The Importance of Being a Self

The Importance of Being a Self Kathinka Evers International Council for Science

ABSTRACT: A traditional belief is that there is but one self to a body, and that each of us has a single biography and personality. Varieties of this monistic view have dominated most of mankind's intellectual history in philosophy, science, religion, and psychology, as well as legal and social theory. It has been challenged by appeal to those people whom psychiatry labels "multiple," or "dissociated" personalities who, some claim, are" multiple selves." This may be adequate if the self is explained by reference to personality. But if the self is characterized in terms of self-awareness, its numerical identity will be independent of that of the individual's personality. On this account, the self is a biological ability that forms the basis of subjective reality without determinately enumerating the subject living it. The concept "seW is ambiguous and contextually sensitive; its meaning can vary with circumstances. On conceptual, ethical and existential grounds, a minimal conception of the self should be adopted without thereby excluding complementary stronger notions of the self. In principle, one organism could thus simultaneously be one and many selves in different meanings of that term. In human societies, the importance of being a self can hardly be overestimated, and any denial of this status must therefore carefully be considered.

I. FIRST PERSON MONISM

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t is generally assumed without question that for each living individual of the species homo sapiens the number of associated selves (minds, personalities, persons, or souls) is exactly one. Various forms and interpretations of this belief (which I shall sometimes refer to as the "monistic" view on the self) have been dominant at one point or another during most of mankind's intellectual history in philosophy, science, religion, and psychology, as well as legal and social theory. Science and philosophy traditionally assume that the body correlates with one mind only; most religions say the same about the soul; law presupposes a singular subject and rarely, if ever, foresees the

©200 I. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 15: I. ISSN 0738-098X.

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eventuality that there may be several legal subjects within a single body; psychology typically posits one self to each individual; and the unity and singularity of the person is a fundamental social tenet. The Oxford Companion to the Mind (OCM) writes: a basic assumption we all make about human nature ... [is] that for every body there is but one person; that each of us, despite the passage of time and changes in mood and activity, remains the same person with a single biography and store of memories.

Evolutionary intuitions could motivate a monistic conception of the survivalfit mind. Without a minimally unified experience, an organism would arguably find it difficult to survive. This, however, is less an argument against mental plurality than it is an argument for a minimum of unity. It does not preclude that there could, in principle, be several subjects of experience in an intelligent organism, each of which (or at least one of which) fulfills this requirement of minimal unity.1 Possession and transformation have been dominant metaphysical themes throughout the entire course of human history and across the most varied cultural, ethnic, and religious traditions: shamans transforming into animals or embodied spirits, demons taking possession over the human soul. Shamanistic transformations have an acknowledged goal (most often involving the acquisition of knowledge), but possession states are typically feared and shunned. The rough idea here is that the soul is (supposed to be and to remain) one. Any splitting is tantamount to possession, and possession is always the work of the devil or demons. Interestingly, angels or other professed servants of gods, seem never to be responsible for possession states, which might serve as a further indication of the negative attitude humans have towards plural minds2 • Legally, a living human individual is always a single, unified subject. This is an axiom of jurisprudence. If a physical individual appears to be several distinct personalities (d. below), and these "alter egos" should start disputing, say, the ownership of a house, or a criminal offense committed by one of them, that multiplicity is irrelevant from the legal point of view. They are owners or not, responsible or not, as one subject from the legal point of view. The axiom holds in all circumstances. A universal ideological basis for first-person monism is the strong desire, in human beings, to control their environment. Unity and homogeneity of the individual are (amongst other things) social requirements stemming in part from the belief that individual heterogeneity and disunity are ultimately "unmanageable" within the social context. Homo sapiens is fundamentally a homo politicus, which limits individual freedom yet may enhance personal growth. The community's survival presupposes the adaptation of its members. The criteria for acceptance versus rejection in a community vary between species, but it is only in more evolved species that intentional (mis)adaptation becomes an issue. "In man there is", writes Koestler (1967, 308), "a terrifyingly wide range of criteria, from territorial possession through ethnic, cultural, religious, ideological

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differences, which decide who stinks and who does not." Adaptation becomes a very real problem as our urgent desire to control our environment imposes strict limits on the level of heterogeneity and individuality considered sociallyacceptable. Psychologically, we have a natural need to understand and foresee our own reactions, as well as those of other people. We observe, sense and query-:hoping for comprehension and control. But our limited intellects cannot cope with too much complexity, and rapidly become frustrated when we meet it. This attitude is strongly expressed in OeM: Given the fact that all social relations and contracts presume consistency and unity of personality, it is hardly surprising that the occasional person who claims or appears to change into someone else becomes an object of concern to the police, of curiosity to the psychiatric profession, and offascination to the general public. (italics added)

