Interpersonal Conflict and Relational Models Theory: A Structural ...

Relational Model Conflict

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Running head: RELATIONAL MODEL CONFLICT

Interpersonal Conflict and Relational Models Theory: A Structural Approach to Injustice Barton Poulson Graduate School and University Center, City University of New York

This research was part of a doctoral dissertation submitted to the SocialPersonality Psychology program at the City University of New York Graduate Center. Kay Deaux, Nick Haslam, and Herb Saltzstein provided extensive critiques of earlier drafts of this paper. Alan Fiske, Len Saxe, and Vita Rabinowitz also provided valuable suggestions in the course of this research. Correspondence regarding this article should be addressed to Barton Poulson, who is now at the Department of Psychology, Brigham Young University, 1132 SWKT, Provo, Utah 84602. Electronic mail may be sent via Internet to [email protected].


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ABSTRACT Two experiments analyzed social conflicts based on A. P. Fiske’s (1991, 1992) four relational models: communal sharing, authority ranking, equality matching, and market pricing. Because each model has a distinct logical structure, it was hypothesized that social conflicts in which participants used incommensurate models would lead to more extreme reactions than would conflicts in which both participants used the same model. Participants in both experiments read 16 interpersonal scenarios in which an expectation based on one of the four models was contradicted by a negative outcome based on one of the four models. In neither experiment was the incommensurability hypothesis supported, although exploratory analyses indicated significant effects of communal sharing and equality matching.

KEY WORDS: Relational models; Procedural and distributive justice; experimental analysis.


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INTERPERSONAL CONFLICT AND RELATIONAL MODELS THEORY: A STRUCTURAL APPROACH TO INJUSTICE

Social life is a delicately balanced process in which conflict is a constant risk. In examining the sources of interpersonal conflict, researchers have focused on factors such as undesirable outcomes (e.g., Thibaut & Kelley, 1959) and undesirable procedures (e.g., Lind & Tyler, 1988). While these approaches have shed considerable light on the genesis of interpersonal conflict, recent developments in the study of social relationships (Fiske, 1991, 1992, Fiske & Haslam, 1996) have pointed to a third possible source of conflict: the logical structure of the relationship. The purpose of this paper is to explore the potential of this structural approach to understanding social and interpersonal conflict. Connections between relational structure and conflict have been found in research using the interpersonal circumplex and the communal/exchange dichotomy. According to the interpersonal circumplex, social relations vary along the dimensions of love/hate and dominate/submit (Kiesler, 1983). Using such an approach, Benjamin (1974) found that interactions were sensible when they involved theoretically logical combinations of behaviors on the circumplex, such as opposites. This is not to say that the interaction is necessarily satisfying—the opposite of “embrace, tender, touch” in Benjamin’s system is “murderous attack”—but it is interpretable at the logical level as the diametric opposite of what was expected. On the other hand, “obey routines” has no clear relation to “embrace, tender, touch.” Benjamin (1974) reported that such violations of structural


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expectations led to confusion and anger. Such emotions, in turn, contribute substantially to interpersonal conflict. Similar results were using a simplified relational dichotomy. In an experiment by Clark and Mills (1979), participants were led to desire one of two relationships with an attractive confederate: a communal relationship, in which exchanges are noncontingent, or an exchange relationship, in which exchanges are reciprocated. The confederate who violated the expectations in either situation was judged as significantly less attractive and less likable than the confederate who acted in a manner congruent with the relational expectation. These studies provide evidence that relational frames bring with them mutually exclusive expectations and evaluation bases that can contribute to conflict. A more general approach to relationship structure is found in Fiske’s (1991, 1992; Fiske & Haslam, 1996) relational models theory, which synthesizes relationship literature from anthropology, sociology, psychology, and theology. Relational models theory outlines four fundamental and universal structures for social relations: communal sharing, authority ranking, equality matching, and market pricing. Communal sharing relationships are based on categorical membership, in which all group members are treated as identical in some sense, such as among spouses (who may share a joint checking account) or within ethnic groups (e.g., a Swede may feel unity with all other Swedes). Authority ranking relations involve linear ordering or hierarchy, in which certain people are given precedence, as in military hierarchies (e.g., generals have precedence over colonels). Equality matching assumes strict balance or in-kind reciprocity, as with dinner invitations (e.g., if you have me over for dinner, I then invite


