1, ENV/WKP(2007)1. OECD, Paris, France NRC (National Research Council) (2009) Informing Decisions in a Changing Climate. The National Academies Press. http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12626. PEER (Joint Legislative Committee on Performance Evaluation and Expenditure Review) (2006) The Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Mississippi’s Commercial Public Ports and Opportunities for Expansion of the Ports. http://www.peer.state.ms.us. Accessed 15 January 2013 Rahmstorf S (2007) A Semi-Empirical Approach to Projecting Future Sea-Level Rise Science 315 (5810):368 – 370 Roger A. Pielke J (2007) Future Economic Damage from Tropical Cyclones: Sensitivities to Societal and Climate Changes. Phil Trans R Soc A 365:27172729 Santella N, Steinberg L, Sengul H (2010) Petroleum and Hazardous Material Releases from Industrial Facilities Associated with Hurricane Katrina. Risk analysis 30 (4):635-649 Simpson M, Scott D, Harrison M, Silver N, OíKeeffe E, Sim R, Harrison S, Taylor M, Lizcano G, Rutty M (2010) Quantification and Magnitude of Losses and Damages Resulting from the Impacts of Climate Change: Modelling the Transformational Impacts and Costs of Sea Level Rise in the Caribbean (Summary Document). United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Stern NH, Britain G (2006) Stern Review: The economics of climate change, vol 30. HM treasury London, Transporation Institute (2008) Industry Profile. http://www.trans-inst.org/industryprofiles.html. UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) (1985) Port development: A handbook for planners in developing countries. Publication UN. UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) (2008) Maritime transport and the climate change challenge, Note by the UNCTAD secretariat. Note by the UNCTAD secretariat. United Nations, Geneva, TD/B.C.I/MEM.1.2 UNSD (United Nations Statistics Division) (2009) Composition of macro geographical (continental) regions. United Nations Statistics Division. http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm. Accessed 03/15/2009 USCOP (United States Commission on Ocean Policy) (2004) An Ocean Blueprint for the 21st Century. Final Report. 71

Vermeer M, Rahmstorf S (2009) Global sea level linked to global temperature. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 106 (51):21-27 World Bank (2009) The Costs to Developing Countries of Adapting to Climate Change: New Methods and Estimates, Consultation Draft.

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CHAPTER 2 CASE STUDY DESCRIPTION AND DATA COLLECTION METHODS The survey results described in Chapter One revealed that, globally, port operators feel concerned about vulnerabilities to severe storms of the kind that are expected with continuing climate change, but they have not yet begun to implement adaptation planning. To delve more deeply into how other stakeholders of ports consider these issues, I examined two ports using a case study approach. These two case studies focus on problem and solution identification on the local level. They elicit the concerns of external port stakeholders, the ways that port resilience is currently addressed in planning and policy, and some potential strategies to build port resilience. This chapter provides the background and context for the case studies that are further discussed in Chapters Three-to-Five. It begins with an overview of the reasons for selecting Gulfport and Providence as case studies. It then provides background and context for each of the ports. Finally, the methods used for interviews and documents selection, as well as the analysis are described. More detailed description of the analysis of the methods used specifically for Chapters Three-to-Five is also provided at the start of those chapters.

CASE DESCRIPTIONS - GULFPORT (MS) AND PROVIDENCE (RI) The variation in ports and the early stage of this type of research made a case study approach an appropriate method for exploratory work to begin to answer nuanced questions about impacts of hurricanes and potential resilience strategies available to stakeholders of a port. With approximately 4000 ports in the world (NGIA (National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency) 2011), each with a unique management structure, different types of cargos, a wide range of sizes, and a range of geomorphological characteristics, there really is no “typical” port. As the port director of Redwood City put it, You’ve seen one port, you’ve seen one port (Giari 2011). 73

Because my main interest and focus was on questions about impacts and resilience, I selected two ports, Gulfport (MS) and Providence (RI) (Figure 2-1), both with high exposure to hurricanes, where stakeholders were likely to be familiar with storms, and where the research could prove relevant for their future planning efforts. Both ports are small to medium sized and provide jobs, goods, and services to their local economies and communities.

Figure 2-1 -- Map of Gulfport and Providence

Gulfport, Mississippi, faced utter destruction from a 28’ storm surge during Hurricane Katrina. Gulfport had recently adopted a plan to elevate the entire port from 10’ to 25’ as a strategy to build the port’s resilience to Katrina-magnitude storms. This $140m investment in resilience was unparalleled. No other port that I researched had considered such a drastic step toward storm resilience. Thus, I selected Gulfport because I anticipated a high degree of awareness around the impacts of hurricanes (due to the recent Katrina event) and the potential resilience-building strategies. 74

Providence, Rhode Island, had not had a major storm since 1954 but faces a potential similar storm surge scenario as Gulfport from future hurricanes. Providence is uniquely exposed to storm events due to its location at the head of Narragansett Bay. This 20-mile estuary can act as a funnel for storm surge if a hurricane passes to the west and produces strong southerly winds, forcing water up to the narrowest part of the Bay at its northernmost end. Though Providence had not had a major hurricane in recent memory, the state of Rhode Island has been at the forefront of state-level climate adaptation policy development in the US. Efforts included the formation of a state Climate Commission (not yet officially designated at the time of the interviews) and the adoption of a sea level rise policy for the state (in draft form at the time of the interviews). These efforts suggested that stakeholders here would have a higher awareness of the adaptation and resilience issues than those from a state that had less momentum in this area. In addition, my previous work experience as a policy analyst in Rhode Island focused on the Port of Providence and the creation of state and local policies that directly addressed the port uses. Through a number of stakeholder-based exercises, I was introduced to most of the waterfront stakeholders who belonged to the port stakeholder cluster. The additional level of access provided through my existing network provided an additional reason for selecting Providence as one of the case studies for this research.

OVERVIEW OF GULFPORT The Port of Gulfport (Figure 2-2) is Mississippi’s largest port and the third busiest container port on the U.S. Gulf Coast. It imports fruit, garments, limonite ore, and hardwood lumber, and it exports paper, cellulose, fabrics, and other products. Primarily a container port, Gulfport handled 216,000 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs) in 2011 (Table 2-1). A chief executive officer and five port authority commissioners oversee the port operations under the auspices of The Mississippi Development Authority (MDA) and the Mississippi State Port Authority at Gulfport (MSPA). The mission of the port is “to be a profitable, self-sufficient port providing world-class maritime terminal services to present and future customers and to facilitate 75

the economic growth of Mississippi through the promotion of international trade and creation of employment” (PEER 2006)

Figure 2-2 -- Aerial view of Port of Gulfport (www.portofthefuture.com) Table 2-1 -- Port of Gulfport statistics

Throughput in Throughput tons in TEUs

2,200,000 (2011)

216,156 (2011)

Primary freight

Hurricane Highest Last # Of probability recorded major hurricanes storm storm 1858-2009 surge (Year) Containers High 30 feet 2005 25 Bulk (2005) (Katrina – Break-bulk Cat 3)

HURRICANE RISK TO THE PORT OF GULFPORT Gulfport has been hit by 25 hurricanes since 1858, with 9 of them being major (i.e., Categories 3, 4, or 5) (Figure 2-3). The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) estimates a return period of 11 years for a hurricane hitting 76

Gulfport (Blake et al. 2011). The port is very exposed to open water and sits in the hurricane “catcher’s mitt” of the Gulf Coast, where storms tend to track after passing through the Gulf of Mexico.

Figure 2-3 -- Hurricane tracks near Gulfport

On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall as a Category 3 storm that brought storm surges of up to 30' to Gulfport (Fritz et al. 2008). Katrina devastated much of the Gulf Coast, leaving almost 2000 people dead and causing $81B in damages (Knabb et al. 2005). In the City of Gulfport, the surge flooded six to twelve miles inland (Fritz et al. 2008). Direct damages to the port itself were estimated at over $50 million (Table 2-2). During that storm, gaming barges, a gantry crane, and 430,000 square feet of warehouses and freezer facilities were demolished. Another 400,000 square feet of enclosed warehouses, parking structures, and fill material were severely damaged. The public at large experienced losses due to the direct impacts of the port’s physical contents (containers, poultry, etc.) and also due to the indirect impacts of the port’s loss of business and operational continuity. The loss of business continuity resulted in rising price, difficulty in obtaining materials, unemployment, and strain on other parts of the transportation system. The loss of operational continuity left an important resource unavailable. For example, the severe damage to Gulfport resulted in regional shortage of tropical fruits, because major fruit 77

importers such as Dole, Chiquita, and Crowley were forced to reroute shipments to Port Everglades, FL, or Freeport, TX, at extra expense (USCCSP 2008; Grenzeback and Andrew). The local and regional economy suffered when the operations at the port shut down after Katrina due to the loss of jobs, taxes, and an increase in prices. Table 2-2 -- Assessed damages to the Port of Gulfport (PEER 2006)

Asset value prior to Hurricane Katrina

$127,573,778

Post-Katrina [2006] tonnage as compared to Pre-Katrina

69%

Tonnage for September -- December 2004 Effect on staffing Effect on revenues Types of [direct] damage Direct damage assessment Anticipated source of funding for repairs (2006)

Retained 100% of staff Decreased by 70% Damaged or destroyed port buildings and warehouses; damaged warehouses; $50,556,175 Port funds, FEMA, and insurance

THE PLAN FOR RESTORATION After Katrina, the MSPA, Governor Haley Barbour, and the MDA weighed options for developing a more resilient port, ultimately choosing a strategy to elevate the port (see Table 2-4). However, the roots of this plan lay in a pre-existing master planning effort to expand the port in anticipation of new business that would come from the widening of the Panama Canal. Before Katrina, the MSPA had already initiated an 84-acre port expansion program. 60 acres of the Mississippi Sound had been filled in before Katrina hit, leaving an additional 24 acres still to fill. This expansion plan was to be funded entirely through state bonds and port revenue and would increase business opportunities for the port. After Katrina, the Governor charged the MSPA with the task of developing a new strategy for resilience and the MDA with managing the funding of the project. The MSPA hired the JWD Group, an engineering consulting firm, to revise a 2003 master plan that addressed new development opportunities for both maritime and non-maritime uses in downtown Gulfport. The new revised plan

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also incorporated resilience measures that piggybacked on a pre-existing inland port distribution-center concept; at a cost of approximately $130m, an inland port three miles from the coast would also serve as a freight evacuation depot under any significant hurricane threat. Though this evacuation plan was incorporated in the 2007 Master Plan Update, it included no explicit discussion of future hurricane risk, or about the importance of storm resilience at the port itself. A detailed visioning section focuses only on land-use goals and port expansion (MSPA 2007).

PORT ELEVATION – A NEW RESILIENCE STRATEGY After completing the 2007 Master Plan Update, the MSPA contracted CH2M Hill, an engineering consulting firm, to implement and manage the project, which began with a review and comment of the updated plan. CH2M Hill found that the evacuation plan was, “an enterprise limiting constraint, as well as an unquantifiable business risk to potential facility users. To put all containers at an off-site location increases the cost of shipping, thereby making the Port of Gulfport less attractive and less competitive to maritime carriers” (CH2M Hill 2010). CH2M Hill recommended a radically different approach. Rather than relying on a plan to evacuate the port every time a hurricane approached the Gulf Coast, they suggested elevating the entire port from 10' above sea level to a 25' above sea level. The Governor and MSPA agreed and the MSPA and MDA undertook a revision of the project’s Environmental Assessment Report to include the new elevation strategy. In their plan, they stated two main reasons for the new elevation plan: 1. To protect facilities, equipment and cargo against storm surge; 2. To minimize disruptions to the Port tenants by eliminating the need to fully evacuate the terminal in the event of an approaching storm. This improvement to the Port’s facilities would serve as a benefit and potential lure for new customers. No other port on the Gulf Coast offers such hurricane surge protection

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(CH2M Hill 2010). CH2M Hill and MSPA convened a “council of experts” to assess the design feasibility of raising the container laydown area, while keeping the ship loading/off-loading at its current elevation, ultimately proposing a series of ramps between the two heights. CH2M Hill estimated the cost of elevating 140 acres from 10' to 15' to be approximately $140m, or $1m/acre (CH2M Hill 2010). Through the Federal Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the State of Mississippi applied for and received a “Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) Disaster Recovery Program” grant in the amount of $621m to “rebuild and restore the damage to its facilities caused by Hurricane Katrina. The allocated funds would assist in providing mitigation against future damage, prevent future recurrence of damage and destruction in Hurricane events, and provide the long-term recovery of the operating capacity of the Port” (MD 2011). Once the decision to elevate the port had been made, an Environmental Assessment Report (EA)- as required by HUD- became the main mechanism for ensuring organizational checks, balances, and involvement in the project. Since HUD provided the bulk of the funding, it served as the lead organization for the environmental review process. However, the MDA served as the “responsible entity” and prepared the EA, together with the MSPA. The EA process required numerous other agencies to be consulted (Table 2-3). However, the EA did not require any specific external review of the elevation component of the project.

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Table 2-3 – Organizations consulted in Gulfport’s Environmental Assessment for port restoration

List of Sources, Agencies and Persons Consulted [40 CFR 1508.9(b)] Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians-Tribal Historic Preservation Officer Mississippi Department of Archives and History Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality-Air Quality Branch Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality-Hazardous Waste Branch Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality-Water Quality Branch Mississippi Department of Marine Resources Mississippi Department of Transportation Mississippi Department of Wildlife, Fisheries, and Parks Mississippi Development Authority/CDBG Disaster Recovery Program Mississippi Emergency Management Agency Mississippi State Port Authority Harrison County Board of Supervisors Harrison County Utility Authority City of Gulfport-Planning City of Gulfport-Floodplain Manager Federal Emergency Management Agency U.S. Department of Agriculture-Natural Resources Conservation Service U.S. Army Corps of Engineers-Mobile District U.S. Department of Interior-U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service U.S. Department of Commerce-National Marine Fisheries Service U.S. Environmental Protection Agency BMI Environmental

The MSPA planned to complete the “Restoration Program” project by 2017, but in 2012 decided to significantly downscale the elevation component of the plan in order to bring the port back online more quickly. As of the writing of this paper, the MSPA was weighing “no additional elevation” vs. “additional two-to-four foot elevation” alternatives (MSPA 2012).

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Table 2-4 -- Timeline for port resilience strategies in Gulfport

YEAR 1998

DECISION Expand port by 84 Acres

2003

ACTORS MSPA, MDA

Complete 2003 Master Plan

Begin filling 60 of 84 acres as per 2003 Master Plan

2003 2005

ACTION

AECOM, MSPA, Governor (Gov.) MSPA

HURRICANE KATRINA DESTROYS PORT

Identify resilience strategies / revisit expansion plan 2005 Choose “Evacuation model” as resilience strategy

Governor, MSPS, AECOM

2006

MS applies for $600m funding from HUD to support restoration and resilience

Gov., MSPA, MDA

2006

Update 2003 Master Plan and incorporate new evacuation model as resilience strategy

Gov., MSPA, MDA, AECOM

2007

MS obtains $600m for CDBG/HUD funding in support of Restoration Program

Gov., MDA

2007

2007 – MSPA hires CH2M Hill to review and implement the revised 2007 Port Master Plan

MSPA, CH2M Hill, Gov

Review 2007 Master Plan Update, reject evacuation 2007 strategy and create new 25’ elevation strategy

Gov., MSPA, MDA, CH2M Hill

MSPA begins additional “Expansion Program” 2007 component be completed in conjunction with “Restoration Program”

Gov., MSPA, MDA

2010

MSPA and MDA conduct Environmental Assessment for Restoration Program

MSPA, MDA, HUD

2010

MSPA and MDA conduct Environmental Impact Statement for Expansion Program

MSPA, MDA, USACE

2011

Complete 60 acre fill, begin 24 acre fill and MSPA elevation

2012 Abandon plan to elevate port

Redirect $140 million to channel dredging project

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MSPA

OVERVIEW OF PROVIDENCE The Port of Providence, a private service port (For a discussion of types of ports, see Chapter 1 and also PPIAF 2013), supplied a large part of Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island states with petroleum products and handled bulk and break-bulk imports and exports. Home heating oil, jet fuel, diesel, and other petroleum products are imported through Providence Harbor. Numerous ancillary businesses also depend on the port’s functionality, including: trucking companies, rail service, manufacturing companies, ship repair facilities, marine pilots, and dredging companies, and even the State’s airport, which depends on the port for jet fuel. The Port also sits at the head of Narragansett Bay, an ecologically sensitive estuary that provides breeding grounds for marine life in the region. 105 acres of port lands were owned by the City of Providence and operated by a five board member nonprofit organization, ProvPort. However, ProvPort leased the land to and contracted the services of Waterson Terminals LLC, to operate and maintain the port. However, the full area of the Port of Providence comprised a number of other waterfront businesses and industries, which together, took up nearly 230 acres of waterfront (Becker et al. 2010). In 2010, the Port of Providence handled approximately 3.1 million tons of cargo. ProvPort generated more than $200 million in economic benefits for the region and over 2,400 jobs were attributed to port activities (PWWA 2010). ProvPort itself handled a variety of products, including scrap metal, wood products, coal, salt, cement, and chemicals. There was no official port authority in Rhode Island and the State played no direct role in port operations, though the state’s coastal agency does regulate land use in the coastal area that the port occupies. For the purpose of these case studies, I consider the “port” to encompass the entire port district (Figure 2-4), even though Waterson Terminal Services is referred to as the Internal Port Stakeholder, as described in the Introduction and Overview section of this paper. Since Rhode Island has no official port authority that oversees operations or the development of the port area in Providence, there is no centralized planning body that considers storm resilience issues. Even though Waterson Terminal Services

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oversees the operation, maintenance, and planning for the terminals of ProvPort, they function more autonomously than a port authority, such as the one in Mississippi.

Figure 2-4 -- Providence Harbor and its water dependent uses (Becker et al. 2010)

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HURRICANE RISK TO THE PORT OF PROVIDENCE The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) considers Providence to be the “Achilles heel of the Northeast” due to its position at the head of Narragansett Bay (Rubinoff 2007). For context, before Hurricane Katrina caused $80 billion in damages to the Gulf Coast, FEMA considered New Orleans to be the Achilles heel of that region. Rhode Island has been hit by nine hurricanes, two of them major, since 1900 (Figure 2-5). The length and orientation of Rhode Island’s Narragansett Bay, and its proximity to the Atlantic hurricane zone, make it susceptible to extreme storm surges from the southerly winds that are generated when a hurricane passes to the west of the Bay. The U.S. Geological Survey currently considers the probability of a storm hitting this area as “low” (Rubinoff 2007). A recent study estimates the hurricane return period for Rhode Island to be 24 years, with the “major” hurricane return period of 94 years based on historical data (USGS 2010). The Bay has not experienced a significant hurricane since Hurricane Carol in 1954, which produced 14.5’ of storm surge. Models for hurricane effects in Providence projected storm surges of over 20’, but these do not include climate change projections for sea level rise or the intensification of hurricanes (Blake et al. 2011). Most of the port lands are 3-10’ above mean high water. There is a hurricane barrier in place, but the barrier is north of the port and could cause higher storm-surge levels at the port, as surge waters would accumulate in Providence Harbor instead of spreading throughout the low-lying region now protected behind the barrier.

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Figure 2-5 -- Providence and History of Storm Tracks

ADAPTATION PLANNING IN RHODE ISLAND As I began this research, Rhode Island was in the midst of undertaking adaptation planning efforts for the State. The Coastal Resources Management Council (CRMC), together with the Coastal Resources Center (CRC) at the University of Rhode Island (URI), had been drafting new sea level rise policies and a new Hazards Chapter for the State’s Coastal Resources Management Plan. These policies provide broad guidance for adapting to new sea level rise, including recommendations for altering building codes. The Climate Risk Reduction Act of 2010 (RIGL 23-84) established a new Rhode Island Climate Change Commission (RICCC 2012), with a mandate to study the potential impacts of climate change in the State, and identify methods to adapt to these changes in order to reduce harm and increase economic and ecosystem sustainability. The RICC would also identify ways that adaptation could be mainstreamed into existing state and municipal programs (e.g., policies, plans, infrastructure development). At the time I conducted interviews, this Commission had 86

not yet convened. In Rhode Island, planning efforts such as these often involve a relatively small pool of decision makers, as Rhode Island is a very small state. My own experience working on such planning and policy efforts in the state indicated that many stakeholders of the port cluster would also have some awareness or involvement in these planning efforts. I expected concepts of resilience and adaptation to be familiar, due to this involvement.

DATA COLLECTION AND INTERVIEW METHODS The case studies were designed to identify the ways that port stakeholders perceive the impacts of a hurricane occurring at the port, the ways that planning/policy addresses those concerns, and the potential strategies for building port resilience. These studies assessed two sources of information about impacts of a hurricane on the Port of Providence, RI and Gulfport, RI: the perceptions of port stakeholders and policy documents that address storm issues at the port. The interviews of port stakeholders show the concerns of stakeholders about potential impacts that may or may not be recognized through the more formalized planning and policy-making process. The analysis of policy documents reveals how decision makers formally recognize the potential impacts of a storm hitting the port. By utilizing both of these sources, a richer picture of the range of impacts and strategies emerged, as well as indications of disconnects between the stakeholders' concerns and the current policy. I carried out surveys in these two ports over the summers of 2010 and 2011 during two visits to the Port of Gulfport and three to the Port of Providence. During these visits, I conducted the interviews of stakeholders, collected policy and planning documents, and visited the ports themselves and other organizations where the interviews were conducted.

SELECTION OF INTERVIEWEES For the purpose of this study, I consider the seaport stakeholders as a cluster that 87

includes all of the organizations that could or should play some role in the decisionmaking regarding long-term storm resilience for the port (see Introduction chapter for a discussion of stakeholder clusters). I selected stakeholders using a snowball sampling approach (Chermack 2004; Cairns et al. 2012; Patton 2002) that resulted in an approximation of each of the seaport clusters. Beginning with the port managers, I asked respondents, “what other organizations could play a role in port resilience planning, and who, in the respective organizations, should I speak to about these issues?” As noted above, the stakeholder of the port could include every citizen in the State of Rhode Island or Mississippi and beyond, and number in the hundreds of thousands. I thus limited the cluster to those organizations that could play a role in resilience planning for the port, as indicated by the stakeholders themselves. When no new names or organizations were added to the suggested list by the interviewees and attempts had been made to interview the organizations mentioned, the sample was deemed complete. Named individuals were contacted, given a brief explanation of the project, and subsequently interviewed. In almost all cases, the named individual agreed to be interviewed or designated another individual within the organization who did. In Gulfport, the 30 interviewees included five internal port stakeholders, three external economic/contractual stakeholders, nine federal public policy stakeholders, nine state public policy stakeholders, three local public policy stakeholders, and one community group stakeholder (Table 2-5). Both the MDA and MSPA were considered to be internal port stakeholders, rather than state agencies, because both are directly involved in the port planning and operations. The federal and state governments featured prominently, mostly because a state port authority operates the Port and the Katrina rebuilding efforts depended on federal funding. I was unable to interview representatives from U.S. Customs, the State Senate, the Environmental Protection Agency, and Kansas City Southern Railroad. Other interviewees mentioned these stakeholders, but I was unable to identify a specific representative who could speak to the issues of hurricane impacts to the port. No academic/research stakeholders were

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suggested in Gulfport. In Providence, 27 interviewees included three internal port stakeholders, five economic/contractual stakeholders, one community/environmental group stakeholder, three academic/research group stakeholders, four federal public policy stakeholders, eight state public policy stakeholders, and three local government public policy stakeholders (Table 2-6). I was not able to interview representatives of the Oil Heat Institute, some of the private companies within the port area, or the Rhode Island Marine Pilots Association. Table 2-5 -- Stakeholders interviewed in Gulfport Stakeholders

Organization interviewed

Port interests

Interviews

Internal Stakeholders Mississippi State Port Authority (MSPA) Internal port stakeholders

Mississippi Development Authority (MDA) CH2M Hill (Contracted by MSPA)

External economic/contractual stakeholders

External Stakeholders Port tenants (Chiquita, Dole, Port user, supply fruit to customers Crowley, DuPont, Island View Casino) Steward Sneed Insurance Manage risk and protect port assets Kansas City Southern Railroad

Public policy (state)

1 2 0

US Coast Guard (USCG)

1

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association (NOAA) US Customs

Facilitate the navigational needs of the port and shipping, facilitate storm operations Facilitate maritime commerce, protect marine resources, maintain ship channel Facilitate disaster preparation, mitigation, response, and recovery Provide weather and climate data

State Senate (Senator Wicker)

0

Environmental Protection Agency

0

US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE)

Public policy (federal)

Make port an economic engine for the state, 3 provide jobs Make port an economic engine for the state, 1 provide jobs, oversee long-‐term planning for port Provide program management and support for 1 restoration project

US Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

Gulf Regional Planning Commission Long range planning for regional transportation system

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2 5 1 0

1

Gulf of Mexico Alliance (GOMA) Mississippi Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) Mississippi Department of Transportation (MDOT) Mississippi Department of Marine Resources (MDMR)

Public policy (local)

Harrison County Civil Defense City of Gulfport Southern Mississippi Planning and Development

STEPS Neighborhood Group

Community groups

Coastal community resilience Review port project applications Construction and maintenance of connecting infrastructure Activities at the port that impact coastal waters or wetlands

1

Facilitate local emergency response, including evacuations Represent citizens of the city in port decisions Grant facilitation for transportation project adjacent to port

1

Protect adjacent communities, advocate for jobs growth

1

3 1 3

1 1

Table 2-6 -- Stakeholders interviewed in Providence Stakeholders


Port interests

Interviews

Internal Stakeholders Internal Stakeholders

Waterson Services

Terminal

Generate profit

3

Univar Affiliated Insurance Managers Moran Shipping Agency Promet Marine Services Marine Pilots Association Rhode Island Oil Heat Institute US Coast Guard

Port tenant Reduce risks and liability

1 1

Service port and users Repairs to ships and docks Pilots all commercial traffic to/from the port Represent petroleum companies at the port

2 1 0 0

Facilitate maritime commerce, protect marine resources, maintain ship channel

1

US Army Corps of Engineers National Flood Insurance Program

Facilitate maritime commerce, protect marine resources, maintain ship channel Facilitate disaster preparation, mitigation, response, and recovery

2

RI Coastal Resources Management Council RI Statewide Planning RI Economic Development Corporation RI Dept. of Transportation

Regulate coastal zone

3

Transportation and land use planning Generate jobs, economic development

1 1

Maintain/improve highways/bridges

1

External Stakeholders

Economic/contractual/ private firms

Public policy (Federal)

Public policy (State)

90

1


RI Dept. of Env. Management RI State Senate Providence Planning Dept. Providence Emergency Management Agency Providence Fire Dept.

Environmental concerns

1

Promote city interests, generate taxes, zoning Emergency response

1 1 1

Emergency response

1

Save the Bay

Protect adjacent communities, advocate for jobs growth

1

Brown University

Provide research capabilities

1

RI Coastal Resources Center URI


1


1

Community Academic

STORM SCENARIO In order to help interviewees think about storm events with respect to the port, I presented respondents with a plausible, potentially catastrophic storm scenario as a visual prompt. This scenario method has been successfully used in other studies on climate change to engage stakeholder groups and inform policy (Chermack 2004; Cairns et al. 2012). I created storm scenarios together with Applied Science Associates (Rhode Island) who developed the storm surge overlay for the visuals. Three students (Suejung Shin, Ernestine Fu, and Akshay Adya) helped develop 3D models to represent the structures of (or in) the port. The resulting visual scenario was a combination of a map of the port area, overlaid with a storm surge image, equivalent to an approximately Cat 3 (Gulfport, see Figure 2-6) or Cat 4 (Providence, see Figure 2-7) hurricane, with an additional 1.6’ added for anticipated sea level rise. The scenario depicted a map of the port area overlaid with the resulting storm surge. In Providence, this represents the expected surge from a Category 3 hurricane that passes just west of Narragansett Bay, producing approximately 26’ of surge.1 In Gulfport, this represents a Category 4 storm that produces approximately 30’ of surge.

1

The surge heights were derived from NOAA’s Maximum of Maximum Envelope of High Water, which is a worst-case scenario storm surge from a given hurricane. For more information, see http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/ssurge/ssurge_momOverview.shtml. We added 0.5m (1.6’) of sea level rise, a low-end projection for 2100.

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Figure 2-6 -- Port of Providence with simulated Category 3 storm surge

Figure 2-7 -- Port of Gulfport with simulated Category 4 storm surge

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INTERVIEWS WITH STAKEHOLDERS I conducted, as much as possible, the semi-structured interviews individually, though in some cases two or three people attended an interview. In these cases, transcripts were coded to record the responses from each individual separately. Interviewees were assured that their identities would remain anonymous and that quotes from their responses would not be identified and attributed to them individually. I designed a questionnaire using (Moser and Ekstrom 2010) as a template (see Appendix II), as theirs was also designed to interview stakeholders about plans and perceptions around climate adaptation and resilience issues. Using the storm scenario as a thought prompt, the purpose of the questionnaire was to elicit perceptions of storm impacts, current and potential strategies for reducing port vulnerability to storms, perceptions of planning processes and barriers to reducing vulnerability, and perceptions around climate change and climate change adaptation. I tested the questionnaire through six mock interviews with fellow students and experts in the field and revised questions that were unclear. The dissertation work focuses on the first two areas of inquiry in the questionnaire (impacts of storms and resilience strategies). Questions probed the respondents’ perspectives on these issues, as well as on their management responsibilities with respect to the port. For each of the 30 questions, I also provided potential follow-up prompts to help generate further detailed discussion. Not all questions however, were covered in each interview. Interviews focused on the subjects that matched the interviewees’ knowledge and expertise. Thus, questions not relevant to the interviewee were skipped. Respondents were encouraged to think broadly about the port, the role it plays in the community, and the full range of hurricane impacts and strategies that could build resilience, including both short and long term possibilities that could be implemented by their own organization or others. Respondents in both case studies discussed both the strategies that were already being followed and those that could be implemented in the future. If they had trouble responding to the questions, some follow-up prompts were used to stimulate the conversation (full questionnaire can be found in Appendix II). Though it came up in

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interviews, I did not provide a definition of resilience, thus allowing the interviewees to consider this concept in a way that was most meaningful from their organization's perspective. In Gulfport, many respondents referred back to their experience with Hurricane Katrina. Although five years had elapsed since the storm and the interviews focused on hurricanes in general, Hurricane Katrina remained a strong theme. The interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed by either myself or through a hired transcription service.

DOCUMENT COLLECTION In order to examine how stakeholders' perceptions were reflected in formal port planning and policy documents, I also examined the documents that address storm impacts and/or long-range resilience plans for the case study ports. I identified planning documents for the states and cities, hazard mitigation plans, storm planning documents for individual businesses, economic development plans, and others that I felt might possibly include references to port resilience planning or the impacts of hurricanes on the Port. Through web searches and suggestions received from stakeholders in the interviews and through follow-up requests, I examined the 16 documents from Providence and 32 from Gulfport that I expected might address storm impacts and/or long-range resilience plans for the port. I searched the collected documents for the following keywords: “[name of the case study port]” and “port or seaport or ‘maritime infrastructure’” and “hurricane or storm or hazard.” I eliminated documents if they did not address these search terms, were not officially published/released, or were not policies actually in use by a port stakeholder. Of the 32 documents collected and reviewed in Gulfport, 16 met the search criteria (Table 2-7). These included numerous planning documents from the Mississippi State Port Authority (MSPA), as the MSPA was in the process of an expansion and redevelopment process after Katrina. I also reviewed hurricane plans, economic impact assessments for the port, the testimony of Governor Haley Barbour in which he appealed for disaster recovery funding, and the impact assessments for the region. 94

Of the 16 documents collected and reviewed in Providence, six met the search criteria (

Table 2-8). The Port itself had no documents that specifically addressed storm resilience, outside of a hurricane plan that I was not able to review formally. Interviewees, however, described this as a standard operating procedure for securing the port facility in advance of a storm and not a long-term planning document. Representatives from the port informed me that planning was generally completed on a task basis and contracted out to consultants, thus there was no master plan or strategic plan for the port. The most detailed of the plans in Providence, is the Hazards Chapter draft that would ultimately be a part of the Coastal Resources Management Program. This plan also drew from a student report on debris that had been conducted at URI (Spaulding et al. 2007). I did not include this student report in analysis, as it was not an official planning/policy document.

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Table 2-7 -- Documents reviewed from Gulfport Author

Sponsor organization

BDMJM Harris and AECOM

MSPA

The Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Mississippi’s 2 Commercial Public Ports and Opportunities for Expansion of the Ports

PEER

Mississippi Legislature

3 Hurricane Katrina Damage Assessment Report

MSPA

4 Port of Gulfport Restoration Program Action Plan

Title 1 Gulfport Master Plan Update 2007 Final Report

5

Master Planning the Port of Gulfport, Mississippi Rebirth after Katrina

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita - Implications for 6 Hurricane Science and Engineering

7

Type of document

Year

Port and private

Master Plan

2007

Public (local, state, regional)

Report

2006

MSPA

Port and private

Damage assessment

2005

MSPA

MSPA

Port and private

Master Plan

2008

John Webb

MSPA

Port and private

Report

2007

Building and Fire Research Laboratory NIST

National Science Board

Public (federal)

Report

2006

MDA

Port and private

Environmental Assessment

2010

Academia and nonprofit

Academic paper

2008

Port and private

Press Release

2008


Report

2011

Port and private

Master Plan

2010

Report

2007

Environmental Environmental Assessment and Environmental Review Record for Community MSPA Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery Project at State Port at Gulfport

8 Hurricane Katrina Storm Surge Reconnaissance

Fritz et al

Georgia Tech

Read the Port of Gulfport's Restoration Program 9 Description

MSPA

MSPA

Reilly Morse

Mississippi Center for Justice

10 Sustainable Restoration of the Port of Gulfport

Sector

The Plan for the Implementation of the Port of Gulfport 11 CH2M Hill Restoration Program

MSPA

Academia and nonprofit Academia and nonprofit

12 Advancing in the Aftermath IV:

Loren C. Scott

Capital One N.A.

