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Int. J. Sport Psychol., 2015; 46: 1-00 doi: 10.7352/IJSP 2015.46.000

Manipulating task constraints of situated normativity to study decision making in Krav Maga RAÚL SÁNCHEZ-GARCÍA*, ÁLVARO VILLAROYA-GIL**, and ALEJANDRO ELRIO-LÓPEZ** (*) Universidad Europea de Madrid, Dpto. Motricidad, Rendimiento Humano & Gestión del Deporte, UEM, Spain (**) Graduado CAFYD, Spain

This paper claims that situated normativity is part of the task constraints which affect the dynamic process of decision making. Situated normativity is mainly defined by behavioural modes and levels of expertise, expressed in and as ethnomethods. 12 Krav Maga participants (five novices, five intermediates, two experts) were distributed into two experimental groups. Each group underwent a different experimental breaching condition: G1 faced a boxer that performed a judo attack (Morote Dori); G2 faced a judoka that performed a boxing attack (Jab). Results showed that every participant, irrelevant of their level of expertise, was surprised by the attack in T1. During T2, expectancies of the previous trial acted as a task constraint that affected participants in different ways. As a general trend, novices were still surprised but experts and intermediates were not. The detailed comparison of two case studies suggested that adaptability was only possible for experts, not novices. KEY WORDS: Affordances, Ethnomethods, Krav Maga Task constraints, Situated Normativity.

Introduction Decision making is a topic with long tradition within the informationprocessing approach to skill acquisition (see García & Moreno, 2014 for a current review). Nonetheless, studies from ecological dynamics have brought interesting insights into the field (Araujo, Davids, & Hristovski, 2006; Araujo & Davids, 2011; Araújo, 2011, 2013). Ecological dynamics is a blend of Gibson’s ecological psychology and dynamic systems (Travassos, Araújo, CorCorrespondence to: Raúl Sánchez-García, Universidad Europea de Madrid, Edificio D, planta 1(sala profesores), C/ Tajo s/n, 28670 Villaviciosa de Odón, Madrid, Spain (e-mail: [email protected])

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R. Sánchez-García, A. Villaroya-Gil, A. Elrio-López

reia, & Esteves, 2010; Vilar, Araújo, Davids, & Travassos, 2012) that takes the individual-environment as the unit of analysis to study cognition. Decision making can be conceived from the ecological dynamics standpoint as “a goaldirected process of acting on the affordances available in the performance environment” (Correia, Araújo, Cummins, & Craig, 2012, p.306). This paper brings to the fore the relationship between affordances, goals and constraints due to normativity within the emerging process of decision making in Krav Maga, a self-defense discipline. This first introductory section examines Beek’s critique on the selection of affordances and the notion of situated normativity as a special kind of task constraints. The methods section explains the experimental conditions, participants and procedure we used to study situated normativity in Krav Maga. Then we present results and discussion sections followed by some concluding remarks. BEEK’S CRITIQUE ON THE SELECTION OF AFFORDANCES Gibson (1979) critiqued information in an information-processing, computational paradigm (information as indirect, in need of some extra computation within the brain) and he supplied the notion of optic flow and invariants related to the animal. For Gibson, the perception-action coupling depends on the direct detection and use of information. Decision making appears as an emergent process in the continuous interaction of an individual with certain abilities and the surrounding environment with certain energy flows presented as invariants that are perceived by the individual as opportunities for action (affordances).1 But decision making cannot be specified only by affordances. (e.g. a coming ball in football affords “to clear the ball” for the defender or “shoot to goal” for the striker). As Beek stated: The first issue that will have to be addressed is that of the selection of affordances. In virtually all research on affordances the goal of the performed action, and thus the actor’s intention, is either explicitly given or unambiguously implicit in the experimental set-up (…) In contrast, in the complex sport situations referred to in the target article, such as a forward in soccer dribbling the ball up the field, the forward is confronted with an almost “innumerable array of possible actions” (e.g., dribbling on, passing forward, sideward or backward, firing a shot at goal) and must indeed select one of those possible actions. Put differently, the actor must select an affordance (2009, pp. 147-148). 1 See Fajen, Riley, and Turvey (2008) for a comprehensive review on the research of affordances in sport and physical activities.

