However, life under the military regime of Desi Bouterse drove many Surinamese people to emigrate to the Netherlands at the beginning of the 1990s (CGM,.
Transnational activities of migrant organizations in the Netherlands and political participation: the case of the Surinamese organizations Annelien Meerts, Gery Nijenhuis & Annelies Zoomers International Development Studies, Utrecht University First draft – not to be quoted
Introduction The potential of migrants to promote poverty reduction and development in their regions of origin – which is generally referred to as the ‘migration and development nexus’ – is a hot topic on the development agenda. Several seminars on this issue have recently been held, such as the 2006 UN Migrants in Development Cooperation conference, the three Global Forums on Migration and Development, and the Brussels-based M4D initiative, which explicitly targets civil society. In addition, several host countries have developed specific co-development programmes aimed at supporting migrants’ transnational activities and linking these to development (IFRI, 2008; Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010). Migrants are enthusiastically welcomed in international development cooperation for two reasons. First, the role of remittances, and particularly the amount of money sent back to areas of origin, is recognized. In many countries, the flow of remittances surpasses the ODA flows, and in some countries is even larger than FDI flows. Second, migrants1 who are involved in transnational activities are considered ‘bridge builders’ between communities and development organizations in both their countries of origin and their countries of settlement. Since they know the language and culture of both countries, they are considered capable of building the capacity of communities in their countries of origin and linking them to development organizations in the North. They are thus expected to contribute to sustainable poverty reduction and development in their regions of origin (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, 2009). The increased popularity of migrants as development actors is also related to the fact that newly acquired insights have allayed the fear that transnational activities inhibit integration into host societies. Snel and colleagues (2004) and Portes and colleagues (2007) show that migrants who develop transnational activities are not less integrated in their countries of settlement than migrants who are not involved in such activities, and that in fact most migrants who undertake transnational activities are well integrated. These authors also point to the pivotal role of migrant organizations in the process of political incorporation. Many practitioners take for granted the bridge-builder function and developmental role of transnational migrants and migrant organizations. It is also acknowledged that apart from the impact of their remittances on economic development, migrants can also play a role in the development of the political and social systems in their regions of origin (van Naerssen et al., 2008). However, little empirical evidence for this is available in the European context. Research has tended to focus on migrants’ remittances, their integration in their countries of settlement and their construction of identity (Snel et al., 2004). Only a few studies have looked at development in countries of origin in a wider sense, such as the contributions of migrants to political 1
In this paper, ‘migrants’ are people who were born abroad (first-generation migrants) or have at least one parent who was born abroad (second-generation migrants).
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and social systems. Moreover, few studies have been conducted at the meso level (that of migrant organizations), since most focus on the household (de Haas, 2009). It is, however, important to focus on the meso level, since migrants need a certain degree of institutionalization in order to sustain their transnational activities, which is the core of transnational research (Van Amersfoort & Van Heelsum, 2007). The study of migrant organizations and their contribution to development in areas of origin is still in its infancy. Portes (2007; 2008; 2009) is one of the pioneers in this field. He analysed the way ‘Colombian, Dominican and Mexican transnational immigrant organizations pursue philanthropic projects that stimulate the development of their country or community of origin’ and the consequences for political incorporation in the countries of settlement (Portes et al., 2007, 242). To our knowledge, similar studies have not been conducted in the European context. This study aims to fill part of this vacuum by focusing on Dutch-based migrant organizations and their wider networks in relation to their countries of origin. As such, it builds upon the research of Portes and colleagues (2007; 2008; 2009) and will generate new knowledge on the contribution of migrant organizations to the political incorporation of their members and to development in the migrants’ regions of origin. This paper first sketches the scene, by presenting a thematic overview on migrant organizations, transnational activities and political participation. It then provides insight into the main background and characteristics of our study on the transnational activities of Dutch-based migrant organizations, including the current state of the art. Finally, it presents the preliminary findings of one of the partial studies, namely that on the transnational activities of Surinamese organizations and political participation. We argue that the great majority of development activities undertaken by Surinamese organizations comprise small-scale projects that do not adhere to the main mantra of today’s development cooperation: capacity building. Most activities comprise the sending of goods or the provision of infrastructural support. As such, these activities could be classified as private or ‘fourth-pillar’ activities.
Transnational activities by migrant organizations and development: a review of the literature Many scholars argue that the relation between migration and development is controversial (Fargues in IFRI, 2008). It is assumed that the development of a country will in the long term ease the strong migration pressure on low-skilled people (ibid.). In the short term, however, migration and development are interlinked (IFRI, 2008). ‘Development is a factor of exile and exile a factor of development’ (ibid., p. 3). As the living conditions of people in developing countries improve, people’s incentive to move increases. They first move to the urban peripheries of metropolises in the South, then towards the West. On the other hand, migration is a factor of development, since remittances improve the conditions of those who remain in the countries of origin. Migrants thus bring economic well-being to regions of departure, and also create dependency in sending areas. Some regions receive substantial remittances from migrants and are thus dependent on the migrants’ countries of settlement (ibid.). Previous studies have shown that people who receive remittances from abroad are less competitive in agriculture and business (Gubert, 2007 in IFRI, 2008). Although there have been several debates on the link between migration and development, no clear-cut answer has been provided and there are various views on the issue (see also van Naerssen et al., 2008). In the past, neoclassical authors considered migration beneficial for development: migrants create money flows to the South, and this balances the distribution of resources. However, most migrants send money to their families or friends, and these might not be the neediest of people. Others, such as dependency thinkers, viewed migration as the instigator of brain-draining, and therefore as the cause of further inequality. 2
