VIOLENCE AND PEASANT LIFE Ethnographic reconstruction of the violence of everyday life in La Macarena, Colombian Amazon1
Nicolás Espinosa Menéndez
[email protected]
How to quote this article: Espinosa, Nicolás. 2006 Violencia y vida campesina. Revista Colombiana de Sociología No. 27. Bogotá. (Translation)
Abstract This article addresses the influence of frameworks of violence and conflict frameworks on everyday life in Sierra de la Macarena, a region located in Colombian Amazon. Ongoing violence in the region is mainly linked to the armed struggle between the State and Marxist insurgents. Amid the coca eradication plan carried out by the Colombian government, farmers here have experienced a “violence of everyday life,” which in turn has resulted in its normalization in the social sphere. In consequence, suffering caused by war has become routine, and farmers have adopted a set of strategies to address the conflict. Key words: Farmers, colonization of the Amazon, guerrilla, Colombian conflict, Sierra de La Macarena.
Introduction By mid-2007, rumors were rapidly spreading that the eradication of coca crop had reached La Macarena. To confirm it, I met in late September with a National Parks official, who had recently addressed municipal authorities announcing: “God willing, manual eradication will begin in October.” I had arrived in La Macarena with two researchers dealing with coca farming. One of
Manual eradication made its entrance to La Macarena in 2005, following an attack by Farc, a communist guerrilla organization, against an Army patrol, resulting in 29 deaths.1 A reserve zone, this region has been the epicenter of environmental debates on the dangers of aerial defoliant spraying. The government was forced to opt for manual eradication instead, which took
them announced the official that she had gone to the eradication area near the Guayabero River. After listening to the official’s story, I said: “If God exists, He would not approve manual eradication.”
1 “Por atentado de las Farc el Gobierno decidió iniciar fumigaciones en La Macarena” (After attack by FARC, the government decided to start spraying in La Macarena) August 4 2006 http://www.eltiempo.com/conflicto/noticias/ARTICULOWEB-NOTA_INTERIOR-3066609.html
1
effect six months later. It went on until a land
the municipal human rights office.
mine planted in a coca field killed 14 eradicators in October 2006.
This situation is another example of anti-drug
That day, the government resumed aerial
policies affecting the region. Such policies are
spraying. No environmental debates ensued, and
implemented by the national administration, but
an important part of the story went unnoticed:
the government of the United States has much to
the humanitarian impact of the eradication and
do with it. In La Macarena, it is commonsense to
the forced uprooting of several thousand
assume that the military component of the anti-
peasants. Like an occupation army, thousands
drug budget comes from the U.S. This condition
of men were in charge of the eradication tasks.
renders the possibility of a solution to the coca
Resembling mongooses, they destroyed
problem unlikely, because if farmers found it
everything on their way, be it crops, houses, or
very difficult to gain political recognition from
any kind of property. Since the state considers
the Colombian state, it would be even more
occupation of a national park an illegal action,
difficult to deal with a foreign government.
and since coca fields are embedded into these
U.S. interests affect the lives of peasants in La
parks, the military treated citizens as criminals,
Macarena, via governmental policies and the
and stole many possessions, including chickens,
political and military response to insurgent
houses, and personal belongings. It was,
groups, which in turn resist and respond to the
literally, a scorched earth policy. Yet regardless
state. In the overall context of political violence
of its negative impact, manual eradication is
raging throughout the region, this chapter
here to stay. In 2007, after U.S. aid for the war
attempts to explore how political conditions,
on drugs in Colombia was significantly slashed,
determined outside the region and beyond the
the discourse has changed and the national
will of its inhabitants, are incorporated into
government has acknowledged that manual
everyday life.
eradication is more effective.2
One example of this impact, that I deem worth
Thus, after several spraying sessions, manual
observing, is the introduction of a “violence of
eradication was reinstated in 2007. A call from
everyday life”, which implies, for the peasants,
La Macarena alerted me on the situation.
the normalization of human suffering as
Someone from the town center told me that
something “normal,” observable in multiple
eradication had begun near the river, and
forms (Scheper-Hughes 1997). It is the result of
peasants were already under threat. This is what
the interaction between changing cultural and
me and peasant leaders had expected, so I
social experiences and individual subjectivity
suggested a visit to the local ombudsman and
(Kleinman 2000). Other conceptual elements
2 “¿Por qué Colombia cambió el glifosato por la erradicación manual”? (Why did Colombia trade aerial spraying for manual eradication?)” July 27 2004 “http://www.semana.com/wf_InfoArticulo.aspx?IdArt=105 184
offer clues to understand the social dimension of this concept. For instance, the violence of everyday life can expand and line up with a “culture of terror” (Taussig, 2002), creating a
2
continuum of violence both in public and private
of regulatory patterns that have had a direct
spheres (Bourgois, 2001).
impact on rural life. A detailed study of the
I am, therefore, interested in rescuing
dynamics of armed conflict in this region must
theorizations by the above-mentioned authors on
take into account the hegemonic discourses of
the relevance of certain social forces behind the
the U.S. 'war on terror.' It explains the funding of
violence of everyday life, its incorporation into
a continuous military offensive in the Southeast,
common sense, and the role social experience
under titles such as Plan Colombia in 1998, Plan
plays in it. A fundamental condition must be
Patriot in 2003, Plan Victory or Plan
considered: the political nature of the conflict in
Consolidation in 2007, and every operation
this region. Politics is, then, relevant to define
deployed afterwards by the government.
what political violence is.
