irish sword

THE

IRISH

SWORD

THE JOURNAL OF SOCIETY VOL. XIV

ILITARY HISTORY ELAND

SUMMER 1980

NO. 54

THE IRISH SWORD THE JOURNAL OF THE MILITARY HISTORY SOCIETY OF IRELAND Vol. XIV, No. 54

Summer 1980

CONTENTS

Page A Soldier of the Regiment of Walsh, 1778 (Illustrated) F.W. Van Brock and F. Glenn Thompson

1

Seventeenth Century Fortifications, Forts and Garrisons in Ireland: a Preliminary list (Illustrated) Paul M. Kerrigan

3

The Phoenix Conspiracy

Leon 6 Broin

25

The State of the Realm: English Military, Political and Diplomatic Responses to the Flight of the Earls, Autumn 1607 to Spring 1608 (lllustratedi F.W. Harris

47

Eileen Black

65

James Hope (1754-1847), United Irishman (Illustrated) Irish-made

'Bowie Knives' (Illustrated)

68

Two Stamps of Irish Military Interest

facing

69

Grenfell Morton

69

The Confederate States at Sea in the American Civil War: the Irish Contribution 10hn de Courcy Ireland

73

Notes: Period of Study; General Count Daniel O'Mahony, Hero of Cremona; Volunteer Units of Cork City and County; Orangemen of Co. Limerick; Irish Captives released from Sallee in 1637; An Indenture Concerning the King's Munitions in Ireland, 1532; Irish Coastguard Stations, 1858-67; Exhibition of Military Prints

9S

Henderson

Wightman, R.N., 1810-16

Queries

106

Replies

107

Proceedings

108

Reviews

109

c. 0 Danachair

Gerald Simms: An Appreciation Hon. Editor: HARMAN MURTAGH, Address: MILITARY

HISTORY

M.A., M.Litt.

SOCIETY

OF IRELAND

Newman House, University College, 86, St. Stephen's Green, Dublin, 2. Editorial and Lectures Eric Lambert; Col. Dan Bryan; Mrs. Katharine McCone, Ph.D.; Comdt. Marcus Beresford, PRINTED

BY ALFA

PRINT

Committee: Leon 6 Broin, LL.D. J. Rigney; Capt. J. Gallagher M.Liu.

LTD .• DEER PARK

ROAD.

ATHLONE

116

The state of the realm: English military, political and diplomatic responses to the Flight of the Earls, autumn 1607 to spring 1608* by F.W. HARRIS

N Friday, 4 September 1607 occurred the first of the two surprising events which were to have great effect upon the history of Ulster and, for that matter, of Ireland. The Bight of the earls of Tyrone and Tyrconne11 in 1607 and O'Dogherty's fruitless rebellion less than a ~~~~~ year later brought to a virtual end effective Gaelic resistance to' English subordination of the province by removing the principal obstacles to and allowing for the massive introduction of English law and government which closely followed, At any other time the native population of Ulster might have proved themselves capable of thwarting the designs of the English government, but the flight of the earls removed those leaders best suited to' frustrate English plans and O'Dogherty's rebellion and the working of the legal machinery which came in its wake put paid to' most of those who remained. In two swift strokes the power and strength of Gaelic leadership and society in Ulster were shattered, to be replaced almost immediately by law and government from England and shortly thereafter by settlers from both England and Scotland. The causes which motivated or drove the earls to flee from Ulster have perplexed writers and historians from the time of the event to' the present day. Both Lord Deputy Sir Arthur Chichester (plate 6) and Attorney General Sir John Davies had ideas to' explain what had happened, but even they were confused and unconvinced as to' the motivation of the fugitives. This lack of an ability to understand may have been caused by the answers laying farther afield than either of them was aware. Three days after the event and the day immediately after he received the news Chichester wrote to inform the privy council in London of what had taken place. He fully described what steps had been taken for the apprehension of the earls and what precautions and measures had been ordered for strengthening the government position in Ulster at a most extraordinary moment. Though showing it only for a moment, Chichester was bewildered and at a complete loss to explain why Tyrone had fled. The most obvious explanation was that Tyrone believed he was to be 1Fo%!!>~~~W

*I

am greatly indebted to' Professor D.E. Quinn (visiting professor at St. Mary's College of Maryland) who read a draft of this paper and kindly offered much needed and helpful advice and assistance.

