The European Journal of the History of Economic

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Uchronies and the History of Economic Knowledge

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Nicoló Bellanca & Marco E.L. Guidi Published online: 28 Jul 2006.

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To cite this article: Nicoló Bellanca & Marco E.L. Guidi (1997) Uchronies and the History of Economic Knowledge , The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 4:1, 116-142, DOI: 10.1080/10427719700000022 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10427719700000022

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The EuropeanJournal ojlhe Hiclmy of Economic Thought 4:l 116-142 Sp'ng 1997

Uchronies and the history of economic

Downloaded by [Universita Degli Studi di Firenze] at 03:57 17 October 2013

knowledge*

Nicolo Bellanca and Mamo E. L. Guidi

1. Introduction A number of events suggest the presence of very active debate in recent years among historians of economic ideas: a growing number of books and articles have been published, transnational societies, research projecu and specializedjoumals have been established. It is therefore not surprising that there has been a n increasing debate on the method and on the appropriate subjects of this field of research. Current discussion revolves around two issues: 1 the nature of evolution in the history of economics; and 2 the scope of the history of economic ideas. The first focus has led to disputes between relativism and absolutism, while both these approaches have been associated with a continuist o r a discontinuist view of evolution (Screpanti 1992). Disputes have followed in the steps of contemporary epistemology - the latter having developed a new specific branch, known as the epistemology of economics (Barrotta 1992). In recent years the relativistdiscontinuist approach appears to have gained the upper hand, thanks to attraction Feyerabend's 'counter-methodological model' (Pera 1991: 15) - o r Rorty's reduction of the scientific debate to 'normal conversation' (Rorty 1979)' - had on historians. However, discontinuist relativism is not the end of the story: both Pera's 'rhetorical model' (Pera 1991; Barrotta 1992), and Hacking's 'realism of entities' (Hacking 1983; 1990; Belloliore 1994) oppose absolute incommensurability of Address for correspondence N. Bellanca. Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Finanziarie 'G. Prato'. Universib di Torino, C.so Unione Sovietica. 218/bis, 1-10134Torina. Iraly. M. E. L. Guidi. Dipartimento di Storia e Critica della Politica, Uoiversit.5di Teramo, V.le Crucioli 120.164100 Teramo. Italy.

0967-2567

O 1997 Routledge


'.s Uchmnies and the history ojeconomic knowledge paradigms and aim at moving beyond the sand-banks of methodological anarchy. If we turn to the second focus, we observe a traditional opposition among scholars about the subject the history of economic thought is intended to study. The choice is between a 'thin' approach, addressing the mere development of the tools of economic analysis, and a 'thick' study encompassing economic knowledge at all levels, as well as the cultural and social context economic theories and reflections stem from (Backhouse 1992a, 1992b; Weintraub 1992; Walker 1988; Bianchini 1992). This paper is devoted to the latter issue and is intended as a contribution to a 'thick' methodology of the history of economic ideas. The first part aims at highlighting some of the assumptions commonly shared by 'thick' historians of economic ideas. Section 2 will deal with these attitudes in general terms. We argue that the typical interest of 'thick' history of economic ideas is not merely economic science, but a broader discursive whole, which can be defined 'economic knowledge'. Section 3 will be devoted to the exemplification of these attitudes, with examples drawn from current research. Section 4 is an attempt at giving a general definition of the series of subjects of the historian of economic knowledge. Our tenet is that these subjects enclose a non-linear idea of time. We thus suggest to call them 'uchmnies', i.e. 'possible albeit non-arbitrary histories'. Part I1 debates some of the implications ensuingfrom the adoption of this approach. It aims at showing both the advantages and the problems introduced by the 'history of economic knowledge' approach. We hold that, uir4uir traditional history of theory, this approach makes more room for the autonomy of the role played by historians of economic ideas in scientific debate. In Section 5 we show that the toolbox consistent with the historians' intents cannot be made up of a standard set of analytical instruments. Rather, it must vary according to the textual and contextual aspects they have to deal with. In Section 6 we argue that the notion of 'uchronie' shifts emphasis from the problem of progress in economic theory to that of diachrnnicgmwlh ojknowledge, considered as an enlargement of the potential connections between different levels of knowledge. Section 7 illustrates our tenet that the utility of the history of economic ideas for current economic theorization cannot be stated a pion.. In n o case can economic science furnish the only standard for a hierarchy of the subjects to be inquired. On the contrary, history of economic knowledge should be considered in iwelf one of the possible contribution to the diachronic growth of knowledge. Finally, Section 8 is devoted to an analysis of the relations between historians of economic knowledge, economists and other scholars: we note that, as a matter of fact, they have sometimes better exchanges with historians than with economists. This fact is a proof of the attained autonomy

Nicolo Bellanca and Marm E I-.Guidi

of their discipline. However, there is no reason to rejoice for the loss of contact with economic theorizing.


2. The tenets of 'thick' history of economic ideas It is quite hard to identify common traits among those historians who favour a 'thick' approach to the evolution ofeconomic ideas. Among the methodological tools they adopt, one can find very different mixtures of notions derived from anthropology, sociology, psychology and psychoanalysis, as well as linguistics, semiology and even aesthetics. Also philosophical references are very dissimilar: some authors are influenced by the tradition of pragmatism, while others subscribe to structuralism (especially in Foucault's version of it) or to Gadamerian hermeneutics. It is not necessary to say that these approaches are reciprocally alternative. However, a common ground does exist among them: the bundle of specialized disciplines and philosophical references just described is the same from which all historians of ideas - independently of the field of inquiry they study ordinarily pick u p their tools of analysis. So the specialization of 'thick' h i s torians of economic ideas is not that of the economist concerned about epistemological issues.' but that of the historian who studies the (economic) ideas of the past. This genuinely historical background explains other common attitudes of 'thick' historians of economic ideas. All of them share the persuasion that the understanding of an intellectual (or scientific) event - such as a work. a line of th'ourrht. u . a text. a tradition. etc. -is neither immediate nor self-evident; on the contrary, it requires an analysis of the social and symbolic context in which the event is placed. The context is not only responsible for the languages and paradigms adopted, or for the 'problems discussed: a part of it is also the public to which literary performances are addressed, and by which they are interpreted, accepted or rejected. In the light of that, it is not surprising that, on the one hand, most 'thick' historians of economic thought reject the absolutist interpretation of the evolution of economic discourse, while, on the other hand, they disregard functionalist explanations of intellectual events, such as the Marxist notion of superstructure, as too simplistic forms of contextualization. Lastly, these general beliefs are associated with at least three attitudes in research: 1 the widening of the field of inquiry from economic theory to other kinds of economic discourse;

Uchmnies and the hirlory oJepnomic knowledge

2 contextualization; and 3 a peculiar kind of what the French call 'une culture de la dij/bnce'. The rest of this section will be devoted to a general analysis of these three attitudes.