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you over for dinner) or one-person-one-vote elections, in which all people have equal influence. Finally, market pricing relationships are based on proportional input and output. Unlike equality matching, in which tradeoffs are between identical acts or objects, market pricing strives to balance inherently unequal quantities or objects, such as receiving wages for labor. A substantial body of naturalistic and experimental data demonstrates that people from several cultures do, in fact, use the relational models in thinking about people and relationships (see Fiske and Haslam, 1996, for a review). These studies examined social errors (in which one person is mistaken for another; Fiske, 1993; Fiske, Haslam, & Fiske, 1991), intentional substitutions (e.g., finding a new partner for a game of tennis; Fiske & Haslam, 1998a), order of recall for friends (Fiske, 1995), and personality disorders (Haslam, Reichert, & Fiske, 1998). These studies showed not only that people intuitively use the relational models in thinking about people, but also that relational information appears to take cognitive precedence over information about social roles, personality, race/ethnicity, or age. Other research has applied the theory to distributive and procedural justice (Folger, Sheppard, & Buttram, 1995), worker attrition (Connelley, 1997), negotiation (Gelfand, Dominguez, & Nishii, 1998), and moral violations (Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000), demonstrating the flexibility of the models. Two characteristics critical to Fiske’s models are their categorical nature and theoretical incommensurability. Each model represents a qualitatively distinct form that cannot be reduced to any of the other three models. This is supported by the mathematical properties of each model (Fiske, 1991) and by empirical studies (Haslam, 1994; Haslam


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& Fiske, 1992). Consequently, relations structured according to one model should be incompatible with those structured according to other models. If the incommensurability of the models is salient in social relations, then conflicts in which the two participants are using different models (between-model conflicts) should be experienced as qualitatively different from conflicts in which the same model is used but implemented differently (within-model conflicts). For example, two people in a market pricing relationship may agree that payment should be proportional to effort but may disagree on how to measure effort or how much to pay for the effort. As such, the basic structure of the relationship is clear but there is considerable disagreement about how the structure is to be filled in or implemented. This is not to imply that within-model conflicts are superficial—preserving one person’s life at the cost of another’s involves a particularly painful within-model conflict (Fiske & Tetlock, 1997; Tetlock et al, 2000). Between-model conflicts, by contrast, concern whether a particular model is appropriate for the interaction at all. When allotting office space, for example, one person may use authority ranking and assign larger offices to higher-ranking persons. Another person may use equality matching and conclude that everyone should get equal size offices. Here, one person assumes that personnel are equivalent in an important way, whereas the other assumes that they are not equivalent. The conflict, then, is not about the relative worth of employees but whether it is appropriate to assign worth at all. In a direct, experimental comparison of within-model and between-model conflicts, Tetlock et al. (2000) compared reactions to “taboo tradeoffs,” or unethical between-model tradeoffs, (Fiske & Tetlock, 1997) with “tragic tradeoffs,” which are


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difficult within-model conflicts In the taboo-tradeoff condition, participants read a scenario in which a hospital administrator had to chose between allocating financial resources to equipment and personnel for the hospital (a market pricing choice) instead of saving a child’s life with a needed transplant (indicative of communal sharing values, and therefore a between-model conflict). In the tragic tradeoff condition, the same administrator had to choose between allocating resources to save one child’s life or another child’s life (a within-model conflict). Participants reacted much more negatively to the taboo tradeoff than the tragic tradeoff, as shown through moral outrage, sanctions, and moral cleansing. This study provided preliminary data in support of the incommensurability effect in social conflict. However, it is limited by the inclusion of only two conflicts, whereas the four models allow for sixteen possible combinations. Moreover, the study centers on a single domain (resource allocation in a hospital) with dramatic consequences. It remains to be seen, therefore, whether the incommensurability effect exists for other combinations and for less dramatic situations. For the current studies it was hypothesized that between-model conflicts, which involve fundamental, structural incompatibilities, would lead to more negative reactions than would within-model conflicts, which involve differences in implementation but not in structure.