13 Letter of opposition to HUD funding

Multiple

STEPS

14 Maritime Severe Weather Contingency Port Plan

USCG

USCG

Public (federal)

15 Central Harrison County Connector Highway

MDOT

MDOT


FAQ

2007

Haley Barbour

Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Disaster Recovery


Testimony

2009

CH2M Hill

MSPA

Port and private

Presentation

2009

State of MS

MEMA


Hazard mitigation plan

2007

16 Testimony of Governor Haley Barbour

17

Port of Gulfport Restoration Program Presubmittal Meeting

18 State of Mississippi Hazard Mitigation Plan

Letter of opposition Hazard mitigation plan

2007 2010

DOCUMENTS NOT ANALYZED 19 Federal Disaster Recovery Grant Report 20

Gulfport Restoration Program Action Plan Amendment 5 - Modification 1

21 MSPA Current and Projected Jobs 22 Question received on "request for ideas" proposal The Projected Economic Impacts from Container Terminal Development at Gulfport Mississippi Unified Long-Range Transportation 24 Infrastructure Plan 23

25 State of Mississippi Budget 2011 26 Mississippi Pay Now, Pay Later:

MDA

MDA

Port and private

Grant report

2011

MSPA

MSPA

Port and private

Port planning document

2008

MSPA

MSPA

Port and private

Report

2011

Port and private

Response to public comment Economic assessment

MSPA

MSPA

2010

TranSystems

MSPA

Port and private

MDOT

MDOT


Transport Plan

2007

Joint Legislative Budget Committee American Security Project

Joint Legislative Budget Committee American Security Project


Budget

2011


Pamphlet

2011

2011

Hurricane Katrina: Profile of a Super Cat Lessons and 27 Implications for Catastrophe Risk Management

Risk Management Risk Management Solutions Solutions

Port and private

Report

2005

28 Harrison County Flood Insurance Study

FEMA

FEMA

Public (federal)

Flood insurance study

2009

FEMA

FEMA

Public (federal)

Report

2008

USACE

USACE

Public (federal)

Report

2006


Budget

2011

Public (federal)

Flood insurance study

2009

Mississippi Coastal Analysis Project - Coastal Documentation and Main Engineering Report Mississippi Coastal Improvements Project, Interim 30 Report 29

31 City of Gulfport Budget 2011 32 Harrison County Hurricane Surge Map

City of Gulfport FEMA

City of Gulfport FEMA

(Green background indicates document analyzed and coded)

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Table 2-8 -- Documents reviewed in Providence

Title

1

DOCUMENTS ANALYZED Natural Hazards: Hurricanes, Floods, and Sea Level Rise in theMetro Bay Region Special Area Management Plan

Author

Sponsor organization

Sector

Type of document

Year

Pam Rubinoff

Ri CRMC


Policy

2009

City of Providence Local Hazard Mitigation Committee, Maguire Group, Inc.

Rhode Island Emergency Management Agency


Hazard 2011 mitigation plan


State planning document

Port and private



Report



Brown University

Academia and non-profit

Student Report 2010

Timmons Roberts et Brown al University


Report

2010

Port and private

Economic assessment

2008

Public (federal)

Planning document

2009

2

Strategy for Reducing Risks from Natural Hazards in Providence, Rhode Island: A Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan

3

Bays, Rivers, and Watersheds Systems-Level Plan: Ames Colt 2009-1013

4

Promet Marine Services Hurricane Preparedness Checklist

5

Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment

6

Rhode Island State Hazard Mitigation Plan

7 8

DOCUMENTS NOT ANALYZED Beyond No Regrets: Assessing the Economic Efficiency of Climate Adaptation in Rhode Island Summary: Preliminary Assessment of Rhode Island's Vulnerability to Climate Change and its Options for Adaptation Action

Promet Marine Services Providence Emergency Management Agency Rhode Island Emergency Management Agency Kyle A. Polar

Rhode Island Bays, Rivers, and Watersheds Coordination Team Promet Marine Services Providence Emergency Management Agency Rhode Island Emergency Management Agency

Providence Working Waterfront Alliance Dept. of Homeland Security

2008

2010

9

Economic Effects of Allens Avenue Businesses

FXM Associates

10

National Infrastructure Protection Plan

Unassigned

11

Rhode Island and Southeastern Massachusetts Area Contingency Plan

Rhode Island and Southeastern USCG Massachusetts Area Committee

Public (federal)


12

Rhode Island Hurricane Evacuation Study Technical Report

USACE

Public (federal)

Report

1995


Report

2007


Report

2011


Pamphlet

2011


Student Report 2007

13

FY07 Economic Monitoring Report

Ri Economic Monitoring Collaborative

14

Rhode Island's Ports and Commercial Harbors: A GIS Inventory of Current Uses and Infrastructure

Jennifer McCann

15

Rhode Island Pay Now Pay Later

16

Natural Hazards and Flood Plain Management in Upper Narragansett Bay

USACE Ri Bays, Rivers and Watersheds Coordination Team Rhode Island Statewide Planning American Security Project

American Security Project Malcolm Spaulding, University of James Hu, Rhode Island Christopher Baxter

(Green background indicates document was analyzed and coded)

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CODING METHOD Following transcription, the interviews and documents were coded and analyzed using the NVivo qualitative data analysis software package. The analysis used an analytic induction method described by Ratcliff (1994) as an iterative process that allows for themes and ideas to become evident through the coding process, also allowing for modification of concepts. An example of this process, in this case for coding impacts of a hurricane event in Providence, is shown in Figure 2-8. The following steps summarize the coding process: 1. Line by line review. In total, 955 pages of interview transcripts from Gulfport and Providence were reviewed line by line. Planning and policy documents were reviewed through the use of key word searches for relevant terms (e.g., storm, hurricane, impact, damage, port, etc.) and a review of the pages surrounding these key words. 2. Identify the idea to be coded (e.g., impact or strategy mentioned). A first round of coding was performed on transcripts and documents to identify initial impacts and strategies (Charmaz 2006). Key phrases and ideas were tagged, grouped, and ultimately distributed into broad categories and more specific subcategories. 3. Create key phrase to group main ideas. A second round of coding was conducted with more attention to details and resulted in a variety of subcategories for both impacts and strategies. 4. Create subcategories to group main ideas identified in Step 3. 5. Group into main categories.

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Figure 2-8 -- Method of coding

As I developed subcategories, I continued to review the transcripts to ensure that all relevant ideas were captured and categorized appropriately. Coding was an iterative process and ultimately the documents and transcripts were reviewed numerous times. For the work on impacts, an inductive approach was used to create the subcategories, followed by a deductive approach to group them into three main impact categories, as defined by the IPCC (i.e., direct damages, indirect costs, and intangible consequences). For the resilience strategies work, the main categories were developed using an inductive grounded theory approach, whereby the categories emerged as themes from the data. The details on these steps are addressed in Chapter 3 (for impacts) and Chapter 5 (for strategies).

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REFERENCES Becker A, Wilson A, Bannon R, McCann J, Robadue D, Kennedy S (2010) Rhode Island’s Ports and Commercial Harbors: A GIS Inventory of Current Uses and Infrastructure. Rhode Island Statewide Planning Program,, Providence, RI. Blake ES, Gibney EJ, Landsea C (2011) The deadliest, costliest, and most intense United States tropical cyclones from 1851 to 2010 (and other frequently requested hurricane facts). NOAA/National Weather Service, National Centers for Environmental Prediction, National Hurricane Center, Washington, DC Cairns G, Ahmed I, Mullett J, Wright G (2012) Scenario method and stakeholder engagement: Critical reflections on a climate change scenarios case study. Technological Forecasting and Social Change 80 (1):1-10 CH2M Hill (2010) The Plan for the Implementation of the Port of Gulfport Restoration Program. Charmaz K (2006) Constructing grounded theory: A practical guide through qualitative analysis. Sage Publications Ltd, London, UK Chermack T (2004) Improving decision-making with scenario planning. Futures 36 (3):295-309 Fritz HM, Blount C, Sokoloski R, Singleton J, Fuggle A, McAdoo BG, Moore A, Grass C, Tate B (2008) Hurricane Katrina storm surge reconnaissance. Journal of Geotechnical and Geoenvironmental Engineering 134:644 Giari M (2011) Port Director. Port of Redwood City. In person interview, Grenzeback L, Andrew T Case Study of the Transportation Sectorís Response to and Recovery from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Cambridge Systematics. Inc, Knabb RD, Rhome JR, Brown DP (2005) Tropical cyclone report: Hurricane katrina, 23-30 august 2005. National Hurricane Center, MDA (Mississippi Development Authority) (2011) Federal Disaster Recovery Grant Report Summary for March 31 2011. Moser S, Ekstrom J (2010) A framework to diagnose barriers to climate change adaptation. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 107 (51):22026 MSPA (Mississippi State Port Authority) (2007) Gulfport Master Plan Update 2007 Final Report. MSPG (Mississippi State Port at Gulfport) (2012) Port Commission Nixes 25' Elevation Plan. http://www.portofthefuture.com/News.aspx?NewsID=301. Accessed 11/07/2012 NGIA (National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency) (2011) World Port Index, 21st Edition. http://msi.nga.mil/MSISiteContent/StaticFiles/NAV_PUBS/WPI/wpi.zip. Patton MQ (2002) Qualitative research and evaluation methods. Sage Publications, Inc, London, UK PEER (Joint Legislative Committee on Performance Evaluation and Expenditure Review) (2006) The Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Mississippi’s Commercial Public Ports and Opportunities for Expansion of the Ports. http://www.peer.state.ms.us. Accessed 15 January 2013 PPIAF (Public-Private Infrastrucutre Advisory Facility) (2013) Alternative Port 100

Management Structures and Ownership Models. http://www.ppiaf.org/sites/ppiaf.org/files/documents/toolkits/Portoolkit/Toolki t/module3/port_functions.html. Accessed July 1, 2013 PWWA (Providence Working Waterfront Alliance (2010) Economic Impact Providence Working Waterfront Alliance. http://providenceworkingwaterfront.org/index.php/providences-workingwaterfront/economic-impact/. Accessed October 25 2010 Ratcliff DE (1994) Analytic induction as a qualitative research method of analysis. http://finntrack.co.uk/shift/analytic.pdf. Accessed May 13 2013 RICCC (Rhode Island Climate Change Commission) (2012) Adapting to Climate Change in the Ocean State: A Starting Point. http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/Reports/Climate Change Commission Prog Report Final 11 15 12 final 2.pdf. Accessed July 1 2013 Rubinoff P (2007) Increasing Resilience along Rhode Island’s Coast. URI Coastal Resources Center, Spaulding M, Hu J, Baxter C (2007) Natural Hazards and Flood Plain Management in Upper Narragansett Bay. Unpublished student report from University of Rhode Island - OCE495 USCCSP (United States Climate Change Science Program) (2008) Impacts of Climate Change and Variability on Transportation Systems and Infrastructure: Gulf Coast Study, Phase I. Transportation Do. http://www.climatescience.gov/Library/sap/sap4-7/final-report/. USGS (United States Geological Survey) (2010) Natural Hazards - Hurricanes. U.S. Geological Survey. http://www.usgs.gov/hazards/hurricanes/. Accessed September 15 2012

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CHAPTER 3 ASSESSING IMPACTS OF HURRICANES ON SEAPORT STAKEHOLDER CLUSTERS: A CASE STUDY OF GULFPORT, MISSISSIPPI INTRODUCTION Understanding the potential impacts of storms for different port stakeholders can help them to plan for an appropriate level of storm resilience given new environmental conditions presented due to climate change (Koetse and Rietveld 2009). Without such understanding, stakeholders are left to plan in a way that does not necessarily account for many indirect costs or intangible consequences that will ultimately be borne by society. To plan for a future with more extreme events in coastal areas, decision makers need to understand which stakeholders are affected by these events, what kinds of impacts they bring, and how to incorporate stakeholder concerns into the planning process. In this paper, I thus address two main questions: 1) How do stakeholders of the Port of Gulfport perceive the impacts of a major hurricane hitting the port, and 2) In what ways are port stakeholders in Gulfport considering the resilience of the port in planning and policy? This chapter provides a fine-grained analysis of hurricane impacts for a port cluster through a review of documents, an analysis of interviews, and a review of the port’s resilience plans. I invited key representatives of the port cluster to review and respond to a hazard scenario. By presenting a hypothetical storm event to a set of stakeholders, many of whom experienced Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath, I identified and catalogued the wide range of impacts of storm events on the port cluster, as well as which stakeholders would bear the cost of impacts, and also examined how stakeholder concerns were accounted for in planning and policy. Background information on Gulfport, rationale for choosing this location, and details 102

on methods used in this case study can be found in Chapter 2 of this dissertation. I begin this chapter by discussing traditional methods of impact assessment, many of which are either at the wrong scale or not suitable for ex ante assessments that decision makers need in order to plan for more resilient seaports. Next, the results of the study are described as a typology for hurricane impacts illustrated with examples from key stakeholders and the documents reviewed. Finally, interviews and documents are compared with each other and also against the Port of Gulfport’s plans for hurricane resistance.

IMPACTS OF STORM EVENTS AT PORTS In this chapter, I use the IPCC’s (2012) definition of impact as an umbrella term to capture both the direct damage to a given port facility as well as the various indirect costs and intangible consequences (economic or otherwise) of that damage (Figure 3-1). Thus, impacts include three main subcategories, as follows: Direct damages refer to damages that occur at the time of the weather event and are a direct result of it, such as damage to structures, infrastructure, and property. Indirect costs are the “reduction in production of goods and services, measured in terms of value added” (Hallegatte 2008). These include losses associated with the disaster that occur in the weeks, months, or years following the event. They also include losses or gains in wages, changes in profits, and decrease or increase in production. Models that quantify indirect costs often use industry input/output tables, but since they rely on regional data, the technique is difficult to apply to one specific facility, like the port (Cochrane 2004). Finally, intangible consequences include many non-market consequences of disasters. Examples include: loss of life, health impacts, ecosystem damages, and damages to historical and cultural assets. These consequences of the disaster, sometimes called high-order losses (Rose 2004) or hidden costs (Heinz Center 2000) are very difficult to characterize and quantify as there are often no economic measures. 103

Naturally, some impacts have a cascading effect. For example, damage to a crane (direct damage) can result in expenses from cargo being re-routed (indirect cost) and/or that cargo being unavailable to consumers in the short term (intangible consequence).

Figure 3-1 -- Hurricane impacts on port stakeholders

IMPACT ASSESSMENT TECHNIQUES Identifying impacts serves as a first step toward adaptation, before strategies to reduce (or transfer) risk and mitigate disasters can be identified, assessed, and selected (Moser and Ekstrom 2010; NCADAC Draft; IPCC 2007). Many databases account for disaster losses and numerous analyses have employed these databases to generate comparisons of risk on a national or international scale (Allison et al. 2009; GCRP 2009; Hanson et al. 2010). One study, the UNDP’s “Disaster Risk Index,” uses mortality data to create a quantitative measure that allows for a comparison of risk 104

levels of various hazards between countries (Peduzzi et al. 2009). Another, called the “Hotspots Project,” developed a world map of hotspots that illustrates where the risk of mortality and economic losses due to natural hazards are greatest (Birkmann 2007). Depending on the database, losses are generally reported as direct monetary (observable damage to infrastructure) and indirect losses (e.g., decline in revenue, business interruption). Some will also count these losses at the community, state, regional, or global levels, depending on the nature and impact of the hazard event” (Gall et al. 2009). Impact assessments conducted on a regional or national scale are generally too coarse to capture the unique ramifications felt by a given sector, like a particular port stakeholder cluster. Thus, there are also many ways to categorize impacts on a local or regional scale. Short-term vs. long-term costs, reported vs. unreported losses, breakdowns by “who pays,” and costs by geographic area are but a few. The Heinz Center report, The Hidden Costs of Coastal Hazards (2000), recommends a mix of quantitative estimates when data are available and qualitative descriptions when they are not. It suggests breaking down costs by economic sectors such as: housing, commercial and industrial property, or transportation infrastructure. However, as the report points out, many of these costs are hidden and/or very difficult to quantify due to the lack of data. Damage assessments, typically conducted on a particular property, focus on the actual damages to the property, but do not account for the indirect costs and intangible consequences resulting from that loss that impacts the broader community. Impact assessment and risk identification methods typically do not allow for a detailed understanding of how storms might impact clusters of stakeholders who depend on a given piece of infrastructure, such as transportation, utilities, or seaports. Some assessments may be too broad in geographic scale (Lian et al. 2007; Hallegatte 2008) to inform relevant local decision makers, while others may focus on one projection of one particular cost, such as insured losses (Grossi et al. 2005) or direct damage to structures (Curtis 2007; LADOT 2006). Further, many traditional ways of assessing

105

direct damages and indirect costs may only be applied post factum. They are designed more for looking at “what happened” and using costs for repairs and insurance claims to quantify damages. This case study provides the type of richer understanding of the full range of potential impacts that can lead to better resilience planning for ports (Woodroffe 1990; IPCC 2012; Stern and Britain 2006).

CODING OF IMPACTS As noted in Chapter 2, results of interviews and documents were coded and bundled into the impacts categories defined by the IPCC: direct damages, indirect costs, and intangible consequences. Every attempt was made to assign each “impact mention” to a single “impact type” and category. This proved to be straightforward when interviewees were explicit about a given impact. In some instances, however, an “impact mention” fell into multiple “impact types.” For example, a mention of shipping containers being washed up throughout the City has a quantifiable indirect cost element (e.g., a fixed cost to remove a container from a residential property) and an unquantifiable intangible consequence impact (e.g., psychological ramifications of a resident living with a shipping container on her front lawn). When not explicit, I based coding on my best interpretation given the context. I aimed to be as specific as possible about given impacts and thus allowed some impacts that might be conducive to grouping to remain distinct. For example, a subcategory of Disruption of critical services, could have captured the following more specific items: Destruction of energy infrastructure, Disruption of regional energy distribution, Interruption of critical goods supply, Interruption of essential services, and Interruption of power supply. However, my intention was to allow this to be a fine-grained analysis, thus I kept these somewhat similar impacts distinct. For each impact, I also assessed whether the cost would likely fall upon the “internal stakeholder” (i.e., the port operator) or the “external stakeholders” (i.e., one or more of the other stakeholders that make up the cluster) or both. The purpose of this cost assessment was to examine how the range of impacts distributes across the stakeholder 106

cluster. I assessed cost burdens based on the management responsibilities described by respondents in interviews, as well as a review of organizational mission statements, jurisdictions and mandates (See Appendix II). I use the concept of “bearing the cost” broadly, as some costs may be easily determined (e.g., the cost to repair a structure), while others may be more difficult (e.g., cost of lost business), or not easily quantifiable in economic terms at all (e.g., environmental costs of an oil spill). Though this is a subjective exercise, it offers an initial assessment of how these impacts are distributed across the stakeholder network. Finally, I noted which impacts were mentioned in interviews and which were mentioned in documents in order to examine how the impacts were addressed through planning and policy (for more on stakeholders interviewed and documents reviewed, see Chapter 2).

RESULTS Through the analysis of interview transcripts and document reviews, I found 253 total “mentions” of 80 distinct impacts across the 30 interview transcripts and 16 reviewed documents in Gulfport. The 80 distinct impacts consist of 31 direct damages, 18 indirect costs, and 31 intangible consequences. In this study, I do not venture too deeply into the linkages between impacts, nor the specific cost amounts that could arise should the event occur. However, I do examine which stakeholders would likely bear those costs in order to provide a frame of reference for which groups have the most to lose. Cost burden is indicated by a “$” in the four right hand columns in Table 3-1 and Table 3-2 show that there is likely a monetary cost for that particular stakeholder group. In Table 3-3, a checkmark is used, as many of the costs associated with intangible consequences are difficult to monetize.

DIRECT DAMAGES The interviews and documents combined contained 128 total mentions of 31 unique direct damages. These include many damages experienced at the port itself, as well as damages to the surrounding area that result from events at the port. Though 107

interviewees were provided with a future storm scenario, they tended to refer back to their experience with Katrina. Thus, most of the direct damages mentioned were descriptions of actual events, rather than perceptions about what could happen during the next event. Many direct damages also result in downstream indirect costs and intangible consequences, which will be addressed in subsequent sections of this chapter. Tracing those pathways in detail was beyond the scope of this study. In interviews, many respondents focused on Damage caused by debris off port property, which refers to the containers and cargo that were washed off port property during Katrina. Twelve of the interviewees talked about these issues in terms of the direct damage associated with debris. Some aspects of this debris problem are easily quantified, such as the cost of cleanup or the damage to a building caused by a piece of debris. However, as subsequent sections will show, the impacts of debris are cross cutting and also include indirect costs, and intangible consequences. Some debris damaged the port itself, but much of it originated from the port and resulted in other types of impacts throughout the city. Interviewees described how, during Katrina, the storm surge completely submerged the port, containers floated free, industrial rolls of paper ended up on the second story of the parking garage, warehouse contents scattered throughout the surrounding neighborhoods, and the structures on the port itself suffered enormous damages due in part to debris. Shipping containers in particular caused extensive damage. One respondent described containers surfing down the faces of waves, and “flying into neighborhoods, breaking up houses that may have been repairable from flooding alone, but instead were just pulverized.” Nine respondents, most from the port or port businesses, also recounted a variety of direct damages to port property itself, including gantry cranes, warehouses, piers, and utility lines that Katrina completely destroyed: [The port] was flattened. There was nothing here. Our berth collapsed . . . Eight weeks later, the channel was okayed [and] later they finally brought a ship in, but it was of course restricted to daylight only ... The infrastructure was completely gone.

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Direct damages to freight and cargo referred to cargo and freight, but interviewees spoke about it more as a cause of damage (as debris) than as a loss in and of itself. In the context of the level of damage and costs of cleanup, the monetary loss associated with a cargo of poultry products or some industrial rolls of paper was probably quite minor and likely covered by insurance. Like all ports, Gulfport depends on a transportation network that includes road and rail. Though two of the documents reviewed mentioned general damage to the on-port rail lines, interviewees did not discuss damages to road and rail specifically. However, I was not able to speak with a representative from the Kansas Southern Rail Company. Of the planning or policy documents I analyzed, one focused on direct damages at the port in great detail. A damage assessment undertaken by the Mississippi State Port Authority (MSPA) consisted of an extensive survey of the port property conducted after Katrina, that assessed the level of damage to all buildings, piers, wharves, and equipment at the port (MSPA 2005). The repair and rebuild estimates from this assessment were used both for insurance claim purposes and as a work list for the MSPA. The report notes 22 unique damages to the east and west piers. Items included debris fields under the piers, building foundation damages, building topside damages, total destruction of buildings, damage to railways, and damage to utilities. The costs of repairs for direct damages fall primarily upon the internal port stakeholders

(Table

3-1),

though

many

will

also

be

paid

for

by

the

economic/contractual stakeholders who do direct business with the port. Port tenants, for example, could bear the costs of repairs to their buildings and equipment, utilities (e.g., the cost to replace electric service to refrigerated storage containers), or damage resulting from flooding. Many of these direct damage costs result from repairs and cleanup. In the case of Katrina, the port tenants and insurance companies paid for some of the damages mentioned, though interviewees did not discuss specifics. In addition, the Federal Government provided funding for both repair and rebuilding/expansion of the port through both FEMA ($60 million) and Community Development Block Grant funds (approximately $560 million). Numerous indirect

109

costs and intangible consequences, however, also result from these direct damages. Those are discussed in the following sections. Table 3-1 -- Direct damages (Gulfport)

Mentioned in interviews

Mentioned in documents

Internal

Economic/Contractual

Public policy (Inc. state/fed taxpayers)

Community (Inc. environmental)

(Cost burden represented in $)

X

X

X

$

$

$

Fill eroded around berths

X

$

$

Damage to wharf, piers, docks

X

X

$

Damage to vessels and barges

X

Casino barge broke free

X

$

$

Damage to port utilities and systems

Direct damages identified in document and interview analysis

Damage to wharfs, docks, and berthing areas Rail cars ended up in ship berths

X

X

Utility damage (general)

X

$

$

Sewer lines down

X

$

$

Power loss

X

$

$

Mechanical and electrical system damage

X

$

$

Damage to port roads and rail lines

X

$

$

X

X

$

$

X

X

Total losses at all MS ports 99.9 million

X

$

$

$

Specific port damage figures

X

$

$

$

General damage mention

X

$

$

$

Cost of rebuilding

X

$

$

$

X

X

X

$

Damage to port lands Damage to construction projects underway Damage to port facilities (general)

Damage to port equipment Fencing system damage

110

Damage to port equipment

X

X

$

Damage to cranes

X

$

X

X

Warehouse floors blown up from pressure

X

$

$

Roofs blown off

X

$

$

Flooding damage to buildings

X

$

$

Debris causing damage to structures

X

$

$

Damage to warehouses, office, structures

X

X

$

$

Damage to parking structure

X

$

$

Damage to fire system water tower

X

$

$

Damage to casino

X

X

$

$

X

X

Lost or damaged freight and cargo

X

X

$

Containers washed inland

X

$

$

$

$

Damage to connecting road and rail systems

X

Damage to off-‐port roads and rail lines

X

$

$

Damage caused by debris off port property

X

X

Debris field

X

$

$

$

$

Cost to clean up debris

X

$

$

$

$

Containers all over city

X

$

$

$

$

Damage to port buildings and structures

Damaged freight and cargo

INDIRECT COSTS Interviewees and documents mentioned 18 distinct impacts (for a total of 49 total mentions) that I classified as “indirect costs.” These were all impacts that could be quantified in economic terms, although special models or techniques would be required to do so. Lost business for ports and port tenants was mentioned 15 times in the documents reviewed and 7 times in interviews. Interviews mentioned that many businesses in Gulfport suffered or even failed due to Katrina and that five years after Katrina, the Port of Gulfport operated at about 80% of its pre-Katrina business. Two major clients had shut down their operations at the port and at least one was still operating, out of a temporary facility on the grounds of the port. After Katrina, ports that were less damaged and less vulnerable were appealing to shippers that had been long established in Gulfport. As one official put it: 111

You can rest assured these other ports were running around trying to get our business. They knew we were suffering; and I can promise you they were knocking on each one of these guys’ doors down here trying to get them to come to their ports. It’s just the nature of the business. Delays in port-related commerce and increased prices were discussed by several interviewees, but were mentioned only twice in the port’s planning and operations documents. Business interruptions occur in many sectors after a storm, but the port firms play an especially important role in the process of rebuilding communities: Since rebuilding and restoring a sense of normalcy depend heavily on the movement of materials, the lost business in and around the port can result in shortages of necessary supplies. In reviewing the port planning and operations documents, I found no calculations and little explicit quantification of these indirect impacts even when the impact itself was mentioned. One exception was in the Mississippi Development Authority (MDA) report which cited a loss of “about 1,200 port-related jobs (direct, indirect, and induced)” over the two years following Hurricane Katrina (MDA 2011). I was not able to ascertain the methodology used to develop these job-loss numbers. MDA also reported port revenue falling significantly from about $20m/year in the years preceding Katrina (combined maritime and non-maritime) to about $9m/year in the two years following. These indirect costs fall upon the internal port stakeholders and many others within the stakeholder cluster. Indeed, determining who exactly will pay for these is difficult to ascertain. Interviewees also mentioned one positive-spillover effect: rebuilding can stimulate the economy. Table 3-2 shows a categorization of these costs by stakeholder groups that would likely bear the costs of each impact. Impacts such as lost business for port and port tenants can affect all stakeholders of the cluster: e.g., internal stakeholders lose lease revenues, economic/contractual stakeholders lose profit, the public loses the services provided by the individual businesses and potential jobs that are associated with those businesses. Delays in port-related commerce and increased profits affect stakeholders in a similar way. Either the state or the economic/contractual stakeholders, along with 112

the port operator, would often pay many of the costs associated with cleanup. The one positive-spillover impact noted by interviewees could benefit a number of stakeholders. Since cleanup and rebuilding stimulates the economy, the port, the economic/contractual stakeholders, and the public sector all stand to gain in some ways from a disaster, as well. For example, new jobs can be created in the construction sector and federal money (e.g., FEMA and HUD grants) can benefit local workers and businesses.

113

Table 3-2 -- Indirect costs (Gulfport)


Internal




Lost business for port and port tenants

X

Tonnage decline

X

$

$

$

$

Lost tenants

X

X

$

$

$

Lost revenue to port businesses

X

$

$

$

$

Casino losses Delays in port-‐related commerce and increased prices

X

$

$

$

X

Loss of facilities at port

X

$

$

$

Downtime after storm Cost of materials goes up due to port shutdown Cost to re-‐dredge, clear, and re-‐open navigation channel

X

$

$

$

$

X

$

$

$

$

X

X

$

$

$

Port closed to navigation

X

$

$

$

Navigation channel closed Cleanup costs, emergency workers, emergency services, etc.

X

$

$

X

Housing costs for relief workers Costs to the state (cleanup, emergency services, etc.) Other hurricane-‐related costs for port and tenants

X

$

$

$

X

$

Port evacuation cost

X

$

$

$

Overtime pay

X

$

$

$

$

Lawsuits against the port and tenants

X

$

$

$

Insurance costs going up Carriers need to move equipment to other ports

X

$

$

$

X

$

$

$

Indirect costs identified in document and interview analysis

114


(Cost burden indicated in $)

Positive spillovers Accelerated redevelopment and opened markets

X

$

$

$

INTANGIBLE CONSEQUENCES Finally, intangible consequences (Table 3-3) include many non-market consequences of disasters. Examples include loss of life, health impacts, ecosystem damages, and damages to historical and cultural assets. The 31 unique intangible consequences identified, account for 67 mentions in interviews, but only seven mentions in the documents reviewed. 83% of those interviewed discussed intangible impacts. This category encompasses many concerns about ongoing difficulties that last far beyond the initial cleanup and recovery stages of a disaster. For example, a reduced labor pool or inability to find insurance coverage can result in major changes for businesses for years after an event. As with the direct impacts and indirect cost categories, debris emerged as a major concern that also has intangible and unquantifiable aspects. Specific intangible consequences of debris were mentioned 67 times in interviews. During Katrina, food items from the port’s warehouses washed up around the city and caused major problems. Stored in a refrigerated warehouse at the port, plastic bags full of chicken and pork parts were carried by the storm surge and deposited on people’s lawns. One respondent described the level of frustration with the subsequent cleanup efforts: [At one city council meeting in Gulfport, up stands] a classic southern lady during the citizen comment period, with her hair kind of up like this, dressed like she was getting ready to go to church, but she was holding this bag of dead chickens . . . And this is, say, four months [after Katrina], while these chicken had been in these people’s yards. And she talks very slowly, and everyone’s kind of watching the bag of chicken. You can tell how unsatisfied she is. The mayor is sitting right beside her. She turns to him and . . . she puts it on the table right in front of him, this big bag of rotten chicken, and she says, ‘You need to do something about this.’

115

Many of the stakeholders talked at length about the many consequences of this debris, including: the stench, the health hazards, and the difficulty of cleanup. For weeks, neither the MSPA, nor the tenants or the City addressed the problem. One interviewee indicated that salmonella from the rotting carcasses had made its way into the soil. In addition to the items that washed up on private property, debris ended up on the waterway and caused both environmental and navigation issues. As stated in one interview: The water comes up, it moves into the coastal areas, and then when it’s retreating back to the ocean it’s pulling various refrigerators and things like that, so going back [later] to do dredging work, you’ve got these [residual] issues with debris. Debris is especially problematic because of the difficulty in assigning responsibility for damages and cleanup. For example, if a shipping container floats free and causes a breach in a petroleum tank, which organization bears responsibility? The owner or insurer of the container? The longshoreman who secured the containers? The owner of the petroleum tank? According to the interviewees, the organizations in Gulfport litigated for years over these kinds of issues. After Katrina, there were more than 50 claims of this nature. As one respondent described it: People [were] real pissed off about chickens being in their yard. It was crazy to blame and sue the port because they weren’t even their chickens; they belonged to the shipping company. Interviewees described how, in the aftermath of Katrina, the costs of insurance policies rose, certain risks became uninsurable, and moratoriums were placed on new policies. Though aspects of these impacts may be quantifiable, many are not. For example, it is difficult to say how the inability to insure against future risk affects a business: Would the business operate anyway if authorized by its financial backers? Would it change its operations in some way? Would it move its operations? As one Gulfport respondent said, [Without insurance], the whole economy was going to come to a frigging halt. Because if you can’t insure it you can’t finance it, if you can’t finance it you can’t build it. Another intangible consequence results from the loss of use of the port due to damage. An undamaged port can be used as a resource for disaster response (Mileski and 116

Honeycutt 2013). It can serve as a staging ground for supplies, manpower, and equipment. While not always considered a “critical facility”, like a hospital or fire station, a port can be instrumental in cleanup, recovery, and rebuilding. With roads and bridges closed, ports offer an alternative for bringing in goods and relief workers. However, a port that is severely damaged will not be available to provide this service, as was the case in Gulfport after Katrina. One respondent described how even after the channel was cleared, the port was not able to support disaster relief ships because it had no water or sewer infrastructure. After Katrina, a lack of available staff further hindered recovery: When people are trying to figure out their livelihoods and where they’re going to live and everything, it’s kind of hard to have them working for you. These types of labor and employment consequences impacted many in the region. Some of the port’s employees had no homes and prioritized finding a place for their families to live over returning to work. Port officials also discussed how storms like Katrina could create additional difficulties in port planning and development. Plans for growing the Port of Gulfport that had taken years to develop had to be shelved and priorities reviewed after Katrina destroyed the port, setting the port’s expansion timeline back by a considerable amount of time. Respondents also talked about many issues that I categorized as General disruptions to a sense of normalcy and the quality of life. Some of these, like disruptions of energy supply, can be traced back to port uses (e.g., a damaged fuel terminal results in interruptions of fuel supply). Interviewees indicated that normal life was disrupted for months or even years after Katrina as residents worked to clean up and rebuild their homes and places of employment. Many respondents also talked about environmental consequences such as household chemicals and other materials that would end up in the waterway and marine sediment layer. Chemical contamination harms marine life and results in higher costs for dredging, as special techniques must be used to minimize contamination of the waterway and to dispose of toxic dredge spoils. In this way, even waterway contamination that occurred from an off-port location would still

117

have an impact on port operations and costs since dredging is a requirement for ongoing operation of the port. As one respondent noted: Ensuring that the sediments are suitable for ocean disposal, upland disposal, or open water disposal becomes very costly as you may have [tested the sediment and] initially started to dredge, [but then] if you have a storm you may have to go right back and test it again, which could cost another $300,000 to $400,000. Consequence for the local and regional economy from losing port functionality included a variety of public sector concerns, as well as reductions in energy product imports and damages to other infrastructure commonly found at or near the port. For example, respondents talked about their experience trying to rebuild in a crippled local economy: Immediately after Katrina, the infrastructure was not in place anymore to house and feed workers and handle all the rebuilding … materials were scarce, because everybody was fighting for a limited amount of building materials and products. Salaries went way up because there was a limited work force … everybody was in a bidding war for labor. Public sector impacts such as fuel availability for generators and transportation, lack of boat access to the navigational channel, and the costs of unemployment, all slowed down the recovery process. Some aspects of these intangible consequences may be quantifiable. For example, lost jobs in the labor and employment consequences subcategory may manifest as unemployment insurance costs. Pollution to bay or waterway may also be quantified using specialized techniques such as those used to value ecosystem services (Daily et al. 2009). Generally speaking, the costs of intangible consequences that were identified through interviews and documents were distributed across the stakeholder cluster. The internal port stakeholders feel the effect of most of these, but most also can be felt in the budgets of public agencies and in, for example, the quality of life of community members in the local region and the state.

