Operationalizing Sen’s Capability Approach Flavio Comim† Paper prepared for the Conference Justice and Poverty: examining Sen’s Capability Approach, Cambridge 5-7 June 2001. Comments and suggestions are most welcome
Introduction Professor Amartya Sen (1993: 30) once observed that “Capability is not an awfully attractive word”. One wonders what might be said of the word “Operationalizing” and of “Operationalizing Capabilities”? Operationalizing is definitely an awfully unattractive word that has no clear or unambiguous meaning. It can be used in a very broad sense, meaning “something that can be put into practice or used” or something narrowly defined, meaning “quantification” restricted to a particular level of analysis. There are many different ways through which any theory can be used or applied and it does not seem correct to limit the ‘processes of putting these theories into operation’ to one or two particular modes. Thus, by ‘operationalizing’ we mean the diverse sequence of transforming a theory into an object of practical value. To simplify matters, it could be suggested that operationalization consists of four sequences/alternatives: i)
theoretical inclusion: elaboration of theoretical concepts with potential empirical significance;
ii)
measurement: transformation of these theoretical concepts into empirical variables;
iii)
application: use of these variables in qualitative empirical analysis;
iv)
quantification: use of these variables in quantitative empirical analysis.
This should not be understood as a unidirectional structure because empirical feedbacks and the choice of techniques do influence theoretical paths and the final outcome is far from being clear-cut, as suggested above. In any case, it seems that it is important to note that operationalizing a theory should not be restricted to quantifying it and that quantification in itself should be seen in a wider framework of ‘using’ the theory. While researchers working from a Utilitarian perspective appear to take for granted the nature of the examined objects and to reduce operationalization to its last stage (quantification), the Capability Approach –on the other hand- seems to require the process of operationalization in its entirety: from the theoretical inclusion (which assumes an investigation of the context and nature of object) to its quantification –when applicable. †
Von Hügel Institute, St Edmund's College, University of Cambridge. Not for citation without permission from the author (email
[email protected]).
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The operationalization of the Capability Approach is the most important challenge that lies ahead of this framework; partly because it seems to be a fruitful philosophical incursion into development ethics which faces disproportional difficulties in being implemented or empirically applied, partly due to its theoretical under-specification and inclusive view of operationalization which contests not only the evaluative but also the practical foundations of Utilitarianism.
Some critiques of Sen’s approach, as those exemplified by Sugden (1993), Ysander (1993), Srinivasan (1994) and Roemer (1996), have suggested that the multidimensional-context-dependent-counterfactualnormative nature of this approach might prevent it from having practical and operational significance1. One might conclude from these critiques that prima facie the approach is not usable or that Sen did not attach great empirical significance to this approach.
However, Sen has quite often attached a strong practical meaning to his work related to the Capability Approach. For instance, when discussing the conditions for an ‘appropriate’ approach to the evaluation of the standard of living he remarked that (1987: 20) “the approach must nevertheless be practical in the sense of being usable for actual assessments of the living standard”. Similarly, when examining the relation between his substantive claims on inequality and the Capability Approach, he stressed that (1992: 11) their implications “are not only of theoretical interest, they also have some practical importance”. More examples could be given to illustrate the point that Sen attaches great practical importance to the Capability Approach. It must be noted that Sen (e.g. 1985, 1998) himself and in association, specially with Drèze (1989, 1997), carried out extensive empirical work from a Capability Perspective, analysing issues such as sex bias, mortality, hunger and Indian development.