Manipulating task constraints of situated normativity to study decision making in Krav Maga

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This explicit specification of the goal does not necessarily happen in naturalistic settings of real games. Thus, possible research could face a lack of “representative experimental design” (Brunswik, 1956) of real situations during the game. We argue that the problem of selection of affordance can be solved by taking into consideration intentions and motives of the situated subject performing the action. The problem lies in Gibson’s claim that affordances do not change depending on the needs or motives of the observer. As a consequence, some difficulties arise when trying to develop agency in the subjects. Precisely Reed developed motivation and intention within an ecological framework to try to solve such problems, defining intentions “not as causes of action but patterns of organization of action (Reed, 1993, p. 62).” Nonetheless he used a particular version of natural selection between Perception Action Cycles (PACs) in order to explain the emergence of intention, giving birth to goaldirected behaviour as intention select proper affordances. A more refined version of the argument was proposed by Withagen, de Poel, Araújo, and Pepping (2012): affordances not only provide opportunities for action but they can also invite behaviour, as demonstrated in designing practices such as architecture or even art. They interestingly established the animal-environmental system as the proper unit to study agency and asked researchers to “…specify the environmental and organismal factors that determine whether and when an affordance invites” (Withagen et al., 2012. p. 257). We aim to advance in this direction by taking into account the social environment, understood not as shared cultural ideas impinging the mind but as embodied practices and methods for conducting interactions in specific activities such as football or martial arts. We will do so by exploring task constraints of situated normativity, studied within the interaction order (Goffman, 1983). Instead of reducing our paper to a theoretical proposal such as Rietveld’s discussion of situated normativity (Rietveld, 2008) and its relationship to affordances (Rietveld & Kiverstein, 2014), we will conduct a detailed analysis of empirical research. NORMATIVITY ON A MODEL OF CONSTRAINTS The problem for the selection of affordances was approached through dynamic systems theory by Kugler, Shaw, Vincente, and Kinsella-Shaw (1990) defining the intending-perceiving-acting cycle. The agent choses a goal among different options and then, the “role of the perception-action cycle in goal-directed behaviour is to conserve intention” (p. 111). It may

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seem that they maintained a plain idea of a rational actor that choses a goal among different options but these authors also took into account the idea of different behavioural modes as representing qualitatively different types of behaviour (eating, working, reading…) (p. 113). Behavioural modes are very relevant in sport where we talk about defending or attacking or playing by certain system etc. Behavioural modes are clearly social as they imply certain conventions and rules to be followed during the interactions. As Gibson considered that affordances do not change due to the needs or motives of the observer, it is difficult to link affordances to behavioural modes unless we consider behavioural modes as social accomplishments (not as individual choices) developed over time. (Fig. 1) Ecological dynamics considers decision making as emerging in the course of action, related to the intending-perceiving-acting cycle affected by task, organismic and environmental constraints (Newell, 1986). For instance, an action of a striker in football when a teammate has made a pass from the corner depends on the speed and height of the ball, on the situation of the adversaries and the goal, on the height, jump power and fatigue of the striker, etc. All these constraints are affecting the dynamics of the system formed by striker and environment. According to Newell (1996), task constraints imply goals and rules (generally referred to as normativity), being implicit or explicit (Newell & Val-

Fig. 1 - 1 Schematic representation of Kugler et al., (1990) intending-perceiving-acting cycle. (*) E.g. hungry, sleepy, angry.


