Risk Analysis, Vol. 00, No. 0, 2018
DOI: 10.1111/risa.12969
Mitigating Litigating: An Examination of Psychosocial Impacts of Compensation Processes Associated with the 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Liesel A. Ritchie,1,2,∗ Duane A. Gill,1,2 and Michael A. Long1,2
During the past four decades, a number of social science scholars have conceptualized technological disasters as a social problem. More specifically, research in this arena has identified individual and collective stress as a secondary trauma of processes intended to provide compensation and economic relief from disasters in general and, more specifically, technological disasters. Based on data from a 2013 household telephone survey of 1,216 residents of coastal Alabama, this article examines the relationship between psychosocial stress and compensation processes related to the 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill. We examine involvement with claims, settlement, and litigation activities; vulnerability and exposure to the spill; ties to resources; resource loss and gain; perceptions of risk and recreancy; and intrusive stress and avoidance behaviors as measured by the impact of event scale. Regression analysis reveals that the strongest contributors to intrusive stress were being part of the compensation process, resource loss, concerns about air quality, and income. Although being involved with compensation processes was a significant predictor of avoidance behaviors, the strongest contributors to avoidance behaviors were resource loss, air quality concern, income, being male, minority status, and community attachment. Beliefs that the compensation process was as distressing as the oil spill also significantly contributed to intrusive stress and avoidance behaviors. This research represents a step toward filling a gap in empirical evidence regarding the extent to which protracted compensation processes exacerbate adverse psychosocial impacts of disasters and hinder community recovery. KEY WORDS: BP oil spill; compensation for technological disasters; psychosocial stress
1. INTRODUCTION
lighted ways in which this event and others like it are similar to more traditional social problems such as poverty, crime, and drug and alcohol abuse. Their perceptive insights—drawn from their own work, as well as from prior research—provided significant advances in this then underexplored arena.(2–11) There are numerous empirical studies that contribute to our understanding of technological disasters as a social problem. Early research includes studies of disasters at Buffalo Creek (West Virginia, 1972), Love Canal (New York, 1978), Three-Mile Island (Pennsylvania, 1979), Bhopal (India, 1986), Chernobyl (Russia, 1986), and the Exxon Valdez oil spill (Alaska, 1989). More recent inquiry has
In 1997, Picou et al.(1) conceptualized the Exxon Valdez oil spill as a “modern social problem.” In their edited book on the 1989 technological disaster that devastated the physical and sociocultural environments of Prince William Sound, Alaska, they high1 Department of Sociology, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater,
OK, USA. 2 Center for the Study of Disasters and Extreme Events, Oklahoma
State University, Stillwater, OK, USA. correspondence to Liesel A. Ritchie, Department of Sociology, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, OK 74078, USA;
[email protected].
∗ Address
1
C 2018 Society for Risk Analysis 0272-4332/18/0100-0001$22.00/1
2 examined the Tennessee Valley Authority coal ash spill (Tennessee, 2008) and the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill (Gulf of Mexico, 2010). All of these cases involve compensation processes, yet there is a dearth of empirical research on this topic and how claims, settlement, and litigation affect communities. Contention and protracted litigation for health and medical claims related to industrial water contamination cases have been illuminated in popular culture by movies such as Erin Brokovich and A Civil Action. However, the ways in which involvement with claims, settlement, and litigation activities affect communities remain largely understudied. Although a host of legal scholars have addressed the Exxon Valdez case, we focus here on social science research where there have been just a few efforts to empirically document and examine these issues.(12–16) A solid majority have focused solely on litigation surrounding one event— the Exxon Valdez oil spill. More specifically, research on the Exxon Valdez disaster has centered on the community of Cordova, Alaska. Considered ground zero for the 1989 spill, Cordova is a remote coastal community located on southeastern Prince William Sound. At the time of the spill, the town had a population of about 2,500 and to this day it remains accessible only by plane or boat. Class action litigation connected to the spill spanned more than two decades, going through a series of appeals that ultimately led to consideration by the U.S. Supreme Court 14 years after a 1994 jury decision. The 2008 Supreme Court ruling cut punitive damages by 90% and the process left many survivors with a lack of closure.(14,17) Beginning in 1992, Picou et al. examined the relationship between involvement with Exxon-Valdezrelated litigation and intrusive psychological stress in Cordova.(15) Based on quantitative data collected in 1991 and 1992, they characterized Cordova as a “corrosive community”—a concept developed by Freudenburg and Jones(5) to describe post-disaster environments in which relationships are negatively altered and social support is diminished. Analysis revealed that being a litigant contributed to a significant portion of the intrusive psychological stress and perceptions of a corrosive community. Marshall et al.(13) updated the earlier analysis by examining survey data from 1991, 1992, 1995, 1997, and 2000. Again, they found that mean intrusive stress scores for litigants were significantly higher than for nonlitigants. Among the independent variables of education, gender, occupation, and litigation status, litigation status consistently predicted intrusive stress.
