Implementation of Alternative Integrity Validation on a ...

Proceedings of IPC2008 7th International Pipeline Conference September 29-October 3, 2008, Calgary, Alberta, Canada Proceedings of IPC2008 The 7th International Pipeline Conference September 29 - October 3, 2008, Calgary, Alberta, Canada

IPC2008-64479 IPC2008-64479

Implementation of Alternative Integrity Validation on a Large Diameter Pipeline Construction Project Joe Zhou TransCanada PipeLines Limited Calgary, Alberta, Canada

Alan Murray National Energy Board Calgary, Alberta, Canada

Jake Abes DNV/CC Technologies Canada Calgary, Alberta, Canada

Disclaimer: The views expressed with respect to the regulatory perspective on AIV are those of the contributing author and are not to be taken as the views of the Board.

ABSTRACT

INTRODUCTION

Hydrostatic testing has been used by the pipeline industry for many decades as an effective means to demonstrate safety and the leak-free condition of a newly constructed pipeline. However, significant advancements have been made in material, construction and leak detection technologies and quality control processes. These advancements have created the possibility of implementing an alternative to hydrostatic testing while still meeting the original purpose of demonstrating safety and leak-free condition of newly constructed pipelines. TransCanada PipeLines Limited (TransCanada) initiated the development of its Alternative Integrity Validation (AIV) approach in 2004. During 2004 and 2005, TransCanada successfully implemented AIV on a NPS 24 construction project under the jurisdiction of the Alberta Energy and Utilities Board (EUB). With the learnings obtained from the first pilot AIV implementation, TransCanada subsequently implemented AIV on a NPS 42 construction project under the jurisdiction of the National Energy Board (NEB), with CC Technologies (CCT) as the independent third party auditor. As a result of the successful implementation of AIV, the hydrostatic testing requirement was waived for both projects by AEUB and NEB, respectively. This paper summarizes the AIV implementation on the larger diameter pipeline project and provides the perspectives from the pipeline company, regulator, and independent auditor.

In 2005, TransCanada proposed to install a total of 37.8 km of 1064 mm (NPS 42) loop on its North Bay Shortcut in two sections, as follows: • 19.7 km from MLV 1216 + 10.3 km to MLV 1217 (the “Stittsville Loop”) • 18.1 km from MLV 1205 + 11.6 km to MLV 1206 (the “Deux Rivières Loop”) Collectively, these two loops are referred to hereafter as the “Stittsville and Deux Rivières Loops”. The proposed loops were located in Ontario and form a part of TransCanada’s Mainline system known as the North Bay Shortcut. Design requirements and criteria for the Stittsville and Deux Rivières Loops were based principally on the Onshore Pipeline Regulations (OPR-99) (NEB, 1999) and the CSA Z662 (2003) Standard, as well as other standards referenced and permitted therein. Pipe and coating materials generally followed the requirements of the CSA Z245 series with additional requirements as specified by TransCanada specifications which exceed the normal CSA requirements. Grades 550 and 690 pipes were utilized for the project. The wall thicknesses of line pipe and heavy wall pipe of Gr. 550 were 10.6mm and 13.4 mm, respectively. The wall thickness of line pipe was primarily limited by TransCanada’s internal requirements on diameter to wall thickness (“D/t”) limitation of maximum 100, and therefore, Gr. 550 line pipe was utilized for location class 1 and 2. The Gr. 550 line pipe resulted in an operating stress level of 63% of SMYS which met the requirements for both Class Location 1 and 2. The Gr. 690 pipes were supplied by two pipe mills and the wall thicknesses of 14.3 mm and 12.7 mm specified were simply a function of the

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services, being incorporated into many pipeline standards, codes and regulations. This historical perspective has been well illustrated by Brooks (1957) and Jones (1992). The work done by Battelle (Duffy et al. 1968) further established the pre-service hydrotest as the primary means for determination of the maximum operating pressure (MOP) of the pipeline. Hydrotesting is utilized to demonstrate the margin of safety against normal operating pressure, as well as the leak free condition of the pipeline. Accordingly hydrotesting is often divided into a strength test followed by a leak test with the testing pressures and durations specified in standards such as CSA Z662. Over the period of 1950 to the late 1970s, the number of failure incidents which resulted from pre-service hydrotesting was relatively high. Data presented by Duffy et al (1968) reported hydrotest failures over the period from 1952 to 1964 from one company in the US. Leis et al (2001) presented a review of all of the US DOT onshore data from 1970 through 1982 and the NEB database from 1950 through 1995. In addition data from a major UK company is available covering a period when over 2000 km of pipe was constructed from 1969 through 1974 (Jones 1992). A smaller database (Parloc 1990, 1992, 1994) on UK offshore pre-service hydrotest failures is also available for the period 1975 through 1993. The US DOT database included a little over 1600 failure incidents and among these, 232 incidents could be clearly identified as arising from newly constructed pipelines from 1970 to 1979 (Leis et al. 2001). A review of the 232 incidents had indicated the main causes for pre-service hydrotest failures to be: outside force (4%), construction (13%) and material (83%). The causes in the category of outside force included equipment impact, shipping and handling. The causes in the category of construction included inadequate bedding, backfill, girth welding, and buckling from excessive bending. The majority of the incidents which resulted from pipe manufacturing included inadequate wall thickness, excessive trim, arc burns, pinholes, stitching, cracking in welds, dents and gouges on plate, and slag inclusion. Many of them were related to the early generation of low frequency ERW pipe manufacture. Another important finding from the review of historical data was a clear trend of reduction in the pre-service failure incident rates, Kirkwood and Cosham (2000). The significant reduction from the 1970s onward made the pre-service hydrotest failure a rare event in modern transmission pipelines. Although the review of historical data did not provide information allowing further delineation between ruptures and leaks, one may reasonably postulate that ruptures represent a small fraction of the total failure incidents during hydrotests in the modern pipeline industry. The failure rate of pre-service hydrotesting had been reduced to such a low level that many regulatory authorities discontinued the requirement to report pre-service hydrotest failures after the 1990s. The significant improvement noted above in performance of pre-service hydrotesting was mainly due to the advancement in steel and pipe making technologies, and substantial improvement in quality control processes utilized for pipe manufacturing, shipping and handling