Nor, I should like to add, is it surprising that many people (given the choice) would hesitate to admit to profound personality changes in view of the possible consequences of such an admission. This is a factor that greatly complicates all investigations into the deeper layers of the human mind. We are so filled with indoctrination of what we "should" be like, if we want to be accepted or respected in our society, that anything that goes too flagrantly against the tide is likely to be concealed to the point of obliteration. And most human societies desire nonmultiples in their midst, as supervision, prediction, and control require. But does this norm reflect reality? Are we really by nature singular? Or is any apparent singularity no more than a social convenience, a coercive effect, and a good excuse for heteronomous people to, as Cortcizar (1987, 79) suggests, "set themselves up comfortably in a supposed unity of person which was nothing but a linguistic unity and a premature sclerosis of character"? Monism sets standards for normality: insofar as the possibility of there being multiple selves correlated to one body is admitted, it is typically considered abnormal. Although one could regard such multiplicity as a frequent but undesirable phenomenon, it would hardly be appropriate to use numerical oneness as a standard for normality unless "singular" individuals were believed to be most frequent. So the "Singulars," I take it, are supposed to constitute the majority of the human species, leaving "multiples" (at best) as a controversial minority. However, the strength of a conviction does not guarantee its truth; many beliefs that were once firmly held have since been refuted. The brain sciences, psychiatry and philosophy of mind, notably, have long cast doubt on the monistic view of the self, and according to Radden (1996, 5) [a]llusions to divided, fractured, fragmented minds, and to multiple, successive selves are nowadays commonplace in both theoretical and empirical studies. We no longer accept unquestioningly the various Western traditions these concepts challenge ... which posits a single, unified, unvarying subject of experiences in every human breast.

Characterizing the "postmodern" world as a multifarious and socially fragmented environment, Cooper and Rowan (1999, 1) call the notion of a unified

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self "a relic from a bygone era." Dennett (1991, 422) likewise criticizes the traditional axiom that there can be only one self to a body, "one to every customer": many people ... think that ... it must be All or Nothing and One to a Customer. . . . The convictions that ... there must be a whole number of selves associated with one body-and it better be the number one!-are not self-evident.

The purpose of this inquiry is to ask: how many selves can one organism be simultaneously? The question focuses on the numerical identity of selves at a given point in time. 3 Logically, there are three (positive) replies: "one", "more than one", or "less than one." All three have prominent advocates: the first reply is the classical, monistic view; the second is its major challenge; whereas the third reply is a response to this challenge (typically arguing that if an entity, x, is not one self, then x is not a self). I shall argue for a (negative) fourth reply, suggesting reasons for adopting a "minimal" notion of the self as an indivisible entity that lacks a determinate numerical identity. This could be regarded as an open-ended version of the monistic view that is in principle compatible with some pluralistic positions. The monistic view of the self having been introduced, let us now consider one of its most thought-provoking plural challenges.

II. DISSOCIATIVE IDENTITY DISORDER There is no such thing as a simple mind. Each individual consciousness is rich beyond our comprehension. The manner in which we express ourselves varies greatly depending on our biological makeup and environment (upbringing, culture, education, etc.). Given the capacity and opportunity, many of us seize the chance to lead a number of qualitatively profoundly different lives, subsequently or simultaneously" trying on" various identities. (A typical example is the teenager.) In a sense we are all multiple in that we harbor within us a far more complicated and variegated set of personality traits, or "alter egos," than we are ever (by choice, or by force of circumstances) able or willing to exhibit. As a rule, we strive to maintain an aura of relative consistency, allowing our environment some assurance of prediction and control. Yet this does not accurately mirror our minds. At least, it is not the full story. According to Putnam (1989,51), "the evidence suggests that we are all born with the potential for multiple personalities and over the course of normal development we more or less succeed in consolidating an integrated sense of self." A necessary condition for consolidating an integrated sense of self is that the external circumstances (such as our environment and the people who are close to us) should provide us with sufficient security and comfort. When they do not, and our environment becomes severely disturbing, the human being has a defense mechanism that becomes active: dissociation. Dissociation, writes Putnam (1989, 9): "is a normal process that is initially used defenSively by an individual to handle traumatic experiences". In itself, it is neither maladaptive nor pathological, but an important adaptive function. 4 Daily life, says Hilgard (1973, 406), "is full of many small dissociations if we look for them."


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Casually described, dissociation is a way to disconnect oneself from a disagreeable experience. In more technical language West (1967, 890) defines dissociation as a "psychophysiological process whereby information-incoming, stored, or outgoing-is actively deflected from integration with its usual or expected associations." In effect, when an experience is too painful to accept, we sometimes refrain from accepting it; instead of integrating it in our ordinary system of associations. We push it away from us, dissociate ourselves from it, and prevent it from being integrated in our consciousness. This is a valuable evolutionary asset allowing us to survive events that we would otherwise be unable to endure. Pushed to an extreme, however, it becomes pathological. Dissociative reaction produces a pathological alteration in our thoughts, feelings, or actions when the person's sense of identity becomes sufficiently dissociated to represent an abnormal state or process. Pathological dissociation is basically characterized by a dissociative change in the normally /logically integrative functions of consciousness, memory, and identity; it involves disturbed memories from the dissociation period as well as alterations in the individual's sense of identity.s In other words, different degrees of dissociation can be described as lying along a continuum,6 ranging from minor and "ordinary" dissociation, such as daydreaming, to the extreme and "abnormal" kind involved in dissociation disorders. The fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM IV) distinguishes four main dissociative disorders: Depersonalisation Disorder, Dissociative Amnesia, Dissociative Fugue, and Dissociative Identity Disorder (formerly Multiple Personality Disorderl. This discussion will now focus on Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID), which is the most extreme form and involves elements of each of the others. DSM IV describes the diagnostic features of DID as follows: The essential feature of Dissociative Identity Disorder is the presence of two or more distinct identities or personality states (Criterion A) that recurrently take control of behavior (Criterion B). There is an inability to recall important personal information, the extent of which is too great to be explained by ordinary forgetfulness (Criterion C). The disturbance is not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance or a general medical condition (Criterion D). In children, the symptoms cannot be attributed to imaginary playmates or other fantasy play.

