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Like a phantom ocean beating upon the shores of life in successive waves of ..... Hence "It. Stinks" expresses maximum rejection or repulsion' (Ong, 1967: 117).
Foundations of Management Knowledge: Assumptions and Limitations Paper number 01/04

Robert Chia University of Exeter

Abstract Modern management knowledge relies overwhelmingly on the written word and it’s disseminated through print. Writing in general and alphabetic writing in particular facilitated the development of abstract thinking and the linear logic necessary for the systematic framing of individual activities into purposeful functions. In so doing it precipitated the necessary future goal-orientation required for a rudimentary form of organization and management to emerge. With the invention of typography the printed word reached far beyond the spatial confines of a particular established social order enabling the aspirations, cultural attitudes and lifestyles of those both far and near, and across time, to be influenced and shaped according to the priorities of modernity. Printing thus freed thought and aspirations from the shackles of local knowledge and inspired a visual emphasis that led to the advent of the Enlightenment with its obsession with rational analysis, systematic empiricism, representationalism and causal determinism. These four epistemological imperatives continue to underpin the foundations of management knowledge.

School of Business and Economics Streatham Court, Rennes Drive Exeter EX4 4PU Tel: +44 1392 263241 Email: [email protected]

ISSN No: 1473 2939

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Introduction 'We inherit an observational order, namely types of things which we do in fact discriminate; and we inherit a conceptual order, namely a rough system of ideas in terms of which we do in fact interpret….Observational discrimination is not dictated by the impartial facts. It selects and discards, and what it retains is rearranged in a subjective order of prominence'

A. N. Whitehead Adventures of Ideas (1933: 183-184)

The origins of management knowledge lie in the background of a dim consciousness slowly but almost inexorably sapping the base of some established cliff of instinctual habit. Like a phantom ocean beating upon the shores of life in successive waves of specialization, evolution as a whole is characterised by a net increase in the rate at which expandable energy is harnessed and used in organic maintenance (Sahlins, 1960). Living things, especially humans, have an inherent tendency to increase their 'thermodynamic accomplishment': that is, their capacity to trap and utilise such forms of energy to raise their level of existence from lower to higher forms. This is what makes 'a crab superior to an amoeba, a goldfish to a crab, a mouse to a goldfish and a man to a mouse' (Sahlins, 1960: 21). Evolution is, thus, an interminable process that works from a start of more or less randomness towards increasing coherence, and that moves from amorphousness towards definiteness, from fumbling trail-and-errors to purposeful decision. Humans, in particular, evolve not by physical changes in our bodies but by advances in our mindsets and by our expanding capacity for stockpiling knowledge. Thus, the cultivated impulse to impose some systematic order and coherence on our otherwise amorphous flux of lived experience provides the first clues to the development of the kind of problem-solving orientation that we have come to associate so much with effective management practice. Our almost insatiable need for differentiating and fixing parts of experience, for situational clarification, and causal attribution, as well as the ongoing attempt to successfully predict future courses of events, stems from what McArthur (1986: 32) calls our primordial ‘taxonomic urge’. It is by now a well-documented fact that the ability to ask questions relating to these key domain of concerns is what accounts for the impressive artefacts of modern civilisation and underpins almost all of its outstanding discoveries and achievements particularly over the last two thousand five hundred years. What is less well appreciated is the fact that the basic principles and assumptions of modern management, formulated and developed within the context of contemporary concerns

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and preoccupations, are inextricably linked to these wider–ranging survivalist patterns of thought.

The history of management thought is, therefore, also the history of how humans have learned to develop and operate systems of recording, reference, information retrieval and methods of analyses that are increasingly more and more abstract and external to the brain. This capacity for externalising, objectifying and systematizing thought in order to aid comprehension and control is a central feature of mankind's rise into prominence over the other species. It is what underpins the more modern economicadministrative practice of management. Managing, in its most fundamental existential sense, is, therefore, the ongoing refinement of methods, means and mechanisms for fixing, portioning, externalising and objectifying aspects of our lived experiences in order to render them more amenable to manipulation and control, and to thereby attain a desired level of predictability in affairs of the world. Understood thus, management and organization are, in effect, reality-constituting and world-making activities intrinsic to the survivalist instincts of the human species and not just a specialised technique applicable to economic-administrative activities designed to achieve profits, growth, market share, or global dominance in the world of affairs.

The purpose of this chapter is to trace the foundational roots of modern management knowledge and to relocate their origins in the broader civilisational processes that have taken place especially over the last five millennia. In particular, it will be shown that

contemporary

management

knowledge

owes

much

to

three

major

transformational events occurring in the history of Western civilisation, namely; the invention of writing; the alphabetization of the world beginning some three thousand years ago; and the rapid rise of the printed word from the latter half of the fifteenth century. These three civilisational milestones have irretrievably changed the course of human history in that they have precipitated the necessary asymmetries in our senseratios such that visual knowledge have come to predominate over all the other senses. Such an intellectual pre-disposition has, in turn, fundamentally shaped contemporary attitudes towards management and its priorities and practices. Indeed, it has instilled a set of instinctive 'readinesses' (Vickers, 1965: 67) amongst management academics and practitioners to construe the vague, the instinctive, the tacit and the contextual to be perennial 'problems' that need to be overcome in the establishment of management 4

knowledge. This metaphysical preference for visibility, clarity and precision, for the individual, the explicit, the articulate and the expressible owes much to the formative influences that language, and in particular the alphabetic system, has had on our thought processes. It is argued here that without such a historical appreciation of the material events in human history and their effects on contemporary modes of thought, the foundational principles of modern management knowledge and, more importantly, their hidden preferences and limitations cannot be fully appreciated. This chapter seeks to make a small contribution towards this deeper understanding of the foundational forces shaping the establishment of management knowledge and to reframing it in terms of the wider historical-shaping of modern civilisation.

