Submission to LGWM - Squarespace

light rail for wellington

Submission to LGWM  January  at :am

Prepared by Fair Intelligent Transport Wellington

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons AttributionShareAlike . License. a It can be cited as: John Rankin, ed. (). Light Rail for Wellington: Submission to LGWM,  January  at :am. Fair Intelligent Transport, Wellington. a. creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/.

light rail for wellington

Submission to LGWM Prepared by Fair Intelligent Transport Wellington  January  at :am Summary Mass transit in Wellington City as proposed by LGWM is necessary but not sufficient. To compete successfully with private car travel requires rapid transit that delivers a congestion-free journey — the basis of Scenario A+. Transit Oriented Development around stops is an essential complement to urban rapid transit. Wellington needs an ambitious goal, that by  over % of all trips to and from the CBD will be by public transport. Light rail is a proven, low risk rapid transit option which has been deployed in other earthquake-prone cities. There would be benefits in Wellington adopting the same technology standards as Auckland. The investor that assumes the ridership risk should have the final say on rapid transit route and technology choice. LGWM needs to set the performance targets for travel time, service frequency, and transfer time at hubs.

Contents  LGWM Submission

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 Rapid Transit Proposal . Why Rapid Transit . . . . . . . . Regional View . . . . . . . . . . . Connective Network . . . . . . . Transit Oriented Development . Future Route Extensions . . . .

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 Implementation Considerations . Ridership Ambition . . . Earthquake Risk . . . . . Project Funding . . . . . Technology Standards . Procurement Options .

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     

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 List of Recommendations

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Glossary

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§ LGWM Submission

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LGWM Submission

The LGWM Scenarios A to D make no provision for a “rapid transit” option—where “rapid” means public transport fast enough to compete with private car travel. Designating the Golden Mile (Lambton Quay, Willis St, Manners St, Courtenay Place) as the “mass transit” corridor, an area crowded with pedestrians and with many narrow sections, excludes the possibility of rapid transit through the central city.  The scenarios do not include any measures designed to grow public transport’s mode share, by offering people an attractive and inviting alternative to the private car. FIT Wellington proposes that LGWM properly assess the case for investing in rapid transit based on light rail now, rather than bus “mass transit” now, upgrading to light rail at some unspecified future date. LGWM presents no credible proposal for how a future upgrade from bus “mass transit” to light rail rapid transit would be carried out. Evidence from overseas cities strongly suggests that such an upgrade will be difficult and expensive at best, impossible at worst. FIT proposes that in the long run it will be cheaper and less disruptive to build light rail now. FIT estimates that current patronage on Lambton Quay is already close to justifying light rail, assuming buses will still carry % of all passengers. This means taking a more strategic approach to public transport than LGWM’s narrow focus on capacity, to include targets for mode share and travel time savings. The primary aim for light rail is to maximize demand by mode shift from private cars. To achieve this: choose a string-of-pearls route, serving locations with high demand all day; foster transit-oriented development along the route; and make the service predictable, frequent and well-connected, with competitive travel times. For a possible route, see figure  on the following page, Light Rail on a String of Pearls. Light rail on a waterfront route to Taranaki St offers fast service for through trips, while reducing the number of buses on the Golden Mile to about ¼ of current numbers. Bus trips through the CBD will be faster because the route is no longer overloaded. Suburban bus trips will be faster because CBD delays no longer disrupt the timetables. Connections at hubs will be faster and more reliable because local buses face fewer delays and pulsed timetables become practical. LGWM also needs to consider measures for managing travel demand. This could include a congestion charge for car trips entering the central city during peak times, to reduce traffic on city streets and make it easier to get around. In addition, review parking strategies around pricing and options for progressively reducing the number of on-street car parks in the CBD. FIT proposes Scenario A+ as an alternative to the LGWM Scenarios A to D. Scenario A+ is Scenario A plus light rail rapid transit and congestion . Perhaps LGWM expects a future light rail line will run underground through the CBD—a very expensive option.

Submission to LGWM

 January  at : AM

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§ LGWM Submission

charging. Completing Scenario A+, FIT endorses calls for multiple safe places for people walking and cycling to cross SH between Willis St and the airport. FIT supports the proposal in Scenario C to move eastbound SH from Vivian St to a tunnel on the Inner City Bypass route, provided that this is in addition to Scenario A+. This would facilitate grade-separation between SH and FIT’s suggestion for light rail on Taranaki St. The string-of-pearls route proposes a rail tunnel under Mt Albert between the Zoo and Kilbirnie; with Scenario A+ a second Mt Victoria road tunnel for “mass transit” in Scenario B is not needed. Implementing Scenario A+ will offer many more people the option of congestion-free travel and grow public transport’s mode share. It will make public transport more effective for more trips, including those by bus. Scenarios A to D will not do this. Light rail is a mature, proven, lowrisk solution available from a range of suppliers, thus giving maximally competitive procurement. LGWM may wish to consider joint procurement with Auckland, depending on project timing. FIT proposes that LGWM investigate options for changing current transport funding models so that urban rapid transit projects are funded on the same basis as state highways. Move to a polluter-pays model for solutions that relieve congestion: invest revenue from road congestion charges in public transport. Value uplift capture from transit-oriented development is another potential funding stream.