Each alternate identity (personality, personality state, or "alter ego") may be experienced as having its own name, biography, and self-image. Their distinction is not only psychological but also involves physiological traits such as body language, handwriting, state of health, etc. The individual thus seems to be not one personality but many, switching between them voluntarily or involuntarily. According to DSM IV, transitions among identities are often triggered by psychosocial stress, and the average number of alter egos is said to be eight for men and fifteen for women. When a switch has occurred the emerging alter immediately tries to adapt to the environment-he or she looks around, touches him- or herself (supposedly,

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one can have both male and female alters), checks for clues as to where he or she is, and so on. Occasionally, several alters are in executive control simultaneously and can confer with each other about, say, the next course of action, or how to keep disturbing or dangerous alters in the background. The vast majority of dissociative disorders have traumatic causes, such as inescapable danger, deep personal loss, or panic-causing impulses, e.g., suicide or murder. Many such disorders are induced in war (through experiences of being near death, or killing others, or seeing people die), or in war-like civil circumstances of extreme aggression (including concentration camps, horrifying family relations, etc.). Strong evidence suggests that multiple personality is typically induced in childhood when the child is subjected to extreme (e.g., sexual) abuse, most often by one or both parents, or by other people upon whom the child depends. Faced with a terrifying situation from which there is no physical refuge, the desperate child creates an escape itself; it "leaves" mentally, and puts another identity in its place to endure the sufferings inflicted. As in ordinary circumstances, dissociation is here a survival mechanism; it may be the only way for these children to survive the horrors to which they are exposed. However, when DID develops, the dissociative reaction has gone too far and becomes maladaptive, namely, when it persists beyond the traumatic contexts. Multiples come into therapy when their capacity to "leave," which helped them survive a traumatic experience, has outlived its usefulness. In the less dramatic circumstances then prevailing, DID can create an extraordinarily difficult way of life-in part, but not only, due to other people's reactions to their condition. Still, some multiples maintain that it is better to be multiple than singular, and refer to nonmultiples as people suffering from "single personality disorder." Braude (1995, points to certain alleged advantages with multiplicity: Switching personalities enables a multiple to cope with exhaustion, pain, or other impairments to normal or optimal functioning. For example, if A is tired or drugged, B can emerge fresh or clear-headed. When in pain, A can switch to an anesthetic personality. Or personalities can keep passing the pain to each other in turn, switching when the persistent pain becomes intolerable.... multiples do indeed have ways of handling pain and exhaustion available (apparently) only to such virtuoso dissociators. Second, multiples often feel that they have many valued and intimate friends among their alters, whom they would hate to lose in the process of integration.

This notwithstanding, the plural mental condition is a major social problem. It is outstandingly a cause of fear in a general public that requires consistency and unity of personality to be the basis for personal relationships and interaction. In professional contexts, multiple personality is often met with deep (and not always rational) scepticism, to which Dennett (1991, 419) objects: The idea of MPD strikes many people as too outlandish and metaphysically bizarre to believe.... they have failed to notice that two or three or seventeen selves per body is really no more metaphysically extravagant than one self per body. One is bad enough!


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The phenomenon of multiple personality is not all that outlandish. We are, after all, speaking about one of the oldest known psychiatric syndromes, and one which parallels the history of modern psychiatry. With good reason, Putnam (1989, 33) finds it "curious, in these times when syndromes appear and disappear with each new edition of the ... DSM, that MPD, one of the oldest psychiatric entities on record, remains continually called upon to prove its existence while other newly defined disorders are routinely accepted." A scepticism that fails to register such substantial evidence is a denial that may well itself amount to a dissociative response, quite possibly a result of fear. It is beyond our scope here to ascertain the reality of multiple personality, but there is more than sufficient evidence for taking the possibility seriously enough to question its implications. The phenomenon of multiple personality is extremely complex, and no short description can do it justice. For our present purposes, however, this simple introduction will suffice. Our concern is limited to the question of whether the (assumed) multiple personality must also be a multiple self.

III. THE MINIMAL SELF Infant consciousness is organized into series of discrete behavioral states the transitions between which are relatively abrupt. These behavioral states are rare in adults; however, they resemble the switches between alter egos that multiples experience. 8 Gradually, as the child grows, these states become increasingly numerous, the distinctions between them grow softer, and the transitions smoother.9 In the course of growing up, the infant develops a capacity to focus its attention; it learns to distinguish between and recognize objects in its environment, and becomes aware of itself as standing in various relations to these objects. Consciousness develops into auto-distinction. 1o Further developed, the individual becomes aware of itself as a subject of experience and ascribes mental states to itself: auto-distinction evolves into self-awareness. At this stage, the individual has become a self. Thus, in order to be a self, three conditions must be fulfilled: 1) Consciousness. A self is a subject of experience, something to which mental states (experiences, thoughts, and desires) are attributable.

2) Auto-distinction. A self must be able to differentiate between itself (as thishere) and other objects (as that-there). A mind that draws no distinction between itself and others would not be a self, because insofar as it differentiates distinct objects at all, it only does so without identifying with any of them. 3) Self-awareness. A self must be able to identify itself as a subject of experience. It does not merely experience itself as an object amongst other objects, but is able to attribute mental states to itself. These conditionsll are, I suggest, sufficient conditions for selfhood in a minimal sense. What they express, in my opinion, is all that it takes to merit the status of a self: A subject, S, is a self if S is able to identify itself as a subject of experience.