More recent theories on migration and development focus on migration as a group behaviour. Proponents of the new economic labour migration paradigm (NELM) stress that migration is a strategy for households to diversify their income, and thus secure a certain standard of living (van Naerssen et al., 2008). Moreover, transnationalist approaches look at ties between people in different countries. Many migrants maintain contacts with their countries of origin for at least a generation. Globalization and new communication and transport facilities make it easier for them to do so (Faist, 2000). The social networks of migrants play an important role in their decision to move or stay, and to move to particular communities or places. These social networks thus consist of and stimulate various relationships (e.g. economic and social relationships) between people in the countries of origin and those in the countries of settlement (van Naerssen et al., 2008). This is why many researchers refer to migrants as transnationalists: ‘people at home abroad […] integrated in the society of settlement, but at the same time part of a wider community’ (van Amersfoort & van Heelsum, 2007, p. 240). Transnational migrant systems Transnationalism has become a dominant paradigm in migration research (Lacroix, 2009). A transnational system refers to ‘sustained ties of persons, networks and organizations across the borders across multiple nation-states, ranging from little to highly institutionalized forms’ (Faist, 2000a, p. 189). A transnational system is characterized by a high density of ties between individuals, organizations and networks, ties that can be both material and symbolic (Faist, 2000a). It thus opposes the duality of an international system of states, since it emphasizes ‘a sphere of multifaceted, polycentric social networks’ (Lacroix, 2009, p. 1697). According to Lacroix (2009), mobility, fragmented social space and cultural hybridity are the fundamental characteristics of transnationalism. The actors in a transnational system are very mobile and they are involved in the social life of both their countries of origin and their countries of settlement. Through efficient organization and modern means of transport and communication, it is possible to be involved economically, socially or politically in one place while living in another country. The social space of a transnational community is thus fragmented (ibid.). Cultural hybridization – a process in which elements of the culture of the migrants’ countries of origin and elements of the culture of the countries of settlement are blended into new traditions – is also sometimes called ‘third space’: ‘An in-between space […] where hierarchies between cultures […] become untenable’ (Bhabha in Blunt & Wills, 2000). Transnational systems thus allow migrants to find economic, cultural and psychological resources to escape the bounded categories like race, nation or citizenship (Lacroix, 2009). Transnational systems are heterogeneous. There are, for instance, multinational companies, migrant organizations and a wide range of specialized networks (Lacroix, 2009). Faist (2000) distinguishes three types of transnational systems: transnational kinship groups, transnational circuits and transnational communities. This study focuses on transnational communities, in which ‘international movers and stayers are connected by dense and strong social and symbolic ties over time and across space to patterns of networks and circuits in two countries – based upon solidarity’ (ibid., p. 207). Communities ‘encompass all forms of relationship which are characterized by a high degree of personal intimacy, emotional depth, moral commitment, social cohesion and continuity in time’ (Nisbet in Faist, 2000). Although spatial proximity is absent from transnational communities, people and organizations in the community have a high degree of social cohesion and a common repertoire of symbolic and collective representations. Transnational communities emerge on several levels, ranging from village communities in emigration and immigration countries, to a higher level, such as diaspora communities of Kurds or Jews (Faist, 2000). As previous research has pointed out, many transnational migrant systems function in a bilocal way. Migrant organizations help migrants to integrate in their countries of settlement and they implement development interventions in their countries of origin, which creates economic 3
development (MPI, 2008). This bi-local function of the transnational migrant system forms the focus of this study. It is elaborated upon in the following two sections. Migrant organizations and political incorporation in countries of settlement Migrant organizations are important for understanding migration and integration processes. The extent to which migrants cluster can be seen as a measure of ‘collectively expressed and collectively ascribed identity. The character, number and size of organizations indicate the extent to which immigrants want to profile themselves as being different or how they are seen to be different by others’ (Schrover & Vermeulen, 2005, p. 824). Although many people think that migrants who have close ties with their countries of origin are not integrating in their countries of settlement, research shows the opposite. The MPI study (2008) shows that migrant organizations in the USA, besides stimulating migrants’ transnational activities, offer all kinds of services to help their members integrate into American society. ‘They provide a safe and familiar setting for migrants to gain basic assistance in adjusting to their new communities’ (MPI, 2008, p. 15). Migrant organizations give migrants information not only about housing, day-care or health services, but also about language and integration courses, and sometimes provide such courses. Migrant organizations also connect migrants with each other and thus help to build a migrant network. MPI (ibid.) showed that migrant organizations promote the active citizenship and political participation of migrants in American society. They give their members the skills required to become involved with community organizations and help them to enhance their organizational skills. Almost all members of migrant organizations are also members of non-migrant community organizations (ibid.). The findings of Portes and colleagues (2008) are in line with these results. They show that members of Latino migrant organizations2 have strong bonds with their countries of origin but are also well integrated into American society (Portes et al., 2007). Most of these organizations maintain close ties with American civic and political activities; for instance, they encourage migrants to stand for elective office, organize debates, provide political information to the immigrant community or participate in political campaigns. In addition, all leaders of the organizations stress that there is ‘no contradiction between home-country loyalties and activities and US citizenship and voting’ (Portes et al., 2008, p. 1056). At the European level, research on the contribution of migrant organizations to the integration of transnational migrants in Europe is still in its infancy. Studies focusing on the integration of individual migrants show the same results as the American studies on migrant organizations. Snel and colleagues (2004; 2006) conclude that migrants’ transnational activities are not a barrier to political incorporation. They argue that those migrant groups that are generally less integrated (e.g. Moroccans, Antilleans) are not engaged in more transnational activities, nor do they feel a stronger identification with their countries of origin than better integrated groups of migrants. The study also shows that there is no relation between, on the one hand, transnational activities and identification with the country of origin, and on the other hand, several factors that determine the level of integration (e.g. knowledge of Dutch, contact with Dutch people, employment, level of education). Van Heelsum (2008) adds that ‘an active and interwoven immigrant community seemed to have a positive effect on political participation, particularly voting’ (p. 7). Most migrants in the Netherlands exercise their right to vote; they mainly vote for left-wing parties. Compared to the native Dutch population, however, migrants cast their votes less often. This is ‘generally seen as a consequence of low educational levels’ (ibid., p. 3). Among migrants, Turks and Surinamese vote more often than other migrants. As for active political incorporation, the percentage of migrants on the councils of big cities in the Netherlands (e.g. Amsterdam, Rotterdam) is similar to the percentage
2
This study looked at 90 Colombian, Dominican and Mexican organizations.