Figure . Light Rail on a String of Pearls

 January  at : AM

Submission to LGWM

§ Rapid Transit Proposal

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Rapid Transit Proposal

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Why Rapid Transit

Plan to open a rapid transit line between the railway station and Miramar by , as a reliable and superior alternative to driving. Mass transit versus rapid transit

LGWM aspires to deliver “mass transit”—which it defines as “a high capacity, high quality form of public transport, usually separated from other traffic.” This is a traditional product-based approach, lacking in ambition. In contrast, FIT proposes an outcome-based approach and aspires to create a public transport service that gives fast and consistent access, in a way that provides a reliable and superior alternative to driving, so that people travel efficiently, thereby reducing traffic and emissions. A core element of such a service is “rapid transit”—frequent enough and fast enough to compete with private car travel and hence increase public transport mode share. Rapid transit is: • frequent—service every  minutes or less (average wait time ½ minutes or less) • available—at least  am to  pm,  days a week (frequency may be less outside these hours) • reliable—operating on a dedicated right-of-way (with priority at intersections or grade-separation) • fast—level boarding through all doors at stops – m apart on average (a – minute walk to the nearest stop) • busy—linking dense residential areas and major destinations Given Wellington’s size, a fully grade-separated (underground or overhead) rapid transit service is not needed. Instead, FIT proposes an urban rapid transit service, operating on existing streets. Grade separation may be needed at the busiest intersections, such as where the rapid transit line crosses SH. The design challenge is to identify a route suitable for rapid transit between Wellington railway station and the airport. On the one hand, rapid transit needs to run on link streets—designed for saving time. On the other hand, stops need to serve place streets—designed for spending time. Globally, the most widely-used technology for urban rapid transit is light rail, on which riders can enjoy a congestion-free journey. LGWM’s mass transit route

The chosen LGWM “mass transit” route runs on the Golden Mile from the railway station to Courtenay Place, Kent and Cambridge Terraces to Submission to LGWM

 January  at : AM

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§ Rapid Transit Proposal

the Basin Reserve, then splits, with one leg running via Ruahine Street to Kilbirnie and the airport, the other running to the regional hospital and Newtown. As a “rapid transit” route, this has a number of serious shortcomings. . The Golden Mile is Wellington’s principal place street so pedestrians are the first priority. It therefore cannot function as a rapid link street. For travel times to stay competitive, a rapid transit service will have to operate at a higher frequency to compensate for the lower operating speed. Parades and demonstrations will regularly disrupt the rapid transit service. . From the southern part of Lambton Quay to the eastern end of Manners Street (between Panama and Taranaki Streets), there is not enough road width for  rapid transit lanes and  regular vehicle lanes. To avoid rapid transit vehicles and buses having to share the same lane, buses will have to go somewhere else, such as Victoria Street. Service vehicle access would be restricted to times when rapid transit is not operating. . South of the Basin Reserve, the split route means that each leg runs at half the frequency of the main branch. To provide the same level of service as a non-branching route, the service therefore has to operate at twice the frequency. . People wishing to travel from one leg to the other (e.g., Newtown– Airport or Kilbirnie–Hospital) have to change, either at the Basin Reserve or Courtenay Place (LGWM doesn’t say). To offset the transfer time penalty, the service has to operate at a higher frequency on each branch than would be needed for a non-branching route. . The route between the Mt Victoria Tunnel and Kilbirnie is “all link and no place”—fast, but a demand desert. Hataitai passengers already have a fast trip to the CBD via the bus tunnel. A mass transit stop would attract few new passengers. The cumulative effect of these shortcomings is that operating a rapid transit service on LGWM’s chosen mass transit route will be high cost, for both capital and operating costs. Delivering the same level of service as a non-branching route that bypasses the Golden Mile will require using smaller, slower vehicles running more frequently. FIT’s rapid transit route