Ritchie, Gill, and Long Picou(14) extended the analysis of intrusive stress by including survey data from 2006 and 2009 and found similar results. These quantitative findings were supported by in-depth qualitative research conducted between 2001 and 2007, in which Cordova residents described the litigation as “an ongoing nightmare.”(17) Cordovans recognized the process as contributing to elevated stress in themselves, their families, and the community.(18) As one Cordovan put it: “Now we are not being traumatized by the spill, we are being traumatized by the litigation.”(17) Part of the social problem of technological disasters left unexplained by Picou et al. is how other processes of seeking compensation for losses (e.g., claims and settlement) can be a source of intrusive stress, as well as lead to avoidance behaviors that affect social interactions. Although research on the Exxon Valdez oil spill has provided valuable insights regarding adverse effects of involvement in litigation in a post-technological- disaster environment, it is not without limitations. First, much of the work focuses on one measure of event-related stress. As will be discussed in the next section, there are other indicators of event-related stress. Second, there are a number of theories and concepts regarding stress that were not included in the prior analysis. In particular, vulnerability theory as articulated by Cutter(19) and others offers additional new perspectives on stress and compensation processes and conservation of resources theory(20,21) advances understanding of the relationship between resource loss and stress. These will be addressed in a later section. Finally, Exxon Valdez oil spill research examined involvement in litigation, excluding other compensation practices such as claims paid directly by the primary responsible party. The 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill represents an opportunity to extend this line of inquiry and to address the aforementioned developments. Specifically, this study examines how experience with spill-related compensation processes (i.e., claims, settlement, and litigation activities); vulnerability and exposure to the spill; ties to resources; resource loss and gain; risk perceptions; beliefs about recreancy (i.e., matters of blame and responsibility associated with the disaster); and sociodemographic characteristics are related to psychosocial stress. Psychosocial stress includes anxiety, uncertainty, social disruption, and avoidance coping behaviors experienced by individuals and their primary group (in this case, a family/household). Given the large number of citizens
Mitigating Litigating affected by the oil spill and the high number of claimants, the DHOS provides an excellent case to study litigation-related stress stemming from a technological disaster. We begin by reviewing the DHOS disaster and accompanying compensation activities. After providing this context, we examine research on litigationrelated stress, focusing on research on Cordova in the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez spill and broader research describing reasons for stress in litigious actions. Next, we present theories and concepts primarily drawn from research on technological disasters such as the DHOS. These theories and concepts provide a foundation for describing the dependent and independent variables included in this study. 2. OVERVIEW OF THE DHOS AND COMPENSATION PROCESS On April 20, 2010, the BP Deepwater Horizon drilling rig exploded, killing 11 workers and injuring 17 others. The rig, located about 50 miles off the Louisiana coast in the northern Gulf of Mexico, collapsed and breached the Macondo wellhead. Declared a “spill of national significance” within two weeks after the explosion, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration began restricting fishing in federal waters between Louisiana and Florida. Initial attempts to cap the well were unsuccessful and an estimated 3.19 million barrels flowed into the Gulf before the well was sealed on July 15 and permanently capped two months later.(22) In the meantime, the spill oiled more than 950 miles of the northern Gulf Coast and response and containment efforts involved approximately 1.84 million gallons of dispersants.(23–25) Consistent with the aftermath of other technological disasters involving toxic contamination, there is substantial uncertainty surrounding the environmental, economic, and health impacts related to the DHOS.(26–28) Restoration activities are underway throughout the region and are scheduled to continue for years—amidst contested scientific findings and legal wrangling over the extent of damage caused by the spill. Numerous studies of ecological and economic effects of the disaster are ongoing. Broadly speaking, there is consensus in these arenas that some areas of the northern Gulf can be classified as “recovered,” whereas other areas continue to experience negative impacts. Similarly, research on physical and mental health, as well as social disruption associated with the spill, shows differential effects of
3 the DHOS, primarily associated with ties to coastal resources and losses related to these resources.(26–29) The spill generated claims, settlement, and litigation processes to address a variety of ecological, economic, health, and sociocultural damages in the northern Gulf of Mexico. The geographical scope and complexities of legal issues concerning the DHOS are extensive. Beyond lawsuits associated with the tragic deaths and injuries to workers as a result of the initial explosion, cases addressing the disaster crossed multiple jurisdictions in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, and Texas, and involved three corporate defendants—BP, Transocean, and Halliburton. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 provided the framework for moving forward with compensation activities associated with the DHOS, identifying BP as the “primary responsible party” for the spill. The U.S. Department of Justice filed criminal and civil suits against each of the three companies. On January 29, 2013, the Justice Department and BP settled the criminal case for $4 billion in penalties—the largest criminal resolution in U.S. history.(30) As the primary responsible party, BP was required to institute a claims process to address individual and business economic losses.(12,31) In June 2010, the U.S. federal government directed BP to set aside $20 billion to pay damage claims. Despite deploying 1,258 claims adjusters in the region, the company was ill-prepared to handle the initial wave of almost 144,000 claims.(25) Between May 3 and August 23, 2010, BP paid out more than $395 million in an effort to alleviate nongovernment economic losses along the Gulf Coast.(25) In late August, 2010, Kenneth Feinberg—who administered the U.S. government’s September 11th Victim Compensation Fund—established and led the Gulf Coast Claims Facility, which over a 16-month period disbursed $6.3 billion to almost 225,000 claimants. Both BP and the 15-member Plaintiff’s Steering Committee were highly motivated to avoid extended litigation as witnessed following the Exxon Valdez oil spill. It was in this context that the parties collaborated to develop guidelines for payment strategies to offset lost business revenues, property damages, medical, and other claims. Nonetheless, the claims process quickly emerged as a source of contention and stress in coastal communities.(12,32) Breaking with Exxon’s precedent of protracted litigation in the Exxon Valdez case—in which there were no apparent efforts to settle out of court—BP entered into formal settlement negotiations within a year after the Deepwater Horizon blowout. By
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Ritchie, Gill, and Long
mid-April 2012, BP and the Plaintiffs Steering Committee filed an agreement to compensate for economic and medical claims.(33) The presiding judge, Carl Barbier, authorized an unusual preliminary approval for settlement payments to begin in June 2012 and established a Court Supervised Settlement Program.(34) The Economic and Property Damages Settlement Agreement was approved in December 2012, followed by approval of the Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement Agreement in January 2013.
Cordovans were also keenly aware that the litigation, uncertainty about when the litigation might end, and uncertainty about the ultimate court decision were sources of stress in the community:
3. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH ON LITIGATION-RELATED STRESS
Study participants further described chronic uncertainty and feelings of loss of control resulting from ongoing involvement in the litigation as generating stress. A Cordova resident said: “There is no closure on it. It is just still a big, gaping wound.” A former commercial fisherman summed it up as follows:
Although there is limited research on social impacts of DHOS compensation activities as described above, the research that does exist illustrates several key issues of concern to those involved. Specifically, qualitative research by Flocks and Davies(12) revealed a lack of transparency, accountability, and consistency in claims processes and payments following the spill, leading to confusion, frustration, and uncertainty. Their findings are similar to issues revealed by studies in the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez. For example, quantitative data collected in 1995 and 2001 from Alaska Natives and commercial fisherman in Cordova showed that the litigation process evoked bad memories of the disaster event, was considered unfair by plaintiffs, had lasted too long, and diminished respondents’ faith in the U.S. court system.(35) These data also revealed that almost half of survey respondents felt a loss of control over their lives, which exacerbated levels of stress. Qualitative research conducted in Cordova between 2001 and 2004 shed further light on aspects of the post-EVOS litigation process that contributed to stress.(35) Cordovans cited spending too much time on paperwork associated with the lawsuit—as well as too much time with attorneys—both of which detracted from family time, work responsibilities, and engaging in community activities. As one study participant put it: The litigation process is where a lot of the trauma is right now . . . . We know that the oil is out there, and we know that it affected the economy, but nobody has paid for it. That is where the post-traumatic type symptoms come into [play] . . . . This isn’t our fault. Somebody needs to help us. We are losing our culture, our livelihood, and yet there is nothing. The litigation draws it out and keeps the feelings on the surface. It retraumatizes folks.
We had to go through all this paperwork on our fishing and spill stuff over and over and over again. Every time we would get one [we’d think], “I can’t believe it.” [We’d] dig stuff out of the files and go back to pre-spill fishing records. They were pre-computer too . . . . This is like going to the storage bin and pulling out [the information]. . . . Every time it is stressful having to deal with that stuff.
Being able to see the end of it and start to heal didn’t happen, [especially] with the lawsuit going on as long as it has. It’s not just that lawsuit going on, but the questionnaires or all the paper work that keeps coming at you because then you have to re-dredge up what was going on . . . . You just have to go through it [again]. Every time you hear from your lawyers you have to dig up all this memory.