118

Table 3-3 -- Intangible consequences (Gulfport)



✓

✓

✓

✓

X

✓

✓

✓

✓

Lost jobs

X

✓

✓

✓

✓

Fluctuations in supply and demand of labor pool

X

✓

✓

✓

✓

Emotional toll on staff General disruptions to sense of normalcy and quality of life

X

✓

✓

✓

✓

Population shifts

X

✓

✓

✓

✓

Disruption of energy supplies (LNG, LPG, Fuel) Environmental damages to waterways, ecosystems, and coastal land resulting from release of materials stored at port

X

✓

✓

✓

✓

Pollution to bay or waterway

X

✓

✓

Hazardous materials impacting sediments

X

✓

✓

✓

Loss of coastal wetlands and ecosystems damages

X

✓

✓

✓

Coastal land damages

X

✓

✓

✓

Difficulty in planning and development

Pre-‐storm business plans derailed

X

Fluctuations in freight patterns

Labor and employment consequences

Workers stranded at port

X

Unemployment insurance lost

Intangible consequences identified in document and interview analysis

✓

✓

X

✓

✓

✓

Difficulties in obtaining insurance

X

Risks become uninsurable

X

✓

✓

✓

✓

Moratorium on new insurance policies

X

✓

✓

✓

✓

119


Internal



(Cost burden indicated by ✓)

Damage at the port prevents more efficient disaster response for region

Can't use port as recovery and response platform

X

Consequences of debris Debris in waterway obstructs navigation and hinders dredging Debris gets reported and recorded causing paperwork logjam Debris from port ends up as battering ram causing other damage Debris damming up marshes and wetlands and preventing normal tidal flushing

X

✓

✓

X

✓

✓

X

✓

✓

X

✓

✓

Debris as pollution

X

✓

✓

Debris as negative impact on residential quality of life

X

✓

✓

Debris as a general problem -‐-‐ no specifics offered Consequence for the local and regional economy from losing port functionality

X

X

✓

✓

Supply chain interruptions

X

✓

✓

✓

✓

Role of ports in state economy

X

✓

✓

Lost jobs devastate local economy

X

✓

✓

Local economy suffers (general)

X

✓

✓

Business operational burdens

Operations continuity

X

✓

✓

Lost business records

X

X

✓

✓

Forced to work from temporary facilities

X

X

✓

✓

120

✓

✓

✓

✓

DOCUMENT VS. INTERVIEWS COMPARISON Interviews and document comparison shows the differences between how stakeholders perceive impacts of the storm and how the port’s planning documents address them. Figure 3-2 shows the number of mentions for each of the three categories of impacts in interviews vs. documents. The port planning and policy documents focus primarily on direct damages and barely discuss the intangible consequences at all. The specific impacts of past or future hurricanes at the port received little attention in the documents that addressed both the port and storm impacts. In fact, many of the specific impacts noted in documents, originated from just one source: the damage assessment conducted by the MSPA after Katrina. This report went into great detail on the individual direct damages to port property. Interviewees, however, were far more concerned with the intangible consequences, which were barely addressed in the planning/policy documents that I reviewed. This indicates that stakeholders of the port cluster had many concerns about hurricanes at the port that had not been formally addressed through planning and policy.

Figure 3-2 -- Impacts mentioned in interviews vs. document

INTERNAL PORT STAKEHOLDERS CONCERNED WITH DIRECT DAMAGES, INDIRECT COSTS, AND INTANGIBLE CONSEQUENCES In order to examine how stakeholders considered the different types of impacts mentioned across the three categories, I normalized the data to show the average

121

number of impacts mentioned by each stakeholder by category (Figure 3-3). These results show that on average, the internal port stakeholders interviewed considered impacts fairly evenly across the three categories, though they did speak more about direct damages than any of the other categories. These internal stakeholders are closely involved with the port operations, planning, and disaster management and had been working on port recovery from Katrina. Thus, it is not surprising that these individuals had a fairly deep understanding of how a storm impacts the port itself, as well as how this type of event impacts the surrounding area and the various external stakeholders of the port. However, an understanding of the breadth of concern alone, does not necessarily result in those concerns being reflected in the port’s own planning process, as represented in Figure 3-4, which shows that the port planning documents incorporated very few impacts, outside of direct damages. The 21 interviewees from the public policy group talked more about the intangible consequences (1.1 mention/interviewee), as did the three interviewees from the external economic/contractual group. This indicates that these external stakeholders were less concerned with the actual damage at the port and more with the resulting indirect costs and intangible consequences. In the documents drafted or sponsored by external stakeholders, very few impacts are mentioned at all (Figure 3-4).

122

Impacts(men+oned(per(stakeholder(by(stakeholder(category( Intangible# consequences# 4.0# 3.5# 3.0# 2.5# 2.0# 1.5# 1.0# 0.5# 0.0#

Direct#damages#

Indirect#costs# Public#(local,#state,#regional)#

Port#and#Private#Sector#

Academia#and#NonProﬁt#

Public#(federal)#

Figure 3-3 -- Frequency of mentions per respondent by stakeholder group

123

Total&number&of&men.ons&in&documents& Intangible"consequences" 45" 40" 35" 30" 25" 20" 15" 10" 5" 0"

Direct"damages"

Indirect"costs"

Public"(local,"state,"regional)"

Port"and"private"

Academia"and"nonAproﬁt"

Public"(federal)"

Figure 3-4 -- Number of distinct impacts mentioned in documents

STAKEHOLDER CONCERNS IN PORT PLANNING DOCUMENTS At the time of the interviews, the Port planned to raise its elevation from 10’ to 25’ (See Chapter Two for discussion of this plan). The MSPA’s planning documents provided justification of its hurricane resistance strategy. However, these plans did not go into detail about the full range of impacts that its plans would mitigate. Of the documents analyzed and coded, ten (see Table 2-7 in Chapter Two) were drafted by the MSPA and addressed plans to restore and expand the port after Katrina. This project was funded through The Federal Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) through a $621m grant from the Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery Program to rebuild and repair the damage caused by Hurricane Katrina (Appendix II). The allocated funds were to “provide mitigation against future damage, prevent future recurrence of damage and destruction in 124

Hurricane events, and provide the long-term recovery of the operating capacity of the Port (MSPA 2010),” though no specific requirements were attached to the funding. Then-Governor Haley Barber also prioritized a port that would be more storm resistant (no. 15 in Table 2-7) In the plan (nos. 6, 7, 13 in Table 2-7), the improvements would potentially attract new customers, as no other port on the Gulf Coast offers such hurricane protection (no. 6 in Table 2-7). Once the decision to elevate the port was made, an Environmental Assessment Report (EAR) became the main vehicle for organizational checks, balances, and involvement in the project (no. 4). The Environmental Assessment and Review (EAR) process required numerous other agencies to approve the plan; however, it did not require any specific review of the 25' elevation component of the project. In the EAR public comments and other documents reviewed, I found no comments or concerns noted by any stakeholder about the decision to elevate the port or the chosen new height of 25'. When asked about how the decision to elevate came about, interviewees indicated that the Governor initiated the idea, with the help of CH2M Hill. FEMA representatives informed me that the elevation of structures or the land itself was a prerequisite for eligibility for certain funds that could be used toward rebuilding. I found no evidence of a cost/benefit analysis, nor any other formal study to help in the determination of this strategy over any other. As one respondent stated: The only other option [considered] was to evacuate the port … There wasn’t sufficient inland property available to be able to do that, and the cost to do that every time you have a storm alert was, in the long run, way more than what I were going to spend elevating the port. So really it came down to the only feasible option in order to protect it. ATTITUDES TOWARD CLIMATE CHANGE Climate change will increase the probability of storms like Katrina in the coming decades (Grinsted et al. 2013). Respondents were fairly evenly split between those who were and were not concerned about climate change impacts. One concerned respondent stated: 125

[We] lack a look at sea level rise in the region. Not just for the Port of Gulfport, but for Harrison County. What is sea level rise going to do to the total infrastructure of Harrison County? Well it’s going to totally destroy it…Raising the port to 25’ elevation is stupid, because the surrounding land is not at 25’, and they’re not going to raise all of Harrison County. So yeah, your containers will sit there, but everything in them is going to rot because you’re not going to be able to get them off the port … The way the area’s developed, you’d have to totally destroy downtown Gulfport [in order to make the port] truly resistant to sea level rise. Although the respondents were generally aware of the potential implications of climate change, most had not formally incorporated it into their planning or strategizing. As one unconcerned respondent put it, I hadn’t really thought about it; I mean I’d thought about global warming and how it raises the water, [but I thought] it was insignificant. I was told by the contractor that it didn’t really matter. Others were under the impression that sea level rise had already been taken into account in the elevation plan: Flooding . . . is one of our concerns … I’m pretty sure [the port considered] sea level rise. The new floodplain maps drafted by FEMA do not, however, incorporate any climate change projections (FEMA 2009).

DISCUSSION Impact assessments serve to inform policy and planning by helping decision makers understand the nature of the risk from and vulnerability to disasters. Since impacts of major storms are generally described in economic terms based on either direct damage figures or indirect losses (IPCC 2012), most reports of losses do not incorporate larger systemic impacts or non-market intangible consequences that were so prevalent in Gulfport (Pelling et al. 2002; IPCC 2012). Though many techniques help quantify various aspects of risk, no such assessment had been done in Gulfport for the stakeholders of the port. A number of assessments conducted after Katrina captured the specific damage that occurred at the port itself (MSPA 2005; Curtis 2007) and some of the indirect costs resulting from damage to all of the ports in Mississippi (PEER 2006), but none looked specifically at the port stakeholder cluster. 126

My assessment in Gulfport did not seek to monetize or otherwise quantify the actual costs of impacts. Rather, it served to help identify and define perceptions around the nature of the problem that climate change presents to stakeholders of the port as storms intensify and sea levels rise. Many of the impacts do not appear to be considered in stakeholder plans and policies for enhancing port resilience. The impacts reported most by stakeholders (intangible consequences) are those that appear least in the formal planning documents. This gap leads to many questions, such as: Are the investments in resilience enhancement adequate to meet the needs of the full cluster of stakeholders? If the direct damages were mitigated, which indirect costs and intangible consequences would also be mitigated? Given how few of the stakeholders’ concerns are reflected in the port’s planning documents, how comfortable are the stakeholders with the level of resilience the port is planning? The type of analysis provided here can help in planning reconstruction in a way that ensures an overall reduction in vulnerability (ECLAC 2003).

SUMMARY OF RESEARCH QUESTION RESULTS 1) How do stakeholders of the Port of Gulfport perceive the impacts of a major hurricane hitting the port? Stakeholders of the Port of Gulfport consist primarily of public agencies at local, state, and federal levels, but also include business owners in and around the port itself. I categorized stakeholders’ concerns about a hurricane event at the port into three broad categories of direct damages, indirect costs, and intangible consequences, as defined by the IPCC. Within these categories, stakeholders identified a wide range of specific impacts, including the damages to the structures on the port, freight, and equipment (direct damages); delays in commerce, loss of port functions, and increased costs (indirect costs); and operational burdens, disruptions of normality, environmental consequences,

and

difficulties

in

planning

and

development

(intangible

consequences). The internal port stakeholders (i.e., the MSPA) were more concerned with direct damages, but had a high awareness of the full range of impacts from all 127

three categories. The public policy stakeholders concerned themselves more with the intangible consequences, as did the external contractor/economic stakeholders. Many of these impacts, in particular the intangible consequences, are not easily captured by traditional impact assessments designed to quantify damage after an event. 2) In what ways are stakeholders considering the resilience of the port in planning and policy? In Gulfport, I found a gap between stakeholder concerns and resilience planning for the port. The documents that addressed these impacts skewed heavily toward the direct damages of a hurricane on the port facility itself and most mentions came from just one document: the damage assessment done after Katrina. Very few indirect costs were cited, but those that were, included tonnage declines, employment losses, and lost tenants. Though many indirect costs and intangible consequences result from the direct damages at the port, no assessment of these linkages had been conducted. Missing from the documents was analysis of the role the port plays in the wider region and the many ways that damage to port infrastructure ripples out to affect the port cluster as a whole. Decision makers may understand these implicitly, but an analysis of level of understanding was beyond the scope of this research. As urged by the IPCC, the U.S. Government Accountability Office, and Heinz Center, these broader impacts must be considered in resilience planning (GAO 2007; Heinz Center 2000; IPCC 2012). Many of the concerns expressed in stakeholder interviews were absent from the port’s planning documents. Public comment and review in the planning process reflected that the broader stakeholder cluster did not bring these concerns to the attention of the port. Most of the public comments addressed job creation, as opposed to the hurricane protection strategies the port planned to incorporate. For its part, the MSPA’s main mission is to be “a profitable, self-sufficient port providing world-class maritime terminal services to present and future customers and to facilitate the economic growth of Mississippi through the promotion of international trade and creation of

128

employment” (CH2M Hill 2010). There is no explicit mandate for the port to consider the interests of other stakeholders in the cluster or the long-term viability of the port, though many interests and goals are common to both groups. In addition, the funding the port received for the project had no specific requirements for hurricane resilience; rather, the HUD mandate was tied to job creation. By the time my research was completed, the port commissioners had voted to abandon the elevation plan entirely in favor of investment in a channel-deepening project. As stated by one of the port commissioners in a newspaper article, "I need to move forward. I need to get jobs. I need to get moving out and get this behind us” (MSPG 2012). A logical next step would be surveying the stakeholders themselves to better quantify their perceptions of the importance of the various impacts noted by the cluster as a whole.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS Categorizing, quantifying, and assessing impacts of natural disasters on specific sectors are daunting but critical components of disaster-mitigation planning (Canton). Results in Gulfport indicate that planning and policy should consider more than traditional quantitative direct damage assessment by including qualitative assessment tools that address indirect costs and intangible consequences resulting from a hurricane at the port. Even in Gulfport where Hurricane Katrina devastated the port, the resilience portion of the port’s strategic plan is largely overshadowed by the desire to expand operations, increase tonnage throughput and create jobs. While reducing the risk of direct damages also reduces the risk of many of the other impacts, a broader range of considerations would be appropriate, especially given climate change. Concerted efforts to include the full range of stakeholders in planning/policy for resilience could help bridge the gap between concerns and how they are accounted for in these documents.

LIMITATIONS AND NEXT STEPS The study has a number of limitations. 129

•

Assessing how stakeholders prioritize the various impacts was not covered in this study. Just because an impact was mentioned twice, for example, does not necessarily mean that it is of greater importance than an impact only mentioned once. It would also be valuable to consider the linkages between impacts, as mitigating one direct damage might offset multiple indirect costs and intangible consequences. A next step is to revisit the Port of Gulfport and ask stakeholders to prioritize and rank the relative value of the different impacts mentioned, as well as to trace the pathways between impacts. A network analysis tool could help determine which impacts stand out as central nodes from which other impacts result.

•

My interview analysis indicates some perception gaps in how different sectors of stakeholders consider impacts. For example, little concern was expressed for impacts on the environment or on the intermodal system with which ports interface. An assessment of how these gaps in perception align with jurisdictions and mandates would help identify areas that warrant more attention in planning. If, for example, federal entities show concern for environmental impacts but have no mandate or jurisdiction over the potential source of those impacts, then improved communications and planning could help address this disconnect.

•

The impacts noted in this study are limited to the perceptions of those identified by the stakeholders within the port cluster itself. There may be other impacts that were either unknown or not identified by these stakeholders. An “expert analysis” by a group external to the stakeholder cluster could identify these other potential impacts.

CONCLUSION This chapter identified impacts of an extreme event on the stakeholder cluster of Gulfport (MS). Interviews and documents from Gulfport show that stakeholders perceive that storms at the port result in direct damage to the port itself, but also on the quality of life and business in the region, and the environment. Stakeholders described 130

their experience with Hurricane Katrina and their concerns for another similar storm. Gulfport makes for an excellent case study because of its experience related to hurricane Katrina and the MSPA’s consideration of plans to rebuild in a more hurricane-resistant fashion. Many stakeholders' concerns did not appear in formalized documents that concerned planning and policy for the port. I also found that hurricane resilience was not a priority for respondents when it came to providing commentary and input to the port’s planning process. In the face of climate change, I suggest that port resilience plans consider not just the impacts on the port itself, but the impacts storms have on the wider port cluster. As seen in this study, the true costs of an event at the port are distributed amongst many stakeholders. The concerns expressed by stakeholders and the port’s decisions about resilience strategies suggest that stronger stakeholder engagement would help future resilience planning efforts.

REFERENCES Allison EH, Perry AL, Badjeck MC, Adger WN, Brown K, Conway D, Halls AS, Pilling GM, Reynolds JD, Andrew NL, Dulvy NK (2009) Vulnerability of national economies to the impacts of climate change on fisheries. Fish and Fisheries 10 (2):173-196. doi:Doi 10.1111/J.1467-2979.2008.00310.X Birkmann J (2007) Risk and vulnerability indicators at different scales: applicability, usefulness and policy implications. Environmental Hazards 7 (1):20-31 Bradshaw S (2003) Handbook for estimating the socio-economic and environmental effects of disasters. United Nations & ECLAC & International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (The World Bank), NY, NY Canton LG (2008) Review of Measuring Vulnerability to Natural Hazards: Towards Disaster Resilient Societies. Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 5 (1) CH2M Hill (2010) The Plan for the Implementation of the Port of Gulfport Restoration Program. Cochrane HC (2004) Indirect losses from natural disasters: measurement and myth. Modeling of spatial economic impacts of natural hazards, Y Okuyama and S Chang, eds, Springer, Heidelberg, Germany:37-52 Curtis SA (2007) Hurricane Katrina Damage Assessment: Louisiana, Alabama, and Mississippi Ports and Coasts. American Society of Civil Engineers, Reston, Virginia Daily GC, Polasky S, Goldstein J, Kareiva PM, Mooney HA, Pejchar L, Ricketts TH, Salzman J, Shallenberger R (2009) Ecosystem services in decision making: time to deliver. Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment 7 (1):21-28. 131

doi:10.1890/080025 FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) (2009) Flood Insurance Study for Harrison County, Missippi, and Incorporated Areas. Gall M, Borden KA, Cutter SL (2009) When do losses count? Six fallacies of natural hazards loss data. Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 90 (6):799809 GAO (United States Government Accountability Office) (2007) Port Risk Management: Additional Fedeal Guidance Would Aid Ports in Disaster Planning and Recovery. GCRP (United States Global Change Research Program) (2009) Global Climate Change Impacts in the United States. Cambridge University Press, http://www.globalchange.gov/publications/reports/scientific-assessments/usimpacts,Accessed January 1, 2009 Grinsted A, Moore JC, Jevrejeva S (2013) Projected Atlantic hurricane surge threat from rising temperatures. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. doi:10.1073/pnas.1209980110 Grossi P, Kunreuther H, Windeler D (2005) An introduction to catastrophe models and insurance. Catastrophe Modeling: A New Approach to Managing Risk:2342 H. John Heinz III Center for Science E, and the Environment. Panel on Risk Vulnerability, (2000) The hidden costs of coastal hazards: implications for risk assessment and mitigation. Island Pr, Hallegatte S (2008) An Adaptive Regional Input‐Output Model and its Application to the Assessment of the Economic Cost of Katrina. Risk analysis 28 (3):779799 Hanson S, Nicholls R, Ranger N, Hallegatte S, Corfee-Morlot J, Herweijer C, Chateau J (2010) A global ranking of port cities with high exposure to climate extremes. Climatic Change 104 (1):89-111. doi:10.1007/s10584-010-9977-4 IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) (2007) Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge, UK IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) (2012) Managing the risks of extreme events and disasters to advance climate change adaptation. Special report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press. Koetse MJ, Rietveld P (2009) The impact of climate change and weather on transport: An overview of empirical findings. Transportation Research Part D: Transport and Environment 14 (3):205-221 LADOT (Louisiana Dept. of Transportation & Dev. Office of Public Works and Intermodal Transportation) (2006) Status Report of Louisiana Ports from Hurricane Katrina. Lian C, Santos JR, Haimes YY (2007) Extreme risk analysis of interdependent economic and infrastructure sectors. Risk analysis 27 (4):1053-1064 MDA (Mississippi Development Authority) (2011) Federal Disaster Recovery Grant 132

Report Summary for March 31 2011. Mileski JP, Honeycutt J (2013) Flexibility in maritime assets and pooling strategies: A viable response todisaster. Marine Policy 40:111-116 Moser S, Ekstrom J (2010) A framework to diagnose barriers to climate change adaptation. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 107 (51):22026 MSPA (Mississippi State Port Authority) (2005) Hurricane Katrina Damage Assessment Report. MSPG (Mississippi State Port at Gulfport) (2010) Environmental Assessment and Environmental Review Record for Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery Project for 24-acre Fill and New Tenant Terminals and Infrastructure at Mississippi State Port at Gulfport (MS). MSPG (Mississippi State Port at Gulfport) (2012) Port Commission Nixes 25' Elevation Plan. http://www.portofthefuture.com/News.aspx?NewsID=301. Accessed 11/07/2012 NCADAC (National Climate Assessment and Development Advisory Committee) (Draft) National Cimate Assessment. http://ncadac.globalchange.gov/. Accessed July 25 2013 Peduzzi P, Dao H, Herold C, Mouton F (2009) Assessing global exposure and vulnerability towards natural hazards: the Disaster Risk Index. Nat Hazards Earth Syst Sci 9 (4):1149-1159. doi:10.5194/nhess-9-1149-2009 PEER (Joint Legislative Committee on Performance Evaluation and Expenditure Review) (2006) The Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Mississippi’s Commercial Public Ports and Opportunities for Expansion of the Ports. http://www.peer.state.ms.us. Accessed 15 January 2013 Pelling M, Özerdem A, Barakat S (2002) The macro-economic impact of disasters. Progress in Development Studies 2 (4):283-305 Rose A (2004) Economic principles, issues, and research priorities in hazard loss estimation. Modeling Spatial and Economic Impacts of Disasters:13-36 Stern NH, Britain G (2006) Stern Review: The economics of climate change, vol 30. HM treasury London, Woodroffe CD (1990) The impact of sea-level rise on mangrove shorelines. Progress in Physical Geography 14 (4):483-520

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CHAPTER 4 ANTICIPATED IMPACTS OF HURRICANES ON THE STAKEHOLDER CLUSTER: A CASE STUDY OF THE PORT OF PROVIDENCE, RHODE ISLAND INTRODUCTION As discussed in the Introduction to this dissertation, implementing appropriate strategies to build resilience for ports requires that decision makers understand the full range of impacts that could occur when a hurricane strikes; this is a first step in the climate adaptation and resilience-building process. In the case study of Gulfport (Chapter Three), I found that despite a recent hurricane and an emphasis from the internal port stakeholders on resilience building, the official planning and policy documents did not directly address many of the impacts of concern voiced by the stakeholders in interviews. This chapter provides a similar assessment of Providence, RI, a port that has not had a hurricane in the past 50 years, but has an overall statewide focus on climate adaptation. Together, these two case studies lay the groundwork to better understand the impacts of hurricanes upon port stakeholders. Like Gulfport, the Port of Providence, Rhode Island, is highly exposed to hurricanes that can produce extreme storm surge heights over 20’. However, Providence has not experienced a major storm since 1954. The decision makers in Providence and statewide Rhode Island have been involved with two principal climate adaptation efforts: a new part of the Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Program addressing adaptation to natural hazards; and the formation of a Climate Change Commission (referenced in Chapter 2). In this chapter, I address the following questions through an analysis of interview transcripts and planning/policy documents for the Port of Providence: 1) How do stakeholders in the port stakeholder cluster of Providence perceive the impacts of a major hurricane hitting the port; 2) How will internal and external

134

stakeholders bear the costs resulting from a hurricane hitting the port; 3) Do perceptions of stakeholders align with the potential impacts noted in planning and policy documents? This chapter provides an empirically based, bottom-up approach to identifying a specific set of vulnerabilities to the port system of Providence, RI, associated with a particular disaster event (a major hurricane) and its affects on the port stakeholder cluster. By using the case-study approach of the Port of Providence, RI, it provides a fine-grained analysis of hurricane impacts for a port cluster through a review of documents and an analysis of interviews. Chapter 4 also includes a comparative assessment of this case study and that of Gulfport in search of general learnings.

REVIEW OF METHODS Chapter Two provides a full description of the interview/survey process used in this case study. In brief, I selected the stakeholder cluster members using a snowball sample approach. The sample consisted of 27 stakeholders from across the stakeholder cluster. Interviewees included three internal port officials, five private firms, one community/environmental group, three academic/research groups, four Federal Government officials, eight state government officials, and three local government officials (Table 2-6). Interviews lasted between one and two hours, during which time I presented interviewees with a plausible storm scenario to use as a thought prompt, as discussed in Chapter Two. Interviews were recorded and transcribed and then analyzed line-by-line. As detailed in Chapter Two and Three, analysis followed an inductive method, whereby I identified impacts, grouped them into subcategories, and then used a deductive method to categorize them into the three main headings defined by the IPCC as: Direct Damages, Indirect Costs, and Intangible Consequences.

RESULTS OF THE INTERVIEWS AND DOCUMENT ANALYSIS Between the six planning/policy documents reviewed and the 27 interview transcripts,

135

I identified 60 distinct impacts that were mentioned a total of 138 times. I grouped these into 48 distinct types of impacts and then further into subcategories and main categories as described in the Methods section (Chapter Two). In this section and following sub-sections, I detail these distinct impacts, subcategories, and main categories. As in Chapter Three, Direct damages refer to damages that occur at the time of the weather event and are a direct result of it, such as damage to structures, infrastructure, and property. Indirect costs are the “reduction in production of goods and services, measured in terms of value added” (Hallegatte 2008). Finally, intangible consequences include many non-market consequences of disasters. Examples include: loss of life, health impacts, ecosystem damages, and damages to historical and cultural assets. Quotes from the individual interviews are indicated by the use of italics. Because interviewees were assured anonymity, I do not attribute quotes to individuals, nor do I identify the person interviewed. The subsequent tables in each subsection describe the specific impacts, subcategories (in bold/Italics), the potential bearer of the cost associated with the impact (internal port stakeholders and/or external stakeholders), and the number of times the impact was mentioned in interviews and documents. I assessed which stakeholders would bear the costs by considering the management responsibilities they described in interviews, as well as reviewing the missions, mandates, and jurisdictions of each organization (see Appendix II). “Bearing the cost” means that paying for the impact would come from the budget of the organization, either directly or through a mechanism such as insurance premiums (e.g., the port) or employee salaries (e.g., the City paying wages to workers for cleanup efforts). The costs incurred due to intangible consequences may not be conducive to monetary quantification, thus those costs are “felt” as negative impacts on the quality of life (e.g., lack of gasoline causes long lines at the pump) or the environment (e.g., ecosystem damages impact swimmable/fishable waterways). Impacts mentioned five or more times are indicated with dark shading. The analysis shows the diversity of impacts that stakeholders were concerned about, 136

as well as how the cost of those impacts is distributed across the stakeholder cluster.

DIRECT DAMAGES Direct damages refer to damages that occur at the time of the weather event and are a direct result of it, such as damage to structures, infrastructure, and property. This section details the specific damages from the hurricane scenario that I presented to stakeholders during interviews. It also includes impacts mentioned in the six planning and policy documents that discussed both storms (or storm planning) and the port, as detailed in Chapter Two (Table 4-1). A total of eighteen distinct direct damages were mentioned cumulatively in interviews and in the planning and policy documents. Fifteen of these were mentioned in interviews and four were mentioned in the planning and policy documents.

General damage to port facilities General mention of damages to port Damage to port lands Erosion of filled land Damage to wharfs, docks, and berthing areas Boats sinking at docks and cost to remove them Damage to wharf, piers, docks Damage due to stress on vessel mooring systems Damage to port buildings and structures Damage to LNG and LPG tanks Damage to warehouses, office, structures Debris causing damage to structures Flooding damage to buildings Fuel tanks breached Tanks floating free Damage to port equipment

137

1 2 3 1 4 2 2 1 5 1

1 1

Frequency of mentions in interviews Frequency of mentions in documents

# Of docs that mentioned in PVD

X X X X X

that

X X X X X X X X X X X

# Of respondents mentioned

External stakeholders bear cost

Impacts mentioned

Port bears cost

Table 4-1 -- Direct damages (Providence)

1 3 2 1 5 2 2 1 5 3

1 1

Damage to port equipment Damage to vessels and barges at port Ships torn from moorings Vessels floating off their dry-‐dock blocking Damaged freight and cargo Lost or damaged freight and cargo Damage off port property Damage to off-‐port roads and rail lines Transportation sector (general) Total Direct Damages

X X X X 15

X X X 8

3 1 2 5 3

1 1

5 1 2 7 3 43

1 1 4

Most of these impacts referred to damages on port property, either to structures or equipment or to the wharves and berths at the port. The petroleum fuel tanks stood out as a major concern amongst those interviewed. Concerns about the tanks included damage to the tanks themselves, spills, and even a concern that with enough storm surge, the tanks might float off their bases. These damages to tanks could have major repercussions for the region, as they could also result in both indirect costs (e.g., cleanup costs) and intangible consequences (e.g., environmental harm from fuel spillage). One respondent illustrated his concern by telling an anecdote about the last major storm some 55 years before: We’ve got big time problems down in the port as far as hazards are concerned. In 1954 we had hurricane Carol come through here … petroleum tanks went floating down Narragansett Bay because the storm surge that came up flooded out the low lying areas of the port. Almost all of these direct damages would likely result in some or all of the costs being borne by the port itself, though others, such as damage to vessels and barges would likely be covered by external stakeholders, mainly grouped in two categories: the economic/contractual stakeholders who are tenants at the port and the stakeholders who do business directly with the port (e.g., insurance companies, shipping companies, rail lines). Many such damages would likely be covered through insurance policies, unless the damage far exceeded the amount covered, however I was not able to review the specific insurance policies to ascertain which specific damage items would be covered. The Federal Government, through disaster relief funds would also likely cover some cleanup and rebuilding costs. Other stakeholder in the cluster, such 138

as the local public policy makers and the community groups, would probably not be responsible for the costs associated with direct damages. Although the costs associated with direct damages would not be borne by the stakeholder cluster, many indirect costs and intangible consequence costs that result from these direct damages would be shouldered by external stakeholders, as shown in the subsequent sections.

INDIRECT COSTS Indirect costs are the “reduction in production of goods and services, measured in terms of value added” (Hallegatte 2008). Below are the impacts mentioned in interviews and documents that may occur in the weeks and months following a hurricane that can be quantified in financial terms. I identified eight distinct types of indirect costs, including one positive spillover, which could occur from a major storm at the port (Table 4-‐2). All eight were mentioned in interviews, but only one was mentioned in the documents (i.e., General business continuity problems).

139

in

in


1 1 2

X X X X 4

X X X X X 8

1 1 2 1 2

1

1 1 2 1 2 11

1 1

Frequency interviews Frequency documents

mentions

of

1 1 2

mentions

X X X

of

# Of respondents mentioned


Cleanup costs, emergency workers, emergency services, etc. Costs to the state (cleanup, emergency services, etc.) Costs to replace buoys moved off station Debris impacts to navigation Costs associated with delays in port-‐related commerce Port closed to navigation Downtime after storm General business continuity problems Fisheries losses Positive spillovers New business can result from catastrophic event Total Indirect costs

Port bears cost

Impacts mentioned

that

Table 4-‐2 -‐-‐ Indirect costs (Providence)

Unlike the direct damages, stakeholders outside of the port itself would likely pay for many of the indirect costs mentioned. The result of a shutdown of the port or an important navigational channel can be felt as indirect costs (such as cleanup costs or costs to survey the channel) that may be paid for through tax revenues or business losses experienced by port tenants and other external contractors. For example, cleanup and emergency service costs would likely be covered by the public agencies such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Rhode Island Emergency Management Agency (RIEMA), or the City of Providence. The State would also need to hire emergency relief workers, which is a cost not currently included in its budget, according to one state representative. The port and the external stakeholders would share many of these indirect costs. One example from an interview illustrates how some of these indirect costs would be shared: In the case of a big event, the biggest [cost] for us would be an interruption of business. If we had a ship waiting to come in, and we couldn’t get it in here to unload it, that would be the biggest impact to us: Revenues that we wouldn’t receive because [that ship] might go someplace else. Though this respondent was speaking about the port, there are clear implications for other businesses, including the shipping companies, the shipping agents, the customers of the freight, and others in the supply chain. Similarly, the closure of the navigation channel would result in costs to the USCG to re-open the channel after clearing debris and realigning buoys. Meanwhile, the breaks in business continuity would hurt the port’s profits, as well as increase costs for those stakeholders who do business with the port. When the U.S. Coast Guard ramps up the warnings [and orders the port closed] it results in a delay of commerce ... they have to check if 140

all the buoys are on site [and] make sure the docks have no serious damage. Depending on the severity of the storm, commerce can get delayed considerably. Thus, as the ripple effect of damages to the port and the channel makes its way through the transportation system as a whole, the recovery costs fall more upon the stakeholders. Not all indirect costs were considered as having a negative effect. For instance, two respondents mentioned the positive spillover effect that occurs after a disaster as new disaster recovery jobs are created and relief funds are pumped into the local economy. These positive spillover effects for one region, may also result in negative effects for another region. For example, Federal Disaster Relief funding could be considered as having a negative indirect impact on the National budget, but a positive indirect benefit to the local area receiving that funding.

INTANGIBLE CONSEQUENCES Finally, intangible consequences include many non-market consequences of disasters. They tend to be more general and may include some aspects that are quantifiable, but it is difficult or impossible to quantify their overall affect in financial terms. The shifting burden of cost from internal to external stakeholders as impacts move from direct, to indirect continues when considering the intangible consequences. The 23 intangible consequences ranged from job losses, to disruptions in energy and critical service supplies, to a whole host of potential environmental damages resulting from spills originating at the port (Table 4-3).