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STUDY 1 Method Participants A power analysis indicated that 197 participants would be necessary to have power = .80 in detecting a small effect (d = .20) for the incommensurability hypothesis using a repeated-measures design (Cohen, 1988). Consequently, 199 participants (153 females, 45 males, 1 not specified; mean age = 26.1) were recruited from psychology department participant pools at Hunter College and Lehman College, both large public universities in New York City. Participants received course credit for their participation. Materials Participants read one of two sets of sixteen short scenarios (one for each combination of the four models) that were developed through several stages of pretesting. Two sets of scenarios were used to partially compensate for the variability in expectations and context that could affect reactions to the scenarios. In addition, the use of two sets allowed for a greater range of more natural scenarios, which would reduce fatigue. The substantial variation of these two sets does allow for uncontrolled confounds in the scenarios, but the more restricted methodology of Study 2 provides a counterbalance to this. In the first stage of pretesting, the equivalence of scenario outcomes (i.e., the end result of the interaction) was established. A pool of 65 potential scenario outcomes, such as not being invited on a family vacation, was composed by the researcher. The outcomes


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addressed diverse behavioral domains: decision making, distribution, contribution, and social influence. In addition, the scenarios described personal (i.e., the other party was known) and impersonal (i.e., the other party was anonymous, as with a letter from a company) interactions that could have one or more people enacting the outcomes. A sample of 33 participants at Hunter College and Lehman College rated the outcomes of the 65 scenarios on a 7 point scale (-3 = very negative to +3 = Very positive). From these original 65 scenarios, 32 scenarios (permitting 2 scenarios for each of the 16 relational model combinations) had outcomes with moderately negative outcomes (i.e., between -1 and -2) and were selected to form the basis for the scenarios. The outcome ratings (see Table 1) were analyzed with a 4 (Expected relational model: communal sharing, authority ranking, equality matching, market pricing) x 4 (Enacted relational model: communal sharing, authority ranking, equality matching, market pricing) within-subjects ANOVA. For each significant effect, post-hoc comparisons were conducted using the Rom sequentially rejective procedure, which controls the familywise error rate and has excellent power (Wilcox, 1996). A significant effect was found for Enacted relational model, F(3,90) = 3.57, p < .05, η2 = .11. Outcomes for scenarios in which communal sharing was enacted elicited significantly less negative reactions than when authority ranking was enacted. Scenarios in which equality matching or market pricing was enacted did not differ from any of the others. No other effects had effect sizes over η2 = .05 or were statistically significant, including the within/between-relational model effect. Specifically, the mean evaluation of the within-


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relational model conflict outcomes (M = -1.65, SD = 0.65) did not differ from the between-relational model conflict outcomes (M = -1.57, SD = 0.51). In the second stage, expectations for the interaction and relational structure were added to the 32 scenario outcomes. Two judges showed substantial agreement when determining whether the scenarios clearly reflected the desired models, κ = .92. A scenario in which the perceiver expected equality matching but authority ranking was enacted follows:

Imagine that you’re working with several people to organize a group project. You expected that the group would vote on the various decisions. However, one of your group members claims to be a natural leader with very high standards. Because nobody’s suggestions meet his/her standards, this person decides to make all of the decisions and tells everybody what to do.

The third and final step in pretesting was the assessment of differences in perceived likelihood or probability of occurrence of each of the scenarios, which would constitute another artifactual explanation for differences in overall reactions. A sample of 19 participants was recruited from the Psychology departments at Hunter College and Lehman College. Demographic information was not collected at this stage. These participants rated the likelihood the 32 complete scenarios on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = “Not at all likely” and 5 = “Very likely”).


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As with the outcome evaluations, the data (see Table 2) were analyzed with a 4 (Expected relational model: communal sharing, authority ranking, equality matching, market pricing) x 4 (Enacted relational model: communal sharing, authority ranking, equality matching, market pricing) ANOVA with repeated measures on both factors. A main effect was found for Enacted relational model, F(3,51) = 13.01, p < .001, η2 = .43. Post-hoc t-tests showed that scenarios in which communal sharing was enacted were rated as significantly more than likely than were authority ranking or equality matching scenarios and that all were rated as more likely than market pricing scenarios. The interaction of Expected relational model by Enacted relational model was also statistically significant, F(9,153) = 2.35, p < .05, η2 = .12. Post hoc tests showed that the scenarios for the within-relational model conflicts (M = 4.05, SD = 0.69) were seen as more likely than the between-relational model scenarios (M = 3.65, SD = 0.81). This result opens the possibility that any differences in reactions to within-relational model conflicts and between-relational model conflicts may be the result of unusual behavior and not relational model conflict, per se. This possibility will be addressed below. With the three stages of pretesting completed, the 32 scenarios were randomly split into two sets of 16 scenarios each and randomly ordered. Participants were then asked to imagine themselves in the place of the perceiver and then to rate each scenario on 6 items that measured negative reactions to conflicts on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = Not at all, 5 = Very Much). These items were chosen from an original pool of 14 items composed by the researcher to measure affective, behavioral, and cognitive reactions. The original list of 14 items was reduced to six to minimize participant fatigue. The six


