Normative views in practice: the political discourse on ...

7 Normative views in practice: the political discourse on secession in Catalonia 2003-2015 Ivan Serrano .

7.1. Introduction Cases such as Scotland, Quebec, or Catalonia have prompted a renewed attention to secession in democratic contexts. The literature has focused either on the legitimate causes for secession from a normative perspective or on the explanatory factors that account for secessionist demands.1 However, little attention has been devoted to how normative elements are present in the political narrative of secessionist movements. The aim of this chapter is to bridge this gap by exploring how normative reasons are used to legitimize secessionist demands in the Catalan case. The historical goal of mainstream Catalanism consisted of a horizon of accommodation within Spain combined with a direct participation in the European Union. The development of the Spanish autonomic system and European integration was seen as a multilevel framework where a sufficient level of self-government could be achieved. On the one hand, the institutional design of the so-called State of Autonomies was expected to evolve towards a progressive federalization of Spain, but the evolution of the territorial question has resulted in an unstable equilibrium between demands for self-government and the national project of the state, which has also in1. Moore, National self-determination; Sorens, “Cross-sectional determinants of secessionism.” Comparative political studies.

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cluded recentralizing policies.2 On the other hand, in the Spanish context the idea of Europe was historically seen as a facilitator for the democratization of the country, as a factor of modernization that offered a framework for political stability. For minority nationalisms it was also seen as a process that would erode states’ sovereignty, opening the possibility for a direct participation in European affairs. However, the expectations of a Europe of Regions have been far from fulfilled, reinforcing the perception that the only way to participate in the European arena is to have a state of their own.3 The perceived failure of a sufficient if not optimal accommodation within the multilevel framework of Spain and Europe prompted a relevant change in the institutional goal of Catalanism where independence is progressively seen as the best and only way to achieve a meaningful level of self-government. Accordingly, arguments sustaining self-determination and independence on national and democratic grounds have been reframed and remedial and instrumental arguments have been progressively incorporated into the political discourse. This evolution has been accompanied by the strategic choice of a unilateral approach to secession, given the alleged reluctance of the state to agree to a bilateral process of consultation on the constitutional status of Catalonia.

7.2.  Theories of Secession in Practice The elements shaping the contemporary discourse on independence in Catalonia are closely linked to potential arguments justifying secession in the field of political theory. An important consideration to bear in mind when attempting to explore how these theoretical elements are present in the political realm is the distinction between categories of practice and analysis. The concepts used in the social and political arena are categories of practice that should not be taken for granted as categories of analysis, following the distinction made by Bourdieu and further developed by Brubaker in the field of nationalism and ethnicity.4 Taking this perspective, 2. Maiz, Caamaño, and Azpitarte, “Hidden Counterpoint of Spanish Federalism,” 63-82; Serrano, “Just a Matter of Identity?,” 523-545. 3. Elias, “Introduction: Whatever Happened to the Europe of the Regions?”; Hepburn, “Rise and Fall of a ‘Europe of the Regions’”, 537-555; Keating, “A Quarter Century,” 629635; Nagel, “Transcending the National/asserting the National,” 57-74; Requejo, and Nagel, Federalism Beyond Federations. 4. Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power; Brubaker, Ethnicity Without Groups.

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we can identify elements of comparability such as the self-determination debate in terms of an alleged “right to decide” or the definition of the national community entitled to this right, highlighting the evolution and specificities of the political discourse in a given case of study. From a normative perspective, there is a long-lasting debate on which group of arguments is necessary and sufficient for a unilateral secession to be morally acceptable.5 However, nationalist movements tend to express their demands for self-governments as a combination of these elements. Moreover, the usual configuration of arguments for secession in the theoretical field does not necessarily reflect how it is expressed in the political arena. Demands for self-determination by minority nations are in a primary sense presented in terms of self-recognition as a national community. This first level of legitimacy is related to ascriptive or national arguments, where a key element is to define what a national community is and, to the extent that they are necessary vehicles for individual selfrealization, whether or not they are entitled to self-determination.6 Once a given group is self-recognized as a national community, the exercise of self-determination in the context of liberal democracies is related to associative or choice theories of secession. Given that individuals are the best judges of their own interests and explicit consent is necessary for the creation of a political community, the democratic will of a territorially concentrated group of population is a sufficient basis for the creation of a new state, without the need for external causes to justify secession.7 National and democratic arguments share a rationality based on principle, that is, that the legitimacy of secession -and in fact of the creation of political communities- is based on moral reasons without the need to rely on external causes.8 Complementary to reasons of principle, the political discourse of secession also relies on consequential arguments. The emphasis here is placed on the instrumental rationality of secession, in terms of means and ends. Remedialist theories of secession represent a first group of arguments in this category. In the most restrictive version, secession is only acceptable as a last resource in cases of severe violation