As the spouse of a commercial fisherman commented, “I can’t get anything from the attorneys anymore at the post office without actually almost having an anxiety attack. It has gotten to the point where their paperwork is almost as stressful as the actual spill itself was.” The chronic nature of the process, with no end in sight, further added to stress among Cordovans, as described in the following narrative: I would just like the litigation to be over with. I don’t want to read about it in the news anymore. I don’t want anyone to send me any goddamned letters. The sooner it is over with, the happier I will be. If they came out tomorrow and said, “We are going to pay you out,” that would be great. If they came out tomorrow and said, “You are never going to get a dime, it’s over with, and you will never hear from us again,” that would be fine too. I don’t expect the money . . . . I am tired of looking in my mailbox . . . . It just gets tiresome. Even if you don’t get anything [from the attorneys] for a while you know it’s still out there . . . . I just want it to be over with.
Study participants also talked about internal community dynamics being negatively affected by the litigation. Some believed that a potential payout from the court case would be disruptive to the town and reopen old wounds between “haves and have nots.”
Mitigating Litigating Like other communities affected by technological disasters, many Cordovans expressed frustration that people outside Cordova did not realize that EVOS litigation was ongoing (through 2008). In this context, they shared concerns that they were being stigmatized—viewed as “whiners” for not just “getting over” the oil-spill. This further translated into feelings of being abandoned by the government and judicial system as the litigation dragged on, which also diminished trust in these entities. These oil- spill-specific findings are also consistent with the relatively small body of literature on litigation in general (e.g., cases of divorce and medical malpractice), in which scholars have described litigation as being a source of stress to plaintiffs.(36–39) For example, in 1988, Lees-Haley(37) identified the anxiety, stress, and depression resulting from the process as “Litigation Response Syndrome.” According to Cohen and Vesper, sources of what they call “forensic stress” associated with involvement in litigation include meeting with attorneys, demands on claimants’ time, participating in depositions and trials, lengthy investigations, complex law, unfamiliar language, and adversarial exchanges with the opposing side.(36) In 2002, Relis(38) discussed litigants’ perspectives of civil litigation, citing manipulation by their attorneys and feeling a loss of control during the litigation process as sources of stress. Additional stressors included litigants’ interactions with their own attorney (e.g., feeling intimidated), confusion about the process and the advice they received, and perceptions of poor service. These factors were compounded by delays and costs associated with litigation. Relis also described how negotiation and settlements are understudied and that their outcomes are poorly documented—requiring further investigation. The data that do exist suggest that litigants feel alienated from the processes and that lawyernegotiated settlements typically leave litigants unsatisfied. Overwhelmingly, “it is a frequently overlooked truth that much litigation affects litigants’ lives for extremely prolonged periods, very often diverting both litigants and their families from their normal daily routines.”(38) 4. THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF THIS RESEARCH There are several theories and concepts guiding this research, including Erikson’s work on individual and collective stress, vulnerability theory, Hobfoll’s
5 conservation of resources theory, risk theory, and beliefs about recreancy. In this section, we begin by discussing the notions of trauma and stress as they are being used in the work presented here. We then provide an overview of each key concept employed in this research. Technological disasters are traumatizing events. Fassin and Rechtman’s(40) book, The Empire of Trauma, provides a history of the concept of trauma in which they argue that it has primarily become a politicized social construction. They present trauma as “utilitarian,” describing its potential to be harnessed and actively mobilized in seeking reparation, providing testimony, and offering proof in situations to advance the rights of victims. In doing so, however, Fassin and Rechtman acknowledge the underlying reality of trauma that should not be ignored. Erikson’s(4,41) scholarship sheds light on this underlying reality. As he notes, trauma occurs at individual and collective levels and refers to both the initial “blow” of an event and to subsequent reactions to an event. He maintains that conceptual distinctions between trauma and stress have become increasingly blurred, but that both terms can be applied to the psychological and the social. Psychological studies of stress focus on individual trauma, “a blow to the psyche that breaks through one’s defenses so suddenly and with such brutal force that once cannot react to it effectively.”(4) Sociological considerations of collective stress focus on trauma as “a blow to the basic tissues of social life that damages the bonds attaching people together and impairs the prevailing sense of communality.”(4) Secondary trauma may be considered as further blows, following an initial event, that produce additional reactions—much like aftershocks following an earthquake. We use “stress” to refer to the response to a blow—whether one to the psyche or one to the social fabric. Paramount in our research is advancing understanding of the response to a blow as it relates to a particular event—in this case, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. To do so, we employ the impact of event scale (IES).(42) The scale is based on the rationale that extremely stressful events are likely to generate high levels of intrusive stress (recurring, unintentional, distressing feelings, and thoughts), as well as high levels of avoidance behaviors (intentional efforts to suppress intrusive thoughts and to avoid reminders of the event). Intrusive stress contributes to post traumatic stress disorder—an aspect of the IES focused on in prior studies of the Exxon Valdez
6 oil spill. Avoidance behaviors have generally been overlooked in the previous research but are of particular importance from a sociological perspective. Such behaviors tend to diminish social capital by disrupting social interactions, communication, and violating norms of reciprocity, thereby weakening social connections and networks and reducing trust. A number of theories and concepts help to explain disaster-related stress and avoidance behaviors. Vulnerability theory contributes to our understanding of stress in the context of hazards and disasters. According to Cutter,(19) vulnerability is “the pre-event, inherent characteristics or qualities of social systems that create the potential for harm.” Vulnerability is a function of the exposure (who or what is at risk) and sensitivity of system (the degree to which people and places can be harmed).(19) Conceptually, the most vulnerable “are typically those with the fewest choices, those whose lives are constrained, for example, by discrimination, political powerlessness, physical disability, lack of education and unemployment, illness, the absence of legal rights, and other historically grounded practices of domination and marginalization.”(43) These factors contribute to individual and collective stress on a day-to-day basis, and they tend to exacerbate both individual and collective stress in post-disaster settings. Technological disasters involving toxic contamination reveal vulnerabilities specific to economic, social, and cultural dependence on damaged or threatened resources.(7,8,44) These vulnerabilities make certain populations more susceptible to higher levels of stress in the event of environmental contamination. Picou and Gill’s(44) concept of “renewable resource communities” exemplifies this type of vulnerability. A community whose “primary cultural, social and economic existences are based on the harvest and use of renewable natural resources”(44) is particularly susceptible to ecological damage resulting from technological disasters. Conservation of resources theory focuses on resource loss and gain, threats to resources, and investment of resources without return or gain.(20,21) Loss and threat of loss, in particular, lead to individual and collective stress. Among the resources articulated in the theory are: (1) objects (e.g., natural resources, shelter, physical possessions); (2) conditions (e.g., social support, employment, physical health); (3) personal characteristics (e.g., high self-esteem, self-confidence, sense of optimism, social competence, mental health); and (4) energies (e.g., money, time, knowledge, savings). According to Hobfoll,(21)