48

The Irish Sword

charged with treason and had fled out of fear for his own personal safety. Sir Arthur was confused because he was unaware of any such charges being prepared, either in London or Dublin. While there was much correspondence between the two centres of government regarding a planned conspiracy, there was little or no evidence which could have been used to charge Tyrone and that accumulated against Tyrconnell was, at best, weak. I As for Davies, while the flight would cause him to cancel his planned journey to London to take part in the hearing by King James of the controversy between Tyrone and Donel O'Cahan, he clearly saw that this 'accident extraordinary' had brought about what great expenditures of arms, money and men had not. Tyrone was gone and apparently nothing stood in the way of the complete assimilation of Ulster into English control. Sir John, however, was wise enough-to realise that such a conclusion might, after all, be precipitate, for it would depend on where Tyrone had gone and this was not immediately known. Two possibilities presented themselves as the logical destination of the earls and their entourage: London, where Tyrone was to be party to. the decision by the king in his dispute with O'Cahan, or Spain, their ally in the wars of Elizabeth's reign. Davies gave an inkling of his perceptiveness by proposing arguments for and against both, As it was known that Tyrone's son, the baron of Dungannon, was to marry a daughter of the earl of Argyle, a journey to London by way of Scotland was not out of the question. That Tyrone had taken up the rents from his tenants before leaving could be explained by the costliness of such a journey, the wedding" and his subsequent stay in London. The paucity of military assistance received from Spain during the late war further militated against such a destination for, as Davies reasoned, Tyrone surely would not seek refuge from such a reluctant former ally. Then too, the great number of followers who had accompanied the earls would prove a great drain on their financial resources if they were to be fitted out so that they were not 'taken for a company of gipsies'. To appear in a ragged and dishevelled condition, accentuated by their normal 'blunt behaviour', could be expected to cause the notoriously vain and 'formal Spanish courtierjs]' to scorn and despise them 'ail and to reject Tyrone as 'the same O'Neill who maintained so long a war against the crown of England'. Sir John was convinced that had Tyrone gone to Spain the first news of him would be that through frustration he was either 'a shorn monk or dead with extreme grief and melancholy'. What Davies found most difficult to accept was that Tyrone, 'subtle, fox-like, and craftily wise', would give up his earldom 'for smoke and castles in the air' or that, having been peacefully possessed of such an estate, he would leave it 'to try if he could win it again by force'. Thus both Davies and Chichester confirm, albeit indirectly, that charges of treason were not then being prepared against Tyrone. As charges against one of the earls would certainly have involved them Chichester to the privy council, 7 September 160'), Chichester to Salisbury, 8 September 160'7 (Cal. S.P. lre., 1606-8, pp 259-62, 264; c.r. Meehan, The fate and fortunes of Hugh O'Neill, earl of Tyrone, and Rory O'Done/, earl of Tyrconnell ... [3rd ed., Dublin, 1886], pp 89-93, 95 where the second letter is dated 19 September). The best recent investigation into the causes of the flight is N.P. Canny, 'The flight of the earls, 160'7' in I.H.S., no. 67 (March 1971), pp 380'-99; see particularly the primary and secondary sources cited in his first three footnotes.

