The Politics of Large-scale CCS Deployment - Science Direct

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ScienceDirect Energy Procedia 114 (2017) 7581 – 7595

13th International Conference on Greenhouse Gas Control Technologies, GHGT-13, 14-18 November 2016, Lausanne, Switzerland

The politics of large-scale CCS deployment Juho Lipponena*, Samantha McCullocha, Simon Keelinga, Tristan Stanleya, Niels Berghouta, Thomas Berlya a

International Energy Agency, 31-35 rue de la Féderation’, 75739 Paris, France

Abstract Since the early 2000’s, there has been growing recognition of the important role that CCS can play as part of a leastcost, global solution to climate change. Modelling by the International Energy Agency (IEA) has consistently highlighted a significant role for CCS in achieving a 2oC target, and recognition of the role of CCS has also increasingly been a feature of reports by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). However, this growing appreciation of the value of CCS has not been accompanied by commensurate growth in political and policy support for the technology. In fact, support for CCS has been inconsistent and at times tumultuous, and has been closely intertwined with progress in global climate negotiations and wider economic conditions. CCS will not advance without significant public investment and the required support policies will not be put in place without political support – hence the politics of CCS play a major role in this respect. This paper looks at the politics of deploying large-scale CCS projects, including the drivers for CCS support, the opposing political forces and the practical challenges of deploying CCS. It will examine what factors could help to de-politicise CCS, and consider whether the Paris Agreement could provide a turning point. © by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 2017Published The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. © 2017 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/). Peer-review under responsibility of the organizing committee of GHGT-13. Peer-review under responsibility of the organizing committee of GHGT-13. Keywords: Climate change; CCS; energy policy; politics; Paris Agreement

* Corresponding author. Tel.: + 33 1 40 57 66 80 E-mail address: [email protected]

1876-6102 © 2017 Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/). Peer-review under responsibility of the organizing committee of GHGT-13. doi:10.1016/j.egypro.2017.03.1890

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1. Introduction International experience demonstrates that strong political commitment and leadership is essential for the successful deployment of large-scale carbon capture and storage (CCS) projects. These projects can take up to a decade to develop where suitable geological storage sites need to be identified and assessed. They are also capitalintensive, involving investments of up to several billion dollars, while being considerably more complex than other low emission technology solutions. As a result, the development phase of a first-of-a-kind CCS project has the potential to outlast governments and will often traverse multiple budget cycles. These factors have tested political commitment over the past decade, with significant fluctuations in the availability of policy and financial support for CCS projects. The lack of consistent and adequate support for CCS has contributed to the relatively slow pace of project deployment to date. The global portfolio of large-scale projects has expanded from 8 in 2010 to 15 today, with 22 expected to be operating by 2020 [1]. The portfolio has also become more diverse, and importantly now includes CCS applied to coal-fired power generation. However, the progress achieved falls well short of expectations and of the potential contribution of CCS to achieving global climate objectives. The International Energy Agency (IEA) 2013 CCS Roadmap, which set out a vision for CCS deployment consistent with a 2oC target, included a goal of having at least 30 large-scale projects operating by 2020, capturing around 50 MtCO 2 each year. By 2030, this level of CO2 capture under the Roadmap would need to be increased to 2 000 Mt [2]. However, the global project pipeline has actually been shrinking, from 77 projects in 2010 to around 45 today, and the maximum cumulative capture rate of all projects under consideration would be less than 80 MtCO2 per year [3]. Following the success of the Paris Agreement, the need to accelerate deployment of CCS has become more urgent and critical. It is therefore essential that political support for the technology is reignited. This paper will examine the factors that have underpinned political support for CCS, or alternatively which have impeded political support, across a number of OECD economies. It will also consider the role of “arms-length” institutions in delivering CCS projects in select countries. 2. Policy and political support for CCS has fluctuated Since the early 2000’s, there has been growing recognition of the important role that CCS can play as part of a least-cost, global solution to climate change. Indeed, the turn of the century has been identified by some as the “birth of a global vision” for CCS [4]. Modelling by the IEA has consistently highlighted a significant role for CCS in achieving a 2oC target, with CCS contributing as much as 12% of the emissions reductions needed to 2050 [5]. This is the third largest contribution of the basket of technology options considered by the IEA, behind deployment of renewable energy and energy efficiency. Recognition of the role of CCS has also been underpinned by global climate scientists and particularly the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The 2005 IPCC Special Report on Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage (SRCCS) was a major turning point in terms of confirming and communicating the potential of CCS as a climate solution. More recent IPCC reports, including the Firth Assessment Report (AR5) found that CCS may indeed be critical to achieving more ambitious climate targets: “many models could not achieve atmospheric concentration levels of about 450 ppm CO2eq by 2100…under limited availability of key technologies, such as bioenergy, CCS, and their combination” [6]. The IPCC also found that, without CCS, the median cost of achieving atmospheric concentrations in the range of 430-480 ppm would be 138% higher. However, this growing appreciation of the value of CCS has not been accompanied by commensurate growth in political and policy support for the technology. In fact, support for CCS has been inconsistent and at times tumultuous, and has been closely intertwined with progress in global climate negotiations and wider economic conditions (see Fig. 1).

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Fig. 1: The fluctuating support for CCS. Source: [10], modified from [7].