Material Foundations: Externalising, Representing, and Containerising According to popular estimates, the species Homo has been in existence for some two million years yet it may not have become properly sapiens up until a mere 100,000 years ago. Civilisation, a dynamic complex of collective purposeful practices including especially organised agriculture, centralised authority, socially coherent communities and some kind of established system of communication, therefore, make up only a very small percentage of the much lengthier process of human evolution. For much of this early civilising period, there were little or no external systems of reference to speak of and hence to systematically organize collective effort. The human brain, with its erratic memory, was the only available apparatus for knowing, referring, recording and problem-solving. As a consequence, learning and the capacity for adaptation was contingent and limited and survival always a question.

Somewhere in this early period of human evolution, however, tool making emerged as the first indications of the attempt to externalise thought and to exert some kind of proactive influence on our surroundings. Tools are prosthetic devices that help 'extend' human influence across space by substituting an artificial part for a human limb, an eye or a tooth. Tongs, for instance, may be used in inhospitable circumstances such as a fire in place of our hands which are frail and hence unable to deal with the intense heat a fire generates. Tools are, therefore, technologies of representation in that they stand for or represent a part of the human body. Such 'real' tools created have, in turn, served as models and templates for the tools of the mind as Richard Gregory (1981) so vividly points out. Tools produced for effective use in 5

dealing with physical nature inspired a parallel urge to create similar efficiencysaving tools of the mind. Thus, 'Just as long ago, we learned to cut up the carcasses of animals and name the varieties of plants, just as we acquired the ability to make shapes out of pieces of skin sewn together, so we transposed "ideas" from the physical world and "cut up" and "stitched together" parallel artefacts inside our heads, creating mental dissections, mental classifications, mental frames and mental bags or containers' (McArthur, 1986: 4). It is this impulse which has led to the eventual development of language and systems of representation over five thousand years ago.

Language and systems of representation are convenient containers or tools for thought. Thus, just as a box, cupboard, or goblet is a tool of the world, a 'noun' is a tool of the mind in that it 'contains' an enormous number of other words and images that are immediately brought to mind by its usage. The word 'church' for instance is a powerful container in that it invokes a rich variety of thoughts and images with its use. Nouns facilitate habituation and help to orient us in particular ways by narrowing semantic connections and hence the range of choices available for conception and action. Moreover, conventionalised language as a tool of communication, 'by providing a stable background in which human activity may proceed with a minimum of decision-making…frees energy…(and) opens up a foreground for deliberation and innovation' (Berger and Luckmann, 1966: 71). Language and systems of representation are thus routinising devices that help to conventionalise meaning and hence establish certain preferred connections. Thus, the image of a skull almost immediately evokes a sense of danger and death. But even in the basic elements of language as Saussure (1966) argued, the meaning of a word does not depend upon a direct correspondence with a part of concrete reality. Instead the meanings of words are arbitrary but conventionally established. Thus the word 'tree' evokes almost instinctively an image of a tree even though there is no necessary resemblance or connection between the word 'tree' and the physical object in the woods1. It is through this ongoing process of languaging (i.e., the routine connecting of a word/sound with an object visualised or a phenomenon experienced) that social reality is forged and sustained. Thus, the social order and the seemingly organized character of modern societies that we find so familiar and reassuring are human products, or human

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productions made possible by language and systems of objectification and representation that belie a certain precariousness and uncertainty in the human condition. They have to be constantly 'managed', updated and adjusted to retain their legitimacy and coherence. This is something that has been going for the best part of the last 30,000 years.

Some 30,000 years ago the Cro-Magnon peoples of Europe began, for the first time ever known, to produce on rock surfaces, figures and shapes that resembled other shapes that lived and moved in the real world. As far as we are able to ascertain, they were the first representations of actual living things in which three-dimensional moving creatures were translated into static two-dimensional outlines. In a basic sense, the Cro-Magnon peoples were the original producers of the containers of knowledge as we understand it today. These rudimentary pictograms' or 'writings' have helped create what the philosopher of science Karl Popper (Popper, 1987: 58-74) calls 'World 3'. World 1, for Popper is the world of material effects: storms, heat, cold, sticks, stones, teeth, claws etc - the flesh and bone of 'reality'. World 2 describe our inner landscape of images, sounds and unspoken words. It is the mindscape within which our thoughts and ideas are registered and processed. World 3, on the other hand is the cumulative 'stockpile' of the richest fruits of human brainpower. It represents the outcome of our collective attempts at 'externalising' thought and containerising them into more permanent forms of register by embedding them in physical inscriptions. It makes libraries, databanks, art, science, and social institutions far and away more important than the knowledge of any single individual at any point in time. Such externalised forms of thought constitute the basis of what we now call 'information'. It makes of it a 'commodity' suited for handling, assembling, manipulating and transferring either from one form to another or from one point to another. This is how much of contemporary management knowledge is basically perceived. However, the transformation of systems of representation from the crude shapes etched out on rock surfaces in caves to the complexity and sophistication of modern forms of written knowledge and information-storage has been a long and tedious journey. It is a story of the emergence and refinement of tallying, recording, 1

This is less true for the Chinese language where the written character for 'tree' does bear a resemblance to the physical object. This is because, unlike the alphabetic system which is an abstract