However, the argument that Sen considers his work of practical significance is not enough evidence to prove that the approach does not face additional operational hurdles in comparison to those experienced by the conventional use of statistics from a utilitarian perspective. Moreover, it is not a complete answer to the problem of providing clear practical guidelines to development practitioners (researchers, policy makers, etc). To some extent, Sen himself acknowledges the concern about empirical difficulties in operationalizing 1
For instance, Sugden (1993: 1953) argues suggests that “Given the rich array of functionings that Sen takes to be relevant, given the extent of disagreement among reasonable people about the nature of the good life, and given the unresolved problem of how to value sets, it is natural to ask how far Sen’s framework is operational”. Similarly, Ysander comments that (1993: 84) “in an overwhelming number of cases, the investigators failed to observe and measure anything which could, with the best will in the world, be called a capability”. Srinivasan (1994) seems to see in the Human Development Index (HDI) the ‘operational face’ of Sen’s Capability Approach which, according to him, is vulnerable to the charge of not providing an ‘empirically sound’ metrics. He argues that (1994: 241) “the HDI is conceptually weak and empirically unsound, involving serious problems of noncomparability over time and space,
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the Capability Approach (e.g. 1985: 46 and 1992: 52). With regard to the very wide range of relevant freedoms, he notes that (1999: 24) “The extensive coverage of freedoms is sometimes seen as a problem in getting an ‘operational’ approach to development that is freedom-centered. I think this pessimism is illfounded”. Yet, the fact remains that one of the most challenging aspects of the Capability Approach regards its operationalization, that is, its application and its practical use.
Sympathisers of the Capability Approach have acknowledged that the operationalization of the approach is (yet) one the major challenges lying ahead. For instance, Robeyns (2000: 26) has noted that “despite the fact that Sen published Commodities and Capabilities in 1985, the number of empirical applications is still quite limited” and that none of the applications she reviewed “were using surveys which were specifically constructed to measure functionings”. Sympathisers have also remarked the difficulty in translating the approach into practice; either due to its emphasis on value judgments with high informational requirements or its multidimensional nature. Alkire (1998: 3) observes that “Sen has not specified how the various value judgments that inhere in his approach, and that are required in order for its practical use (whether at the micro or macro level), are to be made” and that “without some specification -and simplification- the capability approach cannot be used efficiently”. Chiappero Martinetti has argued that (2000: 3): Undoubtedly, the richness of such theoretical argumentation is not easy to translate into practical terms. The capability approach is certainly more demanding at an informational and methodological level if compared with more standard approaches (i.e. income or opulence-centred analysis) to well-being; it is also hard to constrain and to manage in the traditional framework of welfare and poverty analysis, if we want to fully preserve its informative and interpretative contents. These difficulties could partially explain why, up to now, there are relatively few empirical applications that have been able to capture the richness of such a perspective even if many well-being analyses conceptually refer to it. The aim of this essay is to analyse the difficulties and challenges in operationalizing Sen’s Capability Approach. Although far from being an original enterprise, in face of previous works such as those of Alkire (1998), Brandolini and D’Alessio (1998), Chiappero-Martinetti (2000), Klasen (2000) and Robeyns (2000) among others, it attempts at identifying and organising the main conceptual issues involved in using the Capability Approach, complementing the previous discussions.
The essay is divided into three parts. The first part discusses the foundational level related to the operationalization of the Capability Approach. It consists of conceptual characteristics of the approach that influence the sort of empirical work that can be subsequently pursued. The second part focuses on the measurement errors, and biases”. Roemer’s critiques are related to his emphasis on complete orderings and the evidence that the capability approach does not provide a complete index of functionings.
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empirical level of the approach and its features, such as those of aggregation, weighting and incompleteness and the constraints imposed by data. Finally, the third part briefly discusses different options in operationalizing the approach as presented at this conference.
Foundational Level 1. ‘Valuational’ Foundation
The Capability Approach is a framework for evaluating and assessing social arrangements, standards of living, inequality, poverty, justice, quality of life or well-being. It is not meant to be a substantive theory of these issues. Its main contribution consists in the broadening the informational space2 of other ethical approaches by defining as units of evaluation not ‘opulence’, utilities, primary goods or rights but functionings (‘doings’ and ‘beings’) –a measure that encompasses these other unities of evaluation. Simply put, the valuational exercise, required by the Capability Approach, consists in the identification and weighting of valuable things that people are able to be or to do. This valuational exercise, at the core of this approach, brings different layers of complexity to its operationalization. First, it leads to a multiplicity of variables and to a plurality of relevant spaces that are more often than not heterogeneous. Secondly, it requires the solution of the complex issue of the varying importance of different functionings and of how people evaluate them. While many functionings can be essential and important for a ‘good life’, others can be trivial and valueless.