In the lead-up to the COP15 climate negotiations in Copenhagen, and three years after the IPCC SRCC, political support for CCS was at its highest levels. This included a strong focus on deploying large-scale projects, with the G8 leaders pledging in 2008 to launch 20 large-scale CCS projects globally by 2010. This was with a goal to beginning broad deployment by 2020. That same year, Australia’s Prime Minister Kevin Rudd established the Global CCS Institute (GCCSI), which was formally launched in July 2009 at the meeting of the Major Economies Forum in L’Aquila, Italy. At this global launch, Prime Minister Rudd was joined by US President Barack Obama and Italy’s Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi on stage to support the GCCSI objective to “play a significant role in delivering the G8’s goal of developing at least 20 fully integrated industrial-scale CCS demonstration projects around the world by 2020” [8]. Both Prime Minister Rudd and President Obama referenced the need to address the practical challenge of coal in their remarks. Later in 2009, the Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum Ministerial (CSLF) emphasised that these projects were “vital” and recognised that developing countries may need assistance to achieve the level of CCS required to fight climate change. This political support was accompanied by significant financial commitments. Between 2007 and 2010, major funding programmes for large-scale projects had been announced in Australia, Canada, Europe, the United Kingdom and the United States. By 2010, the total of announced global support for CCS projects had exceeded USD 31 billion [9]. This funding was designed to support as many as 35 large-scale projects [10]. However, the level of political commitment and financial support were ultimately not sustained. Of the USD 31 billion pledged, less than USD 3 billion was actually invested in projects in the period 2009 to 2014, with only seven projects† successfully deployed having received support from these programmes [10]. All of these projects are in Canada and the United States. Funding programmes in Australia and most recently the United Kingdom have been scaled back or cancelled. The G8 pledge to have launched 20 new projects by 2010 for operation before 2020 is now not expected to be fulfilled, with only 14 projects commissioned or likely to be commissioned within this decade. There are a great many factors which have contributed to the tapering-off in support for CCS since the highs of 2008-2009. These include the failure of Copenhagen to deliver a global climate agreement, which removed significant political impetus for climate change measures, and the lingering effects of the global financial crisis which put pressure on government budgets ‡. Significant penetration and cost reductions achieved in alternative low

†

Projects operating or currently under construction and expected to commence operation within the next 12-18 months. Although in the United States, significant funding for CCS was linked to stimulus measures in response to the global financial crisis. This included under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.

‡

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emission solutions this decade, including renewables and energy efficiency, have arguably also impacted political support for CCS and fuelled a perception that CCS is expensive, not required, or will only be needed in the longterm. Furthermore, deploying large-scale CCS projects has proven to be more challenging, expensive, and time consuming than many had expected. Some of these challenges are discussed further below. It is notable that, outside of CSLF Ministerial meetings, there has been little in the way of global, collective political leadership on CCS. CCS has not featured in G8 discussions since 2009, and the interest towards CCS has also fluctuated within the Clean Energy Ministerial process. Recent developments give cause for optimism that there could be a revival in political support for CCS. The most significant of these is the historic success of the Paris Agreement, with global political leaders agreeing to limit future temperature increases to “well below 2oC” and to pursue efforts towards 1.5 oC. Achieving these targets will almost certainly require CCS – something that the IPCC is anticipated to confirm in its 2018 special report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5oC and related emission pathways. The inclusion of CCS as a key area of technology focus in the Mission Innovation initiative may also assist with rebuilding a global political consensus on the need to accelerate CCS deployment. 3. What drives political support for CCS? In examining the role of political support in deploying large-scale CCS projects, it is useful to identify key drivers for political “backing” of CCS. This inherently depends on national circumstances and will differ between countries and regions. However, four key areas of political justification for CCS investment can be identified. First of all, most government programmes and statements of support for CCS are based on a recognition of its contribution to achieving long-term climate goals (see e.g. [11]). This is unsurprising, with limited rational for CCS deployment beyond climate change objectives. Unlike renewables or nuclear, CCS is not an energy generation technology– on the contrary, its application to power or industrial facilities actually consumes significant additional energy and adds to the cost of production. Its value is in significantly reducing CO 2 emissions from the use of fossil fuels (or delivering “negative emissions” in combination with bioenergy), which is almost exclusively linked to climate change. Several governments, including in the United Kingdom, have acknowledged that CCS can provide a cost-effective solution to national climate targets in the future, even if the first projects would be expensive to undertake (for example, see [12]). Second, CCS has been identified as a strategically important technology for countries with an economic or energy security-related interest in the continued use of fossil fuels. Resource-rich countries such as Australia and Canada derive significant income from exports of coal and natural gas and hence have had a strategic interest in pursuing the deployment of CCS to support future sustainable use of fossil fuels in these export markets. CCS can also enable the continued domestic use of fossil fuel resources in these countries, with coal and gas often relied upon for secure and relatively affordable energy supply, including baseload power. In addition, fossil fuel industries tend to be major employers, particularly in regional areas, which adds to the political impetus to ensure a sustainable future for the sector. For countries with limited natural resources, such as Japan and Korea, ensuring a diversity of the energy mix which includes fossil fuels is seen to be important from an energy security perspective. In all cases, the development and deployment of CCS technology both domestically and globally would allow these economic and energy security objectives to be maintained in a manner that is also consistent with climate objectives. This has been highlighted by the Premier of the Canadian province of Saskatchewan, Brad Wall, who has been a strong and active supporter of the development of the Boundary Dam CCS Project: “We have been mining coal in Saskatchewan since the 1850s, making it one of the earliest resources to be mined in the province. Although it may not be as well known to those outside of Saskatchewan, it’s just as valuable to those of us who live here. In the southeast corner of Saskatchewan…sits a 300-year supply of lignite coal that is affordable, abundant, and accessible, and has been fueling power plants in Saskatchewan for nearly a century. Today, it’s the baseload fuel of choice for SaskPower, our government-owned power utility, and currently accounts for about 50% of our total power production. It’s also the reason Saskatchewan is the largest per capita emitter of greenhouses gases in Canada.” [13]