Ritchie, Gill, and Long resource loss in one of these categories tends to lead to further loss or depletion of other types of resources. Similarly, resource gain in one area often results in gains in other areas. In the throes of a technological disaster, once-stable personal and social resources are taxed—particularly in a corrosive community context. Post-disaster environments place excessive demands on individual and collective resources and are beyond the typical scope of resource utilization. There is a growing body of literature on risk and risk perceptions, including the work of Beck, Giddens, Rosa, Lupton, Edelstein, and others.(3,45–48) These contextual constructionist perspectives have application to technological disasters—particularly those involving toxic contamination. The “ambiguity of harm”(49) surrounding technological disasters spawns uncertainty regarding health effects, extent of ecological damages, and economic impacts. Science and scientific findings are often contested by corporate, government, and special interest groups in the media, academic journals, and in the courts, which further contributes to uncertainty. Concerns about risks from technological disasters and clean-up activities exacerbate these issues, threaten ontological security, diminish trust, and create anxiety—all of which contribute to psychosocial stress. Beliefs about blame and responsibility for a disaster event have been shown to contribute to feelings of sadness, betrayal, moral outrage, and anger. The term “recreancy,” coined by Freudenburg, refers to “the failure of experts or specialized organizations to execute properly responsibilities to the broader collectivity with which they have been implicitly or explicitly entrusted.”(49–51) Perceptions of recreancy are especially evident in technological disasters where a primary responsible party is identified during response and compensation processes. This reflects notions of increased stress related to loss of control over one’s surroundings and beliefs that a disaster should have been prevented.(2) Beliefs about recreancy have the potential to influence stress by increasing distrust, prolonging uncertainty, and diminishing ontological security. These theories elucidate why psychosocial stress is often elevated among those who are vulnerable because of livelihood and sociocultural ties to damaged/threatened resources and those who experience disaster-related loss. They also shed light on how perceptions of risk and recreancy may exacerbate psychosocial stress. In the context of these theories, we consider how involvement in
Mitigating Litigating compensation processes contributes to event-related stress and avoidance behaviors. 5. RESEARCH DESIGN Supported by a National Science Foundation Grant (Division of Polar Programs Grant #1248118) awarded to examine the impacts of compensation issues associated with the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the findings presented in this article are based on a 2013 household telephone survey of 1,216 coastal Alabama residents living in the renewable resource communities of south Mobile County and Baldwin County. We focused on these areas in order to avoid contributing to “assessment fatigue” in other regions along the Gulf, particularly Louisiana. The survey research was conducted by the University of South Alabama Polling Group, using a random digit dialing technique. To be eligible to participate in the study, respondents had to be age 18 or more and had to have lived in the area for more than one year. The response rate for the survey was 21%. South Mobile County, south of Interstate 10, is a section of Mobile County that borders the western shore of Mobile Bay, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Mississippi State line. Considered the “Seafood Capital of Alabama,” this region is economically dependent on seafood harvesting, processing, and sales. Baldwin County is located south of Interstate 10, bordering the eastern shore of Mobile Bay, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Florida State line. Home to the “Emerald Coast,” Baldwin County is economically dependent on tourism for its economic livelihood. Both counties have strong economic, social, and cultural ties to the Gulf Coast’s renewable natural marine resources.
7 based on these figures. In the case of age, the weights were calculated based on 10-year intervals (20–29 years old, 30–39 years old, etc.) and applied to the same age ranges in the sample data. All analyses of these data have had the post-stratification weights applied.4 The characteristics of this post-weighted sample are as follows: 50% female; 63% married; 81% white; and a median age of 48. Four out of 10 indicated they had lived in south Mobile or Baldwin County for 26 years or more. Of those who provided household income data (n = 926), 59% reported a total household income of less than $50,000. Almost all of the respondents were high school graduates, with approximately 27% of these holding a BA or BS degree or higher. Almost two-thirds of respondents (62%) indicated that their employment did not depend on environmental conditions in the Gulf. A demographic comparison between south Mobile and Baldwin Counties revealed that the Baldwin County sample was significantly older, more educated, and in higher income categories whereas the south Mobile County sample included significantly more nonwhites and respondents had lived more years in their community. These survey demographics are consistent with observed demographic differences between the two coastal counties.(53) 6.2. Descriptive Data Overall, 277 survey respondents (22.7%) reported they were personally involved with some type of claims, settlement, or litigation activity associated with the DHOS. Roughly, one out of ten (11.4%) reported that they were part of the Deepwater Horizon Court-Supervised Settlement Program and a similar number (11.3%) responded that they were part
6. FINDINGS 6.1. Sample Characteristics Because the sample was highly skewed in terms of age (mean age = 64) and gender (more than 60% of respondents were female), we applied poststratification weights to the data so the results would be more representative of the overall population.(52) We used population data on age and gender from the U.S. Census Bureau(53) for Baldwin County and south Mobile County3 and weights were calculated 3 For
south Mobile County, the population data for Bayou La Batre; was used rather than all of Mobile County. The majority of
south Mobile County falls within Bayou La Batre; therefore, it is a better representation of the overall population. 4 Applying post-stratification weights to survey data can introduce instability into the data when there are a number of very large or very small weights. This instability can cause the standard errors to be inflated, which then may affect hypothesis testing.(54) Despite this potential problem we chose to weight the data to increase the representativeness of the sample and the analysis. Instability should not meaningfully impact our results for two reasons. First, we have only a very small number of weights that are either very large or very small. Second, inflated standard errors would make it more difficult to find statistically significant results. Therefore, finding a significant result between the main independent variable of interest, compensation, and the various dependent variables would represent evidence of a true effect between the variables, with or without inflated standard errors.
8 of “other legal processes or claims activities related to seeking compensation for impacts caused by the Deepwater Horizon oil spill” (e.g., claims made directly to the BP Claims Office, the settlement activities with Kenneth Feinberg, or litigation activities involving an attorney). In addition, 7.7% and 8.0%, respectively, indicated that someone else in their household was part of Settlement Program or part of other legal activities related to the DHOS. Of those affiliated with the Court-Supervised Settlement Program, 40.1% had received payments; of those with family members involved with the program, 67.1% had received disbursements. Of respondents involved with compensation processes as described above, approximately two-thirds reported that these activities were a source of stress to both themselves (70.6%) and to their families (63.5%). A majority (65.6%) indicated they had spent too much time on DHOS claims issues, and most noted that the process was not a positive experience for either themselves (61.9%) or for their families (65.2%). In terms of situating the aforementioned findings in a broader community context, more than half (54.8%) of those surveyed—including individuals who were not directly involved in claims, settlement, or litigation activities—responded that the compensation process had been a source of disruption in their community. Eight out of ten respondents believed that the process had lasted too long. Most notably, almost two-thirds (64.9%) indicated that “[t]he compensation issues surrounding the BP Deepwater Horizon have been as distressing as the oil spill itself.”