Furthermore, it leads to drug eradication policies
One possible answer may come from Charles
that, as a tradition, Colombian administrations
Tilly (1998), who deals with situations of political
have thoroughly followed, focused on complying
conflict involving two or more groups with
with U.S. interests, European requirements, and
disputing interests, one of them being the
UN monitoring (Thoumi 1997, Tokatlian 1997).
government. However, a more comprehensive
In encompassing a global perspective on
concept of conflict would include political
situations that seem to be strictly local, as is the
violence, whenever exercised as “a means of
regional power exerted by FARC and the military
political struggle, either in order to maintain,
response by the state, we can highlight some
modify, replace, or destroy a state model or
regional impacts. Forced eradication produces
society, or to punish a group identity in a human
hundreds of refugees, military abuses over
society because of its social, political, trade
communities, damages to the environment, and,
union, ethnic, racial, religious, cultural, or
as a response, an increase in guerrilla
ideological affinities, whether organized or not”
recruitments among young people, as well as a
(CINEP 1999).
higher hostility towards the government, as I
From this perspective, the social
configuration3
of La Macarena has been developed under a set
have been able to document while conducting fieldwork. Moreover, since the end of a demilitarized zone in 2002, the militarization of
3 For the purposes of this chapter, I understand social configuration as the way communities organize their lives following the political and social patterns derived from the relationship between guerrillas and peasants. These ties have been built around the fragile position of the state in the most isolated Western Amazon areas, which has not meant a vacuum or power or legitimacy for its residents. On the contrary, it has led to the consolidation of power and legitimacy by insurgents, who defy the hegemonic intentions of the state. Several studies have addressed the increasing guerrilla power in peasant regions, such as: Guillermo Ferro (2000), Fernando Cubides (1988), and Reinaldo Barbosa (1998).
social life has become an increasing process: the state exerts most of its presence through the military forces, which in turn impose a strict food blockade on communities, with the aim of avoiding staples and other elements from reaching guerrilla forces. All population movements are controlled by census, photographs, and registration. At odds with these regulations, a considerable number of
3
people have decided to leave the region.
and Fanny Sierra (1995), tell of the lives of
The next section addresses the historical
peasants expelled by the Army from their
panorama of regulatory frameworks intertwined
homeland in Huila and Tolima, who in 1953
in social experience as a result of the
opened their own roads from the East Andean
confrontation between state and insurgent
mountains to San Vicente del Caguán, a
violence. Afterwards, I will present a selection of
settlement ruled by conservatives. Upon their
my field notes to illustrate two representative
arrival, they were not accepted due to their
cases, useful for analyzing the impact of such
liberal political affiliation. They then moved to
frameworks in the everyday life of peasants.
Llanos del Yarí using old indigenous paths, and weeks later they came across the
Frameworks of violence
Gucompieayabero River, located south of Sierra
As a strategy to understand regional violence,
de La Macarena. In this place, they settled next
this section explores the constitutive factors of
to an abandoned rudimentary trail left by Shell's
social conditions lying behind the regional
oil explorers.
settlement process, as well as the regulatory
Some years later, other families would join them.
frameworks of armed conflict that set the
Peasants organized by the Partido Comunista
conditions for a violence of everyday life. The
(Comunist Party) opened new colonization fronts
concept of frameworks implies, in the context of
in Sierra de La Macarena using “columnas de
this research, an interpretative scheme pointing
marcha” (marching columns) (Molano 1983).
to the basic elements that indicate the nature of
Such columns were organized by peasants from
those social forces responsible for political
Tolima and Cundinamarca after the government
violence. I have designed such scheme based
attacked what politician Álvaro Gómez used to
upon a set of notions coming from the social
call independent republics. It was 1955.
movements theory, particularly by assuming the
Columns of peasant families protected by poorly
process of framing as a collective interpretation
armed guerrillas, who nevertheless resisted the
of the world legitimating the collective action of
military offensive, set off from Sumapaz and
social groups (Tejerina 1998). The pertinence of
Villarrica. They moved through steep mountains
this proposal lies in that it enables the
in order to reach El Guayabero Hill, El Pato
recognition of those elements making sense of
(Huila), and the Ariari region. Trochas y fusiles
the state and the insurgence in peasant
(Roads and Guns), a book by Alfredo Molano
narratives, as social forces strongly intertwined
(1998), compiles the columns' experience and
with this region's fate.
provides clues to understand the conditions a regional society has been built upon. An
Colonization and conflict
anecdotal account included in the book
The stories about the first settlers of La
illustrates the impacts of peasant expulsion and
Macarena, compiled by Alfredo Molano (1989)
the feat of these columns capable of crossing rivers and mountains. The commander of the
4
FARC group deployed in Eastern Colombia is
and Meta (Molano 1987), and a violence that
Jorge Briceño (a.k.a. El Mono Jojoy), who spent
grew more acute with the inclusion, in the mid-
his childhood as a member of a marching
1960s, of a new agent in these dynamics: the
column, his teenage years as a guerrilla, and his
FARC communist guerrilla.
adult life as a commander.