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referring and then classical writing as aide memoirs, supplementary and external to the brain. This attempted externalising of memory may take a simple form such as the notched sticks adopted by the Maoris for aiding the process of story-telling or the rosary bead used for jogging the memory of the Catholic devotee. Alternatively, it may take the form of modern computers the most modest of which has an enormous capacity for data storage and retrieval and which now threatens to even render obsolete the printed word. Bill Gates, the founding Chairman of Microsoft for instance, suggests that with the new developments in computers, it will very soon be possible to purchase electronic books on the Web and to store a personal library of some 34,000 books in an ordinary PC. If this materialises, electronic books are likely to replace paper and print as the dominant form of information storage. These developments form a part of the ongoing search for the creation of more and more sophisticated and dependable tools to assist our rather feeble and erratic human memories and to help extend our influence over our environment. Rudimentary devices, such as the tally sticks, however, unlike the printed word or computerised information storage, have a rather limited informational value. They, cannot be 'read' as such for separate existing information. Instead they are simple memory joggers and reflect the beginnings of this interminable attempt to externalise and compactify data in such a way as to assist in structuring, regularising and 'managing' social existence. Tallying devices remain very much part of an oral tradition and continue to be used even in modern times by the less literate peoples particularly in Africa and the East Asian regions. Like the 'talking drums'2 which help amplify voice in predominantly oral cultures and hence aid communication over large distances, tallying devices help retain memory over longer stretches of time. They are management tools in the most rudimentary sense of the word.

In the mid-West and in China, however, written inscriptions as a system of recording and referral took off some five thousand years ago each very much in its own ways. As systems of representation that facilitated communication and control, and hence enabled an economising of effort, writing ranks as perhaps the most important invention ever. Christopher Evans, in a panoramic survey of the impact of computers writes in The Mighty Micro (1979: 104):

language, Chinese characters are basically ideographic in nature. 2 For a fascinating discussion of this feature of African 'talking drums', see Ong (1977) pp. 92-102. 8

'The invention of writing was the most revolutionary of all human inventions, for in one great blow it severed the chains which tied an individual and his limited culture to a finite region of space, to a restricted slice of time. Through the act of writing, one human being could express ideas or facts which were communicated to another individual. These facts could then remain as a permanent record after the originator had forgotten them or had passed away into dust. The significance of permanent data storage is the principal and perhaps the sole reason why Man is so absolutely the dominant creature of the planet. All non-human animals carry their knowledge and experience with them when they die. Man can preserve the richest fruits of his brainpower, and stockpile them indefinitely for his descendants to feed on' In developing the capacity for such recording and transmission of knowledge and experience humans have ceased to be slaves of transience. As McArthur (1986) puts it succinctly, it is the intellectual equivalent of 'storing up the harvest for later consumption' (p. 7).

Writing as a Generic Tool of Management Writing is essentially a generic system of representational ordering that developed differently in different locations and was contingent upon the means available at each geographical site. Thus, the clay-and-cuneiform technology developed by the Sumerians was contingent upon the abundance of soft argillic mud found in the irrigation ditches which could be easily shaped, flattened and used as a writing surface whilst the reed Papyrus cyperus was extensively used by the Egyptians to produce a form of pictorial writing that we now know as 'hieroglyphs'. Similarly, in China, tortoise shells and bamboo plates and then subsequently a silk-based surface inspired the kind of ideographic writings we commonly associate with Chinese writings. Despite their vast differences, however, writing is a serial phenomenon and the means we employ for arranging information such as numbers and letters can only be used because they are basically invariant series, however much we shuffle them about. Moreover, there are common universal features present in all forms of writing. All writings involve practices of 'listing, display, hierarchy of arrangement, edge and margin, sectioning, spacing, contrasts' (McArthur, 1986: 23) whatever their contingent origins. These practices provide the foundations for all forms of modern knowledge including especially management knowledge. They underpin the concerns and preoccupations of that economic-administrative activity that we call management.

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What these micro-organizing practices, intrinsic to all languages, are, in turn, dependent upon is the initial act of division and separation.

Division breaks up phenomenal experiences into manageable parts so that each piece can be dealt with effectively and in isolation. Efficiency is one major consequence of this method of dealing with the world. Thus, the specialization that Adam Smith, in his Wealth of Nations, observed in the pin-making factory is one generalised outcome of this process of division. Division, however, is not just about the benefits of the division of labour. It is a far more basic reality-constituting activity involving an active effort of separating and dividing: a labour of division. The function of division is thus not so much about the portioning out of a fixed quantum of work but about making 'the invisible visible, to sort out what's confused' (Cooper, 1998: 164) or entangled. Division makes what is amorphous and unclear into tidy visible categories so that they can be dealt with expediently and efficiently. This is the function of 'vision' in di-vision. It is, as Whitehead (1929) astutely observed, associated with the ontological act of 'decision-making' and the establishing of an observational and a conceptual order3. Our established forms of knowledge, he writes, 'is formed by the meeting of two orders of experience. One order is constituted by the direct, immediate discrimination of particular observations. The other order is constituted by our general way of conceiving the Universe' (Whitehead, 1933: 183). These two orders are shaped by an 'unconscious metaphysics' which provides the basis for legitimising contemporary forms of knowledge, including especially management knowledge. Thus, just as management knowledge, in its economic-administrative sense presupposes and hence begins with the division of labour, the foundations of management knowledge presupposes and hence begins with the labour of division. This is especially the case with written inscriptions. In this sense writing is a metamanagement process.