2.1. Economic science and economic knowledge The main reason why 'thick' historians of economic ideas consider it impossible to limit their inquiries to economic thea'es, is that they believe that both the meaning of economic science and its limits are not given once and for all. So the only way to identify them is to analyse, on the one hand, the relationships between economic theory and other types of economic discourse, and, on the other hand, the position economic knowledgt? as a whole holds in the overall organization of learning. As Foucault said, ' u n savoir, c'est ce don1 on p a l parler dam une pratique discursive qui se lrouve par la spicifie' (Foucault 1969: 238). More exactly, a branch of knowledge is a set of rules, limitations and exclusions, which tend to admit some procedures and subjects and to reject others as inappropriate. These rules are specific to each period and, as a result, the division of knowledge is variable with time. Moreover, a branch of knowledge, and specifically economic knowledge, may contain diNerent levels of discourse: some of them are traditionally recognized as 'scientific' (theories and models), while others should be considered 'broader' levels of discourse (a general set of commonly shared assumptions, which we could call 'economic culture', specific cultures o r mentalitis - such as the culture of merchants, bankers, etc. - or deliberate reflections on economic issues). O u r tenet is that 'thick' historians of economic ideas are in fact historians of economic knowledge, and that their crucial role is to highlight the passage from the more informal and unstructured to the more structured and specifically theoretical levels ofeconomic knowledge. In fact, each passage is full of connections to be interpreted, since discourses practised within each level of economic knowledge are frequently transformed, enriched and even distorted, when they are tranc ferred to other levels. To the historian of economic knowledge, the picture often looks like a pyramid standing on its head, with a number of reflections, theories, and models stemming from the same economic culture. Analysis shows the passages whereby they can either conflict or integrate, and how delays, discontinuity, feedbacks and cross-fertilizations4 often take place moving along the less obvious pathways. These considerations also explain why historians of economic knowledge -as we can now call them - are interested in traditions of economic knowledge that never attained modelling o r even consistent theorization: they

NicoG Bellanca and Mano E. L. Cuidi


have reasons to study why the aims and subjects admitted by these traditions made the passing to the theoretical level immaterial. Moreover, the comparison with these traditions highlights the reasons why modelling took place in other contexts. In other words, theorization and modelling no longer appear as entirely self-referred activities, exclusively due to the requirements of rigorous abstraction.

2.2. Fmm context to culture Current debate on contextualizing past work was initiated by historians of political ideas. In an article published in 1969, Quentin Skinner questioned the history of thought as an atemporal comparison among major classics. The procedure, he maintained, was unable to appreciate the meaning of a discourse or theory in depth, since statements are not per se objective and clear. He believed that a detailed study of the intellectual context that generates a work is necessary. Any work is measured against the topics, languages and problems of its time and place. This means going beyond the notion of 'great works', and looking into the host of writings, pamphlets and journal articles which contribute to generate the leading ideas of a scientific or intellectual community (Skinner 1969; Tully 1987). The inevitable corollary to this approach is that any interpretation of past works carried out using decontextualised categories is suspect. The main risk is that of ex-post reading: past works tend to be analysed is terms of problems and categories which originated later in history, and which are inappropriate to understand their meaning. Moreover, entire languages and currents of thought are neglected or undervalued just because they were not relevant in later times. John Pocock has demonstrated this point by his research on the NeeMachiavellian or civic republican paradigm in seventeenth-and eighteenth-century British political debate (Pocock 1975). The research programme formulated by Skinner corresponded to a growing need among historians of ideas. It has since been developed over a number of areas, including the history of economic ideas5 Methodological debate and historical research has progressively enlarged Skinner's invitation to contextualize texts. Some historians of ideas - also influenced by current epistemological debate - have been looking for languages and paradigms which were shared by circumscribed intellectual communities (Pocock 1972; 1983; 1987). Others have discussed the role played by institutions and by institutionalized values and disciplines in the construction of intellectual reality and personal identity of writers (Berger-Luckmann 1966). Still others have adopted Foucault's notions of 'enonc; and 'archive' (Foucault 1969: sect. 11) as a key to textual 'decon~truction'~: a text is n o longer considered as an intellectual unity, but as the result of the


Uchmnies and Lhe hisloy ofeconomic knowledge overlapping of languages, themes, theories and values of different origin and not necessarily consistent with one another. Finally, other scholars, under the influence of Gadamerian hermeneutics, have developed a theory of the reception of intellectual works based on the notion of 'horizon of expectations'. According to this theory, the way in which a text is read and accepted or refused by an intellectual community is an essential part of its own meaning (Iser 1971-72; Gumbrecht 1975;Jauss 1982). If one were to identify a trend in recent literature on the history of economic knowledge, we suggest it might be in the progressive enlargement of the notion of context itself; we are moving from locally and temporally limited languages, paradigms or traditions, to longuedurieand to the notion of 'culture', seen as a set of persistent categorical coordinates pertaining to the development of civilizations from ancient to recent times.'

2.3. Une culture de la dqym c e The attitude of the historians of ideas to stress the more or less radical incommensurability between historical contexts and paradigms reveals their agreement with one of the most distinctive signs of present-day intellectual awareness: the idea of a culture de la diffirence (Irigaray 1990). One of the consequences of this attitude is the re-evaluation of segments of past intellectual production which had not survived later debates and formalizations because of their semantic incompatibility with modern problems and intellectual attitudes. The study of these languages or debates becomes a legitimate subject of scientific interest not as a purely erudite exercise, but as a way to understand the 'archaeology' of modern knowledge. In the case of the history of economic ideas, the stressing of differences between past and modern languages can improve our understanding of the current state of theory in this field, a fact which also applies to mainstream economics. The appreciation of historical differences between contexts and paradigms was initially characterised by a phase of fume, where the appeal of both Foucault's 'historical a pbri.s' and counter-methodological epistemology led some to read incommensurability and idiosyncrasy into each and every situation. A somewhat calmer phase followed, where Western culture was perceived as leu, fragmented, and crossed by a small number of more stable metaphors, assumptions, categories and 'styles of scientific reasoning'. As Ian Hacking stressed, these are coordinates that have to be seen in the light of Braudelian langue durie (Hacking 1990: 7). Curiously enough, now that the history of ideas seems to go back to the inspiration of its widely acknowledged founder (Lovejoy 1936), epistemology is abandoning the sand-banks of relativism and discontinuity at all costs.