5. López, Sanjaume, and Serrano, “Demandes de Noves Estatalitats al Segle XXI,” 13-27. 6. Costa, “On Theories of Secession,” 63-90; Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship; Margalit, and Raz, “National Self-Determination,” 439-461. 7. Beran, “Liberal Theory of Secession,” 21-31; Wellman, “Defence of Secession and Political Self-Determination,” 142-171. 8. Beran, “Democratic Theory of Political Self-Determination,” 32-59.

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of group rights or occupation of a formerly independent territory.9 Other factors such as a failure of recognition, violation of self-government arrangements or a situation of permanent minority were later introduced into remedialist debates, but from our perspective they all share the instrumentalist approach to secession, as they are thought of as a means of solving an unfair situation.10 Lastly, from an analytical perspective a fourth group of arguments can be added. In minimally just states, where the existence of severe reasons justifying secession is less likely to occur, contemporary minority nationalisms have progressively incorporated an instrumentalist group of arguments based on the material effects of independence in terms of economic prosperity, social well-being, and political participation.11 Catalan parties’ manifestos and parliamentary resolutions for the period 2003-2015 reflect how these groups of arguments are combined in a dynamic rather than static way. In particular, the analysis shows a “remedial shift” from the traditional approach of self-government demands within the state recognizing the national distinctiveness of Catalonia, towards a pro-independence approach that emphasizes consequential arguments.

7.3.  The Statutory Reform: the Last Expression of Traditional Catalanism After the regional and national elections of 2003 and 2004, negotiations started in the Catalan Parliament for a new statute. This period is characterized by a horizon of self-government that still follows the traditional demands for a special arrangement within the State and to participate in the European Union as a distinct region.12 The paradigmatic example of this historical current is represented by Convergència i Unió (CiU), the coalition formed by the liberal Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya and the Christian-democrats of Unió Democràtica de Catalunya, characterized by a moderate approach both in the ideological and the national

9. Buchanan, “Toward a Theory of Secession,” 322-342. 10. Patten, “Democratic Secession,” 558-586; Seymour, “Secession as a Remedial Right1,” 395-423. 11. Dalle Mulle, “New Trends in Justifications for National Self-Determination,” 211-229. 12. Dowling, “Autonomistes, Catalanistes and Independentistes,” 185-200; Giordano, and Roller, “Catalonia and the ‘Idea of Europe’, 99-113.