Through violence, the settlement of the Amazon
This settlement process was defined by William
has transformed itself. In Dario Fajardo's words,
Ramírez (1981) as “armed colonization.” Even
The scenery of this colonization is,
though it was not the kind of settlement that
clearly, the other chapter in Colombian
drew most dwellers to the region, it was
society, in which the outcomes of the
nevertheless the kind that imprinted the
inflexibility of productive structures and
newborn La Macarena society with a distinctive
policies of internal frontier are projected,
political character. The communists that looked
but in which a space and a community
for shelter in this region were the ones who
has begun to be built, with the harshly
offered their experience in community
won lessons of the conquest and carving
organization, and who led the first collective
of this new world (1989:206).
mobilization initiatives in the 1980s, when settlers demanded a new demarcation of the
Settlers adapted themselves to the environment
natural reserve (Cubides 1988).
and adapted the environment to their own
Since the 1980s, consecutive bonanzas of pelts,
necessities in a peasant-conversion process
fish, wood, marijuana, and coca have attracted
imposed after the exhaustion of resources in the
thousands of peasants and urban dwellers,
extractive economies that dominated the Amazon
many of whom remained in the region once
(Ruiz 2002). Colonization and its conflicts
resources were depleted, or after coca and
established the basis for the nascent regional
marijuana ceased to provide them with a profit.
society, which shares a territory, a history, and a
This settlement process was marked by a
particular peasant transformation of the Amazon
dynamic of violence that expelled Andean
environment.
peasants to the lowlands, and threw them once again to the deep jungle, in a circle that Dario
One of the current conflicts is cocaine, which
Fajardo (1989) considered to be characteristic of
entered the region by the end of the 1970s to
our country. It implies a migration-colonization-
meet with the fertile land of poor farmers
conflict-migration process, whose transfer of
(Molano 1989:300). At first, it reached a bonanza
actors through time and space is a constant
status, but lasted only until 1984, when the
element. The agrarian structures and their
price fell down and farmers were ruined. Cocaine
contradictions are, then, transferred to every
reappeared at the beginning of the 1990s
corner of the agrarian frontier. By mid-twentieth
without a bonanza status, except for a semi-
Century, violence in the Amazon extended its
extractive modality that shaped the farmer
frontier through landlord pressure in Caquetá
rationality. Since then, production has expanded
5
to small and middle-size farms, ranging between
One of the most frequent common places in
3 and 10 hectares of land. The coca business
military jargon for Amazon farmers is “colonos”
transformed itself into a family activity whose
(settlers), a label that, as opposed to academic
profits did not generate a major surplus.
attempts to reevaluate the settlement as a
Coca has been a source of conflicts and violence
process of regional identity construction (Chávez
since it drew the attention of drug dealers, who
1998), suggests completely the opposite: the
tried to control the business. Henceforth,
negation of any links between settlement and
guerrillas whom exerted control throughout the
identity. This is not a mere semantic discussion,
region succeeded in the regulation of production
for the label acquires traceable implications
by taxing the commercial chain. Their influence
when the State utilizes it to advance its anti-
began in 1999, when they became intermediaries
narcotics policy by denying the regional ties of
between farmers, drug producers, and dealers.
this region's inhabitants. This a priori stereotype
The government also saw a similar opportunity
does not take population and settlement into
in the coca business by advocating eradication
account. The children of settlers are those who
in a way that drug dealers are expelled and
currently expand and reproduce their culture
guerrillas are prevented from filling the gaps, but
within symbolic and territorial boundaries
without offering any survival alternatives to
perceived as their own.
farmers.
A press release on the early-2006 eradication
During my visits to the region, I found that,
activities, issued by the Presidential Agency for
behind the historic colonization process revived
Social Action and International Cooperation,
from the 1950s through the 1970s, farmers of
exemplifies how the stereotype operates. In the
the Western Amazon region lost their condition
document, the Agency acknowledges that this
of territorial migrants while settling and rooting
region was populated by settlers, who arrived
in their new lands. The children of this
more than 40 years ago, when the area was not
settlement processes inherited their parents'
yet declared a national park. It also states that
farmer rationality, but did not experience the
settlers' children, who were born here, consider
cultural shock that implied, for example,
this place as their territory, while thousands of
migration from the Andes to the Amazon (Trejo
other Colombians arrived in recent years,
2002). They are the farmers behind the current
attracted by coca4.
regional settlement and expansion. Since they
The information, though not far from the actual
were born, they have endured poor life
history of settlement, was poorly contextualized
conditions, such as lack of education and health
by the director of the Agency, Luis Alfonso Hoyos
care, biophysical limitations, armed conflicts,
Aristizábal, who declared: “Many of these people
and a limited set of productive opportunities, with coca growing as the only viable option.