Nicob Belbnca nnd Mnrco E L. Guidi

3. Pathways ofresearch


This new 'common sense' found among what we have called the histmiam o/economicknow[edgeresults in a series of research approaches which can not be described exhaustively in the present paper. Some significant examples will be proposed, selecting the ones best known to us. For the purpose of exposition, they are classified according to a conventional subdivision of their subjects of inquiry, namely: 1 economic knowledge and its relationships with other branches of knowledge; 2 heterogeneity and incommensurability within the economic branch of knowledge; 3 oppositions and inconsistencies within the same level of economic knowledge, and 4 relationships between individuals and the levels of knowledge. This classification roughly corresponds to the following four areas of research: 1 the study of the shaping and institutionalization of economic knowledge as an autonomous field of thought; 2 the contextualization of various levels of thought; 3 the study of the internal consistency among the basic propositions of a theory; and 4 the analysis of schools of economic thought. In the rest of this section, we will propose some examples of these areas of research.

3.I . The developmen1 of an in@mdml economic knowledge

'Thick' historiansof economic ideas have been increasingly attracted by the question concerning the rules, subject& methods and even interdictions that gave rise to an independent branch of economic knowledge and within it, to the new science of political economy, an event that gradually took place between the end of the seventeenth and the beginnings of the nineteenth centuries. The research canied out in this field has considered both the evolution of economic theorization and the political, ideological, academic and journalist debates around economic issues: both these levels of discourse consistently show the overall change in the organization of knowledge which took place along that period, in order to make room for a specifically economic k n ~ w l e d g e . ~ One of the consequences of such a historicization of the genesis of


Uchrnnies and the history oJeronomic knowledge

economic knowledge has been the replacement of many premodern intellectual phenomena within the division of knowledge of the epoch to which they belonged. The best example is perhaps given by the revision of the notion of 'mercantilism'. Considered for a long time the comprehensive and hegemonic economic theory 'before Adam Smith', it has more recently been interpreted as a list of political agenda which can be understood only in the light of the political languages from which they stemmed? Another consequence of this interest for economic knowledge is the attention paid to the practical and theoretical relationships between political economy once it became an independent science - and neighbouring spheres of knowledge, such as politics, moral philosophy or soci~logy.'~ A problem that has intrigued historians is that of changes in the hierarchy between sciences. It is a received view that political economy filled the role of leading discipline among social sciences in the first part of the nineteenth century, and was then replaced in this position by Comtian sociology. However, it has been suggested that many nineteenth-century economists thought that economic and social science was still subordinate to morals and politics in many respects, so that the nineteenth century cannot be easily depicted as the era of the acknowledged triumph of civil society over the State." Historians have also been attracted by the capacity of economic science to absorb the languages of the educated ilites, and have discovered that this permeability may account for the emphasis bestowed upon some of the typical problems of economic analysis.12 Other trends of historical research that can be ascribed to this interest for the development of economic knowledge concentrate on economic dictionaries and textbooks, considered as sources in which a special attention is paid to the definition of economic science and of the accepted research procedures.13 The international research projects on the institutionalization of political economy," and studies in the professionalization of e c ~ n o m i s t sare ' ~ also a consequence of this enlarged interest for economic knowledge. The same applies to the analysis of the shifting boundaries of economic knowledge, to its aim at covering other areas of social thought (Stigler 1984), and to the redefinition of its independent status (Wade 1975; Hirschman 1986).

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3.2. Contexlualizing h e & of knowledge By contextualizing various aspects of the history of economic knowledge historians have shown that it can be misleading to treat the evolution of economic ideas as a homogeneous whole. The more innovative trends in this field can be grouped in three areas:

Nicoi; Beiianra and Marro E. I,. Cuidi


a) the investigation of theory creation; b) the revision of historiographical received views, starting from the relationship between text and context; and c) the analysis of what Foucault called 'enunciative homogeneities' or 'heterogeneities'. a . Recent biographical studies devoted to economists see the author as the bearer of a life project made u p by private drives and social conditioning. Such a project may undergo crises and be revised, thus generating changes in both identityand issues at stake. The writers' reasons (i.e. intentions) can be understood as answers to the questions underlying their life projects.16 In fact, the work of an author has an important biographical side: it is the story of making and unmaking, of routes attempted and then abandoned, or of theoretical impasses and withdrawals due to hesitation uis-a-uis radical conceptual innovations." b. Historiographical revisions based on the relations between text and context have been especially valuable in the case of research on Adam Smith and David Hume, whose economic theories have been replaced within the philosophical framework of eighteenthcentury Britain, thus querying the received view whereby Smith was seen as the founder of nineteenthcentury laissez-faire ide~logy.'~ In the instance the lively exchange between specialists in the history of philosophy, and of political and economic thought proved ~ e m i n a l . 'Revisionism ~ on Adam Smith's political economy has also benefited from the insights of the 'theoryof recepti~n',~" a theory which has also been applied to the case of Keynes's work^.^' c. It was Foucault himself who suggested an exarnple illustrating the heterogeneity in statements of economic thought: La formulation du rapport quantitarif enlre le prix et la rnarse monitaire en circulation peut Etre cNectuPe avec les m h e s mots - ou des mots synonimes - er kcre obcenue par le rnkme raisonnement; elle n'esr pas inonciativernenl identique chez Gresham ou Locke et chez les marginalisles du XIXe siecle; elle ne relPve pas ici et 14. du meme systeme de formation des objets er des concepts. 11 Taut donc dirtinpvr mfrc nnologit Iiguirfique (oo tnductibiliti), idmfifi logiqw (ou equivalence) et homoginiifihonriolivr.