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vano, 1998, p. 53). Nonetheless, Newell’s task constraint lacks the situated dimension that we find in real games and that threatens the representative design of some ecological experiments. We need to study what Rietveld (2008) dubbed situated normativity of unreflective actions2 where “…no additional story about operations at the mental level is needed (for example in terms of having a propositional representation of a goal, following explicit or implicit rules)…”(p. 993). SITUATED NORMATIVITY IN AND AS ETHNOMETHODS According to Araújo (2014), ecological studies select situations where the researcher can perceive the achieving of the objectives. Thus, it must be assumed for instance that the attacker in a basketball situation of 1 v.1 will try to dribble his opponent and shoot to basket instead of keeping the ball (Araújo, 2014, p. 53).This a priori assumption by the researcher can be done because she already knows something about how to play basketball. The researcher shares with the player this sense of the game that defines some actions as reasonable for playing basketball. There is no need to evoke some kind of stored procedural knowledge in order to select the appropriate response after a computation has taken place (McPherson, 2008). Precisely, this information processing was critiqued by Gibson which conflated perception and decision making through the concept of affordance instead. The good news is that there is no need for this internalized version of knowledge. For Araujo, Davids, and Hristovski (2006) intentional rules for action are not computational; they are to be found at an ecological scale. It is our claim that the constraints due to this situated normativity (the intentional rules for action) must be observed at the interaction order between the players. These boundary conditions (constraints) are constituted in and as ethnomethods (Garfinkel , 1967), practical methods which members of a community use and deploy to carry out concerted actions. Ethnomethods constitute embedded/embodied habitual patterns that function as routine grounds of social interaction. Situated normativity is defined by behavioural modes and level of expertise. Thus, behavioural modes (e.g. attack or defense) and level of expertise are expressed in and as ethnomethods; the level of expertise specifies the more general layer of modes of behaviour. E.g. the ethnomethods expressed by an expert basketball defender in the behavioural mode of defending imply 2 We do not agree with the term unreflective action for this type of phenomenon. See Hutto & Sánchez-García (2014) for a discussion on this issue.

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maintenance of appropriate distance and specific orientation (“denying the center to the attacker”) contrasting with the ethnomethods of a novice defender that would just imply trying to snatch the ball. (Fig. 2) Behavioural modes (e.g. defense) define a set of tactical situations where players find affordances. Nevertheless, players find such or such affordances depending mainly on their level of expertise. Moreover, as we will see in the discussion section, previous combat experience could also affect this specific finding and use of affordances. Quéré expresses perfectly the relationship between tactical situation and level of expertise: Affordances are not just linked to objects or space arrangement but to the situation as well: the perception of the situation under a certain perspective, as having such or such structure, actualize a restricted set of appropriate actions and indicate those that are accessible or doable immediately. (1997, p. 173)

Different studies from an ecological dynamics perspective (Chow, Davids, Hristovski, Araújo, & Passos, 2011; Renshaw, Chow, Davids, & Hammond, 2010) show that specific situations affords a quite different and more limited array of action possibilities for novices than experts. A progression in their levels of expertise emerges as a consequence of a history of inter-

Fig. 2 - Situated normativity (behavioural modes and level of expertise) on a model of constraints expressed in and as ethnomethods.


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actions between learners and the environment. The normativity to discern a reasonable (good, correct) from a non-reasonable action (bad, incorrect) cannot be defined by an external rule but by the relation to the normal, habitual pattern of occurrence (Camus, 2009, p. 103) for expert members; so to say, by the relation to expert’s ethnomethods that express reasonable actions in certain situations, a good sense of the game.3 As Rietveld (2008, p.979) states: ”correct is normally what satisfies the socialized expert.” THE STUDY OF MARTIAL ARTS AND COMBAT SPORTS WITHIN A MODEL OF CONSTRAINTS

Hristovski, Davids, Araújo, and Button (2006) and Hristovski, Davids, and Araújo (2006) researched the influence of target distance on the selected actions of boxers. Different scaled-body distances afforded the emergence of different actions (hooks, jabs, uppercuts); they acted as informational constraints for the system. The value of 0.6 produced a state of the system where each action could be spontaneously activated under the task and the environmental constraints. At other specific distances, some specific actions were tightly coupled. Nonetheless, the reachability affordance was not solely responsible for the selected actions. Strikability affordance was more adequate to explain the annihilation of certain actions (jabs and uppercuts) even though there were still possible when taking into account the reach distance. According to the authors: “This finding suggest that, besides reachability, perception of the strikability affordance incorporated additional constraint probably related to the intended energy of collision between the boxer’s fist and target.” (Hristovski et al., 2006, pp. 436-7). We are especially interested in studying a specific set of task constraints: situated normativity. We have chosen Krav Maga as a candidate discipline for research due to its unique characteristics. Krav Maga is a combat system that allows self-defense against armed or unarmed, single or multiple attackers in a myriad of situations. It is based on simple principles, natural movements and practical techniques. The basic idea is to first deal with the immediate threat (e.g. a choking action), then to impede the aggressor to keep on attacking and finally to neutralize him. Krav Maga practitioners are trained to respond to many different actions, from punches, kicks or grappling tech3 See Sánchez-García (2013) and Sánchez-García & Fele (2015) for an ethnomethodological analysis of normativity in sport where three different kinds of rules are constantly interacting: rules of the game, fair play and praxical rules, being the later expressed during the game in and as ethnomethods.