State violence. Military symbolism
4 See: “La erradicación manual forzosa, de experimento a realidad” (Forced manual eradication, from experiment to reality) Presidential Agency for Social Action. http://www.red.gov.co/Noticias/2006/GME_Macarena_2_2 0_01.htm
6
will end up, like those in Miraflores, leaving the
because I can earn more money as a
region and returning to their homeland, because
hired assassin.”6
what brought them here was coca.”5 This example permits us to observe how state This official interpretation highlights two
authorities construct similarities between coca
fundamental considerations: first, a discursive
farmers and criminal offenders, to the extreme of
strategy to see coca growing as a criminal
cynically ignoring that poverty and state neglect
activity, and second, the strictly repressive
are the fundamental reasons for coca growing.
nature of State actions. In light of this,
Instead, it suggests that the only motivation is a
politicians are guided by a punishment-oriented
drive for profit “(I can earn more money).”
rationalization, so as to consider coca farmers as
In a moral metaphor, we can compare coca
criminals and the coca problem solely as a
growing to the considerations of an assassin
criminal one. In consequence, governmental
towards his pay (“earning more money as a hired
assumptions are far from contributing to the
assassin).” Ultimately, every action against coca
solution of the social problem revolving around
cultivation is seen as legitimate, as it is directed
the lack of economic opportunities for farmers,
against greedy delinquents. To understand the
as well as the environmental conflict related to
utility of criminalization practices, it is useful to
the pressure over natural resources, and the
turn to “If This Is a Man,” a book by the
armed conflict itself –it denies FARC's political
Holocaust survivor Primo Levi (2006). This
status, indeed. These assumptions rather add
author explains how prisoners of concentration
up to the escalation of violence in the region.
camps where treated with rudeness and
In the discursive sphere, it is possible to find
barbarism, as part of a strategy to dehumanize
evidence for farmers' criminalization in official
them and facilitate extermination practices.
narratives. In an interview, Gonzalo de
Such a level of maltreatment allowed Nazis and
Francisco, responsible for social programs at the
their foremen to assume they were dealing with
Empresa Colombia Presidential Agency (now
animals, not humans.
Acción Social) during the Pastrana
The criminalization of peasants, as a
administration (1998-2002), referred to coca
materialization of the governmental discourse,
farmers in these terms:
can be found in military operations that have
We have to explain to those people (coca
taken place in the region. For instance, in
cultivators) that being poor and being
January 2006, the government set out to
abandoned by the state does not give
eradicate coca from La Macarena during the
them the right to be a delinquent (...) It is
operation Colombia Verde (Green Colombia),
as if a workman would say: I refuse to be
thus pretending not only to cut the profits
a workman in a construction work,
5 Idem.
6 El Tiempo, Oct. 2, 2000 http://www.red.gov.co/Noticias/2006/GME_Macarena_2_2 0_01.htm
7
obtained by FARC from coca production, but
which stated:
also to affect farmers. As deduced from such
Supported by security personnel from the
operations, the state considers the civilian
Army and the National Police, eradicators
population as a basket case, a group of criminals
have managed to get into areas that were
functionally linked to guerrillas7. As such, if it
for years in the domain of illegal armed
comes to defeating the rebels, it should be
groups, hosting extensive hectares of
removed too.
coca crops that were directly affecting
No doubt peasant communities represent the
primary forests and important water
vague “social base” of guerrilla groups, but they
sources, which flow into the Guejar,
certainly cover a wide range of independence
Ariari and Guayabero rivers, in the
from combatants, who, above all, do not
departments of Meta and Guaviare, said
recognize citizens' rights either (Ramirez 2002).
the High Presidential Advisor Luis Alfonso
The official discourse does not acknowledge the
Hoyos Aristizábal9.
farmer nature of coca production, let alone the distinction between peasants and guerrillas. The
The report did not mention the humanitarian
next excerpt from a speech by former President
crisis caused by the intervention nor the farmers'
Álvaro Uribe, regarding the 2007 eradication
need for assistance, a duty assigned to the
operations in the region, illustrates how the
agency issuing the release. This practice of
government hides social conflict by mixing up
denial is part of a systematic process within the
guerrillas and peasants. Uribe said:
Colombian state to refuse taking into account
The world should know -
the social conditions that have encouraged the
environmentalists must know the
adoption, growth, and spread of coca fields in
following: natural parks such as La
Western Amazon. What explains the existence of
Macarena have been violated by FARC's
coca crops is not an individualistic drive for
narco-terrorism with 3,000 or 4,000
profit, nor a sophisticated drug trafficking
hectares of
coca8.