minimum wall thickness achievable by manufacturing at the time. The Gr. 690 pipes were mainly installed in Class 3 locations and resulted in maximum operating stresses of 37% and 42% of SMYS as opposed to 56% permitted by CSA Z662-03. More details of the project background information can be found in Zhou et al. (2008). On the Stittsville and Deux Rivières Loops project, TransCanada implemented an extensive technology program to advance a portfolio of key technologies for safe, reliable and cost effective pipelines (Zhou et al. 2008). One of the key technologies was Alternative Integrity Validation (AIV), the objective of which was to replace the pre-service hydrotest. TransCanada started the development of AIV process in 2004 and the first implementation, on a trial basis, was on the Peerless II project constructed in 2004-2005 winter season. The successful implementation of the AIV process led to a hydrotest waiver from EUB for approximately two thirds of the newly constructed pipeline. ( i.e. only one of three sections was subjected to hydrotesting). This initial effort was summarized in Glover et al. (2005). To continuously improve the AIV process based on learnings from the first implementation on Peerless II project, TransCanada implemented the AIV process on its Peerless III project which was an extension of the Peerless II pipeline and constructed in 2005-2006 winter season. The primary objectives of this second implementation were to further improve the AIV process and to provide opportunities for all stakeholders to gain additional experience and learn from another application of the AIV process. As a result, TransCanada decided not to apply for a hydrotest waiver for the Peerless III project. The Stittsville and Deux Rivières Loops project however constructed in summer 2006 provided an opportunity to continue the development of the AIV process under the jurisdiction of the NEB. Broadly speaking, in the pipeline industry the benefits and limitations of the pre-service hydrotest have been widely discussed as evidenced by publications such as Leis et al. (1999), Kirkwood and Cosham (2000), Leis (2004), Glover et al. (2005), Cosham et al. (2006). In parallel to TransCanada’s effort to obtain hydrotest waivers from regulatory authorities, others have made similar efforts for offshore pipeline projects in the Gulf Mexico, the Gulf of Aquba and the North Sea. This paper is focused on the AIV process as implemented on the Stittsville and Deux Rivières Loops project under the NEB’s jurisdiction. The successful implementation and the first hydrotest waiver approved by NEB reflected great efforts by three parties: TransCanada, including its pipe suppliers and construction contractor, NEB as the regulator and CC Technologies, Canada as the independent third party. This paper will present the perspectives and learning from each of the three parties in the following sections.

TECHNICAL BASIS FOR AIV Hydrotesting is the most commonly practiced form of pressure testing and has been accepted since the 1950s as an effective means to demonstrate pipeline safety and fitness for

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and pipeline construction. Notable improvements over the last three decades include: • Quality management practices in steel and pipe mills are well established and most of them are certified under recognized authorities. • Steel making practices produce micro-alloyed, fine grain, fully killed and continuous cast steel that is clean and consistent in steel properties. • Plate rolling practices are well controlled and able to maintain high consistency in wall thickness and plate properties. • Pipe making processes are well controlled and full traceability is maintained. Seam welding processes and procedures are rigorously qualified. • Extensive and rigorous inspections are carried out on a regular basis at every step of the steel making, plate rolling and pipe making process. Non-destructive inspections based on UT and X-ray and supplemented by other means have the capability to detect anomalies much less critical than those that would fail in a pre-service hydrotest. • Extensive material qualification tests ensure pipe material properties are in compliance with standards and specifications. High toughness is common for line pipes used to build high pressure energy transmission pipelines. • Mill hydrotesting at pressures inducing hoop stresses of 90 to 95 percent of SMYS provides an assurance of a minimum level of pressure containment capability for every joint of pipe. • Shipping and handling practices have improved and standards and recommended practices for pipe transportation are proven to be effective, as evidenced by low in-service failure rates attributable to defects introduced during these activities. • Quality control processes for pipeline construction are well established, including daily inspection for all main activities, rigorous welding procedure qualification, welder training and qualification, technological improvements in the NDT and regulatory requirement for 100 percent inspection of girth welds, coating holiday detection, bedding and backfill control, inline geometry inspection, etc. This comprehensive quality control process, when properly implemented, will effectively eliminate preservice failure (rupture) while reducing the potential of leaking. Among all the improvements, it is important to understand the benefit of improved toughness in pipe material. Historically, early pipe steels utilized relatively low strength materials characterized by low toughness, and as a result of the toughness factor had relatively low defect tolerance. Changes in the strength and manufacturing technology have resulted in marked improvements in the material toughness and hence resistance to defects. Consequently a much larger defect can be tolerated without a failure occurring during the hydrostatic test. This factor is illustrated in Figure 1 which shows the relationship between normalized pressure and flaw

size for different flaw depth to wall ratios for a present day Grade 550 (X80) with a toughness of 135 J (100 ft lbs). The net result demonstrates that even for moderately deep defects, the failure is essentially flow stress controlled (not toughness) and that large defects would have to be present prior to failure during testing. The fact that, in the above circumstance, large defects can be tolerated during a hydrotest renders the hydrotest a less effective means of detecting defects while leaving sub critical defects in pipelines potentially susceptible to growth during service. The required large defects also make them readily detectable by inspections in mills, during construction and commission therefore making the inspection based process an effective means of ensuring safety and integrity.

Normalized Failure Pressure P/Psmys

X80 100 ft-lbs Charpy 1.4

Limit State d/t=0.1 d/t=0.2 d/t=0.3 d/t=0.4 d/t=0.5 d/t=0.6 d/t=0.7 d/t=0.8 d/t=0.9

1.2 1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 0

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Critical Flaw Length (in)

Figure 1 Critical flaw lengths for Grade 550 (X80) high toughness

AIV PROCESS TransCanada’s support for the AIV process is founded on the basis that the AIV process will lead to a level of quality at least comparable to that for conventional pre-service hydrotesting because of the comprehensive QA/QC process used. In addition, TransCanada believes that the successful implementation of AIV will result in a number of long-term benefits to the industry including: • Reduced environmental impact • Elimination of water related issues including availability, contamination and disposal, pipeline drying • Elimination of winter testing issues, including heating & circulating water or water-methanol mixtures • Reduced number of test activities • Shorter construction schedule • Reduced costs The AIV process developed and implemented by TransCanada is aimed at replacing the strength test portion of the pre-service hydrotest with a comprehensive quality management process based on quality assurance and quality control (QA/QC). The leak test portion is replaced with a leak detection process based on detection of a traceable gas (in the present case methane). In TransCanada’s view the combination