State of the Realm

49

both it can be safely assumed that Tyrconnell, though under suspicion, was not to be charged either.f Having considered why Spain would not have been the fugitives' destination Davies was forced to admit that the stronger argument was indeed in favour of their having gone there. Tyrone's brother, Cormac O'Neill, reported that he had been invited to join in the flight and had been told that the destination was Spain. Then too, Cuconnaught Maguire, the man responsible for bringing to Lough Swilly the ship used for the escape, had recently been in Spain and was said to have brought with him the bishop of Tuam who was a pensioner of the Spanish crown. If such proved to be the case it could be assumed that these two men had been authorised to invite the earls to Madrid. One of the few definite facts government officials then had to work with was that Tyrconnell, 'noted of late for his extreme discontentment' and strongly suspected of being involved in 'treasonable practices', did not have licence to journey either to England or to' Scotland, the possession of which would have been expected of an earl for a journey at that time. In trying to understand the immediate implications of the incident the Dublin administration believed that if they could learn the earls' motive they would know their destination. On the other hand, Davies was confident that if they learned the destination he could supply the motive. He was convinced that Tyrone had come to look upon the steady advance of English law and its ministers into his territory as having been a vindictive attempt to overthrow his rule by using the 'shackles and handlocks' of the English legal system to overcome the barbarous Gaelic customs which supported his pre-eminent position. The troops in their northern garrisons who maintained the English laws he felt as 'pricks in his side' and he could not, therefore, countenance their remaining. Davies was convinced that the earl had been greatly concerned that the continued incursion of English law into his territories would bring to light further evidence that he had little actual right, even in Gaelic law, to the country he treated as his own personal property. Davies had begun to bear this out through his study of and research into the legal history of the earldom, finding that for half his country the earl was either 'a disseissor of the bishops of Armagh and Clogher, or an intruder upon the king's possession'. This not only cast a shadow over the earl's property rights, but also placed him in the extremely sensitive position of having seized crown property without proper warrant. With the Dublin administration bearing down upon him on the one side and with claims against lands within his earldom on the other, it is not difficult to understand how Davies came to conclude that Tyrone had allowed himself to become involved in a plot and, believing this to be discovered, decided to flee rather than face the punishment for treason. Thus if Spain was found to be the destination then discontent resulting in a treasonable conspiracy was the cause. 2

Davies to Salisbury and to Ellesmere. both 12 September 1607; the king to Chichester. 16 July 1607; Chichester to the privy council, 4 August and 7 September 1607 (P.R.O., S.P. 63/222/123; Col. S.P.lre .• 1606-8. pp220-1, 244, 261. 262.270-4; J.P. Collier [ed.]. The Egerton papers [London, 1840], pp 410-6; Meehan, Fate & fortunes. p. 92; a copy of Davies's letter of 12 September is cited in Downshire MSS. ii, p. 458). The Davies letters to Salisbury and Ellesmere are nearly identical and are cited in the succeeding paragraphs of the text.

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The Irish Sword

Preparing for invasion and an international incident: The flight of the earls caused confusion and concern within the circle of government at Dublin and a great deal of apprehension throughout the rest of Ireland. The most striking fear was that the flight was the initial part of a plan in which Tyrone was to return at the head of an atmy of invasion. Reports were received of troops, war materiel and ships for transport being prepared and gathered in Spanish ports. Whispers were heard that the Irish regiment (described by Sir Geoffrey Fenton, one of the two joint Irish secretaries of state, 'as 'a cloud hanging in the sky, prepared to break forth upon this realm upon the first offer of a fit time') was preparing to be in the vanguard of the invasion force.' Chichester, near the Ulster border and very likely still at Slane following an earlier meeting there with Tyrone, received first word of the flight late in the evening of Sunday, 6 September from Cormac O'Neill, Archbishop Henry Ussher of Armagh and Sir Toby Caulfield. Confirmation from the sheriff of Tyrone arrived the next morning. Necessary orders were immediately sent to the commanders of the northern military garrisons and shortly thereafter measures were taken for the tightening of the government of Munster, all as precautions against what Chichester believed to be the greatest possible threat to the realm. Sir Arthur was not alone in thinking the worst. Rumours spread like wildfire from one corner of the island to the other and affected provincial officials, mayors of towns and members of the administration in Dublin as well as the general population. The London privy council, usually well-served by its intelligence network on the Continent;gave periodic assurances to Chichester that Spain was not about to embark on a war with England. At the same time, they saw the advisability of being prepared and therefore supported Chichester's moves to fortify key towns and other strategic areas while reinforcing the depleted military companies. Supervision of the construction of fortifications was given over to Sir Josias Bodley, perhaps the best military engineer in the army, and military reinforcements began to arrive before the end of the year. Regarding the military preparedness of the realm; Chichester and the Irish council suggested to their counterparts in London that Derry and Ballyshannon be strengthened by additional garrison troops, that Carrickfergus be fortified, that Duncannon and Haulbowline be repaired, and that the defence of Killybegs be considered. They further proposed to make military service more appealing and thus increase the number of volunteers by paying them in English currency rather than the debased Irish money. A previous recommendation by Chichester to upgrade the companies to a strength of lOO was repeated (many were then at or below half strength) and a further request was made that the total number of reinforcements to be sent out of England be 800 foot and at least lOO horse. The privy council quickly responded with the 'promise [of] all the means [desired], as men and money, [as well as for the] possession and repairs of forts', with the requested reinforcement's to be levied and shipped over 'as speedily as they can send them'. This 3