network in the hands of guerrillas. Life choices of peasants who colonized the Colombian Amazon
Another example of denial of a social conflict is
have been set up by political violence and
the environmental rhetoric justifying the anti-
poverty. In a way, the emergence and
drug actions in pursuit of conservation. The
consolidation of guerrillas, as well as the
Agency for Social Action issued a press release,
adoption of coca cultivation by the region's
7 See the report by journalist Marta Ruiz "Operación Colombia Verde?" at www.semana.com 8 Closing statement by President Álvaro Uribe at a Security Council meeting in Granada, Meta. “What the world needs to know ...” Office of the President, December, 2005. http://www.presidencia.gov.co/prensa_new/sne/2005/di ciembre/28/06282005.htm
farmers, are social processes linked to those inequality structures (political violence and 9 “Eradication of coca in the Macarena reaches 55% of the target." Presidential Agency for Social Action. July 10, 2006. http://www.red.gov.co/Noticias/2006/Erradicacion_Mac arena_10_07_06.htm
8
poverty) called structural violence by Paul
political, economic, and environmental
Farmer (2003). Such conditions help to
regulations (Espinosa 2003). Military control
understand why thousands of peasants were
tends to increase during Army offensives, which
expelled to the Amazon forest by cycles of
explains why execution and banishment orders
violence in the 1950s and pacification of the
were issued at the outset of Plan Patriot.
1960s, and why most of them resort to growing
It is difficult to find FARC documents dealing
coca as their only survival activity, since
with their strategy for these situations, as it is to
alternative livelihoods are not viable (Molano
assess, by analyzing their guidelines, their
1987, Mora 1986, Thuomi 1997).
method to decide political and social regulations.
Coca is rooted in the history of exclusion and
Throughout my fieldwork and during interviews,
banishment of thousands of peasants from
I have learned of general guidelines issued by the
productive fields, the concentration of property,
highest levels of FARC to organize communities
and a land policy that does not protect farm
into political and military structures. Once
production. Coca is also rooted in the poor
strategies are decided, plans to meet their
Amazon soils in the absence of productive
expectations are drawn, and it is up to each
alternatives for the region. In this regard, a
structure to gain residents' support.
peasant I interviewed back in 2001 said:
Likewise, FARC frequently tries to divest itself of conflict mediation tasks, leaving this
Are there any other means (to replace
responsibility to communities themselves. In
coca)? Look: How could I take yucca,
several meetings carried out since 2000 in La
corn, or bananas to La Macarena if they
Macarena, guerrillas have insisted on
are not going to buy them? What would
communities solving their own conflicts, which
they buy? If you take a kilo or a few
they would assume only in the absence of other
grams of cocaine, you will sell them fast.
ways to reach a solution.
It takes you 20, 100, 200, or 600 grams
However, economic regulations and social
of cocaine to get money. What should you
population control are not so clear. In practice,
do then? That is why we no longer live on
whenever guerrillas visit a peasant household or
pigs. They are not a win, but coca is.
arrange meetings, farmers are informed that “collaborators” to the military will be “brought to
Violence from guerrillas
justice.” This would leave those who are “not in
No less complicated than state violence are the
debt” free from any concern. Yet deaths and
forms of military control exerted by guerrillas.
banishments of innocent peasants causes
Historical relations between rural communities
everybody to fear for their own future, as it is
and FARC have brought up a series of social
never clear how the guerrilla organization
orders, to which agents engage by adopting
determines whether or not someone is deemed a
certain practices for conflict resolution and
supporter of the military forces. Upon some victims, doubts suffice as proof. A jealous
9
neighbor’s accusation or a not so clear
consists of charging 30% of the total amount
association of ideas, like unexplained trips to a
paid by drug traffickers.
town center, could bring a guilty verdict.
This tax used to be paid by coca middlemen,
Such an uncertainty, combined with other
known as “chichipatos,” to the guerrilla front in
factors that will be discussed later, tends to
charge of the respective region. In 2000, as
translate itself into less guerrillas’ legitimacy. In
recounted by locals, FARC decided to hold direct
the case of violence exerted by the guerrilla
control on the mediation between peasants and
organization, I found two elements that deepen
drug traffickers, in order to prevent “chichipatos”
the situation of conflict. The executions they
from evading their tax. To guarantee such a
carry out and their control over the coca
control, each guerrilla front appointed a local as
business lead to a diminished mutual trust and
their middleman, or authorized a group of
less solidarity within communities. It also
guerrillas to carry out this task. As a result, after
erodes, as mentioned earlier, guerrillas’
freebase is purchased by guerrillas, it is then
legitimacy. Executions have to do with the
resold to drug traffickers, who are in charge of
assumption by the guerrilla organization that
transforming it into cocaine. This implies that
peasants can also be part of the military. This
coca production, regarded as a guerrilla activity,
practice, whose theorization was developed by
provides the state with new arguments for
Mario Aguilera (2001), deprives peasants from
accusing peasants of being guerrillas or, in the
their civilian nature and pictures them as an
best case scenario, FARC collaborators.