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This proposition is circular, since some basic understanding of the term "self" is presupposed by the grasp of what it means to "identify itself" as something, but it is a virtuous circle; its circularity does not matter for the purpose at handP My purpose here is to find a set of minimal requirements for being granted selfhood, which render that concept maximally inclusive. It does not purport to offer any exhaustive account of the meaning of self. Several writers posit some fourth condition of selfhood, such as numerical unity, continuity, memory,13 or integration of psyche or personality. For example, Segal (1991, viii-ix) views the self as "a highly integrated structure of the personality that typically exists only partially formed within a person." To Radden (1996, 11) "a self = an embodied repository of integrated psychological states," whereas Spiegel (1993) requires that the self be a numerically unified entity (d. below). In contrast, I propose a minimal notion of the self that makes no essential reference to anything beyond self-awarenesse.g., a particular type of personality, or given psychological states-thus allowing all self-aware organisms into the realm of selves, irrespective of their personality or biography. My arguments for this position will combine conceptual with ethical and existential considerations. An individual's personality is a question of who she is. An individual being a self is a matter of how she is able to conceive of herself· These are separate issues. Having a personality is not tantamount to being a self, and vice versa; being a self does not mean having a personality. It is open to question whether some nonhuman animals (e.g., pigs, chimpanzees, dogs, or dolphins) could be selves; but it is not open to doubt that they have personality. Dogs, for example, are more or less playful, tender, aggressive, etc. Possibly, one could also be a self without personality, e.g., if a self might experience reality from a subjective and (perforce) finite, yet simultaneously disinterested and detached, point of view (a Buddhist goal). To explain these concepts with essential reference to each other is conceptually counterproductive, neither necessary nor informative. The minimal notion of self must therefore be kept free from any reference to personality, specific psychological states, or dispositions to act in certain ways. We have terms already to describe those phenomena, and to avoid conceptual confusion, the concept "self" should be used basically to denote that level of evolution at which a conscious organism becomes aware of itself as a subject of experience. What (if any) personality it develops, or which psychological states it may find itself in, are additional questions. These additional questions need not be raised in order to ascertain whether a given organism is a (minimal) self, but they must be addressed if the purpose is to give a fuller account of an organism's self in terms of its identity. The identity of the individual as a whole (if by that we mean its personality, biography, etc.) is of course a lot more than its capacity for self-awareness. And in ordinary discourse, there is a sense of self that means the full identity. If you wish to describe your "full" self to another ("This is who I am"), you are unlikely to inform her or him that you are able to attribute mental states to yourself (implying that "this shows that I am a self"). Rather, you will


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describe your thoughts, feelings, dispositions, biography, and so on. To the extent that this sense of self is useful, we may keep it as a complement to the minimal self, and allow that the concept "self" is contextually sensitive. But for reasons of conceptual clarity, self-awareness should set the minimal requirements for what it takes to be a self. Any stronger demarcation would also be too exclusive by virtue of excluding thinking, feeling organisms from the realm of selves, as the ethical and existential arguments below will suggest. People who have DID are often described as having distinct personalities who are in executive control of the individual's thoughts, feelings, and behavior-either simultaneously or (more often) successively. These alter egos are considered both qualitatively and numerically distinct. That is to say, the alters are sufficiently different in qualitative terms to merit numerical differentiation. (Complexity turns into division.) There is a continuing debate over the accuracy of these clinical analyses and theories, but the evidence presented appears very strong. Let us for the sake of this discussion assume that this description of multiple personalities is correct. Our question then is: does

the numerical distinction between alters justify a numerical distinction between selves? Does each alter have a self of its own, or do they have one in common? I shall argue that the alters share a minimal self that is indivisible whether or not the view that a multiple personality is a multiple self is considered adequate. Plural, nonminimal selves in one organism can in principle complement its minimal self. Radden (1996, 39-41) posits four "conditions for attributing separate selves to the same spatiotemporal person": 1) The separate-agency condition: separate sets of propositional attitudes (beliefs, values, goals, desires, and responses) expressed in distinguishable patterns of motivation and behavior. Separate selves will have separate agendas." 2) The separate-personality condition: the presence of more than one distinct personality beyond agent patterns; physical and emotional style, temperament, gender, cultural identity, moral disposition, idiosyncratic history, and self concept. 3) The continuity condition: establishing the presence of a second self requires that there are patterns of this presence, for "self" is a dispositional term that refers not to a datable occurrence but to a tendency to respond in certain ways over stretches of time, in the same way as personalityand character traits. "Separate selves will persist through time."

4) The disordered-awareness condition: in a divided mind epistemic barriers qua disordered or incomplete awareness or memory prevent at least one separate self from introspecting the simultaneous conscious content of the composite whole (the person) with which it is identified. These conditions are only relevant to the self explained in terms of personality, dispositions, or persistence through time and may be satisfied by some individuals with multiple personality. None of them are relevant to a notion

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of self that makes no such reference. By these multiplicity conditions, a multiple personality could very well combine her or his plurality of personality and personality-related self with being a nonmultiple (minimal) self.14 However, other multiplicity conditions have been proposed that may prima facie seem relevant to the self as self-awareness. Braude (1995, 64) suggests that "a multiple's apperceptive centers are distinct enough to be considered distinct selves, in what is not a trivial sense of that term." Drawing a distinction between an "indexical" state (that the individual believes to be its own, either by" consciously experiencing a belief," or as a "dispositional cognitive state" [72]) and an "autobiographical" state (that the individual experiences as its own), Braude defines a subject, 5, as an "apperceptive center" if, and only if (a) S is a subject of autobiographical states, both occurrent and dispositional (e.g., sensations, emotions, beliefs, desires), and (b) most of those states are indexical for S (i.e., S believes that those states are its own). In short, an apperceptive center is an individual most of whose autobiographical states are indexical. (78)