The elaboration of a broader informational space is not the only important element in Sen’s normative approach. He argues that a person’s freedom to live the way one would like has intrinsic value and therefore it is constitutive of a person’s being. This means that not only achieved functionings are valuable but also the individuals’ capability of choosing and discriminating among possible livings. Emphasis on freedom or capability reflects the agency aspect3 of a person. But not any increase in choice counts; only those that reflect an expansion of valuable choices.
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The informational space or basis refers to the information that is needed for making evaluative judgments and, as Sen (1999: 56) remarks, what is ‘excluded’ from an evaluative role. 3 The “agency aspect” is crucial for an understanding of the Capability Approach. It describes the situation where one acts in terms of one’s own values and objectives. It is behind individual initiative and social effectiveness. As argued by Sen (1999: 53), “The people have to be seen, in this perspective, as being actively involved –given the opportunityin shaping their own destiny, and not just as passive recipients of the fruits of cunning development programs” [emphasis added].
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In operational terms, individual functionings can be represented by real numbers and a person’s actual achievement can be expressed by a functioning vector. A capability set is then represented by the alternative combinations of functioning vectors that can be achieved. The question remains of how can the identification and ranking of valuable capabilities can be operationalised in this framework. Sen emphasises that (1992: 44) “The need for selection and discrimination is neither an embarrassment, nor a unique difficulty for the conceptualisation of functionings and capabilities”. Operationally, there are five alternatives for the evaluation of capability sets: 1. by the value of its highest-valued element; 2. by their number of elements; 3. by combining a maximal element x with the number n of members of the set (x, n); 4. by the option ultimately chosen; 5. by an a priori definition of a set of basic capabilities. Sen has demonstrated how the assessment of capability behaves asymmetrically against the number of elements; it can be reduced when the number of elements is reduced (the value of a set is also given by having opportunities that are not chosen) but it could not be enhanced by an increase in trivial choices (see e.g. 1992: 63). Thus, neither 1 nor 2 could provide straightforward empirical counterparts for capability sets. The same outcome applies to the third alternative. The fourth option, based on Samuelson’s revealed preference approach, faces the limitation of being used only when data are observable and available. Finally, Sen has argued that because value selection and discrimination are an intrinsic part of the Capability Approach, a priori specifications of capabilities should be avoided4. Yet, when discussing the relation between basic capabilities and poverty assessment, Sen seems to be willing to compromise with an a priori specification of basic capabilities. As he argues (1992: 44-45), “in dealing with extreme poverty in developing economies, we may be able to go a fairly long distance in terms of a relatively small number of centrally important functionings (and the corresponding basic capabilities, e.g. the ability to be wellnourished and well-sheltered, the capability of escaping avoidable morbidity and premature mortality, and so forth)”. The challenge posed by the valuational element of the Capability Approach requires further discussion of procedures for evaluating capability sets that could reflect the agency aspect, as argued by Sen.
2. Human Diversity
Another important characteristic of the Capability Approach with consequences for its operationalization is, according to Sen, the existence of ‘pervasive human diversity’. He qualifies it as an “empirical fact” (1992:
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xi, 117) and uses it to de-emphasise the importance of resources in the assessment of the capability a person enjoys. There are many sources of diversity between human beings, from which Sen (1999: 70-71) identifies as the most important5 those concerning i) personal heterogeneities, ii) environmental diversities, iii) variations in social climate, iv) differences in relational perspectives and v) distribution within the family. These differences will shape the degree of variations in the conversion of resources into capabilities. Consequently, because individuals are diverse their capabilities cannot be assessed uniquely in terms of the resources they have available but also in terms of what they are capable of doing and being with these resources.
The extent of human diversity in determinate context will affect the selection of relevant focal variables. That is, how different are people will influence the choice of variables on which the analysis focuses and of their plurality. As Sen puts it (1992: 3), “The pervasive diversity of human beings intensifies the need to address the diversity of focus in the assessment of equality”. In operational terms, we could say that the degree of human diversity will influence a) the range of conversion rates of resources into capabilities and b) the parameters (group or individual) of the conversion rates. As far as the issue of income inequality is concerned, the consequence of human diversity can be seen not only in the variation of income-using ability of individuals but also in their income-earning ability (Sen, 1999: 119).