The proposed FIT rapid transit route follows the waterfront on Waterloo, Customhouse and Jervois Quays from the railway station to Taranaki Street. It runs south on Taranaki St to Karo Drive, through a short tunnel under Mt Cook to Adelaide Road south of the Basin Reserve. It then runs to the hospital, Newtown, and the Zoo, through a tunnel under Mt Albert to Kilbirnie. From there, it runs to the airport and Miramar, via a tunnel under the runway if feasible, otherwise via Cobham Drive.  January  at : AM

Submission to LGWM

§ Rapid Transit Proposal

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The waterfront and Taranaki Street are already link streets, ideal for rapid transit. Buses would continue to run on the Golden Mile, providing a complementary frequent but slower service. The downside of the waterfront is distance from Lambton Quay and the major CBD catchment. Featherston Street and Jervois Quay may be a possible alternative. This would mean removing parking from one side of Featherston Street. Running via Riddiford Street to Newtown and the Zoo to Kilbirnie would be slightly longer and slower than the more direct route via Ruahine Street, which is a link street. However, the much higher population density through Newtown and avoiding a route split at the Basin Reserve more than offset this. Joining  major regional destinations—CBD, hospital and airport—with a single line is highly desirable. The most direct route from Kilbirnie to the airport is via Coutts Street and a tunnel under the airport runway. Building such a tunnel without disrupting airport operations requires specialised engineering techniques; the required expertise may need to be imported. LGWM may wish to seek independent advice from a suitably qualified and experienced civil engineering firm. A possible alternative route is via the Sports Centre and Cobham Drive. FIT has allowed for continuing the line beyond the airport to Miramar town centre. This suburb is seeing rapid growth, both residential and employment. A transit hub here, with connecting local buses, would enhance the public transport service for the whole peninsular. At the north end of the line, continuing to the ferry and cruise ship terminals is a candidate for early expansion, one of several Future Route Extensions (p ). Economic analysis needed

FIT considers it is premature for LGWM to have assumed that its chosen mass transit route is the best option for a future rapid transit line. Further investigation and economic analysis are needed to determine which route will deliver the most ridership, for a given total cost of ownership. LGWM also needs to provide more information about the cost and disruption involved in upgrading the mass transit route to rapid transit. The analysis needs to assess opportunities for Transit Oriented Development (p ) around future rapid transit stops. This includes capturing the land value uplift as a source of project funding. A practical migration path from mass transit to rapid transit would be to: • identify, designate and protect a future dedicated rapid transit route, plus space for a vehicle storage and maintenance depot • invest in cost-effective bus priority measures on the LGWM mass transit route in the short term • start planning and design for rapid transit, with the aim of completing a line between the railway station and airport by 

Submission to LGWM

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§ Rapid Transit Proposal

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Regional View

Agree that rapid transit is a core component of a future transport system designed around the wants and needs of people. Rapid transit on the railway station to Miramar corridor must be viewed as an integral part of a wider regional transport context, not a stand-alone investment. It is a strategic asset on a par with Transmission Gully. In early  LGWM invited people across the region to share what they love about Wellington City and what frustrates them most about getting around it. More than , people provided more than , ideas, suggestions and options for improvements. LGWM summarised their assessment of the current position and the feedback from people across the region in their “Progress Report February ”. It said: Key routes into and through the CBD are often heavily congested, resulting in delays and unreliable journey times for people and goods accessing the CBD and other important regional destinations like the port, airport and hospital. State Highway  runs through the CBD to the airport, creating conflict in a high growth area with heavy pedestrian activity. Some bus priority is provided along the Golden Mile but it is not consistent across the CBD or wider city, and bus travel times are slow and unreliable. [...] If action is not taken, travel conditions in and around the Wellington CBD are likely to get worse as population and employment grow. The CBD will continue to be the main employment centre of the region with at least , more jobs expected in the next  years. Wellington City Council is planning for almost , more people to live in the city over the next  years, with approximately , of these living in the CBD. Continued growth will depend on the competitiveness of the city and its ability to attract people with a range of specialist skills to create a labour market that will encourage business investment and support the prosperity of the wider region. The liveability of central Wellington is critical for this to happen. To improve Wellington’s liveability, the transport system must fit with our natural and urban environment and enable people to get around safely and easily by all modes. LGWM summarised what people told them; people want a transport system that: • enhances the liveability of the central city  January  at : AM