(Foucault 1969: 190)" Historical analysis is here concerned with linguistic codes. It examines the messages that these codes allow for, and the intellectual groups using them. It is important to distinguish research on the 'translatability' and 'equivalence' of economic theories from the study of 'enunciative heterogeneities'. Both display linguistic features. However, the purpose of 'translation' is to reduce different definitions to one meaning, thus opening inroads into the 'rational reconstruction' of ideas.23On the contrary, linguistic analysis of 'enunciative heterogeneities' is concerned with the many ways in which one

Uchronies and the hislory o/eio%mic knorukdge

proposition can be positioned within other propositions, thus deriving different meaning^.^“


3.3. The critical analysis of lheorelical categories Even within the same level of economic knowledge, historians have found inconsistencies and inner tensions. This is especially true in the case of theorization. A theory can be seen as consisting of two ingredients: 1 its fundamental propositions (FPs). These may consist of concepts

ensuing either from observation, or from other theories and postulates; and 2 the set of secondary propositions (SPs) inferred from them. The latter are often referred to as 'theorems' or 'logical implications'. The purpose of historians is to map relationships between FPs, and in order to d o that they have to establish the heuristic or cognitive importance of each of them and their logical compatibility. Semantic and syntactical coexistence between propositions with diverse origins, and with varying degrees of generality, is not an inevitable outcome. For instance, when in the late nineteenth century, Austrian and Italian economists started considering public economy as a separate discipline, they tried to deduce a set of consistent SPs from a FP framework containing potentially conflicting statements: some of them referred to the fiscal exchange as voluntary, whereas other stressed its coercive nature. This example shows why the study either of the logical consistency of FPs and of 'categories' - i.e. FP combinations - or of the derivation of SPs from FPs, are useless. Such procedure would be valid only if all ambiguities could be eliminated, and a distinct principle were to be used to distinguish each and every FP or category. Unfortunately, categories tend to overlap one another, since 'when explaining a category in a satisfactory manner, we always have to resort to other categories' (Rossi-Landi 1985: 101). This means that historians of economic ideas have to plot the network of intersections between FPs within a single theory. Their task consists in discovering inner frictions, as well as emphasizing potential de~elopments.~"

3.4. Schools of economic lhoughl A school of economic thought is based in a specific cultural locur and has its own relatively identifiable time curve. Two additional features distinguish a school of thought:

Nicoli Bellanca and Marco E. I. Guidi


1 it has a 'idea incubator', i.e. a leading research centre (such as Cambridge, Vienna or Chicago); and 2 its members work on an intellectual projects stemming from the work of a recognized 'master'. Historians identify schools by analysing the research subjects which are either addressed or avoided, as well as the procedures of inquiry and the methodologies employed. Briefly, a school of thought can he defined as a group of researchers who share the same cognifiue p u r p o ~ e ? ~ This notion of school of thought differs from the broad meaning attributed to it in the romantic and idealistic historiography of the nineteenth century.27 It pertains to the toolbox of a historian of knowledge, since it offers a critical insight into the relationship between the individual author and the theoretical paradigm. Moreover, the notion of school of thought may be employed to reappraise the role played by the so called secondary ' characters. These characters cease to he mere imitators of a well-identified mainstream: they become scholars that may have played a decisive role in 1 the fortunes of a school.2R

4. The creation of uchnmies

We have seen u p to now that historians of economic ideas have enlarged their field of research in many directions, in order to focus on the relationships between various levels of economic knowledge. They have studied characters, schools, local and national traditions (or style^')^ which past historiography had considered of secondary importance. Is there a way of defining more exactly the nature of their effort? Perhaps, an answer could come from a more accurate definition of the series of subjecw to which historians of economic knowledge have devoted their attention. It is evident that the change in attitude we are examining is not just a matter of enrichment of historical knowledge: more importantly, what has radically been transformed is the notion of time. In fact, time is no longer perceived as an univocal process, and the idea that the history of economic thought is the linear succession of the mercantilist, classical, marginalist schools no longer holds. By working on the relationships between levels of economic knowledge, historians have outlined several possible histories: ideas, languages, discourses that sometimes in the past and somewhere appeared to be the candidates for future orthodoxy, actually did not triumph; on the contrary, what we perceive as successful theories or paradigms -say, Ricardo's doctrine or marginalism - were absolutely marginal in several contexw. Lastly, clusters of minority thought have appeared

. Uchmnies and the history o/economic knowledge significant precisely because they were not accepted by the largest part of the intellectual community (or of the community of the economists). As Raymond Aron puu it,


Si je dis que la decision de Bismarck a t t C cause de la guerre de 1866, clue la vicloire de Marathon a sauvC la culture grecque,j'enrends que, sans la decision du chancrlier, la goerre n'aurail pas eclat6 (oo du rnoinr n'aorait pas eclat6 ice moment), que les Perses vainqueurs auraient empechC le 'miracle' grec. Dans les deux cas, la causalit6 effectivene se difinit que par une confronlation avec les possibles. Toul hislorim, pour e@liqw cc qui a ilk sr donon& ce qui nurail pu itre.

(Aron 1948: 164)"' So the historians' time frame is made u p by a number of parallel plans and possible futures, although the past can not be changed (DockPs-Rosier 1988, 1991, 1992). We argue that historians of economic knowledge have learnt to move within this counter-factual d i m e n ~ i o n . ~ ' Our suggestion is that all the historiographical subjects which ensue from this changed attitude towards time should go under the name of 'uchronies' (which etymologically means non-zxistent time), although we are conscious that this term stresses what did not happen rather than what happened (or could happen). Therefore, uchmniesshould be defined more exactly as 'possible albeit non-arbitrary hisforier'. They enable historians to retrace the possible historical sequel of events for a given level of economic knowledge (culture, reflection, theory or model) which actually existed, but whose development was curtailed by other prevailing ideas, and whose interpretation was distorted by those who triumphed.32 It would perhaps be useful to spend some words on the ways in which 'possible histories' may be removed by triumphant orthodoxy. Three prccedures can be imagined: a) switching from one level of knowledge to another, which entails losses and linguistic or cognitive changes; b) the clash between discourses (theories for instance) competing at the same level; and c) tensionswithin the same level of knowledge even when developed by the same scholar. Point (a) has partially been discussed in Section 2 above. Over the past years point (b) has been debated, especially in view of the fact that conflicting theorizations - i.e. 'paradigms' or 'research programmes' - often derive from the same economic culture (Lauis 1976; De Marchi-Blaug 1991). On the contrary, point (c) has not always been fully understood: for instance Hayek's social theory refers to Hume's, Mandeville's and Smith's conceptions of spontaneous order, as well as to Kant's universal rationalism (Kukathas 1989). Marx refers to Hegel's dialectics and to the logic of