Ritchie, Gill, and Long sive stress and engagement in avoidance behaviors, respectively.5 We used three variables associated with compensation. Participants were asked about their involvement in the various types of compensation, coded as 1 for being “part of any compensation process” and 0 for “no involvement.” Two additional variables tap into dimensions of compensation: length of the process and feeling that the compensation process was as distressing as the spill itself. Each item was scored on a five-point Likert-type scale where higher scores indicated greater concern. Our analyses also include measures of vulnerability (exposure to oil and ties to resources); resource loss and threat of loss, including concern about economic future; risk perception (concerns about seafood safety, effects of dispersants, family health, oil in harvesting areas, and air quality); perceptions of spill-related recreancy associated with various entities; and sociodemographic characteristics. We hypothesize that individuals involved with compensation processes will have higher levels of intrusive stress and avoidance behaviors than those who are not. We also hypothesize that individuals with higher spill-related vulnerability, losses, risk perceptions, and stronger perceptions of recreancy will have elevated scores on the intrusion and avoidance scales. Factors associated with vulnerability and resilience included basic demographic and social variables. Demographic characteristics such as gender, race, presence of minor children in the household, and marital status were measured on a 0–1 categorical basis (female/male, nonwhite/white, no minors/minors, nonmarried/married). Income was measured in eight categories ranging from 1 (under $10,000) to 8 ($100,000 or more). Education was
6.3. Description of Variables Framed by the concepts and theories described above (Section 3), we examine the relationship between psychosocial stress as measured by the IES(43) and involvement in DHOS claims, settlement, and litigation activities. The IES is a 15-item scale that measures event-specific intrusive stress and avoidance behaviors—in this case, related to the DHOS. The total standardized scale (combining the intrusion and avoidance scales) has a range of 0–75, with higher scores indicative of higher levels of event-related stress. The intrusion and avoidance scales range from 0 to 35 and 0 to 40, respectively, with higher scores reflecting higher levels of intru-
5 Respondents
are asked how frequently during the “past seven days” they experienced each item of the IES in the context of a specific event. Responses are coded as never (0), rarely (1), occasionally (3), and often (5). The intrusion scale consists of: (1) I thought about it when I did not mean to; (2) pictures about it popped into my mind; (3) other things kept making me have thoughts about it; (4) I had trouble falling asleep or staying asleep; (5) I had waves of strong feelings about it; (6) I had dreams about it; and (7) reminders of it brought back feelings I first felt about it. The avoidance scale consists of: (1) I had to stop myself from getting upset when I thought about it; (2) I tried to remove it from my memory; (3) my feelings about it were kind of numb; (4) I had a lot of feelings about it that I did not know how to deal with; (5) I stayed away from reminders of it; (6) I felt as if it had not really happened; (7) I tried not to talk about it; and (8) I tried not to think about it.
Mitigating Litigating assessed on a seven-category scale from 1 (less than ninth grade) to 7 (advanced degree). Two demographic variables—years lived in the community and age—were used to construct a “homeplace” variable. Calculated by dividing the number of years lived in the community by age, homeplace provides an indicator of community place attachment. As conceptualized by Mihaylov and Perkins,(55) community place attachment is interrelated with social capital—an essential component of community resilience. In the context of environmental activism, community attachment plays a significant role in promoting protective actions by local citizens.(56) However, little is known about how community attachment influences individual and collective responses to a technological disaster. Additional measures of vulnerability included exposure to oil and commercial dependence on damaged/threatened natural resources. Exposure was based on items indicating if the respondent had: worked on shoreline cleanup (0.6% did); worked on the Vessels of Opportunity program6 (4.5% did); had property damaged by oil (7.4% did); had come in contact with oil in other ways (e.g. fishing, hunting, walking/hiking, swimming, recreation at the beach, or other (65.0% did). Respondents who had experienced any one item of these items were coded as 1 for “exposed” and the remainder were coded as 0 for “not exposed.” Renewable resource ties were measured by asking residents how much they used coastal areas along the Gulf of Mexico for commercial activities before the spill. Responses were coded as either connected (1) or not (0), with over one-third of the respondents (30.8%) reporting a commercial connection to coastal resources. Variables associated with resource loss and threat of loss focused on economic concerns, as well as other types of resources. Economic loss was measured by asking: “How would you describe the overall economic impact of the oil spill on your household?” Responses were coded on a five-point Likert-type scale from very positive (1) to very negative (5). The mean for the economic impact variable was 2.53 with 16.5% indicating they experienced “very negative” impacts and 31.8% reporting “somewhat negative” impacts. Threat of economic 6 The
Vessels of Opportunity program hired crews and boats to perform various functions after the spill, including oil recovery, supply transportation, wildlife rescue, and boom deployment and recovery.