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dimension.13 The coalition offered parliamentary support both to Socialist and conservative Spanish governments in exchange for advancing selfgovernment developing the potentiality of the statute of 1979 without the need to reform it.14 The coalition sustained this traditional approach in the 2003 elections even though it finally adhered to the proposal for a new statute. According to the party’s platform, the new statute was an opportunity for a better recognition of Catalonia as a nation, to achieve a higher level of self-government and to renew relations with Spain, receiving fairer political and economic treatment from the state.15 This “renewed relationship” with Spain would also include recognition at the external level, with an autonomous foreign policy and presence in international organizations such as the UNESCO, direct representation in the Council of Ministers of the EU in the areas under the regional government powers, or the recognition of Catalan as an official language.16 Direct participation in the EU was seen as a scenario for self-government at its fullest, but also reflected a particular vision of the European project, which should be “more respectful to the plurality of peoples that configure it.” In the case of Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, the party officially supported the independence of the “Catalan Countries” after the incorporation in 1989 of a new generation of politicians coming from pro-independence movements and civil society activists.17 In 1993 a new “Ideological Declaration” was approved, changing the generic references to self-government to proindependence positions. However, the party did not immediately run to regional or national elections with this political platform. While officially pro-independence, the party also strengthened a left-wing agenda and the possibility for an acceptable accommodation within a federal Spain. In the party’s manifesto for 2003 there were no explicit references to the idea of independence and the agenda was rather focused on the development of policies of recognition as a “stateless nation”18 developing a strategy of international projection within the wider process of European integration.19 13. Newman, “Ideological Trends among Ethnoregional Parties,” 28-60. 14. Guibernau, Catalan Nationalism, 124. 15. CiU, ‘Tu Ets Primer,’ 102. 16. Ibidem, 97. 17. Argelaguet, “Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya”; Vilaregut, “Memòria i Emergència en l’Independentisme Català.” 18. In the Catalan context, references to Catalonia’s necessity to have her ‘own State’ are often found in the political discourse. 19. ERC, Un País Actiu i Equilibrat.

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The coalition of Iniciativa per Catalunya-Verds and Esquerra Unida i Alternativa (ICV-EUiA), is formed by parties from a Marxist tradition with different degrees of modernization towards post-materialist and green positions combined within the Catalanist tradition.20 The party’s position was mainly focused on the possibilities for social transformation that a leftist majority in the parliament would open.21 Regarding the possibility for a new statute of autonomy, the autonomic system was perceived as a good step towards self-government but yet far from fulfilling the party’s self-government goal, which was a stable accommodation of Catalonia within a plurinational and federal Spain that would eventually allow for a direct participation in a federal Europe.22 Nonetheless, the bid for a federal Spain in a federal Europe was based on Catalonia’s right to self-determination –either external or internal– an expression of her “sovereignty as a nation.”23 This common approach, which at the time also included the Socialists’ Party of Catalonia (PSC), resulted in the declaration of “Catalonia is a nation,” as included in Article 1.1 of the proposal approved by the Catalan Parliament in 2005. This statement can be seen as a precedent of recognizing Catalonia as a sovereign demos entitled to a unilateral right of self-determination. By 2006 three events would dramatically define the evolution of the years to come. First there was the approval of the new statute by referendum in Catalonia after the controversial negotiation between the Catalan and the Spanish delegation in Madrid. Second, after ERC did not support the final version of the statute, snap elections were called by the leading party of the coalition in government, the PSC. Third, by 2006 a process of grass-roots mobilizations with a sovereigntist agenda had already started, leading to a long series of massive demonstrations that would strongly influence the political agenda.24 It was the moment when the idea of a “right to decide” emerged in the public sphere within the structure of opportunity resulting from institutional developments such as the controversial process of statutory reform, but also from a policy crisis that was linked to complaints of under-investment by the central

20. Guibernau, Catalan Nationalism, 96. 21. ICV-EUiA, ICV - Programa Eleccions Autonòmiques 2003, 5. 22. Ibidem, 227. 23. Ibidem, 202. 24. Muñoz, and Guinjoan, “Accounting for Internal Variation in Nationalist Mobilization,” 44-67.

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government.25 After the first waves of successful social mobilization, the concept would be incorporated into the repertoire of political parties, even though its ambiguity allowed for a wide range of interpretations before it was consolidated as the local expression of the idea of self-determination. In fact, the first references to the “right to decide” in the parties’ discourses are not associated with a pro-independence agenda. Political parties rather emphasized the need to fully develop the potential of the new statute, including ERC, which had opposed the final version and campaigned for a “No” in the referendum. The case of the electoral manifesto of CiU for the 2006 elections is revealing in this sense. The idea of a “right to decide” is not mentioned yet and the emphasis is rather on policy issues that could be developed under the new statute. Regarding international projection, the reference is again to seek “cultural and political recognition as a nation within Europe.”26 A similar approach is shared by ICV, which had also supported the final version of the new statute, offering new possibilities for self-government in areas such as welfare or sustainability.27 Together with the new arrangement within Spain, the European Union is still seen as a horizon that opens alternatives to independence as long as the traditional conception of statehood is eroded. However, it is also stated that nation-states retain their role as the key actors of the integration process, and in this context Catalonia does not renounce self-determination as an expression of sovereignty to decide about its political status.28 In the case of ERC, the final agreement approved in referendum was considered a “mistake,” but emphasis was placed on developing its full potential.29 However, this runs in parallel with a more explicit sovereigntist agenda, aimed at Catalonia’s “right to decide” freely about its political future and to achieve “full sovereignty,” as the states remain the key actors in international relations, the only bodies that would allow participation in “global governance.”30 This is particularly important, as it shows a turning point in perceptions of European integration being increasingly perceived as a matter of states, where the participation of regions is not a viable option for minority nations having a voice of their own. While there is