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niques to armed strikes etc. Thus, in principle, Krav Maga students would not have any constraint due to a restricted repertoire as it occurs in other martial arts and combat sports (e.g. boxers are trained just against punching actions, judokas just against grappling actions). This special feature of Krav Maga would allow us to study situated normativity in different experimental conditions, i.e. using different attacks. Methods As a methodological stance we will use a manipulation of task constraints. Normally, the manipulation of constraints within a constraint-led model has been a pedagogical strategy used by the practitioner (coach, therapist, teacher) to foster the learner’s ability of finding new kinetic patterns (Newell & Valvano, 1998) or to make the learner “become better attuned to the relevant perceptual variables required to successfully perform a specific task” (Passos, Araújo, Davids, & Shuttleworth, 2008, p.132). Nonetheless, we use manipulation of task constraints following Garfinkel’s (1967) recommendation on breaching experiments. The methodological rationale behind these experiments was to disrupt the natural order of social interactions precisely to make publicly visible a shift in the behavioural modes of the participants, the response being modulated by the different levels of expertise.

PARTICIPANTS AND PROCEDURE 12 Krav Maga students with different level of expertise took part in the experiment. We defined novice as someone with less than two years of practice; intermediate as someone with two to four years; and expert as someone with more than four years. According to the level of expertise they were evenly distributed into two groups (group 1: boxing attack and group 2: judo attack). Thus, in each group there was one expert, two intermediate and three novices. We also recorded their previous combat experience in other combat disciplines (e.g. boxing, muay-thai…) or professions (e.g. police, bodyguard…). Participants signed an informed consent prior to participation and were not paid for their services. We have kept participants’ anonymity during the paper, identifying each of them with a group and a number (e.g. G1P3) instead of real names. Participants were randomly selected to participate in the experiment. Nonetheless, we first run the experiment for all the participants of group 1 and then run the experiment for all the participants of group 2. Participants wore Krav Maga training equipment, consisting of training mittens and helmet. As a way of warming up, all the participants were training in a hall outside the experiment room. Once selected, they entered the room and were asked to stand within a designated area of 1x1m marked tape, waiting for the coming attack of researcher 3 (R3) who was situated 2 m apart from the participant. The attack of R3 varied depending on the specific group but in both groups the attack included unexpected actions. In group 1 R3 wore full boxing equipment, consisting of boxing boots, trunks, a groin protector below the trunks, gloves and a helmet. The attack consisted in two consecutive jabs (direct punches) and then perform Morote Gari ,where the attacker aims for the legs of the opponent (an action known as shoot) in order to throw him to the ground. In group 2 R3 wore full judo equipment, consisting of a gi (trousers plus jacket) and a black belt plus a boxing hel-


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met and a groin protector below the trousers. We decided to include a helmet to prevent excessive risk of injury for R3. The attack consisted in a short approach to the participant showing grappling intentions and then executing a jab to the helmet of the participant. The participant stood in a designated area and could not start any action or abandon such area before the attack of R3.4 R1 explained the protocol and told participant to react in a realistic manner without applying a maximum intensity. Moreover, the action was to come to a halt immediately when R1 called “Stop” in a loud voice. Due to the realistic combat actions of the experiment, these prescriptions were very important to prevent any serious damage during the performance. Once the participant agreed on the protocol, R1 called “Ready”, “Go” and R3 started approaching the participant and proceeded to perform the attack. The experiment was run consecutively twice with each participant. The action of the two trials was video-recorded using a Go-Pro Hero Silver Edition Camera situated 0.5 m behind R3 and 1m to his right side. This type of camera offered a great angle and we could obtain full images with good quality of both R3 and the participant on each occasion. After the two trials, R1 took the participant to a side where the footage was replayed in a computer for the participant to comment on the images. This retrospective interview was recorded on video. After that, R1 interviewed R3, video recording his impressions about the participant’s actions.