Writing, is firstly and fundamentally, a dividing and separating activity. It is a technology that restructures thought in a fundamental way because once established it has a tendency to interact with all sorts of social structures and practices in a bewildering variety of ways. Stock's (1983) analysis of the effects of literacy in Western Europe in the eleventh and twelfth centuries shows that the spread of the 3

For a discussion of this ontological view of 'decision-making', see Chia (1994) 10

written word affected marketing and manufacturing, agriculture and stock-raising activities, religious life and thought, family structures, social mobility and so on in deep and fundamental ways. Fundamentally, writing is diaeretic (Ong, 1986). It divides and distances all sorts of things in all sorts of ways. Firstly, it separates the knower from the known. It makes knowledge a 'commodity' separate and distinct from the knower. All writing systems do this but the alphabetic system in particular does this most since it thoroughly dissolves individual sounds into spatial equivalents (i.e., into alphabetic characters) before reconstituting them phonetically. Secondly, writing 'distances the word from the sound, reducing oral-aural evanescence to the seeming quiescence of visual space' (Ong, 1986: 39). Thirdly, writing distances the author from the reader, both in time and space. It is therefore possible to read a book written several centuries ago or by someone several thousand miles away. Fourthly, writing isolates and distances words from the contexts within which they are spoken or used. Spoken words, in particular, always take place within a social context which extends far beyond the verbal and the articulated. By contrast, the immediate context of written words are simply other words. Fifthly, writing enforces a certain degree of verbal precision and apartness which is not generally experienced in oral cultures. In some homogeneous oral cultures for instance sentences are hardly ever completed because it is assumed that the listener, being part of an established community, is able to comprehend what is implied and unspoken. In literate cultures, however, written words are made to bear the burden of meaning within themselves. Hence they develop more defined or bounded meanings than in speech. Sixthly, writing linearizes thought. It separates the past, the present and the future. By freezing verbalizations, writing can refer either to states of affairs no longer effectively imaginable or alternatively to states of affairs not yet imaginable. Seventhly, and of key importance to our study here, writing separates 'administration' from other social activities. Administration refers to the overseeing, organizing and managing of a social collectivity in a more or less abstractly structured fashion. It comes into being with the development of written accounts, documents and records. As Goody (1986) points out, ‘the desk and the bureau’ (p. 90) are critical to Weber’s concept of bureaucracy. Likewise Green (1981) argues that the emergence of large-scaled, centralized bureaucratic institutions is a consequence of the rise of writing which 'enabled the administration to grow and, through written liability, to maintain direct authority over even the lowest levels of personnel and clientele' (Green, 1981: 367). Eightly, writing facilitated the separation 11

of logic from rhetoric. For Ong (1986), the invention of logic is inextricably tied 'to the completely vocalic phonetic alphabet and the intensive analytic activity which such an alphabet demands of its inventors' (p. 41). The Aristotelian logic which dominates contemporary thought is very much a product of the mental discipline associated with the use of the alphabetic system. Ninethly, writing separates academic learning from wisdom. Although writing makes possible the conveyance of highly abstract thought structures, by committing wise sayings to textual forms they 'denature' wisdom and render them emptied of their insights. It is this 'dumbing down' process created by writing which led T.S.Elliot to lament in The Rock: ' Where is the Life we have lost in living Where is the wisdom we have lost in knowledge Where is the knowledge we have lost in information? T. S. Eliot The Rock (1934)

Modern knowledge, including especially what passes for management knowledge is best exemplified by the frequently held criticism of the Accountant who 'knows the price of everything and the value of nothing'.

But the most crucial of all the separations effect by the invention of writing is the separation of being from time. By this is meant that the most crucial and momentous effect of writing is the spatial and temporal fixing of being, identity and presence from their temporal emergence. Time is, henceforth not incorporated into the formation of identities and attributes but regarded as an independent variable along which beings move. Becoming is thus regarded merely as the passage of being and not the ontological basis from which being arises. This dividing and separating tendency of writing, and especially alphabetic writing, elevated a logic of identity and presence. It also precipitated a visually-based form of knowledge alien to pre-literate cultures.

Alphabetization and Typography: The Rise of Visual Knowledge Any understanding of Western cultural evolution and change is impossible without a prior appreciation of the fundamental changes in sense-ratios, and hence attitudes of observational discrimination, brought about by the invention of the alphabet and the rapid spread of the printed word. Together, they constitute the defining moments 12

shaping the very ground of possibility for the rise of the Cartesian/Newtonian worldview which has lasted till the early half of the last century. Alphabets transformed acoustic sound into visual terms and by so doing gave ‘the barbarian or tribal man an eye for an ear’ (McLuhan, 1967: 26). The interiorization of the technology of phonetic alphabet ‘delivered’ man (sic) from the magical acoustic world to a world dominated by vision and abstract visual space. As Carothers (1959) points out: 'When words are written, they become, of course, a part of the visual world. Like most of the elements of the visual world, they become static things and lose, as such, the dynamism which is so characteristic of the auditory world' (Carothers, 1959: 311). The tonal inflections and emotional emphases accompanying the spoken word are inevitably lost in the translation into written form4. The sound heard and the word seen are distinctly different experiences. In the former, like listening to a continuous melody, the individual sounds melt into one another and there are no clear distinctions separating each note of the music. On the other hand, the phonetically-based alphabet clearly delineates one syllable from another, one word from another, and one sentence from another, and each are treated as distinct entities to be manipulated and dealt with in isolation. In The Presence of the Word, Walter Ong analyses the shift from aural to visual knowing and shows how it is inextricably tied to educational procedures and to the transfer of verbalization from its initial oral-aural economy of sound 'to a more and more silent and spatialized economy of alphabetic writing'. Moreover, the introduction of printing and the idea of the moveable alphabetic type seemed to suggest that words could be assembled out of pre-existent parts 'like houses out of bricks' (Ong, 1977: 126). The way visualism as the basis for knowledge developed proceeded by a series of 'nonce inventions'. Thus, the invention of the alphabet, the development of printing from the idea of a moveable alphabetic type, and a mathematically implemented science were 'all major steps on the road to modern visualism' (Ong, 1977: 128). What is distinctive about this shift in sense-ratios from the aural to the visual is that it led to the vocalization of visual discrimination at a level far more precise and elaborate than primitive man ever achieved. It is true that