Submission to LGWM

§ Rapid Transit Proposal

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– improved walkability in the CBD with better access to the waterfront – enhanced urban environment – reduced impact of motorised transport in CBD – minimised adverse effects on natural environment – minimised impacts on built environment – no increase to number of vehicles in the CBD • provides more efficient and reliable access to support growth – increased reliability and improved access to and from CBD – consistency with the Urban Growth Plan and Wellington Regional Strategy – improved throughput of people and goods on strategic corridors – increased reliability of access to and from the airport, hospital and port – reduced PT travel time variability • reduces reliance on private vehicle travel – increased PT catchment – improved pedestrian mode share – improved cycling mode share – improved PT mode share • improves safety for all users – reduced deaths and serious injuries for road users – improved safety for pedestrians and cyclists • is adaptable to disruptions and future uncertainty – adaptability to be able to respond and recover from unplanned events – adaptability and flexibility to cope with future uncertainty and technologies To this feedback the LGWM project team added: • consenting feasibility • affordable capital cost and operating cost From this feedback the LGWM Governance Group concluded that the project could be summed up as about designing our transport system around the wants and needs of people and set these project objectives: • • • • •

enhance the liveability of the central city provide more efficient and reliable access for all users reduce reliance on private vehicle travel improve safety for all users be adaptable to disruptions and future uncertainty

FIT Wellington accepts and supports these as appropriate guiding principles for the project.

Submission to LGWM

 January  at : AM

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§ Rapid Transit Proposal

.

Connective Network

Reconfigure bus services along the rapid transit corridor to aggregate demand and connect at transit hubs. FIT’s proposed rapid transit line connects high density residential areas and destinations which are busy all day. Using a single line rather than a split route expands the number of potential trips that can be taken without changing from one service to another. However to maximize ridership, connector bus services are needed to gather riders close to, but not within easy walking distance of, the line. Selected rapid transit stops become transit hubs. In other words, like all efficient high capacity networks, rapid transit uses a “hub and spoke” topology. Hubs must be designed to minimize the “transfer penalty”—time lost when changing from one service to another. In the most efficient systems the transfer penalty is zero; connecting services arrive and depart at the same time, changing passengers cross a platform from one service to another. A transfer penalty has two aspects: the time it takes to change from one service to another; and the quality of the connection as a customer experience. In a network designed to offer timed connections, the quality of the customer experience is paramount. A connective network is only as good as its transit hubs. The profile of a typical journey is a shorter, slower bus ride combined with a longer, faster rapid transit ride, via a reliable, quick and easy change at a hub. This keeps the total journey time competitive with private car travel. For a given cost, making the system as inviting as possible to as many people as possible needs connections, not point-to-point services. Successful hub and spoke transit networks share a number of operating characteristics. Connector buses: • arrive at a hub just before and leave just after the rapid transit service (e.g., rapid transit dwell time less than  seconds, bus dwell time less than  minutes) • are scheduled to meet the rapid transit service (e.g., if rapid transit runs every  minutes, a connector bus may run every  minutes so it connects to every other rapid transit trip) • have priority measures along the route to minimize variance from the timetable, so people can rely on making their connections Transit hubs are laid out to make it easy for people to change from one service to another and can accommodate several buses at a time. FIT envisages hubs at Miramar town centre, Kilbirnie, the hospital, Te Aro Park, and the railway station. Hubs south of the Basin Reserve are critical for aggregating suburban demand and delivering it to the rapid transit line. The Te Aro Park hub serves the catchment on and around the Golden Mile.  January  at : AM

Submission to LGWM

§ Rapid Transit Proposal

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The railway station becomes a major regional transit hub, facilitating connections between suburban trains and buses or rapid transit. Depending on their final destination, train passengers would choose to walk, take a bus for shorter onward trips, or rapid transit for longer trips. The quality of the station hub design is critical to creating an inviting alternative for those currently choosing to drive because connections at the station are unpredictable and unattractive. Others argue that a better solution at the railway station is to continue the heavy rail lines south, such as along the waterfront to Courtenay Place and potentially to the airport via a Basin Reserve route. This eliminates the need for passengers from the north to change. In principle this proposal has some merit; rapid transit lines generally tie a city together, from urban fringe to urban fringe through the centre. Stopping at the northern edge of the city centre makes the service less useful. However, rather than avoiding transfers at the railway station regardless of cost, a more realistic and affordable goal is to make transfers there convenient, quick and easy. FIT considers that a well-designed hub at the railway station can do much to overcome the transfer penalty. We believe the objection to transferring at the station mainly arises from a lack of experience of how a well-designed high-frequency connective network operates. Wellington’s track record of poor bus timekeeping and unreliable connections means such scepticism is justified. In addition, suburban rail and urban rapid transit are fundamentally different businesses. The core business of urban rapid transit is all day, every day service to destinations that are busy all the time. Peak service is an addition to the core. On the other hand, the core business of suburban rail is serving peak hour commuter travel. Off-peak service is low frequency, reflecting the lack of demand. A technology-neutral purchasing approach would let potential suppliers propose how to use new and existing assets to meet service requirements. See Procurement Options (p ). We envisage that if the first rapid transit line runs light rail from Miramar to the railway station, a future extension to Johnsonville would be a priority. This eliminates one set of transfers and releases Matangi units for redeployment to meet growing demand on other heavy rail services. The trigger for extending rapid transit to Johnsonville is projected growth in peak and off-peak demand. See Future Route Extensions (p ).