appendix of the illegal armed group, potentially
This picture is further complicated by additional
punishable when they are suspected of having
considerations. Coca production has pushed
ties with the armed forces.
community solidarity bindings forward, as required by illicit farming. In some villages,
Executions are, in fact, the most common
families take turns to harvest coca leaves
method of punishment, whose implementation
(“raspar”) in neighboring farms, yet it has not
does not seem to receive any self-criticism from
lead to any known cases of denunciation.
within the guerrilla group. Although every
Moreover, when there is no currency in
execution is supposed to be authorized by
circulation or coca trade has been affected by a
FARC’s secretariat, the way they are carried out
military offensive, it is common, among farmers
casts doubts on whether this high authority
and between farmers and traders, to exchange
intervened in the decision.
coca for food. The relationship with guerrillas, on
Another element that tends to complicate the
the other hand, has also built a different kind of
conflict situation is FARC’s direct command on
solidarity, where support to the FARC is seen by
the trade of coca freebase. From the moment the
communities as something normal, though
organization consolidated its power and presence
dangerous, as there is still a war going on.
in the region, it has introduced all kinds of
Since FARC are involved in brokering coca
taxes, including one called “gramaje,” which
between peasants and drug traffickers, both
10
types of solidarity and complicity tend to mingle,
made up of a series of events, such as combats
for community solidarity has transformed itself
between guerrillas and the Army, bombings by
into a form of solidarity that is all but imposed
the Air Force, executions by FARC, police
by guerrillas. Those peasants who show no wish
arrests, or indiscriminate crop spraying. Violence
to have direct links with guerrillas find
has also represented a condition of community
themselves involved in the armed conflict, as
life, and, as such, it has been able to settle into
they know, due to commercial relations with
peasant life. It is rooted in the micro-local
them, where guerrillas are and who is
context of everyday life, which implies a steady
responsible for coca dealing. Beyond that, once
dynamic and, sometimes, perverse social
military operations escalated in the region in the
relations.
wake of Plan Patriot, desertions became so
At this point, I would like to move from the
frequent that every person, guerrillas and
context of broad regional violence to the analysis
peasants included, were close to someone who
of the local dimension where it is experienced.
left the rebel movement, and deserters used to
For that purpose, I present two cases compiled
betray not only their comrades but also coca-
throughout my field experience in the region,
growing farmers. They knew who was involved in
upon which I conduct an analysis at the end of
the business, and to what extent. Henceforth,
the chapter.
trust from farmers to guerrillas diminished, given the chances of a potential betrayal. In that
The banishment
scenario, coca production relies further on
In January 2006, Fernando's problems with a
guerrilla and counter-guerrilla actions, in such a
neighbor at El Socorro village did not go beyond
way that solidarity and legitimacy tend to be
a personal conflict that, like any other in La
undermined.
Macarena, would be easily solved by the community. Born and raised in Caquetá, a
Violence in daily life
department located near La Macarena, Fernando
How are the frameworks of violence of peasant
and his family had arrived in El Socorro less
everyday life produced and reproduced? It is
than a year before and, because of the
necessary to bear in mind that farmers are not
similarities between their homeland and this
passive actors in the conflict. They criticize
region, they assumed the problem would be over
FARC, design strategies to address them, write
through mediation by the local Conciliation
memos to them, sue the Army before human
Committee.
rights tribunals, and even send letters to the
Don Julio owed money to Fernando for some
President. In several instances, they have sought
work done months earlier. Don Julio refused to
to distance from guerrillas and win recognition
pay, arguing that a recent crisis in the coca
from the state. But this is far from reality in
business had stripped him of any resources. Yet
terms of regional violence, as war is not only
everyone in the village knew that Don Julio had a way to pay his debts, since he owned some
11
cattle and had enough money left from dealing
clear that no complaints had been filed against
with coca. Although it is true that coca brokers
Fernando, and, as long as he kept working and
take much time before paying what they buy, he
did not take any bad steps, nothing would
was thought to have earned enough money,
happen to him. Furthermore, the commander
because he had dealt with a large amount of
explained that guerrillas never send people with
coca.
that kind of message: in case they intend to
One night, a neighbor delivered a message to
commit a murder, they would do so without
Fernando. Guerrillas were looking for him,
informing anyone, he said.
because someone in the village had denounced
Fernando returned to the village with his family,
him as a member of the paramilitary. It was
but he did not feel comfortable when working
presumed that Don Julio was responsible for the
outside his farm nor trusted anyone. None of his
accusation, for he had declared that, in case
neighbors shared the story, and he avoided
Fernando was still pretending to get money from
community meetings. He then tried to sell his
him, he would then accuse Fernando to
farm, and although he did not leave the region,
guerrillas to stop this annoying situation. Next
at the end he wound up selling the farm and
morning, Fernando sold his animals, abandoned
moving to a different village. Guerrillas fined Don
his farm, took the road with his family, and was
Julio for not paying his debt, and even when it
preparing to travel back to Caquetá. However,
was not possible to verify it he was behind the
before their departure, a friend decided to talk to
gossiping, he was warned that, had a similar
Don Diego and Doña Ligia, who were among the
situation presented itself, his punishment would
founders of the village and held recognition by
be higher.
the community for their honesty and leadership in conflict mediation.