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of migrants in the populations of those cities’. This, however, is not the case in smaller municipalities. Turks are the most politically active migrant group (ibid.). Migrant organizations and their contribution to development in the countries of origin Empirical knowledge on the contribution of migrant organizations to development in the countries or regions of origin is limited. As Khachani (2009, p. 1620) stresses: ‘the impact of migrants’ new investment practices […] calls for a new approach to understanding migration which emphasizes its impact on the country of origin.’ Studies by Portes and colleagues (2007; 2008) and MPI (2008) show that migrant organizations make a fair contribution to development in the regions of origin. Migrant organizations have direct lines of communication with organizations in their regions or countries of origin. While Dominican and Colombian forms of transnationalism resemble well-known philanthropic institutions (such as Rotary or Lions clubs), Mexican transnational activities are more focused on hometown civic associations. A reason for this difference is the background of the migrants: Mexican migrants are mainly low-skilled labour migrants, while Colombians and Dominicans are higher educated. The transnational activities of migrant organizations cover a wide range, such as providing scholarships for students, assisting poor families, supporting orphanages and schools (Colombians), fund-raising for political activities in the countries of origin, providing emergency assistance after natural disasters (Dominicans), promoting hometown committees and sponsoring town festivities (Mexicans) (Portes et al., 2007). These results are underlined by MPI (2008): the study shows that migrant organizations cooperate with several actors in both the countries of settlement and the countries of origin to promote development. Examples are international NGOs, governments in the countries of settlement and/or origin, and the private sector (ibid.). In general, the transnational activities of migrant organizations form part of the migrants’ daily experiences, which explains why many transnational activities continue even after migrants have been in their countries of settlement for a while (Portes et al., 2007). Knowledge on the contribution of European migrant organizations to development in the countries of origin is even more limited than knowledge on their contribution to political incorporation. A quantitative study on the role of migrant associations in local development in Burkina Faso concludes that such associations are ‘powerful instruments of change in rural areas’ (Beauchemin & Schoumaker, 2009, p. 1910), although they do not directly invest in economic or productive activities. The research by Van Naerssen and colleagues (2006) on African migrant organizations in the Netherlands are in line with these results. The contributions of African migrant organizations are particularly in the field of education and health-care. These are small-scale projects (Van Naerssen, et al., 2006). Linking migrants to development: the emergence of co-development policies Both donors and immigrant populations seem to have very high expectations regarding the contribution of immigrants and their organizations to development (Beurden, 2006; Godfrain & Cazenave, 2007; Schüttler, 2008; Ionescu, 2006; Bakewell, 2009). This leads to the establishment of co-development programmes aimed at linking immigrants and their organizations to development processes in the relevant region of origin. In many countries, special groups and commissions are now working on ways to involve immigrants in development processes in their regions of origin. The enthusiastic reception that co-development receives suggests that it has become an important theme and a new, innovative approach within development cooperation. Although research on specific co-development initiatives and their development impact is relatively scarce, the issue of co-development does appear in a substantial number of policy review and discussion papers. Some authors see the value-added of immigrant organizations to 5
development cooperation, but emphasize that ‘it is still too early to announce the wedding’ (van Beurden, 2006). Others recognize the potential, but say that additional issues such as the motivations of donors to involve immigrant organizations in development, the role of local governments in the programmes, and discussions on accountability and equity should be put on the agenda if the initiatives are to be a sustainable success (Bakewell, 2009; Gubert, 2006). Finally, some are rather sceptical about the development potential of co-development efforts; they cite, for example, the mixed policy aims of national donors or the lack of theoretical consensus on the relation between migration and development (Khoudour-Castéras, 2009; de Haas, 2006; Grillo & Riccio, 2004, pp.107-109).
Migrant organizations and transnational activities: the Dutch research context Background The 1.5 million migrants in the Netherlands represent approximately 20 per cent of the country’s total population. Half of these migrants are second generation (CBS, 2010); that is, they were born in the Netherlands. Immigration to the Netherlands gathered pace from the 1950s onwards, starting with the arrival in 1951 of Moluccan men who had served in the Royal Dutch East Army and were thus entitled to emigrate with their families to the Netherlands. They were followed later in the 1950s and in the 1960s by a huge number of Indonesian Dutch, who were repatriated following Indonesia’s independence (Rath, 2009). Today, the four largest (and oldest) migrant groups in the Netherlands are the Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese and Antillean migrant groups: together, they account for 65 per cent of the migrant population in the Netherlands. These groups started to arrive in the Netherlands in the 1960s. The Turks and Moroccans came to fill vacancies in certain labour-intensive industries (mining, clothing, etc.), and were facilitated by the Dutch government through labour migration schemes (Rath 2009). Immigration from Suriname and the Dutch Antilles was at first mainly for educational purposes: middle and higher class families sent their children to Dutch colleges and universities. Later on, in the 1970s, immigration from Suriname was driven by political motives. More recently, the Netherlands has received immigrant inflows from Afghanistan, Somalia, Iraq and Iran. Many of these immigrants are seeking asylum from the political situation in their home countries. Dutch immigration policy over the years can be briefly summarized as a one-way road to integration – and the road has no longer turn-offs towards multiculturalism. The Dutch government plays an important role in the process of integration, a role that Rath (2009, p. 679) labels ‘neoetatism’. In recent decades, immigration management has become increasingly important, following EU policies in this field. This tendency can also be observed in the recent attempts to align the migration and development agendas, resulting in the formulation of co-development policies. However, a close look at these policies and their budgets reveals that circular and return migration continue to dominate (Nijenhuis & Broekhuis, 2010). Nevertheless, some funds are available to migrants and their organizations to finance their development activities in their countries of origin. Some of these funds are managed by co-financing agencies, namely development NGOs that receive money from the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs to fund activities in the South. An example is the Linkis initiative, which is a joint effort between several large co-financing agencies to facilitate the low-threshold funding of private actors (citizens). A third of this funding is made available to immigrant initiatives (Linkis, 2010). Over the course of time, thousands of migrant organizations have been established. IISG (2010) puts the figure at 6,200. This number refers to a highly varied group of organizations, including social, religious (churches, mosques), cultural, sports and other organizations. Some of 6