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items were selected based on their high item-total correlations in pretesting and their theoretical coherence. Items included the following: “This interaction made me feel upset,” “This interaction made me feel hostile,” “I wanted to stop this interaction,” “I wanted to change this interaction,” “I thought that this interaction was strange or unusual,” and “I thought that this interaction reflected insensitivity on the part of the other(s).” These items had a coefficient alpha of α = .85, so scores on the six items were averaged and analyses were based on those means. Procedure Participants were surveyed in classrooms in groups ranging in size from 2 to 20. The study was described in detail, using example scenarios and illustrating the methods for responding. The scenario packets were then distributed, and further verbal and written instructions were given. The study required approximately 90 minutes. Results Reaction Scores The reaction scores (see Table 3) were analyzed with a 4 (Expected relational model: communal sharing, authority ranking, equality matching, market pricing) x 4 (Enacted relational model: communal sharing, authority ranking, equality matching, market pricing) ANOVA with repeated measures on both variables. A main effect for Expected relational model was found, F(3, 495) = 19.72, p < .001, η2 = .11. Communal sharing or market pricing expectations elicited more negative reactions than did authority ranking or equality matching expectations. A main effect for Enacted relational model


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was also observed, F(3, 495) = 28.51, p < .001, η2 = .17. Communal sharing and authority ranking enactments elicited the most negative reactions, followed by market pricing. Equality matching elicited the least negative reactions. The significant interaction of Expected relational model and Enacted relational model, F(9, 1485) = 5.24, p < .001, η2 = .03, indicated that reactions depended jointly, although weakly, on expectations and outcomes. Contrary to the hypothesis, participants generally reacted more negatively to within-model conflicts (M = 3.10, SD = 0.85) than to between-model conflicts (M = 2.91, SD = 0.73). Relations Between Outcome Variables To assess the value of outcome evaluation and perceived likelihood in explaining reactions to scenarios, correlations were computed between the mean values for each of the 32 scenarios. Scenario outcome and perceived likelihood were not significantly correlated, r(30) = .09, ns; nor were outcome and reaction, r(30) = .08, ns. The correlation between likelihood and outcome, r(30) = .19, ns, did not reach statistical significance, but this may have been due more to low power than to a null effect. It implies that respondents were more upset by interactions that seemed less likely. Although scenario likelihood explained only 4% of the variance, compared to 17% for enacted relational model, the role of perceived likelihood in explaining reactions to relational conflict needs to be better explored. Data Exploration Because this study represents an initial investigation into the full range of relational model conflicts and because the data contradicted the hypothesis, the data were


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explored for unexpected patterns. This approach revealed unusually negative reactions to communal sharing/communal sharing conflicts. In fact, when this conflict was excluded, the remaining 3 within-model conflicts (M = 2.92, SD = 0.91) did not differ from the between-model conflicts (M = 2.91, SD = 0.73), t(194) = 0.24, ns. Therefore, communal sharing/communal sharing conflicts appear to explain almost completely the withinmodel/between-model effect. Exploratory analyses also revealed generally mild reactions to conflicts involving equality matching, both when expected and when enacted. Consequently, the scenarios were placed into three categories: communal sharing/communal sharing conflicts (M = 3.64, SD = 1.17), the 7 equality matching conflicts (M = 2.65, SD =0.77), and midrange conflicts (i.e., the 8 conflicts that remained; M = 3.14, SD =0.77). Post hoc tests showed highly significant differences between all three conflict categories. Communal sharing/communal sharing conflicts elicited significantly more negative reactions than did midrange conflicts, t(192) = 7.06, p < .001, or equality matching conflicts, t(192) = 12.55, p < .001. Midrange conflicts were also significantly more negative than equality matching conflicts, t(192) = 14.09, p < .001. Although unanticipated, these differences appear to reflect general preferences for equality, as discussed in the negotiation literature (e.g., Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1991; Rubin, Pruitt, & Kim, 1994) and the all-or-nothing nature of communal sharing. Discussion The incommensurability hypothesis—i.e., between-model conflicts should lead to more negative reactions than within-model conflicts—was contradicted. That is, the analyses yielded statistically significant results in the direction opposite of what had been