Nicolo Bellnnca and Marco E. L. Guidi Ricardo's political economy (Denis 1980). It is a standard procedure for authors to make use of profoundly diverse materials which often lead to crossroads. Crossroads are the points where ideas can turn equally towards Hume or Kant, Hegel or Ricardo. As soon as the decision is made, the reasons underlying previous doubts are erased, and with them 'possible histories' disappear.33 Historians may build their uchronies in a number of ways: these may be based on textual, or contextual evidence, or simply their source may be discontent for the prevailing interpretation. The former are in fact more characteristic of the historians' approach, while the latter pertains more commonly to the creative activity of the theoretician; A clear example is Piero Sraffa. His uchmnieconcerning Ricardo is not the basis, but the result of his intellectual effort. In Appendix D to Produelion oJCommodilies by mans oJComnwdifies, Sraffa maintains that according to Ricardo 'corn' is the only basic commodity in the considered economic system, and adds: should perhaps be slated that i t was only when the Standard system and the d i r tinction between basic and non-basic had emerged it: the course of present investigation that the above interpretation of Ricardo's theory suggested itself as a natural consequence. (Staffa 1960: 93) It

Although Sraffa's uchronie might appear an ancilla lhem'ae, its genesis affects neither the soundness nor the interest of the result. No tribunal, be it a court of historians or of economists, could judge the appropriateness of a uchronie's genesis. The building of a non arbitrary possible history always opens the possibility of a new history: of a new theory (or model), if the historian relays the baton to the the~retician,~' or of a new culture or reflection. In other words, a new possibility of revising the slatus of current economic thought is developed.

Our aim has so far been to identify the features characterising the activity of historians of economic knowledge: we have also suggested a concept encompassing the inmost unity of their objects of scrutiny. In the remaining sections we will turn to some implications deriving from the adoption of such an approach. It is clear that our analysis becomes here more normative: we intend to show some problems connected with the history of knowledge approach, but also some of the advantages it has over the traditional history of economic theories. In synthesis, we argue that the former

,

'>.

Urhmnies and the hislmy ofeconomir knmukdge

makes a larger room for an autonomous role of the historian of economic ideas. Our analysis will concentrate on four points:


1 2 3 4

the the the the

store of knowledge consistent with the historian's intents; notion of progress ensuing from the making of uchronies; uses of the results of research; and relations between historians, economists and other scholars

5. The historians' toolbox The notion of 'history of knowledge' is more comprehensive than that of 'history of theory' or 'of analysis', or even than 'history of ideas'. The former two focus on theorisation while the third is more prone to focus on informal reflections. Thus there are reasons to prefer the single expression 'history of knowledge' rather than using all the othen; it confers the same dignity and importance to research on every level of knowledge. This characterization is far from being widely accepted. For instance, let us consider the recurring objection by academic economists to those studying the history of economic ideas: 'Wouldn't it be ridiculous - they say - to imagine someone writing the history of physics without having professional knowledge of the subject? Likewise it is pointless to leave the history of economic ideas in the hands of those who d o not master economic theory professionally'. The statement appears self-evident, but a closer scrutiny highlights its extreme ambiguity, so much so it is useless as a criterion to differentiate 'proper' historians from those who are not. In fact for it to operate effectively one would have to define a professional sphere of economics such that one could apply itwhen researching into the history of economic ideas. What sort of theoryand how vast an area ought it to cover? Let us imagine having to study Galiani's monetary theory. An initial answer would suggest a minimal prerequisite: one has to at least be acquainted with all the economic theory contained in Galiani's texts. It is evident that it is not enough: in fact, Galiani's theory is not a neutral protocol, but belongs to the cultural and linguistic codes of its time. Therefore, if one wishes to appreciate it hictm'cally, then one must have a package of notions well beyond its theoretical syntax. A second answer would suggest the only aim historians have is to reformulate Galiani's monetary theory in modern terms. This would require historians having absorbed at least an intermediate textbook on monetary economics. Furthermore, if historians wish to identify the logical premises and the constraints of Galiani's arguments, and give an accurate


Nicol2 Bellonce and Marco E. L. Guidi

formalization of them, then they will have to be acquainted with a more advanced knowledge of the subject, including the mathematical tools they have to resort to. However, this answer also avoids addressing the issue we are concerned with: if the aim of historians consists in the understanding of the actual way Galiani used to cross several levels of economic knowledge, then we realize that it is difficult to indicate which and how much theory they need. To be literal, they would need too much of i t in other words, in the course of their research, historians would realize that in Galiani, the divisions between macro- and microeconomics, between statics and dynamics, monetary and real economics, etc., are not self-evident, and above all they are strongly shifted compared to present day mainstream divisions. This means that the following have to be considered to obtain the required 'open' interpretation: a) not just monetary economics but all the many other branches of economics too; and b) within monetary economics the historian ought not to be satisfied with an advanced academic textbook, but would have to find the frontiers of current world debate to appreciate the latest innovative changes that might be linked to his interpretation. However, there is still more to come: our historians would soon realize that there is no impenetrable boundary between Galiani's economic theory and other types of theorizations on society. As a result they would have to develop their professional knowledge on many fronts and with equal depth. In other words, the above-mentioned economists' statement proves too much: if one were to take it seriously but consider Galiani as a pretext to confirm current ideas, then some specialized competence is all that is required. But if one takes Galiani seriously, then our historians have to become walking social science encyclopaedias updated in real time. Hence, anyone wishing to study Galiani and offer a non-prejudiced interpretation has to have the subset of knowledge and tools required for thic purpose. Our historian's research on Galiani will be assessed in terms of its ability to generate uchmnies as non-arbitrary possible histories, rather than according to the number and type of theoretical frameworks it operates.

6. Progress of science or increased knowledge? As mentioned above, uchmnies imply an approach based on d i / f h c e , although this does not mean that there is absolute incommensurability among levels of discourse. In fact, when applied to the problem of the development of economic knowledge, the approach in terms of uchmnies accentuates discontinuities: not merely between paradigms, but also between schools, national styles, etc. Does this mean that, according to this approach, we should simply