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This is much less the case in the Chinese language which is ideographic in character and which allows for tonal inflections in its written form. 13

primitive man had keen eyes and in many ways observed more acutely and accurately than does modern man, but: 'he cannot expatiate on them or describe or analyse accurately to any appreciable extent. He may have a hundred different words for different kinds of snow or camel and no generic word - a quite ordinary lexical situation…But, however specific his visual and other perceptions and however rich his nomenclature, early man has no science of elk or salmon or camels or snow….despite his acute powers of observation, many specific things a scientist needs to observe he has not observed' (Ong, 1977: 129). This shift to vocalising visual observation dramatically affected the secondary use of the senses. McLuhan (1967: 8) suggests that it is this shift in sense-ratios from an overwhelming reliance on mouth and ear to hand and eye that has generated the abstractive and detached attitude necessary for precipitating the opening up of otherwise closed pre-literate societies. Invented some three thousand years ago by the Phoenicians and appropriated and modified by the Greeks some three centuries later, alphabetic writing paved the way for the de-tribalizing of ancient Greece and its subsequent rise into prominence in the first millennium BC. Through the newly-systematized alphabetic script, the Greeks created, from the fifth and fourth century BC, one of the richest literature of all times, including poetry, drama, epics, history and philosophy. So much so that we have today inherited much of this literature and wisdom, just as we have inherited the writing system in which it was recorded. The advantage of the alphabetic system over previous forms of scribal writing lay in its startling economy and flexibility of use in communication: as an achievement it has often been compared to the invention of the wheel and the domestication of the horse. Henceforth, instead of having to deal with hundreds of distinct pictograms (picture signs), ideograms (idea signs) and logograms (word signs), between twenty and thirty quasi-phonetic symbols could now be used to portray an infinity of words and hence afford a much wider variety of expressions. This breakthrough in streamlining an otherwise unwieldy mess of previously disorderly signs gave language an overall orderly shape and made it much more manageable than before. It eventually led to the almost obsessive labelling, classification and thematization of material and social phenomena so as to create order and predictability in an otherwise amorphous and fluxing lifeworld. The alphabet is, as McLuhan (1967) puts it, ‘an aggressive and militant absorber and transformer of cultures’ (p. 48). It inspired the abstraction, isolation, objectification 14

and linearizing of phenomena for the purpose of analysis, and by reducing all our senses into visual and pictorial or enclosed space, precipitated the rise of the Euclidean sensibility which has dominated our thought processes for over two thousand years.

In around the year 1447, Johannes Gutenberg of Mainz became the first in the West to mechanize printing. Initially, printing appeared to complement the manuscript writing which was increasingly in demand by the upper and middle classes and which the monastic scribes became increasingly unable to cope with. Soon, however, like the cottage industries of more recent times, the slow and laborious process of producing the written word gave way to printing. This marked a significant moment in the modification of the visual/tactile/audible sense-ratios that had first been rendered apart by the introduction of the alphabet. For whilst manuscript culture remains effectively conversational in that ‘the writer and his audience are physically related by the form of publication as performance’ (McLuhan, 1967: 84), the print culture created the distinction between authors and the consuming public. The invention of typography exponentially ‘extended the new visual stress of applied knowledge, providing the first uniformly repeatable commodity, the first assembly-line, and the first mass-production’ (McLuhan, 1967: 124). Typography as the first mechanized handicraft altered the use of language and utterance as a means of tactile exploration and perceptual shaping (i.e., uttering as ‘outering’) to a portable commodity distinct from the producer. Whilst scribal culture remained essentially tied to a vocal culture that was intent on throwing light on the world through the manuscript form, typography threw light on the surface print itself. This subtle shift in focus from 'interiority' to 'surface' observations has been critically illuminated by Ong's (1967, 1977) excellent analyses of the emergence of visualism as the basis for modern knowledge.

According to Ong, it is possible to draw a continuum of senses from 'touch' at one end to sight' at the other, with 'taste', 'smell', and 'hearing' reflecting increasing degrees of distancing. Thus, touch emphasises a propinquity of the sense organ to the source of stimulus as does taste. Both touch and taste are intimate but lack clear definition. Smell, on the other hand, can only be experienced in terms of limited localised experience. It suggests 'presences or absences…and is connected with the 15

attractiveness or repulsiveness of bodies…smell is a come-or-go signal. Hence "It Stinks" expresses maximum rejection or repulsion' (Ong, 1967: 117). Sight, however, is possible over large distances hence it invites greater abstraction. But sight unlike hearing, for instance, deals only with surfaces and exteriorities. Sight gives precision but lacks intimacy. It is effective only at a distance. As Ong writes: 'Sight presents surfaces (it is keyed to reflected light; light coming directly from its source, such as fire, an electric lamp, the sun, rather dazzles and blinds us)….To discover…things by sight we should have to open what we examine, making the inside outside, destroying its interiority as such' (Ong, 1967: 118) However, a drift towards visual explanation is inseparable from any economy of explanation since to explain is effectively to 'lay out flat on a surface'; to 'open up' and make evident what is obscured or hidden. Explanation entails forcible externalising of an otherwise hidden interior. Explanation, however, is the quintessential modus operandi of modern science. For this reason, we witness more and more today the attempt to reduce everything supplied by the other senses - touch, taste, smell and sound - to charts and tables or other measurement that can be laid out and visually assimilated. Even our everyday language is infused by visual metaphors. Thus, 'I see what you mean'; 'give a focus to'; 'obtain an insight'; 'throw light on'; illuminate; 'speculate'; 'vision'; 'elucidate' etc., are all examples of the extent with which the language of vision has become so much infused into our everyday language. The visual is, thus, the area most exploited by science. Reduction to spatial form fixes everything including sound. Interestingly, reduction of sensory data on the opposite direction (i.e., from visual to touch or sound say) is virtually non-existent. This is an indication of the extent of the domination of visually-based knowledge in contemporary thought. Such a visually-dominated mode of comprehension, however, gives rise to a problem that plagues us because we intuitively realise that sight or vision is a limited analogue for intelligence since sight is keyed primarily to surfaces. We are able to vaguely recognise the existence of more subtle forms of knowing which are not visually accessible. Thus: 'To say that knowing means being able to explain impoverishes knowing. Explanation is invaluable, but any mere explanation or explication is pretty thin stuff compared either with actuality or with understanding' (Ong, 1977: 123)