A week in the village
Don Diego inquired about the background of the
In June 2005, accompanied by a dentist and a
dispute, and after confirming that Don Julio had
sociologist who shared my research interests in
built a stratagem to escape from paying his debt,
the region, rainy days restricted our fieldwork.
he did not hesitate to show his support to
Hosted by the secretary of the main community
Fernando. For him, Fernando was trustworthy, a
organization, it was perhaps her prudence,
man who worked hard to support his family
rather than rain, what dissuaded us to tour the
without ever getting into trouble. Don Diego
region, as the mobilization of troops in
considered it unfair that a young couple had to
helicopters was constant, and it was not safe to
leave without a reason. That very day, Don Diego
walk around because guerrillas could appear
left the village and looked for guerrillas in places
anywhere. With such mobility restrictions, we
where they are known to show up. He found
decided to organize a makeshift badminton
commander Jairo and made him aware of the
championship in the village to entertain a large
problem. Afterwards, the commander
number of children who were on vacation on
interrogated him and Fernando, and made it
those June days. The event was exotic to locals,
12
as soccer is the only sport practiced by children
be the doom of the rest.”
in the region. Curious about the novelty, some
Thursday: One woman from the village said to us
farmers approached us to observe and talk. Our
that the Army was near her house, and it would
ethnographic goals for that fieldtrip were met
not be strange if they moved to the village.
thanks to their visits and those of close friends
Although troops were seen every day in town,
who wanted to greet us. Then, calmly, while the
their patrolling was a reason for concern, since it
dentist was defeated again and again on the
could lead to fights or bombings, and there are
game, news were brought to us by peasants.
stories about atrocities inflicted on peasants.
This is how we realized the context surrounding
Friday: Early morning came a young man who
us was not the most inviting.
lives across the river. He showed up to collect
Monday: The tournament begins. A child took a
some products he had ordered to Doña Eugenia,
tape recorder out of the house to put on music,
and told her that a group of guerrillas was
and tuned in to a radio station that turned out
camping on his farm. He knew they were rebels
to be run by guerrillas. The child’s mother, Doña
because the group included women and the
Eugenia, came out and changed the station
commander was bearded. Those features suffice
without saying anything. She tuned in to the
to recognize whether a group of armed persons
Army radio station.
belongs to the Army or the guerrillas.
Tuesday: A military helicopter flew at a very low
Saturday: We finished the championship and
altitude near the house. This meant there were
celebrated after a cock fight that took place at a
troops in the region and something had
nearby farm. The occasion attracted almost every
happened or was about to happen. People were
peasant in the village, and became an
curious about the games, and came to visit our
impromptu feast that lasted until dawn.
house.
Apparently, the only ones concerned about what
Wednesday: In the afternoon, farmers brought in
had happened during the week, and what was
more news to Doña Eugenia. In a village up the
about to happen, were us. I asked Doña Eugenia
mountain, one hour away from here by foot,
how they could be so calm. “These are things
guerrillas had killed the baker on Monday night
that happen, and they are normal here.”
and had left a poster on top of his body, reading “This is what happens to Army informants.” The
Forms and dynamics of violence in the
helicopter we saw the day before was the one
region.
that collected the corpse and took it to town.
On one of my visits to La Macarena, bad news
That night, Doña Eugenia shared the
came to Doña Cristina’s home. A guerrilla
information with us, and argued that if guerrillas
militiaman had deserted, and he had started to
had killed him, he must have done something.
denounce not only his fellow guerrillas but also
We discussed death penalty, and I said I did not
coca-growing peasants10. As a middleman, he
agree with this measure. She replied that she did not agree either, but sometimes “one person can
10 FARC have two types of militia: popular and Bolivarian.
13
was in charge of purchasing coca freebase for
FARC, people began moving out of their homes,
the rebel group, but his reluctance to respect the
or were even considering moving out of the
agreed fees and his delays to pay his debts put
region. Others had to be extremely cautious
him in trouble. Complaints reached the local
when visiting the town center, because at some
commander, and he forced the militiaman to
point they had traded coca with guerrillas.
work in his farm until the stolen money was
The normalization of violence takes on many
compensated. Dissatisfied with his punishment,
forms. One of them is the regulation of
he deserted instead.