Sen classifies human diversity as an ‘empirical fact’ but in practice uses it as an assumption -of crucial importance- in his theoretical critique of the utilitarian and Rawlsian approaches. It remains to be seen empirically how diverse human beings are within different communities and societies. The relevance of this element for the operationalization of the Capability Approach requires that it must be treated as an ‘empirical precondition’ to be verified before the application of the approach.
3. Objectivity
Sen (1987: 16) suggests that “the movement in the objectivist direction away from utility may be right” and that the assessment of living standards based on subjective criteria does not provide a reliable picture. Capabilities are best seen as objective properties of the characterisation of individuals’ lack of freedom and not as subjective individual preferences. Objectivity must be distinguished from invariance. A same capability can vary between societies but can be seen, from the analyst’s perspective, as an objective reality
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Nussbaum (2000: 13) notes how “Most importantly, Sen has never made a list of the central capabilities”. Sen notes that (1992: 117) “There are diversities of many different kinds. It is not unreasonable to think that if we try to take note of all the diversities, we might end up in a total mess of empirical confusion. The demands of practice indicate discretion and suggest that we disregard some diversities while concentrating on the more important ones.” 5
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(Sen, 1992: 108). Thus, the use of subjective measures (such as measures of well-being and happiness) to assess ‘the good life’ can be misleading. The problem is that the objective conditions lived by individuals can influence their perceptions of their realities. As argued by Sen (1992: 9-10) “The capability perspective is more sensitive than utility-based approaches to problems of entrenched deprivation, which can lead to defensive adjustment of desires and expectations (thereby distorting the metric of utilities)”. Given the popularity of empirical investigations based on subjective assessments, this characteristic of the Capability Approach may be seen, at least, as a word of caution.
On the other hand, the objective characteristic of the Capability Approach is intrinsically associated with its incompleteness as a practical guide to context-dependent evaluations. Commenting on Nussbaum’s (1988) suggestions that the Capability Approach should introduce an objective normative account of human functioning, with a procedure for objective evaluation of functionings, Sen argues that (1993: 47) I certainly have no great objection to anyone going on that route. My difficulty with accepting that as the only route on which to travel arises partly from the concern that this view of human nature (with a unique list of functionings for a good human life) may be tremendously over-specified, and also from my inclination to argue about the nature and importance of the type of objectivity involved in this approach. But mostly my intransigence arises, in fact, from the consideration that the use of the capability approach as such does not require taking that route, and the deliberate incompleteness of the capability approach permits other routes to be taken which also have some plausibility. [original emphasis] The sort of objective empirical work that can be done from a capability perspective is bound to face the problem of defining coherence among different contexts. Context might differ according to variations in space or time or in particularities resulting from different circumstances. The operational challenge here is how the practical nature of context definition will influence the objective nature of capabilities.
4. Counterfactual Nature
Perhaps the most important (and intriguing) characteristic in influencing the difficulty in operationalizing the Capability Approach (through the use of empirical measures) is its counterfactual nature. The point, as Sen puts it (1987: 1), is that a person “could have a good deal of freedom, without achieving much”. Capability could be high but for any reason individuals may choose not to actualise it; or they may choose to have more from a sort of freedom than from another. Because the informational basis of evaluation
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incorporates counterfactual6 choices and scenarios, it does not correspond to the informational basis derived from an empirical observation of facts. Williams (1987: 96) has observed that Sen “directs our attention to the idea that capability stands to functioning as the possible stands to the actual”. But how can we measure counterfactuals? And how can the Capability Approach be operationalized if capability is a possibility (which can be exercised or not) and not an actuality? The solution, as proposed by Sen, seems to be linked to a close examination of the nature of the counterfactual in question and the possibility of identifying links between counterfactuals and their realisations. In his words (1992: 66), While this may look like adding to the already heavy informational demand for analysing freedoms, it need not, in fact, make the practical problems of such analyses more intractable. Sometimes the nature of counterfactual choices are very easy to guess, e.g. that people would choose to avoid epidemics, pestilence, famines, chronic hunger. The elimination of these unloved things, through public policy aimed at giving people what they would want, can be seen as an enhancement of people’s real freedom. In this sense, even simple observations of realized states may have direct relevance to the analysis of freedoms enjoyed…[italics added] To some extent the idea of counterfactual is related to the property of something contrary to what is observable and it might be more difficult than suggested by Sen to identify circumstances where/when both counterfactuals and realised states are very close. Its relevance to the Capability Approach transcends the number of alternatives available to individuals to be judged according to the goodness of the alternatives.