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Moreover, intellectual knowledge derived from vision is fragmenting. Apartness is a central feature of this form of knowing. We are able to identify what a thing is by cutting it off from other things. Definition, distinctness, clarity and precision are key properties of visual knowledge. Whatness is its essence. More importantly, however, vision freezes and kills. For some knowledge, however, precision, distinctness and clarity is irrelevant or even devastating. When understanding more than explanation is sought the surface-bound knowledge generated by sight and vision is grossly inadequate. Visual knowledge, as Ong (1977) maintains: 'is at best only an adjunct of, never a basis for, interpersonal knowledge and understanding. When a married couple or even a group of friends try to base their understanding of one another on explanation, on a knowledge which has definition, distinctness, precision, the bond is headed for disaster. The drive to symbolize intellection and understanding by vision…corresponds to the drive to objectify knowledge, to make it into something which is clearly thing-like, nonsubjective, yielding meaning not in depth but off of surface, meaning which can be spread out, ex-plained' (Ong, 1977: 140) Visual knowledge generates 'thing-like' thinking. In other words it promotes a tendency to reify experience and to treat personal encounters as inert and object-like.

Sound, on the other hand better represents a 'world of dynamism, action and being-intime….it complements both vision and touch more complexly and richly than either' (Ong, 1977: 136). Unlike sight, sound reveals interiors without the necessity of physical invasion. Thus, we may tap a wall to find out if it is hollow or solid or ring a silver-coloured coin to discover whether it is perhaps lead inside. Sound reveals interiors because 'its nature is determined by interior relationships. The sound of a violin is determined by the interior structure of its strings, of its bridge, and of the wood in its sound-board, by the shape of its interior cavity in the body of the violin, and other interior conditions. Filled with concrete or water, the violin would sound different' (Ong, 1967: 117-118). Because of this distinction between sight and sound, knowledge of things (what Martin Buber calls the world of "it") is more easily assimilable to knowledge by sight whilst knowledge of persons (what Buber calls the world of "I-Thou") is more easily assimilable to knowledge by hearing. Yet our dominant forms of knowledge remain overwhelmingly visually-inspired. This has been a clear (another visual metaphor!) consequence of the alphabetization of the world and its refinement through a culture of print. Despite these setbacks, however, it 17

is clear that the astonishing progress achieved by the West over the last three thousand years owes much to the developments that have taken place in human communication. Without the written word, communication would have had to be passed on ‘by word of mouth’ thereby incurring inevitable distortions. Intimacy is maintained but clarity is sacrificed. Without the alphabetic system the range of abstract meanings, perspectives, concepts and ideas would have remained very limited. Without the printed word, communication would have been restricted only to the privileged few and not to the critical masses required to produce revolutionary changes in the priorities and mindsets that paved the way for the Enlightenment to take place. The dramatic transformations and breakthroughs achieved in the West over the last five hundred years especially would not have been possible.

The Modern Mindset The period of the Enlightenment was a historical watershed because of the emphasis it gave to a number of key ontological assumptions and epistemological imperatives which continues to underpin much of contemporary management knowledge. Firstly, there is the unquestioned commitment to an atomistic/entitative view of reality. According to this view, ultimate reality is made up of discrete and individual particles that engage in processes of combination and recombination to produce the varied lifesized phenomena of our experiences. These atomistic entities are deemed to exist externally and objectively to an observing consciousness and can therefore be isolated and simply located in space and time for the purposes of identification and causal analysis. A logic of self-identity and presence thus ensures whereby the visible and the present are accentuated as the legitimate bases for knowledge-creation. It is this atomistic notion of reality and its implications that has dominated modern Western thought and consequently the visually-based mode of inquiry underpinning management knowledge. Correspondingly, within the realms of social analysis, the idea of discrete individuals agents existing as ultimate units of social reality that act and interact with each other to create macro-social phenomena such as organizations, institutions, cultures and societies is one which therefore remains deeply entrenched in the collective pysche of the Western academic world. Organizations and institutions are generally held to be aggregate (and very often unintended) outcomes of social exchange and interactions between otherwise self-interested individuals. Such 18

individual agents are deemed to exercise rational choice in their desire to maximise their interests and to achieve predefined outcomes. The result is that individual identity, action, and intentions provide the foundational basis for causal explanation and conceptual generalisation. Moreover, experienced macro-social units such as 'organizations' are themselves considered to be aggregate objective and independent socially-constructed entities ‘simply locatable’ (Whitehead, 1926/85: 61) and hence susceptible to systematic analysis. This breaking up of experienced social phenomena into discrete manageable pieces and their conceptual 'reassemblage' into macro-social units rendered them more amenable to cognitive manipulation and causal investigation. Such a strategy of analysis replicates the typographic mindset that was accentuated by the invention of printing. This method for dealing with macro-social phenomena has been called methodological individualism and can be understood as the result of a convenient habit of analysis inspired by the same principles underlying the breaking up of vocal sound into alphabetic form and their reconstitution into words, sentences, paragraphs and complete texts. As we have tried to show previously, the printing press and the typography associated with it also helped to perpetuate this mode of analysis through its method of mass production. Just like the print type-setters dextrously shuffled individual alphabetic letters around to produce the desired combinations, the breaking up and simple-locating of human experiences to create clear-cut, definite objects occupying clear-cut, definite places in space and time, reinforced the underlying principle of methodological individualism.