. Transit Oriented Development Develop a policy and guidelines for transit oriented development around rapid transit stops and at transit hubs. TOD is an approach to building a city, rather than just building LRT. It concentrates housing, shopping and employment along a network of walkable and bikeable streets within a  minute walk of LRT stops—or  Submission to LGWM

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§ Rapid Transit Proposal

metres in any direction. TOD supports the vision of a vibrant, sustainable city with attractive, liveable and more compact communities. To encourage and guide TOD in neighbourhoods near LRT stops over the next  years, Wellington needs to develop TOD Policy and Guidelines in consultation with community and business organisations, public transport users, Council departments and others. The guidelines set out Wellington’s expectations for transit-oriented development near current or future LRT stops. An example of a future TOD Policy statement for Wellington follows. The City of Wellington, through its planning, decision making processes and leadership, supports transit and land use integration. This optimizes the use of public transport, increases mobility choices of Wellingtonians and creates vibrant and diverse neighbourhoods to support a sustainable transport system and concentrate Wellington’s future urban form. The City supports Transit Oriented Development that: . Establishes land uses around LRT stops and transit hubs to reflect the characteristics of surrounding areas and each stop or hub’s role in the network; . Focuses medium and higher density residential, retail and employment growth around LRT stops and transit hubs to support City investment in transport infrastructure; . Creates a safe, direct and convenient circulation system for all modes of transport, with an emphasis on public transport, pedestrians and bicycles that connects people and places; . Grows through collaboration, cooperation, partnerships, public information and education programs; . Increases public transport ridership and reduces the number of vehicle kilometres driven. To encourage Transit Oriented Development, the City will: . Enact bylaws, procedures, directives, processes, programs and guidelines; . Promote, collaborate, cooperate and partner; . Communicate land use and infrastructure expectations; . Prepare masterplans for LRT stops that will create a sustainable, people-oriented city.

TOD Guidelines will help: • residents and community groups understand the nature of development that could occur close to LRT stops and transit hubs • property owners assess their development options

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§ Rapid Transit Proposal

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• the Council in reviewing rezoning or development applications for lands within  metres of a LRT stop, to ensure they are appropriate for the stop and the surrounding areas • the Council in preparing or updating plans for lands near specific LRT stops • the Council in upgrading infrastructure, including footpaths, roads, bike facilities and parks, near LRT stops

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Future Route Extensions

Design the first rapid transit line in a way that facilitates future extensions and connections. How the rapid transit network evolves once the first line between the railway station and Miramar is complete depends on how the city develops and intensifies. Hence a Transit Oriented Development (p ) strategy is an essential part of future network planning. The urban rapid transit network will also become progressively more integrated with a wider Regional View (p ) of public transport. Possible future extensions could include, but are not limited to: • Kaiwharawhara to the ferry and cruise ship terminals (this could perhaps include park and ride for airport passengers, if space allows) • Johnsonville and potentially Lincolnshire Farms via a new double track line suitable for low floor vehicles (once this extension is complete, the existing line could be converted to recreational use) • Karori via Bowen Street and Tinakori Road (Karori buses are already heavily used and higher density developments in the suburb may make this extension a priority sooner rather than later) • a Hutt City extension to Petone and Queensgate (instead of widening SH and with connector buses to Wainuiomata and Eastbourne) • a connector service between Island Bay town centre and either the Zoo or Newtown stop Planning and design for the first line should include an impact assessment considering possible future extensions, to reduce the risk of expensive rework when the line is extended. The long lead time required to plan and build new light rail lines makes accurate forecasts of future demand critical. At the same time, for an approved extension the long lead time brings certainty to those planning redevelopments along the route.