141

142


X

1

1

X X

1 2

1 2

X X

1 1

1 1

X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X X X X

1 1 1 1 1 9

0 1 1 1 1 1 1 2

1 1 1 1 1 11

0 1 1 1 1 1 2 2

X X X 10

X X X 22

6 4 10

2

10 4 16 52

10 22

X X

X

3

1

Frequency of mentions in interviews Frequency of mentions in documents

# Of respondents that mentioned

Business operational burdens Long recovery times Port facility closures Consequence for the local/regional economy from losing port functionality Lost jobs devastate local economy Small businesses forced out of business due to recovery costs Supply chain interruptions Damage at the port prevents more efficient disaster response for region Can't use port for as recovery and response platform to aid region Debris hampers emergency and repair crews Surveying and navigation recovery equipment in short supply Lost insurance Disruption of critical services Destruction of energy infrastructure Disruption of regional energy distribution Interruption of critical goods supply Interruption of essential services Interruption of power supply Environmental Damages Loss of coastal wetlands and ecosystems damages Cement into the channel Coal washed into water Contamination caused by inundation Liquid asphalt into the waterway Pollution to bay or waterway General disruptions to sense of normalcy and quality of life Disruption of energy supplies (LNG, LPG, Fuel) Scale of disaster is overwhelming Debris Total Intangible consequences


Impacts mentioned

Port bears cost

Table 4-3 -- Intangible consequences (Providence)

2

1

Some aspects of these impacts may be quantifiable in monetary terms (e.g., port facility closures do have a financial component, as well as other non-financial components), but many would be extremely difficult or even impossible to quantify in monetary terms. For example, the environmental damages resulting from coal, cement, or other materials spilling into the waterway could have far-reaching implications for the whole ecosystem of the Narragansett Bay. One respondent described these consequences, as follows: You have liquid petroleum products, cement, [and] a chemical company all of which are going to be submerged [and] subject to debris damage ... They’re all going to be pulled right back into the Narragansett Bay, you’re going to have a lot of potential impacts to a lot of important resources that are really hard to [comprehend]. Another respondent mentioned the intangible consequence of losing the port as a resource in disaster recovery and response scenarios, since ports can serve as staging areas for response efforts that aid in recovery. A severely damaged port could result in a longer and more difficult recovery process period, affecting the region as a whole (Spaulding et al. 2007; Mileski and Honeycutt 2013). Six respondents also discussed impacts that fell into the broad category of General disruptions to a sense of normalcy and the quality of life. Since the port provides essential services to the region, losing port functionality results in disruptions of energy supplies and other materials that can negatively impact overall quality of life (e.g., residents have no fuel for heating or driving) and result in psychological stress (e.g., the shear scale of the disaster is overwhelming and leaves residents with a in New York and New Jersey, when feeling of hopelessness). A very real example of this occurred after Hurricane Sandy the damaged port infrastructure prevented necessary petroleum products from getting to the New Jersey refineries and queues at the gas pumps stretched for miles and hours. Debris was also cited numerous times, with some respondents describing debris that originated at the port and impacted other parts of the Bay. Other respondents discussed 143

the impact that debris from elsewhere could have on port operations (e.g., debris could shut down the navigation channel as discussed in the Indirect Costs section above). The numerous mentions of debris were likely due in large part to a detailed study conducted by students at the University of Rhode Island (Spaulding et al. 2007). Five of the respondents indicated that they had read this study. I did not include the student report itself in my review of official planning and policy documents, since it did not qualify as an official planning or policy document of any of the stakeholders within the cluster. However, the “Hazards Chapter” of the Metro Bay Region Special Area Management Plan referenced many of the specific debris concerns brought to light in the student's report. In fact, of the 12 impacts I found mentioned in the Hazards Chapter, eight referred specifically to debris. All of the stakeholders in the port cluster would share to some extent in the costs associated with these intangible impacts, though most of the costs burden would fall primarily upon external stakeholders. For example, Damage at the port prevents more efficient disaster response for region, results from not having the port available as a resource for recovery. A functioning port could serve as a landing area for barges that collect debris, U.S. Coast Guard vessels performing survey work, a terminal for necessary fuel products, among many other necessary functions. A damaged port also could result in individual tenants within the port losing their insurance coverage, thus the service that those businesses supply (e.g., fuel supply, building materials, scrap metal or debris export) would also be unavailable as resources to the overall cleanup effort. Environmental damages, such as chemical spills or bulk materials washing into the waterway, also result in costs that are difficult to quantify in monetary terms, but will ultimately be borne by society as a whole. For example, pollution could make the bay unsuitable for swimming or fishing and harm the sensitive marine environment that provides breeding areas for many species that make up the marine ecosystem. The quality of life of residents in the City and State could be affected by this type of pollution or other impacts, due to lost jobs, lack of access to gasoline or heating oil, or

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simply due to the psychological effects resulting from a disaster that destroys the port.

DISCUSSION This case study was designed to aid in the problem identification stage of adapting ports to climate change. Like the case study of Gulfport, this research addressed questions about stakeholder perceptions about hurricane impacts, and the extent to which stakeholders concerns are considered in port resilience plans and policies. This section addresses these broader questions through three more specific questions researched in Providence, as well as a comparison with findings from similar questions posed in the Port of Gulfport and discussed in Chapter Three.

SUMMARY OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS 1) How do stakeholders in the port stakeholder cluster of Providence perceive the impacts of a major hurricane hitting the port As detailed in the above sections on direct damages, indirect costs, and intangible consequences, stakeholders of the port perceive that they have much to lose when the next hurricane hits the port. The majority of distinct impacts mentioned (22 out of 47) fell into the broad category of intangible consequences and these were mentioned with much greater frequency overall than either indirect costs or direct damages (Figure 4-1). This indicates that stakeholders thought most about these kinds of impacts and were probably most concerned about them. The lowest number of impacts fell in the indirect costs category.

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Figure 4-1 -- Distinct impacts and frequency of mentions in documents and interviews (Providence)

Had interviewees been more specific, some of the intangible consequences may have been categorized as indirect costs. However, the interviewees tended to talk about impacts in very broad terms, thus it was difficult to determine which, if any, aspect of the impact could be quantified in financial terms. In many cases, coding their concerns with specificity was extremely difficult. For example, many interviewees made statements like, You’re going to have a lot of potential impacts to a lot of important resources that are really hard to [comprehend]. In some cases, follow up questions elicited more specificity, but many interviewees were vague when it came to details. This challenge, however, only underscores the necessity for the type of research undertaken in this case study so that potential impacts can be named, perceptions shared, and ultimately better planning and policy developed to address them. 2) How will internal and external stakeholders bear the costs resulting from a hurricane hitting the port? The indirect costs and costs associated with intangible consequences will likely fall 146

more heavily upon the external stakeholders, as seen in (Figure 4-2) rather than on the internal stakeholders of the port. All stakeholders will bear the costs to some extent, with the potential impacts affecting the environment, quality of life, jobs, emergency recovery, and much more.

Figure 4-2 -- Who bears the cost of impacts in Providence

As discussed in Chapter 2, the notion of internal and external stakeholders is fuzzier in the case of Providence, in particular when assessing the costs of the various impacts identified. Unlike Gulfport, where the port is contained in one very specific location, the Port of Providence covers a large geographic area and includes numerous independent firms. There is no overarching port authority with responsibility for the entire district. For the purposes of this analysis, I assigned costs to the Port (i.e., Waterson Terminal Services) only if the Port itself would directly pay for the repair or recovery cost. 3) How do perceptions of stakeholders align with the potential impacts noted in planning and policy documents? Given these far-reaching impacts across the stakeholder cluster, one might expect to find port resilience against hurricanes referenced in many of the documents I reviewed. As one respondent from the port stated, There is a need to] identify the critical weak points. [For example], if we don’t have highway access, that’s going to kill [our business], and if we don’t have rail access that will also kill [our business]. 147

However, most of the stakeholders in the cluster had no planning or policy documents that specifically addressed port resilience and those that did address it, did so in a cursory manner. As seen in Figure 4-3, the majority of impacts were not identified in the documents we reviewed.

Figure 4-3 -- # of distinct impacts mentioned in interviews and documents

Most of the plans and policies of local or state government that I reviewed did not specifically address hurricane impacts or planning for the resilience of the Port of Providence. In the Hazard Mitigation Plans, for example, critical facilities were specifically discussed in terms of their vulnerability, but the port was not addressed. These are defined as those “that are critical to the health and welfare of the population and that are especially important following disasters.” The plan goes on to identify nine specific types of critical facilities: marinas, shelters, schools, hospitals, fire and rescue stations, police stations, water supply points, and rail road stations/airports. The

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port does not show up in this list, nor is it mentioned explicitly as a potential resource following a disaster, despite research that indicates role a port can play in post-disaster recovery (Mileski and Honeycutt 2013). Similarly, the plan provides specific analysis for “state owned/operated facilities,” but because the port is not state owned or operated, it received no explicit mention as warranting special consideration. Most of the impacts identified in the group of six documents came from just one plan: the “Hazards Chapter” (CRMC 2011) of the Metro Bay Special Area Management Plan (SAMP). Drafted by the Coastal Resources Management Council (CRMC), it accounts for half (17) of all the impact mentions found in the reviewed documents. It mentions seven specific impacts, with eight references to debris. It also mentions three of the direct damages that could occur at the port itself and it includes the port in its list of critical facilities. Implicit in the assessment is an understanding that the port plays role in the region and that the impacts from a storm would affect many stakeholders in the cluster.

PLANNING GAPS IN PROVIDENCE The results of analysis of interviews and documents in this case study indicate that the concerns of stakeholders and the potential impacts of a hurricane hitting the Port of Providence have not been addressed in the stakeholders’ formal planning documents. In Providence no studies had been conducted of the port cluster specifically, though two had been conducted on the regional scale. The first of these, the City of Providence Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (PEMA 2010), addressed port issues, but the assessment focused primarily on terrorist attacks with respect to the port. The plan only notes that flooding poses a threat to shipping, port operations, business and property and that, “Uninterrupted port operations have economic benefits to the City.” It provides no further analysis, though does include a recommendation for the City of Providence to conduct further study of the port to, “Identify upgrades necessary to limit damage due to flooding and earthquake” and to “Retrofit the Port of Providence facility to protect against flood and earthquake damage.” The second 149

vulnerability assessment, the “Hazards Chapter” (CRMC 2011) of the Metro Bay Special Area Management Plan (SAMP) also looks at the port within the context of the region. This document devotes the most attention to issues at the port and thus stands out as the exception from the others. The planning gap suggested in our findings is confirmed in part in a passage of the Hazards Chapter of Rhode Island’s Coastal Resources Management Program (CRMC 2011), that states this as an area of concern: Existing [planning] documents (either outdated or in draft form) do not adequately address or link to other plans to address hazard issues on the waterfront. This is problematic because of the unique hazards present in the port districts of Providence ... The port areas … carry major infrastructure and supply the region with critical goods, in both postand pre-hazard conditions. Guidance could include evacuation of shoreside facilities, structural mitigation of shoreline structures, safe harbor recommendations, and boat pullout procedures and priorities, as well as address other concern issues such as spills, contamination caused by inundation, and facility closures. It should be noted additionally that new requirements for facility evacuation, import of supplies, emergency transport, etc. might be placed on this infrastructure in the case of a hazard scenario. Another aspect of the planning gap results from construction of existing infrastructure in the port area being completed decades before appropriate land use and building codes took affect, as noted by the CRMC (2011). Much of that infrastructure still exists and is operational, despite designs that would not be up to today’s regulatory standards. However, even structures build in recent decades in accordance with current codes and regulations are not designed to withstand new environmental conditions likely to occur due to climate change. Planning gaps may result from both jurisdictional issues and a mismatch of timescales, as port operators make investment decisions based primarily on the interest of the port as a business, while state and regional planning efforts do not address the port specifically enough to protect society’s long-term interest in port functions. Port operators typically make investment decisions based on the best interest of port 150

business on a 5-10 year time horizon, as found in a recent survey of port authorities perspectives on climate adaptation (Becker et al. 2012) and in descriptions of the strategic planning process for ports (Allen 2012; Dooms and Macharis 2003). Considering the impacts of strong hurricanes in the face of climate change, on the other hand, must include time horizons that are well beyond the 5-10 year range for the sake of both the business interests of the port and the interests of the other external stakeholders in the cluster. Though all stakeholders stand to lose when a hurricane hits, the port itself is more protected from a financial perspective for two reasons: First, the port generally carries insurance; second, in the even that damages exceed the insurance coverage, the government steps in with disaster relief funding (e.g., this was the case in Gulfport after Katrina). This ultimately results in a cost for society as a whole, since disaster relief funds from the Federal Government are paid by the Nation’s taxpayers.

BRIDGING THE GAPS Though these findings suggest such a gap exists, less apparent is which stakeholder(s) should take a leadership role in addressing port resilience and bridging the gap. The Port of Providence comprises a complex group of private and public entities. The port terminal itself, ProvPort, operated by a private company, does not have a strategic planning process that includes port resilience, nor does it have the financial or staff resources to invest in leading a climate adaptation effort that addresses storm resilience issues. The same holds for the many other smaller businesses that make up the Port of Providence. Since, overall, the Port of Providence provides a public good, the government is positioned to play a role in conducting vulnerability assessments, adaptation planning, and creating policy that leads to appropriate levels of resilience to protect the greater interests of society. However, much of the port falls outside of the jurisdictional authority of the state since it is located landward of the mean high tide line that delimits public and private property. Though some port lands are owned by the City of Providence, respondents indicated that the City stays mostly uninvolved in 151

planning and operations. Research and academic organizations, such as the Coastal Resources Center (CRC) at the University of Rhode Island, are poised to facilitate assessment and planning at a stakeholder scale. On behalf of the CRMC, the CRC has facilitated similar processes in the past that resulted in changes across stakeholder groups. For example, a “Balancing Uses of the Working Waterfront” workshop brought stakeholders together to assess ways that seemingly conflicting uses could be better harmonized (CRC 2007). This effort resulted in changes to state and city policy, business plans of independent firms, and the formation of a new stakeholder alliance group that now represents the common interest of waterfront businesses. Because the CRC served as a neutral facilitator, diverse stakeholders came together to share information freely and plan for mutually beneficial outcomes. A similar effort could help focus research and planning at the port stakeholder scale for adaptation planning.

COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF GULFPORT AND PROVIDENCE The purpose of this study was to lay groundwork that leads to a deeper understanding of what happens to the port stakeholder cluster when the port suffers a major hurricane. This section adds to that understanding by comparing the two case study ports. In Providence, stakeholders identified many such potential impacts ex ante an actual storm event. I found many similarities and some marked differences between impacts noted in Providence and those noted ex post facto by stakeholders in Gulfport (Figure 4-4).

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Figure 4-4 -- Number of distinct impacts mentioned in Providence and Gulfport

SIMILARITIES In both case study ports, planning and policy documents addressed few of the concerns expressed by stakeholders. This was the case both in Gulfport, where the Mississippi State Port Authority (MSPA) was focusing on implementing a resilience strategy in response to a recent hurricane, and Providence, where no such effort existed, but there was a culture of leadership around climate adaptation in the State. In Gulfport, post-storm impact assessments from Katrina addressed direct damages at the port and other impacts on a regional scale. As discussed in the Introduction and Overview section of this dissertation, these assessments provide information that can serve as a foundation for resilience plans, such as the one that was being undertaken for the Port of Gulfport (see Chapter Two). Though the MSPA had plans for a resilience strategy, the planning documents included little input from port stakeholders about storm impacts and few references to the many concerns identified in interviews. In Providence, no post-hurricane event impact assessments for the stakeholders had been conducted, due to the fact that no such event has taken place in their recent

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history. There were, however, vulnerability assessments conducted on statewide and citywide scales, but these did not specifically address the port or its stakeholders in detail. Although a university study done in Rhode Island identifies many of the consequences of a storm ex ante (in particular with respect to debris), most formal documentation either does not address the port directly or focuses primarily on emergency response. Neither interviews nor the documents in Providence identified any established process for identifying the wider impacts that a storm event would have on port stakeholders. Though Gulfport results showed a higher number of impacts cited overall, the trends were the same in both case studies. In both, the highest number were intangible consequences, followed by direct damages, and then indirect costs. Providence and Gulfport respondents identified a comparable number of intangible consequences and in both cases debris stood out as a top concern. All three of the individual impacts that were cited with the highest frequency fell into this category. In Providence, the top impacts mentioned most frequently in interviews were debris (11 times), pollution to the waterway (11 times), and disruption in energy supply (10 times). The first two of these were each mentioned twice in the Providence planning documents. In Gulfport, the top impacts mentioned most frequently were containers all over the city (20 times), chicken and pork bellies all over the city (13 times), and debris polluting the environment (nine times). Cleanup of debris in and around the Port of Gulfport took more than six months after Katrina, explaining why this was a top concern (Miller and Birdsall 2010). Research conducted in the Port of Gulfport also revealed similar planning gaps as Providence and these may have contributed to the MSPA shifting resources designated for port resilience into projects that had more short-term benefits (MSPG 2012). Like in Providence, Gulfport stakeholders felt concern over a very wide range of potential impacts resulting from a lack of resilience at the port. Like Providence, no formalized process existed to ensure that these concerns were recognized and incorporated into the planning process. The consequences of a hurricane hitting the port and the costs

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these events have for society as a whole suggest that bridging this planning gap would benefit all stakeholders.

DIFFERENCES While Providence interviewees tended toward more generality in their descriptions of potential impacts, Gulfport interviewees were more specific as they had prior and direct experience dealing with a hurricane at port. This resulted in a far greater number of total impacts in Gulfport than in Providence. Gulfport’s respondents and document review yielded far more specifics in the categories of direct damages and indirect costs (Figure 4-4). For example Providence interviewees mentioned a general, Damage to port equipment, while Gulfport interviewees mentioned the specifics of, Damage to cranes and Damage to the fencing system. Gulfport’s planning documents for port restoration also focused far more attention on direct damages than on the indirect costs or intangibles consequences. Given that Gulfport has been recovering from Hurricane Katrina, it is not surprising that they have a much higher awareness of some of these specific impacts. Worth noting, is how little overlap there was between the specific impacts identified in the two case studies. Few specific impacts were mentioned in both Providence and Gulfport. Though both ports face high hurricane exposure and both are small to medium sized ports, like all ports, they are quite different in terms of cargo handled, environmental conditions, management, and equipment. This finding suggests that, while it is difficult to generalize with respect to the unique ways that hurricanes impact port stakeholders, the overall trend of concern for higher proportions intangible consequences may hold true across all ports, though this requires further testing. Although the sample size for both Providence and Gulfport is small, I analyzed how internal stakeholders of the port considered impacts (Figure 4-5). Here, the data suggest that the internal stakeholders of the Port of Gulfport have a much broader awareness of the full range of impacts than their counterparts in Providence because:

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1. Port of Gulfport is a operated by a state port authority and thus more engaged with other stakeholders, and 2. The experience with Katrina left the interviewees with a much more detailed understanding of what actually happens as a result of a major storm, suggesting that site visits between these two ports could be a way to share lessons learned.

Figure 4-5 -- Impacts mentioned by internal port stakeholders in Gulfport and Providence

LIMITATIONS AND NEXT STEPS This research was designed to contribute a better understanding of the nature of the climate change problem for one particular port stakeholder system (Providence) and compare it to one other system (Gulfport). It does not allow for a detailed assessment of the many other factors that warrant further analysis, including: more or less severe impacts, how the impacts are linked, probability of the various impacts, their specific costs, which particular stakeholders would bear that cost, how stakeholders prioritize their concerns, and many other issues that would be components of a thorough vulnerability assessment at the stakeholder scale. This study, rather, yields results that represent the diversity of consequences that 156

stakeholders perceive to be of importance when a major storm hits a piece of infrastructure – in this case, the port. The impacts collected in this research were also generated from within the stakeholder cluster itself. There are likely additional impacts that were overlooked, but are nevertheless significant. This case study lays groundwork for future research of seaport resilience that can be conducted at a scale that is narrow enough to be able to trace impacts back to one source e.g., a port), but broad enough to recognize the role that port plays for a wide variety of stakeholders. There are numerous next steps involved in effective planning for a future that includes more frequent and more intense storm events. One next step would be conducting a more formal risk analysis that allows for probabilities and specific costs to be assigned to the various impacts and asks stakeholders to prioritize and their level of concern. There are numerous tools that can aid in this decision support process (Haymaker and Chachere 2006) and similar exercises have begun to be carried out, though not at the port stakeholder-cluster scale described here (see for example the Port of San Diego 2013).

CONCLUSION The Port of Providence faces unique risks from storm events, due to its location and the complex cluster of stakeholders that depend upon its functionality. Climate change-induced sea level rise and changes in storm frequency and intensities raise the level of risk in Providence, like in many coastal areas around the world (Grinsted et al. 2013). To properly plan, decision makers need to understand what direct damages might occur to a given facility, but also the indirect costs and intangible consequences that result from the hurricane events. The results from this study suggest that while a collective awareness around hurricane impacts on port stakeholders exists amongst stakeholders in Providence, the port planning and policy documents include little guidance on port resilience generally, and explicitly mentioned only 33% of all identified impacts. Neither the port operator, nor

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the external stakeholders of the port, addressed long-term resilience planning in their policies and plans in any detail, yet external stakeholders outside of the port are at risk for shouldering many costs associated with a lack of proper planning. These findings are similar to those of Gulfport, MS, in that there is an overall trend of high levels of concern for intangible consequences, many costs will be borne across the stakeholder cluster, and some gaps in how impacts are addressed through official planning and policy. In Gulfport, however, stakeholders named a higher number of impacts overall and with more specificity, due in part to their direct experience with a recent major hurricane disaster. Together, findings from these two case studies suggest that there are gaps between perceived risks and resilience plans. This case study suggests that the diversity of impacts resulting from a hurricane hitting the Port of Providence, the increasing risk of these events due to climate change, and the potential costs to society, warrant that planners and practitioners more fully consider port resilience and hurricane impacts in future planning efforts and bridge the gap between perceptions and formalize planning/policy. I suggest that understanding how stakeholders, planners, and policy makers as a cluster perceive these impacts can lead to a greater emphasis on resilience planning for the port that benefits all stakeholders.

REFERENCES Allen C (2012) Future Ports Scenarios for 21st Century Port Strategic Planning. Journal of Transportation Law, Logistics, and Policy 79:89-137 Becker A, Inoue S, Fischer M, Schwegler B (2012) Climate change impacts on international seaports: knowledge, perceptions, and planning efforts among port administrators. Climatic Change 110 (1-2):5-29. doi:10.1007/s10584-0110043-7 CRC (Rhode Island Coastal Resources Center) (2007). http://www.crc.uri.edu/download/Impacts_2pager.pdf. Accessed July 31 2013 CRMC (Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Council) (2011) Natural Hazards: Hurricanes, Floods, and Sea Level Rise in theMetro Bay Region Special AreaManagement Plan. Dooms M, Macharis C (2003) A framework for sustainable port planning in inland ports: a multistakeholder approach. In: ERSA conference papers, 2003. 158

European Regional Science Association, Grinsted A, Moore JC, Jevrejeva S (2013) Projected Atlantic hurricane surge threat from rising temperatures. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. doi:10.1073/pnas.1209980110 Hallegatte S (2008) An Adaptive Regional Input‐Output Model and its Application to the Assessment of the Economic Cost of Katrina. Risk analysis 28 (3):779799 Haymaker J, Chachere J (2006) Coordinating goals, preferences, options, and analyses for the Stanford Living Laboratory feasibility study. Intelligent Computing in Engineering and Architecture:320-327 Mileski JP, Honeycutt J (2013) Flexibility in maritime assets and pooling strategies: A viable response todisaster. Marine Policy 40:111-116 Miller C, Birdsall I (2010) Bridging the disconnect between development and disaster -- Gulfport case study. Journal of Emergency Management:25-36 MSPG (Mississippi State Port at Gulfport) (2012) Port Commission Nixes 25' Elevation Plan. http://www.portofthefuture.com/News.aspx?NewsID=301. Accessed 11/07/2012 PEMA (Providence Emergency Management Agency) (2010) Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (HIRA). Port of San Diego (2013) The Climate Mitigation and Adaptation Plan of the Port of San Diego. http://www.portofsandiego.org/climate-mitigation-and-adaptationplan.html. Accessed 10 June, 2013 Spaulding M, Hu J, Baxter C (2007) Natural Hazards and Flood Plain Management in Upper Narragansett Bay. Unpublished student report from University of Rhode Island - OCE495

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CHAPTER 5 THE ROLE OF PORT STAKEHOLDERS IN BUILDING SEAPORT RESILIENCE IN THE FACE OF CLIMATE CHANGE: A TYPOLOGY OF STRATEGIES INTRODUCTION Chapters One through Four of this dissertation contribute to the problem identification step in the process of adapting ports to climate change and building resilience for port systems. Identifying and assessing strategies serves as a next step in that process (Moser, 2010), though little work has been done in this area in seaports in particular (EPA 2008). Because the port provides a public good (Baird 2004; Reddy 2000; Cornes 1996), both the stakeholders and the port stand to gain from a higher level of resilience. In this chapter, through case studies of two highly exposed ports, Providence (RI) and Gulfport (MS), I identify potential strategies to reduce the vulnerability of the port to impacts due to extreme storm events, as stakeholders perceive them. In addition, I consider which stakeholders are best poised to implement these strategies, based on their missions, mandates, and jurisdictions. I propose a typology of strategies for port stakeholders and describe how opportunities to implement these strategies distribute across the stakeholder group. This chapter addresses the following questions: 1) How do port stakeholders perceive the strategies that could be implemented to reduce the impacts of a major hurricane at the port 2) Based on the missions and goals of stakeholders, which stakeholders are poised to implement the various strategies? In both case-study locations, I based data collection and analysis on in-depth interviews of stakeholders, including port operators, port tenants, and representatives from the public policy sector, academia, and community groups. I supplemented interview data with a review of relevant planning and policy documents in both case 160

study locations. A full discussion of methods and case study selection is provided in Chapter Two of this dissertation. I begin this chapter by discussing strategies to build port resilience and the existing typologies developed to help frame them. I then present the results of my grounded theory approach to resilience strategies for these two ports, which resulted in seven categories and 128 unique resilience strategies. I conclude with some overall comments on the strategies identified, the stakeholders poised to implement them, and a discussion of the next possible steps of this research.

STRATEGIES FOR RESILIENCE BUILDING This work fits into the larger framework of resilience planning, motivated by concerns about climate change impacts, that may be broadly described through the five steps of adaptation planning discussed in the background chapter of this dissertation (Figure 0-1). This chapter focuses on the second step (Identify, assess, and select strategies) and lays the groundwork for future work on implementation, monitoring, and revision (steps 3-5). Many external stakeholders will suffer the consequences of a disaster at the port (see Chapters 3 and 4 of this dissertation), suggesting by inference that these stakeholders have much to gain from increasing resilience of the port. The port operator itself can invite stakeholders to the planning table and solicit input into ways they can enhance resilience, but in the end, the goals of profit, and for some ports, economic development, typically drive the decisions of the port operators. These goals do not necessarily align with the goals that other stakeholders in the cluster have with respect to port resilience, which may be to protect the environment, maintain a good quality of life, reduce tax burdens, and more (See Introduction and Overview chapter). Aside from a seat at the table, are there other ways that stakeholders can contribute to the common goal of a more resilient port? The research in these case studies provides insights that address this question.

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The National Research Council (NRC) (2010) outlines strategies for building resilience and adapting to climate change in several broad sectors (ecosystems, agriculture and forestry, water, health, transportation, energy, and coastal area vulnerabilities) and identifies which level of government and/or stakeholder (federal, state, local/city, private sector, NGO, or individual citizens) is best poised to implement the option, based on elicitation of expert opinions (Table 5-1; see also Appendix III for more complete list). Ports fit within both the "ocean and coastal" and "transportation" sectors discussed in the NRC report. In this chapter, I examine in much more detail the strategies for one particular facility (the seaport), and one particular impact (more intense storms), from the perspective of the stakeholder cluster that includes the stakeholders with an interest in the long-term resilience of the facility (See Introduction and Overview chapters of this dissertation for discussions on these concepts). Table 5-1 -- "Table of Strategies" for adapting to climate change (from NRC 2010)

A number of typologies exist for strategies to reduce vulnerability and build resilience to sea level rise and storms in the context of climate change adaptation (Wilby and Keenan 2012). One typology suggests three categories: Defend against the risk (e.g., infrastructure, upgrades, engineering solutions), Live with the risk (e.g., flood resistant construction, accept flood damages, submersible structures, etc.); and Withdraw from the risk (e.g., relocation of people and assets) (IPCC 2012). Though this typology works well for considering some coastal uses, like residential or non-water dependent commercial, it holds some constraints for use in coastal infrastructure resilience. First, coastal infrastructure such as ports is inherently dependent on location in the coastal 162

zone, and second, it serves as a public good that provides services for a wide range of stakeholders. For ports, withdrawing from the risk would by definition remove ports from the shoreline where they need to be in order to function on behalf of society as a whole. Indeed, strategies such as relocations, setbacks, and rolling easements that may work for other types of uses (e.g., residential or non-water dependent commercial) (Cheong 2011), simply would not be appropriate for industrial waterfronts. Others have suggested that resilience strategies for coastal hazards broadly fall into “structural” and “nonstructural” measures (Cheong 2011). Structural measures make buildings more resistant to storm impacts. They include the construction of dikes and storm barriers, elevation of land, and building stronger structures that are more wind and flood resistant. Nonstructural measures include such practices as relocation, retreat, zoning, insurance, and subsidies. In the natural hazards literature, Travis (2009) identifies six “reaction modes” that denote key pathways to climate adaptation, as follows: 1. Technological control and intervention of the physical phenomena themselves. 2. Physical protection and barrier to make places safe from the hazard. 3. Monitoring, forecast, and warning systems to provide some sense of certainty and safety and to guide other responses like evacuation. 4. Building codes and engineering design standards to reduce damages of given events. 5. Relief and insurance mechanisms to spread the burden and to support recovery and reconstruction. 6. Land use changes to reduce underlying exposure and vulnerability.

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Each of these pathways represents a step that one or more actors within the system may undertake to enhance resiliency. Following the strategies of these six pathways proactively has been shown to be more cost effective than alternative “reactive” strategies implemented after a disaster event that result in high cleanup and rebuilding costs (Stern and Britain 2006; Roger A. Pielke 2007). However, absent from this framework is the role that governance, networks, and new ways of thinking can play in establishing enabling conditions for building resilience using these approaches. Though portions of these and other frameworks may be applied to help understand port stakeholder clusters options for resilience building, no such typology has been created specifically for ports and those who depend upon this coastal-dependent infrastructure. I thus undertook a grounded-theory approach (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Charmaz 2003) that allowed for categories of resilience strategies to emerge from the case study data I collected.

METHODS As noted in detail in Chapter 2, interviewees in Providence and Gulfport were asked about potential resilience strategies; respondents discussed both the steps that they currently take, as well as the potential strategies that could be employed in the future. Although some of these strategies were being followed in one or both ports, I did not differentiate between what was currently being employed and what was a potential future strategy. Identification of strategies followed a grounded theory approach in which ideas were coded and grouped into unique strategies. These unique strategies were then grouped into subcategories and then seven major categories (Table 5-2 and Figure 5-1). In some cases, strategies fell into more than one category. In these cases, the strategy was assigned to a sole category based on best fit. In my analysis, I also evaluated each individual strategy to determine which stakeholder groups were poised to implement it (this terminology is consistent with the National Research Council approach in Table 5-1). Poised to implement means

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that the organization or agency has within its mandate, jurisdiction, and mission the agency to devote resources to the implementation of the given strategy. I based my determination on interviewees’ descriptions of their role with respect to the port that they described in interviews, as well as through a review of mission statements and organizations objectives (see Appendix II for a full list of organization missions/goals). The analysis of interview transcripts and official documents from both Providence and Gulfport identified 128 unique strategies that could be implemented to protect the ports and the port-related interests of the stakeholders (background and methods can be found in Chapter Two and a full list of strategies may be found in Appendix III). I have ordered these based loosely on the number of stakeholders I found to be poised to implement strategies within the category, from fewest stakeholders to most. The following sections describe the strategies, categorized as follows: 1. Building codes and land use regulations 2. Long-range planning 3. Construction and design strategies – on and off port lands 4. Private sector and insurance policies 5. Emergency response, preparation and recovery 6. Research 7. Networks and new ways of thinking

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Table 5-2 -- Examples of strategies from Gulfport and Providence

Category Building codes and land use regulations

Examples noted in interviews Condition new permits on debris cleanup standards; create post-storm rebuilding requirements before the storm; Incorporate hazard mitigation into other statewide planning effort; restrict building in the floodplain

Long-range planning

Create climate adaptation plans; Public policy (state);

Construction and design strategies Construct or modify features off port lands Construct or modify features on port lands

Build breakwater/barriers/dike; move the port; build sacrificial designs; elevate connecting infrastructure Build stronger; elevate structures; incentivize storm resilience with lower premiums; install hurricane anchors

Stakeholder leads Public policy (state); Public policy (local)

Public policy (federal); Public policy (local); Create offsite evacuation safe haven; Community groups

Public policy (Federal); Public policy (state) Internal port; economic/contractual

Private sector and insurance policies

Conduct insurance inspection specific to storms; factor resilience into normal operations and maintenance programs; create emergency response plans; create inter-corporation agreements for contingency planning

Internal port; economic/contractual

Emergency response and recovery plans

Create communications plans; create debris removal plan; Conduct emergency drills; manage port inventory to reduce stock levels; prioritize employee needs post storm; secure equipment in place; Public policy (local); use storm-resilient equipment

Public policy (state); Internal Port; improve hurricane forecasting ability; Economic/Contractual

Research

Conduct vulnerability assessments; Public policy (state); use gaming exercises and scenario planning tools

Public policy (federal); Public policy (local); Internal Port; Economic/Contractual; Community groups; convene council of experts to address resilience; Academia

Networks and new ways of thinking

Increase collaborations; create regional climate monitoring offices; join international networks related to climate adaptation; think longer term; Public policy (state); use resilience as a marketing strategy

Public policy (federal); Public policy (local); Internal Port; Economic/Contractual; Community, Academia

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Long range planning efforts

6

Private sector and insurance policies

10

Building codes and land use regulations Research (inc. risk assessment, forecasting improvements, and

10 13

Constructions and design

24

Networks and new ways of thinking

32

Emergency preparation, response, and recovery

33 0

10

20

30

40

# of uniquque strategies mentioned in Gulfport and/or Providence Figure 5-1 -- Number of strategies in each category

For each category of resilience strategy, a figure indicates the total number of strategies identified (in parenthesis after the category title), which stakeholders are best poised to implement the given strategies (indicated by dots), as well as how many of those strategies could be implemented by each given type of stakeholder group (indicated by number in dot). Numbers greater than five are highlighted in a darker shade for emphasis. The full list of individual strategies identified may be found in Appendix III. DESCRIPTIONS OF THE SEVEN STRATEGY CATEGORIES 1. Building codes and land use regulations Building codes and land use regulations (Figure 5-2) are tools for controlling what and how structures are built in the coastal margin. They are a means for the state or local government to designate where different land uses can occur, flood proofing 167

requirements, and the construction standards that must be followed.