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hypothesized. However, data exploration indicated that this might have been due primarily to the extreme scores for the communal sharing/communal sharing conflicts. Because of these unexpected findings, a second study was conducted using a modified experimental methodology. STUDY 2 Study 2 modified the experimental scenarios and methodology to overcome some of the weaknesses of Study 1. Participants again read one of two sets of 16 scenarios describing each possible combination of relational models and were asked to respond to evaluative items. However, several important changes had been made: (a) Two domains—distribution and decision making—were used, whereas the previous study used social influence and contribution as well; (b) Scenarios were all explicitly interpersonal with a known partner (e.g., parents or spouse); (c) Evaluations were measured with a single item to reduce participant fatigue; (d) Outcome desirability was included as a covariate; and (e) Scenarios were constructed in a combinatorial manner, such that four expectations and four enactments were combined to make the 16 scenarios. Method Participants A convenience sample of 132 participants (43 Male, 85 Females, 4 not specified; mean age = 26.1) was recruited at Hunter College. Participants received class credit for their participation.


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Materials Two sets of scenarios were prepared for this study. The first set of scenarios involved a student asking a parent for money to buy schoolbooks and being denied that money (the distribution condition). The second set of scenarios involved choosing an apartment with one’s spouse and ending up in the personally less-desired apartment (the decision-making condition). In contrast to Study 1, scenarios were constructed in a combinatorial manner. That is, the same expectation was used for the four distribution scenarios in which communal sharing was expected, another expectation was used for the four distribution scenarios in which authority ranking was expected, and so on. A similar procedure was used for the enacted models. The outcome was identical for every scenario in each behavioral domain. After reading each scenario, participants responded to two statements: (a) “This interaction made me feel upset,” and (b) “An interaction like this could happen in real life.” Both statements were rated using 5 point Likert-type scales (1 = Not at all and 5 = Very much). Participants then evaluated the scenario outcomes (e.g., “How bad is it to live someplace you don’t really like?”) using the same 5 point Likert scale. Procedure The questionnaires were administered to participants either individually or in small groups. Participants were randomly assigned to complete either the distribution or decision making conditions. The scenarios were presented in random order for each participant. Participants were asked to read each scenario carefully and imagine themselves in each interaction. After reading and responding to each scenario,


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participants evaluated the outcome of the scenarios and provided demographic data. They were then asked for comments on the study, debriefed, and thanked for their time. Results Outcome Evaluation The average evaluation of the outcomes for the distribution and decision-making scenarios (M = 4.33; SD = 0.85) was substantially negative and did not differ by domain, t(121) = -0.77, ns. Consequently, the valence of the scenarios may be comparable to those in Study 1, although the use of different rating scales in the two studies makes direct comparisons difficult. Scenario Likelihood Perceived likelihood (see Table 4) was evaluated with a 4 (Expected relational model: communal sharing, authority ranking, equality matching, market pricing) x 4 (Enacted relational model: communal sharing, authority ranking, equality matching, market pricing) x 2 (Behavioral domain: Distribution or Decision Making) ANOVA with repeated measures on the first two variables. A significant main effect for Enacted relational model was found, F(3, 390) = 14.41, p < .001, η2 = .10. Post-hoc t-tests showed that scenarios in which equality matching was enacted were rated as less likely than communal sharing, authority ranking, or market pricing scenarios, which did not differ from each other. This effect, however, was qualified by an interaction of Enacted relational model with Behavioral domain, F(3, 390) = 35.93, p < .001, η2 = .21. Post-hoc analyses showed that for distribution situations, scenarios in which communal sharing