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agreements, if applicable, to specify a comprehensive set of technical requirements and specifications. The company specifications are generally applicable to all TransCanada projects and intended to be supplemental to the standards such as CSA 245.1 (2003) or API 5L (2004). The technical agreements, where applicable, are typically project and mill specific. • Specification review meeting. The specification review meeting, typically held in pipe mills, reviews Manufacture Procedures and Specification (MPS) in detail to ensure pipe produced based on the project specific MPS will meet all requirements specified by TransCanada. The MPS contains all detailed procedures to be used for the specific pipe production. • Comprehensive third party surveillance. TransCanada utilizes a well established third party surveillance process to ensure that a mill’s quality management process is fully implemented, the MPS is rigorously followed, an electronic master book is prepared to verify full traceability for each joint of pipe, and all non-compliances are properly documented and disposed of in accordance with approved procedures. The third party agencies providing the surveillance services are required to have a certified quality management system. • Pipe qualification tests. The mill is required to perform mill hydrotesting and laboratory material tests in accordance with the specified requirements. The mill material test records are submitted to TransCanada. • Pipe transportation. The storage, handling and shipping procedures are submitted to TransCanada for review and approval. The applicable standards such as API RP 5L1 (2002) and 5LW (1996) are consistently observed. For the construction phase, TransCanada uses well established processes for welding procedure qualification, welder training and qualification, NDT design and calibration, and acceptance criteria for girth weld defects based on applicable standards. These processes will not be discussed further in this paper due to limited space they were, however, reviewed by the NEB and formed a part of the third party audit. In addition, TransCanada follows well practiced construction management process for field construction. The primary documents for quality management of field construction are TransCanada’s pipeline construction specifications and the contracts with its construction contractors. The primary resource to implement the quality management process is the construction management team including all inspectors. To supplement the construction management team, TransCanada also assigns dedicated resources to implement the AIV process, including a Responsible AIV Engineer to oversee the process and a Field AIV Engineer to coordinate documentation during field construction. To facilitate the AIV implementation, a supplemental pipeline construction specification for AIV was developed to clearly specify the training requirements for the construction management team and internal auditing requirements for construction activities. The auditing requirements tend to be project specific and requirements for

of the quality management and the leak detection processes has demonstrated an equal or higher level of safety and integrity and consequently eliminates the need for the preservice hydrotest. It is however worth noting that hydrotesting is selectively used to pre-test some facilities associated with the pipeline (meter station, valve station, etc.), components, fabricated assemblies in general, major crossings and pipeline sections in sensitive areas. The selective use of pre-testing simplifies the AIV process and permits attention to be focused sharply on the pipe and the pipeline. The AIV process is fundamentally based on quality management process and as such its success is very much contingent on a corporate commitment to quality and process, supported by a set of well developed and practiced procedures, to enable QA/QC to adequately address all potential failure causes that would be detectable by a pre-service hydrotest. The implementation of the AIV process requires management commitment, organization, and above all, qualified, knowledgeable, experienced, and well-trained personnel to undertake the QA/QC processes for the project. The major enablers related to the processes that involve design, manufacturing, construction and commissioning activities are shown in Figure 2. These include management commitment to safety and innovations and related processes that support the successful implementation of innovations such as AIV. The latter includes training for competency requirements, process and procedures, evaluation of risks, management of change and incorporating improvements. A corner stone to the AIV process, as implemented, was the quality management for the entire process from the beginning of design to the end of commissioning. The quality management was organized into the main phases shown in Figure 3, where activities and auditing processes are highlighted under each of the main phases. While it is neither practical, nor necessary, to describe the details for each activity, the QA/QC processes for pipe procurement, filed construction and leak test are discussed below to demonstrate the comprehensiveness of the AIV process. TransCanada’s pipe procurement process ensures manufacturing and delivering of high quality pipe through a well established, validated and practiced quality management process and includes the following main activities: • Pipe mill qualification. Mill qualification including both steel mill and pipe mill and consists of evaluation of steel making practice, plate rolling practice, aiming chemistries and limits, skelp inspection process, pipe forming procedure, production range, lab test equipment and procedure, welding parameters and consumables, cold expansion practice, dimensional control and inspection, NDT procedures, storage, handling and shipping procedures, record keeping and full traceability. In addition, mill qualification also evaluates mills quality management organization and its certified quality management system. • Pipe standards and specifications. TransCanada utilizes applicable standards, company specifications and technical

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Stittsville and Deux Rivières Loop project are listed in Table 1. The auditing requirements also evolve over time based on the learnings from previous projects. A set of project specific AIV auditing forms are used to implement the auditing process on a daily basis. A variance tracking and resolution process is used to document all deviations from specifications and procedures. All variances are disposed of with acceptable resolutions and documented with variance closeout forms. In the commissioning phase, the notable activity is the leak test. The leak test is based on a gaseous leak detection process and conducted so as to replace the hydrotest based leak test. TransCanada’s leak detection process for use in the AIV process is based on aerial leak detection supplemented by ground-based leak detection. The leak detection is conducted after the newly constructed pipeline is loaded with typical pipeline natural gas to approximately 50 percent of the design pressure and held for a minimum of 12 hours. The aerial leak detection is accomplished with a laser-based gas detector mounted to a helicopter. The aerial leak detection process seeks to identify well-dispersed gas plumes with a low methane concentration resulting from any pipeline leaks. Recognizing that the location of a gas plume relative to the pipeline is influenced by meteorological conditions, a suitable area for leak detection is covered by flying multiple paths to ensure a high reliability of detecting any leak. This involves utilizing GPS mapping to develop flight paths which will place the helicopter at several lateral offsets, thus providing multiple opportunities to detect any leak plume. All leak indications are followed-up with a ground based investigation to confirm or deny the presence of a leak. As a supplemental validation for enhanced confidence, a ground-based leak test is conducted in parallel over a portion of the newly-constructed pipeline. The leak detection equipment used for ground-based leak detection is a Heath Detecto Pak II or III (Flame Ionization) Unit. TransCanada or its service provider ensures that the leak detection equipment is properly calibrated and is functioning correctly. Ground-based leak detection is typically conducted by walking directly on top of the buried pipeline and therefore provides reliable gas detection. Absence of leak indicator from aerial and ground-based leak detections proves the leak free condition and demonstrates the integrity of the pipeline.