Figure 5-2 -- Building codes and land-use regulations

Stakeholders described 12 unique strategies that fell into this category, including specific ideas like prohibit the use of erosive fill, create tighter controls on development in floodplains, and increase freeboard requirements for structures. Most of these strategies have long-term benefits (i.e., more than 20 years) and reduce the overall vulnerability of the port due to the impacts of a storm event. They can be put into place today and the benefit will be felt many decades into the future. Because of this, they require good scientific projections about the probability of future storm events, flooding, and inundation due to sea level rise that will occur throughout the functional lifespan of the structure or land area that they regulate. Both Providence and Gulfport already had freeboard requirements as part of the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) requirements and as part of local building codes. These required buildings to be constructed with an additional 1-3’ of freeboard above base flood elevation. After Katrina, Gulfport had two options for meeting the elevation requirements for building in a floodplain set out by FEMA: 1) They could elevate individual structures, or 2) They could elevate the land itself. Eligibility for certain FEMA funding dollars required that one of these requirements be met for rebuilding any structures that used FEMA funding. In Gulfport, the vast majority of structures at the port were being rebuilt after Katrina, as almost everything at the port had been destroyed. Thus, the port built replacement structures in accordance with more recent building codes and requirements. In Providence, however, “a significant portion of the region’s critical facilities and coastal infrastructure located in the floodplain is not protected or was built before the current building standards were adopted in the 1970s” (CRMC 2011). Only a permit

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application to significantly change or improve those structures would trigger a requirement to bring them into compliance with current building standards, thus many structures would remain unfit for current conditions even without the new changes brought about by new climate conditions. Changing building codes and land use regulations in order to enhance port resilience would most likely be led by local government or state government. In Providence, strategies like conditioning new permits on debris cleanup standards could be implemented by the Coastal Resources Management Council (CRMC) in order to help reduce the amount of debris that accumulates during a storm event. Though respondents were asked to think specifically about the port, many of the strategies they mentioned could also apply to build resilience for the waterfront community in the broader sense. Conditioning new permits on debris cleanup standards, for example, could be a way to give the CRMC the authority to address the debris problem throughout all of the coastal areas of the state. Other ideas, like creating performance measures, would also be implemented by state policy agencies like the RI State Building Code Commission or through local zoning ordinances. Some ideas found in one case study could be applied to the other. For example, in Providence, fitness of purpose regulations authorized the CRMC to inspect waterfront facilities and require upgrades for docks and wharves to ensure they are adequate for their intended use. This type of regulation could also be implemented in Gulfport where the state coastal agency (the Dept. of Marine Resources) played a much smaller role in port regulation. It should be noted, however, that Rhode Island’s state jurisdiction for fitness of purpose does not cover the petroleum storage tanks or any other infrastructure located upland; only structures that are seaward of the high tide line. As one official put it, There’s a gap in mandates and jurisdictions, so a lot of the facilities [e.g., tanks, berms, petroleum transfer facilities] are outside of our jurisdiction. 2. Long-range planning According to respondents, long-range planning (Figure 5-3) was an important

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component of building resilience for the port. I categorized planning strategies as “long-range” when the respondent implied a time horizon beyond 20 years.

Figure 5-3 -- Long-range planning

The six specific long-range planning strategies mentioned fell into three broad types: 1) general hazard mitigation plans; 2) specific climate adaptation plans; and 3) the incorporation of resilience principles into existing planning efforts. General hazard mitigation plans were already well established in both ports and primarily addressed disaster preparedness and response, the specifics of which are discussed in section 5, below. In the documents themselves, which were drafted by the state emergency management agencies, the port was not addressed in specific detail, nor did the plans consider new conditions from climate change. The second type of strategy, specific climate adaptation plans, was broader in scope than the hazard mitigation plans. Suggestions ranged from plans for individual facilities to regional plans that would address impacts and planning efforts for multiple ports in multiple states. Although the port operator or its tenants could create long-range resilience plans, the longer time horizons are typically not aligned with the normal planning cycles of private firms. Respondents discussed a third type of long-term planning strategy, the need to better incorporate resilience into existing plans such as the state’s comprehensive plan and transportation plan. Individual firms and port operators typically plan along 5-10 year time horizons (see Introduction and Overview chapter for more on port planning). With profit-oriented missions, planning beyond 10 years becomes difficult due to potential market shifts, changes in regulations and policy, and technological advances, among other variables. Thus, long-term planning efforts are largely in the domain of state entities such as Statewide Planning and the CRMC (Providence) and the Mississippi Development

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Authority (MDA) and Mississippi Department of Transportation (Gulfport). Statewide planning programs can also work to integrate long-term resilience planning into a variety of existing planning documents, such as transportation plans and guidance for local-level comprehensive plans. As one Rhode Island respondent put it, I think that our Statewide Plan needs to consider this sort of scenario much more [and] give it higher priority. Gulfport respondents did not emphasize this type of planning effort when discussing resilience, whereas in Providence quite a few of the interviewees discussed the need for these types of plans. In general, Providence respondents felt more concerned about the potential impacts of climate change and its implications for long-term planning. Providence respondents were also more familiar with the potential impacts of climate change, though I found very few instances of skepticism about climate change in any of my interviews across both case studies. Many Gulfport respondents still felt overwhelmed by the effects of Hurricane Katrina, expressing resignation to the idea that another storm of that magnitude would simply be impossible to recover from. Thus, paradoxically, Providence respondents may have been in a better position to think about long term planning due to the very fact that they had not recently experienced such a major storm event and felt less paralyzed by the knowledge of its potential for destruction. 3. Construction and design strategies (on and off port lands) Construction and design strategies (Figure 5-4) consisted of physical changes either on or off the port. The 12 Construction and design strategies ON port lands included the use of stronger building materials and hardening structures against the effects of wind and storm surge. Construction and design strategies on port lands might also include building structures that are submersible with designs that allow for flooding followed by draining or pumping dry.

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Figure 5-4 -- Construction and design strategies

Sacrificial structures were also mentioned in interviews. These ideas included the use of materials that would be designed to give way under a load. For example, breakaway walls could be built at ground level. Designed to give way and allow water to pass through a space in case of a flood, these walls would be non-load bearing so that their destruction would not cause the collapse of the entire building. In Gulfport, most respondents talked about elevating the entire footprint of the port to raise the whole port up and out of the floodplain. At the time of the interviews, Gulfport had a formal plan in place to do exactly that, even though that plan was later abandoned in order to reallocate the funding for that project toward the shorter-term goals of port expansion (MSPG 2012). In Providence, the port already had in place a fencing system designed to accommodate storm surges. Interviewees also discussed 12 Construction and design strategies OFF port lands ideas that could result in a more resilient port. Most of these referred to major projects, would likely be beyond the jurisdiction or mission of the port operator itself. These included major new infrastructure initiatives such as constructing breakwaters, building barriers/dikes, or relocating the entire port. Respondents in Gulfport also talked about the need to restore offshore barrier islands that served to protect the coast and the possibility of restoring wetlands that could block or slow hurricane-force winds. Other potential strategies included building resilience for the infrastructure that connects to the port. Many respondents in both case studies raised the point that the port did not function in isolation from its connecting infrastructure, and thus a port was only as resilient as its connecting critical infrastructure (e.g., roads, bridges, rail). Thus, to build resilience for the port would require implementation of new or different

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designs for infrastructure located off the port lands. For example, Gulfport respondents mentioned that tunneling and elevating the roadway to the port had been considered as part of the post-Katrina rebuilding plans, though no plans as such were adopted. Implementing construction and design strategies on port lands would likely be under the authority of the port operators themselves, as they are ultimately the decision makers with respect to the final construction specifications for structures at the port. However, the port operator may be compelled to implement these strategies through a number of external mechanisms (e.g., insurance requirements, building codes, or funding stipulations). Though these types of regulatory mechanisms came up in interviews when discussing construction and design, I categorized them separately from the specific construction or design strategy mentioned. The state and Federal Government stood out as key stakeholders for implementing offport construction and design strategies. Constructing and modifying features off of port lands would most likely be federally funded and state sponsored. Since most of these types of projects would be constructed across federally managed waterways, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) would most likely be a lead agency. However, any major project would require substantial input from many government agencies, as well as other stakeholders in the region. 4. Private sector and insurance policies The ten Private sector and insurance policies strategies (Figure 5-5) included the actions that could be taken by the port, the private companies directly engaged with the port, and by the insurance companies that contract with the port or its tenants to minimize their own risk and liability.

Figure 5-5 -- Private sector and insurance policies

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Specific policies for the port and port businesses included: develop climate adaptation plans, factor resilience into normal operations and management programs, appropriate adjacent properties to minimize damage to neighboring non-port interests, and purchase additional insurance coverage. Some strategies, such as creating a climate change adaptation local partnership to assist the port in preparation for climate impacts could be implemented by any of the stakeholders on the local level, including community groups and private firms. This category also includes actions that the insurance sector could take to encourage resilience building of the port. All businesses associated with the ports carry some amount of insurance that will protect them in case of a major storm event. Since insurance is a critical component of handling risk, it is not surprising that a number of strategies focused on improving the role of insurance. Insurance inspections on site, for example, could identify vulnerabilities of structures and infrastructure. Other interviewees suggested the development of new insurance incentives for going above and beyond the minimum requirements set by local building codes. Insurance turned out to be far more complicated than I anticipated. Since there are multiple businesses, each with multiple types of policies with different agencies, building resilience for the port through insurance incentives would be thorny. However, I did find that in both Gulfport and Providence, the insurance companies interviewed indicated that their setting the costs for premiums did not consider any future changes from sea level rise or storm intensity increasing. I address this in more detail in the discussion section below. 5. Emergency preparation, response and recovery The 33 Emergency preparation, response, and recovery strategies (Figure 5-6) focused primarily on readying the port immediately prior to a storm, as well as actions during and immediately following the storm. These actions manage a disaster’s impacts.

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Figure 5-6 -- Emergency preparation, response, and recovery

Most of them may be thought of as practices, in that they are actual steps taken to prepare a port (or port area) for an impending hurricane. These fell into four subcategories. Business continuity planning included strategies that minimize that amount of downtime that a specific company experiences during and after a storm event. Specific actions suggested included data storage plans that would include an offsite backup of data. Another suggested that contracts and agreements between companies be negotiated and drafted in advance of a storm. These agreements could build in redundancy and increase the efficiency of cleanup. For example, respondents in Gulfport described how cleanup efforts were slowed after Katrina due to the bidding process that was required in the selection of contractors to carry out cleanup efforts. They now bid out the cleanup contracts in advance so that cleanup can begin immediately after a storm event. Another Gulfport interviewee explained how companies had to work together to facilitate the supply of truck chassis that were required to move shipping containers out of the Port of Gulfport after Katrina. Truck chassis were in short supply and had to be swapped between companies in order to move containers off port grounds more quickly. In both cases, pre-storm contracts can lead to more efficient recovery. Drills & pre-event trainings included tabletop exercises that were usually led by the local U.S. Coast Guard office, but included many of the port representatives. These were a major part of existing resilience strategies in both Gulfport and Providence. In both ports, many stakeholders participated in emergency drills and training conducted by the local U.S. Coast Guard offices, though these drills often dealt with other types 175

of emergencies (i.e., terrorist attacks or oil spills). Post-storm actions referred to actions immediately after the storm passes, such as attending to the needs of port employees who may be facing the loss of their homes or displaced families. Response and recovery guidance strategies included the creation of communications plans, evacuation procedures, debris management plans, and guidance for the use of the port facility as a staging area for the first responders. Finally, Storm preparations included the many specific actions that could get the port ready to face a storm. Examples included securing port equipment in place, shutting down the waterway to traffic, evacuation of the port, and moving equipment to higher ground. Gulfport respondents discussed their experience with Hurricane Katrina and the many issues they encountered during and after the storm. Evacuation of the port was a dominant theme in both ports. Along with elevating the port, a comprehensive evacuation plan stood out as the resilience strategy most strongly considered. Evacuation of the port included moving personnel, cargo, and equipment to an inland facility about three miles away from the port. In Providence, evacuation was also considered. However, there was no formal plan, nor designated inland location for port equipment and cargo, and there was the extra challenge of having to relocated bulk cargo like salt or coal piles (as opposed to containers that are more easily transported). As stated by a Providence respondent, During an event like this [hurricane scenario], I don’t think they’d have enough time or forewarning to relocate and move [the coal, scrap metal, or other bulk products] even knowing that a Category 3 hurricane [was coming]. They just wouldn’t have enough time to move it. And [even if they did], where would they put it? Unlike containerized cargo that can be easily trucked, bulk cargo is typically offloaded from a ship into a large pile and then transferred to individual train cars, a timeconsuming process. Since Gulfport had recently experienced Hurricane Katrina, there were numerous

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specific emergency response strategies noted. For example, one respondent talked about using shipping containers as barriers by placing them in front of vulnerable buildings. In Gulfport, respondents also suggested that port inventory could be managed to reduce stock levels well before an oncoming storm, thus minimizing the evacuation effort and ensuring that cargo normally stored at the port would not turn into debris. Other preparations noted included evacuating the port, managing items that could end up as debris, securing equipment in place, and shutting down the adjacent waterway. When I asked about resilience-building strategies, many interviewees in both Providence and Gulfport focused almost entirely on these emergency preparation, response and recovery planning activities. One respondent from Providence stated: We’ve got a plan . . . Since we’re under heavy Coast Guard rule of thumb, they’re pretty much taking a lead as far as [emergency] response, as far as giving us the heads up, the early warming. Basically, the port’s plan is to move the equipment to higher ground. Strong collaborations were already in place in both Gulfport and Providence, with both acknowledging the role the U.S. Coast Guard plays in this area. In both case studies, respondents provided examples of successful emergency management exercises. 6. Research The 13 Research strategies (Figure 5-7) included better understanding the aspects of risk and vulnerability, as well as the costs and benefits of various mitigation responses.

Figure 5-7 -- Research

Respondents

suggested

vulnerability

studies, 177

scenario

exercises,

improving

forecasting, and other efforts that could be conducted by government, private sectors or academia. Some respondents cited a need for better hurricane forecasts and better floodplain mapping. Others discussed a general lack of understanding of vulnerability and how new studies might benefit the ports directly. In Providence, both the University of Rhode Island (URI) and Brown University were identified as “Research/academia stakeholders.” Both had conducted research efforts around the Port of Providence, along with URI’s Coastal Resources Center taking the lead on drafting climate adaptation policies and working waterfront policy, and the Ocean Engineering department of URI conducting an extensive survey of debris potential around the port area. In Gulfport, the snowball sample did not identify any particular research institutions as stakeholders. However, an assessment conducted by Curtis and colleagues (Curtis 2007) suggested some best practices for rebuilding certain structures at the port. In addition, a study conducted by students at Columbia University aimed to inform the Port of Gulfport and its surrounding communities on the essential elements of port sustainability and how those may be incorporated into their planning process (Morse 2011). That study used case studies of other ports to inform best practices that included strategies that I included and categorized in other parts of my study (these were: Develop a climate change adaptation plan, Establish a climate change adaptation local partnership, and Join international networks related to port climate change adaptation). The port or another stakeholder may contract studies such as these. They may also be spearheaded by the research institute itself or in a partnership arrangement. 7. Networks and new ways of thinking Networks and new ways of thinking emerged as a category that captures strategies that set the stage for resilience building, as many of these ideas would help create the conditions necessary for implementation of other strategies identified in these case studies. The strategies included in this category include ways that stakeholders can access and share information, as well as shifting focus to positive actions that favor

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resilience building.

Figure 5-8 – Networks and new ways of thinking

Thirty-two Networks and new ways of thinking (Figure 5-8) strategies fell into the following subcategories: collaborations, empower government, improve information flows, lengthen planning horizons, and shifts in thinking. Ideas for collaborations included: form new collaborations amongst government agencies, create climate monitoring offices and climate commissions, improve information flows, increase planning horizons, and general shifts in thinking. Interviewees also discussed various ways that government could be empowered to help build resilience for the port. For example, a suggestion was made to enhance FEMA’s Hazard Mitigation program to prioritize disaster mitigation. As it stands now, FEMA’s mission with respect to disasters consists of four focus areas: mitigation, preparation, response, and recovery (FEMA 2013). According to respondents, the focus tends to be much stronger on the last three of these, since the Federal Government provided less money for activities around mitigation that could lessen the impact of a specific event. Interviewees also suggested that enhanced insurance coverage be required as a prerequisite for federal aid for post storm rebuilding. As noted by one respondent, the National Flood Insurance Program does offer discounts on insurance if structures are built with freeboard higher than the minimum required. Though this was in part an insurance type strategy and could fit into the Insurance and Private Sector category above, I included this in the empower government subcategory because it is a government-based policy, rather than one that could be created within the insurance or 179

private sectors. These types of new government policy initiatives are most likely to be implemented from within the public policy sector, in particular at the federal level. However, other ways of empowering government include the authorization for development of stronger state regulations. For example, in Rhode Island, a draft “Hazards Chapter” in the Special Area Management Plan recommended that provisions be incorporated “into design and permitting of water-based projects to address preparedness, response and recovery of hazards related to hurricanes and sea level rise (Statewide) (CRMC 2011). At this point, however, the authority of the CRMC only extends landward to the high-tide line. Thus, in order for CRMC to develop regulations along these lines, they would need the additional authority over projects that are water-based, but not necessarily seaward of the high-tide line.

DISCUSSION In sum, I identified 128 strategies through interviews with stakeholders and a review of relevant documents (Figure 5-9 and Figure 5-10). The highest number of strategies fell into the Emergency response, preparation, and recovery and Networks and new ways of thinking categories. It thus seems that these stakeholders had many ideas for effective response to a particular disaster, but were less clear on actions that could be taken to increase resilience longer term and reduce the risks associated with a disaster that might be worse due to climate change. Using the NRC (2010) report as a template, I assigned each strategy to one or more stakeholders that were poised to implement the strategy. I reviewed the management responsibilities described to me in interviews, as well as the mandates, jurisdictions, and missions of organizations interviewed found that stakeholders in the state public policy and internal port were poised to take leadership for the highest number of strategies (Figure 5-11), though every stakeholder was poised to implement at least some of the strategies.

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Figure 5-9 -- Stakeholder groups poised for leadership (Version 1)

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# of strategies stakeholders are poised to implement (n=128)

80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

Building codes and land use regulations Long range planning efforts Constructions and design Private sector and insurance policies Emergency preparation, response, and recovery Research (inc. risk assessment, forecasting improvements, and projections) Networks and new ways of thinking Figure 5-10 -- Stakeholders poised for leadership (Version 2)

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Figure 5-11 -- Summary of stakeholders and strategies

This analysis and the resulting typology provide guidance and framing for considering the range of strategies available to the port stakeholder cluster. The many strategies identified through these two case studies demonstrate that the options for resilience building are incredibly varied from hard actions (like building a dike) to softer strategies (like thinking long term or creating a climate coalition). In conducting interviews with 57 stakeholders across two case studies, I did find some general trends. Though there are many strategies available to build resilience of the port and protect both internal and external stakeholders, the focus in most interviews tended to be on disaster response and management, rather than steps that could be taken to build resilience on the long term (e.g., storm barriers, research efforts, collaborations). This can be seen both in the number of strategies, 33 fell into the emergency preparation, response, and recovery category, and also in the qualitative analysis of the interview data. Many of the respondents spoke almost exclusively about emergency preparations, response, and recovery, and did not discuss the broader issues of longterm planning for resilience. This is likely because it is much easier to understand the parameters around emergency response and roles are already well established. There 183

are clear goals (e.g., remove people and hazards) and clear tasks to be managed (e.g., clean up debris, re-establish utilities, etc.). Measuring the success and determining which organization has responsibility to implement other strategies can be more opaque, as their success occurs only when an anticipated problem or impact is avoided (Moser and Boykoff 2013). It is much more difficult to measure and quantify, for example, the payoff of a good land use policy or building code. Though a thorough discussion of the barriers to implementing these strategies is beyond the scope of this paper (for more on barriers, see Moser and Ekstrom 2010), many interviewees pointed to issues pertaining to a lack of leadership. They generally felt that building resilience for the port should be a priority, but felt less clear on which stakeholders should take the lead. In addition, many pointed to more pressing priorities of the day to explain why more has not ye been done to build resilience. When compared to the other budgetary issues and the needs for staff resources, developing, leading, and implementing port resilience strategies was simply less important than other more immediate needs. In the public policy sector, agency representatives indicated that their resources were already stretched thin and that building long-term resilience for the port was simply not a priority, despite their agreement of its importance. Although I found many strategies for building resilience, the incentive structure for investing in implementation was not clear.

THE INSURANCE STRATEGY A number of respondents mentioned strategies that would increase the role of insurance to manage risks associated with hurricanes. This warrants some discussion, as insurance figures highly as one of the key ways that risk is transferred. The process of risk management entails assessing each risk and determining who is best able to manage the exposure (Kleindorfer 2009). In general there are four ways to manage risk: Avoid: do not engage in that activity 184

Reduce: mitigate the risk by changing elements to reduce uncertainty Transfer: sell the risk to someone else who can better manage it (insurance) Manage: accept and budget for the risk In the context of seaports and the increasing risk of storms, there may be no option to avoid being on the coast and shipping is core to the global economy; therefore it is difficult or impossible to avoid the risk (i.e., reduce exposure). At this point in time, it does not appear that the ports can play a significant role in reducing the risk of sea level rise and increased storms, as they do not have the ability to materially mitigate climate change (though they do play some role and should contribute to global efforts in this regard). This leaves the two options: transfer the risk (purchase insurance) or manage it directly. Generally speaking insurance is used to manage those risks that cannot be avoided or reduced. At a high level, the business model for insurance is that the premium charged covers the exposure; by insuring a large number of diverse customers (geographically or economically) the risk is spread over a large number of customers (the total collected covers the probability of the event happening to one customer). For high probability, low-cost events, most ports will choose to manage the risk directly rather than pay the premium to the insurance company. For the low probability, high-cost events, the ports get insurance to cover large exposures and insurance companies use higher deductibles to keep the ports motivated to better manage these risks. However, states also play a role in regulating the insurance industry through the state department of insurance. They approve rates, promote a stable insurance industry, require that insurers maintain adequate reserves, and generally serve to represent the public’s interest with respect to insurance. Though it did not come up in interviews or document review, the state could play a stronger role in promoting resilience through the authority of the department of insurance. For example, as discussed in detail by (Tran 2008), the state could encourage the use of hurricane projection models to better

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determine rates. Due to capital constraints, and the correlation of risks inherent in natural disasters, there is a limit to the damages the private insurance market can cover. As a result programs have been developed at both the National and state levels to cover the exposure that is beyond the capacity of the insurance companies to bear. At the National level, the most prominent program is the Federal Emergency Management Agency. In addition to coordinating the federal response to disasters, FEMA provides recovery assistance and funding for critical public facilities that are insured, for losses beyond insured limits (See FEMA Section K 2. ). This and other mechanisms to provide federal disaster relief dollars shift the cost burden from the private sector (or the port itself), to society as a whole, once the threshold of insurance coverage is exceeded.

OPERATIONALIZING EXISTING FRAMEWORKS FROM THE LITERATURE Many of the strategies fit well within the broader suggestions found in frameworks such as that of Travis, Cheong, and the NRC (Travis 2009; NRC 2010; Cheong 2011). Though I chose to create a new set of categories based on the empirical data discovered through interviews and document review, I found that most of the categories had analogues with more generalized models. For example, Travis’ “Physical protection and barrier to make places safe from the hazard” includes many strategies that I categorized as Construction and design on/off port lands. Similarly, “Relief and insurance mechanisms” (Travis) is similar to my category of Insurance strategies. However, I also suggest that taking a “bottom up” approach on a local level to identify strategies can lead to a more relevant typology for the actual stakeholder cluster. For example, Networks and new ways of thinking and Research strategies might have been overlooked if a typology such as Travis’ or Cheong’s were employed. When stakeholders were asked, “what measures could be implemented to build resilience,” the opportunity to think broadly about the question resulted in an analysis that included many such strategies that would lead to higher levels of 186

resilience, though may not directly reduce vulnerability.

DIFFICULTIES IN PLANNING RESILIENCE FOR THE PORT Though interviewees and documents identified 128 strategies, many were already in place, and many were focused on disaster preparation and response. Few decision makers really took a long-term view of building resilience for the port. Providence stakeholders thought much more about the climate adaptation challenges (broadly), but had implemented fewer specific actions than the Gulfport stakeholders. Though the Port of Gulfport had developed an extensive plan for hurricane resilience (i.e., elevating the port to 25’), when it came to actually implementing this strategy, it was rejected in favor of shorter-term priorities of job creation and port expansion (MSPG 2012). The traditional planning process for ports often has little or no process for public input, nor is the issue of long-term resilience addressed explicitly. With the long time horizons and uncertain projections for storm probabilities due to climate change, planning for a resilient port will require stakeholders to play new roles in the resilience-building process (Ng et al. 2013). Stakeholders need more than just a seat at the table during the port’s strategic planning process. They must also recognize that they have much to lose when the next hurricane hits the port and that the highest level of resilience may not be achievable by the port alone.

INCREMENTAL VS. TRANSFORMATIONAL STRATEGIES Of the total 128 strategies identified, it is difficult to isolate the strategies that are “climate adaptation” related from those that are more generally concerned with reducing risk, as these concepts are closely intertwined in the context of port resilience (Moser and Boykoff 2013). In fact, I did not ask stakeholders to consider climate adaptation specifically, though it came up in most interviews. Most strategies can be implemented incrementally, over time and will likely occur in an “evolutionary” manner as the impacts of climate change are felt with more certainty. As Kates et al. (2001) describe, these may be thought of as “extensions of actions and behaviors that 187

already reduce the losses or enhance the benefits of natural variations in climate and extreme events.” Research activities, Private sector and insurance strategies, Networks and new ways of thinking, and all of the Construction and design strategies can be implemented over time and with minimal disruption to business as usual. There were, however, three “transformational adaptations” that would occur either at a much larger scale or intensity, be completely new, and/or that transform the place and shift locations (for more on barriers see Moser and Ekstrom 2010). These three were: the construction of a dike, moving the port, and abandoning the port entirely. At the time of the interviews, these transformational strategies were not generally considered to be viable. As one interviewee put it, Nobody wants to talk about things that have huge price tags. Another agreed, A Thames Barrier type solution] would be foolproof, but the government isn’t going to spend the money.

RECOMMENDATIONS/NEXT STEPS Given these challenges, there are a number of areas that emerge where long-term policy adjustments can be made to help build resilience. Port authorities can do a lot on their own to improve the resiliency of their facilities, but need the broader set of stakeholders to improve the overall port system resiliency. State agencies could improve port development standards, including building and land use codes, to help create infrastructure that is more resistant to the kinds of storm events that are expected with climate change. Though these findings show that the major burden for implementing these strategies is on the port and the state, there is also a role for the other stakeholders in the port cluster. The insurance industry for example, together with the state and federal regulators, could create stronger links between insurance premiums and resilience actions, thereby creating incentives to increase port system resilience. The maritime transportation infrastructure system could be considered as a whole to prevent a “weak link” effect of losing one component (e.g., the rail link) while others are built to an increased resiliency standard. Networks and new ways of thinking strategies, in particular, can be implemented by many of the stakeholder groups. 188

“Boundary organizations” may be the well suited for taking a leadership role in developing an overall planning effort through fostering knowledge networks between researchers and decision makers (Bidwell et al. 2013). These organizations, such as the National Sea Grant Program and NOAA’s Regional Integrated Science Assessments (RISA) programs, can maintain a neutral position and bring stakeholders together to better understand the impacts, the strategies, and a best course of action toward selection and implementation. In Rhode Island, Rhode Island Sea Grant and Coastal Resources Center at the University of Rhode Island have served this role for other multi-stakeholder efforts. As noted by the NRC, effective climate adaptation will require all types of decision maker and stakeholders to participate (NRC 2010). There are a number of efforts already underway to address climate adaptation. In Rhode Island, the CRMC has taken a leading role in developing new policies for the state (CRMC 2009). The Consortium on Climate Risk in the Urban Northeast has developed projections for climate change scenarios, as well as guidance for specific broad sectors, including both transportation and coastal communities (CCRUN 2013). In Mississippi, the Southern Climate Impacts Planning Program has also been generating products that help increase resilience and preparedness (SCIPP 2013). However, there is still a gap in resilience planning for individual facilities such as ports. As demonstrated in this research, there are many opportunities for stakeholders to play a leadership role in the implementation of specific strategies, but there is an overarching need for broader leadership to coordinate these types of efforts. This study collected data that generate far more questions than answers. Many of these questions can be answered through follow up research in this, and other ports. As stated in the beginning of this paper, I envision this research as a contribution to the multi-step process of building resilience in the face of climate change. Thus, following along the steps outlined, these strategies need to be evaluated in order to better understand the costs (to whom) and benefits (to whom) of each. Through a stakeholder-informed process, this information can help validate some of the

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assumptions I make with respect to which organizations are poised to take leadership roles. One option is to develop a master plan that considers the entire stakeholder cluster and lays out a strategy implementation timeline for the next 100 years. Though certainly this would need to be a flexible plan, the very process of creating such a document could go far to help inform all stakeholders of the benefits of a more resilient port. Choosing and implementing these strategies involves tradeoffs, leadership, and investment of time, energy and resources. The categories derived from these case studies may be used in the formulation of ranking and prioritizing exercises that could involve many of the stakeholders who participated in this research. There are numerous methods for this, as discussed in the National Research Council’s 2010 report on Adapting to the Impacts of Climate Change.

CONCLUSION In these two case studies of highly exposed ports of Providence and Gulfport, stakeholders in the port cluster identified a wide range of strategies that could be implemented to build resilience that would benefit the entire cluster in the long term. I took a bottom-up approach to categorize these strategies into seven main types and identified the stakeholders best positioned to implement each. The potential to link actionable research to port system resiliency is strong, but scoping that research so that it is salient and timely will require stepped up discussions and on-going consultation among stakeholders and researchers. This study provides an initial step toward a more thorough planning process that must evolve to better prepare for the new environmental conditions expected by century’s end.

REFERENCES Baird AJ (2004) Public goods and the public financing of major European seaports. Maritime Policy & Management 31 (4):375-391 Bidwell D, Dietz T, Scavia D (2013) Fostering knowledge networks for climate adaptation. Nature Climate Change 3 (7):610-611 CCRUN (Consortium for climate risk in the urban northeast) (2013) Consortium for climate risk in the urban northeast. http://ccrun.org/. Accessed August 6 2013 190

Charmaz K (2003) Qualitative interviewing and grounded theory analysis. Inside interviewing: New lenses, new concerns:311-330 Cheong SM (2011) Policy solutions in the US. Climatic Change 106 (1):57-70 Cornes R (1996) The theory of externalities, public goods, and club goods. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England CRMC (Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Council) (2011) Natural Hazards: Hurricanes, Floods, and Sea Level Rise in theMetro Bay Region Special AreaManagement Plan. CRMC (Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Council) ( 2009) Climate Change Policy, Working Draft. http://www.crmc.ri.gov/climatechange.html. Curtis SA (2007) Hurricane Katrina Damage Assessment: Louisiana, Alabama, and Mississippi Ports and Coasts. American Society of Civil Engineers, Reston, Virginia EPA (United States Environmental Protection Agency) (2008) Planning for Climate Change Impacts at U.S. Ports. White Paper prepared by ICF International for the USEPA. FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) Guidelines and Specifications for Flood Hazard Mapping Partners. http://www.fema.gov/library/viewRecord.do?id=2206. FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) (2013) National Disaster Recovery Framework. Glaser B, Strauss A (1967) The discovery of grounded theory: Strategies for qualitative research. Aldine, Chicago, IL IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) (2012) Managing the risks of extreme events and disasters to advance climate change adaptation. Special report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press. Kates R, Clark W, Corell R, Hall J, Jaeger C, Lowe I, McCarthy J, Schellnhuber H, Bolin B, Dickson N (2001) Sustainable Science. Science 641 (642):292 Kleindorfer PR (2009) Climate Change and Insurance: Integrative Principles and Regulatory Risks. Working Paper, INSEAD. At: http://papers. ssrn. com/sol3/papers. cfm. Morse R (2011) Sustainable Restoration of the Port of Gulfport. Jackson, MS Moser S, Boykoff M (2013) Successful Adaptation to Climate Change: Linking Science and Policy in a Rapidly Changing World. Routledge, Moser S, Ekstrom J (2010) A framework to diagnose barriers to climate change adaptation. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 107 (51):22026 MSPG (Mississippi State Port at Gulfport) (2012) Port Commission Nixes 25' Elevation Plan. http://www.portofthefuture.com/News.aspx?NewsID=301. Accessed 11/07/2012 Ng AKY, Becker A, Fischer M (2013) A theoretical discussion on climate change, port adaptation strategies and institutions. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the Canadian Transportation Research Forum, Halifax, NS, Canada, 10-12 June NRC (National Research Council) (2010) America's Climate Choices: Adapting to the 191

Impacts of Climate Change. America's Climate Choices. Washington, DC Reddy SD (2000) Examining hazard mitigation within the context of public goods. Environmental management 25 (2):129-141 Roger A. Pielke J (2007) Future Economic Damage from Tropical Cyclones: Sensitivities to Societal and Climate Changes. Phil Trans R Soc A 365:27172729 SCIPP (Southern Climate Impacts Planning Program) (2013) Southern Climate Impacts Planning Program. http://www.southernclimate.org/. Accessed August 6 2013 Stern NH, Britain G (2006) Stern Review: The economics of climate change, vol 30. HM treasury London, Tran S (2008) Updated Hurricane Models: A New Opportunity to Insure Against Climate Change. Boston University Journal of Science and Technology Law 14 (1) Travis WR (2009) Going to extremes: propositions on the social response to severe climate change. Climatic Change 98 (1-2):1-19. doi:10.1007/s10584-0099661-8 Wilby RL, Keenan R (2012) Adapting to flood risk under climate change. Progress in Physical Geography 36 (3):348-378

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CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION This dissertation contributes to problem and solution identification, the first steps in the climate adaptation framework (Figure 0-1). I conducted research through a survey of port authorities’ perceptions and plans for climate change adaptation, and through detailed case studies in two ports that are exposed to strong hurricanes. Chapters One through Four define the problem on both a global scale, for port authorities, and on a local scale for the stakeholder clusters in the two case study ports, Gulfport (MS) and Providence (RI), that depend on the functioning of the port. Chapter Five addresses the solutions, through an analysis of the perceptions of stakeholders from the two port stakeholder clusters. In this concluding chapter, I address the main arguments and each of the four key research questions in this dissertation. Finally, I discuss the limitations of this work and some of the next steps I suggest.

MAIN ARGUMENTS (CLAIMS) 1.

Globally, port planning practices do not consider climate change and the resulting storm impacts, though port managers recognize climate adaptation as an emerging challenge;

2.

Port stakeholders of Gulfport (MS) and Providence (RI) identified a wide range of direct damages, indirect costs, and intangible consequences of a hurricane hitting the port and these would result in costs that would be borne by all port stakeholders as well as society as a whole;

3.

In Providence and Gulfport, the subjects of the case studies, many concerns expressed by stakeholders were not identified in planning and policy documents, suggesting a disconnect between how stakeholders perceive impacts and how official policy addresses these impacts;

4.