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Technology leadership is a third key driver of political support for CCS. As the world transitions to a low carbon economy, new markets will emerge with potential for significant global export opportunities. For example, Chinese investment in new technologies has seen it become the world’s largest exporter of low-cost solar PV panels. Japan is supporting the development of capture technologies by Japanese companies, including through Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) and Mizuho Bank financing of the Petra Nova CCS project in the United States, which uses technology developed by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. Finally, local economic factors have been a driver of political support for CCS, particularly from politicians representing industrial regions. The industrial region of Teesside in the United Kingdom is a case in point. Teesside is home to 5 of the top 25 CO2-emitting sites in the UK, including Europe’s second largest blast furnace, and accounts for 5.6% of industrial emissions in the UK [14]. The Teesside Collective is proposing the development of a CCS hub, positioning itself as the go-to location for future clean industrial development [14]. Lord Bourne, the former Minister of Energy and Climate Change noted his support for the project “What Teesside Collective is doing goes hand in hand with this Government’s ambition to upskill the workforce and support thousands of jobs in the North” [14]. Trade unions have also emerged as supporters of CCS given its potential to preserve emissions intensive industries in carbon constrained economies such as the UK. 4. What is challenging political support for CCS? Although there are compelling economic and environmental drivers which have underpinned political support for CCS, there are also multiple factors which challenge this support – particularly in relation to large-scale project deployment. 4.1 General opposition to CCS Many of the aforementioned factors relate to general opposition to CCS, including those views driven either by ideology or concerns about the integrity of CO 2 storage. While in practice there are many factors influencing political leaders, in the following we use a simplified typology to highlight those that have been identified as the most prominent. 4.1.1 Public opposition Local public opposition to projects has eroded or reversed government support for CCS in some countries. Public opposition has often been based on arguments on long-term risks and the perceived unproven nature of CO2 storage, leading ultimately to claims that CO2 storage is not safe for the wider population. Such opposition has understandably found more support in densely populated areas and in countries with little or no experience with onshore hydrocarbon extraction. Several highly publicised cases of public opposition have had a very strong impact on politics and government policy on CCS: public opposition in Germany resulted in the option of CCS being virtually removed from the climate policy agenda (see case study below). Similarly, the case of the Barendrecht project in the Netherlands, which was strongly opposed by the local community, contributed to the government effectively banning onshore storage of CO2 (while off-shore is still possible). 4.1.2 Lack of support from non-government organisations (NGO’s), driven by opposition to continued use of fossil fuels Another key challenge has been the perception that CCS prevents a transition away from fossil fuels or is acting as a technological greenwash for fossil fuel producers, to justify business-as-usual with a promise of a technological cure sometime in the future. Opposition to CCS on this basis has been particularly focused amongst environmental NGOs, which have consequently given limited, or in some cases no support for CCS. NGO groups have played a key role in shaping the climate discussion in many countries, often exercising significant influence in legislation, or during project-level permitting processes. NGOs are rather heterogeneous in their position on CCS including those opposed to the technology, but many also taking a more realistic view, accepting the fact that CCS is needed to abate emissions in the foreseeable future (see for example [15]). At the more favourable end are the groups who participate in the ENGO Network on CCS: altogether eleven