Fenton to Salisbury, 15 September 1607 (Cal. S.P. lre., 1606-8~ p. 274). For the general state of affairs see Cal. S.P. lre., 1606-8, pp 252, 260-448, 652-3, passim; Meehan, Fate & fortunes, pp 89-96, 126, 129, 140-1. 154-61; Wild geese in Spanish Flanders, pp 5334,542,545; Cal. S.P. dom., 1603-10, p. 415; Salisbury MSS, xi x, p. 261.

State of the Realm

51

last was greatly accomplished in less than two months, for on 22 November 400 foot arrived in Dublin from Chester, while 200 more travelling from Barnstaple debarked in Munster about the same time. The final complement of troops arrived somewhat later. When a muster of the full 800 foot was taken in December faults in the system of obtaining recruits and outfitting them became glaringly obvious to Chichester who pointed out that while the 400 that had arived from Chester were of good quality they had arrived 'as ill armed as possible'. He expressed satisfaction in the 200 who had come via Barnstaple, but the final 200 had arrived from Workington not only without arms but also lacked clothes and their appearance was 'an object of derision to the Irish'. Of these, thirty were considered unfit and were sent back. A later and closer inspection of the new arrivals found them to include a large proportion of 'old persons or otherwise disabled and insufficient, ... who, for mere debility of body, will be soon consumed here without any other adversary'." Within weeks of the flight Sir Thomas Phillips, a servitor of long and di'Stin-~ guished service and highly sensitive to the military needs of the northern province, recommended that Portrush and Lough Foyle, as well as Carrickfergus, be fortified and maintained and that all cattle and provisions to be found in the nearby woods be brought into their vicinity in order to better facilitate their maintenance. By October preliminary defensive preparations had been begun. The military establishment was studied and many dispositions, particularly concerning the fortification of strategic towns, were made by Chichester and his soldier advisors. Requests for arms, munitions and ordnance were forwarded to London and George Beverley, comptroller of the victuals, suggested that a place in Blackfriars be set aside for storehouses. However, drawing up plans for the construction, repair and maintenance of fortifications proved much easier than the doing. Though Bodley expended much energy in supervising the work going on, there was little to show for it by the end of the year. When, towards the end of February, a letter was intercepted which made mention of the possible landing of an invasion force on the west coast Chichester felt compelled to point au t to Salisbury 'how needful it [was] to finish the work at Galway and to strengthen that at Limerick', the proposed landing sites mentioned in the letter, because it would be most difficult and costly to displace an enemy once they had landed and secured a beachhead. Bodley also recommended that fortifications promptly be carried out at Waterford, Cork and other strategic locations in Munster land in this was supported by Sir Arthur as being extremely necessary 'to protect and assure the towns' while simultaneously restraining 'the rest of this stubborn and refractory nation, in such sort that they may have no power to offend'. 4

Chichester to Salisbury, 8 September 1607 [dated 19 September in Meehan]; Necessary points for the consideration of the privy council [n.d., calendared between 8 and 9 September 1607]; [Salisbury] to Chichester, 27 September 1607; Lords of the council to Chichester, two letters of 27 Septembr 1607 and one of 29 September 1607; Deputy and council to the privy council, 26 November 1607; Chichester to the privy council, 21 December 1607; Instructions for Sir Anthony St. Leger to be imparted to the lords of the council, 21 December 1607; Warrant for ordnance and munition and Warrant for delivery of munition, both 10 November 1607; Chichester to the privy council, II February 1608 (Col. S.P. lre., 1606-8, pp 265-6, 283-4, 287-9, 334, 360, 363, 408; Meehan, Fate & fortunes, pp 9\5-6). O'Dogherty's rebellion made it necessary to send further reinforcements. See tables I and 2.