Secondly, with the Enlightenment came the increasing emphasis on a modern epistemology based upon the principle of systematic empiricism. Systematic empiricism is typified by the obsession with the visual observation, collection, categorisation and classification of both natural and social phenomena and their conceptual location in overarching typological schemas. This emphasis on observation and classification is very much inspired by the rise of visualism as a principle method of knowledge-creation. However, as Ong (1977) has argued this new-found form of visualism is unlike the untainted vision of primitive man because it entailed the explicit need to vocalising visual observations according to the method of assemblage previously discussed. Such a practice requires the mastery of a detached perspective; a dispassionate 'eye', that is able to survey the phenomena 19

apprehended through an established and objectifying set of conceptual lenses. John Berger (1972) for example, shows convincingly how the Enlightenment systematically transformed our ways of seeing from one of involved engagement to that of passive objectification. The 'light' of the Enlightenment inspired what Bryson (1982) calls a 'logic of the Gaze'; a fixing, prolonged and contemplative look that instantaneously freezes its object of analysis. The Gaze, attempts to arrest and extract form from fleeting process. It is penetrating, piercing, fixing, objectifying. A violent act of forcibly and permanently ‘present-ing’ that which otherwise would be a fluxing, moving and amorphous reality. In this focal act, the looker ‘arrests the flux of the phenomena, (and) contemplates the visual field from a vantage-point outside the mobility of duration, in an eternal moment of disclosed presence’ (Bryson: 94). It is a vision disembodied, a vision decarnalised. But it is also underpins the epistemology of contemporary management knowledge.

With the Enlightenment came the overpowering desire to scan, document, classify and sort out objects of interest, and to attribute causal powers to these artificiallyisolated objects of analysis. Through such careful observation and painstaking differentiation and classification of phenomena, it was believed that our knowledge of the universe could be systematically documented and the underlying natural order revealed. Linnaeus’s Systema Naturae, written in the early eighteenth century provides one of the clearest examples of this obsession with fixing, observing, collecting and classification. Initiated by Aristotle’s call for grounding our knowledge in observations and inspired by Descartes’ rigorously logical method of doubting, systematic empiricism surfaced most prominently in the kind of logical positivism which held sway in intellectual circles for the best part of the earlier half of the twentieth century. It is within this theoretical soil, that contemporary management and organization theory took root. Such a systematic and typological approach remains dominant in management theorising. Witness the numerous 2 x 2 typologies and other tabular schemas that abound in the management literature.

Thirdly, the triumph of Enlightenment knowledge brought with it the idea that language is primarily a medium designed to enable us to accurately represent linguistically our visually perceived reality. This representationalist view of language derives from the Cartesian split between mind and matter. The purpose of the 20

Cartesian mind is to mirror accurately the nature of matter existing external to itself. Thus, to claim to possess knowledge, in the Cartesian sense, is to be able to accurately describe and explain things and events occurring outside the mind. Knowledge is only deemed true and acceptable if it is able to accurately represent external reality as it is in itself. Such a view implies that language is seen as merely the medium of communication and that it does not play an active and constitutive role in the production of social reality. This belief about language has led to the commonplace insistence on literal precision and parsimony in the theory-building process in general and organizational theorizing in particular (Pfeffer, 1993).

For, if reason and

observation are to work in harmony and language gives us an unmediated access to an objective reality, it would be possible to objectively validate and assess the status of any truth claims. This would, in turn, mean that an inexorable march towards a complete and ultimate truth was possible. The result would be the systematic application of this established knowledge to produce absolute predictability and the total elimination of any surprises in all facets of our lives. Our world would then be increasingly subjected to our absolute control and this, in turn, would be a desirable outcome for mankind. It is the inherent attractions of the narrative of absolute control that drives the still-unabated search for complete knowledge in all major fields of inquiry.

Finally, and relatedly, a key imperative in Enlightenment knowledge is the emphasis on causal explanation. Such an emphasis is a natural outcome of the atomistic view of reality. For if ultimate reality is deemed to comprise discrete and isolatable entities the question arises as to how each of these entities are able to interact and influence each other to create the changes around us and other life-sized effects. Clearly, despite the insistence upon the fundamentally individual and atomistic nature of reality a conceptual bridge needs to be made to explain how it can then be possible for observable patterns of regularities to emerge. Causal explanations are thus a convenient mechanism for relinking these initially-assumed independent entities so that a coherent system of explanation on the nature and causes of change is possible. Aristotle was, perhaps, one of the first to attempt to formulate the notion of causality as the basis for change. For him there are four aspects of causality. Firstly, the form received by a thing gives it its formal cause. Secondly, the matter underlying that form which provides for the continuity in any change is called the material cause. 21

Thirdly, the active agent that brings about the change in form is called the efficient cause. Finally, the ultimate purpose served by that change Aristotle called the final cause. Thus to take a simple illustration - the production of a marble statue - the formal cause is the shape given by the raw marble, the material cause is the marble itself, the efficient cause is the sculptor and the final cause is perhaps the beautification of a palace or church. In modern analysis, however, following on from Hume's (1740/1992) Treatise of Human Nature, where he reformulated the notion of causality by focussing primarily on what Aristotle termed the 'efficient' cause and basically ignored or underplayed the other aspects proposed by the latter, cause is now defined as 'an event precedent and contiguous to another and so united with it in the imagination, that the idea of one determines the mind to form the idea of the other, and the impression of one to form a more lively idea of the other' (Hume, 1740/1992: 172). To say that an object or event is the cause of an effect is to maintain; a) that the cause and effect are contiguous in space and time; b) that the cause is prior to the effect; and c) that there must be a constant and predictable relationship between cause and effect. Thus, observed 'contiguity', 'priority' and 'constancy of relations' constitute the founding basis for the attribution of causality in the modern positivistic sense.