Uchronies and the history of economic knowledge abandon any notion of progress, and especially progress in economics?As was explained at the beginning of this article, epistemological debate has recently moved from the sand-banks of absolute relativism, especially thanks to the 'argumentative' or 'rhetorical model' based on the three-cornered relationship between the scientist, the scientific community and external reality (Pera 1991; Barrotta 1992). This model, when applied to natural sciences, can call for a non entirely self-referential notion of progress. However, if the same model is applied to economics, it becomes more complex. On the one hand, this is due to the ongoing change in the subject of research (Hicks 1979; LeGonhufwd 1976). On the other hand, consensus-seeking on what is progress implies not only a reference to categories and 'epistemic values' (Pera 1991: 148), but also (and more importantly) to the ethical values used to interpret events. Ethical values also play a role in the appraisal of the analytical tools developed to understand economic facts and to intervene. In fact, economists frequently justify the progress of so called 'technical knowledge' according to values such as the real or presumed success of the economic policy stemming from such notions. Success, for instance, can be assessed according to a greater prosperity, or to a more equal distribution, and so on. Now, it is evident that reference to such values tends to increase rather than reducing the distance from 'an idealstandard evaluation acceptable by all scientists' (Screpanti 1992: 26). In any case, it seems hard to assert that, considering how science operates in practice, all scientists 'independently of any specific theoretical system' would agree to assume that 'a skyscraper represents progress with respect to a pile-dwelling'. Only a theory of history which already includes a theory of progress, can support a theory of science whereby everyone backs the skyscraper from a neutral standpoint. Therefore, the concept of 'scientific progress' in economics is a p r o b lematic issue. This does not mean that it is impossible to allow for any kind of evolution in economic theory. We argue that the approach in terms of history of knowledge we analysed shifts emphasis from the notion of unilinear and unanimously acknowledged progress to that of diachronic gmwth of knowledge, where knowledge is conceived of as the 'condition of possibility' of any level of discourse in a given age. As far as people share the same universe of knowledge (for example, economic knowledge), they are able to establish communication between the various levels which compose that universe: so one economic culture can communicate with another, or the various reflections, theories and models display a degree of interchange even along time and space. Accordingly, the multiplication of the technical and theoretical tools appears to enrich our knowledge. We are now able to define in clearer terms the notion of 'diachronic growth of knowledge'. Greater knowledge is developed every time a passage


NicoG Bellanca and M a ~ E. o L. Guidi from one level of knowledge to another takes place. The possibilities of a branch of knowledge are explored more exhaustively. Lastly, ideas which were not (openly) connected are linked, opening new intellectual inroads. Here a historian's skill comes to play a forefront role. The creation of uchmnies is one of the ways in which the accumulation of knowledge may express itself. Possible non-arbitrary histories are the reviving of previous paths which had been discarded or impoverished. Historians are not just dusting the furniture in an apartment with an already set layout: they can change the furniture in an ever-changing dwelling. Furthermore, historians highlight the fact that this accumulation is an enrichment of our knowledge, although proceeding along different directions, which can not easily be placed along a single vector of progress.

7. The discovery of levels of knowledge of uncertain utility The above conclusions lead us to another topic: the use of the various, results of research in the history of economic knowledge. The ideas andl issues that come to the surface thanks to the tvoical work of the historian1 of knowledge (i.e. uchmnies) can lead to authentic intellectual discoveries: by extending and changing our intellectual horizons. However, no histori-;I ographical process is able to guarantee new 'discoveries'. Furthermore, the! fact that these discoveries may yield fruit, renew a culture, theory or econ-I omic modelling is neither obvious nor foreseeable. ! The unpredictability of historiographical 'discoveries' and of their appli-: cation to economic knowledge often underlies normative attitudes aimed at establishing an apn'm'hierarchy between the subjects to be studied: since! we ignore what and whether will yield resulu, it is said, we should concentrate our efforts on what is clearly more important. However, similar atti-' tudes are not justified within the conceptual framework discussed herein. Although historians obviously move towards what they perceive as being important, a hierarchy of subjects, conceived of as a norm of the discipline, would contradict the very nature of their task: historians would find thernselves in the odd position of accepting ex ante the criteria which they are supposed to discover expost through their research. For instance, how could anyone state that historical research into the theories of value and distribution should prevail over 'peripheral' ones, such as the monometallist or bimetallist doctrines? Frequently, the premise used as a base for rigid normative attitudes consists in reducing economic knowledge to economic science. We argue that the fruitfulness of the historian's 'discovery' of an economic idea can not be exclusively or mainly judged in terms of iu utility for (orthodox or 1 .

Uchronia and the histoly of eronomrc knowkdge


heretical) theorizing. According to the history of knowledge approach, any contribution that historical research can offer to any level of economic knowledge - and even to any other branch of knowledge -is at leastjust as important.

8. The relationships behveen the history of economic knowledge and other disciplines We have seen that historians of knowledge require more than just theoretical and economic insights in their research: they also need to use the results of political and economic historiography, history and sociology of culture and of sciences, anthropology, history of moral and political thought, etc. As a result, it is anything but surprising that there are shifts towards or away from the shores of the history of economic thought to and from other spheres. There are examples of research projects into the history of economic ideas developed by nonspecialists who contributed to the enrichment of the discipline by raising important questions and interpretation^.^" There are increasing links between those studying economic knowledge and those coming from other disciplines outside economics. A number of research projects have been promoted by historians of events and ideas, where the contribution of an expert from our field is called for and vice versa.36 Moreover, academic requirements for historians of economic ideas are - at least in Europe - increasingly similar to those demanded of historians, rather than of economists: volumes and monographs, not just articles, are in fact considered the standard masterpiece revealing their maturity and competence in research. Nor can we hide the fact that an exchange of ideas is often more fruitful and easier between historians of economic ideas and other historians, than among the former and econcmists. These remarks inevitably lead us to a conclusion: the current trend towards a 'thick' and 'contextual' history of economic knowledge has increased the lack of interest and understanding between historians and economists. This may be partly attributable to a conscious decision historians have made: in fact they no longer appear interested in the production of a package of knowledge that an economist can use. But it is also due to the well-known trend in mainstream economics towards a loss of interest for its own history, and aJorlimia loss of interest for culture as a whole. On the one hand, one can but acknowledge the autonomy of history of economic ideas as a discipline in its own right, but on the other there is no reason to rejoice at this loss of contact.