25. Vilaregut, “Memòria i Emergència en l’Independentisme Català,” 141. 26. CiU, Programa de Govern 2006-2010, 143. 27. ICV-EUiA, ICV - Programa Eleccions Autonòmiques 2006, 4. 28. Ibidem, 287. 29. ERC, Programa Electoral 2006, 4. 30. Ibidem, 65.

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criticism of the lack of democratic legitimacy in European decisions and the emergence of a neoliberal paradigm, the traditional positive attitude towards Europe does not change as much as the perception that the best way to participate in the European process is not pushing for a Europe of Regions but rather to become a full-fledged member.31

7.4.  The Failed Expectations of Autonomy within Spain The next electoral cycle was defined by the economic crisis and the crisis of the leftist coalition in government since 2003. However, the longawaited decision of the Constitutional Court about the new Statute of Autonomy would dramatically alter the political agenda in Catalonia. The ruling of the Constitutional Court prompted a massive popular mobilization of protest monopolizing the political agenda, and early elections were called for November 25th. The so-called “right to decide” was interpreted as a democratic response to the failure of accommodation within the state. This conception went further from the initial incorporation of the idea that Catalonia had the right to decide on any relevant matter that its citizens may decide, as established in a political conference delivered by the coalition’s candidate, Artur Mas, in 2007.32As the Court’s decision would show that the constitutional framework of 1978 had “reached its limit,” the electoral manifesto of CiU states that Catalan self-government must be the result of “the democratic and inalienable right of every nation to decide its own future.”33 However, the coalition did not yet transform this claim into a pro-independence agenda, but the application of the “right to decide” was linked to the proposal of a new fiscal status within Spain that would result in the “financial sovereignty” of Catalonia.34 The horizon of self-government also included other demands defined in the first proposal for a new statute approved by the Catalan parliament, such as an autonomous infrastructure policy, the possibility of organizing referendums, bilateral relations with the state, or the clarification of powers with full autonomy.35 The question was whether the level of self-government that

31. Ibidem, 66. 32. Mas, Per Una Casa Gran. 33. CiU, Eleccions Nacionals 2010, 6. 34. Ibidem, 82. 35. Ibidem, 82.

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was necessary according to the party’s vision could be achieved within the existing state. The “right to decide” plays a key role in legitimating the political discourse, as the impossibility of reaching a satisfactory level of self-government would potentially allow for a new political strategy based on the recognition of Catalonia as a sovereign autonomous demos. That is, this approach changes the focus from the contents of autonomy to the legitimacy of self-determination as the best institutional way to achieve a satisfactory level of self-government, assuming that sovereignty is not conceived of in classical terms, but rather through direct participation in interdependence networks either at the European or the Spanish level. In the case of ICV-EUiA, the new statute is still perceived as a positive step granting more self-government, despite the Constitutional Court’s decision, and, on the other hand, the coalition defended the results of the incumbent government and the need to address the impact of the economic crisis with social policies.36 Regarding the new political scenario, the coalition’s proposal consisted of a coordinated plan to restore the powers overruled by the Court’s decision, and to promote a constitutional reform that would transform Spain into a plurinational federation.37 The idea of a “right to decide” is also incorporated into political discourse as an ultimate expression of Catalonia’s right to self-determination, including the right to define its political status, including both the possibility for a unilateral action as a last resort in case the state rejected the possibility of a plurinational and federal reform. In this scenario, the coalition proposal included a referendum to choose between the status quo, a state within a federal Spain, or independence.38 Despite criticisms of the “policies of austerity” promoted by European institutions, the European community arena remains the scenario where nations such as Catalonia should have a voice of their own, becoming “subjects of political and institutional action.”39 In the case of ERC, the party introduced new conceptual elements that translated the generic pro-independence position into a specific program. The manifesto introduces unilateral plans such as the possibility of declaring independence if the party obtained a sufficient majority of the Catalan parliament, but also seeking the necessary post-electoral agreements to