these are formal organizations registered at the chamber of commerce, while others are informal organizations, such as the many non-registered Ghanaian Home Town Associations. The study This study focuses on the organizations of seven migrant groups in the Netherlands, that is, the Surinamese, Moluccan, Turkish, Moroccan, Ghanaian, Chinese and Somali migrant groups. There are several reasons for selecting these groups. First, the Turkish, Surinamese, Moroccan, Chinese and Moluccan groups are the largest non-Western minorities in the Netherlands; the Somali and the Ghanaian group rank eleventh and thirteenth, respectively (CBS, Statline, 2009) (see Table 1). Second, these migrant groups have established more than 3,600 organizations in the Netherlands (Van Heelsum, 2004). Hence, they are accountable for approx. 58 per cent of the total estimated number of migrant organizations in the Netherlands. Third, each group has its own migration context, which might be an explanatory factor for differences in the transnational activities of the migrant organizations. Molucca and Suriname were once Dutch colonies. Most of the migrants from these two countries entered the Netherlands following the independence of Indonesia (1945) and Suriname (1975); emigration was easy for them, since their passports allowed them entry to and residence in the Netherlands. Turks and Moroccans came to the Netherlands as labourers from the 1960s onwards. After WWII, the Dutch government invited many unskilled, and therefore cheap labourers to help rebuild the country. Although the intention was for them to leave after a while, many stayed on and brought their families over (van Heelsum, 2004). Ghanaian and Chinese migrants are also economic migrants, although they were not recruited by the Dutch government. Most of them have entered the Netherlands since the 1970s (CBS Statline, 2010; Sankofa, 2010). Finally, the Somali (and a minority of the Ghanaian) migrants are political refugees, and have migrated mainly since the 1986 civil war. Previous research shows that many of their migrant organizations are aid oriented. Since there are several tribes in Somalia, each of which has its own migrant organization in the Netherlands, the number of Somali migrant organizations is relatively large (Van Heelsum, 2004). It is important to note that most of the migrant groups from the seven countries are heterogeneous. As mentioned, there are several tribes in Somalia. The population of Suriname consists of Indo-Suriname (Hindustanis), Afro-Suriname (Creoles) and Javanese people. The social networks of Afro-Suriname people are more open and less dense than those of Indo-Suriname people (Vermeulen, 2005). Most migrants from Morocco are Amazigh people, from the Rif mountains, and there are many Kurds among the Turkish migrants. Migrants from Ghana and China also have different ethnicities. All these groups have founded their own organizations in the Netherlands. It is assumed that the ethnicity of an organization’s members influences the organization’s activities; for example, Hindu-Suriname people also have many development projects in India.
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Table 1 The seven migrant groups compared to the rest of the Dutch population, 1 January 2009
no. of people Chinese 50,377 Ghanaians 19,733 Moroccans 341,528 Somalis 21,798 Surinamese 338,678 Turks 378,330 Moluccans 40,0006 Total 1,150,444 Source, CBS Statline, 2010
% of total population3 0.3 0.1 2.1 0.1 2.1 2.3 7.0
% of total migrants4 1.5 0.6 10.4 0.7 10.3 11.5 35.0
% of total nonWestern migrants5 2.8 1.1 18.9 1.2 18.7 20.9 63.6
We formulated the following research questions for this study: 1.
What are the main characteristics of the migrant groups’ organizations, with respect to background, membership, internal organization and evolution over the years?
2.
To what extent are these organizations involved in transnational activities with their regions of origin, and what are the main characteristics of these activities?
3.
What is the developmental impact of these transnational activities, and what kind of development dimensions can be distinguished?
4.
To what extent are these organizations involved in activities that stimulate migrants to become politically incorporated in the Netherlands, and what are the main characteristics of these activities?
5.
How do the transnational activities of the organizations relate to political participation, and how does this compare to the situation in the USA?
First, it is important to define the concepts used in this research. Defining ‘migrant organizations’ is complicated, also because of the multiplicity of terms used by academics (Moya, 2005). There are two criteria that an organization has to meet in order to be considered a migrant organization in this research: it must have been founded by migrants and more than half of its members must be first- or second-generation migrants. By ‘development’, we mean processes of change brought about by the transnational activities of migrant organizations, and expressed in social, economic, cultural and political dimensions. As such, we have opted for a more qualitative and holistic approach. The aim is to establish not so much what impact migration has on development, as how and what kind of development is accumulated by migration related dynamics. 3
The total population of the Netherlands on 1 January 2009 was 16,485,787. The total number of migrants in the Netherlands on 1 January 2009 was 3,287,706. ‘Migrants’ are people who were born abroad or have at least one parent who was born abroad. 5 The total number of non-Western migrants in the Netherlands on 1 January 2009 was 1,809,310. ‘Non-Western migrants’ are migrants from Africa, Latin America, Asia (excluding Indonesia and Japan) or Turkey. Thus, all migrant groups in this research (except the Moluccans) are non-Western migrants. 6 This figure is from van Heelsum (2004).
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‘Political incorporation’ in this study is understood as political participation – by voting, canvassing, lobbying for group and common interests, making monetary contributions or supporting political candidates. Approach The research design incorporates a three-step approach: 1)
Select the 30 most important organizations per migrant group, using a multiple entry points approach, through existing inventories and interviews with experts and leaders of migrant organizations/umbrella migrant organizations.
2)
Interview representatives of these organizations in order to gain a better understanding of the organizations, their activities in the Netherlands and in the countries of origin, and their views on development and political incorporation.
3)
Collect data in the countries of origin of the seven migrant groups, in order to gain a better understanding of the activities of the organizations, the partner organizations and the development impact. Select a sub-sample per migrant group, and interview the leaders and members of the partner organizations and with other local stakeholders, such as the target group and the local government.
Data collection is still in an early phase. So far, we have: –
Interviewed representatives of 17 Turkish organizations, of which 15 are umbrella organizations. The interviews revealed that hardly any Turkish organizations are involved in transnational activities: although mosques collect money and individuals send remittances, we did not encounter any transnational activity at the organizational level. A few Turkish federations collect money during Ramadan and send it to local NGOs in Muslim and nonMuslim developing countries.
–
Interviewed representatives of 23 Somali and Ghanaian organizations in the Netherlands.
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Almost completed the process of selecting Moroccan organizations whose representatives we will interview in the Netherlands.
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Interviewed representatives of 18 Surinamese migrant organizations the Netherlands, representatives of 2 Surinamese umbrella migrant organizations, a staff member of each of 8 partner organizations in Suriname, and 10 representatives of the target group.
The Surinamese case presented in the following still needs some additional data collection in the Netherlands, and as such the findings presented here are preliminary.