Nicoli Behnca and Mar60 E. L. Guidi


9. Condusion

The present article illustrates a shift of emphasis among historians of economic ideas concerning the subject of their research. In recent years, a growing number of specialists in this field have moved from research devoted principally to the history of economic rheoly to a broader interest for different levels of economic knowledge (sauoir), as well as for the intersection between these levels. We have shown that this attitude is generalized among historians of ideas, whatever the subjects they study. Moreover, it is connected with the belief that texts cannot be understood if they are not placed within their original intellectual and social context. In its turn, this assumption is part of a more general attitude - inspired by recent epistemological debate - according to which the history of ideas is not a continuous evolution 'from ignorance to skill', but is crossed by discontinuous clusters of discourses. However, historical research based o n the enlarged notion of economic knowledge has shown that discontinuity concerns not only languages and paradigms, but euoy passage from a level of knowledge to another. This element leads us to conclude that what has changed more radically in the attitude of historians of economic ideas is the notion of time: the evolution of knowledge is no longer considered unilinear. It is seen as a series of bifurcations, open to possible further developments, some of which have actually been pursued, whereas others have been neglected. This fact means that historians of ideas, in analysing some parts of this multilinear history, produce what we have called uchmnies, i.e. 'possible and non-arbitrary histories'. We d o not intend to assert that this is the only way of making the history of economic ideas. Nor d o we aim at demonstratingthe epistemological consistence of this attitude towards research. The more modest purpose of this article is to show some of the advantages and implications of an approach in terms of 'economic knowledge'. This is what we have illustrated in the last four sections: historians of economic knowledge believe that neither the choice of the tools for analysis, nor that of the subjects of research should be restricted to what is relevant for contemporary economic theory. They feel themselves free to choose the levels of economic knowledge to which they address their attention and the aspects of contemporary intellectual debate to which they aim at contributing by their research. They believe that historiographical contributions mostly addressing pretheoretical issues may prove as seminal as those which deal with theoretical problems. They feel at home in debating with economists as well as with philosophers or general historians. Lastly, they are not obsessed with the problem of what constitutes progress in economics: on the contrary, they

'


.

Uchronies and the history of qohomic knmukdge

work on a broader idea of 'growth of knowledge', intended as an increasing number of intersections between different levels and spheres of economic knowledge. The field of the history of economic knowledge is open and discontinuous. It also requires a series of skills that historians have to select according to the subject they study, and this may have a cost, calculated both as the effort and trouble required by skill learning, and as the risk of eclectic and unsatisfactory research results. However, we maintain that this is just what could give this discipline a distinct role in the intellectual world. There is no reason why the history of economic ideas should be only an ancylla theoriae. Historians who choose to make uchronies may be useful to contemporary theorizing in more unexpected ways, just because the selection of their subjects is not a pn'm. defined. Moreover, historians partial to what actually prevailed contribute to the passing down of those events in the culture of their time or vice versa, historians considering 'what might have been' facilitate the separation from traditional interpretations. This is the uncertain use of uchroniesgenerated by historians of economic ideas, for all those who may wish to listen to them. Universitd di Tonno and Univmitd di Tmmo

Notes This article originates from a paper the authors presented at two seminars (Florence, October 23rd. 1992: Parma. November 14th. 1992).We are erateful to those who interveoed for their commenm. We would like to express our thanks to professors A. Cara helli. N. De Vecchi and C . Nardorzi, who organized the first of the two conferences, and to proRssor M. Bianchini, who offered us a second opportunity to discuss our oaoer. Furthermore, we would like to thank D. Besomi. 1.L. Cardoso, I. Cuilhaumoo. D. Parisi, and the w o anonymous referees, for their suggestions, and F. Bagliano and D. Matthews for the improvement of our English style. The usual disclaimers apply. Although the paper has been worked in common by the authors, paragraphs 3.3.3.4, 4.5 and 6 have been written by N. Bellanca, and paragraphs 2, 3.1,3.2,7 and 8 by M. Guidi. 1 See also Screpanti 1992. The distinction between absolutism and relativism is drawn from Blaug 1985, who recently redefined these dyads as 'rational reconstruction w. historical reconsuuction', with reference to Rorty. See Blaug 1990. -. 2 This is generally the case with those who are interested in the problem of the continuist vs. discontinuist evolution of economic theory. 3 Bv the term 'knowledge'. we mean in this oarxr what the French call 'souoif (a body of knowledge), rather than 'connaiuance' (an amount of knowledge). The notion of knowledce is here distineuished from that of 'discourse'. which is defined as one of the prrfunu;l~trerHIBICI>TCSUIL f30111 the ~~,ul,it);)tiots of diflerent brattrlse, of knowledge o r diffrrrttt 1t:vcls withtn a hractlcvrlr of discourse

-

..

-

-

..

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Nicofi BeUnnca and Marco E. L. Guidi are what Foucault calls fmatinnr dirmrriver (discollrse-formations). We will refer to them by the term 'levels (of a branch of knowledge)'. 4 For instance, the mathematical foundation of the dynamics going back to Frirch. 'has the relevant led leconomistsl to redefine the obiect of analysis and to reorganire questions as a whole and specifically, attaching a new meaning to notions previously used' (Besomi 1991: 259). 5 Some historians of economic ideas have also disct~sredmethodological issues related to this textualcontextual turn. See Gislain 1991; Steiner 1991. 6 On the 'textual turn' in the historiography of ideas, see White (1987). 7 An example illusratin(: the c h a n ~ ein chis approach is offered by Mirowski (1989). .. where th; tendencyof economic rieox-y to choose physics as a model is seen as a result of the appeal . . the principle of conservation has on the more profound ingredients of Western culture. An example of long-term study in a non-western economic tradition is Baeck (1994). 8 Revolutions and redefinitions also take place in other fields of knowledge: they may either exclude from their spheres topics and issues traditionally included, but currently changed lo the point they no longer seem to belong to them, or they may develop another hierarchy of knowledge, within which political economy tends to play a hegemonic role. For examples of this kind of researches, see Steiner (1990); Tribe (1988). 9 For an interpretation of authors once considered to be mcrcantiliru in terms of neoMachiavellian poli~ical discourse, see Hont (1990). See also Hutchison (1988); Pesante (1996). 10 For instance, see Hilton (1988); GislainSteiner (1995). 11 See Collini-Winch-Burrow (1983). 12 For example, we are referring to the importance of 'manliness' in the discourse of Victorian authors, or to the Italian and French nineteenth-century political econon>y'sappeal to ' i n d u s q ' . See Goldman (1989): Romani (1988). 13 For instance see research in historical semantic on the definition of 'political economy' in the various countries: Permt (1992); Ugartc Blanco (1987). 14 See Le Van Lemesle (1986); Augello el a1 (1988); Barber (1988); Kadish-Tribe (1993). 15 See Coau (1960,1985). 16 See Kohli (1981); Breit (1987). An example of this current of studies is offered by Baia-Curioni (1988). 17 For an example. see Becattini (1983). 18 The two works which triggered this revision are Winch (1978); Haakonssen (1981). 19 See Geuna-Pesante (1992). 20 See Teichgraeber (1987). 21 See Asso (1990). 22 'The formulation of the ratio between prices and the circulating mass of money can be made through the same words - or through synonymous words - and be obtained through the same reasoning; nevertheless, it is nor identical, from an enunciative viewpoint, in Gresham or Locke, and in the marginalist econorniss of the nineteenth century; the systems which forms the objects and concepts is not the same in one case as in the other. Therefore, we should distinguish between linguistic onolqgy (or trans latabiliry), logrcal idmlily (or equivalence) and muncioliuc hmnogmciry'. 23 As an example of 'rational reconstruction', see Donzelli (1986). 24 For instance see Hirschman's analysis of the shifting notions of 'interest' in the eighteenth cenmry. See Hirschman (1977). 25 See Carabelli (1988); O'Donnell (1989).