Stakeholders in Gulfport and Providence, both internal and external to the port

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itself, identified a wide range of resilience strategies that could augment port resilience. These strategies could involve all stakeholders. The following sections provide a more detailed overview of these claims. Claim 1: Globally, port planning practices do not consider climate change and the resulting storm impacts, though port managers recognize climate adaptation as an emerging challenge The first research question, how are port operators currently considering climate change and incorporating adaptation into their planning, is addressed in Chapter One. I surveyed port authorities from around the world about how administrators felt climate change might impact their operations, how sea-level change would create operational problems, and how they planned to adapt to new environmental conditions. The planned rapid expansion of ports reported by the survey respondents indicates that adaptation measures should be considered as ports construct new infrastructure that may still be in use at the end of the century. Respondents agreed that the international port community needs to address these issues and most felt relatively uninformed about potential climate impacts. The ports surveyed had few plans to address climate change adaptation (Figure 6-1), despite a high level of concern (Figure 6-2). Results suggest that there are opportunities for the scientific community to engage with port practitioners to prepare proactively for climate change impacts on this sector. This chapter illustrates that impacts of climate change are not yet registering with ports as being pressing enough to warrant action. Because action is not being taken, the findings also suggest that the issue of storm resilience for ports should be of concern to other stakeholders of the port as well, in terms of the potential for impacts and the opportunities for external stakeholders to implement strategies along with the port operators. This formed the basis for research questions three and four and ultimately the case study work described next.

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Climate adaptation policies in place Has speciXic climate-‐change (CC) planning Adaptation funded as a line item in the budget Other climate change adaptation policy noted Climate change addressed in port strategic Carries speciXic climate change insurance Climate change part of design guidelines or Holds regular staff meetings to discuss 0

20

40

60

% with policy (n = 93) Figure 6-1 -- Ports with climate adaptation policies in place

Impacts of climate change is something that needs to be addressed by the port community. I feel sufaiciently informed about how climate change will impact my port operations. 0%

81%

31% 20%

40%

60%

80%

100% N = 93

Figure 6-2 -- Level of concern for adaptation amongst survey respondents

Claim 2: Port stakeholders of Gulfport (MS) and Providence (RI) identified a wide range of direct damages, indirect costs, and intangible consequences of a hurricane hitting the port and these would result in costs that would be borne by all port stakeholders as well as society as a whole. The results of the survey suggested that port operators were not yet addressing climate change, though increased storminess and sea level rise were the primary concerns. Through two case studies (Providence, RI, and Gulfport, MS), I addressed the second research question to consider the broader group of stakeholders who depend on the port -- In what ways might a hurricane at a port impact the port stakeholders. These

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case studies utilized a grounded theory approach (to create impact names and subcategories) combined with a deductive analysis approach (to determine broad categories in accordance with IPCC definitions) to create a categorization of impacts and an analysis of which stakeholders would likely bear the cost for each. Through a review of official documents and interviews with port stakeholders, I found that stakeholders perceived a wide variety of impacts and costs resulting from a hurricane hitting the port and that these impacts fell into the three broad categories defined by the IPCC (IPCC 2012). These include direct damages to the port (including the waterway and intermodal connections), indirect costs that can be quantified in economic terms and intangible consequences that cannot be easily quantified in economic terms (Figure 6-3).

60 50 40 30

Gulfport

20

Providence Both

10 0 Direct damages (n=40)

Indirect costs Intangible (n=25) consequences (n=50)

Figure 6-3 -- Number of distinct impacts mentioned in Gulfport and Providence

For each of the impacts noted, I assigned the cost (economic or non) to one or more stakeholders, based on my own intuition as informed through interviews and a review of organizational missions and mandates (Figure 6-4). I established that these costs were well distributed throughout the stakeholder clusters, with the port bearing the 196

most responsibility for direct damages. Intangible consequences and indirect costs fell most heavily upon the stakeholders external to the port. The intangible consequences represent impacts that are particularly difficult to put into economic terms and the costs will often be borne by society at large in the form of contaminated waterways, poor quality of life, or longer regional recovery times due to lack of port functionality. No impact assessments had been conducted in Providence or Gulfport with a goal to identify the full range of impacts at a scale that is wide enough to capture concerns of multiple stakeholders of the port, yet narrow enough to trace the root of the impact back to one particular facility. Results from these case studies suggest that much of the burden for these external costs, as well as those internal costs that exceed the port’s insurance coverage will ultimately be borne by the public in the form of disaster relief, cleanup and rebuilding costs, and negative impacts on the environment and quality of life. These case studies identified an area for future research into disconnects between current port resilience planning practices, impacts assessments, and understanding the costs of storm impacts at ports that are ultimately borne by the public.

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Gulfport

Providence

Figure 6-4 -- Cost of impacts for internal and external stakeholders in Gulfport and Providence

Claim 3: In Providence and Gulfport, many concerns expressed by stakeholders are not identified in planning and policy documents, suggesting a disconnect between how stakeholders perceive impacts and how official policy addresses these impacts. Chapters Three and Four indicate that all stakeholders perceived risk from storm events at the port. These two chapters also address my third key question -- In what ways are stakeholders considering port resilience in their plans and policies. To 198

appropriately plan for port resilience, the full range of impacts and cost burdens must be understood and accounted for through port planning, local/state planning, or both. These impacts are typically identified through vulnerability assessments (Bierbaum et al. 2013; Preston et al. 2010). Through the review of documents for these two case studies, I found that Gulfport had a number of planning/policy documents that assessed Hurricane Katrina damages in the region and at the port, but no study that could be considered a “vulnerability assessment” that addressed the port specifically. Providence had two planning and policy documents that could be considered “vulnerability assessments,” however neither had conducted an assessment specifically for the port cluster. When I compared the impacts that were identified in existing planning and policy documents with those concerns expressed in interviews, I found a mismatch in the way that stakeholders perceived potential impacts and the way they were addressed through planning and policy in both Providence and Gulfport (Figure 6-5). In both cases, far more impacts were discussed in interviews than in documents. In both cases, the intangible consequences figured prominently in the minds of interviewees, with 26 mentioned in Gulfport and 13 in Providence. These findings indicate a planning gap in both ports, despite the fact that Gulfport suffered a recent hurricane event.

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Gulfport

Providence

Figure 6-5 -- Comparison of # of distinct impacts mentioned in interviews vs. documents (Gulfport and Providence)

Though I did not set out to address the question of “why” specifically these types of gaps may exist, analysis of interview data and documents suggest one potential reason. Planning gaps result from a mismatch of scale of impact analysis, as port operators primarily account only for the interests of the port as business, while state and regional planning efforts do not address the port specifically enough to protect society’s interest in port functions. This was seen in Gulfport where damage assessments were either regional or port-specific, but did not focus at the stakeholder cluster scale. In Providence, there were regional assessments, but also none that addressed either the port cluster or the port specifically.

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Claim 4: Stakeholders in Gulfport and Providence, both internal and external to the port itself, identified a wide range of resilience strategies that could augment port resilience. These strategies could involve all stakeholders. Finally, Chapter Five addressed my last research question -- What strategies do stakeholders consider for building port resilience in the face of climate change? This chapter used results from the two case studies and identified the hurricane resilience strategies available to the cluster of stakeholders facing increasing risk from disruptive and potentially irreversible impacts from extreme events associated with climate change. Through my analysis of interviews and planning/policy documents, I categorized resilience strategies and discussed the role seaport stakeholders could play in facilitating and implementing strategies, based on interview data and a review of the missions and mandates of the various organizations in the port stakeholder cluster. The individual strategies fell into seven broad categories, as follows (see also Figure 6-6): 1. Building codes and land use regulations 2. Long-range planning 3. Construction and design strategies – on and off port lands 4. Private sector and insurance policies 5. Emergency response, preparation and recovery 6. Research 7. Networks and new ways of thinking The greatest number of strategies (33) fell into the category of Emergency preparation, response, and recovery. Most of these were practices already in place at the two ports. Examples included: evacuation drills, tabletop exercises coordinated by the U.S. Coast Guard, and port evacuation plans. These strategies manage the disaster once it happens. Other strategies, such as Construction and design strategies identified ways in which the overall vulnerability of the port could be reduced, such as elevating the port, constructing a storm barrier, or using stronger building materials.

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Long range planning efforts

6

Private sector and insurance

10

Building codes and land use

10

Research (inc. risk assessment,

13

Constructions and design

24

Networks and new ways of

32

Emergency preparation,

33 0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

# of uniquque strategies mentioned in Gulfport and/or Providence Figure 6-6 – Number of strategies in each category of resilience strategies from Gulfport and Providence

Results from these case studies suggest that the implementation of most strategies is in the domain of the port operator, but external stakeholders could implement many as well (Figure 6-7). For example, the internal port stakeholders (i.e., the port operators) are best poised to undertake construction and design strategies on port lands, like building stronger structures or designing buildings that could withstand occasional flooding. Other strategies, however, could be implemented by a wide variety of stakeholder both internal and external. For example, Networks and new ways of thinking could be implemented by nearly all of the stakeholder groups that make up a port cluster (e.g., any of the stakeholder groups could take the lead in spearheading a climate commission). The scope of this research did not include an analysis of which specific strategies were currently implemented in each port. The purpose, rather, was to explore how strategies could be implemented by a variety of stakeholders across the entire cluster (Figure 6-8).

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Internal Port 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

Research/academia

Community/ Environmental

Economic/ Contractual

Federal Government

Local Government

State Government

# of strategies

Figure 6-7 -- Number of strategies stakeholders are poised to implement

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# of strategies stakeholders are poised to implement (n=128)

80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

Building codes and land use regulations Long range planning efforts Constructions and design Private sector and insurance policies Emergency preparation, response, and recovery Research (inc. risk assessment, forecasting improvements, and projections) Networks and new ways of thinking Figure 6-8 -- Categories of strategies by stakeholder group poised to implement

This analysis revealed a lack of clarity around leadership issues. In Providence, there was no clear leadership for building the resilience of the port, even though the perceptions of consequences of hurricanes identified in Chapter Four underscore the critical nature of resilience planning. In Gulfport, documents and interviews indicated that resilience planning was left primarily to the port, but that the port’s planning process was driven predominantly by profit and job creation goals leaving some stakeholder concerns out of the planning process. Traditionally, port planning has taken place within the confines of the port operating business (often the port authority), with little input from other stakeholders.1 The task of enhancing the port’s

1 In Europe, for example, a survey conducted by the European Sea Ports Organization found that only 17% of ports involved local communities and stakeholders in port development plans (Brooke 1991).

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resilience to a level that adequately protects all stakeholders, and thus the public interest, is likely beyond the means of any given port operator. Though there are strategies that fall within the mandate, jurisdiction, and missions of all organizations, a coordination of individual efforts would be necessary. A master planning effort would be one way to ensure that implementation of individual strategies complemented each other and that moving toward resilience could occur in a coordinated fashion. These strategies require time, staff, investment, and political will that the individual port operator cannot likely spare. In addition, the time horizons that long-range resilience planning addresses (20+ years) fall outside of the port’s normal strategic planning process. There was also no mechanism in place to require upgrades to port infrastructure. As noted in Rhode Island’s Metro Bay Special Area Management Plan, “A significant portion of the [Providence] region’s critical facilities and coastal infrastructure located in the floodplain is not protected or was built before the current building standards were adopted in the 1970s” (CRMC 2011). Unless permits are sought to make significant changes to land or structures, neither the State nor the Federal Government through FEMA has the appropriate authority to require upgrades. As one official put it, There is a gap in mandates and jurisdictions, so a lot of the facilities [e.g., tanks, berms, petroleum transfer facilities] are outside of our jurisdiction. In Rhode Island, new Fitness of Purpose regulations do allow the CRMC to require certain piers and wharves to be maintained for their intended use. It should be noted, however, that Rhode Island’s state jurisdiction for fitness of purpose does not cover the petroleum storage tanks or any other infrastructure located upland; only structures that are seaward of the high tide line. Finally, respondents indicated that port resilience simply was not a priority at the time these case studies were conducted. As one Providence respondent said, I hate to say it, but sometimes it takes something catastrophic just to wake people up to the need for

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action on these kinds of issues. And we’re not there yet on climate.

LIMITATIONS The global survey, followed by case studies of two ports, allowed for the initial framing of problem identification and of the potential strategies to address some of the climate issues for port stakeholders, but much further work is necessary. The survey only sampled the largest of the world’s ports, missing thousands of smaller ports that will be much more limited in terms of resources for adaptation and thus resilience may be an even lower priority than it is for the largest ports. These small ports serve a critical role in their local economies and capturing their perspectives and plans is necessary in order to understand the full implications of adaptation. The perspectives of these ports should be included as decision makers develop strategies for climate adaptation. Furthermore, the survey could only assess perceptions around climate adaptation. When the survey was conducted, no ports I knew of had taken any concrete steps to develop adaptation plans. Recently, that began to change. The ports of San Diego, Cartagena, and ports in Australia have all developed adaptation guidelines. Understanding both the conditions that led to the development of these plans, as well as the successes and failures would be instructive to those port communities that have not yet undertaken such a process. The case studies, too, had several limitations. First, the sample size was relatively small, making it difficult to compare how different sectors of stakeholders felt concern about different types of impacts or how different types of stakeholders perceived strategies differently. Results did not assess how stakeholders prioritize the various impacts or strategies they mentioned. Just because an impact was mentioned twice, for example, does not necessarily mean that it is of greater importance than an impact only mentioned once. It would also be valuable to consider the linkages between impacts, as reducing the vulnerability for one direct damage concern might offset multiple indirect costs and intangible consequences. Interview analysis also indicates some perception gaps in how different types of stakeholders consider impacts. For 206

example, little concern was expressed for impacts on the environment or on the intermodal system with which a port interfaces. An assessment of how these gaps in perceptions align with jurisdictions and mandates would help ensure that all aspects of impacts are considered in future resilience plans. Finally, the interviews did not specifically emphasize questions of strategy implementation, because, even though stakeholders identified potential strategies, they did not discuss who would/should take a leadership role, how effective the strategies would likely be, the suitable timeline for their implementation, and how they would be funded. These questions can be addressed through further work in these and other case study locations.

NEXT STEPS As with the work I have conducted over the previous five years, my future work will also address these issues at both global/national and local scales. It will continue to follow along the adaptation process, as depicted in Figure 0-1. At both scales, I plan work that contributes to the broader fields of climate adaptation and decision support. The two questions I plan to pursue first are: 1. How can decision makers on a national scale prioritize ports (and other infrastructure) for adaptation investments? 2. How can decision support tools be used to help stakeholder clusters prioritize and implement the kinds of wide-ranging strategies identified in this research to build port resilience? The first question can be addressed through the development of a nationwide risk and vulnerability index for ports. Through the identification of specific hazards, as well as a qualitative ranking and prioritization of variables, this tool can be used to compare the vulnerability of ports as a means to guide the allocation of federal funds for disaster mitigation or other investment decisions. Similar to other indices developed for assessing the vulnerability of other industries, such as the fishing industry (Allison et al. 2009) and urban earthquake risk (Davidson 1997), this GIS-based tool will allow 207

for an assessment of both risk (including exposure and potential for damage) and the ability to respond and prepare for climate-change induced natural catastrophes. It will incorporate attributes into the following three main categories that have become standard for examining climate change risk and vulnerabilities: exposure, sensitivity, and adaptive capacity (Turner et al. 2003; Clark 2000). Exposure includes factors that put a port in harms way, such as susceptibility to ocean storms, land subsidence or uplift, El Nino/La Nina effects, and local topography. Sensitivity factors include variables that make the port more or less susceptible to damage, such as the age of infrastructure, the nature of products handled at the port, and the level of storm protection currently in place. Finally, adaptive capacity includes existing plans and policies, protective measures in place, relative importance to the regional economy, proximity to other ports, and resources of the state or country. The second question will be addressed through continued case study work that utilizes and assesses decision support tools that help incorporate stakeholder concerns and contribute to a more holistic port resilience planning process. As identified through the research conducted in the present case studies, stakeholders have a wide variety of concerns about impacts, options for strategies, and resources/mandates for implementation. To continue along the adaptation process requires stakeholder input to make decisions that minimize cost (economic or otherwise) and maximize benefit for the full stakeholder cluster. Tools such as the Multi-Attribute, Collaborative Design, Analysis, and Decision Integration (MACDADI, now called Wecision, see (Figure 6-9), help stakeholders define and prioritize objectives, document impacts of alternatives, weigh values, and communicate this rationale clearly (Haymaker and Chachere 2006). This research will test ways that tools such as MACDADI can be used to help shore up the gap between stakeholder perspectives and formal planning/policy.

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Teams use MACDADI to construct six models that help them clarify their rationale www.macdadi.com

Figure 6-9 -- MACDADI overview (Haymaker 2006)

REFERENCES Allison EH, Perry AL, Badjeck MC, Adger WN, Brown K, Conway D, Halls AS, Pilling GM, Reynolds JD, Andrew NL, Dulvy NK (2009) Vulnerability of national economies to the impacts of climate change on fisheries. Fish and Fisheries 10 (2):173-196. doi:Doi 10.1111/J.1467-2979.2008.00310.X Bierbaum R, Smith JB, Lee A, Blair M, Carter L, Chapin Iii FS, Fleming P, Ruffo S, Stults M, McNeeley S (2013) A comprehensive review of climate adaptation in the United States: more than before, but less than needed. Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change 18 (3):361-406 Brooke J (1991) Stakeholder Participation in Port Development Decision Making: How?, Where? and When. In: Proceedings of the 30th International Navigation Congress (PIANC), 1991. Clark W, Jaeger, J., Corell, R., Kasperson, R., McCarthy, J., Cash, D., Cohen, S., Desanker, P., Dickson, N., Epstein, P., Guston, D., Hall, M., Jaeger, C., Janetos, A., Leary, N., Levy, M., Luers, A., MacCracken, M., Melillo, J., Moss, R., Nigg, J., Parry, M., Parson, E., Ribot, J., Schellnhuber, H.J., Schrag, D., Seielstad, G., Shea, E., Vogel, C., Wilbanks.T. (2000) Assessing vulnerability to global environmental risks. Report of the Workshop on Vulnerability to Global Environmental Change: Challenges for Research, Assessment and Decision Making. CRMC (Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Council) (2011) Natural Hazards: Hurricanes, Floods, and Sea Level Rise in theMetro Bay Region Special AreaManagement Plan. Davidson R (1997) An Urban Earthquake Disaster Risk Index. Haymaker J, Chachere J (2006) Coordinating goals, preferences, options, and analyses for the Stanford Living Laboratory feasibility study. Intelligent Computing in Engineering and Architecture:320-327 209

IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) (2012) Managing the risks of extreme events and disasters to advance climate change adaptation. Special report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press. Preston BL, Westaway RM, Yuen EJ (2010) Climate adaptation planning in practice: an evaluation of adaptation plans from three developed nations. Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change 16 (4):407-438. doi:10.1007/s11027010-9270-x Turner B, Kasperson RE, Matson PA, McCarthy JJ, Corell RW, Christensen L, Eckley N, Kasperson JX, Luers A, Martello ML (2003) A framework for vulnerability analysis in sustainability science. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 100 (14):8074

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APPENDIX I SURVEY MATERIALS SURVEY INSTRUMENT

Climate Change Impacts On Ports 1. Welcome Other

Thank you for participating in this survey. It should take no more than about 15 minutes to answer the questions. You may edit your responses by using the PREV and NEXT buttons at the bottom of each page. Questions with an asterisk (*) symbol require an answer before you can move to the next page. Thank you very much! -Austin Becker (Ph.D. Student, Stanford University) -Prof. Martin Fischer (School of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Stanford University) -Kurt Nagle (President, American Association of Port Authorities) -Wolfgang Hurtienne (Chair, Port Planning and Development Committee, International Association of Ports and Harbors) Please contact Austin Becker at [email protected] with any questions. 2. Port Planning Horizons As improvements and expansion to the physical infrastructure to a port can take years or even decades, we are interested in how your port plans for expansion and what kinds of construction you envision in the future.

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Climate Change Impacts On Ports 1. In terms of expansion, please check the column that describes current plans at your port for each of the following: No Plans

In conceptual design

Will be completed

phase only at this

within the next 5

Will be completed in 5-10 years

Will be completed beyond 10 years from

time

years

Constructing new terminals

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Constructing new

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Acquiring land

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Building new storm

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Building dikes

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c d e f g

c d e f g

c d e f g

Building hurricane barriers

c d e f g

c d e f g

c d e f g

c d e f g

c d e f g

quays/berths

protections

now

Other Other (please specify project and timeline)

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Climate Change Impacts On Ports 2. Please indicate your port's planning horizon for capital improvements, expansion, and maintenance projects is best described in terms of the following (select one): j None k l m n j 5 years k l m n j 10 years k l m n j 15 years k l m n j 20 years k l m n j 25 years k l m n j 50 years k l m n j Other (please specify) k l m n

3. Please indicate which, if any, of the following areas have been considered at your port with respect to climate change: c Revision of construction design standards d e f g c Potential shifts in source or market locations and population centers (customer base/location) d e f g c Potential effects on facility operations d e f g c New equipment and facility maintenance needs d e f g Other c Potential impacts on connecting transportation infrastructure (waterway, highway, rail, air) d e f g c Potential impacts on surrounding community and environment d e f g c Effect on logistics d e f g c Air pollution/air quality d e f g c Other (please specify) d e f g

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Climate Change Impacts On Ports 4. Please list the top three impacts that climate change might have on your port's operations. 1. 2. 3. 5. When designing new structures at your port, do you generally account for future storm and/or flooding events by engineering structures for: j The most recent storm event k l m n j The 100 year storm event k l m n j The 500 year storm event k l m n j The 1000 year storm event k l m n j We do not consider historic storm events in our planning k l m n j I am not sure k l m n Other (please specify) Other

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Climate Change Impacts On Ports 6. The person at your port who probably knows the most about potential climate change impacts on the port is the: j Chief Engineer k l m n j Port Planner k l m n j CEO or Port Director k l m n j Chief Environmental Planner k l m n j Chief Facilities Manager k l m n j Policy Director k l m n j Public Relations Director k l m n j Other (please specify position) k l m n

7. Climate change impacts on port operations, in terms of sea level rise, flooding, and storm events, is a subject that is (check all that apply): c Specifically addressed in your insurance coverage d e f g c Written into your strategic plan d e f g c Addressed and funded as a line item in your budget d e f g c Part of the design guidelines or standards that you use d e f g c Addressed through a specific climate change planning document d e f g c Not addressed at this time d e f g c I am not sure d e f g c Other (please specify) d e f g

3. Climate Change Information Page 5

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Climate Change Impacts On Ports Climate change responses may be broken down into two major categories: mitigation and adaptation. "Mitigation" refers to the steps that ports may take to reduce their impact on climate change, like limiting CO2 emissions. "Adaptation" refers to steps that ports may take to respond to the direct physical impacts that climate change may have on their own operations, like building a new sea wall. The next two questions will address mitigation and adaptation as two distinct issues. The remaining questions in this section address climate change more generally. 8. In internal staff meetings at your port, the topic of how you might MITIGATE your impact on climate change is discussed: j Never k l m n j Informally only, but not as an agenda item k l m n j Occasionally as an agenda item k l m n j Frequently on the agenda k l m n j In meetings solely devoted to this topic k l m n j Other (please specify) k l m n

9. In internal staff meetings at your port, the topic of how you might ADAPT to new direct threats from future climate changes on our operations is discussed: j Never k l m n j Informally only, but not as an agenda item k l m n j Occasionally as an agenda item k l m n j Frequently on the agenda k l m n j In meetings solely devoted to this topic k l m n Other (please specify)

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Climate Change Impacts On Ports 10. Addressing impacts of climate change is something that needs to be addressed for the port community in general. j Strongly disagree k l m n j Disagree k l m n j Agree k l m n j Strongly agree k l m n 11. Do you feel sufficiently informed about how climate change may impact your port operations in the coming 50 years? j Yes k l m n j No k l m n

4. Local and Regional Climate Changes Although many scientists agree that climate change is happening, the specific impacts are still being debated. Some potential impacts include changes in storm patterns, accelerated sea level rise, and global warming. These questions are designed to collect your thoughts about this controversial topic and how climate change may directly impact your particular port. 12. By 2100, how much sea level rise do you expect to see at your port? j None k l m n j Less than .5 meters k l m n j .5 - 1 meter k l m n j 1 meter - 2 meters k l m n j More than 2 meters k l m n j Other (please specify) k l m n

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Climate Change Impacts On Ports 13. What minimum level of sea level rise would pose a significant threat to your operations if no new protections were built? j Current sea level is already a problem k l m n j .5 meters or less of rise would cause a problem k l m n j .5 - 1 meter of rise would cause a problem k l m n j 1 - 2 meters of rise would cause a problem k l m n j More than 2 meters of rise would cause a problem k l m n j Other (please specify) k l m n

14. How vulnerable is your port to the following causes of physical damages? Damage occurs

vulnerable

very rarely

Sea Level Rise

j k l m n

j k l m n

j k l m n

j k l m n

j k l m n

j k l m n

Drop in water levels (inland

j k l m n

j k l m n

j k l m n

j k l m n

j k l m n

j k l m n

Wave damage

j k l m n

j k l m n

j k l m n

j k l m n

j k l m n

j k l m n

Flooding due to rain events

j k l m n

j k l m n

j k l m n

j k l m n

j k l m n

j k l m n

Coastal erosion of port

j k l m n

j k l m n

j k l m n

j k l m n

j k l m n

j k l m n

j k l m n

j k l m n

j k l m n

j k l m n

j k l m n

j k l m n

j k l m n

j k l m n

j k l m n

j k l m n

j k l m n

j k l m n

ports)

lands Flooding due to storm surge Wind damage

Damage occurs

Damage occurs

My port is

My port is not

once per decade every five years

damaged once or

N/A

more per year

Other (please specify)

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Climate Change Impacts On Ports 15. In terms of elevation, is the land mass at your port: j Subsiding (sinking slightly each year) k l m n j Rebounding or uplifting (rising slightly each year) k l m n j Neither subsiding nor rebounding k l m n j I am not sure k l m n 16. Please rate your feeling on the following statements? Strongly disagree Climate change will have direct negative consequences on our port during the next 50 years. Climate change will present new business opportunities for port and shipping industries in the next 50 years. Our port must significantly reduce our CO2 emissions.

Disagree

Have no opinion

Agree

Strongly agree

j k l m n

j k l m n

j k l m n

j k l m n

j k l m n

j k l m n

j k l m n

j k l m n

j k l m n

j k l m n

j k l m n

j k l m n

j k l m n

j k l m n

j k l m n

5. Port Characteristics The following questions address the size, characteristics, and features of your port. Please answer them as best you can. If you do not know the answer to a question, leave it blank. 17. How is your port insured? c Standard insurance d e f g c Self-Insured d e f g c Insured as part of a group or co-op of ports d e f g Other (please specify)

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Climate Change Impacts On Ports 18. How is your port owned/operated? c Private Entity d e f g c Public Entity d e f g c Private/Public d e f g c Other (please specify) d e f g

19. Which of the following best describes your port? j Service/Operating Port (terminals owned and operated by a public port authority) k l m n j Tool Port (publicly owned infrastructure and superstructure, but cargo handled privately) k l m n j Landlord Port (port authority owned, but terminals are operated by private leaseholders) k l m n j Fully Privatized k l m n 20. Please describe your port by entering as much as you know about the following: Total footprint of land occupied by the port in thousands of hectares (1 hectare = 2.5 acres) Annual throughput volume in millions tons Annual throughput volume in millions of U.S. Dollars Number of full time employees of the port Number of ship visits per year Approximate height of port land above mean high tide in meters

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Climate Change Impacts On Ports 21. Which of the following activities does your port support (check all that apply): c Imports d e f g

c Containers d e f g

c Air Terminals (Cargo or Passenger) d e f g

c Exports d e f g

c Roll On/Roll Off d e f g

c Research Vessels d e f g

c Fishing d e f g

c Lift On/Lift Off d e f g

c Tugboats d e f g

c Bulk Cargo d e f g

c Ferries d e f g

c Recreational Vessels d e f g

c Liquid Bulk Transfer d e f g

c Cruise Ships d e f g

c Shallow draft coastal freighters d e f g

c Break Bulk d e f g

c Rail Terminals d e f g

c Other (please specify) d e f g

22. With respect to sea routes, where is your port located (check all that apply): c On a navigable river within 50 kilometers (30 miles) of the ocean d e f g c On a navigable river more than 50 kilometers (30 miles) from the ocean d e f g c On a river separated from the ocean with a lock system d e f g c On a man-made canal d e f g c In a naturally protected coastal bay or harbor d e f g c In a bay or harbor protected by man-made structures d e f g c Other (specify below) d e f g Other

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Climate Change Impacts On Ports 23. Please indicate which of the following protective measures your port CURRENTLY has in place: c Breakwater d e f g

c Sea Wall d e f g

c Storm Barrier d e f g

c Protective Dike d e f g

c Lock System d e f g

c Drainage Pumps d e f g

c Storm Response Plans d e f g

c Storm Insurance d e f g

c Other (please specify) d e f g

24. What was the most recent storm event that significantly impacted operations at your port? Name of storm (if named) Year of storm

6. Respondent Information

* 25. Port Location Information City/Town: State/Province: ZIP/Postal Code: Country:

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Climate Change Impacts On Ports * 26. What is your position at the port? j CEO or Port Director k l m n j Engineer k l m n j Planner k l m n j Public Relations Director k l m n j Development Director k l m n j Safety or Security Director k l m n j Other (please specify) k l m n

27. How many years of professional experience do you have in the maritime industries? j 1-5 Years k l m n j 6-10 Years k l m n j 11-15 Years k l m n j 16 or More Years k l m n 28. In what year were you born? Enter Year 29. Which of the following are you a member of? c American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA) d e f g c International Association of Ports and Harbors (IAPH) d e f g Other (please specify any other associations that your port belongs to))

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Climate Change Impacts On Ports 30. If you are interested in participating in future dialogue on climate change impacts on ports, please enter your email address below. By entering your email address, your answers will still remain confidential but we may contact you for further information:

On behalf of the American Association of Port Authorities, The International Association of Ports and Harbors, and Stanford University, thank you very much for taking the time to fill out this survey! Contact [email protected] with any questions.

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INVITE LETTER FOR SURVEY

Dear Member Port Director:

18 August, 2009

In order to inform governments, scholars, and the world ports community, Stanford University, the American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA), and the International Association of Ports and Harbors (IAPH) formally invite you to participate in this brief survey regarding how you view potential climate change impacts on your port. The purpose of the survey is to explore how port directors around the world may see climate changes as a risk to their ports and how they plan for these types of risks. The survey is being sent to all port directors whose ports are members of one or both of the IAPH and AAPA (apologies to those who receive the survey from both organizations). Your participation in this survey is important, as the marine transportation sector is a critical component of local, regional and global economies. The survey results will be shared with the world port community through the AAPA and IAPH, and will be a major component of future research at Stanford designed to benefit port authorities and all who depend on them. The results will also be used to determine future international project and research agendas, such as the priorities that will emerge from the upcoming UN Climate Change Convention in December 2009. Answers to questions are confidential and will be used only for the purposes outlined above. Cooperation is voluntary and no negative consequences will result should you decide not to participate in this survey. This survey should take you no more than 15 minutes to complete. You may end the survey at any time, save the survey to finish later, and skip questions that you would prefer not to answer. The deadline for surveys to be returned is Sept. 10, 2009. By clicking the link below, you will be taken to a web page where you may complete the survey: CLICK HERE TO ENTER SURVEY The survey is endorsed by the American Association of Port Authorities and the International

224

Association of Ports and Harbors. It is being carried out by Austin Becker, a Ph.D. student at Stanford University under the advisement of Professor Martin Fischer, School of Civil and Environmental Engineering. Please contact Austin Becker at [email protected] if you have any questions about this survey before, during, or after completion. Thank you very much, Austin Becker Ph.D. Student, Stanford University Prof. Martin Fischer Faculty Advisor, Stanford University Kurt Nagle President, AAPA Dr. Satoshi Inoue Secretary General, IAPH

225

RAW DATA FROM SURVEY

226

227

228

229

230

231

232

233

234

235

236

237

238

239

240

241

242

243

ADDITIONAL GRAPHS FROM SURVEY

World Bank Income Status low-‐income (4)

0.8

Lower-‐middle-‐income (4)

0.8

upper-‐middle-‐income (10)

1.8

High-‐income (75)

2.4 0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

Respondents by income status

Adaptation is addressed by at least one policy 80%

73%

70%

% Yes 57%

60%

50%

50%

36%

40% 30%

25%

20% 10% 0% Gulf Coast (11)

Southeast

Northeast West Coast Great Lakes Non-‐U.S. (56) (8) (4)

Adaptation policies by region

244

Size of ports surveyed

Very Large 23%

Small 12%

Medium 39%

Large 26%

Size of ports

Type of Insurance and Climate Policies In Place 70% 60% 50%

60%

57% 43% 35%

40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Standard Insurance Co-‐Op Insurance

Types of insurance policies in place

245

Self Insured

Other

How often is climate change adaptation addressed in staff meetings? 50% 40%

1 -‐ Africa

30%

2 -‐ Asia

20%

3 -‐ Europe

10%

4 -‐ Americas

0% Frequently In meetings Informally on the solely only, but not agenda devoted to as an agenda this topic item

Never

Occasionally as an agenda item

5 -‐ N Am 6 -‐ Oceania

Discussions of adaptation by region

% of respondents by region

How much SLR do you expect at your port by 2100? 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

1 -‐ Africa 2 -‐ Asia 3 -‐ Europe 4 -‐ Americas 5 -‐ N Am 6 -‐ Oceania

Expectations of sea level rise by region

246

250 200

# of ports w/n 100k of hurricane Total # of hurricanes

150 100 50 0

Ports within 100k of tropical cyclone 1990-2008

Expected vs. problematic sea level rise

247

Do you feel sufaiciently informed about how climate change may impact your port in the next 50 years? Adaptation score

2.00

1.72

1.50 0.97

1.00 0.50 0.00

No (60)

Yes (29)

Informed about climate change vs. adaptation policy scores

Is the port within 50km of the coast? Adaptation score

2.00

1.73

1.50

1.08

1.12

No Answer (25)

Yes (57)

1.00 0.50 0.00 No (11)

Location with respect to coast vs. adaptation scores

248

Is climate change adaptation addressed in staff meetings? 25 American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA)

Count

20 15

Both

10 5

International Association of Ports and Harbors (IAPH)

0 No

No Answer

Yes

Organization membership vs. adaptation discussions

Addressing climate change is important for the ports community (by staff meeting agenda) Count

30 Climate change adaptation is not a topic in staff meetings

20 10 0 Strongly Agree Disagree Strongly agree disagree

Climate change adaptation is a topic at staff meetings

Climate change should be addressed by ports community vs. addressed at staff meetings

249

14

Expected sea level rise by world region Africa

# of respondents

12

Asia Europe

10

South/Central America North America

8 6 4 2 0 More than 1 -‐ 2 .5-‐1 meter less than .5 2 Meters meters meters

Expected sea level rise by world region

250

none

decrease

Don't know

APPENDIX II CASE STUDY MATERIALS INTERVIEW INSTRUMENT USED IN GULFPORT AND PROVIDENCE Barriers to reducing storm vulnerability in seaport decision-making systems Interview Instrument Modified from Susanne Moser and Julia Ekstrom (Moser and Ekstrom 2010) PURPOSE: Elicit storm impacts from actors in decision making system (Section I and II) Elicit understanding of the strategies (current and potential) for reducing vulnerability (Section III and IV) Elicit perceptions of process flow and specific barriers to reducing vulnerability through a test of the framework developed by Moser and Ekstrom (Section IV) Elicit perceptions and concerns around storms and climate change adaptation (Section V) HYPOTHESES: There are different frameworks for long-term vs. short-term planning. In terms of long-term planning for storm impacts (FORMAL RESPONSE), port decision-making systems will tend to cluster in the “understanding” stage of the process. Short-term impacts (RECOVERY) will be addressed through all nine stages. With respect to climate change adaption and increasing storm risk, although a signal may be detectable the main barrier will lie in the actor’s lack of perceived responsibility for implementation of adaptation process. Long-term planning tends to be the responsibility of the public sector and funding agencies, while recovery planning lies with the port itself. Information on future storms will come through “boundary organizations.” MATERIALS PROVIDED AT INTERVIEW: A short “scenario” of a Category 5 storm will be used to ground interviewees in a common understanding of what we mean by “major storm.” This will include some general information about the port, wind strengths, and a history of storms in the area, as well as visual representations of the port area under a Cat 5 storm surge. INFO = Information to be given to informant Blue = notes for interviewer Red – Coding guidance for post-interview analysis OVERVIEW Respondent Name:

________________________________Date_______ Interviewer: _____

Organization: Position:_________________________________ Section I: Background on institutions and informants (5 minutes) Codes: name, organization, role of organization, role of interviewee, decision-making process, other organizations involved, meaning of reducing storm vulnerability INFO: There are 30 questions, but I won’t be asking all of them, as some questions will only be necessary depending on your response to others. (Checked questions need not be asked if respondent was already interviewed.) Please tell us about your agency’s management responsibilities ✔

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(Setting the stage here to have the scope of jurisdiction and mandate in their words, and get at interactions among agencies) Follow up (FUP) A: Could you tell me a bit about the current priorities your agency has? FUP B: Does your agency interact with other local, state, regional or even federal agencies or companies to do its work? And what specifically does your work entail? ✔ FUP A: So you manage …. What does that actually mean as far as your daily work is concerned? FUP B: Who do you interact with regularly to accomplish this? FUP C: How long have you been in this position? FUP D: What is your education background (degrees and discipline)? Can you describe the decision-making process for long-term planning and investing bit more? These questions are likely to bring out issues of conflict, institutional cooperation or lack thereof FUP A: Who applies/proposes/initiates?.... FUP B: Who else is involved? FUP C: Are your decisions reviewed by some higher authority? FUP D: Can anyone appeal or supersede your decisions? How does that process work? FUP E: What information is required so you can make an adequate assessment? FUP F: How long does it take to complete one project/application? How often do you have to make these kinds of decisions? FUP E: What are the most significant changes in your work in the last five years (assuming the person has been in this or similar position for this long) This research is about the “port system.” This includes all of the various functions, costs, and benefits of the port that could be of concern for the region. Please tell us about your agency’s management or planning responsibilities in terms of the port system. ✔ Follow up (FUP) A: Could you tell me a bit about the current priorities your agency has with respect to the port? FUP B: Does your agency interact with other local, state, regional or even federal agencies or companies to do its work and meet its port-related goals? FUP C: How does the port fit under your organization’s mandate? FUP C: How does the port fit under your organizations jurisdiction? FUP D: To what extent is your organization dependent on the success of the port? Section II. Impacts of storm events (5 minutes) INFO: Present the interviewee with the storm scenario and functions of the port Here is an imaginary storm event. We’ll call it Hurricane Ernestine. This storm is a little bit stronger than Katrina and we’re going to imagine it coming right across the port. The port has a number of functions for the region and these functions will be impacted by this event. As we go through the rest of the interview, I’d like you to consider this storm event and the functions of the port as you answer the questions. Codes: impacts, environmental impacts, social impacts, economic impacts, long-term impacts, shortterm impacts, medium-term impacts Have you had any experience with this kind of storm? ✔ ☐ Yes ☐ No Do you have to prepare/account/plan for these kinds of events? ✔ FUP A: In what ways, how so, etc. Consider the hurricane described will hit your area. How would this storm affect the resources and responsibilities within your jurisdiction (including infrastructure, social well-being, ecosystems, etc.)? ✔ FUP A: What would your immediate concerns be? FUP B: What impacts would difficult to address in the immediate aftermath? FUP C: Can you get more specific on what the impacts might be?