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NGOs§ have come together since 2011 to advocate for safe and effective deployment of CCS [16]. While clearly not arguing in favour of continued use of fossil fuels, the NGOs in the ENGO Network have taken a rather “realpolitik” view and agreed with the need for CCS. Several other NGOs have traditionally been much more sceptical about, if not outright against, the use of CCS. WWF has seen CCS as a “necessary evil”, accepting its use in certain applications such as industrial CCS or in conjunction with sustainable biomass [17]. Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace on the other hand have consistently opposed CCS. Friends of the Earth have held the view that CCS is part of “false solutions” merely only perpetuating the reliance on fossil fuels [18]. Greenpeace opposes CCS on the grounds of it being costly, unproven and ultimately a distraction from renewable energy investment [19]. 4.1.3 Perceived competition with renewable technologies The perceived competition with renewable energy has been a key factor contributing to limiting political support for CCS. The perceived competition is built on the assumption that CCS and renewables are competing for the same public and private investment dollars. Renewable energy has been politically easier to support over the years. Almost all major economies have a renewable energy programme in place, with targets and support policies, often stressing the reduction of energy imports and the creation of a domestic technology and service industry. Critically, the comparatively lower technical and commercial complexity of renewables has led to a much greater project success rate and uptake of offered government support. Government support programmes for CCS have generally been underspent as projects have failed to progress for various reasons, while renewable feed-in-tariffs, for example, have often been hugely oversubscribed, forcing policy changes. 4.2 Project-specific challenges From the perspective of deploying large-scale CCS projects, there are some significant challenges which have directly or indirectly led to the withdrawal or erosion of political – and often with it, financial – support. 4.2.1 Timeframes for project development CCS projects can take up to a decade to move from conception to operation, particularly if CO 2 storage sites or EOR opportunities are not already available. This means that public funding commitments for these projects will in practice traverse multiple budget – and even political – cycles. For example, the Quest CCS project in Canada, which commenced operations in 2015, secured funding from the Alberta CCS Fund and the Canadian Clean Energy Fund in 2009. The Kemper County IGCC, Petra Nova and ADM Illinois CCS plants all secured government funding through the US Clean Coal Power Initiative in 2008, 2009 and 2010 respectively, and all are expected to come online in 2016-17 [10]. Further, the greatest value of these early projects is arguably in their contribution to future CCS deployment: reducing costs, refining technologies and improving practical know-how. The investments being made by today’s political leaders will bear fruit in future decades, requiring long-term vision and commitment within a context of short-term political imperatives. This isn’t insurmountable, but has been well characterised by the former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair: “Long term, everyone accepts that the needs of economy and environment are in partnership. Short term, there is a clear tension. And we live in the short term” [20]. 4.2.2 High capital and operating costs First-of-a-kind CCS projects can be complex and expensive, particularly when capital investment in new CO 2 transport and storage infrastructure is required, and significant public support will be critical. The ZeroGen Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC) project in Australia, which had received strong political support

§

The Bellona Foundation, Clean Air Task Force, The Climate Institute, E3G, Environmental Defense Fund, Green Alliance, Natural Resources Defense Council, The Pembina Institute, Sandbag, World Resources Institute, Zero Emission Resource Organisation

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from the Premier of the State of Queensland **, was cancelled after cost estimates escalated by 46%, to AUD 6.9 billion 21. This was a result of several factors, including the choice of technology, exchange rate impact, domestic productivity factors and access to suitable storage [22]. In the United Kingdom, one reason for the cancellation of the GBR 1 billion CCS Commercialisation Programme was the perceived lack of “value for money” of the CCS projects in question. However, this assessment failed to consider the long-term role of CCS in achieving the UK’s climate goals (National audit office) as well as their contribution to supporting the transport and storage needs of future projects. In particular, the National Grid Corporation estimated that the transport and storage unit costs of future projects would have dropped by 60-80% using infrastructure put in place by the White Rose project [23]. Early CCS projects will also have higher operating costs that may need to be addressed through ongoing direct or indirect support if the project is to be commercially viable. For projects in the power sector, this can have political implications insofar as electricity prices are affected. For example, the Kemper County IGCC Plant – which is not yet operating – has been partly subsidised by increases in electricity rates, with strong local community and political opposition – including claims that the University of Southern Mississippi raised annual tuition by USD 236 per student, partly to offset higher electricity costs [24]. While the Kemper case is not considered typical – in terms of overall projects costs (approaching USD 7 billion) or in the nature of the subsidies provided – it highlights the potential political sensitivities associated with electricity price increases. 4.2.3 High project “failure” rates The number of large-scale CCS projects globally which have been proposed but have failed to progress to operation outnumbers the successful projects by a factor of two to one [10]. The reasons for this range from inadequate financial or policy support or lack of access to suitable CO2 storage sites to local community opposition [6]. This “drop-out” rate is not necessarily unexpected given the nature of the technology, the requirement for suitable CO2 storage and the fact that many projects may not ever have been developed beyond the initial concept stage. However, there are clear political implications where projects have received significant public funding prior to a decision not to progress – even where the decision is widely considered to be sound (for example, in the ZeroGen case described above). 5. Politics in practice: Country case studies The challenges described above have tested, and will continue to test, political commitment to CCS globally. To better understand how this has impacted CCS deployment in practice, and what factors have been conducive to sustained political support, we will examine a selection of country case studies. 5.1 Norway: Pioneering CCS globally Norway has been one of the early pioneers of CCS technology, with forward-looking policy, research and investment in world-first large-scale CO2 storage projects. The Sleipner project was brought on line in 1996, after the introduction of an off-shore carbon dioxide tax (in the order of EUR 45 per tonne) back in 1991. Snøhvit followed in 2008. The government-funded Technology Centre Mongstad was inaugurated in 2012, and provides a test-bed for new CO2 capture technologies. Political support for CCS in Norway has been relatively stable for over twenty years and this has been the case across all main political parties. Addressing climate change and a related “moral imperative” have been key components in Norwegian CCS policy from early days: it has often been emphasised that as Norway gets significant revenue and wealth from selling oil and gas that will have a CO2 impact elsewhere, the country should be at the forefront in developing CCS technologies [25]. The fact that Norway has been such an important fossil fuel producer and exporter, and that it has been very progressive as regards climate policy has placed CCS in a rather central position in Norway’s energy discussions. It is also noteworthy that in Norway the CCS discussions have not only

**

In 2007, Premier Beattie proposed an increase in coal royalty rates unless the industry increased its voluntary AUD 300 million commitment to CCS technologies, including to invest in the ZeroGen project.