9 loss was measured by asking respondents to indicate their confidence in their economic future using a fivepoint Likert-type scale where higher scores indicated less confidence. The economic future variable had a mean of 2.36 and 18.9% lacked confidence in their economic future. Other dimensions of the spill’s impacts were assessed by asking respondents to indicate the degree of loss or gain of 10 different resources since the DHOS. Drawing on Hobfoll’s conservation of resources theory, these resources included objects (Gulf of Mexico natural resources and physical possessions); conditions resources (family stability, good relationships with nonfamily members, and personal health); energies resources (time with family, financial stability, medical insurance); and personal characteristics resources (feeling of control over your life and feeling independent). The 10 items were combined into a scale with higher scores indicative of greater resource loss. The scale ranged from 10 to 50, had a mean of 32.4, a standard deviation of 3.71, and a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.85. Risk perceptions were measured using statements about the effects of the oil spill on family health, health effects of dispersants, air quality, seafood safety, and oiled seafood harvesting areas. Each item was scored on a five-point Likert-type scale where higher scores indicated greater concern and uncertainty. Perceptions of recreancy in our survey were measured by asking respondents to indicate how much they trusted six different entities involved in the oil spill disaster. Each entity was rated from “no trust” (1) to “a lot of trust” (5). 6.4. Bivariate Results Table I provides the bivariate Pearson correlations for the intrusion and avoidance scales, involvement with the compensation process, and other substantive variables. Being part of the compensation process was moderately correlated with the intrusion and avoidance scales, as were exposure to oil and ties to renewable resources. The highest correlation with the intrusion and avoidance scales was the conservation of resources scale, indicating that higher levels of resource loss were associated with higher levels of intrusive stress and avoidance behaviors. Economic loss and concern about economic future were also highly correlated with the intrusion and avoidance scales. All five risk perception indicators were significantly correlated with the intrusion and
0.88 0.21 0.03 0.27 0.19 0.27 0.38 0.39 0.54 0.39 0.32 0.39 0.34 0.55 −0.15 −0.12 −0.19 −0.03 −0.20 0.12
3
4
0.15 0.03 0.03 0.27 0.09 0.26 0.13 0.20 0.01 0.24 0.13 0.04 0.36 0.14 0.05 0.39 0.10 −0.03 0.55 0.23 0.04 0.36 0.05 −0.12 0.27 0.07 −0.01 0.36 0.15 0.05 0.32 0.04 −0.03 0.50 0.09 −0.06 −0.15 0.06 −0.03 −0.11 0.04 0.02 −0.20 0.05 −0.04 −0.03 0.02 −0.03 −0.18 −0.07 −0.02 0.15 −0.01 −0.01
2
6
7
−0.02 0.16 0.02 0.19 0.18 0.10 0.15 0.08 0.16 0.23 0.26 0.20 0.18 0.08 −0.01 0.13 0.16 0.10 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.21 0.05 0.05 0.23 0.09 0.17 −0.14 0.01 −0.15 −0.03 −0.01 −0.11 −0.03 0.03 0.08 −0.08 0.04 −0.07 −0.18 −0.03 0.01 0.11 −0.12 0.23
5
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
0.39 0.54 0.44 0.28 0.33 0.32 0.26 0.18 0.27 0.32 0.25 0.34 0.41 0.25 0.21 0.26 0.29 0.30 0.45 0.41 27 0.31 0.31 0.40 0.40 0.36 0.49 0.43 −0.16 −0.17 −0.17 −0.16 −0.09 0.14 −0.14 −0.14 −0.16 −0.12 −0.12 −0.13 −0.09 0.12 −0.13 −0.11 0.65 −0.03 −0.03 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.33 0.34 −0.10 −0.10 −0.10 −0.09 −0.05 0.08 −0.04 −0.07 0.39 0.42 0.60 0.28 −00.21 −00.24 −00.30 0.33 0.21 −00.39 −00.27 0.27 0.30 0.20 0.20 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.07 −0.16 −0.08 −0.06 0.00 −0.06
8
Notes: Correlations are weighted by the population values of age and gender. All correlations with an r value greater than ± 0.05 in the table are statistically significant at the p < 0.05 (two-tailed).
(1) Intrusion scale (2) Avoidance scale (3) Part of compensation (4) Process too long (5) Distressing as oil spill (6) Exposed to oil (7) RRC (8) Economic impact (9) Economic future (10) Conservation of resources scale (11) Seafood safety (12) Dispersants (13) Family health (14) Oiled harvest areas (15) Air quality (16) Local gov’t (17) Ala. state gov’t (18) Federal gov’t (19) Federal courts (20) BP corporation (21) Homeplace
1
Table I. Bivariate Pearson Correlations (r) for Variables in the Analysis
10 Ritchie, Gill, and Long
Mitigating Litigating avoidance scales. Those with greater concerns about air quality, family health, harvesting in oiled areas, seafood safety, and health effects of dispersants were likely to have higher levels of intrusive stress and avoidance behaviors. Of the indicators of recreancy, lack of trust in BP and the federal government were moderately correlated with both scales. Finally, the homeplace variable is positively correlated with both the intrusion and avoidance scales. 6.5. Multivariate Results We modeled the intrusion and avoidance scales using weighted least squares regression equations. In each case we modeled the dependent variables using two equations. The first equation includes the compensation variable and the demographic controls, and the second equation includes the compensation and demographic variables in addition to measures of dimensions of compensation, vulnerability, resource loss, and perceptions of risk and recreancy.7 Table II reports the equations modeling the intrusion scale. It is clear that being involved in compensation processes regarding the DHOS increases the likelihood of intrusive stress. The compensation variable is positive and significant in both models (p < 0.001), demonstrating that being part of DHOS compensation processes significantly increased people’s level of intrusive stress. Specifically, respondents who were part of the compensation process scored almost four points (3.96) higher on the intrusion scale, compared with respondents who were not part of the compensation process. Focusing on the results from the full model (Model 2), we observe that finding the compensation process as disturbing as the oil spill is significantly related to intrusive stress (p < 0.01). In terms of vulnerability, neither exposure to oil nor ties to renewable resources were significant in this model. Respondents who scored higher on the resource loss scale also scored higher on the intrusion scale (p < 0.001). Respondents who were concerned about their family’s health (p < 0.05), oiled harvest areas (p < 0.05), and air quality (p < 0.001) also reported higher levels of intrusive stress. Interestingly, 7 The
sample sizes vary between the equations for two reasons: (1) not all respondents were asked all of the questions, and (2) some respondents did not answer all of the questions. To ensure that this did not meaningfully affect our results we ran additional first models not reported here that restrict the analysis to the 498 respondents who make up the second models. The results were similar to those reported here. We report the models with the higher Ns as they are estimated from more data.
11 Table II. Weighted Least Squares Regression Coefficients (b) and Standard Errors (SE) for Determinants of Intrusion Scale
Compensation Part of any compensation? Compensation dimensions Process too long Distressing as oil spill Vulnerability Exposed to oil Renewable resource community Resource loss Economic impact of spill Economic future concern Conservation of resources scale Risk perception Seafood safety Dispersants Family health Oiled harvest areas Air quality Recreancy Local government Ala. state government Federal government Federal courts BP corporation Demographics Age Income Education Gender Race/ethnicity Marital status Homeplace County Constant F Adjusted R2 N
Model 1
Model 2
b
b
5.00***
SE
SE
0.98
3.96***
1.09
– –
– –
0.29 1.07**
0.36 0.39
– –
– –
1.12 0.86
0.86 0.80
– – –
– – –
0.39 0.19 0.70***
0.52 0.41 0.11
– – – – –
– – – – –
0.72 0.85 0.75* 1.04* 2.99***
0.38 0.37 0.37 0.41 0.41
– – – – –
– – – – –
0.69 −0.64 −0.40 0.71 −0.40
0.42 0.45 0.42 0.39 0.34
−0.01 0.02 0.40 0.03 −1.48*** 0.17 −0.86*** 0.21 0.31 0.90* 0.37 0.76* 0.72 1.11 0.65 1.91** −5.43*** 0.89 −2.64* 1.04 1.05 0.73 1.09 0.86 3.38** 1.02 2.28* 1.15 0.29 0.72 0.08 0.80 −9.74 38.09 43.14 48.83 25.22*** 22.16*** 0.20 0.53 878 498
Notes: All models have been weighted by the population values of age and gender. *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05 significance (two-tailed).