36. ICV-EUiA, ICV - Esquerra, Ecologia i Llibertat 2010, 2. 37. Ibidem, 221. 38. Ibidem, 221. 39. Ibidem, 223.

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exercise the “right to decide” by means of a referendum on independence.40 With an explicit pro-independence platform, the international projection of the Catalan case becomes a political priority, in order to get the “necessary supports” at the international level, with the final aim of becoming an independent state within the “framework of the European Union.”

7.5.  A Remedial Shift towards Self-determination However, after the victory of CiU, the main proposal of the new elected government was to negotiate a fiscal agreement with the central government, similar to the fiscal regime of the Basque Country and Navarre. The proposal was approved by the Catalan parliament two years later, including CiU, ERC and ICV, but as expected, the central government refused to introduce a bilateral component in the fiscal arrangements of the Autonomous Communities. This again prompted a social and political mobilization about the possibility of independence. After a new cycle of social mobilizations that culminated in a massive demonstration on September 11, 2012, early elections were called again, once the Parliament had approved a resolution establishing the priority of holding a referendum for Catalans to decide upon “their collective future freely and democratically.”41 According to the nationalist narrative, the Spanish government’s refusal to negotiate a bilateral process showed the impossibility of finding satisfactory accommodation within Spain, especially after an agenda of recentralization policies on key areas such as education or the failure to make the public investment included in the Statute of 2006. Even though the proposal suggested reaching an agreement with the central government for the referendum to be held under the existing constitutional framework, the situation could eventually legitimate unilateral decisions by the Catalan parliament if the state’s negative position persisted.42 The official statement of the Parliament underlines the failure of the historical goal of Catalanism, that is, the accommodation of Catalonia within a plurinational Spain, leaving statehood within Europe as the only remaining alternative.

40. ERC, Programa Electoral 2010, 9. 41. Catalan Parliament, Resolution 742/IX. 42. Ibidem.

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This new scenario was later conceptualized as the “national transition” by the governing coalition in the electoral manifesto for the new elections, a process where key “structures of state” were to be strengthened or built, aiming at the creation of “a state of its own within Europe.” This national transition is presented more as a process of state-building than an event, a process which is legitimated by the unlikelihood of a viable accommodation within Spain, even though the final institutionalization of this process would not exclude the possibility of some arrangement with the state.43 Accordingly, the emphasis remains on the exercise of the “right to decide” in a broad sense, understood as the expression of the democratic will of the “Catalan people” to decide upon their political future, but expressing a will to negotiate with “the Spanish State, the European Union and the international community.”44 For ICV-EUiA, the situation of 2012 reflected the failure of a negotiated agreement with the state to advance towards the federalization of Spain and the recognition of its national diversity. In this new political scenario, the political discourse explicitly included unilateral and remedialist elements. On the one hand, the “right to decide” legitimates the exercise of self-determination to achieve the goal of “full sovereignty,” as expressed by a massive cycle of social mobilizations, and on the other hand, this is the only alternative left after the ruling of the Constitutional Court of 2010 and the unwillingness of national parties to make a more flexible interpretation of the Spanish Constitution.45 This position aims to appeal to both pro-independence and pro-federalism supporters, not excluding the possibility of an agreement with the state which would include a referendum for Catalan society to express its preferences. Under this approach, the so-called “right to decide” is a strategy either to force the central government to negotiate or to confirm that no agreement is possible.46 In any case, the referendum should be called and defined following international standards and negotiating the terms with Spain and the European Union.47 The references to the European Union are combined with a critical stance against fiscal austerity measures, which have failed to overcome the economic crisis.48

43. CiU, Programa Electoral 2012, 15. 44. Ibidem, 13. 45. ICV-EUiA, ICV - Programa Electoral Autonòmiques 2012, 130. 46. Ibidem, 132. 47. Ibidem, 133. 48. Ibidem, 149.