The difference between these two states is, however, unclear to me. To my mind, the experience of a state as x (whatever x is, e.g., mine) presupposes that a belief that the experience is x has (at least subconsciously) been formed. (Whether or not the belief is true and the experience veridical is another matter.) It is certainly possible to experience a state without believing it to be one's own; there are subjects of perception that have no beliefs at all. We distinguish a conscious organism that has experiences but is not a self, because it is not sufficiently evolved to ascribe these experiences to itself. But how can it be possible to experience a state as mine without in some sense believing it to be mine? Braude explains: when our experiences are confined primarily to the animal or biotic levelfor example, during a drunken stupor, sexual orgasm, panic, or while fighting for one's life ... it is not clear that we believe, even dispositionally, that our ongoing mental or bodily states are our own. Those particular autobiographical states are not indexical. (74)

I agree that one would not in these situations be likely to form the conscious thought "This experience is mine!" although some of these experiences would be very acutely lived as "mine." (One is rarely more acutely self-aware than in sexual arousal, or in a death struggle.) But it is beyond my comprehension how I could ascribe a state to myself without believing it (in some weak sense) to be mine, and vice versa, what my (non)conscious belief that "This experience is mine" might amount to, other than an ascription of that experience to myself. Unless I misinterpret him, Braude's distinction between indexical and autobiographical states rests on a confusion between the experience of a state, and the experience of a state as mine. Braude's multiplicity conditions are stated in the same terms: Since many alters are both autobiographically and indexically discontinuous from each other, to that extent they would seem to be different individuals, with corresponding distinct senses of themselves. (164)


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Judging by the evidence presented in many of the case descriptions, the alters of a multiple do indeed have distinct senses of themselves. They refer to other alters as "he" or "she," for example, and seem often to regard them as different people altogether (sometimes even to the point of denying that they share the same body). And if this is correct, then it is reasonable to describe the alters as "different individuals" qua "different identities" (or personalities). They are ipso facto "indexically discontinuous," as Braude uses that expression. Subjectively, the alters live in different worlds, have varying experiences, believe distinct experiences to be their own, and have, in that sense, distinct selves. However, "indexical discontinuity" is an ambiguous term. It can distinguish subjects by reference either to the contents of their beliefs, or to the ability to form certain beliefs. It is only in the former sense that the multiple personality'S alter egos are indexically discontinuous, and this is also how Braude uses the expression. (This distinguishes Broade's indexical states from our concept of self-awareness. Both make doxastic reference, but the former is content related, whereas the latter is ability related.) In the latter sense, indexical discontinuity differentiates between those who are, versus those who are not, able to form a belief that certain mental states are theirs. Indexical discontinuity thus understood separates the self-aware from the merely auto-distinct, or conscious organisms, i.e., the selves, from the nonselves. And although a multiple may have one alter that has this ability and another that lacks it, it is not the case that the alter egos have distinct abilities to form doxastic references, even though the contents of their doxastic references differ. The ability to ascribe mental states to oneself makes no specific reference to which mental states one ascribes. It makes no essential reference to any psychological state, or character trait. In that sense, it is perfectly possible for any number of alters to live in what are, subjectively speaking, profoundly diverging realities, and yet share the same minimal self. None of the conditions for the multiplicity of selves that we have here considered are relevant to the self conceived as the capacity for self-awareness. The ability to ascribe mental states to oneself is, it seems to me, indivisible. 15 The numerical identity of this indivisible self could be determined by the numerical identity of the organism in question. If the numerical identity of that organism is "one," that would yield a singular self, in accordance with the mainstream tradition. However, it will not be determinately one; selfawareness is a biological stage the borders of which are vague. There are borderline cases in the transition from not being to being self-aware, so this singular self must be indeterminate. Alternatively, one can argue that biological abilities, being vague and ambiguous, are not countable things at all. To my mind, the minimal self is most accurately described as a biological capacity that forms the basis of subjective reality without enumerating the subject living it. Ethical and existential arguments for the adoption of this notion of a minimal self (as a complement to stronger and possibly pluralistic notions) will now be suggested against this conceptual background.