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Probe for STEEPLE impacts – six drivers of decision making (drivers of change) S – Social T – Technological EN – Environmental EC – Economic P – Political LE – Legal Environmental Petroleum release

Social Jobs lost/unemployment

Economic Lost business

Infrastructure Power outage

Hazmats released Debris (small) Debris (large) Erosion

Jobs created

Tenants relocate

Water supply

Workers displaced

Cleanup costs Preparation costs Repairs costs Damage to product Can’t get insurance

Utilities (general) Cranes damaged Roads/bridges Rail

Other Loss of competitive advantage Fences and signs Tree debris Lost data

piers On-site buildings

Which of these issues fall within the agency’s priorities? ✔ Section III. Establishing how the informant thinks about storm planning and strategies that have already been implemented (10 minutes) Codes: impacts of Cat 5 storm (short, medium, long), level of concern What are the characteristics of a resilient port system? FUP A: Would you say that the people you work with share your understanding of this? FUP B: What about people in other organizations? FUP C: Prevention, preparedness, emergency phase vs. long term recovery, etc. What measures are currently in place or planned to reduce the port’s vulnerability to hurricane events? FUP A: Say more… FUP B: Was your organization involved with creating this strategy? FUP C: What about (policies, practices, or physical changes)? FUP D: What do you think is good about the strategy? Anything missing? FUP E: Are these strategies reviewed periodically/regularly? How is their (likely) effectiveness assessed? Can you give me a sense of what your agency/organization/company has done to date in terms of reducing vulnerability to storms? ✔ What has your role been in this? FUP A: Is this part of your job description? FUP B: Is storm resilience something that was added to your responsibilities? Has it been part and parcel of what you do on a daily basis since you startedin the position? FUP C: And what has that been like? [The follow-up questions are to get a preliminary sense of the respondents’ attitude about storm resilience, any indication of burden, frustration, excitement, interest etc.] Picking up on what you just said about what your agency/organization/community has done so far: Is this problem within the jurisdiction/mandate of your organization? ☐ Yes ☐ No Is your organization still trying to understand the scope of the problem? ☐ Yes ☐ No Has it moved on to trying to develop some plans of what to do? ☐ Yes ☐ No Are you actually already implementing and monitoring some of these strategies? ☐ Yes ☐Section IV. Establish where they are in the storm planning process and how they

253

think about the future (potential strategies) (20 minutes) Codes: Attitude toward resilience planning, strategies implemented, interviewee role in planning, stages in the process (understanding, planning, managing) INFO: We would like to understand your agency/organization/community’s efforts to reduce vulnerability to storm events. Consider Hurricane Ernestine in your answers to the following questions. Review the storm scenario. What do you think are the advantages and disadvantages of starting to further reduce storm vulnerabilities now? You listed a number impacts (refer to Question 7). If you had plenty of time and plenty of funding, what strategies exist for reducing the region’s vulnerability to the impacts you noted? FUP A: What are some new policies that could be implemented? FUP B: What about new practices? FUP C: Are there any physical changes you could make that would reduce vulnerability? Organizational changes? Incentives? FUP D: Earlier you mentioned such and such, what would you do about that? Policies Setbacks Elevation requirements Integrate evacutation plans Insurance Hurricane continuity plan Freight coordination plans between companies Design standards Fitness of purpose regs

Practices Evacuation drills Evacuate personnel

Products Elevate port Reinforce infrastructure

Evacuate all equipment

Crane tie downs

Lash in place Table top exercises

Dikes, breakwaters Berms

Communications plans

Elevate transportation corridors

Sandbagging Provide “container safe haven”

Replace infrastructure

In place or potential?

You mentioned XXXX strategies that COULD be implemented. For each of these, which organizations should take the lead and which should be partners and who might oppose implementation? Strategy Lead Partners Strategy Lead Partners Strategy Lead Partners What would need to happen to implement those strategies? FUP A: Policy, appropriations, institutional hurdles, etc… FUP B What would you need to actually achieve that goal? FUP C What exactly do you need to know? (E.g. new flood models, social vulnerability, forecasts, etc.?) Have you developed any new strategies to deal with the problems that would come from a hurricane? If

254

so, what are they? FUP A: Depending on informant’s response, ask about that process: FUP B: Who led/is leading this process? FUP C: What is their jurisdiction (or control over the process)? FUP D: How much control do they have over what strategies are developed? FUP E: Are there other organizations, entities or individuals that are/were involved in this process? If so, what has been their influence? FUP F: Was there any broader stakeholder participation? Who (public, other agencies, departments, orgs) was solicited for feedback on developing these strategies? Do the mandate of the lead entity and stakeholder interests align or diverge? Do the strategies fit within the existing public or policy agenda? FUP A: Do you feel that your agency’s pre-existing mission and policy agendas pre-determined the range of strategies that were being considered? Are there overarching goals for the strategies that you developed? FUP: Are the goals made explicit to those involved in developing the strategies? Were there any criteria used? Planning Codes: developing strategies (options), assessing strategies (options), choosing strategies (options) Planning: Developing Strategies Coding Barriers: Leadership, authority and skill in guiding the process; Ability to identify and agree on goals; Ability to identify and agree on a range of criteria; Ability to develop and agree on a range of strategies that meet identified goals and criteria; Level of agreement; Control over process ;Control over strategies Have there been sufficient resources to develop these strategies and facilitate the process? FUP: Depending on answer, probe for staff time, financial, technical resources. Planning: Assessing Strategies Barrier codes: Availability of data/information to assess strategies ; Accessibility/usability of data; Availability of methods to assess and compare strategies; Perceived credibility, salience and legitimacy of information and methods for option assessment; Agreement on assessment approach; Level of agreement on goals, criteria, and strategies Has there been an assessment (formal or informal) of which strategies to select? FUP: If so, could you tell me about this process? Who designed the assessment, who ran it, what data were used, were participants trained/educated (and how so)? What resources were made available for this process? By whom and for what? Did you have specific goals and criteria in mind when you selected among all the strategies? FUP A: If so, how were these developed and by whom? FUP B: Do actors agree on goals, criteria and resulting strategies? FUP C: If no goals were developed or if goals conflict, has this hindered the process (created any conflict?)? Do the involved parties agree on the selected approach to assessing strategies? How much time was given to this assessment? What other timing issues affected the time available for this assessment? Was there enough time? Planning: Selecting Strategies Barrier codes: Ability to reach consensus on selecting option(s); Sphere of responsibility/influence/control over option; Threshold of concern over potential negative consequences; Threshold of perceived option feasibility; Clarity of authority and responsibility over selected option Was one or more storm planning strategy SELECTED, but not yet actually implemented? FUP A: How did this work? Tell me more… FUP B: Who are all the people that were/are/will be involved in the selection process? Did they have conflicting values or preferences? FUP C: Was it based on consensus or something else?

255

FUP D: Were/are there laws or decision making procedures that favor or inhibit certain strategies more than others? FUP E: Who was in charge of the process? Was the authority clear? FUP F: Do you see participants of selection process as risk-seeking or risk-adverse in their selection process? (e.g. do they prefer to have residents remain in area that will be in flood risk but put in a levee to block the flood or do they prefer to move residents out of the flood zone?) Do you think the selected strategies are broadly supported by the port decision-making system? FUP: Tell me more… Section V. Process description and associated barriers (understanding the barriers and impediments) (15 minutes) Understanding Codes: signal detection, information gathering, problem definition Understanding: Problem detection and initial framing phase Barrier codes: Existence of a signal, detection/perception of a signal, threshold of concern (framing as problem), threshold of response needed/feasibility Do you expect the vulnerability of the port and surrounding infrastructure to change in the future? What is the cause of your concern and when did this concern first come to your attention? This response will help us understand if/how the signal was transmitted (and by whom), which would then be further investigated by the investigator through other means (i.e. questioning other informants, document analysis, or other). FUP A: Do you remember if something in particular happened or raised the concerns? What triggered attention to the issue? FUP B: Who initiated it? FUP C: Depending on the respondent’s answer, follow-up with questions that relate that timing to other local events, state reports or policy changes, or international attention to the issue. FUP D: What were some of the first signs to you that it was a concern of the agency/department? FUP E: Back then, when you first heard about this, what did people in your agency think about that? Were they interested, responsive? Did they take it seriously or dismiss it? What was it like? What is your sense of why the issue was taken seriously/dismissed? FUP A: Depending on the response: Was there any reason why it was/was not? FUP B: Did/do laws, policies, and social norms support or prevent taking it seriously and responding to it? Understanding: Information Gathering Barrier codes: interest/focus, availability of information, accessibility of information, salience/relevance, credibility/trust, legitimacy, receptivity to information, willingness/ability to use information Have you been able to get the information you wanted to assess storm vulnerability challenges? FUP A: What kind of information was needed or wanted to assess vulnerability? FUP B: Did you all agree on that? Who decided and how was it decided what you would look at? FUP C: If you were able to get the information you were hoping for, how has the information been used and what did you have to go through to get it? FUP D: Where have you found the best information? FUP E: If not, does this information exist somewhere? Was it just not accessible to you? What did you do without that information? Are there future plans for obtaining what is needed? FUP F: Who did the work for you to collect all this information? For example, do you call on scientists to do the research needed, do you hire consultants, do you compile existing peer-reviewed literature yourself or someone else in the department, or do you do your own in-house research? FUP F: Of these, are some preferred more than other? Say more… In terms of the information you gathered, how will you use that? FUP A: Is the information compatible with existing decision-making processes and models? FUP B: What made this information salient, credible and legitimate to you FUP C: Tell me more… Understanding: Problem (re)Definition

256

Barrier codes: Threshold of concern, threshold of response need, threshold of response feasibility, level of agreement/consensus After information was collected, did your/your agency’s concerns about storm planning change from the original concerns? FUP A: If so, how did they change? FUP B: Were there any new people involved in the storm resilience planning process? FUP C: Was there agreement on how the problem was defined between people and organizations involved? And was it important to have such agreement? Do you think there are any constraints on what issues you look at? For example, given the jurisdiction of your agency, is there something you could not look at? FUP A: What about your or anyone else’s personal interests – anyone who has been involved so far? FUP B: What about financial constraints? FUP C: What about political considerations? FUP D: Do existing policies or decision processes at all constrain what kind of information you can consider? Is there a particular person or group of people in your region who is advocating for preparing for storms? FUP: If yes, then follow up with questions about that person’s or group’s concern and perceived need for preparing for storm impacts. Questions will get at leadership as a barrier or facilitator to reaching the thresholds of concern, response need, and option feasibility. Do any local, state or federal laws and policies support or prevent you from taking the threat/problem seriously and responding to it? Governance as barrier to response feasibility FUP A: How so? FUP B: What role did you play in that process? Is there social/community support for addressing the threats? This question is particularly relevant if the government is in charge of and initiated the process, and if it has gone public with it yet. FUP A: If so, in what way? FUP B: If not, has there been opposition? Managing Codes: strategies implemented, strategies monitored, strategies evaluated Managing: Implementing Barrier codes: Threshold of intent; Authorization; Sufficient resources (fiscal, technical, etc.) to implement; Accountability; Clarity/specificity of option; Legality and procedural feasibility; Sufficient momentum to overcome institutional stickiness, path dependency, and behavioral obstacles Have any of storm resilience strategies already been implemented? In cases where nothing has been implemented, but strategies for storm planning have been selected, then the interviewee will be asked questions to understand why no implementation has yet occurred. Specific barriers to probe deeper include: FUP A: Was the intent to implement set? FUP B: Was the necessary authorization given? Insufficient resources? FUP C: Was anyone accountable to implement? Were strategies clear enough to implement? FUP D: Were the selected strategies procedurally possible? Was there the necessary political will/support? Or other? In cases where the informant is just beginning or in the middle of implementation, a different set of questions will be asked, including: FUP A: Do current laws and institutional requirements support your intent to implement [X]?

257

FUP B: Do you anticipate social and/or political acceptance of the strategies to implement? FUP C: Does implementation require explanation, education, and skill building within your agency? Is implementing the strategy within the responsibility or authority of your agency? FUP A: Will it (did it) require coordination with other agencies or entities? FUP B: Was an implementation strategy developed as part of the planning process? FUP C: What is the role of other relevant agencies, institutions, or actors? FUP D: Do these have overlapping authorities with your agency? How, and how well, do you coordinate what each one of you does? Are there any practices or policies within your agency that overlap with or contradict the storm resilience strategy? If the storm resilience strategies have been implemented in the past, then the above questions will be reframed as appropriate. Managing: Monitoring Barrier Codes: Existence of a monitoring plan; Agreement on and clarity of monitoring targets and goals ; and acceptability of established methods and variables; Availability of technology ; and sustainability of economic resources; Availability and sustainability of human capital; Ability to store, organize, analyze and retrieve monitored data Is there a monitoring plan for strategies that have been implemented initiatives? If so, what is being monitored? FUPs: Over what time scale? Over what time scale does funding exist? What does the funding support? How is the information evaluated and how often? Have the [relevant agencies] agreed on what and how things are going to be monitored? FUPs: What about agreement on goals, design, targets, needed resources, and the intent and schedule for analysis and assessment of the obtained data? What additional capacity (resources) and/or expertise do you need to design and implement the monitoring program? FUP A: Are sufficient resources allocated to implement this (staff, $)? FUP B: Does your agency or others you work with invest in human capital (expertise, time) to carry out the monitoring program? C3: Managing: Evaluating Barrier codes: Threshold of need and feasibility of evaluation; Availability of needed expertise, data and evaluation methodology; Willingness to learn; Willingness to revisit previous decisions; limitations on reopening prior decisions; Social or political feasibility of revisiting previous decisions and/or initiate new actions or policies Does the monitoring program require periodic evaluations? FUP A: How often? What triggers the evaluation? How about unplanned evaluations? FUP B: Do you report [to whom?] the results of the monitoring program? Why/why not? How often? How are the results used? Has a system been set up (or planned) for storing, organizing, analyzing, and retrieving the data? If so, could you tell me about it? Who is accountable (e.g. through formal mandates or plans) to conduct these evaluations? Have there been any evaluations yet? FUP: If so, follow up with questions asking such as: When and by whom, and what were the goals, outputs, outcomes, and impacts? How do the findings of the evaluation get incorporated/feedback into management? FUPs: Are there mechanisms that support or prevent this? Do you think decision-makers are willing and legally and politically able to revisit and change past decisions based on evaluations? Are there sufficient resources to conduct these periodic evaluations? Section VI. Establish how they relate storm planning to climate change (5 minutes) Codes: adaptation planning, climate training, biggest challenges Are you aware of any other ports, cities, counties, or agencies in the region working on adapting to climate change?

258

FUP A: How did you learn about their efforts? FUP B: Do you or your department/agency work with any of these directly and in what capacity? FUP C: Do any of these efforts focus on the port at all? How so? (this is to gauge collaboration and information sharing, as well as attitude toward other efforts) Have you participated in any climate change-related training? If so, what and when? Workshops, instructional events, etc. FUP A: How was it/did it help you with your job? FUP B: If you haven’t participated in such a training, did anyone in your agency? FUP C: If you had the opportunity, what kind of training would be helpful to you? Do you think this kind of training exists, you just haven’t been able to attend one or is it just not out there? Do you know if your city or county has a climate action plan? FUP A: How were you involved in developing it? FUP B: Has this effort affected your storm preparedness plans? FUP C: Any of your long-term infrastructure upgrades? FUP D: Your investment decisions? If so, when was it adopted? FUPs: What does it focus on? Does it include any discussion of storm resilience (if so, to what extent)? Who helped write it? What methodology was used in the creation of the plan? Relative to other dangers and challenges, how does climate change compare? FUP A: At what point would you begin to be concerned about climate change? FUP B: What kinds of events would concern you? Closing. [at discretion, depending on length of interview] Is there anything else we might have missed that you want to add about the storm resilience process you’ve gone through so far

259

CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT FOR TRANCRIBERS It is understood and agreed to that the below identified discloser of confidential information may provide certain information that is and must be kept confidential. To ensure the protection of such information, and to preserve and confidentiality necessary, it agreed that: The confidential information can described as and includes: Audio recordings and transcripts of interviews of business and government officials in Gulfport, Providence, and Kingston conducted by Austin Becker as part of his PhD research at Stanford University. The recipient agrees not to disclose the confidential information obtained from the discloser to anyone unless required to do so by law. The recipient agrees not to retain or distribute any copies of the audio recordings or transcripts. This Agreement states the entire agreement between parties concerning the disclosure of confidential information. Any addition or modification to this Agreement must me made in writing and signed by the parities. If any of the provisions of the Agreement are found to be unenforceable, the remainder shall be enforces as fully as possible and the unenforceable provisions shall be deemed modified to the limited extent required to permit enforcement of the agreement as a whole. Wherefore, the parties acknowledge that they have read and understand the agreement and voluntarily accept the duties and obligations set forth herein. Recipient of confidential information: Name (Print or Type): Address: Signature:

Date:

Discloser of Confidential Information: Name: Austin Becker Signature:

Date:

260

ALL ORGANIZATIONS INTERVIEWED IN PROVIDENCE AND GULFPORT

261

HURRICANE SCENARIOS FOR PROVIDENCE AND GULFPORT

H URRIC A NE ERNES TINE H ITS P RO V ID ENC E Hurricane Ernestine Projected Path

Stanford University

Austin Becker, PhD Candidate E-mail: [email protected] | Phone: 401-636-0430 Website: http://stanford.edu/~austinb/

Providence Hurricane Facts • Brushed or hit by a storm approx. every 5.15 years • Direct hurricane hits approx. once every 17.38 years • Last affected by Hurricane Hanna (Cat. 1) in 2008 • Last major storm was Hurricane Bob (Cat. 4) in 1991 • Next predicted hit before the end of 2015

Hurricane Ernestine (Category 3) Impacts

Projected Storm Surge

111-130 mph | Devastating damage • Port: • Unstrapped containers • Petroleum tanks, chemical storage, and other debris scattered by storm surge • Access roads and rail shut down, cutting off access to port • Coast: • Entire coastal communities nearly destroyed • Industrial Buildings: • High percentage of roof covering and siding damage • Isolated structural damage to wood or steel framing • High percentage of collapse to unreinforced masonry buildings • Numerous windows blown out of high-rise buildings resulting in falling glass • Power and Water: • Electricity and water unavailable for several days to a few weeks after the storm passes • Sewage treatment plan flooded • Signage, Fences, and Canopies: • Most commercial signage, fences, and canopies destroyed • Trees: • Many trees snapped or uprooted and power poles downed • Fallen trees and power poles isolate residential areas • People: • High risk of injury or death from flying or falling debris, even if indoors in mobile homes or framed homes. • Many forced to evacuate to shelters during the passage of the storm

Surge Distribution

Slosh Model Storm Surge MEOW for Stimulated Category 3 moving north at 40 mph at Narragansett / Buzzard's Bay Basins Storm surge layers provided by Applied Science Associates

http://www.mass.gov/czm/chc/meetings/present/vallee_hurricanes_6-12-06.pdf

262

263

Appendix A: H URRIC A NE

ERNES TINE H ITS G ULF P O RT

Hurricane Ernestine Projected Path

Stanford University | Civil & Environmental Engineering

Ernestine Fu, Martin Fischer, Austin Becker, Ben Schwegler

Hurricane Ernestine (Category 4) Impacts

Hurricane Ernestine

Projected Storm Surge

Winds: 131-155 mph | Catastrophic damage Port: • Damage to warehouses • Debris and containers washed inland impact the city and surrounding area Industrial Buildings: • Structural damage to top floors of apartment buildings • Some steel frames in older industrial buildings collapse • High percentage of collapse to older unreinforced masonry buildings • Windows blown out of high-rise buildings resulting in falling glass Power and Water: • Power outages for weeks to possibly months • Long-term water shortages • Most of the area uninhabitable for weeks or months Signage, Fences, and Canopies: • Nearly all commercial signage, fences, and canopies destroyed Trees: • Most trees snapped or uprooted and power poles downed • Fallen trees and power poles isolate residential areas People: • Very high risk of injury or death to people due to flying objects and falling debris

Surge Distribution

Storm surge layers provided by Applied Science Associates

http://chps.sam.usace.army.mil/USHESdata/StateMapSelect.htm

264

H URRIC A NE ERNES TINE H ITS G ULF P O RT PORT OF GULFPORT is largely a fishing, tourism, and agricultural area. It is a man made harbor, and its importance lies in its accessibility and distribution range; the port provides international accessibility to Mexico, Central America, and Caribbean nations. On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina hit Gulfport. Much of the port was flooded or destroyed, and the area is still recovering from the devastating impact of tropical storms and storm surges. Cargo

Customers

Nature of Operation

International accessibility to Mexico, Central America, and some Caribbean nations

Public Operation by Mississippi Port Authority (MSPA)

MSPA Volume in 2010

Primary Freight: Containers, bulk freight Imports: Fresh fruit, raw materials, garments, ore, lumber Exports: Products primarily to South and Central America

Over 2.15 million tons of cargo 208,000 TEU’s (twentyfoot equivalent units)

Topography • Center of Gulf Coast “catcher’s mitt” for hurricanes • Exposed to open water to the south, allowing for port expansion, but little protection in the event of a storm

Infrastructure The Mississippi State Port Authority (MSPA) owns and maintains much of the major infrastructure located on the Gulfport’s portlands, including: •10 multiple berths ranging from 525 – 750 feet • Over 400,000 square feet of covered storage • Two Gottwald Mobile harbour cranes • Open Container Storage with reefer plug outlets • Bulk Material Unloading System • Dockside and Off Dock Storage • Open Bulk and Break‐bulk storage • Customs secured boundaries with roving patrols • Container Freight Station. • Ro‐Ro ramp •

Port Infrastructure as of December 2009

Hurricane Katrina August 28/29, 2005 Category 3/4

$90.9 billion (2011 USD) damages

33 tornadoes

1200 deaths (200 in MS)

Winds: 175mph (sustained)

Storm surge: 25-28 ft

Transportation Good existing transportation system with north, south, east, west interstate systems and rail systems, including the CSX railroad that runs east-west.

Pre-Hurricane Katrina vs. Post-Hurricane Katrina 2004

2009

$180 million dollars revenue

$106 million repair project cost

Over 2.4 million tons of cargo

2.04 million tons of cargo

213,108 TEUs

198,900 TEUs

353 ship visits

235 ship visits

Before and After Hurricane Katrina

Hurricane Katrina Impacts • Psychological damage • Long-term damage • Physical damage • $106 million for reconstruction of • Main structural members of port in infrastructure place, but floors blown up • $600 million invested for expansion • Covered storage warehouse damaged and hurricane resilience • Rotting poultry and seafood • Impacts to the channel scattered throughout city • Federal government costs, i.e. • Paper rolls, containers, and other responsible for reopening shipping debris washed inland, blocked roads channel getting in, and damaged houses • Unemployment • Insurance: many wind and water • Business relocated outside of Gulfport, claims i.e. freezers and poultry exports

265

Surge coming into Gulfport over the beach road, Hwy 90

TABLE OF DOCUMENTS DISCOVERED FROM GULFPORT Document)Name)

Type)

Author,)year)

Main)goals)

Environmental) Assessment)for) HUD?funded) Proposal)for)24? Acre)Fill,)New) Tenant)Terminals) and)Infrastructure) at)Port)of)Gulpfort) Conditional)Letter) of)Map)Revision) (CLOMR)) 2003)Master)Plan) 2007)Master)Plan) update) Environmental) Assessment)

Environmental, Assessment,

MSPA,,2010,

,

,

FEMA,,2009,

,

Sets,new,elevation, requirements,

, ,

MSPA,,2003, MSPA,,CH2M, Hill,2007, MSPA,,CH2M, Hill,,MDA,

, ,

None, Creates,new,evacuation, plan,component, ,

Permitting,

Plan)for)the) , Implementation)of) the)Port)of)Gulfport) Restoration) Program) Sustainable) , Restoration)of)the) Port)of)Gulfport)

Letter)of) opposition)to)the) Port)of)Gulfport) Restoration) Program) Port)of)Gulfport) Hurricane)Katrina) Damage) Assessment)Report) Master)Planning) the)Port)of) Gulfport,)MS)–) Rebirth)after) Katrina) Central)Harrison) County)Connector) Highway)Project) History) Pay)Now,)Pay)Later:) Mississippi)

Ensure,compliance,with, all,environmental, requirements, CH2M,Hill,,2010, ,

Relevance)to)Port) Resilience) Describes,elevation, component,,justifies,, provides,budget.,

Rejects,evacuation,plan,in, favor,of,new,elevation, plan,

,

,

Letter,

Columbia, University,–, School,of, International, and,Public, Affairs, Steps,Coalition,

,

None.,

Report,

MSPA,

,

Report,

,

Provides,detail,on, individual,structures,that, were,damaged,during, Katrina, Provides,overview,of, restoration,plan,

Flier,

MDOT,

Provides,timeline,for, connector,project.,

None.,

Report,

American, Security,Project,

Discusses,the,costs,of, inaction,to,climate,change,

,

266

,

Hurricane)Katrina) Storm)Surge) Reconnaissance)

Journal)Paper)

MS)Unifited)LongH Planning' Range) document' Transportation) Infrastructure)Plan) Maritime)Severe) ' Weather) Contingency)Plan)–) Guide)to)Port) Planning)and) Preparation)

Fritz)et)a.,)2008) Documents)storm)surge) heights)from)Katrina,) including)up)to)9.7m)in) Gulfport.) MDOT,'2007' Lays'out'plan'for' transportation'with'2030' vision' USCG'

Shows)actual)surge) heights)at)the)Port)of) Gulfport.)

Does'not'address'resilience'or'strom'p

Plan'for'advising'the' None.' maritime'community'of' sequence'and'timing'of' decision'and'action'during' periods'when'the'port'is' threatened'by'a'hurricane;' and'recommend'actions' that'can'me'taken'to' minimize'death,'injury,' and'threats'to'the' environment' Updates'flood'maps' Sets'requirement'for'25’' elevation'height'

Harrison)Country) Flood)Insurance) Study) MS)Hazard) Mitigation)Plan) Impacts)of)Climate) Change)and) Variability)on) Transportation) Systems)and) Infrastructure:)Gulf) Coast)Study,)Phase) 1) Port)of)Gulfport) Restoration) Program)Action) Plan)Amendment)5) –)Modification)1)

Study'report'

FEMA,'2009'

'

'

'

'

USDOT'and' USGS'under' auspices'of'the' US'Climate' Change'Science' Program'

Analysis'of'risk'to'SLR'and' ' surge'resulting'from' climate'change.'Puts' Gulfport'into'the'context' of'other'ports.'

'

MDA,'2008'

Revision'of'HUD'action' plan'for'HUD'monies.' Discusses'public' comments'to'the' amendment.'

The)Projected) Economic)Impacts) from)Container) Terminal) Development)at) Gulfport:)Update)

Economic' Impact' Analysis'

TransSystems,' 2011'

Mississippi%Coastal% Report% Analysis%Project%–% Documentation% and%Main% Engineering%Report%

FEMA,%2008%

!

267

'

Changes'from'evacuation' plan'to'elevation'plan,' and'securing'of' containers'by'lash'and' stow'method,'and' eliminates'need'for' inland'port'and' breakwater.'Public' comments'do'not'address' elevation.' Projects'economic'impacts' ' under'a'number'of' expansion'scenarios'

Background%information% % for%FIS.%Provides%%details% of%storm%analysis,% modeling,%and%analysis% used%to%develop%revised% maps%for%coastal%flood% zones%

SUMMARIES OF DOCUMENTS ANALYZED FROM PROVIDEMCE

Short Title

Sponsor

Sector

Type of document

Year

1

Hazards Chapter

RI CRMC

Public (state)

Policy

2009

2

Providence Hazard Mitigation Plan

RI EMA

Public (state)


Systems-‐level Plan

Coordinat ion Team

Public (state)

State planning document

2008

4

Promet hurricane checklist

Promet Marine Services

Port and private


2011

5

Hazard ID and Risk Assessment

6

RI Hazard Mitigation Plan

RIEMA

Public (local)

Report

Public (state)


Indire ct costs

Intangible Conseque nces

3

0

12

0

1

5

1

0

3

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

2011

3

PEMA

Direct damage s

2010

2008

1.

Natural Hazards: Hurricanes, Floods, and Sea Level Rise in the Metro Bay Region Special Area Management Plan

2.

Strategy for Reducing Risks from Natural Hazards in Providence, RI: A Multi-‐Hazard Mitigation Plan

3. 4. 5. 6.