DATA ACQUISITION We used a triangulation of qualitative methods, researchers (R1, R2, R3) and data obtained from different points of view (external observer, attacker, defender; the last two offering a view from within) to analyze the responses of participants. (Fig. 3) We were interested in a deep understanding of the complex interplay between different task constraints. We therefore decided to focus the analysis in a relatively small number (12) of case studies through the use of different qualitative research techniques. R2 and R1 carried out a structured observation using an observation guide (see Table.1) jointly generated by R2 (expert in Krav Maga) R1 and R3 (experts in combat sports) to assess the behaviour of participants in this experiment. This research technique provided the point of view of an external observer. The observation guide consisted in a rubric with different criteria and categories qualitatively assessed for both trials. The criteria and categories were defined as follows: I) SURPRISE: referred to the very first reaction to the attack. Yes: there is surprise. The guard is not prepared for the attack and the attacking action succeeds: in Morote Gari both hands clinch the legs of the participant; in the jab action the hand impacts the helmet in a clear way. No: the guard is prepared and the attacking action is aborted before it succeeds. II) PERFORMANCE: referred to the technical performance of counter attack or defense and displacements on the follow-up to the first reaction. Good: the defender avoids the continuation of the attack fully. In the case of Morote Gari, he impedes getting to the ground; in the case of jab, the participant impedes the continuation of the punching actions by counter attacking. 4 This stationary, reactive condition of participants could be a design limitation in relation to representative design to study Krav Maga.

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Fig. 3 - Methodological design for the analysis of participants’ behaviour. It implied a triangulation of systematic information and retrospective interview to participants and to R3. TABLE I Example of the Observation Guide to Assess the Quality of Participants’ Behaviour Group 1

Participant 3

Level of expertise

Expert (7 years in Krav Maga)

Previous combat experience

8 years Kick boxing;1 year Boxing;1 year MMA; Bodyguard

Trials

1st

2nd

Surprise

Yes

No

Performance

Average

Good

Comments

Bad adjustment of intensity. In the first trial he reacted appropriately when taken to the ground. In the second trial he anticipated the tackle and was able to counterattack.

Average: the defender impedes the continuation of the attack partially, placing himself in an adequate position to follow the defense or counter attack. In the case of Morote Gari, the participant goes to the ground in an advantageous position for counter attacking or place and adequate guard; in the case of jab, the participant places a safe guard and a safe distance. Bad: the defender gets blocked; there are no defensive combat techniques; the participant only retreats and try to avoid confrontation. The observation guide also includes the level of expertise, the previous combat experience of the participant and a section for comments by R2. The analysis of video recordings through observation guides took into account agreed concordance (Anguera & Mendo, 2013, p.152) between R1 and R2 in order to preserve the quality of the data.


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Researcher 1 analyzed video-recorded retrospective interviews (Hauw & Durand, 2007) based upon the categories of the observational guide: surprise and performance. We used video recorded interviews to capture the embodied multimodal dimension of communication. Thus, we were not only interested in just what they were saying but also we paid attention to gestures, marking or miming actions that revealed a lot more on how the participant encountered the experiment. R1 also analyzed video-recorded retrospective guided interviews of R3, based on the categories of the observational guide (surprise and performance). Guided interviews of participants and R3 are interesting as they “…provide an opportunity to give greater meaning to behaviours which at the time may have been performed automatically and this can also shed light on why a given action might have been chosen” (Anguera, Camerino, Castañer, & Sánchez-Algarra, p.127). Moreover, the retrospective guided interviews conveyed information from the participants (defender) and R3 (attacker) point of view, contrasting with the external observation of R2 in the observation guide, providing a fruitful triangulation of data.