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was enacted (M = 3.37) were seen as most likely, market pricing least likely (M = 2.47), and authority ranking and equality matching at similar values in between (M =3.00 and 2.88, respectively). For decision making scenarios, market pricing was judged as most likely (M = 3.70), communal sharing and authority ranking were less likely (M = 3.11 and 3.27, respectively), and equality matching was least likely (M = 2.58). No other effects had η2 > .02 or reached statistical significance. Reaction Scores The reaction data (see Table 5) were analyzed with a 4 (Expected relational model: communal sharing, authority ranking, equality matching, market pricing) x 4 (Enacted relational model: communal sharing, authority ranking, equality matching, market pricing) x 2 (Behavioral domain: Distribution or Decision Making) ANOVA with repeated measures on the first two variables. The main effect for Expected model was significant, F(3, 372) = 3.62; p < .05, η2 = .03. Post hoc t-tests showed that scenarios in which equality matching was expected were associated with more negative reactions than were communal sharing, authority ranking, or market pricing scenarios, none of which differed from each other. A significant main effect for Enacted relational model was also found, F(3, 372) = 5.92; p < .001, η2 = .05. Scenarios in which communal sharing was enacted led to significantly more negative responses than did authority ranking, equality matching, or market pricing scenarios, which did not differ from each other (see Table 3). The omnibus ANOVA did not show a significant interaction of Expected model x Enacted model, F(9, 1116) = 1.71, ns, η2 = .01. More specifically, responses to withinmodel conflicts (M = 3.54; SD = 0.92) did not differ significantly from between-model


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conflicts (M = 3.48; SD = 0.85), t(130) = 1.86, ns. This null finding applied to both behavioral domains. Thus, for the second time, the incommensurability hypothesis (within-model vs. between-model conflicts) was not supported. Relations between dependent variables Participants provided data on three variables: how bad the outcome was (without considering the perceiver’s expectations), how likely each interaction was to occur, and reactions to the scenarios. Likelihood ratings and reaction scores were provided for each scenario. Consequently, individual level data on each variable could be correlated, whereas as scenario averages were used in Study 1. Outcome and likelihood of the scenario were not correlated, r(1968) = .03, ns (the large df is due to a restructuring of the data file in order to compute individual level correlations). The valence of scenario outcomes, however, was predictive of reactions to the scenarios, although the effect was small, r(1968) = .16, p < .001. This indicates that people were more upset by interactions that had negative outcomes, regardless of relational model expectations, although this relationship accounted for only slightly more than 2% of the variance in reactions. Furthermore, interactions that were seen as less likely to occur also led to more negative reactions, r(2112) = -.20, p < .001. Again, this effect was also on the small side, accounting for 4% of the variance in reactions, compared to 15% for the enacted relational model by behavioral domain interaction. However, it confirms a pattern seen in Study 1, which leads to the conclusion that interaction likelihood is an important mediator of reactions to conflicts.


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Data Exploration Exploration of the data in Study 1 showed that communal sharing/communal sharing conflicts elicited the most negative responses and conflicts involving equality matching had the least negative responses. When this pattern was applied to Study 2, there was some agreement (communal sharing/communal sharing conflicts: M = 3.71; SD = 1.18; equality matching conflicts: M = 3.47; SD = 0.90; remaining conflicts: M = 3.49; SD = 0.90), but the differences were not statistically significant. However, the main effect for Enacted model made it clear that communal sharing again played an unusual role. Responses to conflicts in which communal sharing was expected were markedly negative (along with market pricing), a surprising finding because the conflicts in these situations did not involve being excluded from the relationship—rather, other people were included. In addition, scenarios in which equality matching was enacted elicited significantly lessnegative reactions. This provides partial support for the theory of equality matching as a commonly acceptable model. Discussion Study 2 investigated the same hypothesis as Study 1, but had greater consistency among the experimental scenarios and had briefer outcome measures. As with Study 1, the incommensurability hypothesis was not supported. In addition, equality matching maintained its role as least-offensive enacted relational model, although equality matching expectations were now associated with greater negativity than any other model. Moreover, as with Study 1, communal sharing was the most-offensive enacted relational