Submission to LGWM

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§ Implementation Considerations

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Implementation Considerations

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Ridership Ambition

Note that to provide reliable rapid transit for the projected demand, Wellington needs light rail operating no later than . FIT proposes the following step change goal for the rapid transit corridor: By  at least % of all trips to and from the CBD will be by public transport To translate this goal into projected LRT ridership numbers, we have made a number of planning assumptions, set out in Table  on the current page, Planning assumptions. “Peak of peak” refers to the busiest one hour period. Demand is potentially some % higher still in the busiest half-hour. These assumptions translate into the ridership projections set out in Table  on the following page, Ridership projections. FIT envisages that when LRT is introduced, the number of buses on the Golden Mile would reduce to about  per hour per direction. The projections assume public transport mode share increases from % to % in the first  years and grows ½% per year thereafter. These are conservative growth rates; many cities have seen faster growth after introducing LRT. In Wellington’s narrow streets, rapid transit is restricted to  lanes. This means BRT cannot provide the capacity needed to satisfy the ridership projections. Based on a  minute headway ( vehicles / hour) and capacity of  persons per vehicle, BRT’s maximum reliable capacity in Wellington would be  passengers / hour. At a ½ minute headway, BRT could carry up to , passengers / hour, but the service would experience delays and be unreliable. On the other hand, the projections fall wholly within the ,–, passenger / hour range for which light rail is designed. Light rail has a lower total cost of ownership than buses above about , passengers / hour. It could take up to  years to complete the first project, so planning should have started in . To open in , LGWM must start planning a rapid transit solution by the end of .

Table . Planning assumptions Buses per hour on Lambton Quay during  peak



Average passengers per bus during peak



Average passengers per bus during peak of peak



Average annual growth in travel demand

%

Year station – airport LRT introduced  LRT share of total public transport demand

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%

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Implementation Considerations

Table . Ridership projections Year











PT mode share

%

%

%

%

%

Total peak demand , , , , , Peak bus ridership

,

,

,

,

,

Peak LRT ridership

−

−

,

,

,

Total peak of peak , , , , , Peak of peak bus

,

,

,

,

,

Peak of peak LRT

−

−

,

,

,

A key factor in attracting riders to rapid transit is the journey time relative to travel by private car. This is made up of wait time, determined by service frequency, travel time, determined by speed and number of stops, and transfer time, determined by hub design and schedule reliability. Ridership modelling needs to use values for these appropriate to an urban rapid transit service.

.

Earthquake Risk

Note the earthquake risk to light rail lines can be mitigated and other earthquake-prone cities have extensive passenger rail networks. Although both road and rail are damaged by earthquake and storm, recent experience in New Zealand shows that rail disruptions can be restored comparatively quickly. After the  Christchurch earthquake, the city heritage tram rail line was restored more quickly than road reconstruction, which still continues. After Wellington’s  storm, the severely damaged commuter rail link between Petone and Wellington took just  days to restore. The rail link for freight between Picton and Christchurch was restored in  months after the November  Kaikoura quake, despite major access problems, while road reconstruction continues after well over a year. The main Ohariu–Wellington fault runs along the line of SH, making the Hutt–Wellington motorway and heavy rail into and out of Wellington vulnerable. But light rail from the Railway Station to the hospital and airport does not cross that main fault-line. A contingency plan for buses and light rail would be a necessary part of recovery: this would include managing the risk to power supplies. To get LRT back up and running as soon as possible is likely to be a matter of weeks or months, not years: because of this, it is likely to be running before all bus routes are fully restored, leaving spare buses which would be quickly available within days to replace LRT for a short period.  January  at : AM

Submission to LGWM



§ Implementation Considerations

In the event of a very major earthquake, Wellington may be cut off from the rest of New Zealand for days or weeks. In such an event survival rather than commuting will be uppermost in people’s minds. Rail-based urban transit systems are a feature of many cities located on the Pacific “Ring of Fire” in North America and Japan. Wellington can adopt existing engineering standards for building resilient urban rail systems in earthquake-prone cities.

.

Project Funding

Note the estimated cost of a first light rail line is $m and a public– private partnership is one of several possible funding mechanisms. How much would it cost to build a light rail line from the railway station to Miramar and how could the project be funded? Table , Indicative cost of a rapid transit route, gives a total estimated project budget of $m (about $m/km). Financing light rail capital projects requires innovative investment funding arrangements. They would be ideal investments for New Zealanders’

Table . Indicative cost of a rapid transit route Stage

Cost item

Cost

Railway Station to Hospital via Waterfront Street track .km @ $m/km $m Double-track tunnel under Mt Cook: m @ $k/m

$m

Design & contingency (%)

$m

Total $M Hospital to Kilbirnie via Zoo Street track .km @ $m/km via Zoo

$m

Single-track tunnel under Mt Albert: m @ $k/m $m Design & contingency (%)

$m

Total $M Kilbirnie to Miramar via Airport Street track .km @ $m/km $m Double-track tunnel under runway: m @ $k/m

$m

Design & contingency (%)

$m

Total $M Management Reserve Allowance for changes to project scope (%)