Bays, R ivers, and Watersheds Systems-‐Level Plan: 2009-‐1013 Promet Marine Services Hurricane Preparedness Checklist Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment RI State H azard Mitigation Plan

1. Natural Hazards: Hurricanes, Floods, and Sea Level Rise in the Metro Bay Region Special Area Management Plan The “Metro Bay Special Area Management Plan” is part of Rhode Island’s coastal management program, but tailors regulations for the specific area of the state that includes the Port of Providence. The Natural Hazards Chapter “advises the communities, state and local government, and the public on the relevant coastal hazard issues in the Metro Bay Region and proposes recommendations to effectively address and mitigate those hazards”. Of the documents reviewed, the “Natural Hazards Chapter” of the Metro Bay Special Area Management Plan offered the richest analysis (17 mentions) of the potential impacts of a hurricane strike at the Port of Providence. 13 of these mentions fell into the “intangible consequences” category, with a high focus on specific types of debris and potential contamination of the waterways. 2. Strategy for Reducing Risks from Natural Hazards in Providence, Rhode Island: A Multi-‐Hazard

268

Mitigation Plan The Providence Emergency Management Agency led the effort to compile a City-‐scale hazard mitigation plan to “reduce or eliminate long-‐term risk to people and property from natural hazards.” The completion of the plan also qualified local communities for five federal mitigation grant programs: Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, Pre-‐Disaster Mitigation, Flood Mitigation Assistance, Severe Repetitive Loss, and Repetitive Flood Claim. The goals of the plan are to both identify areas at risk and implement priority hazard mitigation actions. The Hazard Mitigation Planning Committee included representatives of the port and maritime industries. 3. Bays, Rivers, and Watersheds Systems-‐Level Plan: 2009-‐2013 The Rhode Island Bays, Rivers, and Watersheds Coordination Team, a state interagency commission dedicated to the protection, management, restoration and sustainable development of Rhode Island’s fresh and marine waters and watersheds, drafted a “systems-‐level plan” to guide policy and management of Rhode Island’s waterways. The plan includes two relevant goals. First, it aims to protected human life, property, and infrastructure against the hazards of storms and floods. Second, it aims to enhance the functions, resiliency, and productivity of the State’s ports and related maritime industries. Though this is a wide-‐reaching document that brought together many agencies and organizations within the state, it provides few details on the specific impacts and consequences with respect to storm threats to the Port of Providence. It notes the threat of debris, the potentially severe interruption of energy distribution, and the potential destruction of upper bay port facilities and related energy infrastructure. 4. Promet Marine Services Hurricane Preparedness Checklist Promet Marine Services, though not part of the ProvPort facilities, was an important ship repair operation located within the bounds of the study area. Theirs was the only “hurricane preparedness checklist” we were able to obtain in this study, though other stakeholders did mention that they had such documents. Promet’s checklist contained only one reference to the impacts of a storm (“Debris as a general problem), though clearly the intention of the document and the policies it contained were to minimize impacts overall. 5. Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment The Providence Emergency Management Agency drafted this plan to assess the City’s vulnerability to natural, human-‐caused and technological hazards and to facilitate all-‐hazards planning and preparedness for the City. The plan looks at a variety of hazards and assesses potential affects on the City in terms of: Human impact; Property impact; and Business impact. The Port of Providence receives special attention as an area of concern, though the report provides no specifics with respect to how hurricanes might affect the port. A 2010 Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment Study for the City acknowledges the port as an area of risk, but does not go into any detail or specifics. A recent update to the Multi-‐Hazard Mitigation Plan recommends further study of the port district to identify risk-‐reduction options, as well as retrofitting of facilities to protect against flooding. 6. RI State Hazard Mitigation Plan Like the local level hazard mitigation plan described above, the state hazard mitigation plan, “identifies hazard mitigation goals, objectives and recommended actions and initiatives for state government that will reduce injury and damage from natural hazards”. It includes long-‐term goals, short-‐term objectives and the assignment of specific, measurable tasks or actions. The report mentions no specifics around the Port of Providence, nor does it include port facilities explicitly in its definition of “critical facilities.” However, many of the implications and recommendations may be inferred to include the port. The report does mention state-‐owned property and infrastructure, but the Port of Providence is not state owned, so does not fall into this part of the analysis.

269

ALL DOCUMENTS REVIEWED IN GULFPORT Title

Author

Sponsor/ organizatio n

Advancing)in)the)Aftermath)IV:

Loren&C.&Scott

Capital&One& Academia&and&non5 N.A. profit

Hurricane)Katrina)Storm)Surge) Reconnaissance

Fritz&et&al

Georgia& Tech

Academia&and&non5 profit

Letter)of)opposition)to)HUD)funding Multiple

STEPS


Sustainable)Restoration)of)the)Port) of)Gulfport

Sector

Addres Addre Address ses/ sses/ es/ports/ Port/ storm/ Intangible/ and/ Directl dama consequenc storms y ges es

Direct/ Total/ Indirect/ damage ment costs s ions

Type/of/document

Year

Report

2007

Yes

Yes

Yes

0

1

0

1

Academic&paper

2008

Yes

Yes

Yes

0

0

4

4

Letter&of&opposition

2007

Yes

Yes

Yes

0

0

1

1

Report

2011

Yes

Yes

Yes

0

1

1

2

Reilly&Morse

Mississippi& Center&for& Academia&and&non5 Justice profit

Environmental)Environmental) Assessment)and)Environmental) Review)Record)for)Community) Development)Block)Grant)Disaster) Recovery)Project)at)State)Port)at) Gulfport

MSPA

MDA

Port&and&private

Environmental&Assessment

2010

Yes

Yes

Yes

2

1

2

5

Gulfport)Master)Plan)Update)2007) Final)Report

BDMJM&Harris&and& AECOM

MSPA

Port&and&private

Master&Plan

2007

Yes

Yes

Yes

1

9

16

26

Hurricane)Katrina)Damage) Assessment)Report

MSPA

MSPA

Port&and&private

Damage&assessment

2005

Yes

Yes

Yes

0

0

11

11

Master)Planning)the)Port)of) Gulfport,)Mississippi)O)Rebirth)after) Katrina

John&Webb

MSPA

Port&and&private

Report

2007

Yes

Yes

Yes

0

0

8

8

Port)of)Gulfport)Restoration) Program)Action)Plan

MSPA

MSPA

Port&and&private

Master&Plan

2008

Yes

Yes

Yes

1

6

3

10

Port)of)Gulfport)Restoration) Program)Presubmittal)Meeting

CH2M&Hill

MSPA

Port&and&private

Presentation

2009

Yes

Yes

Yes

0

0

0

0

Read)the)Port)of)Gulfport's) Restoration)Program)Description

MSPA

MSPA

Port&and&private

Press&Release

2008

Yes

Yes

Yes

1

0

2

3

The)Plan)for)the)Implementation)of) the)Port)of)Gulfport)Restoration) Program

CH2M&Hill

MSPA

Port&and&private

Master&Plan

2010

Yes

Yes

Yes

0

0

2

2

Hurricanes)Katrina)and)Rita)O) Implications)for)Hurricane)Science) and)Engineering

Building&and&Fire& Research&Laboratory& National&Institute&of& Standards&and& Technology

National& Science& Board

Public&(federal)

Report

2006

Yes

Yes

Yes

0

0

7

7

Maritime)Severe)Weather) Contingency)Port)Plan

USCG

USCG

Public&(federal)

Hazard&mitigation&plan

2010

Yes

Yes

Yes

0

0

1

1

Central)Harrison)County)Connector) Highway

MDOT

MDOT

Public&(local,& state,®ional)

FAQ

2007

Yes

Yes

Yes

0

0

1

1

State)of)Mississippi)Hazard) Mitigation)Plan

State&of&Mississippi

MEMA


Hazard&mitigation&plan

2007

Yes

Yes

Yes

0

0

0

0

Testimony)of)Governor)Haley) Barbour

Haley&Barbour

Ad&Hoc& Subcommit tee&on& Disaster& Recovery


Testimony

2009

Yes

Yes

Yes

0

0

1

1

The)Impact)of)Hurricane)Katrina)on) Mississippi’s)Commercial)Public) Ports)and)Opportunities)for) Expansion)of)the)Ports

Joint&Legislative& Committee&on& Performance&Evaluation& Mississippi& and&Expenditure&Review Legislature


Report

2006

Yes

Yes

Yes

3

2

9

Federal)Disaster)Recovery)Grant) Report

MDA

MDA

Port&and&private

Grant&report

2011

No

Yes

No

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Gulfport)Restoration)Program) Action)Plan)O)Amendment)5)O) Modification)1

MSPA

MSPA

Port&and&private

Port&planning&document

2008

No

Yes

No

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

MSPA)Current)and)Projected)Jobs

MSPA

MSPA

Port&and&private

Report

2011

No

Yes

No

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Question)received)on)"request)for) ideas")proposal

MSPA

MSPA

Port&and&private

Response&to&public&comment

2010

No

Yes

No

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

The)Projected)Economic)Impacts) from)Container)Terminal) Development)at)Gulfport

TranSystems

MSPA

Port&and&private

Economic&assessment

2011

No

Yes

No

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

MDOT


Transport&Plan

2007

No

Yes

No

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A


Budget

2011

No

Yes

No

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A


Pamphlet

2011

No

No

Yes

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Mississippi)Unified)LongORange) Transportation)Infrastructure)Plan

MDOT

State)of)Mississippi)Budget)2011

Joint& Legislative& Joint&Legislative&Budget& Budget& Committee Committee

Mississippi)Pay)Now,)Pay)Later:

American&Security& Project

American& Security& Project

14

Hurricane)Katrina:)Profile)of)a)Super) Cat)Lessons)and)Implications)for) Risk&Management& Catastrophe)Risk)Management Solutions

Risk& Manageme nt&Solutions

Port&and&private

Report

2005

No

No

Yes

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Harrison)County)Flood)Insurance) Study

FEMA

FEMA

Public&(federal)

Flood&insurance&study

2009

No

No

Yes

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Mississippi)Coastal)Analysis)Project)O) Coastal)Documentation)and)Main) Engineering)Report FEMA

FEMA

Public&(federal)

Report

2008

No

No

Yes

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Mississippi)Coastal)Improvements) Project,)Interim)Report

USACE

USACE

Public&(federal)

Report

2006

No

No

Yes

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

City)of)Gulfport)Budget)2011

City&of&Gulfport

City&of& Gulfport


Budget

2011

No

No

Yes

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Harrison)County)Hurricane)Surge) Map

FEMA

FEMA

Public&(federal)

Flood&insurance&study

2009

No

No

No

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

270

MISSIONS OF ORGANIZATIONS IN GULFPORT AND PROVIDENCE

271

272

MISSIONS AND MANDATES OF INDIVIDUAL ORGANIZATIONS INTERVIEWED GULFPORT Stakehold ers


Mission or mandate with respect to the port

Internal Stakehold ers

Internal Port

Mississippi State Port Authority

To be a profitable, self-sufficient Port providing world class maritime terminal service to present and future customers and to facilitate the economic growth of Mississippi through the promotion of international trade. The Mississippi State Port Authority Board of Commissioners governs the port. The State Port’s fivemember board represents a cross-section of Harrison County and the City of Gulfport and is appointed to staggered, five-year terms. Three members are appointed by the Governor, one by the Harrison County Board of Supervisors, and one by the City of Gulfport.

Stewart and Sneed Insurance (Bancorp South)

Mission Our mission at Bancorp South Insurance Services is to reduce the real cost of risk for our clients by building longstanding relationships enabling us to understand the nuances of our clients’ business, their personal needs and those of their employees. With a keen understanding of these needs, we deliver solutions that pay real dividends over the long term.

External Stakehold ers

Tenants (Chiquita Banana)

"The company’s products and services are designed to win the hearts and smiles of the world's consumers by helping them enjoy healthy fresh foods. " My Mission, Vision & Values What Are We Striving For? Mission (Our Work) We are a global project delivery company, helping our clients build a better and more sustainable world. Vision (Our Aspiration)

Economic/ Contractu al

Best place to work and best client experience CH2M Hill

Most respected company in our industry What Do We Value? Governing Values (Our Priorities) Respect: Civil, ethical workplace--delivering sustainable excellence based on the Little Yellow Book philosophy Delivery Excellence: Client-driven quality, delivered safely in the "CH2M HILL Way" Employee Control: Responsible financial management providing long-term company stability and agility to invest/grow where we choose

Public Policy Stakehold ers


United States Corps of Engineers, Mobile District, Regulatory Division

The Department of the Army Regulatory Program is one of the oldest in the Federal Government. Initially, it served a fairly simple purpose: to protect and maintain the navigable capacity of the Nation's waters. Changing public needs, evolving policy, court decisions and new statutory mandates have changed several aspects of the program including its breadth, complexity and authority. The Regulatory Program administers and enforces Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 and Section 404 of the Clean Water Act. Under Section 10, a Corps permit is required for work or structures in, over or under navigable waters of the United States. Under Section 404, a Corps permit is required for

273

the discharge of dredged or fill material into waters of the United States. Many water bodies and wetlands in the Nation are waters of the United States and are subject to the Corps' Section 404 regulatory authority. For more information, click here.

National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Association, Office of Coast Survey

United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, CDBG

Federal Emergency Management Agency

Mississippi Department of Transportation, Freight, Rails, Ports and Waterways division Public policy state Mississippi Department of Marine Resources Mississippi Development Authority

NOAA's Office of Coast Survey ensures safe, efficient and environmentally sound marine transportation that brings an uninterrupted flow of people and goods into and out of our nation's ports. The foundation of the United States economy is the Marine Transportation System--America's network of oceans, rivers, canals, locks and dams. Shipping on these "marine highways" moves people and cargo around the country, and connects us to the global marketplace for international trade and affordable goods. The Office of Coast Survey is responsible for producing the suite of nautical charts that covers the coastal waters of the U.S. and its territories. National Objectives Eligible activities must meet at least one of three program national objectives: benefit persons of low and moderate income, aid in the prevention or elimination of slums or blight, or meet other urgent community development needs because existing conditions pose a serious and immediate threat to the health and welfare of the community where other financial resources are not available. Eligible Customers CDBG Disaster Recovery grants primarily benefit low-income residents in and around communities that have experienced a natural disaster. Generally, grantees must use at least half of Disaster Recovery funds for activities that principally benefit low-and moderate-income persons. These can be either activities in which all or the majority of people who benefit have low or moderate incomes or activities that benefit an area or service group in which at least 51 percent of the populous are of low- and moderate-income. Eligible Activities Grantees may use CDBG Disaster Recovery funds for recovery efforts involving housing, economic development, infrastructure and prevention of further damage to affected areas, if such use does not duplicate funding available from the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Small Business Administration, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. FEMA’s mission is to support our citizens and first responders to ensure that as a nation we work together to build, sustain, and improve our capability to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate all hazards. The Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) provides grants to States and local governments to implement long-term hazard mitigation measures after a major disaster declaration. The purpose of the HMGP is to reduce the loss of life and property due to natural disasters and to enable mitigation measures to be implemented during the immediate recovery from a disaster. The HMGP is authorized under Section 404 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act The primary mission of the Office of Intermodal Planning is to ensure quality of life and economic development by providing support for a well-planned, comprehensive, coordinated, and sustainable intermodal transportation network guaranteeing safety, access, and mobility. Combined, the Freight, Rails, Ports an Waterways division will act as a mechanism, to better connect, develop, and assure a manner that will maximize use of existing facilities and optimum integration and coordination of the various modes of transportation, including the combined utilization of both government owned and privately owned resources. The Commission on Marine Resources (CMR) is composed of five members appointed by the governor for four-year terms to represent the following areas: commercial seafood processors, nonprofit environmental organizations, charter boat operators, recreational fishermen and commercial fishermen. "Mississippi Development Authority's mission is to foster a strong state economy and vibrant communities through innovation, use of talent and resources to improve our citizens' lives."

274

The Mississippi Development Authority (MDA) is the State of Mississippi’s lead economic and community development agency. More than 250 employees are engaged in providing services to businesses, communities and workers in the state. The agency is organized into three groups, Economic Development, Asset Development and Administration and Financial Services. The Economic Development Group focuses its efforts in traditional business recruitment and retention, community development, tourism development and export development. The Asset Development Group pursues innovative ways to develop unique Mississippi assets such as cultural heritage, natural resources and small town life styles. The Administration and Financial Services Group oversees the agency's financial and administrative responsibilities and community development grant programs. Hazard mitigation is the cornerstone of emergency management. Mitigation is the ongoing effort to lessen the impact disasters have on people's lives and property through damage prevention and flood insurance. The Mississippi Emergency Management Agency’s Office of Mitigation is responsible for coordinating disaster loss reduction programs, initiatives and policies throughout the state. Disaster loss reduction measures are carried out through the development of state and local hazard mitigation plans and the implementation of those plans.

Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, Hazard Mitigation Office

The mitigation office administers hazard mitigation grant programs to state and local governments, qualifying nonprofits and tribal organizations. Grant programs include the post-disaster Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, the Flood Mitigation Assistance Program, the Pre-Disaster Mitigation Program and the Severe Repetitive Loss Grant Program, which funds the mitigation of high loss insured properties through the National Flood Insurance Program. OFFICE OF PREPAREDNESS The Office of Preparedness is divided into three Bureaus, which has daily oversight for Plans, Training and Exercise. The Plans Bureau is responsible for providing emergency planning assistance to state agencies and local governments to include the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, as well as regional and national emergency planning initiatives. Additionally, the bureau manages all program requirements for the Hazardous Materials Program, Local Emergency Planning Committees, Waste Isolation Pilot Program, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program, Earthquake Program, Hurricane Program and Continuity of Operations and Continuity of Government planning assistance for state agencies.

Mississippi State Port Authority

To be a profitable, self-sufficient Port providing world class maritime terminal service to present and future customers and to facilitate the economic growth of Mississippi through the promotion of international trade. The Mississippi State Port Authority Board of Commissioners governs the port. The State Port’s fivemember board represents a cross-section of Harrison County and the City of Gulfport and is appointed to staggered, five-year terms. Three members are appointed by the Governor, one by the Harrison County Board of Supervisors, and one by the City of Gulfport.

Governor

275

The Southern Mississippi Planning and Development District (SMPDD),

The Southern Mississippi Planning and Development District (SMPDD), through the leadership of the local officials comprising its Board of Directors and through the synergy of its staff, has grown to be one of the largest and most diversified regional planning entities in the United States. Assisting 15 county and 37 municipal governments, the Districts geographic service area encompasses Covington, Forrest, George, Greene, Hancock, Harrison, Jackson, Jefferson Davis, Jones, Lamar, Marion, Pearl River, Perry, Stone and Wayne Counties. Since its beginning in 1967, SMPDD continually evolved to meet the needs, discover opportunities and anticipate the trends challenging the economic vitality, environmental integrity, and overall quality of life enjoyed in South Mississippi. The District perceives its function as a change agent to add value to the information and resources it possesses, and by doing so, accomplish its mission of "providing the information and technical capacity needed for private and public sector leaders in Southern Mississippi to make informed decisions and to take effective actions to encourage and accomplish planned development of the region's human, economic, political and natural resources." The basic mission of SMPDD's Community Development and Planning Division is to identify and capitalize on the development potentials of the fifteen counties. The Division operates from SMPDD headquarters on the Gulf Coast in Gulfport and is organized into six functional areas. http://www.smpdd.com/ The Gulf Regional Planning Commission, created in 1964, is the only regional planning commission authorized by HB 393, Mississippi Code Title 17, Planning and Zoning. Forty-five years later GRPC continues to serve as a general planning organization to the fourteen local and county governing bodies within the counties of Hancock, Harrison and Jackson. MPO Goals and Objectives These goals and objectives were developed to comply with the TEA-21 MPO Planning Process. The MPO transportation planning program requires all planning and proposed projects to demonstrate the following: GOAL ONE Enhance accessibility, mobility, and general traffic flow of the transportation system for persons and all modes on the Mississippi Gulf Coast GOAL TWO

Gulf Regional Planning Commission

Provide and balanced multi-modal transportation system by promoting the enhancement of all mobility strategies available to people and freight GOAL THREE Support the connectivity and economic vitality of the Mississippi Gulf Coast region GOAL FOUR Protect the Environment; improve aesthetics, and increase safety for the region through comprehensive transportation planning. GOAL FIVE Maintain and preserve existing facilities by promoting efficient system management as well as, alternative and technologically advanced mitigation measures GOAL SIX Provide a transportation planning process that informs the community and its public officials, as well as involves all members of the public http://www.grpc.com/mpoplanning.html

City of Gulfport

The Office of the Chief Administrator serves as a vital link between the Mayor’s Office, City Council, department directors and other entities to facilitate outcomes consistent with the overall vision and mission of the City of Gulfport. The CAO oversees the city’s more than 20 departments and is responsible for oversight and management of city operations, ensuring efficiency, accountability and productivity in the city’s commitment to deliver quality services through the daily operations of municipal government.

276

General Responsibilities of the Office: Implements executive and legislative policy relative to city staff and services. Oversees the functions of city departments and coordinates with department directors and management personnel. Maintains stability among municipal services and strategic planning, budgeting, and comprehensive and capital programming, and performance accountability. Enforces fiscal policy and monitors, with the assistance of the Chief Financial Officer, the accuracy of financial reports, preparation and adoption of annual budgets, and examines and reviews spending and revenues to ensure a healthy financial condition for Gulfport. Coordinates the presentation and dissemination of administrative business that is to be presented by city staff through the mayor to the City Council. Monitors contract compliance and expenditures with department directors to insure fiscal responsibility and timely completion of capital projects. Serves as point of contact in the executive branch on non-legal matters, responds to requests and inquiries from the City Council, other city offices and department directors. http://www.gulfport-ms.gov/administration.shtml

Harrison County Emergency Management

Harrison County is required/responsible to prepare for in the event of a natural, technological or man-made emergency or disaster that threatens life, property or the environment of the citizens of this county. The Mississippi Emergency Management Law of 1995 as codified at Title 33, Chapter 15 of the Mississippi Code of 1972, Annotated, confers emergency powers on the Governor, the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, and the executive heads of governing bodies of municipalities and counties of this state to meet that responsibility. The Harrison County Board of Supervisors is therefore required to appoint a County Emergency Manager to carry out these responsibilities in conjunction with local agencies and municipalities within the county. In order to provide an effective response to emergency situations, the Federal, State, Local and Tribal governments must plan and prepare together. The concept and assignment of responsibilities outlined in this plan shall serve as the basis of the conduct of emergency operations by the Harrison County Office of Emergency Management. It shall be the responsibility of all local agencies and organizations to perform their functional tasks and to prepare and maintain Standard Operating Procedures. All responsible parties shall provide notice of revisions and improvements to the Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP) and support it through training and exercises. http://co.harrison.ms.us/departments/ema/

Communit y/Environ mental Stakehold ers

Communit y/Environ mental Groups

STEPS Coalition

OUR MISSION: To build a democratic movement to create a healthy, just and equitable Mississippi Gulf Coast by developing local leadership, supporting communities to advocate for their needs and by facilitating communication, coordination, and collaboration among our membership. OUR VISION: Steps’ vision is that local neighborhoods will be involved in decision-making processes that affect their lives and the future of their communities. Non-profits, faithbased and civic organizations, and all people who share Steps’ vision, work together for a healthy, just and equitable Mississippi Gulf Coast.http://www.stepscoalition.org/index.php/about-us/

277

PROVIDENCE Stakehold ers Internal Stakehold ers


Waterson Terminal Services

Missions/goals with respect to port

Operates the Port of Providence

External Stakehold ers Univar Affiliated Insurance Managers Economic/ contractua l/private firms

Moran Shipping Agency

Promet Marine Services

Communit y

Save the Bay

Brown University

Academic

RI Coastal Resources Center URI, Department of Ocean Engineering


Public policy (State)

US Coast Guard (USCG) - Marine Transportation Recovery Unit, Sector Southern New England US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) National Flood Insurance Program RI Department of Administration RI Coastal Resources Management Council

Univar USA is the leading chemical distributor in the United States, providing more chemical products and related services than any other company in the marketplace. Provides insurance to Waterson Terminal Services Superior full-vessel agency attendance and ship husbandry services throughout The Americas, servicing all vessel types, and in particular, crude and clean product tankers, LNG, LPG, chemical, dry-bulk, cruise and container vessels. Moran Shipping Agents are companies that are hired primarily by ship owners and ship to take care of the needs of vessels that are calling in ports in the United States. So we’re protecting both the commercial interests as well as safety and security interests of the owner. Ship repair yard adjacent to the port. We started out as voyage repair for large cargo vessels, trafficking the area southern new England basically we would send mobile crews out to service vessels in New Haven, Bridgeport, Boston, Maine, Portland, but mostly in the port of Providence once in a while vessel will come to our pier for dock side maintenance. Promet was recently acquired by Sims Metal Recycling, Inc. Located next to ProvPort. Save The Bay protects, restores and improves the ecological health of the Narragansett Bay region, including its watershed and adjacent coastal waters, through an ecosystem-based approach to environmental action; defends the right of the public to use and enjoy the Bay and its surrounding waters; and fosters an ethic of environmental stewardship among people who live in or visit the Narragansett Bay region. Provides various research capabilities. Dept. of Env. Studies involved with formation of Climate Commission in Rhode Island. Provides research capabilities and coordinates stakeholder involvement in policy development for the RI CRMC. Developed Ports chapter of Special Area Management Plan, Climate Adaptation and Hazards chapter for Coastal Resources Program Provide research capabilities, in particular performed extensive "debris study."

Maintain and update severe weather plans, maritime transportation recovery plans, salvage plans. Conducts roundtable exercises for emergency planning of all sorts.

Serves as conduit between FEMA and the communities. Creates FEMA flood maps, but not too much involvement in the port itself.

Provides funding for statewide projects Policy and the planning as well as the majority of the permits for the commercial portions of the port. Maintenance of dredged channel.

278

RI Statewide Planning

No mandated legislative role to the functioning of port facilities. Role is more connected to the municipal role in deciding underlying zoning and future uses of properties. . State law requires comp plans to be submitted to statewide planning to ensure consistency with the state guide plan. State guide plan gives state planning council authority to set goals, policies and objectives for the state as a whole. But, no direct role in port operations or planning.

RI Economic Development Corporation

EDC does not have a statutory role for the port of Providence. Port of Providence operates up in the park from the state of Rhode Island. The port of Davisville, which is a part of the Quonset development commerce park, is a part of the state of Rhode Island. So statutorily the port of Providence operates in a separate part of the state. It is a municipal. Rhode Island general assembly has a joint senate house port commission that’s looking at that issue it’s looking at how can we maximize port related economic activity within the state, looking very carefully at our two principle port facilities.

RI Emergency Management Agency, Critical Infrastructure Program RI Dept. of Transportation

RI Dept. of Env. Management

RI State Senate

Providence Planning Dept.


Providence Emergency Management Agency

Interagency networking, identify critical assets, harden and prepare them for most likely threats, utilize infrastructure survey tool as part of critical infrastructure protection program, utilizes site assistance visit tool at the port Participates in evacuation planning. The Rhode Island Statewide Planning Program, in cooperation with other agencies, prepares a long-range (20-plus years) transportation plan that is part of the State Guide Plan. The State Guide Plan is a collection of plans and policy documents adopted by the State Planning Council that addresses the social, economic and physical development of the state Facilitate the efforts of the coordination team to comprehensively plan implement and evaluate priorities for water resources management, restoration, and sustainable utilization. The current priorities are to maintain and enhance existing waterfront lands that are zoned industrial. That’s a statewide priority. It’s essential for the port of Providence, obviously. It also has identified climate change as one of the most serious long-term impacts that we must address as a state with regard to water resources generally and our ocean economy specifically. So in the planning that we’ve done, we have highlighted climate change as a, if you will, external state driver that’s going to significantly impact many of the key management priorities we’ve identified. Emphasis is on creating jobs. I think that we’re going to have to do one of two things. Either create some sort of port authority state wide you know take not, and not that that would take any decision, all of the decision making out of the locals hands, but it would at least give a different perspective to the ports and a statewide perspective not just the local. Or utilize an economic development corporation that’s already existing, give them perhaps more authority to what happens at these ports, again utilize some them in a manner in which I think they were designed, and that’s at level six.

Municipalities have the authority to designate zoning within the port, specify which uses are allowed, and so on through their comprehensive plans Emergency management organizations have typical responsibilities across the Nation. We kind of look at the four phases of an incident from mitigation, trying to reduce that risk, or remove that risk, preparedness, making the community resilient, through information, materials, training exercises, and then response, responding effectively and efficiently to the incident. And again, in the response mode, or the emergency mode, you know cities respond to emergencies every day. My role is for those emergencies or emergencies that exceed or have the potential to exceed local resources, where there’s multiple departments responding. So my role in the response phase is to make sure the city has an integrated single-minded response to a major incident. So, instead of the fire department going off on, you know, whatever direction they’re off on, and the police department going off on a separate direction, my role is to herd all those cats and make sure that we have an integrated solution, common objectives, make sure we have an acceptable outcome. And then the last is recovery. And recovery is everything, you know after all the flashing lights have stopped how do you get back to normalcy? And we’re actually in the recovery phase right now from the flooding of March. And so that consists of getting people back into their homes, there’s different vehicles for the Federal Government, FEMA, individual assistance, public assistance, SPA loans, there’s a whole host of vehicles to get people and business back to pre-incident conditions. So that’s kind of like the four phases of emergency management.

279

Providence Fire Dept.

Developed port evacuation plan, participate in local emergency planning committee, exercise plans on annual basis (June)

280

APPENDIX III ALL UNIQUE STRATEGIES IDENTIFIED IN

1

2 3 4 5

6

7 8

9

10

Building codes and land use regulations Adjust coastal agency's enabling legislation to allow for more proactive regulation of facilities Assure that fill in not used as structural support in potential V zones Change state building standards and freeboard requirements Condition permitting on debris cleanup standards Create fitness of purpose regulations to ensure piers and docks are adequately protected Create new coastal A-zone policies for structures subject to wave activity currently designated as Vzone Create performance measures Create post-event rebuilding requirements Create tighter controls for development of infrastructure and commercial facilities in floodplains Incorporate provisions into design and permitting of water-based projects to address preparedness, response and recovery of hazards related to hurricanes and SLR

0

0

1

10

5

X

X X

X

X X

X

X

281

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

0

Research/academia

Community/Environmental

Local Government

State Government

Federal Government


Internal Port

Name

GULFPORT AND PROVIDENCE

0

11 12 13 14 15 16 17

18 19 20 21

22 23

24

25 26 27 28

Networks and new ways of thinking Collaboration Collaborate between agencies Collaborate to develop emergency plans Convene council of experts to develop resilience plans Establish a climate change adaptation local partnership to coordinate environmental networks Form climate change commission Improve stakeholder coordination Create regional climate monitoring offices Empower government Enable FEMA to prioritize mitigation activities through Code of Federal Regulations Enhance community rating system (NFIP) Follow FEMA disaster mitigation philosophy Incorporate storm preparedness into DHS voluntary inspection program Require enhanced insurance coverage as federal funding stipulations Hire more staff for hurricane events Improve information flow Develop an ongoing outreach program for coastal developers engineers, and others on best ways to safeguard lives and property Educate stakeholders about risks and strategies Join international networks related to port climate change adaptation Share information Increase planning horizons Better incorporate port into Statewide hazard plans

18

11

19

24

22

13

8

4

1

4

6

6

4

3

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

1

1

0

0

X

X

4

4

4

2

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X 5

X 3

X 0

X

X

X

X

X

X

X 1

1

5 X X X X

X X

X

3

1

X

2

X

X X 2

X 1

X 2

X

282

X

X 1

29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54

Create new multi-tiered action plan for the port (restore, enhance, anticipate the future) Improve land-use planning for resilience Improve long-range planning Incorporate resilience as a part of the Statewide plan Preplan for post-storm rebuilding Shift in thinking Be more proactive on resilience Consider port as bigger piece of state infrastructure Consider resilience as economic advantage Emphasize role of port in disaster recovery Learn from past events Plan for incremental adaptation Practice no-regrets strategies Think long term Use resilience as a marketing strategy Construction and design Construct or modify features off port lands Build breakwater Build flood barriers or dike Create offsite evacuation safe haven Create seasonal facilities Create single rail line to inland hub Design bridges with sacrificial sections Design connecting infrastructure to aid in evacuation of port Elevate connecting infrastructure Move the port Restore barrier islands that protect the port Restore wetlands that serve to block and slow hurricane winds Tunnel connecting roads beneath flood plain

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X X

X

X

8

7

6

8

8

5

X

X

X

X

X

X

2

X X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

16

0

4

10

4

0

4 X X

X

X

4

2

0

10

4

2

0

X X

X

X

X

X

X X

X X X

X

X X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

283

X

55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66

67 68 69

70 71

72 73 74 75

76

Construct or modify features on port lands Install breakaway walls Build with sacrificial decking materials Build with steel and concrete Construct barriers around individual structures Design and build submersible structures Design debris catchment fencing system Elevate existing structures Elevate footprint of port Harden structures Install anchors for hurricane tie down straps Install pass-through fencing Retrofit the Port facility to protect against flood damage Emergency preparation, response, and recovery Business continuity plans Create business continuity plans Create data storage and offsite data backup plan Create pre-storm master agreements with service providers to facilitate timely cleanup Drills and pre-event training Conduct emergency drills and trainings Conduct site assistance visits to identify problem areas Conduct table top scenario exercises that involve multiple actors and agencies Manage port inventory prestorm to reduce stocks Post-storm actions Address employee needs Utilize port as emergency response asset Response and recovery guidance Create debris removal plan and management task force

12

0

0

0

0

0

0

26

23

7

13

14

0

5

3

3

0

1

1

0

0

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

3

3

2

3

3

0

2

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

1

1

1

X

X

X

3

8

9

X

X

X X X X X X X X X X X X

X

X X

X

2 X

1 X

X 8

6

284

0

0

0

3

77 78 79 80

81

82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99

Create emergency communications plans Create evacuation plan and procedures Create facility-level hurricane plan Create guidance for evacuation of shore side facilities Create guidance for use of infrastructure for facility evacuation, import of supplies, emergency transport in the case of a hazard scenario Create guidance to address spills, contaminations caused by inundation, and facility closures Create hazard mitigation plans Create list of essential navigational aids Develop emergency response plans Post-storm employee management plan Utilize emergency siren warning system Utilize multi-agency response planning Storm preparations Evacuate the port Manage items on location that could potentially end up as debris Secure port equipment in place Block and reinforce drydocked vessels Cover equipment Move equipment to high ground on port property Press up petroleum tanks with water Shut off power at port Tie equipment and containers down using lashin-place methods Use storm-resilient equipment Shut down the waterways Long range planning efforts

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

1

0

0

0

0

6

2

1

0

10 X

10 X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X X

0

0

285

2

100 101 102 103 104 105

106 107

108

109 110 111

112

113 114 115

116 117 118

Create new state sea level rise policies Create regional-scale hazard mitigation plans Incorporate hazard mitigation into transportation plan Create regional climate adaptation plans Require local comprehensive plans to consider hazard resilience Streamline post-hurricane permitting process Private sector and insurance policies Adjust insurance premiums incrementally Appropriate adjacent property to accommodate surge waters Conduct structural stability analysis for port structures in compliance with federal requirements for FEMA monies Conduct insurance inspections Create insurance-based incentive Create inter-corporation distribution contingency plans Develop a climate change adaptation local partnership to assist port in preparations for impacts of climate change Factor resilience into normal operations and maintenance program Insurance companies incentive going above code with lower premiums Purchase additional insurance coverage Research (Inc. risk assessment, forecasting improvements, and projections) Conduct damage assessments Conduct risk and vulnerability assessment Create coastal flood study

X X

X X

X

X

X X

X

X

2

2

1

1

X

X

X

X

X

X

3

11

X 5

6

0

X X

X

X

X

X

X

X X

X

X

8

6

10

11

11

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

286

119

120 121 122 123 124

125 126 127 128

Develop a build-out analysis for the entire coastal flood plain within the region Evaluate impact of increasing storm surge heights and SLR on facilities Identify funding streams to support adaptation Improve hurricane forecasting accuracy Incentivize resilience strategies (FEMA) Inventory hazardous material and debris and create debris removal plan Perform study of port to identify upgrades necessary to limit damage due to flooding Re-map flood-prone areas to account for sea level rise Develop and utilize gaming exercises, simulations, and scenario planning tools Utilize academic and NGO research expertise Total

X X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X X

X X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

73

46

43

76

60

20

25

TABLE OF STRATEGIES FROM NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL REPORT (NRC (National Research Council) 2010)

287

288

REFERENCES Moser S, Ekstrom J (2010) A framework to diagnose barriers to climate change adaptation. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 107 (51):22026 NRC (National Research Council) (2010) America's Climate Choices: Adapting to the Impacts of Climate Change. America's Climate Choices. Washington, DC

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