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mode, although market pricing was at a similar level. Study 2, therefore, provided partial support for the special role of communal sharing found in Study 1. GENERAL DISCUSSION Scholarly work on the nature of relational models (Fiske, 1991, 1992; 1993, 1995; Fiske & Haslam, 1996, 1998; Fiske, Haslam, & Fiske, 1991; Haslam, 1994; Haslam & Fiske, 1992) and relational model conflict (Fiske & Tetlock, 1997; Gelfand et al., 1998; Haslam et al., 1998; Tetlock et al., 2000) suggested that people may react more negatively to conflicts in which structures are discordant or incommensurable than when they are concordant. That is, because within-model conflicts share the same logical structure, they should be more comprehensible and less disturbing than would betweenmodel conflicts. The data in Study 1 showed the opposite pattern, although this resulted from extreme reactions to situations in which communal sharing inclusion was expected and categorical exclusion resulted. This reaction is likely due to the binary nature of the communal sharing/communal sharing conflict; a person who has been excluded from communal sharing may feel that he or she no longer has any relationship at all. With other models, compromise may be possible, as when price is negotiated in market pricing. Communal sharing exclusion, in contrast, is dichotomous: you are in the relationship or you are not. It is no surprise that this would be particularly painful and upsetting. It is, however, somewhat surprising that communal sharing overinclusion— that is, including unwanted others in the relationship—would also cause such strong reactions, as was the case in Study 2. It would appear that group boundaries carry


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particularly strong emotional affects and that people alter those boundaries only at great risk. Study 1 also showed a special role for equality matching, which may have served as a possible default relational structure. That is, when people find themselves in ambiguous situations, they may be willing to propose equality matching, but readily give it up for another option. Similarly, people may be ready to accept equality matching. This interpretation is consistent with other work on social conflict (e.g., Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1991; Rubin, Pruitt, & Kim, 1994) that generally finds a strong preference for equality matching behaviors in negotiating settlements, even when such behavior does not lead to the maximization of personal outcomes. Why wasn’t the incommensurability effect observed in the current studies? The nature of the specific conflicts studied may contain the answer. The incommensurability hypothesis was based on the work of Fiske and Tetlock (1997), whose “taboo tradeoffs” often involved serious social violations. For example, they discuss the horror people would feel at being asked to sell their children or selling a cemetery to a brothel. Both of these situations represent highly unusual (and illegal) relations. Although Fiske and Tetlock do discuss more moderate situations, the extreme examples may dominate the evaluative field when assessing conflicts. The present studies, however, intentionally avoided strongly negative interaction outcomes to focus on structure and not outcome. It would be informative to study interactions in which the outcome valence varied more than it did in the present studies to determine if this can explain the unexpected results.


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In conclusion, relational models have important effects on interpersonal conflict. Although logical incommensurability does not appear to drive reactions to conflicts, other effects are clear: violations of relational boundaries are particularly painful, and the assumption of strict equality seems widely acceptable. The outcomes of situations and other idiosyncrasies of interactions are not sufficient to explain the full variation in reactions. In addition, the systematic structure of relationships significantly influences whether and to what degree people are satisfied with their social interactions.


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Kiesler, D. J. (1983). The 1982 interpersonal circle: A taxonomy for complementarity in human transactions. Psychological Review, 90, 185-214. Lind, E. A., & Tyler, T. R. (1988). The social psychology of procedural justice. New York: Plenum. Rubin, J. Z., Pruitt, D. G., & Kim, S. H. (1994). Social conflict: Escalation, stalemate, and settlement (2nd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill. Tetlock, P. E., Kristel, O. V., Elson, S. B., Green, M. C., & Lerner, J. (2000). The psychology of the unthinkable: Taboo trade-offs, forbidden base rates, and heretical counterfactuals. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78, 853-870. Thibaut, J., & Kelley, H. H. (1959). The social psychology of groups. New York: Wiley. Wilcox, R. R. (1996). Statistics for the social sciences. San Diego, CA: Academic Press.


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Table 1 Mean Evaluations of Scenario Outcomes (and Standard Deviations): Study 1

Enacted Relational Model Expected

Communal

Authority

Equality

Market

Relational

Sharing

Ranking

Matching

Pricing

Average

Model Communal Sharing -1.14 (1.20) -1.86 (1.00) -1.82 (0.87) -1.50 (0.82) -1.58 (0.68) Authority Ranking

-1.30 (1.19) -1.97 (0.97) -1.51 (0.90) -1.62 (0.81) -1.60 (0.64)

Equality Matching

-1.64 (1.02) -1.39 (1.10) -1.74 (0.76) -1.50 (1.50) -1.57 (0.66)

Market Pricing

-1.41 (1.14) -1.67 (0.93) -1.56 (1.22) -1.74 (0.99) -1.59 (0.65)

Average

-1.38 (0.79) -1.73 (0.58) -1.66 (0.68) -1.58 (0.56) -1.59 (0.51)

Note: Scores range from +3 (Very positive) to -3 (Very negative). N = 33.