Results We analyzed two trials for each of the 12 participants through the triangulation of different research techniques: systematic observation (external view of the expert R2; e.g., see Fig. 3 and 5); retrospective interview of the participants (internal view of participants as defenders); retrospective interview of R3 (internal view of attacker). Tables 2 and 3 show the triangulation of data gathered from these different research techniques for each group, relating the categories of surprise and performance with level of expertise of the participants and trials. A content analysis of retrospective interviews to participants and to R3 was carried out in order to generate codes for the categories of surprise and performance. E.g., in Group1 P2, a novice, stated:”I have stood still, haven’t I? I stand still seeing he is coming for me, I cover myself in the upper level instead of concentrating that he is coming for me (…) I expected it but I have not seen myself able to get out of it.” This response implied a “No” for surprise and a “Bad” for performance. On the same participant (P2), the retrospective interview of R3 revealed: “Well, first trial he did not expect it, I have noticed it. He was waiting for a boxing punch, with hands up. As soon as he has received the judo throw, he has gone to the ground, he just could not prevent it.” Thus, it implied a “Yes” for surprise and a “Bad” for performance. The triangulation of the three research techniques allowed us to discern a definitive verdict on what happened in relation to surprise and performance for each participant in each trial. In G1 we found two novices, two of them (P2, P6) being surprised (even

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though P2 stated he was not surprised) and performing badly in both trials. The other novice (P4) was surprised but performed well in both trials. Both intermediates (P1, P5) were surprised in the first trial but not in the second and both performed well. The expert participant (P3) was surprised in the first trial, performing average, but was not surprised in the second, presenting a good performance. In G2 we found two novices (P9, P10), both of them surprised and performing badly or average respectively. Of the three intermediate, two (P7, P11) were both surprised but presented a good performance; the third intermediate (P12) was surprised in the first trial, performing badly, but he was not surprised in the second, performing well. The expert participant (P8) was surprised in the first trial, performing average, but was not surprised in the second, presenting a good performance. Discussion This section focuses on the interpretation of the results taking into account the influences of the constraints constituted by situated normativity. In the case of Krav Maga these task constraints were: rules (explicit or implicit) defining the experiment; expectancies due to R3 appearance; expectancies due to previous trial (these three affecting the behavioural mode); level of expertise in Krav Maga; and previous combat experience. All these constraints played a role in the degree of surprise and the quality of the defensive reaction. Every participant, regardless of their level of expertise, was surprised by the action that started the shift of behavioural modes5, from Restricted Krav Maga (RKM; either boxing or judo) to full Krav Maga Mode (FKM) in the first trial (T1). Nonetheless, during the second trial (T2), expectancies from the previous trial (i.e. “this is a ruse”) acted as a task constraint that affected the participants in different ways. On one hand, in the case of expert and intermediate participants of group 1, the expectancies of the previous trial counteracted the expectancies due to R3’s appearance or the implicit rules defining the experiment. Thus, they were not surprised, using a FKM. On the other hand, novices in group 1 were still surprised by the attack in the second trial, using a RKM. In group 2 the level of expertise did not affected the category of surprise to the same extent. Only one expert (G2P8) and one 5 This action (the jab in G1 and the shoot in G2) acted as a kind of control parameter that produced a change in the coordination pattern which depended on the level of expertise of participants. See (Southard, 2002) for the role of throwing velocity as a control parameter affecting the coordination patterns of baseball pitchers or Newell and Ranganathan (2010) for the role of instructions as control parameters for changes in task relevant coordinations.


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TABLE II Triangulation of Results For Group 1, Including Systematic Observation; Retrospective Interview To Participants; and Retrospective Interview To R3 Group 1

Systematic observation

Retrospective interview to participants

Retrospective interview to R3

Trial 1

Trial 2

Trial 1

Trial 2

Trial 1

Trial 2

P1 (Intermediate)

Surprise Performance

Yes Good

Yes Good

Yes Good

No Good

No Good

No Good

P2 (Novice)


Yes Bad

Yes Bad

No Bad

No Bad

Yes Bad

Yes Bad

P3 (Expert)


Yes Average

No Good

Yes Good

No Good

Yes Average

No Good

P4 (Novice)


Yes Good

Yes Good

Yes Good

Yes Good

Yes Good

Yes Good

P5 (Intermediate)