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AIV IMPLEMENTATION ON STITTSVILLE AND DEUX RIVIERES PROJECTS The AIV process described in the previous section was fully implemented in Stittsville and Deux Rivières Loops project. In addition to the great effort by TransCanada to follow all applicable processes and procedures, the implementation required significant effort to work with all stakeholders of the project. Some of these efforts are briefly summarized below: • Building consensus and commitment within TransCanada. TransCanada’s management commitment to quality was essential for the project team to balance project cost,

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schedule and quality. With the commitment from senior management, the project team built up consensus on the implementation process and clearly defined the roles and responsibilities. The project execution plan was established to accommodate the uncertainties associated with the hydrotest waiver and included a contingency plan for schedule, equipment and resources, including the possibility of having to hydrotest if the waiver was denied for the Deux Rivières section. Submission of application for AIV process. As a part of a facilities application, a separate document was prepared and submitted to the NEB. The AIV document described the technical basis for AIV, TransCanada’s AIV process and a preliminary set of AIV auditing requirements and forms. Understanding expectations of regulator. Prior to the submission of the facility application and during the regulatory review process, TransCanada worked extensively with NEB staff to explain the AIV process and answer questions. The NEB also utilized the information request process to get formal written responses on some important issues, one of which resulted in the preparation of a detailed leak detection plan for Board approval. This interactive working process has helped greatly to improve mutual understanding and to define the regulatory expectations. Collaboration with pipe mills. The pipes installed in the project were supplied IPSCO Inc. (IPSCO) and JFE Steel Corporation (JFE). TransCanada shared the AIV methodology and process with the mills and rigorously implemented quality management process. Both IPSCO and JFE demonstrated high levels of competency and provided high quality pipes, and full cooperation in providing access and auditing. Training of construction management team. The construction management team, including all inspectors, were trained for the AIV process and auditing requirements. The AIV auditing forms were collected and reviewed by the Field AIV Engineer on a daily basis. The Field AIV Engineer also monitored and tracked the level of auditing to ensure compliance with the pre-determined auditing requirements in Table 1. Supportive construction contractor. TransCanada shared the AIV methodology and process with the construction contractor, Louisbourg Pipelines Inc. (Louisbourg), and developed collaboratively an execution plan based on TransCanada’s pipeline construction specification and construction management process and Louisbourg’s quality management process. This plan led to enhanced communication and more rigorous documentation. Louisbourg was also an integral part of the decision making process for resolution and disposition of all variances. In addition, Louisbourg agreed to extend the conventional one year warranty for the pipeline where pre-service hydrotest was waived. Variance tracking and resolution. The variance tracking and resolution process was rigorously implemented. A total of

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to Open” certificate to be granted for new construction. Physically, as well as psychologically, satisfying both requirements also provides a direct means of reassuring the public that their safety has been verified and safeguarded, albeit only at the instant at which the pipeline enters service. Protecting the public and the environment looms large for the NEB, as indeed it must for any pipeline regulator. In fact for the NEB these are Goals 1 and 2, respectively. At the same time the NEB has strived to be an enabling regulating authority, seeking to work with its regulated companies in the pursuit of goal based outcomes rather than to be totally constrained by prescriptive measures. Nevertheless the Onshore Pipeline Regulations (NEB, 1999) does require that companies adhere to the requirements of the current edition of the Canadian Pipeline standard CSA Z662 which stipulates hydrotesting. Thus an application to eliminate the hydrotest has a legal as well as a technical component, requiring the Board to grant the applicant a waiver. Such waivers are not granted lightly and in this instance involved careful consideration of a number of factors and the placing of conditions which are elaborated upon later. Central to the process was the need for the applicant to provide a rational approach which could withstand scrutiny when establishing “equivalency” of the proposed methodology with the hydrotest. It is important to note that, once a project application has been filed, the NEB’s quasi judicial process imposes a number of constraints on the manner in which information can be exchanged. It was helpful therefore for TransCanada staff, well in advance of a specific application, to provide several technical exchange sessions to NEB staff during which they articulated the philosophy and broad approach to AIV, largely along the lines described in previous sections. Since Board staff are not permitted to coach applicants as to the adequacy of any potential application, the above exchanges were quite one sided but nevertheless useful in minimising the information requests of this portion of the project once the application had been filed. At the outset a necessary request, for the public record, was that not withstanding any claim of improvements in pipe manufacturing and construction techniques, supported by advances in field inspection processes, negating the need for hydrotesting; could the company supply factual evidence of its past performance in pre-commissioning tests? The proponent, as well as the Board itself, had long since ceased to keep records of its hydro-test results. It is an omission which, as Cosham et al. (2006) point out, would be extremely helpful to rectify, on a go forward basis, especially in support of any future change to the pipeline standards. As it was, the objective of verifying that the alternative integrity validation process met the original purpose of demonstrating strength and safety, that is, equivalency became over arching. Before pursuing this objective though, it was important, from a regulatory viewpoint, to consider whether there were critical benefits to hydrotesting that would be lost through its elimination. It has been suggested for example that hydro-testing has the effect of “blunting’ defects that survive the test, thus increasing the subsequent fatigue life of the pipeline. It affords the possibility of reducing residual stress and potentially

149 variances were tracked. Among them 110 variances were minor bevel damages resulted from lifting hooks. The on-site re-bevelling for mechanized welding resolved almost all bevel damages. Other variances included cold bending induced buckles and excessive ripples, mechanical impact induced gouges, marks and coating damage, a rock induced dent, mill marks and gouges, an unacceptable defect missed by an NDT inspector and excessive misalignment in a transition weld. Each of the variances was disposed of with an acceptable resolution, reviewed by the responsible persons and documented with a closeout form. Timely communication. TransCanada maintained timely communication throughout the project. Recognizing the high activity level during the construction, TransCanada submitted a weekly activity report that summarized the main activities, progresses, and status of variance tracking and resolution. The weekly report facilitated regulatory review on a timely basis. Pre-service hydrotest. Based on the discussion with NEB, TransCanada proposed to conduct a conventional preservice hydrotest (both strength and leak tests) for the Stittsville Loop, which was completed before the Deux Rivières Loop, to demonstrate the effectiveness of the AIV process. The hydrotest was trouble free and successfully completed. Leak test. A combination of aerial leak detection and ground-based leak detection was used for Deux Rivières Loop. The aerial leak detection consisted of three flying paths at some nominal offset distances from the pipeline centerline determined based on the weather condition. The aerial leak detection found one leak indication which was later determined to be originating from swamp gas, rather than a pipeline leak. The ground-based leak detection covered the entire pipeline and found no leaks. Independent third party. Per NEB’s conditions attached to its permit, TransCanada retained an independent third party, CC Technologies Canada, to conduct an assessment of the AIV process. The third party conducted the assessment in a manner completely independent from and transparent to both TransCanada and NEB. More details will be presented later in this paper. Waiver application. A waiver application for the preservice hydrotest on the Deux Rivières Loop was prepared and submitted to the NEB. The application was thoroughly reviewed and evaluated by the NEB and the independent third party. The evaluations led to the granting of the NEB waiver for pre-service hydrotest of the Deux Rivières Loop. The maximum operating pressure (MOP) permitted was established based on the design pressure