no recreancy variables are associated with scores on the intrusion scale. Income (p < 0.001), education (p < 0.05), gender (p < 0.01), race (p < 0.05), and homeplace (p < 0.05) are also significant predictors of intrusive stress. In particular, respondents with higher incomes had lower scores on the intrusion scale, suggesting that having a higher income helped to shield people from some spill-related stress. Measured by the adjusted R2 , the model explained 53%
12
Ritchie, Gill, and Long
Table III. Weighted Least Squares Regression Coefficients (b) and Standard Errors (SE) for Determinants of Avoidance Scale Model 3 b Compensation Part of any compensation? Compensation dimensions Process too long Distressing as oil spill Vulnerability Exposed to oil Renewable resource community Resource loss Economic impact of spill Economic future concern Conservation of resources scale Risk perception Seafood safety Dispersants Family health Oiled harvest areas Air quality Recreancy Local government Ala. state government Federal government Federal courts BP corporation Demographics Age Income Education Gender Race/ethnicity Marital status Homeplace County Constant F Adjusted R2 N
2.69***
Model 4 SE
b
SE
0.80
1.96*
0.89
– –
– –
−0.32 0.73*
0.32 0.35
– –
– –
0.59 −0.30
0.78 0.73
– – –
– – –
−0.05 −0.08 0.69***
0.48 0.37 0.10
suggest that individuals who were part of the compensation process scored almost two points (1.96) higher on the avoidance scale compared with those who were not involved in the compensation process. Similar to the intrusion full model (Model 2), compensation process as distressing as the oil spill, the resource loss scale, concern about air quality, income, education, gender, race, and homeplace were all significantly related to higher scores on the avoidance scale. As with the intrusion scale model, neither exposure to oil nor ties to renewable resources emerged as significant in the full avoidance scale model. Finally, the adjusted R2 = 0.48, indicating a moderately well-fitting full model (Model 4).
7. SUMMARY OF RESULTS – – – – –
– – – – –
– – – – –
– – – – –
−0.01 0.02 −1.47*** 0.15 0.52* 0.26 0.55 1.85** 0.76 −3.83*** −0.01 0.62 3.86*** 0.87 0.13 0.61 −10.85 32.55 28.06*** 0.22 878
0.49 0.28 0.53 0.65 1.69*** 0.19 −0.02 −0.71 0.68 −0.44
0.34 0.37 0.33 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.41 0.38 0.36 0.31
0.03 0.02 −0.89*** 0.19 0.89** 0.33 2.55*** 0.65 −3.57*** 0.94 −0.43 0.78 3.67*** 1.05 0.40 0.72 26.69 44.28 18.31*** 0.48 498
Notes: All models have been weighted by the population values of age and gender. *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05 significance (two-tailed).
of the variance in the intrusion scale with the combination of the predictors in Model 2. Table III provides the results of the avoidance scale models. As with the models for the intrusion scale, the compensation variable significantly predicts scores on the avoidance scale, although, in the full model (Model 4), the significance level decreases from p < 0.001 to p < 0.05. The results in Model 4
This article presents findings from research conducted in coastal Alabama approximately three years after the 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Results highlight factors that influence intrusive stress and avoidance behaviors, including vulnerability, resource loss, and perceptions of risk and recreancy. These findings also illuminate the relationship between involvement with spill-related compensation processes and event-related intrusive stress and avoidance behaviors. In doing so, we move beyond a focus on litigation to include claims and settlement activities. Bivariate correlational analyses showed that being involved in any aspect of the compensation process was moderately correlated with intrusive stress and avoidance behaviors. In the regression analyses, all of the models revealed higher scores on the intrusion and avoidance scales for those who were part of compensation processes. Beliefs that the compensation process was as distressing as the oil spill itself also significantly influenced levels of intrusive stress and engagement in avoidance behaviors. Nonetheless, being involved in compensation processes was not the most significant factor in the regression models. Rather, resource loss and risk perceptions emerged as more significant. This differs from the findings of Picou et al. where being a litigant was the most important predictor of intrusive stress.(13–15) As we suggested at the beginning of this article, adding vulnerability, resource loss, and risk perceptions into the models tempers the strength of the relationship between involvement in compensation processes and intrusive stress and avoidance behaviors.
Mitigating Litigating Correlational analysis revealed that intrusive stress and avoidance behaviors were moderately correlated with exposure to oil and ties to renewable resources. However, these relationships did not hold in the regression analyses. This diverges from prior research on the Exxon Valdez and DH oil spills. For example, Palinkas et al.(57) in their work following the Exxon Valdez found exposure significantly related to psychological stress. Similarly, after the DHOS, researchers found exposure and ties to renewable resources were significantly related to intrusive stress and avoidance behaviors in 2010 and 2011.(26,27) Findings from the present study indicate that exposure may not be as salient in 2013 as it was more immediately after the DHOS. Resource loss emerged as the most important factor explaining intrusive stress and avoidance behaviors. As anticipated, correlational analyses indicated that respondents who reported higher levels of resource loss had elevated levels of event-related intrusive stress and avoidance behaviors. Regression analysis revealed that economic loss and threat of loss as measured by economic impact of the spill and concern for economic future did not significantly contribute to high scores on either the intrusion or avoidance scales. The conservation of resources scale, however, was a significant predictor (p < 0.001) of both intrusive stress and avoidance behaviors. Notably, these spill-related losses spanned a range of objects, conditions, energies, and personal characteristics resources as identified in the conservation of resources approach. Our results are similar to those of Arata et al.(58) in their research following the Exxon Valdez oil spill. They drew upon the conservation of resources model to examine the relationship between chronic psychological stress and coping mechanisms—some of which included avoidance behaviors. As hypothesized, our data indicate that heightened perceptions of risk are significantly correlated with spill-related intrusive stress and avoidance behaviors. Bivariate correlation analyses indicated higher intrusion and avoidance scale scores among individuals who expressed greater concerns about air quality, family health, harvesting in oiled areas, seafood safety, and health effects of dispersants. Regression analysis revealed that concern about air quality was a significant predictor (p < 0.001) of elevated intrusive stress and avoidance behaviors. Based on observations and media accounts, coastal residents tended to relate being able to smell the oil and dispersants to potential negative health
13 outcomes—particularly for children. Concern about seafood harvesting areas being oiled and concern about family health were significant predictors (p < 0.05) of intrusion scale scores. Recreancy, as measured by “lack of trust” in a specified organization, was relatively insignificant in predicting the scores on the intrusion and avoidance scales. Lack of trust in BP and the federal government were moderately correlated with event-related intrusive stress and avoidance behaviors, but were not significant in the regression models. This may be an issue of measurement. We used an “institutional trust” approach to measure recreancy, but this taps into a narrow aspect of the concept and may not account for issues of blame, responsibility, and institutional failure. Although recreancy was not a significant factor in our analysis, we believe it has theoretical relevance. A review of the correlational analysis of demographic variables and scale scores for intrusion and avoidance (not included in tabular form in this article) revealed the significance of more traditional indicators of vulnerability such as income, education, gender, and minority status. The regression models show elevated intrusive stress and avoidance behaviors among males, minorities, and individuals with higher levels of education. Notably, the results suggest that having a higher income may help to assuage some spill-related psychosocial stress. The findings regarding stress among males and individuals with higher levels of education appear to diverge from prior studies. Although gender was not significant in the bivariate correlational analysis, it emerged as influential in the regression models. In the case of the DHOS, it may be that men experienced more stress than women because they assumed more traditional gender roles and may have felt more responsibility for handling compensation processes.8 Moreover, those with higher levels of education may have greater concerns about long-term environmental and economic damages as a consequence of the spill. Additional research is needed to better understand these relationships. Homeplace, as a measure of community place attachment, was significantly related to scores on both the intrusion and avoidance scales. 8 We
analyzed gender differences through a series of t-tests between gender and (1) compensation-related stress, (2) intrusion, (3) avoidance, and (4) total IES and found no significant differences between gender and any of the four variables. Thus, it seems that gender only becomes significant when including other control variables and modelling them with regression equations.