Yes Good

Yes Good

Yes Good

No Good

Yes Good

No Good

P6 (Novice)


Yes Bad

Yes Bad

Yes Bad

Yes Average

Yes Bad

Yes Bad

TABLE III Triangulation of results for Group 2, including systematic observation; retrospective interview to participants; and retrospective interview to R3 Group 1

Systematic observation

Retrospective interview to participants

Retrospective interview to R3

Trial 1

Trial 2

Trial 1

Trial 2

Trial 1

Trial 2

P7 (Intermediate)


Yes Good

Yes Good

Yes Good

Yes Good

Yes Good

Yes Good

P8 (Expert)


Yes Good

No Good

Yes Good

No Good

Yes Good

No Good

P9 (Novice)


Yes Bad

Yes Bad

Yes Bad

Yes Average

Yes Bad

Yes Bad

P10 (Novice)


Yes Average

X*

Yes Average

X*

Yes Average

X*

P11 (Intermediate)


Yes Good

Yes Good

Yes Good

Yes Good

Yes Good

Yes Good

P12 (Intermediate)


Yes Bad

No Good

Yes Bad

No Good

Yes Bad

No Good

*Invalid trial: the participant acted before R2 initiated the attack.

intermediate participant (G2P12) were not surprised in the second trial; two intermediates and two novices kept being surprised in the second trial. This could be due to the different biomechanics of the attacks in G1 and G2. In G1, the definitive attack was Morote Gari, a technique that implied a big

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movement of the whole body to go for the legs of the defender. In G2, the attack was a jab, a quicker and simpler technique that implied a small change in the biomechanical configuration of the attacker. As a general trend, the efficiency of performance (the problem solving) following the change from RKM to FKM depended on the level of expertise. That is why when novices tried to react after the breaching action the tactical situation posed an unsolvable problem for them; the novices could not make sense of the attack (they did not know how to defend themselves, how to react properly). Nonetheless, in relation to the surprise and efficiency of performance there were two interesting cases that contravened some of our expectations. The comparison of these two cases was considered very relevant for a better understanding of the complex interplay of different task constraints. We therefore present a detailed analysis of G1P3 (an expert that performed average in the first trial) and G1P4 (a novice that performed well in both trials). In the case of G1P3 in T1 (see Fig. 4) he was highly influenced by expectancies due to R3 appearance and implicit rules of the experiment.6 After the first trial, this participant explicitly stated to the camera in a recriminating tone that he though “only punches were valid”. We never stated such a claim but it seems R3 appearances made him think that the experiment just implied defense against boxing techniques and that no fooling, cheating or breaching experiments would be tolerated in the serious experimental setting we had prepared. He was constraining himself through what he thought were the implicit rules governing the experimental setting. To sum up, both expectancies due to R3 appearance and implicit rules of the experiment constituted a restricted Krav Maga mode (RKM) that constrained the actions of G1P3. As G1P3 was heavily influenced by the appearances of R3 and by what he thought the experiment was allowing there was a big delay in shifting of modes from RKM to FKM. Even so, when he shifts modes (already in the floor) he solves the situation very well (see Fig. 5) due to his level of expertise, another constraint from situated normativity. In T2, the expectancies generated by the previous trial (“ruses are allowed”) acted as a constraint that varied the influence of R3’s appearance and the implicit rules of the experiment for G1P3, keeping a FKM that resulted in No surprise and a Good performance (see Fig. 6).

6 G1P3 was leading the warming up practice of the group while the experiment was running. It implied he did not practice much but guided his partners. Thus, he entered the experimental condition without the warming up practice. It is plausible that such fact acted as an organismic constraint (cold, not focused, a bit stressed) that affected his performance in T1. We have not included it in the analysis as we are just taking task constraints into account.


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Fig. 4 - Different constraints affecting the action of G1P3 in T1. The appearance of R3 and implicit rules of the experiment (both constituting a RKM) and the level of expertise had a significant impact in the coordination pattern in T1, resulting in “Yes” surprise and “Average” performance.

As we can observe in T2 (Fig. 7), G1P3 changed the guard. He was not expecting exclusively a boxing attack: the guard was lower and the stance was wider. This indicated some caution against a judo attack like Morote

Fig. 5 - Detailed systematic observation of G1P3 in Trial 1.