REGULATOR’S PERSPECTIVE ON AIV Historically hydrotesting has been viewed as accomplishing two things: ensuring adequate pipeline strength and establishing the necessary leak tightness to allow a “Leave

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implemented from the start to end of the AIV process. In the present project the use of DSAW pipe and an extended hold time during hydrotesting at the pipe mill were distinct advantages to securing good quality pipe, as was good pipe handling procedures. Board inspectors and the third party staff were engaged throughout each stage of the project. Clearly it is easier to establish equivalency for strength than it is for leak tightness since the latter results from comparatively much smaller defects. The NEB requirement in this instance was for TransCanada to perform a ground-based flame ionisation leak detection test on the pressurised pipeline loop. While the aerial leak detection tests conducted at Deux Rivières indicated that no pipe body leaks were present, a previous controlled leak test demonstration project at another location had produced ambiguous results. These appeared to tie the efficacy of the method to the skill of the pilot since it involved identifying upward air movement and flying the helicopter into the presumed location of the plume. With further demonstrated improvements to airborne leak detection systems, however, it may prove acceptable in any subsequent AIV project under NEB jurisdiction to use this method. Board decisions are case specific and based on the merits of the body of evidence placed before it. Board accepted that the AIV process as implemented in these specific projects constituted a satisfactory quality control process and adequately demonstrated the safety and leak-free condition. In order to provide useful guidance to future applicants seeking to obtain a waiver to the hydro-test the wording of the following letter addressed to TransCanada, but publicly available, is pertinent: On October 4th, 2006, the Board granted Leave to Open for the Stittsville loop, based on the results of a successful hydrotest. Board inspectors, as well as independent third party evaluators acting on the Board’s behalf, observed and audited the manufacturing and construction activities related to the Stittsville and Deux Rivières loops. On October 5th, 2006, TransCanada filed its Final Summary report on the implementation of the AIV process in Stittsville and Deux Rivières loops. The Board has examined the submissions and its own field evidence and concludes that the AIV process as implemented on the Stittsville and Deux Rivières loops, constitutes a satisfactory quality control process for this project. In addition to the quality control process the Board took the following circumstances into consideration: • The low applied strains • The class location • The successful Stittsville loop hydrotest • The low operating stress level • The oversight brought by the independent third party; and, • TransCanada’s specifications some of which are more stringent than CSA Z662 requirements. Therefore in the event of a successful leak test on the Deux Rivières loop, the Board will not require a hydrotest of the loop. The Board reiterates that it considers TransCanada’s AIV process to be a field trial of a new technology. For the AIV

warm pre-stresses those defects that do survive the test, possibly improving their material properties at low temperature. In the present instance however of a buried gas pipeline in Southern Ontario, these were deemed to be inconsequential. The focus of the regulatory assessment for the Stittsville and Deux Rivières Loops project therefore became one of calculated risk. As noted earlier, two sections of pipeline were to be looped, in a mostly Class 1 location, using high strength steels and a mechanised welding and inspection process. Further, while applying the AIV methodology to both, TransCanada undertook to complete hydrotesting of one of these sections in its entirety, as well as at the major river crossings installed by HDD and at additional facilities on the Deux Rivières section. Since both loops were being tied into an existing system the maximum operating pressure (normally an output determined from a hydrotest), was predetermined with the corresponding maximum hoop stresses in the pipe determined to be 63% of SMYS. The nature of the terrain implied that there would be little in the way of bending stresses due to ground movement, while axial stresses due to temperature effects were well within code requirements. Indeed the most severe stress condition on the girth welds appeared to derive from the lowering in activity. This later proved to be the case, when it became apparent from CTOD testing that low values were obtained adjacent to the heat affected zone. This necessitated the use of CSA Z662 Annex K to establish acceptable weld defect sizes that in actuality were well within the capability of the equipment to detect. In turn the lowering in stresses had to be reduced by altering the spacing of the side booms. This speaks to the need within the AIV protocol to be flexible, responsive and to have a good management of change process in place. Indeed the crux of an alternative to hydrotesting, which is a binary decision of go or no go, is to establish whether or not an effective risk and quality management system is in place to ensure equivalent safety and integrity. To help with this determination the Board imposed upon TransCanada the need to conduct a complete third party review of the AIV process, details of which are described in the next section. Given the uniqueness of the project, the remit of the third party included making recommendations to both the NEB and TransCanada as to the extent of the oversight required in each activity to verify compliance. In other words to identify the value added inspection verification activities. From a risk perspective, it is reasonable to suppose that a new pipe will only fail a pre-service strength and leak test if critically sized manufacturing defects (defective seams, defective pipe) or construction defects such as defective girth welds, excessive wrinkle bends, defective valve seals, poor flange fit up etc; are present. Many of these defects will only be introduced whenever a phase change occurs in the pipe material, so increasing surveillance during pipe making and construction welding is obvious confirming the need of an effective Quality Management System (QMS) developed and

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process to progress beyond the field trial stage the Board expects a demonstration that an effective quality management system is fully implemented. In coming to its decision to grant the waiver the Board was appreciative of the comments contained in the independent third party’s report, which are documented later in the paper. Throughout the project Board staff sought and obtained rational arguments from TransCanada in support of particular actions. Clearly the level of regulatory oversight required was much greater on this project than had a hydrotest been performed and entailed working closely and in a timely manner with the third part auditor and the proponent TransCanada. Similarly the level of effort expended by the proponent was commensurately greater. Suffice to say that the leave to open was granted in time for the on stream delivery date to be met. It has also been of value to NEB staff to have had the opportunity to take part in a review and learning session with the company and the independent third party following the completion of the project to capture learnings and discuss the content of the Board’s letter.

of the review and audit would be to provide an assessment of the suitability of the aerial leak test as a replacement for the leak test portion of a hydrotest.