The case: transnational activities of Surinamese organizations Migration of Surinamese people to the Netherlands To understand migrant organizations in the Netherlands and their counterparts in Suriname, some background information is needed. This section provides a brief summary of the history of Suriname and its country characteristics, and elaborates upon the history of the emigration of Surinamese people to the Netherlands. 9
Suriname is situated between Guyana and French Guiana on the east coast of South America. The country became independent in 1975, after over 300 years of Dutch colonial rule. During the colonial period, African slaves, Hindu labourers from northern India, and Javanese and Chinese people from the Dutch East Indies were taken to Suriname to work on the plantations (de Schoolmeester, 1983). In 1980, Desi Bouterse overthrew the civilian government in a military coup. Opposition parties were banned and the new regime became a socialist dictatorship (Kruijer, 1977). Despite this, many Surinamese people hoped that the new government would put an end to corruption and improve their standard of living. The Dutch initially accepted the new government, but their relationship cooled following what came to be known as the ‘December killings’: on 8 December 1982, fifteen members of the political opposition were murdered by the army (Verschuuren, 1994). Civil war erupted in 1986, after the anti-government ‘Jungle Commando’, led by Ronnie Brunswijk, helped the Maroons7 in the interior to resist suppression by the military regime. These disturbances, combined with international pressure, weakened the military regime and finally led to a democratically elected government in 1991 (ibid.). During this new political era, the Surinamese economy became more diversified and less dependent on Dutch assistance. The country had long had an income from bauxite mining, but now also benefited from the exploitation of oil and gold; many gold diggers, mainly from Brazil, entered the country. Agriculture remains an important source of income, although tourism/ecotourism is providing new opportunities. The majority of Suriname consists of rain forest; the Central Suriname Nature Reserve was established to conserve it. In July 2010, Desi Bouterse was re-elected president, despite charges against him for the December killings. Compared to other countries, Suriname is a middle-income country (World Bank, 2011). It has significant economic growth and the division of the economic sectors indicates that the country has a diverse economy. Development indicators show that while 70 per cent of the population lives below the poverty line, Suriname scores relatively well on, for example, life expectancy and literacy. The flow of emigrants from Suriname has always been towards the Netherlands. For many years, hundreds of students, nurses, teachers and labourers went to the Netherlands, and about the same number returned to Suriname (CGM, 2010). Emigration to the Netherlands increased in the 1960s, and rose dramatically in the 1970s: in 1974 alone, some 400,000 Surinamese people arrived in the Netherlands (Figure 1). It was a highly varied migratory flow, consisting of Hindu agrarians, urban Creoles, Chinese, Maroons and even descendants of plantation owners (boeroes) (Bovenkerk, 1983). The main driver of this increase was Surname’s independence in 1975. Many Surinamese did not have much faith in Suriname as an independent nation, and they feared political unrest, since frictions between Creoles and Hindustanis were increasing (CGM, 2010). Emigration to the Netherlands peaked again in 1979 and 1980 (Figure 1). The main reason for this was the introduction of the visa duty. However, life under the military regime of Desi Bouterse drove many Surinamese people to emigrate to the Netherlands at the beginning of the 1990s (CGM, 2010). By 2010, there were more than 185,000 Suriname-born people living in the Netherlands. Moreover, the number of second-generation Surinamese migrants had risen to almost 157,000. The total number of Surinamese migrants in the Netherlands was approximately 342,000 (ibid.), or about 70.3 per cent of the total population of Suriname.
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Maroons are the descendants of African slaves who worked on the Surinamese plantations. They escaped and ran away to the interior jungle, where they lived in isolation for many decades.
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Figure 1 Number of Surinamese migrants to the Netherlands (1950-2010)
Legend Blue line: Immigration from Surinam Pink line: Emigration to Suriname
Source: CGM, 2010
Many Surinamese migrants are relatively highly educated, particularly in comparison to other migrant groups (CBS 2010). According to some authors, most of the highly educated Surinamese now live in the Netherlands, since the fragile social and political system in Suriname means that it is risky for them to work there (Van Heelsum & Voorthuysen, 2002; Bureau Jansen, 2011). Although the majority of the Surinamese in the Netherlands can be considered integrated, their labour participation is relatively low, particularly among youngsters (Bosma, 2009). Characteristics of Surinamese organizations in the Netherlands The Surinamese community in the Netherlands has an large number of organizations: a network analysis by Van Heelsum (2002) refers to 900 Surinamese organizations at the national level. Some of these organizations were founded in the 1960s. Most organizations are divided by religion and/or ethnicity (ibid.). As stated, we interviewed representatives of 18 Surinamese migrant organizations in the Netherlands, representatives of 2 Surinamese umbrella migrant organizations, a staff member of each of 8 partner organizations in Suriname,8 and 10 representatives of the target group. The majority of these organizations were established relatively recently, namely since 1990. This might be related to the decline of the Surinamese economy following the military coup (1980 – 1989), which led to the closure of factories and plantations and an increase in poverty. The respondents said that they had created organizations in response to the worsening economic situation in Suriname. Suriname is our country. We’re concerned about Suriname; we have our roots over there and we don’t want the country to deteriorate. We want to do something, and that is why we give support.
Another reason that was mentioned concerns the emancipation and integration of the Surinamese in the Netherlands: The reason for founding this organization was that many Surinamese had questions about Dutch laws. Moreover, we wanted to promote social events so that Surinamese can meet each other.
In line with these motives, it is not surprising that the main aim of 60 per cent of the organizations is to improve living conditions in Suriname. For 30 per cent of the organizations, the main aim is to 8
Of one Dutch-based Surinamese organization, we interviewed two Surinamese counterparts.