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The idea of independence is thoroughly dealt with in the ERC’s electoral manifesto. It is the party’s key goal, also sustained in an alleged “right to decide,” a concept that translates the right to self-determination into political language emphasizing the democratic basis of recognition as a demos.49 The main goal for achieving independence is the organization of a referendum, but a unilateral declaration of independence is not excluded if, as expected, the state refused to enter into negotiations.50 The discourse on independence increasingly features a remedialist approach, that is, independence is presented as a last resort because the state not only rejects the possibility of further autonomy, but also does not fulfil the existing arrangements of self-government. Europe and the international community is seen in this context as an arena where the Catalan bid for the democratic right to self-determination can be defended, and on the other hand, as a space where an independent Catalonia would be fully integrated by the doctrine of “internal enlargement.”51 The 2012 elections also witnessed the emergence of a new political party, the CUP, a grassroots coalition of far-left, pro-independence and anti-capitalist groups that obtained three representatives. The coalition ran in the election with a unilateral approach to secession and a discourse denouncing the European Union as not representing working classes, but rather capitalist interests.52

7.6.  Democratic and Welfare Arguments for Secession After the elections, the new Parliament approved a number of resolutions which eventually resulted in a non-binding consultation held on November 9, 2014 and a legislative initiative to negotiate an agreement with the central government to entrench it within the existing constitutional framework. The rhetoric used in the parliamentary resolutions reflects the process of discursive convergence that had been emerging in previous years. The main resolution in this new period is the Declaration of Sovereignty of January 25th 2013, which was approved by CiU, ERC, ICV and partially by CUP, claiming that after the failure of accommodation within the State and the massive demonstrations of civil society, 49. ERC, Un Nou País, 12. 50. Ibidem, 8. 51. ERC, Un Nou País, 10. 52. CUP, La CUP Al Parlament.

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the parliament has received the mandate of holding a referendum for Catalan society to be consulted on its political future. According to this rhetoric, the goal of independence reflects the Catalan people’s will to be recognized as a collective identity, but it is also an instrument for “more progress, welfare and equal opportunities for all its citizens.”53 In December, 2013, the four parties agreed on a date and a referendum question scheduled for November 9, 2014. Moreover, in January, 2014, the Catalan parliament agreed to send a proposal to the Spanish Congress to hold an agreed-upon referendum in the Spanish Congress, a proposal that was rejected in March by the two main Spanish parties, the People’s Party and the Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party. The following months became a controversial period, given the state’s opposition to allowing a unilateral, full-fledged referendum. Eventually, the consultation was organized as a non-binding informal process, with a twofold question asking “Do you want Catalonia to become a state?” with a follow-up: “In case of an affirmative response, do you want this state to be independent?” This sort of referendum wording would raise some concerns of clarity given the existing international recommendations on the matter, but it reflected the widest consensus possible among parties supporting the possibility of a unilateral consultation, that is, the recognition of Catalonia as a demos and the inherent right to self-determination, despite ideological differences –from radical left to liberal and conservative positions– and constitutional preferences –from outright independence to the possibility of an agreement within Spain.54 Given the political gridlock between the Catalan and the Spanish government, new regional elections were called for September, 2015. This election was considered by pro-independence parties as a pseudoreferendum, given the difficulties in organizing a standard referendum agreed upon by the state, which also reinforced a shift from a bilateral to a unilateral approach. This “plebiscitarian” character was accompanied by a reconfiguration of the political coalitions that participated in the election. On the one hand, a wide coalition was agreed on between CDC –which had split from its historical partner UDC in the coalition 53. Catalan Parliament, Resolution 17/X. 54. Regarding some international references on referendums, see for instance the wellknown opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada about the necessity of a “clear question” (Supreme Court of Canada 1998), the recommendations of the British Electoral Commission on the Scottish referendum (Commission 2013), or the Code of Good Practices in Referendums of the Venice Commission (Venice Commission 2009).