Conformance with technical specifications and AIV process With respect to the assessment of conformance with the requirements of TransCanada’s technical specifications and AIV process, the third party verification followed the principles and methodology described in the ISO 19011 Guidelines for quality and/or environmental management system auditing. An audit team comprised of an audit team leader and subject matter specialists was formed. The audits invariably included a review of pertinent documentation; the preparation of audit plans and associated work documents; an opening meeting with the auditee to confirm agreement of all parties with the audit plan; on-site audits to gather objective evidence to assess compliance with established audit criteria; a closing meeting to summarize critical findings; and the preparation of audit report. Audits were conducted of the pipe manufacturing process, the pipe coating process, the transport, storage and handling of the pipe, and the construction of the Stittsville and Deux Rivières pipe sections. The finding of the audits was that there was a high level of conformance to TransCanada’s specifications and standards, as well as TransCanada’s AIV process.

INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION As previously noted, the NEB Order included a requirement for an independent third party verification of the AIV Process. CC Technologies, Canada, which is part of Det Norske Veritas (DNV CCT), was selected by TransCanada to perform the third party verification. The scope of the work included the manufacture of the NPS 42 Grade 550 pipe for TransCanada at the IPSCO Pipe Mill in Regina; the coating of the NPS 42 Grade 550 and Grade 690 pipe at the Shaw Pipe Protection plant at Cam rose and Regina; and the construction of the Stittsville and Deux Rivières pipeline sections. As set out in the NEB Order, the objective of the third party verification was to provide an independent assessment of the processes and engineering principles involved in implementing the AIV process. In order that the expectations of the NEB and TransCanada with respect to the Third Party Verification could be better defined, meetings were held with NEB and TransCanada staff. It was agreed that the Third Party Verification of the AIV process should: • provide an assessment of conformance with the requirements of TransCanada’s technical specifications; • provide an assessment of conformance to the requirements of TransCanada’s AIV process; • provide an assessment of the suitability of the AIV process as an alternative to the post-construction hydrotest; • provide an assessment of the effectiveness of the AIV process on the basis of quality management system principles; • Identify areas for improvement in the AIV process. With respect to TransCanada’s proposed aerial leak detection program for the Deux Rivières section, the third party verification called for the review and audit of TransCanada’s preparation and implementation of the leak detection test. It was agreed with TransCanada and the NEB that the objective

The AIV process as an alternative to the hydrotest Since the AIV process was put forward as an alternative to the hydrotest and, since the hydrotest is essentially a quality control test for the pipeline, it was agreed that the AIV process would be evaluated on the basis of its effectiveness as a quality control program; i.e. of its effectiveness in providing assurance that the pipeline meets specifications. The audit of the AIV process addressed the following elements: • program documentation (AIV specification); • competency and training; • roles and responsibilities; • control of records (AIV forms); • design and development process (technical review); • clearly defined product requirements (construction specifications); • monitoring and measurement procedures to ensure product quality (audit targets; audit and inspection procedures); and • control of nonconforming product (variance tracking and variance resolution process). The presence of and conformance to the requirements of each of these elements, as confirmed by the third party verification, demonstrated the effectiveness of the AIV process as a quality control program, and hence, its suitability as an alternative to the post-construction hydrotest.

The AIV process as a quality management system In addition to evaluating the AIV process as a quality control program, it was also agreed to assess its effectiveness as a quality management system. Quality control pertains to the

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operational techniques and activities (e.g. inspections, tests, process controls) employed so that the pipeline meets specified project requirements. A quality management system comprises a systematic, comprehensive and proactive process for the management of the quality of the pipeline. The elements of a management system include organizational structure, planning activities, management of resources, and continual improvement. Early in the review of the AIV process, it became evident that, although the AIV process was intended to function as a quality management system, it did not include some core elements of a quality management system. It was therefore decided to proceed with a gap analysis, the objective of which was to determine which elements of a management system had been developed and effectively implemented, and which ones needed to be further developed or improved. The findings of the gap analysis were as follows: • In its current form, the AIV specification is principally a quality control document for the construction phase of a pipeline project. It does not have many of the basic elements of a quality management system, nor does it adequately address the requirements for the preconstruction stages of the project; e.g. design and material selection. • The AIV process, as applied in this project, did encompass pipe manufacture, coating, transport and construction and there are documented processes and procedures relating to these other project stages, but the interface between these and the AIV process is not clearly or explicitly defined in the AIV specification. Hence, there was a tendency to view them as independent, rather than interdependent, processes. • TransCanada did have documented processes and procedures for other elements (e.g. document control, customer-related processes) of a quality management system. In order that a functional management system may be developed, the interface (i.e. sequence and interaction) between these processes and the AIV process needs to be determined, together with the criteria and methods needed to ensure that the operation and control of these processes are effective. • The AIV process, as actually applied in this project, functioned as another technology development application. In other words, it was another deliverable for the project, as opposed to being fully integrated with the management of the pipeline project. • As a result of the additional monitoring activities (e.g. for conformance to technical specifications), the AIV process allows for an enhanced level of understanding of the condition of the pipeline after construction, compared to the knowledge that can be gained from a simple hydrotest. •

•

•

•

• •

objectives. All processes that could affect product quality or the ability to obtain a hydrotest waiver should be determined and incorporated or referenced in the AIV specification. The sequence and interaction of processes should be understood and the criteria and methods necessary to ensure effective control and operation of processes should be determined. The quality control function must be fully described for all project stages and must remain independent of production. Final acceptance of non-conformances must be taken by expert personnel outside the production function. Decision gates should be established within and after each project stage (e.g. design, procurement, installation, etc) to ensure quality requirements are acceptable. Ideally, objective and measurable acceptability criteria should be developed for each decision gate. The requirements of the regulatory process and the expectations of the regulatory agency should be determined and accommodated in the project plan. Consideration should be given to engaging the applicable regulatory agency at critical decision gates to ensure there are no “show stoppers” before proceeding to the next stage. A management of change process should be incorporated as part of the AIV process. Consideration should be given to conducting a thorough failure mode assessment for each stage of the project to ensure that critical activities are identified and appropriate criteria, control measures, or validation processes are developed.

The Aerial leak detection program The scope of the work included a review of a controlled leak test demonstration of the aerial leak detection technique, an assessment of TransCanada’s leak test plan, and an audit of the actual leak test of the Deux Rivières section. The leak detection method used by TransCanada is based on laser absorption spectroscopy. A laser beam directed towards a target gas will induce gas particle vibration at specific frequencies. These are referred to as absorption wavelengths, since a portion of the incident light energy is absorbed, causing the particle to vibrate at these wavelengths. The concentration of the gas can then be determined from the amount of laser light absorbed. The technology can reportedly detect methane concentrations as low as 1 ppm. This sensitivity is path-length dependent, with greater sensitivity achievable with longer path lengths. Although the equipment is very sensitive, it is effective only if it goes through the gas plume. This is highly dependent on the pilot’s ability to predict the location of a gas plume and select the appropriate flight plan; i.e. altitude and offset. Another limitation of the technology is primarily associated with weather conditions and the level of particulate matter in the air. Excessive levels of dust, steam or fog would result in a dispersion of the laser beam and impair the ability of the instrumentation used to record measurements.