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strengthen the social and economic position of Surinamese people in the Netherlands, and as such these organizations are more focused on integration of the Surinamese population in the Netherlands. We were interested to see how the organizations would classify themselves, so we asked them to state whether they see themselves as a ‘migrant organization’ or a ‘development organization’. About two thirds said that they see themselves as a development organization: Helping people in Suriname is our main goal. We are not really a migrant organization since we – as a Hindu organization – help Hindu people as well as other people. We’re not a migrant organization! That’s what we look like from the outside, but when we founded the organization we never thought ‘Let’s found a migrant organization’. We just wanted to improve the quality of education in Marowijne [a district in Suriname]. Two organizations consider themselves primarily a migrant organization: We are migrants and many members of our families still live in Suriname. A couple of organizations do not consider themselves migrant or development organizations. We’re not a development organization, because we do not directly bring development to Suriname.9 Moreover, we are not a migrant organization, since we do not see ourselves as migrants. Dutch people see us as migrants, but that’s not how we feel. However, one organization considers itself both a migrant organization and a development organization. All the organizations we interviewed are foundations, managed by a board. This implies that they do not have members, but stakeholders. Generally, we can distinguish between two different types of stakeholders: active stakeholders (volunteers who organize activities) and passive stakeholders (visitors of activities). Most organizations do not exactly know the number of stakeholders, and estimates range between 50 – 1,500 stakeholders. Most boards are relatively small, with four to six members, and the far majority of these board members have a Surinamese background: 87 per cent of the organizations count with board members born in Surinam. Only 5 organizations have a mixed board, and count with Dutch members. Although there is a board, in practice there is often one person who can be considered as the ‘engine’ of the organizations. Of course, this makes the organizations very dependent on one person, and therefore vulnerable. Accessing funds All the organizations stated that they receive funding from several sources; on average, they have 2.4 types of income sources. In most cases, they receive funding from private donors, often family members and friends. Most organizations also receive money from companies and development organizations (Table 2). Board members and volunteers often ask their employers to sponsor their organizations. Companies can also sponsor organizations in kind by, for example, distributing mailings free of charge. Two Dutch funding agencies were mentioned quite often: Seva Network Foundation and Cordaid, which run programmes that are especially designed for migrant organizations. Other development organizations that fund these organizations are NCDO, Oxfam Novib, Wilde Ganzen, 9
Interview with an organization that distributes warm meals to poor children at various primary schools in Paramaribo.
12
Kinderpostzegels and Wings of Support (a foundation established and financed by KLM). The organizations also raise their own funds by, for instance, selling products, organizing dance performances, renting out their premises, giving lectures on Suriname and holding fund-raising dinners. The organizations do not receive any funds from any of the Dutch government programmes that are specifically designed within the framework of migration and development (co-development programmes), in contrast to the organizations of other migrant groups (e.g. the Somali and Ghanaian organizations). Table 2 Surinamese organizations’ sources of income Source of income
No. of organizations receiving such income
Private donors
12
Subsidy from national government
1
Subsidy from municipalities
4
Dutch Consulate
0
Development organizations
8
Companies
9
Schools
1
Churches
1
Health institutions
1
Service clubs (Rotary, Lions)
1
Income-generating activities
5
These funds make up an annual budget, which varies substantially among the organizations: some have a budget of only 2,000 euros, while others have 78,000 euros to spend. Not all organizations knew (or perhaps wanted to reveal) their annual budget (Figure 2).
13
Figure 2 Annual budget of the Surinamese organizations, in Euros
Activities in the Netherlands Although most of the organizations focus on development activities in Suriname, they all also undertake activities in the Netherlands, which is one of their objectives. However, their main mission in the Netherlands is strongly related to their overall goal: to promote development in Suriname. One organization added to this that they also aim to help Maroon people to find their way in the Netherlands. The majority of the organizations said that raising funds for development in Suriname is the main objective of their activities in the Netherlands. These activities can be divided into five categories: 1) informing people in the Netherlands about Suriname and/or their development initiatives; 2) fund-raising to finance development activities in Suriname; 3) organizing cultural activities; 4) providing training; 5) helping homeless people in the Netherlands. The first two activities were mentioned by 10 of the 18 organizations. They also form a logical combination: the organization delivers a presentation, and after the presentation, the public is asked for a donation. Of course, having heard about the project, people are more willing to donate. Cultural activities – such as music and dance performances, Surinamese cooking workshops and the celebration of Surinamese festivities (Divali, Independence Day) – were mentioned by 5 organizations, and 4 mentioned training (computer lessons, applying for a job, helping with homework, etc.). Transnational activities In line with our expectations, Suriname is the main country in which activities are undertaken. Notwithstanding this, three organizations also implement projects in other countries: one of the Hindu organizations also implements development interventions in India, while two organizations also send goods to Curacao, Nigeria, Morocco, Turkey, Romania and Ukraine. The organizations explained this multinational focus by the presence of personal contacts: there are contacts and a certain need, and thus there is a project. However, all the organizations focus on Suriname. Almost all organizations work with a partner organization in Suriname; in the majority of cases, it was the Dutch-based organization that established this partner organization in Suriname, because it needed an implementing organization. As such, this can be considered a mirror organization. This approach was confirmed by the partner organizations in Suriname: They pushed us to establish the organization; they needed our help, our support. Other organizations undertake their activities in collaboration with a public sector agency – such as schools or health institutions – or work not with a partner, but with volunteers. 14
Following this, it is tempting to conclude that the majority of the transnational activities are supply-driven: the Surinamese organization in the Netherlands takes the first step to initiate activities. That, however, would be jumping to conclusions: In Suriname I worked as a school teacher. When I moved to the Netherlands, I received letters from schools in Suriname that needed materials. That was my motivation to start an organization. In addition, I wanted to do something for my country. The fact that the Dutch organization founded the organization does not mean that they are the Surinamese partner’s only donor. Overall, all Surinamese partner organizations have additional sources of income. They attract other cooperation partners, such as companies and NGOs, in order to acquire financial support, knowledge and network. There is a relation between the extent to which the Surinamese partner depends on the funds of the Dutch organization, and the influence the Dutch-based organizations has on the development activities. In the case of the four Surinamese partner organizations that are heavily dependent on their Dutch partners, the Dutch organizations have a major influence on the development interventions. In addition, it seems that organizations that already existed are better able to determine the development intervention by themselves. In mirror organizations, the Dutchbased organization has more influence on the development intervention. In fact, there are only two development interventions in which the Surinamese partner organization determines the actions of the organization. The director of a hospital provided us with a good example: We as a hospital chose certain brands of medical instruments, because the people here had knowledge about these instruments. They knew how they work and how to repair them. I did not accept other brands of medical instruments when Dutch organizations offered them to us. Not all these organizations understood this. They said: ‘I thought you needed medical instruments.’ The transnational activities of the organizations can be classified into four categories: the sending of goods (33.3%), educational projects (33.3%), social projects (27.8%) and health projects (5.6%). One third of the organizations send containers of goods to Suriname. Most of these goods (printers, books, bikes, chairs, etc.) are used in schools or hospitals or for social projects. Examples of educational projects are the renovation of schools, helping preschool children to learn Dutch, giving warm meals to poor children to improve their school results, and a project in which young boys are sheltered in a home and their education is paid for. Social projects include building houses for people living in the interior, caring for the elderly, building a shelter for semi-criminals and creating a social workplace for the handicapped. Health projects are, for example, starting a diabetes programme and educating nurses and doctors on such subjects as anaesthesia and operations. In approximately 65 per cent of cases, the main target group of the activities are children and youths. Although 20 per cent of the activities have a more national focus, the large majority are very localized and target a specific area, such as Marowijne or Nickerie (two of Suriname’s ten districts). One third of all activities are implemented in the capital, Paramaribo. The city is centrally located and has good infrastructure, such as a harbour and roads that connect Paramaribo to the rest of the country. In addition, it is the seat of the government, which makes cooperation easier. Impact The majority of the projects implemented can be classified as basic needs provision: they cover the primary needs, focusing on the sending of goods and the provision of health-care, school breakfasts, etc. In the development discourse, there is a lot of a critique of such projects: these projects are not aimed at sustainable development at a longer term, but only aim at short term relief. Also, it would 15