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been retained on the level of expert and technical communities, but have reached government departments, the energy minister and even the Prime Minister. While politics have in general been favourable for CCS in Norway, they have also had their more dramatic side. In fact, Norway is likely to be the only country where a government has fallen, at least partly, linked to a question on CCS. Norway’s then Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik resigned in year 2000 as he lost a vote of confidence over a question on whether to permit gas-fired power stations without CO2 capture technology [26]. This may well be the only CCS-related high-level political casualty to date. Despite the earlier challenges, Norway’s political support for CCS continues to be strong today. The government has a CCS strategy in place, and is in the process of investigating the opportunity to invest a significant amount of public funding to a third large-scale project [27]. 5.2 Canada: Reducing emissions from coal-fired power generation and oil sands Canada has been at the forefront of CCS developments in recent years. On federal level, the Conservative government announced its CAD 1 billion Clean Energy Fund in 2009, including a strong share for CCS projects. The Fund has supported two projects in the Province of Alberta: the Shell Quest project, as well as the Alberta Trunk-line project. The Federal Government also supported SaskPower’s Boundary Dam project in Saskatchewan, with the CAD 240 million committed in 2008, before the establishment of the Clean Energy Fund. In 2011 the Canadian federal government announced regulations to reduce CO 2 emissions from coal-fired generation of electricity. The final regulations were published by Environment Canada in 2012, setting an emissions performance standard of 420g CO2/kWh to all new coal-fired power units, as well as to units that have reached the end of their useful life [28]. Much of Canada’s activity on CCS is however on Provincial level, due to the fact that Provinces largely govern the use of natural resources and can enact support for CCS deployment. On provincial level, the province of Saskatchewan has championed the Boundary Dam CCS project through its crown-owned power utility SaskPower. SaskPower is controlled by the Province of Saskatchewan, which has been governed by the conservative Saskatchewan Party since 2007, currently occupying 50 out of 61 seats in the province’s legislature. The politics of CCS remained relatively stable until the start-up of the CCS facility in 2014, but took a different turn quickly afterwards. Political issues were raised especially during 2015, as the new capture unit did not perform as expected. While the political support by the ruling party for the Boundary Dam 3 project remained stable, the opposition New Democratic Party used issues with the lower than expected performance of the CO 2 capture unit to call into question the Government’s competence. The unit captured 426 000 tonnes of CO2 from January through December 2015 [29]. The New Democratic Party also took issue with the penalty payments that SaskPower issued to a private corporation (Cenovus Energy) during 2015, linked to the lower than agreed volumes of CO2 delivered to its CO2-EOR operations [30]. Another particular element of Saskatchewan politics is the question on carbon tax, which in most cases could be an instrument that could favour CCS investment. While the opposition New Democratic Party supports a carbon tax, the ruling Saskatchewan Party opposes it. Despite the arguments by the opposition, Saskatchewan’s CCS politics have nevertheless not posed serious threats to the Boundary Dam CCS project. In the neighbouring Alberta, home to two large-scale CCS projects (the Shell Quest project and the Alberta Trunkline project), there has however been an explicit change in politics, at least in the rhetoric. Alberta’s long-time ruling party, the Progressive Conservatives, put significant emphasis on CCS as a key technology to deliver emission reductions in the oil-rich province, and committed CAD 2 billion for CCS projects in 2008. However, it subsequently changed its position back in 2014, as then-Premier Jim Prentice announced that the party would support the existing large-scale CCS funding programme, but would not commit any new funds for CCS projects [31]. Such change came about shortly after the cancellation of a third large-scale project in Alberta, the TransAlta Project Pioneer, in 2012, despite a commitment of CAD 795 million to the project by the government [32]. Campaigning for the 2015, Alberta’s New Democratic Party (NDP) vowed to scrap Alberta’s CCS programme altogether. NDP subsequently won the provincial elections by a landslide, but has since toned down its anti-CCS stance. The government has instead stated that it will honour the existing funding and contracts [33].