The following recommendations were made: The AIV process must be fully integrated into the project management process, not simply an add-on to project

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The results of the controlled leak test demonstration were inconclusive. The conclusions and recommendations of the audit and review were as follows: •

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•

•

•

REFERENCE API 5L. (2004). “Specification for Line Pipe”, 43rd Edition. American Petroleum Institute. API 5L1. (2002). “Railroad Transportation of Line Pipe”, 6th Edition. American Petroleum Institute. API 5LW. (1996). “Recommended Practice for Transportation of Line Pipe on Barges and Marine Vessels”. American Petroleum Institute. Brooks L. E. (1957). “Hydrostatic Testing of Pipe Line”. Journal of the Pipeline Division, ASCE. Vol. 83, No PL3, September. Cosham, A.; Hopkins, P. and Spiekhout, J. (2006). “Qualifying the Probability of Failure During the pre-Commissioning Hydrotest”. Proceeding of International Pipeline Conference, September 25-29, Calgary, Alberta, Canada. CSA Z662. (2003). “Oil and Gas Pipeline Systems”. Canadian Standards Association. CSA Z245.1 (2002). “Steel Pipe”. Canadian Standards Association. Duffy A. R.; McClure G. M.; Maxey W. A. and Atterbury T. J. (1968). “Study of the Feasibility of Basing Natural Gas Pipeline Operation Pressure on Hydrostatic Test Pressure” PRCi, AGA Cat No L30050, February. Glover, A.; Purcell, J.; Rudge, P. and Hudson, B. (2005). “Implementation of an Approach to Replace the Construction Hydrostatic Test with an Alternative Integrity Validation”. Proceeding of Rio Pipeline Conference, October 17-19, Rio de Janerio, Brazil. Jones D.G. (1992). “Notes on philosophy and history of pressure testing”. Inst. of Mechanical Engineers Seminar on Developments in Pressure vessel Technology, London Oct Kirkwood, M.G. and Cosham, A. (2000). “Can the Pre-service Hydrotest be Eliminated”. Pipes and Pipelines International, Vol. 45, No. 4, July/August. Leis, B.N.; Rudland, D.L. and Eiber, R.J. (1999). “Final Report on the Evaluation of Benefits of hydrotesting Gas Transmission Pipelines”. Submitted to PRCI Onshore and Offshore Design Committee, PR-249-9728, July. Leis, B.N. (2001). “Hydrostatic Testing of Transmission Pipelines: When it is Beneficial, and Alternatives When It is not”. Final Report to PRCI Design and Construction Committee, December, PR3-9523. Leis, B.N. (2004). “Hydrostatic Testing of Transmission Pipelines: When it is Beneficial, and Alternatives When It is not”. Proceeding of Fourth Pipeline Technology Conference, , Oostende, Belgium, Vol. 4, pp. 1895-1919 NEB. (1999). “Onshore Pipeline Regulations”. National Energy Board. PARLOC (1990, 1992, 1994). “Update of Loss of Containment Data for Offshore Pipelines”, OTH 95 91 (1992), and OTH 93 468 (1994), and OTH 95 468 (1996), all HSE Books, Sheffield Zhou, J.; Taylor, D. and Hodgkinson, D. (2008). “Further LargeScale Implementation of Advanced Pipeline Technologies”. Proceeding of International Pipeline Conference, September 30 – October 3, Calgary, Alberta, Canada

The aerial leak detection technology used by TransCanada has the sensitivity to detect leaks of the size that would be typically detected during a hydrostatic test of a pipeline. The critical limitation of the technology is that it is effective only if it travels through the gas plume. In the absence of clear guidelines for the selection of flight paths, consideration should be given to selecting a surveyed area that encompasses a wide range of offsets and altitudes. Consideration should be given to studying gas plume behaviour for small leaks and the factors that influence it in order to further enhance the understanding of gas plume behaviour and provide guidance in the selection of flight paths. TransCanada’s procedures do not include objective guidelines or criteria for deciding whether to further investigate an indication and verifying whether there is a leak. Without clearly defined guidelines or criteria, decisions may vary from operator to operator. Consideration should be given to developing such criteria. The aerial leak test can be a suitable replacement for the leak test portion of a hydrotest provided the appropriate procedures and criteria are developed for 1. the selection of flight paths (i.e. altitudes and offset distances); and 2. deciding when a particular reading requires further investigation to determine whether there is a leak.

CONCLUSION This paper presented the development of, and technical basis for, the AIV process as implemented in Stittsville and Deux Rivières Loop project. The successful implementation of AIV on these projects adequately demonstrated the safety and leak-free condition and led to the pre-service hydrotest waiver for the Deux Rivières Loop. This was the first pre-service hydrotest waiver granted by NEB. NEB approval was granted on the basis of case-specific evidence and the successful implementation of a quality management process. The perspectives of the regulator and an independent third party have also been presented. A number of areas for improvements to the AIV process have been identified. TransCanada and its partners will continue to improve the AIV process.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT It was obvious that the successful development and implementation involved a considerable collaborative effort. The authors wish to acknowledge the contributions made by all involved, including TransCanada’s management and project team, pipe mills, contractors, NEB board members and staff, and the staff of CC Technologies.

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Table 1 Auditing Requirements for Field Construction Activities Construction Process Receiving Material (all materials)

Observation

Auditing

Field Inspection and Validation

Ultimate Integrity Verification

An inspector shall receive each pipe and check it off on the tally sheets and investigate the pipe and rail cars for signs of humping.

Confirm all pipes are received against the tally sheets.

Tally Sheets, pipe and/or coating damage

Full Traceability of material, holiday detection, visual examinations, caliper pigging

Site free of rocks, stacked on timbers, chock blocks, lifting hooks

Full Traceability of material, holiday detection, visual examinations, caliper pigging

Decks clean, bearing strips acceptable, tie downs acceptable, string hooks approved

Full Traceability of material, holiday detection, visual examinations, caliper pigging

Padded bending shoes, seam in proper location, 1.8 m to start of bend, ripple acceptable, coating and bevel damage

Holiday detection, lowering inspection, welding set up, caliper pigging

Measure thickness of the transition around the circumference, measure the counterbore distance.