be better to purchase such goods locally, to stimulate the local economy. One of the organizations commented on this: Of course, I understand that argument – but how can I refuse goods? I see people in the Netherlands throwing away goods that are still fine, that are just a bit old fashioned, and at the same time I receive letters in which people plead for computers. In that case, it’s better to ship them to Suriname, to give them a second life. Also, the quality of goods from the Netherlands is much better than those produced locally. All organizations emphasized that their activities contribute to development in Suriname. The most frequently mentioned argument (mentioned by eight organizations) is that they offer certain services or materials to people in Suriname that are not otherwise available. For instance, nurses were trained in diabetes care and can now give diabetics better assistance. Another example is Dutch lessons for preschool children living in the interior. A second argument is that their activities strengthen the capacities of the Surinamese partner organization and target group, or that is their intention to make the development intervention self-sufficient. An example of such a project is the library: people pay a small amount of money to borrow the books. This money is used to make minor repairs and to finance the project. Some organizations were quite critical about the development dimension of their activities: When we started, our project was not very sustainable, we only sent goods; that is a good solution for the worst need. Right now, our projects are much more sustainable: we are working on the transfer of skills and our projects should be able to run independently after three years. Collaboration The Surinamese organizations, and particularly their partners in Suriname, said that they are satisfied with the cooperation: The chair of our Dutch partner organization is a very inspiring woman, and she is a good people manager. .... Our Dutch partner gives very useful feedback. They are very involved in our organization and our projects. The director of a Surinamese partner organization stressed that he lives in the Netherlands and his colleagues from the Dutch organization live in Suriname, so they know both systems. All Surinamese partner organizations stated that working with Dutch Surinamese people has certain advantages: They know both systems, you only have to say half a word and they will understand what you mean. […] They know the culture and living situation in Suriname. […] They understand things quickly and we do not have to explain to them many things. […] The chairman of our Dutch partner is from Moengo. He knows the situation well […] He has long experience with development interventions, and because of that he is able to arrange many things. There were, however, also some critical comments about the cooperation between the Dutch-based and the Surinamese partners. Some Surinamese partners said that the Surinamese organizations in the Netherlands hold an image of Suriname that is no longer correct: the Netherlands and Suriname are two different worlds. Other Surinamese partner organizations confirmed this and said that the Dutch organizations should be more aware of the changing context in Suriname:
16
Some of the goods we receive do not fit into modern Suriname. We’ve received computers and printers that are really old fashioned; so dated that we decided not to use them. As stated, apart from the Surinamese organizations and their partners in Suriname, there are other actors involved, at least financially. Five organizations collaborate with the Surinamese government. One of the Dutch-based organizations that ships goods to Suriname arranged this in such as way that they do not have to pay import duties. Moreover, the Surinamese army stores and distributes all the goods. In another project, officials from the municipality of Rotterdam are helping government officials in the Marowijne district to set up an information centre. Some Surinamese partner organizations also receive partial funding from the Surinamese government. The government, for instance, pays part of the salary of the employees of one of the Surinamese organizations. There are also some organizations that merely inform the government about their development interventions. These organizations stated that they ‘passively cooperate’ with the government, because they have to. Government permission is needed to, for instance, build schools or erect other buildings. Who else is going to pay the teachers and donate a piece of land? We’re able to recruit teachers and build a school, but for the rest we need the government. However, some organizations do not want to involve the Surinamese government as a stakeholder. According to these Dutch-based organizations, the government works slowly and is corrupt and bureaucratic. Most importantly, though, there is no funding available. Some organizations avoid contact with the Surinamese government and do not even ask for permission to, for instance, renovate schools, which officially is a government task. Political participation Only a minority of the Surinamese organizations are involved in activities that are oriented towards political participation. Not surprisingly, the organizations that promote the integration of Surinamese people in the Netherlands are included in this group. Paying attention to politics in their radio broadcasts, by interviewing all kinds of Dutch politicians, is an example. Other activities embrace information meetings about Dutch politics, in particular before national elections. In this way, people are encouraged to vote or become politically active. Some organizations explain the lack of politically active Surinamese organizations by the fact that the political participation of Surinamese people in the Netherlands was formally assigned, as an issue that needs resolving, to the Surinaams Inspraak Orgaan (SIO; Surinamese constitutive body). SIO was set up by the Dutch government to represent the Surinamese population and their organizations in the Netherlands. The leaders of three Dutch-based organizations are politically active in the Netherlands: one is a member of the liberal party (VVD), while two are city councillors. The leaders of two of the Surinamese organizations are politically active: both are government MPs. However, the number of politically active board members of the Netherlands-based organizations and their Surinamese partners is small. None of the Surinamese organizations or their partner organizations is formally engaged in political activities in Suriname. They added to this that political engagement would affect their neutral position and, as such, could hinder matters when, for example, collaborating with the government. The view of the partner organizations on this is even more explicit: they stressed that Netherlands-based organizations should not try to play a role in political participation in Suriname: They’ll say ‘You went away in the seventies and left all the problems behind. Suddenly you’re going to tell us what we should vote!’ 17
Helping people and connecting that to politics seems attractive, but it is a not an option. It will always exclude a certain group of people. Transnational activities and integration: an unhappy marriage? All respondents in the Netherlands were asked to respond to several statements. These statements concern the role of migrant organizations in enabling or weakening migrants’ ties with their countries of origin and their integration in the Netherlands. Table 3 shows the responses to the statements. Table 3: The seven statements and the responses given, in percentages (N=15) Statement
To be a member/stakeholder of a migrant organization helps migrants to maintain ties with the country of origin Migrant organizations stimulate their members/stakeholders to keep ties with their country of origin Membership/stakeholdership of a migrant organization helps migrants to find a job, a network and personal support It is possible to become a Dutch citizen and be faithful to the country of origin Membership/stakeholdership of a migrant organization slows down the attainment of Dutch citizenship It is possible for migrants to integrate in the Dutch society and to participate in social and political life in the country of origin at the same time This organization contributes to the active participation of migrants in Dutch society
Totally disagree
Disagree
0.0
33.3
Disagree nor agree 0.0
0.0
46.7
0.0
Agree
Totally agree
No opinion
53.3
13.3
0.0
6.7
33.3
6.7
6.7
13.3
20.0
33.3
33.3
0.0
0.0
13.3
0
60.0
20.0
6.7
13.3
46.7
13.3
0.0
6.7
20.0
0.0
13.3
6.7
53.3
20.0
6.7
0.0
20.0
0.0
46.7
20.0
13.3
There is much debate about whether migrant organizations help their stakeholders maintain their ties with people and organizations in their country of origin and whether they stimulate their stakeholders to maintain these ties. Although two thirds of the respondents agreed or totally agreed with the former statement, the latter statement had fewer proponents. Only 40 per cent of the respondents stated that migrant organizations stimulate their stakeholders to maintain their ties with the country of origin. Several respondents stressed that keeping or stimulating ties with the country of origin is not the main goal of an organization, but that it is possible. Other stated that they do not need an organization in order to maintain their ties with Suriname. The respondents were slightly positive about the statement whether migrant organizations are able to help migrants to find a job, social networks and personal support: 66.7% agreed or totally agreed with the statement.