I

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Urhmnzes a n d ihc hrrlory oJe&nomic knowledge 26 For this approach, see De Vecchi (1990). ~ i v e nby Elie Halevy's 27 An examole of this rniruse of the notion of 'school' cl~aybe .. employment of the notion of 'utilitarian school' to include both utilitarian philoso phers such as Bentham and Mill and classical e c o n o n ~ i s usuch as Smith and Ricardo. The question if Ricardo was o r not a n udlitarian is still open. However, it is commonly accepted that Adam Smith was not utilitarian. See Halivy (1995). 28 See Steiger (1971); Hicks-Weber (1973); Hansson (1982). 29 See Coau (1988). focusinr! o n national styles and . . Several collective research proiecu " traditions in political economy are underway. Amongst others see Allnodovar (1990); Faccarello d nL (1992). O n the Scottish tradition see Skinner (1990). 30 'If I say that Bismarck's decision was the cause of the war of 18%. that the victory a t Marathon saved the Greek civilization. I mean that, without the chancellor's decision, tllr war h011111 1 1 0 1 break 0111 (or at 1 e ~ sitt ~ u t l l l 1l01 l l,ne;tk ~ 8 at t tllis !n#,alrllt).2nd that the I'en,i.w v a ~ ~ q t ~ ~ swould l ~ c r shindrr thr (;reek ' ~ n ~ r a r l c11) ' bulb case\, tllr cffcct~vc c:tusalit) c : onl) ~ I x ~ l ? I i ~h) ~ cthe ~ l < 'mq~;ir~c>za 3' 1 l~tmihlccwnts b . ' ? ttts~

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!+I ll~,tc,rlanr r1.k tc, i~t,lr,verirll tlwir (-~1>1311.110ry .+l~ilit),it I I ~ c ) a v r ~ d(ut~nte!-f:tcttt:al arcun>rnta~tot,s. st#chas 'il A wolrld I* v d l ~ lt. h r ~ B t aottlcl exi5l' ''I'lnr telnpwtion I,, regard earlier evenu as more important than later ones in historical explanations derives from a failure to consider whnl might have hopprncd given the empirical facu present a t each stage. Take the simple sequence X I + X? -t XJ + X,, and suppose that in the world XI, X2. X:,, and XI actually did occur. Let us also suppose that once XP occurs, XI h a a very high probability of occurring. It could still be the case that given X,, the most likely future wot~ldbe something other than X, + X, + X,. But X, actually occurred. In such a sequence it would be wrong to claim that of all the evenu in the chain, XI had the greatest causal importance. Because many historians refuse to consider counterfactual trajectories of evenu, they therefore treat the 'origins' of dz/nrtn sequences as most important by default' (Wright-ImvineSober 1992: 161-2). We believe that this point has a general mlidity. If historians analyse only the passages XI to Xr, the causal chair, seems to them a strong and necessary one. Vice versa, if, following Aron, they 'consider what might have happened', then they stress the role of passage XI.Without this passage, X, would not happen. However, it was all hot certain that XI should imply Xp.'Therefore, the reference to alternative possible histories is crucial to the understanding of what really happened. 32 Should we say that this procedure is a n arbitrary onc? We argue that it is not, p r o vided [ha( the following conditions are respected: 1 the arguments presented by the hirtorian are bared on textual and documentary evidence; 2 the scientific community considers these arguments as a persuasive reading, o r it accepts to question them with reference to the same o r new textual and documentary evidence. For instance, Sraffa's (L951), Hollander's (1989) and Porn's (1986) interpretations of Ricardo's system differ, hut no hirtorian has questioned their legitimacy. 33 An outstanding example which illustrates the case in point, refers to Giomnni Gentile: in a paper written in 1899, he carried out a 'reconstruction' of Marx's philosophy. His insight led him to identi* a number of 'soorces' Marx had drawn from, highlighting the possible crossways which had been met. A very brief early manuscript, the Thuu on F d h , was used by him to a r p e that Marx could have developed a subjectivist metaphysical approach instead of a n objectivist determinist one,

Nicoli Bellanca and Mano I?. I.. Guidi


such as both the published texu and the prevailing interpretations of the time suggested. In the 1920s and 1930s thousands of unpublished pages of both the earlier and later Man substantiated Gentile's interpretation turning it into a respectable urhmnie. 34 We are clearly considering the functional roles. Nothing changes if in Srafla's care the two roles are played by the one scholar. 35 See Cremaschi (1984). 36 See Aa. Vv. (1990); Capra (1990).

References Aa. Vv. (1990) Fronccsco F m r n e il ruo mpo. Proceedings of the Conference held in Palermo, 27-30 October 1988. Rome: Bancaria Ed. Almodovar, A. (ed.) (1990) Esludos sobn o $momenfa econimim m PorlugaL Porto: Faculdade de Economia, Universidade do Porto. Aron, R. (1948) lnfmducfion i2 la philosophie de l'hirloire. Errrri sur k.7 limilcs de l'djecfiuiti hufrmgue, 2nd ed". Paris: Gallimard. Asso. P. F. (1990) Thc Eronomirf behind lhe Model: The Keynesian /?~o/ulion in Hirlo~icalPerr/xrfr,r Rome: Enle per gli s181d~ monrun, bancan e firnwiari 1.uigi Klnatrdi. Aatgello. Y . M..Rxanchint. M.. Cioli. (:. and Roxgn. I?( r A ) (19dB) 11 cnflrdrr d , rrunumzn @lrrtm tn lrolto. 1.0 dr//uzoar dl unu d~craplmn'co\bnfn'(l75&1900,. Milan: Angcli. Raerk, 1.. (1'394) Th. Mnhlmaneon ?iod,rwn in liunamtr '77hmrghf. I n n d o , ~ :K