Non-destructive testing process

Approved procedure & electrodes, parameters & pre-heat acceptable

Non-destructive testing process

Welding parameters for 10% of mainline welds up to 4 welds per day shall be recorded and reviewed daily.

Determine acceptability of weld parameters as per weld procedure data sheet

Non-destructive testing process

An inspector shall observe each tie-in welding process to ensure compliance with the welding procedures.

Welding parameters for one tie-in weld per day shall be audited if 4 or more tie-in welds are completed in a day. Random audits on preheats, and electrodes

Audit process and welding parameters

Non-destructive testing process

NDT set up and calibration shall be observed by TCPL NDT specialist.

The UT process shall be recalibrated for every 10th weld.

Probe configuration, axial alignment, coverage, calibration, documentation TEP-NDT-ADT, Procedure for NDE Audits

Every tenth weld the Ultra sonic process is checked to ensure calibrated to standard test piece

Pipe Stockpile 100% observations (site) 10% audit (pipe)

An inspector shall observe the stockpiling process at each site to ensure compliance with the PCS.

Hauling, Storage, Stringing 100% observation (process) 10% audit (pipe loads)

An inspector shall observe each the pipe loading process to ensure compliance with the PCS.

Pipe Bending 20% observation (process) 50% audit (pipe bends)

An inspector shall observe 20% the bending operation to ensure the process meets the PCS requirements.

Transitions observation – a minimum of one transition (process) 100% audit

An inspector shall observe a minimum of one transition to ensure the process meets the project specific transition detail.

Welding 100% observations (process)

An inspector shall observe each mainline welding process to ensure compliance with the welding procedures.

Welding Parameters Four (4) welds per day Tie-ins 100% observations (process) Weld parameters of tie-in weld one per day (audit) Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) 100% of welds inspected with NDT Non-Destructive Test Audit 15% audit Girth Weld Coating 50% process observation 10% audit

A minimum of 10% of the joints shall be inspected for pipe damage. Typically only the top half and the bevels can be inspected safely during stockpiling. A minimum of 10% of the joints shall be inspected for pipe damage. Typically only the top half and the bevels can be inspected safely during loading. Inspector shall audit a minimum of 50% of the bends completed. An inspector shall take measurements around the circumference of each transition to ensure it is within the parameters of the transition detail. Visual inspection shall be conducted for each weld. Random audits on preheats, and electrodes are also conducted

UT data shall be audited by TCPL NDT specialist for min. 15% of the welds. An inspector shall observe 50% of the girth weld coating operation with both epoxy and sleeves (where applicable).

An inspector shall audit 10% of the girth weld coating.

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Calibration of holiday detector, holiday detection of pipe prior to lowering-in

Audit review

Cathodic protection process

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Construction Process

Observation

Auditing

Buoyancy Controls 100% process observation 10% audit

An inspector shall observe each process for the installation of buoyancy control measures

An inspector shall complete an audit on 10% of installed buoyancy control equipment.

Crossings 100% observation, 50% audit

An inspector shall observe each crossing for the main steps in the crossing process.

50% of the crossing should be audited and an AIV form is completed for each of the audited crossing.

Trenching, Blasting and Excavation 20% observation 50% audit

An inspector shall observe 20% of the trenching and blasting operation to ensure compliance with PCS.

An inspector shall visually inspect 50% of the trench.

Lowering-in 50% observation 10% audit

Backfilling 50% observation (process) audit minimum 1 location per km Internal Cleaning and Inspection 100% (process) Caliper pigging 100% (process)

An inspector shall observe 50% of the lowering-in operation to ensure the work is in accordance with the PCS.

An inspector shall observe the backfilling process for 50% of the pipeline total distance to check sand padding and backfill material An inspector shall witness the material removed from the pipeline after the internal cleaning run. A TCPL inspector shall observe and inspect the pig prior to the run and after the run.

Field Inspection and Validation Check process (e.g. concrete), check gauges, verify sizing & adequate pull tests HDD includes feed speed, size of bore, soil type, distance between side booms

Ultimate Integrity Verification Hammer tests, pull tests, caliper pig

Potential for pre-tested sections

Ditch clear of damaging debris, adequate cover

Lowering-in process, ensure ditch is clear of debris

An inspector shall inspect 10% of the pipe lowered. Checks include: - depth of cover - sandpadding / rockshield where required - voltage level for jeeping - number of side booms - holidays are repaired An inspector shall complete the audit at 1 randomly selected location per km for depth of sand padding and size of rocks used in backfilling

Ditch clear of damaging debris, adequate side booms, holiday detector set for proper voltage, holiday detection during lowering-in, repair holidays found by approved method

Caliper pig, cathodic protection

Ensure quality of back fill material, padding if required

Caliper pig, cathodic protection

Complete one AIV form for every tool run.

Ensure final cleaning pig run is acceptable

Ensure final cleaning pig run is acceptable

The TCPL inspector shall inspect the condition of the cups on the pig before and after the run

Caliper pig run acceptable for ovality, dents and/or ripples

Caliper pig run acceptable for ovality, dents and/or ripples

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Policies Goals & Objectives

Project Initiation

START

AIVEnablers

Organization & Responsibilities

System Planning

Management Commitment Procedures QC-QA Process

Evaluation & Acceptance

Pipeline Engineering & Design

AIV Documentation

Communication Plan

Non-Conformance

Monitoring & Assessments

Risk

Reporting & Performance Measurement

Reports Survey

Manufacturing

Inspection

Risk Management

Management of Change

Mill Inspections

Commissioning & Start Up

Document Management

Transportation

Construction & Installation

Receipt & Stockpile

Training & Development

Figure 2 AIV Quality Management Processes & Enablers

Design

Manufacturing & Transportation

Planning Standards Regulations Pipe Size Pipe WT Pipe Grade/Materials Pipe Toughness Fracture Control BOM Manufacture

Construction

Commissioning & Start Up

Procedures Construction Specs Welders training Welders Qualification AIV Process training Filed Management Inspection Stock piling Loading/hauling Bending Welding Inspection Trenching Lowering –in Buoyancy Control Cleaning Tie-ins

Procurement TansCanada P/L Specification Mill Qualification Mill Work Practices Mill Testing &Inspection Third party Surveillance Freight/Transportation Tally sheets Inspection

Testing Load Purge Pressure Up Mechanical acceptance Handover for start up

Figure 3 Alternative Integrity Validation (AIV) Implementation Phases

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