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Fig. 6 - Different constraints affecting the action of G1P3 in T2. Red arrow indicates that the expectancies due to T1 had a significant impact in the change of coordination pattern in T2, resulting in “No” surprise and “Good” performance.

Fig.7 - Detailed systematic observation of G1P3 in Trial 2.

Gari. This time the feint of the jabbing action did not work and when R3 went for the shoot G1P3 was able to avoid the surprise and solved the situation efficiently.


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Fig. 8 - Different constraints affecting the action of G1P4 in T1. Expectancies due to R3 appearance (defining a RKM), level of expertise and previous combat experience had a significant impact in the emergence of a coordination pattern in T1, resulting in “Yes” surprise and “Good” performance.

In the case of G1P4, the level of expertise did not match with the efficiency of his performance: he was a novice but he reacted well already in the first trial. How could it be possible? Because in this case the previous combat experience was playing a determining role as a task constraint of situated normativity (see Fig. 8).7 This was not evident at first sight. He had no previous experience in standard combat sports such as boxing, martial arts etc. Nonetheless, during the retrospective interview he expressed:”I think that…well…it just came out of instinct because I played American Football and this [the defense against the attack for the legs. See Fig. 9] was what I did when they were attacking me.” Thus, he was really used to that kind of tackling action from American football so he just reacted according to his habitual pattern of interaction in such tactical situations. His combat repertoire was enhanced by his previous corporeal interactions in American Football. We could consider American Football as containing certain features that resembles combat practices. Sheard and Dun7

The case of G1P1, a riot police member, was very telling in this matter as well.

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ning (1973) identified rugby as a kind of combat sport due to the degree of intensity in physical contact and actions such as tackles that are used to take the players down. Nonetheless, we should not forget that level of expertise in Krav Maga still played a great role as a task constraint of situated normativity. Even if G1P4 was able to present a Good performance in T1 and T2 he was not able to avoid a Yes in the category of surprise in both trials (see Table. 2). Thus, despite the fact that both expectancies of T1 and previous combat experience played a role in the performance, the effect was not significant for surprise, pointing to the relevance of level of expertise in this matter (see Fig. 10). As G1P4 expressed in the retrospective interview: “The second time, I did not expect either he would do the same, so to say, I did not know what was going to happen either.” The coordination pattern of T1 and T2 was very similar. Maybe it was a bit better in T2, with a more energetic action in the defense against the shoot of R3 (see Fig. 11). Nonetheless, G1P3 was not able to adapt to the situation due to his low level of expertise. The comparison of both cases had offered a better and more nuanced understanding of the role of task constraints due to situated normativity in the emergence of specific coordination patterns in relation to surprise and performance. G1P3 was an expert caught by surprise in T1 and performing average due to the expectancies of R3’s appearance and the implicit rules of the experimental setting (“just punches”). When this constraint was coun-


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Fig. 10 - Different constraints affecting the action of G1P4 in T2. The expectancies due to T1 had not a significant impact in the change of coordination pattern in T2, still a “Yes” surprise and “Good” performance, indicating the relevance of the level of expertise as constraint.


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terbalanced by the expectancies due to the attack of the previous trial (T1), G1P3 was able to act in FKM as an expert, without surprise and performing well. G1P4 was a novice that acted surprisingly well in T1. The constraint of previous combat experience was a determining factor to explain this fact. Nonetheless, the level of expertise was also a relevant constraint to explain why G1P4 was not able to adapt to the situation in T2 (he was surprised again), contrasting with the functional adaptability of G1P3, a feature of expert behaviour (Davids, Button, & Bennett, 2008). Conclusions The manipulation of task constraints due to situated normativity expressed in and as ethomethods in Krav Maga affected the degree of surprise and the quality of performance. Expectancies due to R3 appearance; expectancies due to previous trial; implicit rules of the experiment; previous combat experience; and level of expertise played a role in explaining the differences between the participants’ behaviour. The comparison of two specific case studies suggested that adaptability to the challenging situation of the experiment was only possible for experts, not novices.

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Manuscript submitted

. Accepted for publication August 2015.

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