14 Respondents who had spent a higher proportion of their life in their community experienced higher levels of intrusive stress and avoidance behaviors. Notably, homeplace was highly significant (p < 0.001) in predicting avoidance behaviors. Our results are similar to research in coastal Louisiana following the DHOS, which found that community attachment was associated with higher levels of anxiety, stress, and depression.(28,29) This suggests that community attachment can be a source of vulnerability when technological disasters occur. In sum, for intrusive stress, being part of the compensation process was highly significant, as were the COR scale, air quality concern, and income (p < 0.001). Although being involved with compensation processes was a significant predictor (p < 0.05) of avoidance behaviors, the strongest predictors of avoidance behaviors were the COR scale, air quality concern, income, being male, minority status, and homeplace (p < 0.001). 8. CONCLUSIONS In the United States, reparation for economic and other losses resulting from technological disasters is typically sought through claims, settlement, and litigation. These processes are arduous, resource intensive (e.g., in terms of time, energy, and money), protracted, and produce mixed results. Mechanisms intended to provide compensation and economic relief from technological disasters can instead contribute to individual, collective, and secondary trauma as defined by Erikson. This article advances understanding of how involvement with compensation processes, vulnerability, resource loss, risk perceptions, and beliefs about recreancy are associated with event-related intrusive stress and avoidance behaviors. It does so by analyzing the combination of these factors in ways not previously examined in the literature. Although it is not surprising that compensation processes are a source of stress, this research expands the limited body of empirical evidence on stress and litigation in both disaster and nondisaster circumstances. Compensation processes associated with technological disasters affect geographically defined communities and specific groups within communities. Thus, unlike class action suits that typically draw plaintiffs from a wide geographic scope, those involved with technological disaster compensation processes tend to be geographically concentrated. This creates a “pressure cooker effect”(21) in which once
Ritchie, Gill, and Long supportive social interactions can become a source of stress and ensuing avoidance behaviors that adversely affect the broader community. Our data in the present study show that while 10% of survey respondents were involved in compensation processes, two-thirds of all respondents indicated that the processes were as distressing as the oil spill itself. As found in studies of the Exxon Valdez spill and prior DHOS research, perceptions regarding a lack of consistency and transparency in claims processes exacerbate the pressure cooker effect. This contributes to a corrosive community by reducing trust, weakening social connections and networks, altering social discourse, diminishing feelings of goodwill, and violating norms of reciprocity.(18) Technological disasters continue to reveal new forms of vulnerability ranging from exposure to resource ties to community attachment. Our research highlights community attachment as a relatively new form of vulnerability in technological disasters. Sociologically, individuals who have greater levels of community attachment are less likely to leave the community and are less likely to have strong social support networks beyond the community. Consequently, they are more likely to engage in avoidance behaviors to cope with eventrelated stress, which adversely affect social interactions and disrupt normal patterns of reciprocity and civic engagement. From the conservation of resources perspective, residents with greater levels of community attachment may experience greater loss or threat of loss of conditions, energies, and personal characteristics resources and thus may experience higher levels of psychosocial stress compared to those with less of their lives invested in a particular place. Our findings emphasize the relevance of the conservation of resources theory for understanding how various forms of resource loss and threat of loss contribute to intrusive stress and avoidance behaviors. While economic concerns were an important predictor of stress in the immediate wake of the DHOS, our data suggest that the predictors of stress associated with resource loss change over time. As discussed, the conservation of resources scale includes an array of resources beyond economic. Although resource loss and gain data were collected at an individual level, they are reflective of collective loss and gain, as well. As such, conservation of resources theory helps us to understand what communities have collectively lost or gained in the context of a technological disaster. In doing so, it
Mitigating Litigating also advances understanding of how resource losses influence intrusive stress and avoidance behaviors. The ambiguity of harm associated with toxic contamination heightens perceptions of risk and increases uncertainty. Conflicting interpretations of technological disasters—further confounded by contested science—do little to alleviate uncertainty. These elevated concerns feed into intrusive stress and avoidance behaviors. It remains to be seen whether this results in major lifescape changes as was documented more than a decade after the Exxon Valdez oil spill.(17,18,35) Recent toxic releases in West Virginia (Elk River, 2014 and Kanawha County, 2015), California (Santa, Barbara, 2015), and Colorado (Animas River, 2015) have focused media attention—though fleetingly—on higher-profile events. At a more mundane level, communities deal on a daily basis with events that do not make it to national news or to Hollywood—that is, the cumulative effects of environmental degradation related to “crescive troubles.”(59) These events are not solely “personal troubles”—they are “public issues” that represent a broader social problem.(60) Given that preventing technological disasters altogether is improbable, attention should concentrate on more effective and efficient forms of relief and restitution. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Support for this research was provided by the National Science Foundation’s Division of Polar Programs, Grant #1248118. The authors would like to thank the reviewers for their constructive feedback. REFERENCES 1. Picou JS, Gill DA, Cohen MJ (eds). The Exxon Valdez Disaster: Readings on a Modern Social Problem. Dubuque, IA: Kendall-Hunt Publishing Co., 1997. 2. Baum A, Fleming I. Implications of psychological research on stress and technological accidents. American Psychologist, 1992; 48(6):665–672. 3. Edelstein MR. Contaminated Communities: The Social and Psychological Impacts of Residential Toxic Exposure. Boulder: Westview Press, 1988. 4. Erikson K. Everything in Its Path: Destruction of Community in the Buffalo Creek Flood. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1976. 5. Freudenburg WR, Jones TR. Attitudes and stress in the presence of technological risk: A test of the Supreme Court hypothesis. Social Forces, 1991; 69(4):1143–1168. 6. Kates RW, Kasperson JX. Comparative risk analysis of technological hazards (a review). Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA, 1983; 80:7027–7038. 7. Kroll-Smith JS, Couch SR. Technological hazards, adaptation and social change. Pp. 293–320 in Couch SR, Kroll-Smith JS
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