18
A migrant organization can help a person to build a network or give personal support, but in the end a migrant has to do it himself. The most consensus was on the fourth statement: 80 per cent of the respondents stated that it is possible to become a Dutch citizen and be loyal to Suriname at the same time. There were, however, some remarks: What is loyalty? […] When I am loyal to Suriname it also means that sometimes I turn my back on the Netherlands. Another respondent added: When you choose to live in the Netherlands, you create a distance between Suriname and yourself. This means that you cannot be loyal to both countries. More than half of the respondents disagreed or totally disagreed with the statement that being involved in a migrant organization slows down the process of integrating into Dutch society. However, some of these respondents stressed that this does not apply to Surinamese people, since those who were born in Suriname before its independence in 1975 have a Dutch passport. The statement whether it is possible to both integrate in the Netherlands and participate socially and politically in Suriname also provoked diverse reactions. A couple of respondents stated that it is possible to participate socially in Suriname, but not politically. When a migrant gives his opinion about politics in Suriname, many Surinamese people are insulted. They say: ‘You’ve left Suriname, so don’t interfere with our politics!’ About two thirds of the respondents agreed or totally agreed with the statement that their organization contributes to migrants’ more active participation in Dutch society, while 20 per cent disagreed.
Concluding remarks The Surinamese organizations present us with a special case for two reasons: Suriname is a mosaic of different migrant groups and thus has a very heterogeneous population, and many of the Surinamese people who migrated to the Netherlands are already well integrated (those who migrated before 1975 hold Dutch passports, and the vast majority speak Dutch very well). This is reflected in the focus of the Surinamese organizations we interviewed: the vast majority concentrate on development activities in Suriname, and do nothing related to integration in the Netherlands. This finding might be a result of our approach, since we selected only those organizations that undertake development activities in Suriname. However, the fact that Surinamese people in the Netherlands are already well integrated might play a role in this. According to a study by Liem and Veld (2005), their average educational level increased, as did their labour market participation and monthly income, in particular compared to other minority groups. Surinamese people also score highest on sociocultural integration, as expressed by, for example, emancipation and their contacts with autochthonous Dutch people. A study by the SCP (2007) concludes that 85% of Surinamese people living in the Netherlands feel at home; 39% consider themselves Dutch, while 40% state that they have two identities: they see themselves as Surinamese and Dutch. A closer look at the transnational activities of the organizations revealed that these can be characterized as activities that address basic needs: sending goods and materials for use in social 19
sectors (education, health) and providing infrastructural support (construction). Some of the projects also embrace capacity building, such as training. All but one are small-scale development projects. Looking at these characteristics, the transnational activities of the organizations fit very well into the category of private or ‘fourth-pillar’ activities. Private initiatives (PIs) are defined by Schulpen (2007) as organizations of citizens that initiate development interventions in the South. Examples of such PIs are the tourists who started an orphanage after the 2004 tsunami in India, the group of backpackers who built a school in Nicaragua and migrants who support their birth villages. Their activities range from ‘brick-and-mortar’ activities (the provision of basic services in the form of small, temporary projects) to more complex, larger and permanent interventions, such as microfinance (Meerts, 2009). The role of PIs in development is heavily debated – at least, in the Netherlands. According to Kinsbergen (2007), PIs contribute to sustainable poverty reduction and play an important role in strengthening the support for development cooperation. As such, they are considered ‘billboards for development cooperation’ (Westra 2008, p. 61). Other authors level severe criticism at PIs, blaming them for making the same mistakes as traditional development actors, such as bilateral aid channels and development NGOs. In this respect we can mention a lack of ownership, donor-driven interventions, a paternalistic attitude and the inability to generate sustainable development on a higher level of scale (Schulpen 2007). Although some of these comments also touch upon the Surinamese organizations we interviewed, there are other characteristics that do not apply to these organizations. An example is the critique that some PIs work in isolation, without any contact with local governments or other NGOs. Our group of Surinamese organizations does collaborate with a variety of actors, such as the various government levels, the army and other NGOs. As such, they seem to be embedded in local and national governance structures. This might be related to the fact that the Surinamese organizations have a migrant background and, as such, are rooted in Suriname. The preliminary findings of our study show that Surinamese organizations in the Netherlands focus mainly on transnational activities, which can be characterized as relatively small, low-budget, ‘brick-and-mortar’ activities; they are, however, embedded in local and national governance structures. It will be interesting to see whether this is also the case for the other migrant groups in our study, as they have different migratory backgrounds and different positions in Dutch society.
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