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IV. ONTOLOGICAL SECURITY The number and variety of circumstances that have to coincide in order for the human organism to function properly is daunting. Our bodies are intricate systems requiring an enormous range of favorable conditions in order not to break down. The natural environment we need to survive must be congenial, and the social environments that we construct in the hope of achieving a safer and more enjoyable survival are veritable labyrinths of rules, codes, and structures. Given our starting conditions, even in the most propitious circumstances, it is a small wonder when we find a human being who is healthy and happy, with a strong and secure feeling of her own identity and place in the world. Few are so fortunate. Misery in its many forms-wars, malnourishment, poverty, illness, loneliness, etc.-is the rule rather than the exception from a global perspective; and the effects of misery are revealed not least in people's mental health. Numerous writers on mental disorders suggest that certain severe symptoms alter the person's self to the point of dissolution. For example, Spiegel (1993) suggests that the problem with people who have DID "is not having more than one personality; it is having less than one personality." Sacks (1985, 37) describes his patient Jimmie G., who suffers from a severe form of amnesia called Korsakoff Syndrome, as "condemned to a sort of 'H umean' froth, a meaningless fluttering of the surface of life" by this amnesia. Radden (1996, 38) agrees: "its victims appear, as Sacks says ... 'de-pithed, de-souled and scooped out,' or, we might say without self." She extends this denial of a self to severe cases of schizophrenia that to her "suggest a devastating want of integration and continuity." These writers all presuppose a stronger conception of self than the one I have elaborated above; they recommend a fourth condition (e.g., unity, integration, continuity, or memory), in addition to selfawareness, that must be satisfied by an organism if it is to be a self. Their conceptions are, in other words, more exclusive. In defence of the amnesic self, I have argued at length that amnesia is irrelevant to the status of being a minimal self, and I shall not repeat those arguments here. 16 An aim of this article is to save other, as I see them, relevantly similar selves from annihilation. In the previous section, I argued by appeal to conceptual adequacy. In this section, an ethical! existential case will be proposed. It is not merely conceptually inaccurate to posit exclusive (nonminimal) necessary conditions for being a self. It is also ethically objectionable, excluding thinking, feeling creatures from the realm of selves. Strong definitions of the self render a number of individuals (notably, certain nonhumans, underdeveloped humans, and people with various mental disorders) nonselves, an exclusion that can be appreciably cruel. Conceding a person a self is more than a logical conclusion, it is a moral gesture of admission into a socially important group. To be conceded a self is a socially crucial asset, an entrance ticket to social participation and protection, whereas not being regarded as a self is a dangerous social handicap that can exclude the possession of numerous rights. As yet, there is no global agreement over what it


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takes to possess moral status, but being a self is normally regarded as vital. Moral status is typically (though not necessarily11) granted when an individual possesses a level of intelligence for which being a self is a prerequisite. The notion of a self has been fleshed out within a number of disciplines, e.g., neuropsychology, philosophy, and psychiatry, within which there are deep theoretical divisions. Our conceptions of the self-and our assessments of who is one/who is not-are also largely a result of our religious and wider cultural traditions. However, selfhood is taken to be important across all human societies. If you do not consider the individual before you a self, there are likely to be fewer restraints of conscience on your behavior towards her. Partly on that basis, human beings allow themselves to treat what they consider "selfless" beings, (in particular nonhumans, but sometimes also underdeveloped or sick humans) as social outcasts or nonmembers. They treat them as mere means to almost any end, with various degrees of disregard for their sufferings. To illustrate this, Descartes did not hesitate to subject nonhumans to vivisection or other excruciatingly painful experiments, for he was convinced that they were soulless automata, unable to feel either pain or pleasure. Voltaire rejected such acts and beliefs as barbarous, unlike Kant who, although he also denied the Cartesian view that nonhumans are mere automata,18 declared that we have no moral duties to those who are not selfconscious. A problem is that both humans and nonhumans belong to that group, whilst humans tend to be "speciesists," i.e., they favor, and are especially reluctant to deny basic rights to, members of their own species. 19 In reality, however, both nonhumans and socially weak humans have occasionally been treated with the utmost cruelty in all political systems and religious creeds. For example, they have been used without their informed consent in harmful medical experiments, or forcibly sterilized. Trivially, how an individual is treated in a human society depends on her social status. Nontrivially, without any social status, she could end up as food. Would we trade, skin, kill, eat, experiment upon, or forcibly sterilize admitted selves? Quite possibly, we would, but hopefully with more moral qualms, or, at the very least, with greater discretion. The social importance of being a self can hardly be overestimated-which by no means implies that lacking a self would be the only, or even the principle, reason for suffering abuse. It seems tome that the life of "psychic minorities"-bywhichI mean, e.g., intellectually less well-equipped individuals, or mentally disturbed people, or (to use a more neutral expression) people who fail to meet the received standards for normality in the society in which they reside-is difficult enough without us robbing them of their selves in addition. There is a very big difference between proposing that an individual is less developed, ill, weak, or suffering from a disrupted or fragile sense of self, and suggesting that because she is ill, etc., she has no self. Denying a basically intelligent and emotional, but mentally relatively underdeveloped, or damaged, or disturbed individual a self is an ethically unacceptable act of exclusion that may push the rejected individual over the brink of despair, or inflict other serious harm upon her. We would help her more by acknowledging that she has a self, a self in trouble.

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Furthermore it is existentially unsound to exclude intelligent and emotional beings from a minimum of social participation and protection. This is not just a question of imperialism of standards, or of wrongly imposing "universal" or "objective" norms upon what counts as a meaningful life, but a question of attitudes to individual integrity and dignity. Basic social rights should not be contingent on any more advanced intelligence than that which self-awareness involves (insofar as intelligence is at all relevant to that status). The right of protection, e.g., from arbitrary abuse, should instead be conceded in terms of the individual's capacity to suffer from its denial. Any selfconscious individual is capable of suffering from violations of integrity, acts of disrespect, exclusion, or abuse. By virtue of this capability (as a sufficient, but maybe not necessary condition), all such individuals merit protection from experiences of this type. They should be shown a minimum of respect. Many of those in the psychic minorities whom some writers describe as "lesser selves," as "selfless," or as "soulless," deserve a better treatmentfirst, because the lack of self entails a high risk of their suffering demeaning abuse, and second, because that description fails to take their own viewpoints into account. An admirably open and respectful attitude in this respect is expressed in the works of Luria (a founder of neuropsychology). Luria's accounts of his work with an extremely brain-damaged man in The Man with a Shattered World express profound respect for his struggles. His story is told in a sequence of images of reality, visible from his own viewpoint. This sequence is intertwined with Luria's descriptions (137, 158): He no longer understands or recognizes the meaning of words .... he cannot form an image of a thing or an object when he hears it mentioned .... he also cannot orient himself in space, or figure out immediately where a sound is coming from .... He desperately wanted to wake from this terrible nightmare, to break through the hopelessness of mental stagnation.... But it was impossible. Time is flying. Over two decades have slipped by and I am still caught in a vicious circle. I can't break out of it and become a healthy person with a clear memory and mind. The average person will never understand the extent of my illness, never know what it is like unless he experienced it himself.