These four epistemological axioms; methodological individualism, systematic empiricism, representationalism and causal determinism constitute the founding basis for modern knowledge. They provide the intellectual cornerstones for modern management thought and the knowledge associated with it. Yet such forms of knowledge are increasingly proving to be inadequate in our comprehension of global capitalism and the phenomenon of management as we enter the 21st century. They fail to account for the unabated fluidity of enterprise, inventiveness and imagination as well as tacit understandings that oil the wheels of day-to-day business and managerial functioning. For example, as George Gilder (1993) has so convincingly shown in Wealth and Poverty, contrary to Adam Smith's insistence that it is individual 'selflove' that gives rise to exchange and the division of labour necessary for the capitalistic enterprise, it is in fact the more ancient art of 'giving' and hence self-denial that inspires the enterprise and creativity necessary for capitalism to thrive and prosper. As Gilder writes: 'Capitalism begins with giving. Not from greed, avarice, or even self-love can one expect the rewards of commerce, but from a spirit akin to altruism. A 22

regard for the needs of others…..Not taking and consuming, but giving, risking, and creating are the characteristic roles of the capitalist….The unending offerings of entrepreneurs, investing capital, creating products, building businesses, inventing jobs….all long before any return is received….constitute a pattern of giving that dwarfs in extent and in essential generosity any primitive rite of exchange. Giving is the vital impulse and moral centre of capitalism….Economies run not only on light but also on heat and energy, not merely on information but also on courage and skill. Entrepreneurial learning is of a deeper kind than is taught in schools….Capitalism is based on the idea that we live in a world of unfathomable complexity, ignorance, and peril; and that we cannot possibly prevail over our difficulties without constant efforts of initiative, sympathy, discovery and love' (Gilder, 1993: 21-37) Such a definition of capitalism precipitates a radically alternative conception of the function of management. Instead of the obsessive preoccupation with the distribution of limited resources, a concern with what might be called 'allocational efficiency' and the calculative mentality associated with it, management in this revised post-modern understanding becomes one concerned with productive inventiveness, risky offerings, uncertain futures and ambiguous returns. This is the real world of precarious managerial experiences which is hardly ever reflected in the management literature.

Understood thus, a post-modern critique of management knowledge seeks to show that what underpins modern rationality is a reductionistic 'logic of representation' whereby the phenomenal flux of lived experience are systematically subjected to division, representation and classification in order to render the latter more amenable to instrumental manipulation and control. Modern rationality, and hence representation, is thus a method of organization which creates legitimate objects of knowledge for a knowing subject. Through this almost unconscious method of organization, subjective experiences are imbued with objective representations thereby rendering the former more amenable to analysis, judgement and action. In this process of representation, the subjective and ephemeral aspect of human experiences are inadvertently marginalised and overlooked. It is this rejection of the concrete but 'subjective and ephemeral' aspect of human experience which circumscribes the epistemological limits of modern management knowledge. Such an arbitrary privileging of the explicit and the measurable over the tacit and qualitative aspects of human experience is what post-modern analyses seek to overturn. The postmodern then is centrally concerned with giving voice and legitimacy to those tacit and oftentimes unpresentable forms of knowledge that modern epistemology inevitably 23

depends upon yet conveniently overlooks or glosses over. This is the real purpose for analysing the foundations of management knowledge.

Conclusion Modern management knowledge relies overwhelmingly on the written word and it’s disseminated through print. Writing in general and alphabetic writing in particular facilitated the development of abstract thinking and the capacity for purposeful framing of individual activities: all crucial elements of modern management. In so doing it precipitated the necessary future goal-orientation required for a rudimentary form of organization and management to emerge. However, these organizational forms were confined to local orderings and this state of affairs did not substantially alter until the invention of the printing press enabled the printed word to reach far beyond the spatial confines of a particular established social order. Through the printed word, the aspirations, cultural attitudes and lifestyles of those both far and near, and across time, could be influenced and shaped. Printing thus freed thought and aspirations from the shackles of local knowledge. Moreover, it inspired a visual emphasis that led to the advent of the Enlightenment with its obsession with rational analysis, systematic empiricism, representationalism and causal determinism. Contemporary management knowledge has, thus, only become possible for a number of interconnected reasons. Firstly, the practice of management as a technique for constituting, ordering and control of ‘resources’ is only possible because of the development of an analytical attitude based upon the alphabetization of the world and the advent of typography. Secondly, the systematic accumulation of knowledge about management (i.e., management knowledge) as a reality of World 3 is only possible because such knowledge relies upon the stockpiling of the written word. In this sense, as we have attempted to argue throughout this chapter, modern management knowledge would not have been possible without the alphabetization of the world and its systematic dissemination through the printed word. However, it is clear that we are now entering a realm of reality in which wisdom, knowledge and information can no longer be simply understood in commodified and identitarian terms. Instead, instability and ‘noise’, informational fluxes, dispersions and transient configurations of relations are what characterise the phantom-like qualities of our post-modern world. From this perspective an elliptical and allusive form of knowledge is now required in which the 'unspoken', the ‘in-betweens’, the opportunistic ‘conquests’, the 24

restless expansions and sudden offshootings are accentuated and celebrated. Such knowledge-formation is often subtle, agglomerative, subterreanean and heterogeneous in nature spreading like oil patches rather than following any particular preestablished order. They insinuate themselves into our consciousness rather than confront us directly through a logic of the Gaze. From this understanding, modern management knowledge can no longer confine itself to the articulate, the explicit, the well-defined and the unambiguous. Instead, it is the tacit, the inarticulate, the unconscious forms of scanning and the ellipitical modes of understanding which now needs to be forgrounded in our search for a more complete understanding of the management phenomenon. This is the new mode of thought to cultivate as we enter into the new millennium.

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