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5.3 Australia: Ambitions of global leadership have faltered As a major producer, user and exporter of coal and natural gas, Australia has a strong economic and strategic interest in the success of CCS technology. Recognition of this underpinned Australia’s efforts to position itself as a “world-leader” in the development of CCS in the 2000’s. The 2004 Energy White Paper: Securing Australia’s Energy Future, acknowledged carbon capture as part of a suite of technologies that could significantly reduce the greenhouse signature of energy production and use (EWP) [36]. Australia’s approach to CCS development was evaluated as being in the “market leader” category, or more simply, “it was considered to be in Australia’s interest to take a lead role in international efforts to develop and implement CCS” [34]. The EWP provided AUD 500 million in funding towards low emissions technologies, which ultimately included AUD 60 million for the Gorgon CO 2 injection project. Gorgon will be the world’s largest CO 2 storage project when it commences operations in 2017, storing between 3-4 Mtpa. By 2007, climate change was high on the political agenda, with the country in a prolonged drought, and the issue was a major factor in Kevin Rudd’s election as Prime Minister. One of Prime Minister Rudd’s first official acts was to sign the Kyoto Protocol, and in 2008 his government published a final White Paper on the introduction of an emissions trading scheme (the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme), with the intention that it would take effect in July 2010. The Rudd Government also established an AUD 500 million National Low Emissions Coal Fund, to support the development and demonstration of CCS. In May 2009, a further AUD 1.9 billion for a CCS Flagships Programme was announced, to support 2-4 large-scale, integrated CCS projects. These projects were to be Australia’s contribution to the G8 pledge to have 20 projects operating by 2020. One of the programme criteria was that projects needed to commence operation by 2015, an ambitious timeframe when there was limited confidence in CO2 storage options. Australia’s political and financial support for CCS was expanded internationally – and at the highest levels – in July 2009, with the launch of the Global CCS Institute at the G20 meeting in L’Aquila, Italy. Prime Minister Rudd was joined by US President Barak Obama to announce the establishment of the Institute, which was to receive funding of AUD 100 million per year. The original aim of the Institute was to contribute to accelerated deployment of an international portfolio of industrial-scale CCS projects globally [35]. However, this period of unprecedented support for CCS did not last, and closely paralleled the loss of momentum in climate policy. Kevin Rudd’s CPRS had been twice rejected by the Senate, any prospect of bipartisan support for the scheme was lost with a change of leadership in the Coalition Opposition party, and Copenhagen’s COP15 failed to deliver a global climate agreement. Prime Minister Rudd ultimately deferred plans for the CPRS in April 2010. Progress with the CCS Flagships Programme also faced challenges. Four projects had been shortlisted for initial funding in December 2009, including the high-profile ZeroGen IGCC project in the state of Queensland. This project was cancelled a year later, with project costs estimated to be around AUD 6.9 billion – well beyond the funding that was likely to be available [22]. Between 2010 and 2014, the remaining Flagship projects were all significantly scaled-back, with a focus on CO2 storage development rather than integrated projects. The AUD 1.9 billion in Flagship funding was reduced by successive governments, to now total around AUD 300 million. The 2015 Australian Energy White Paper acknowledged a role for CCS but positions Australia as an early adopter of capture technology while focusing investment in storage capacity development [36]. CCS was not mentioned in Australia’s Independent Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) in the lead-up to the COP21 climate negotiations, nor its Mission Innovation pledge. Funding for CCS R&D was announced in 2016 – around AUD 26 million – but there remain no plans for large-scale project deployment beyond the Gorgon CO2 injection project, which will commence operation in 2017. The 2015 Australian federal election also highlighted that neither of the major political parties have a strong commitment to CCS, with no mention of CCS in either party’s preelection policies. Australia’s political aspirations to be a world leader in CCS now appear to be all but abandoned. 5.4 United Kingdom: Strong support for CCS succumbed to budget pressure There has been broad political consensus in the United Kingdom on the role of CCS in meeting ambitious domestic emissions reduction targets, which has underpinned the development of a comprehensive CCS policy

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framework. However, ultimately there was insufficient political capital in CCS to prevent the GBP 1 billion CCS Commercialisation Programme funding from being cut given the competing budgetary priorities. The UK has attempted to bring about several CCS projects over the past 10 years, with a low success rate. In 2007, BP pulled out of the first attempt to construct a CCS project at Peterhead in Scotland, after the UK government announced that funding would be awarded based on a competition. BP considered that a new process would take too long for the company to take advantage of its declining Miller oil field as storage site. In 2007, the Government subsequently launched a procurement process to support the UK’s first commercial scale CCS demonstration project. In October 2010, up to GBP 1 billion was made available to contribute to the capital costs of this first project, and the UK CCS Demonstration Programme was launched to deliver the next two to four projects. Demonstrating the cross party support for CCS in the UK, the 2007 procurement process was launched by a Labour Government, while the appropriation of GBP 1 billion was a commitment in the coalition agreement between the Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties following the 2010 election. The competition came to an end in 2011 after the only project left standing, Scottish Power’s Longannet project in Scotland, failed to reach agreement with the government. However, the coalition Government further showed its commitment to CCS in 2011, when the Prime Minister confirmed in Parliament [37] that the funding for CCS would be safeguarded for use on future projects following the collapse of Longannet. The “ringfencing” of the GBP 1 billion was particularly significant given the Government was dramatically cutting public spending at the time following the global financial crisis. Starting in 2012, the third phase was entitled “UK CCS Commercialisation Programme”. Among four bidders, two (Peterhead and White Rose) were selected for detailed engineering studies with the initial aim of reaching final investment decision by 2015. As well as keeping the GBP 1 billion of capital support available for CCS projects, the Coalition Government now also introduced a mechanism to support the operation of CCS on power projects through the Electricity Market Reform (EMR) in 2012. Amongst a number of measures to support low carbon electricity generation, the EMR included a feed-in-tariff with a contract-for-difference (CfD) mechanism for power produced with CCS. However, in November 2015 the UK government announced that the GBR 1 billion ringfenced capital budget for the CCS project(s) would no longer be available, effectively ending the Commercialisation Programme. In hindsight, it would appear that the support for CCS from the Coalition Government was largely due to pressure from the Liberal Democrats given that the funding was withdrawn shortly after the Conservatives won the 2015 election in their own right. The Conservatives acknowledged rhetorically the importance of CCS, however amongst competing budgetary priorities, preferred to withdraw funding from CCS in favour of other more politically sensitive areas. Following the withdrawal of the funding, support for CCS has still been politically driven, coming largely from Members of Parliament with strong industrial constituencies. There is also growing support from trade unions and regional industry associations who recognise that CCS can offer a lifeline to high emissions industries in a carbon constrained future. In contrast to the Australian general election in 2015, almost all major political Parties in the United Kingdom mentioned CCS in their pre-election policies [37]. The Conservatives highlighted that investment in CCS was a key part of their climate response [38], while the Labour Party focused on the potential of CCS to secure the future of the offshore oil and gas industry [39]. Both Parties had released papers setting out their vision for CCS development in 2014. Yet despite this bipartisan support, the cancellation of the CCS Commercialisation Programme, with no prior notice, was met with a relatively muted response. Lisa Nandy, Labour’s shadow energy secretary, said: “CCS offers huge economic opportunities for Britain. Year after year the prime minister has personally promised to support CCS, so this is a huge betrayal.” [40] The industry and shortlisted projects responded with understandable surprise and disappointment, but there was almost no political fallout from such an unexpected and significant decision. This underscores the challenges of building sustained political commitment to CCS in the absence of strong community or NGO support.