Table 2 Mean Likelihood Ratings (and Standard Deviations): Study 1


Communal

Authority

Equality

Market

Relational

Sharing

Ranking

Matching

Pricing

Average

Model Communal Sharing

4.03 (0.63) 3.39 (1.17) 3.74 (0.59) 2.79 (0.90)

3.49 (0.47)

Authority Ranking

4.11 (0.72) 4.29 (0.63) 3.68 (0.77) 3.13 (0.94)

3.80 (0.41)

Equality Matching

3.95 (0.74) 3.95 (0.98) 4.08 (0.63) 3.47 (0.70)

3.86 (0.41)

Market Pricing

4.16 (0.65) 3.55 (0.76) 3.84 (0.80) 3.82 (0.85)

3.85 (0.44)

Average

4.06 (0.29) 3.80 (0.40) 3.83 (0.36) 3.30 (0.56)

3.75 (0.26)

Note: Scores range from 1 (Not at all likely) to 5 (Very likely). N = 19.

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Table 3 Mean Reactions (and Standard Deviations) to Conflicts: Study 1


Communal

Authority

Equality

Market

Relational

Sharing

Ranking

Matching

Pricing

Average

Model Communal Sharing

3.64 (1.17) 3.39 (1.16) 2.57 (1.13) 3.10 (1.16)

3.17 (0.85)

Authority Ranking

2.99 (1.26) 2.81 (1.19) 2.41 (1.12) 2.85 (1.09)

2.76 (0.77)

Equality Matching

2.66 (1.24) 2.93 (1.22) 2.78 (1.20) 2.64 (1.21)

2.75 (0.86)

Market Pricing

3.49 (1.11) 3.33 (1.15) 2.56 (1.22) 3.15 (1.27)

3.14 (0.86)

Average

3.20 (0.80) 3.11 (0.88) 2.58 (0.83) 2.93 (0.81)

2.96 (0.72)

Note: Scores range from 1 (Not at all negative) to 5 (Very negative). N = 199.


Table 4 Mean Likelihood Ratings (and Standard Deviations): Study 2


Communal

Authority

Equality

Market

Relational

Sharing

Ranking

Matching

Pricing

Average

Model Communal Sharing 3.30 (1.27) 3.19 (1.25) 2.72 (1.29) 3.06 (1.32)

3.07 (0.93)

Authority Ranking

3.22 (1.26) 3.17 (1.24) 2.75 (1.24) 3.17 (1.33)

3.08 (0.92)

Equality Matching

3.23 (1.22) 3.07 (1.25) 2.70 (1.30) 3.03 (1.36)

3.01 (1.00)

Market Pricing

3.20 (1.29) 3.12 (1.27) 2.74 (1.28) 3.08 (1.38)

3.03 (0.95)

Average

3.24 (1.07) 3.14 (1.05) 2.73 (1.10) 3.09 (1.22)

3.05 (0.89)

Note: Scores range from 1 (Not at all likely) to 5 (Very likely). N = 132.

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Table 5 Means Reactions (and Standard Deviations) to Conflicts: Study 2


Communal

Authority

Equality

Market

Relational

Sharing

Ranking

Matching

Pricing

Average

Model Communal Sharing 3.71 (1.18) 3.42 (1.24) 3.30 (1.19) 3.39 (1.29)

3.45 (0.90)

Authority Ranking

3.60 (1.23) 3.48 (1.20) 3.30 (1.34) 3.40 (1.22)

3.45 (0.90)

Equality Matching

3.72 (1.14) 3.58 (1.26) 3.67 (1.18) 3.49 (1.33)

3.62 (0.91)

Market Pricing

3.73 (1.18) 3.45 (1.26) 3.38 (1.25) 3.30 (1.31)

3.47 (0.95)

Average

3.69 (1.05) 3.48 (1.08) 3.41 (1.05) 3.39 (1.10)

3.50 (0.85)

Note: Scores range from 1 (Not at all negative) to 5 (Very negative). N = 132.

31