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CiU– and ERC which included a number of independent candidates from social movements and former PSC and ICV members. The coalition was labelled Junts pel Sí (“Together for Yes”). On the other hand, the CUP widened its electoral space by incorporating a variety of social movements from the radical left. The electoral manifesto of Junts pel Sí can be seen as the culmination of the rhetorical shift towards remedial and instrumental arguments for secession. The introductory part of the manifesto emphasized arguments for secession related to the prospects of a more “flourishing” and “fairer” society, which underpinned the necessity of exercising the right to self-determination by democratic means given that Catalonia “belongs to a hostile State.”55 The unilateral nature of the election was also a core element for the CUP, breaking away from the Spanish State, but also from the austerity policies “dictated by the European Union and the Troika.”56 On the other hand, the instrumental dimension of independence is well reflected in the fact that 5 out of 9 policy measures to be implemented referred to welfare, economic, and environmental policies.57 ICV also merged into a new electoral coalition formed by Podemos, a national political party created in 2014, and a Barcelona-based movement that had won the local elections of May, 2015. This prompted a change in the political discourse of independence, keeping the emphasis on the so-called “right to decide” which was now also linked to a “constituent process” at the Spanish level. Thus, the unilateral component was relaxed, as the main strategy was to reach an agreement with the central government, if new majorities were to have a determinant role in the Spanish Congress.58 The new elected parliament passed a resolution on November 9 that set the priorities for the new government to be agreed upon between Junts pel Sí and CUP, given the parliamentary results of the election. The document represented a mandate for Catalan institutions to implement a number of legislative measures that had been overturned by the Constitutional Court, mostly referring to welfare and social policies in areas such as health, housing, abortion, or energy poverty.

55. Junts pel Sí, “Programa electoral 2015,” 10. 56. CUP-Crida Constituent, “Programa 2015,” 3. 57. Ibidem, 5. 58. En Comú Podem, “Programa Electoral 2015,” 73-75.

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7.7. Conclusions The aim of this chapter was to analyze the presence of normative theories of secession in the political discourse of pro-independence movements, focusing on the Catalan case. Contrary to theoretical discussions in the academic field, political actors do not rely on a single group of arguments to legitimize their claims, but rather on a contextual combination of these elements. Moreover, these particular configurations not only vary across cases but also evolve over time. The evolution of nationalist discourse in Catalonia has three main features. First, a reconceptualization of primary factors related to what I have labelled rationality of principle, that is, the modernization of national and democratic arguments for secession, reflected in the emergence of the so-called “right to decide.” Second, the growing importance of remedial and instrumental arguments, which have progressively gained preeminence in the political discourse of pro-independence movements. This is not to say that elements such as self-recognition as a nation or the right to exercise self-determination by democratic means disappear. These primary elements are rather the necessary base from which nationalist movements can expand their discourse in democratic contexts. Third, the preeminence of these elements linked to an instrumental rationality is accompanied by a unilateral approach to secession that departs from traditional demands for self-government and self-determination by means of a bilateral and negotiated agreement with the state. Exploring the analytical possibilities of arguments discussed by normative theories of secession, the basic feature of contemporary Catalan nationalist discourse could be summarized as a shift from cultural and national preservation arguments to the legitimacy of a unilateral definition of the institutional status of Catalonia, articulated as a response to the perception of failure of accommodation within the state and Europe and as a rational means of improving welfare policies and economic performance.

References Argelaguet, Jordi. “Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya: The Third Pole within Catalan Politics”. In: L. De Winter, M. Gomez-Reino, and P. Lynch (eds.). Autonomist Parties in Europe: Identity Politics and The Revival of the Territorial Cleavage. Vol. 1. Barcelona: Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials, 2006.

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