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5.5 Germany: Public opposition takes CCS out of the mix CCS has proven a particularly controversial technology proposition in Germany, raising high emotions amongst politicians, NGOs and civil society groups. Against the backdrop of an energy transition strategy strongly based on renewable energy and the phase-out of nuclear power, attempts at building CCS projects, and passing CCS-related legislation, have been met with strong resistance and complicated politics in Germany. A political clash on CCS was particularly apparent during the period 2009-2012, when the German Federal Government was implementing the EU Directive on Geological Storage of CO 2. With the cross-party support of the then Christian Democrat and Socialist Party coalition government, a first draft bill transposing the Directive was presented to the Parliament in April 2009, but the process ground to a halt ahead of federal elections in September, as the coalition withdrew the bill. After the election, a new much watered-down version of the bill was presented and subsequently passed, limiting the law to a mere demonstration law. The law sets a limit to the volumes of CO2 that could be stored underground to 1.3 MtCO2 per project per year and 4 MtCO2 in total in Germany per year. The politics around the passing of the German CCS legislation showed sharp divisions between the Federal and the State level, with several of the Bundesländer highly sceptical of CO2 storage in their territories. The States represented by the Bundesrat played a critical role in limiting the scope of the law, also including a strong opt-out clause for the Bundesländer from CO2 storage activity. Politics were at play more widely during this time, as the media reported extensively on the progress with the legislative process, and on CCS as a technology more generally. Media coverage did not help the case of CCS, as much of it has been deemed rather negative [41]. Since the passing of the much watered-down CCS law, the prospects of deploying carbon capture and storage in Germany have all but disappeared. While Germany continues a level of efforts in research and development and in international collaboration, the earlier idea of Germany being one of the early CCS developers and users has been buried. 6. Taking the politics out of CCS: A role for “arms-length” institutions? Developing large-scale CCS projects, including CO2 transport and storage infrastructure, in the short to medium term will require significant investment of public funds – potentially hundreds of millions of dollars. This investment is also closely aligned with climate policy approaches. It is therefore impossible to imagine that the development of these projects could occur in political vacuum. However, global experience, and particularly the case studies identified above, suggests that certain conditions can help to foster long-term political support for CCS project implementation. The first of these is strong and consistent bipartisan or multi-party support. This is arguably the most important factor for ensuring the sustained political support required by CCS projects being developed over relatively long timeframes. This has been a salient feature of the Norwegian experience. Second, a national strategy for climate mitigation that includes a) strong climate targets and b) a clear articulation of the role of CCS in meeting these targets. This is important for communicating the role, and future value, of CCS over the medium and longer term. Third, support from proactive and engaged environmental NGOs can provide a trusted and influential voice in public dialogue. In Norway, Bellona has had a particularly positive impact on promoting policies necessary to support CCS. Finally, global leadership through key international bodies has acted as a catalyst for CCS policy commitments at a national level, including the original (but ultimately unsuccessful) G8 pledge for 20 projects to be operating by 2020. Organisations such as the CSLF and now Mission Innovation could play an important future role in supporting CCS project investment. In addition to these key factors, alternative institutional frameworks could help to “de-politicise” the deployment of CCS projects and allow political support to be maintained from a more “arms-length” perspective. This includes the creation of government agencies to progress CCS deployment objectives or the establishment of private consortiums tasked with similar objectives. In Norway, Gassnova has been established since 2005 as a state enterprise with three key areas of focus:

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1) Technology development, including the CLIMIT research and development programme and the CO 2 Technology Centre Mongstad, which allows suppliers can demonstrate and refine CO2 capture technologies before they are commercialised; 2) Full-scale CCS deployment, including studying the possibility for full-scale CCS in Norway, at existing and potential CO2 emissions sources, with a goal of having a full-scale CCS demonstration facility in place by 2020. 3) Advice, acting as a technical advisor and export for Norwegian authorities and climate policymakers. Gassnova has been the project coordinator of Norway’s program to identify a least one technically feasible CCS chain with corresponding cost estimates. Three feasibility studies have been completed at industrial sites, and all will now move to more detailed engineering with the announcement of NOK 360 million (approximately EUR 40 million) in funding in Norway’s 2017 Budget 42. Gassnova enjoys a reputation as an effective, expert advisor on the development of these CCS projects in Norway. In Japan, Japan CCS Co. Ltd was established in May 2008 by a group of 24 major companies with expertise in CCS-related fields, including electric power, petroleum, oil development, and plant engineering [ 43 ]. The organisation has been commissioned by the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) to undertake a significant proportion of the country’s CCS programme, including investigations of potential CO2 storage sites and the management of the Tomakomai CCS demonstration project. The UK Parliamentary Advisory Group on CCS has recently recommended the establishment of a CCS Delivery Company (CCSDC), which would initially be government-owned but could eventually be privatised. The company will have the responsibility of managing “full-chain” risk and will be responsible for the progressive development of infrastructure focused on industrial hubs to which power stations and other emitters could deliver CO2 which, for a fee, will be pumped to appropriate storage [44]. In addition, the IEA has proposed that a storage-driven approach to CCS development, led by a governmentbacked Public Storage Agency (PSA) could be an effective way of driving investment in CCS with a view to widespread deployment [10]. While not specifically considered from a political perspective, such an approach could also help to ensure that the long-term decisions around CO2 storage development can be made in an environment that is somewhat insulated from the shorter-term political and budget cycles. The approach also recognises that significant government involvement in early CO2 storage development will be required, and this is arguably best managed on a day-to-day by a dedicated and expert organisation with strong government backing. Looking beyond national approaches, there may also be potential for an analogous approach to CCS development on a global scale. This would be particularly the case for CO 2 storage development, with a global agency promoting consistent methodologies for the identification and characterisation of CO 2 storage resources, advancing global understanding of CO2 storage potential and ultimately accelerating development. If CCS deployment is to be expanded to a scale contemplated in 2oC climate scenarios – with as much as 6 GtCO2 being captured and stored by 2050 [5] – new approaches and global coordination may need to be considered in global climate forums. The establishment of “arms-length” organisations to deliver CCS would not replace the need for strong political commitment and support – indeed, political support will be required to establish their initial mandate and to ensure continued, adequate funding. However, this approach may assist with ameliorating some of the more acute political challenges associated with deployment of large-scale projects, including by providing concentrated expertise and greater flexibility for the management of project development over longer time periods. 7. Could Paris shift the political landscape for CCS? The success of the Paris Agreement in 2015 could represent a major turning point for CCS and provide the impetus needed to reignite high-level political support for investment in large-scale projects. The Agreement includes strengthened climate targets, including a target of “well below 2oC”, and provides a framework for climate action that looks beyond 2050, including a goal of achieving a “balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks” in the second half of this century. The Agreement also invites Parties to communicate, by 2020, “mid-century, long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies” [45]. Within this context of ambitious temperature targets and longer-term timeframes, the role of CCS will become harder for governments to ignore. Successful implementation of the Paris Agreement will require national climate

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strategies to be strengthened and expanded, and in particular will require a policy response that goes beyond the current emphasis on renewable energy and energy efficiency. The challenge of reducing emissions industry, which account for 26% of global CO2 emissions, will need to be addressed – and CCS is one of the few options available. Emissions from existing fossil fuel assets must also be considered. There is currently 1 950 GW of coal-fired power generation globally, with a further 250 GW under construction. Around 500 GW was added since 2010 [5]. Premature closure of much this coal fleet – necessary to achieve a 2oC target – may prove even more politically challenging than deploying CCS. Furthermore, gas is expected to provide crucial flexibility for renewable dominated grids in the future, however the emissions from gas-power will also need to be addressed. Implementation of the Paris Agreement could therefore increasingly see CCS emerge as a key part of the global climate response, and indeed even as a key barometer of a country’s commitment to a well below 2oC target. However, it must be acknowledged that there is still a significant gap between the ambitions of the Paris Agreement and today’s climate response. The INDCs submitted in the lead-up to COP21 were consistent with future temperature increases of 2.7oC, and only 10 out of 162 identified a role for CCS. Without a significant strengthening of climate policy action – not just ambition – policy and political support for CCS may remain inconsistent. 8. Conclusion The “politics” of CCS will ultimately determine whether it reaches its potential as a key part of the global climate response. Widespread deployment of CCS will require a strengthened climate response, targeted policy support and government leadership – it is clear that markets alone will not be able to drive CCS deployment at the pace and scale needed to meet climate targets. An examination of political support for CCS in different countries can therefore be useful in understanding what factors are aiding, or alternatively challenging, the politics of CCS project deployment. Support for CCS has fluctuated in the past, with high-profile funding announcements, raised expectations and ambitious programme goals followed by declining interest and support as the challenges of first-of-a-kind CCS projects became more apparent; and as global climate negotiations faltered. Despite recent momentum in project deployment, the limited number of large-scale projects in operation falls short of what is required to support rapid “learning by doing” technology cost reductions. This has created somewhat of a vicious circle, with slow progress in CCS contributing to declining political interest in supporting the technology, notwithstanding the continued emphasis on the importance of CCS in achieving climate targets by the IEA, IPCC and others. The Paris Agreement may provide a “circuit-breaker” for this vicious circle, by obliging Parties to set out long-term visions for their energy transformation, as well as tangible policies to drive change. This will almost certainly require a re-focusing on CCS by global political leaders.

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