$m

Grand Total $M

Submission to LGWM

 January  at : AM



§

Implementation Considerations

pension pools and could be set up as a partnership between central government, local government, and KiwiSaver funds. The long term nature of rapid transit projects is a natural fit to the long term investment horizon of pension funds. In Canada for example, the Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec, a provincial pension fund manager, is the funder, builder and operator for a new light rail network in the city of Montreal. With fares the main revenue source, the Caisse has assumed the ridership risk that governments usually carry. In return for taking on the ridership risk, the Caisse has the final say on the route and Technology Standards (p ). Since the LRT vehicles will be fully automated, the operating cost of the network will be low, making a high frequency service cost-effective even during off-peak times. A rapid transit project for Wellington City is potentially an opportunity to consider new financing mechanisms. The income stream to pay for the investment could include a mix of: • operating surpluses through a design that maximizes ridership, and hence fare-box revenue, at least overall cost • a special land value uplift rate from Transit Oriented Development (p ) around rapid transit stops, rather than gifting owners a windfall gain in value • revenue from road congestion charges—a polluter-pays model for relieving urban traffic congestion • a regional fuel tax, which while simple to implement would be more of a blunt instrument than levying a congestion charge • selling naming rights to corporate sponsors of the rapid transit line FIT agrees with others who advocate moving to a mode-neutral approach to funding transport infrastructure. The main problem arose when Transit NZ (the state highway authority) was merged with Transfund NZ (the funder) to form NZTA. As a result, since  road building has dominated funding decisions, despite the  Land Transport Management Act’s more balanced objectives. There is a need to separate the functions of the NZTA and make funding decisions mode-neutral. The road building arm of NZTA needs to be refocused on operations and maintenance, with decisions on new transport infrastructure made by regional transport bodies for urban areas and central government for inter-urban connections. There should be no state highways running through major urban areas. This simply distorts funding allocation. Urban rapid transit projects then need to be funded on the same basis as state highway builds. In Wellington, SH should end at the Terrace tunnel.

 January  at : AM

Submission to LGWM



§ Implementation Considerations

.

Technology Standards

Choose technologies that are based on widely-used standards, to provide maximally contestable supply and avoid supplier lock-in. A high frequency rapid transit system will create a step change in people’s expectations for system reliability and predictability. The system must “just work” all day, every day, whatever the weather. The best way to achieve this is by adopting standards which have been proven in a wide range of operating conditions. By adopting widely-used standards, Wellington will ensure contestable supply from a wide range of qualified and experienced suppliers. Proven standards will also contribute to making the system future-proof, as suppliers must innovate to remain competitive. When the time comes to extend the system, an upgrade path is assured. In some cases there may be a choice of standards (e.g., light rail track gauge), in which case choosing “the same as Auckland” would be the least risk option. Given New Zealand’s isolation and low skill base, we are ill-suited to pioneer unproven new rapid transit technologies, especially those based on proprietary standards. The risk of buying a technology orphan, which proves unreliable in operation and with no upgrade path, would be high. The most common configuration for modern urban rapid transit systems is modular, low floor vehicles, . metres wide on . metre gauge track, with station platforms up to  metres long. These provide level boarding at all doors, from platforms close to normal footpath level. Typically they have a floor –mm off the ground and so require a platform only slightly higher than a normal kerb. As Table , Passengers per hour for .m vehicles, illustrates, these can be configured to support a wide range of vehicle sizes, capacities and service frequencies. Many cities have found that passenger growth on a new rapid mass transit system happens much more quickly than predicted. While narrower vehicles (. metres wide) and shorter platforms may be sufficient

Table . Passengers per hour for .m vehicles Length

Capacity

½ min

 min

 min

 m









 m









 m









 m









 m









 m



,





Submission to LGWM

 January  at : AM



§

Implementation Considerations

early in the system’s life, retro-fitting, especially to build longer platforms, is at best expensive and at worst impractical. FIT envisages that Wellington might start with m vehicles, but to future-proof the system would build platforms to accommodate either m or m vehicles. There are two areas where emergence of standards for new technologies have the potential to improve rapid transit economics, especially in smaller cities: • autonomous light rail vehicles capable of on-street operation will make it more cost-effective to deliver a high frequency service outside the peak hours • lower weight, higher capacity batteries, with charging at stops, will make it more practical to operate without overhead wire

.