Throughout Luria's works, there can be no doubt but that he regards his patients as individuals in their own right-as intelligent but damaged, emotional but distressed selves. Another writer who insists on analyzing mental disorders partly from the patient's point of view is the psychiatrist Laing. Radden refers to Laing (1960) in order to support her judgment that people who suffer from the most severe forms of schizophrenia lack selves. However, it is extremely unlikely that Laing would appreciate her position, for he was a pioneer in choosing to analyze persons with schizophrenia within their own perspectives in a broader social context. Far be it from him to deny them a self; to the contrary, he took his patients seriously enough to give them a voice to speak up for the particular nature of their minds. The OeM wri tes: As Chairman of the Philadelphih. Association, London from 1965 to 1982, Laing was involved in the provision of social contexts where people in disturbed


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states of mind could live, at their own choosing, on their own discretion, in their own way. Some of the experiences that emerged in these contexts were very unusual. In contemporary psychiatric practice they had never been allowed to happen. A notable feature of some of the accounts is the way some people's minds go through transformations which, if they are allowed to continue and if they do not lose their own momentum, seem to eventuate in a clear, balanced state of mind.

Laing (1960, 39, 42) introduces the term "ontological security" to denote a person's stable and self-secure position in relation both to herself and to her environment: A man may have a sense of his presence in the world as a real, alive, and ... continuous person.... Such a basically ontologically secure person will encounter all the hazards of life, ... from a centrally firm sense of his own and other people's reality and identity.... If such a basis for living has not been reached, the ordinary circumstances of everyday life constitute a continual and deadly threat.

According to Laing, a "firm sense of one's own autonomous identity is required in order that one may be related as one human being to another" (44). The onto logically insecure person, by contrast, suffers from an unnerving feeling that her autonomous identity is under threat as soon as she enters into any personal relationship or contact with another human being. The experience of insecurity that a person with schizophrenia might have involves three main forms of anxiety: engulfment (the fear of losing one's identity by absorption into another person); implosion (the fear of the world crashing in at any moment to obliterate all identity, just as a gas obliterates a vacuum); and depersonalization (which, simply put, is the fear of being treated as an "it" without feelings). Such anxiety of losing one's self is not only compatible with but actually presupposes a sense of having a self to lose. The anxious individual must also attach some value to that self, for otherwise the concern would not arise. In Laing's account, the ontologically insecure person seems in fact to have a very strong sense of a (frighteningly weak) self-a painfully vivid sense of a self that is in constant danger. Is this the person we should reject as selfless? Denying such an ontologically insecure individual a self is considerably worse than conceptually inaccurate; it is an act of disrespect that can (indeed, is likely to) have disastrous consequences. In summary, it is ethically unacceptable to rob intelligent and emotional, but damaged or less developed beings of their selves by reference to their mental structures. This is a social exclusion that entails a high risk of abuse. The ability to suffer should entitle an individual to a minimum of social participation, protection, and other basic social privileges.

V. CONCLUSION A monistic view of the self that does not acknowledge the deep complexity of the human mind is simplistic. A plural phenomenon, such as multiple personality, may be questioned but not dismissed offhand by a realistic account

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of the self. To this extent, the widely accepted belief that a self is singular stands in need of revision. On the other hand, plural mental phenomena do not exclude a firstperson monism that is able to accommodate them. The self is an ambiguous concept, the meaning of which is contextually sensitive. It can be realized in one organism as both "one," and "many" (or, perhaps, not numerical at all) depending on the meaning that it has in the context. If the self is described in terms of the capacity to ascribe mental states to oneself, and an organism's ability of self-awareness is regarded as singular, then the self cannot be multiple-nor is it determinately singular. Self-awareness is an indeterminate biological stage the limits of which are marked by borderline cases. Alternatively, as I have suggested, this "minimal" self may lack a numerical identity and form the basis of subjective reality without enumerating the subject living it. On either account, the alter egos of a multiple personality share the same self (in that sense) in spite of living in subjectively different realities. Multiple personalities can still be multiple selves if the self is explained by reference to personality, dispositions, and temporal continuity. A self thus described is considerably more than self-awareness; it involves an individual's identity in a much richer sense. In ordinary discourse, we normally speak of the self in this manner (for instance, when we introduce "ourselves" as "who we are"), and we may indeed continue to do so. However, what I have tried to show is that we must not let this demarcate what it takes to be a self. From an ethical point of view, such limits would be unjustifiably exclusive. Logically, being a self is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for possessing moral status. To the extent that moral status is held to require selfhood, it may be just one among other necessary conditions. But moral status can in any case be construed without reference to the self, or to any other aspect of consciousness. This notwithstanding, it can be readily acknowledged that selfhood is (as a matter of fact) typically viewed as a requirement for moral or social rights and protection. It is likely that many who advocate a strong and exclusive definition of the self have failed to notice the ethical! existential dimensions. They do not realize just how devastating the denial of a self can be. Conceptually, they join the self with identity/personality, and let the latter demarcate the realm of selves, little understanding who, or how many, they thereby exclude, or what effects such exclusion might have upon a powerless or ontologically insecure individual. Yet it is deplorable thus to reject someone who is in a position of social weakness, or whose threshold of basic security is so low that practically any relationship with another person appears threatening. Even when the presumed "selfless" individual is unaware of this dangerous want of social status, it is ethically unacceptable to treat a self-aware being as a lesser creature of mainly-or merely-instrumental worth. The meaning that we choose to give to certain concepts, such as the self, reveals more than our philosophical sensitivity. It is also a result of our cultural upbringing, and Signals our attitudes to other beings, and to life in genera1.