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The Irish Sword

Chichester, however, doubted that enough funds had been allocated out of the royal treasury for the building of new fortifications and the strengthening or repair of the old ones.! Chichester had initially sought to meet some of the military expenses through a loan from the city of Dublin, but received instead an outright refusal from the burgesses who excused 'themselves by protesting that they have it not'. Fortunately, the cost of levying, equipping and shipment of the reinforcements from England was to be paid out of the exchequer in London, but once they had landed they would become a further burden on the king's strained Irish treasury. The privy council, meanwhile, had sent over £13,000 to cover the debt incurred up to the end of September and promised that further disbursement would be made monthly so that there might be no problem of arrears. The next allowance was intended to' cover expenditures through the end of December and was believed to be of sufficient quantity not only to 'serve for the present forces, but [also] would be enough for the 800 foot and 100 horse if they were already in pay'. It was even believed that there would be 'a surplus of revenue' which could be used to cover any additional expenses which might arise, 'unless for some accident or some main fortifications'. Yet, the promises of money notwithstanding, the privy council also appealed to Chichester 'to pledge his own credit, for this time only, to raise money for lodging for his troops in the towns, rather than undertake [the construction of] buildings' to house them. Having recently been rebuffed for a loan by the city of Dublin, such a request would not have been very palatable. In March, however, the privy council, perhaps in response to Chichester's continuing doubts that enough funds had been allocated for the work begun by Bodley to be adequately completed, approved Sir Arthur's proposal to use part of the rents from the lands of the fugitives to pay the cost of repairing some of the forts. They noted that it was.'all one to His Majesty whether [the cost of such work] be paid out of his English or Irish exchequer'. In April the replacements arrived for those returned by Chichester as unfit for service. 6 Although rumours of wa:r continued well into spring a general air of optimism began to emanate from government circles in Dublin as Chichester and the army 5

Phillips to Salisbury, 22 September 1607; Establishment for Ireland, 1 October 1607; Chichester to Salisbury, 7 October 1607 enclosing disposal of the army in Ireland, [n.d.]: St. John to Salisbury, 9 October 1607; Deputy and council to the privy council, 17 October 1607 enclosing returns of arms and supplies, [n.d.]; Beverley to the privy council, 20 October 1607; Chichester to Northampton, 7 February 1608; Chichester to Salisbury, 27 February 1608 enclosing an intercepted letter of 12 February 1608 (N.S.); Bodley to Salisbury, 28 February 1608; Chichester to the privy council, 28 February 1608 (Col. S.P. lre., 1606-8, pp 280, 2915, 301, 304, 306, 404-5, 429, 430; U.J.A., i [I st series, 1853J,p. 181).

6

Chichester to the privy council, 17 September 1607; Exchequer warrant, 26 October 1607; privy council to Chichester, 26 October 1607; Memorandum [by Salisbury], [n.d., possibly October 1607]; Chichester to the privy council, II February 1608; Privy council to Chichester, 8 March 1608 [incorrectly dated in Desid. cur. Hib.]; Chichester to Salisbury, 24 January 1608; Privy council to Chichester, 20 March 1608; Chichester to the privy council, II April 1608 (Col. S.P. Ire., 1606-8, pp 275,308-9,398,408,4315,441, 470; Maxwell, Sources, 1509-1610, p. 274; Col. S.P. dom., 1603-10, pp 373, 376; Desid. cur. Hib., i, p. 515).

State of the Realm

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began to make their presence felt. In order to achieve better control of Ulster, Sir Arthur divided the province into areas of military influence. Sir Henry Docwra was given superintendence of the greater part of Tyrconnell with Sir Richard Hansard and Sir George Pawlett having particular duties there. Upper Tyrone and Armagh fell to both Sir Toby Caulfield and Sir Francis Roe, while lower Tyrone became Caproin Edmund Leigh's responsibility. Coleraine, to include the vexatious O'Cahan's country, and the territory of Glenconkeyne were to be supervised by Sir Thomas Phillips, while Chichester, as governor of Carrickfergus, was to hold Antrim and part of Down. Sir Edward Blaney was to look after Monaghan while Sir Garrett Moore did the same for Cavan and Sir George Cromwell and Captain Edward Trevor were to hold the remaining bits and pieces of Down. By this tight control Sir Arthur hoped to be in a better position to ward off invasion and to crush rebellion should either come to pass. Munster, next after Ulster the most dangerous trouble-spot because of its usefulness in landing an invasion force (such as those by Spanish troops