Procurement Options

Consider adopting a technology-neutral approach to procurement, specifying the services that the rapid transit system must deliver. While FIT has concluded that light rail is the technology which best meets Wellington’s requirements for a rapid mass transit system, we envisage that procurement will adopt a technology-neutral strategy. That is, specify the services the system must deliver, leaving potential suppliers to propose the technology mix that delivers these services. Service specifications could include: • maximum expected travel time between Wellington Station and the Airport (e.g., must be less than  minutes and should be less than  minutes, at all times) • capacity required at opening and over the life of the contract (e.g., initially  pass / hour during peak periods, with capacity for up to  pass / hour) • service frequency in the morning and afternoon peak periods, the inter-peak daytime period, evenings, and weekend daytime periods (e.g.,  minutes,  minutes,  minutes, and  minutes respectively, to all stops, with provision for ½ minute frequency if needed) • quality of connections at transit hubs to minimize transfer penalties, particularly at the railway station to connect rail, bus and rapid transit (e.g., transfer times must be less than  minutes and should be less than  minutes) • maximum motor vehicle queue lengths and delays at busy intersections during morning and afternoon peak periods, where the service crosses strategic travel corridors such as SH at grade • considering ways to leverage existing regional rail assets, which may result in proposals to extend the heavy rail service or use a bridging technology like tram–train  January  at : AM

Submission to LGWM



§ Implementation Considerations

• maintaining contestable supply for future system extensions, such as to Karori (this may exclude the various “guided-bus” technologies, which use proprietary and mutually incompatible standards so would lock in a single supplier) • operational resilience, including the ability to recover from earthquake damage and adapt to sea level rise Bus timetables would be reconfigured to minimize wait times for connections at all transit hubs. Contracts for bus services connecting to the rapid mass transit system could then include strict provisions for on-time performance. Bus passengers transferring to and from the system at hubs must have certainty that they can rely on making their scheduled connections. A connecting bus should arrive at a hub not more than  seconds early and leave a hub not more than  seconds late. Depending on project timing, there may be opportunities for joint procurement with Auckland, and possibly Christchurch. New Zealand is at the end of global supply chains, so it may be prudent to adopt a common technology platform across all our cities. This would enable sharing of parts and expertise, while providing a low cost way to increase system resilience. The number of vehicles required for a Wellington system alone is below the minimum order quantity needed for significant price discounts. The initial vehicle order quantity depends on the service frequency and round trip travel time. Table , Vehicles needed for a  minute headway, is an illustrative example. It shows that a vehicle leaving the station at : am starts its next round trip at : am, : am, or : am, depending on the travel time. The layover time is needed for the driver to walk from one end of the vehicle to the other for the return trip. Round trip times of  and  minutes require a  or  minute headway. If Wellington achieves the Ridership Ambition (p ), FIT expects the system will operate at a ½ or  minute headway during peak times within  years of opening. If so, this doubles the number of vehicles needed and the contract for supply ought to allow for this. vehicles needed = round trip time ÷ headway

Table . Vehicles needed for a  minute headway Travel time (mins) Station–Miramar  Miramar layover

 ½

Miramar–Station  Station layover



 

 ½



Round trip time 

 



 

Vehicles needed

Submission to LGWM

 

 January  at : AM

§ List of Recommendations





List of Recommendations . Plan to open a rapid transit line between the railway station and Miramar by , as a reliable and superior alternative to driving. See Why Rapid Transit (p ). . Agree that rapid transit is a core component of a future transport system designed around the wants and needs of people. See Regional View (p ). . Reconfigure bus services along the rapid transit corridor to aggregate demand and connect at transit hubs. See Connective Network (p ). . Develop a policy and guidelines for transit oriented development around rapid transit stops and at transit hubs. See Transit Oriented Development (p ). . Design the first rapid transit line in a way that facilitates future extensions and connections. See Future Route Extensions (p ). . Note that to provide reliable rapid transit for the projected demand, Wellington needs light rail operating no later than . See Ridership Ambition (p ). . Note the earthquake risk to light rail lines can be mitigated and other earthquake-prone cities have extensive passenger rail networks. See Earthquake Risk (p ). . Note the estimated cost of a first light rail line is $m and a public– private partnership is one of several possible funding mechanisms. See Project Funding (p ). . Choose technologies that are based on widely-used standards, to provide maximally contestable supply and avoid supplier lock-in. See Technology Standards (p ).

. Consider adopting a technology-neutral approach to procurement, specifying the services that the rapid transit system must deliver. See Procurement Options (p ).

Submission to LGWM

 January  at : AM



§Glossary

Glossary BRT (p ): Bus Rapid Transit CBD (p ): Central Business District FIT (p ): Fair Intelligent Transport LGWM (p ): Let’s Get Wellington Moving light rail (p ): An urban rapid mass transit system, segregated from general traffic as much as possible, with wide spacing between stops and priority at intersections, fast enough to compete with private car travel LRT (p ): Light Rail Transit NZTA (p ): New Zealand Transport Agency PT (p ): Public Transport SH (p ): State Highway  SH (p ): State Highway  TOD (p ): Transit Oriented Development

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 January  at : AM