community life. Some topics are not discussed
One evening, while having dinner at Doña
beyond the family sphere, like criticism to
Cristina’s, his husband brought up the topic. He
guerrillas or the conversation about the defecting
was very upset that some of his friends could not
militiaman. Confidentiality is, then, mandatory,
go to town anymore, for they have been accused
given that it is “common sense” to assume that
of aiding FARC. Doña Cristina wondered why
voicing any opinions on the rebel group is
FARC had not executed this militiaman. If they
dangerous: one can be labeled as a FARC
had done so, she explained, all their problems
supporter, or, on the contrary, an Army
would have been avoided. At that point, I
supporter. Totalizing simplifications imply that
recalled Doña Eugenia’s words after the baker
those who do not seem close to a power in
was killed, not long ago: “One person can be the
conflict can be accused of affinity with the
doom of the rest.”11 Other diners claimed that,
opposite side.
since he had children, the solution was not to
It is possible to identify the normalization of
execute him but to transfer him to another
violence in yet another series of daily-life
region. In any case, the damage was already
regulations. Moving by La Macarena’s roads
done, and even if they had no connection with
means following the tracks of the conflict. On the way to town center, on the road that connects
The Bolivarian Militia is made up of civilians who operate underground, provide support to guerrillas, and carry out political functions in their communities. The Popular Militia is made up of civilians who join the political and military structures, and do not only perform political activities but also support the military activities without belonging to the military guerrilla force, i. e., farmers who work on their farms and fulfill military duties on request. Although they are supposed to be clandestine, many militiamen are known by peasants. 11 Processes of life and death have an impact on peasants, and imply, to a certain extent, a biopolitics in which life, instead of deserving a political struggle for its preservation, as initially suggested by Foucault, is sustained through strategies for the naturalization of social experience. According to them, in order to live, it is sometimes necessary to let die. On the concept of biopolitics as an analytical lens to understand the struggle for life and the rationalization of death, see Michel Foucault (1991).
the region to San Vicente del Caguán, I found, one after the other, guerrilla roadblocks and Army checkpoints. The Army carefully inspects cargo and passengers, while guerrillas make sure that all passengers are known to them. It is also common to see signs reminding peasants of the social rules adopted by the community. They establish the schedule for community work, as well as fines for dodgers. Banned behaviors, such as gossiping, have their sanctions listed as well. Some rules are clearly aligned with guerrilla law, like the prohibition against the hunting of certain animals. By adopting them as
14
community norms with the approval of the
conversations.
community action council, fines add up to
Some topics are not discussed beyond the family
community funds.
sphere, as in the case of the conversation at
To understand this situation, it is useful to
Cristina’s about the defecting militiaman. No one
resort to Carolyn Nordstrom’s ideas. This author
wants to be seen next to a compromising person,
adopted the concept of habitus proposed by
such as whoever is said to be a militiaman or an
Pierre Bourdieu to explain how violent structures
informant to the military.
can be replicated in society (Nordstrom 1995:7).
Beyond bullets and bombings, war leaves its
The internalization of violence in the farmer
marks on the region through the exemplary
habitus has been a historical process, causing a
executions perpetrated by guerrillas, the
normalization of violence and a naturalization of
persecution of farmers by the state, or the
responses to it. The way locals assume their
indiscriminate arrests and summary executions
everyday life, and are represented by the social
by the military. These are extreme situations
environment, are influenced by those regulatory
that do not happen every day, yet are frequent
frameworks entailed by political violence and
enough to affect several areas of daily life.
social conflict. A product of this entanglement,
Regarding social relations, they influence the
violence of everyday life is a condition that
choice of friends and visitors. Transit by road is
routinizes suffering from war and conflict as
limited too: There is a curfew after 6 p.m., and
something “normal.” Anti-drug policies, along
“hot roads,” where combats may be taking place,
with guerrilla strategies focused on economic
should be avoided. They are also to be found in
and political exclusion of peasants, have finally
conversations: they define what can and cannot
internalized in the peasant habitus.
be said. Limited personal mobility is another
“The exercise of discipline presupposes a
consequence: Visiting a place very often could be
mechanism that coerces by means of
suspicious, either to the Army or the guerrillas.
observation,” writes Foucault (1977, p. 170), and
In the same way, the planting calendar is
the power of that observation is almost
determined by guerrilla regulations on the
immanent. Paradoxically, the forest around La
hectares of forest that can be deforested per
Macarena is a sort of panopticon embracing it
year. One year they may allow farmers to clear 4
all. While on the roads, no discussion about
hectares, but the next they may only authorize
problems, the Army, or guerrillas can take place.
burning the underbrush.
Compromising matters are proscribed, and, if
This broad spectrum of impacts on everyday life
any, the only space for them is the kitchen.
reveals the influence of war in this region. In the
Complex subjects, such as executions, a
next chapter, I will explore how farmers assume
neighbor’s demobilization, or the arrest of a
the naturalization of violence and react to the
leader, show their own patterns in terms of who
standardization it entails. Then, I introduce the
can be chosen as a safe witness, usually within
concept of social grammar as the internalized
the family circle, and the most suitable place for
rules that conform to the normalization process.
15
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