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The election of a definition for the self goes beyond conceptual matters. Once the conceptual work is complete and all relevant distinctions have clearly been drawn, the issue turns largely into a question of values. Should selves unite in an exclusive club with few and relatively homogenous members? Or shall we opt for a multifarious, larger community in which any self-conscious creature is welcome? So long as the ethical relevance of selfhood stands, it is risky to lack a self in human eyes. Thus we have, I suggest, in addition to conceptual reasons, moral reasons for adopting a minimal notion of the self admitting all of those who might suffer from the consequences of its assumed absence into a haven of relative security. By whatever path, granting moral status and basic social rights on the basis of the individual's capacity to suffer from their denial, instead of the ability to fight for them, would be gesture of immense symbolic importance, the enactment of which would amount to a social revolution.

Endnotes 1. A distinction must here be drawn between numerical identity (the number which a given object instantiates) and qualitative identity (the qualities which the object instantiates). The question "is x unified?" is ambiguous. Interpreted as "how many is x?" we are querying about number. Interpreted as "are x's experiences coherent?" we query about qualities. Claims about the (dis)unity of a given object must be specified to make clear if we are speaking of numerical or qualitative identity. 2. Oesterreich (1966) offers interesting historic and conceptual analyses of possession states. 3. The problem of what constitutes a "person" or the problem of sameness through temporal change will not be addressed. The term "person" is used only in a theoretically unassuming sense. For the sake of convenience, I shall not always spell out the reference to the moment as opposed to a period. The focus on simultaneity should then be tacitly understood. 4. Ludwig (1983, 93) enumerates seven important adaptive functions of "normal" dissociation: "(I) the automatization of certain behaviours, (2) the efficiency and economy of effort, (3) the resolution of irreconcilable conflicts, (4) escape from the constraints of reality, (5) the isolation of catastrophic experiences, (6) the cathartic discharge of certain feelings, (7) the enhancement of herd sense." 5. Cf. Nemiah (1981). 6. Cf. Bernstein and Putnam (1986) for discussions of this continuum. 7. For the purposes of this inquiry, it is suitable to treat these expressions as equivalent. Hacking (1995, 17-20) gives a rather detailed account of the reasons for this change of label. 8. Cf. Putnam (1988). 9. Cf., e.g., Wolff (1987) and Emde et al. (1976). 10. Auto-distinction is reminiscent of what Dennett (1991,414) calls "the biological self," arguing that "the boundary between 'me' and 'the rest of the world,' [is] a distinction that even the lowliest amoeba must make, in its blind, unknowing way," though I strongly doubt that an amoeba is capable of drawing this distinction. 11. Being a self is generally taken to require that these conditions be fulfilled, but we should note that they contain philosophically problematic concepts; e.g.,

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"consciousness" or "ability." A full explanation of the self would require a discussion of these concepts. 12. The reasoning would arguably have been viciously circular if the above proposition had purported to state a full definition, seeing that the definiendum would then recur in the definiens. This, however, is not here the case. Furthermore, it is possible that self is a basic concept that does not admit of entirely noncircular definition. That question is beyond the scope of the present paper. 13. According to Radden, the self's essential unity consists in continuity in terms of memory linking experiences through time. I have rejected that view in Evers (1999), where I argue that memory is onto logically irrelevant to being a self, although it is of epistemic value to self-knowledge and self-development. The present discussion will focus on the requirements of numerical unity and qualitative integration. 14. It is not implausible that an account that admits the possibility of multiple personality and personality-related selves yet asserts the nonmultiplicity of the self might reduce the scepticism that professed multiples encounter. For this scepticism is largely based on attitudes of what is socially acceptable, which is a fairly narrow spectrum. The notion of an extremely complex character is a potential social concern, but can be socially acceptable (e.g., as a sign of intelligence) so long as the person appears in control of her variegated personality. In contrast, the idea that this complexity goes as far as to divide into several distinct personalities meets greater suspicion, fear, and hostility. If then we add the suggestion that these personalities are also correlated to distinct selves, this may well be the last nail in the coffin, insofar as the sceptics are concerned. However, unlike the ethical considerations suggested in the next section, I do not consider this a valid argument for adopting any particular conceptual analysis, either of the self or of the personality. Social acceptance is not an argument in this context, it is a possible consequence that one mayor may not value. 15. However, the statement that self-awareness is nonmultiple is contentious and begs other questions than that of multiple personality. A proper justification of this monistic stance would require that further issues be addressed, e.g., the alleged multiplicity of mind, or consciousness (d., e.g., Sperry [1968], or Bogen [1969]). 16. Cf. Evers (1999). 17. The ethical/existential argument for the adoption of the maximally inclusive demarcation of the self that I propose is based on the assumption that being a self is relevant to the concessions of moral status and social protection. If or when being a self is not required for this status, my justification would limit itself to conceptual clarity. 18. For example, in Kritik der Urteilskraft, part 2, § 90 n. 1. 19. Singer (1990, chap. 5) offers a short history of speciesism.

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