The four issues -briefly discussed above- of valuation, diversity, objectivity and counterfactuality shape the possibilities and the choice of alternatives techniques. They represent difficulties that should not be ignored but that, nevertheless, pose a set of challenges to the operationalization of the Capability Approach. There seems to exist a natural and expected tension between the foundational and the practical levels of analysis. To what extent the Capability Approach influences the translation of theory into practice? How the above foundational characteristics interact with the practical elements of this approach? In what follows, elements for analysing these questions are presented.
Practical Level 1. Data
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The notion of counterfactual is used (instead of transfactual) because it is used by Sen when describing choice (1992: 66). We work with the notion of counterfactual as described by him (1982 [1980]: 359): “It contrasts what is observed with what allegedly would be observed if something else were different”.
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According to Sen (1985: 26), the most important possible sources of data for the application of the Capability Approach are i) market purchase data, ii) responses to questionnaires and iii) non-market observations of personal status. While the approaches based on utility and opulence tend to concentrate on the sources i) and ii), the Capability Approach makes more extensive (but not exclusive) use of the source iii). When discussing international comparisons, Sen pointed out to the problem of “limitations of reliable data” (1985: 46) which he identifies as a problem of “lack of demand” for this sort of database.
It is interesting to note that formally the reference unit of the Capability Approach is the individual, but that in practice Sen quite often illustrates the approach by using group or country-level data. For instance, when discussing the existence of sex bias in India, he presents his analysis in terms of the relative performance of different groups (1985: 52-58). Similarly, when illustrating the differences between judging poverty by income and judging poverty by capabilities, Sen (1992: 126-7) works with data at national level. Indeed, as Douglas and Ney (1998: 72) observe, Sen is only formally or nominally concerned with the individual because in practice “the measures are designed to assess the institutional support for the individual”. Therefore, there seems to be no restriction concerning the reference unit used to applied the Capability Approach.
The data needed for the operationalization of the approach is related to the sort of evaluation intended and to the circumstances. Data limitation is constantly pointed out by Sen as a “substantial drawback”7. Depending on the context, the informational basis needed may be approximated by data already available. It seems that practical compromises are intrinsic to the counterfactual nature of the Capability Approach. As Sen observes (1992: 52), In fact, the capability set is not directly observable, and has to be constructed on the basis of presumptions (just as the ‘budget set’ in consumer analysis is also so constructed on the basis of data regarding income, prices and the presumed possibilities of exchange). Thus, in practice, one might have to settle often enough for relating well-being to the achieved –and observedfunctionings, rather than trying to bring in the capability set (when the presumptive basis of such a construction would be empirically dubious). Sen argues that it is important to know what data in principle would be useful even though we may not able to get them. The empirical strategy suggested consists in acknowledging the practical problems of informational availability whenever necessary and searching for practical compromises. Therefore, at the 7
Sen remarks that (1992: 53) “The capability approach can, thus, be used at various levels of sophistication. How far we can go would depend on the practical considerations regarding what data we can get and what we cannot. Ideally, the capability approach should take note of the full extent of freedom to choose between different functioning bundles, but limits of practicality may often force the analysis to be confined to examining the achieved functioning bundle only” [original emphasis].
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end of the day, it seems that the counterfactual characteristic of the capability approach does not prevent it from being operationalized. Sen argues that (1999: 131) “The assessment of capabilities has to proceed primarily on the basis of observing a person’s actual functionings, to be supplemented by other information. There is a jump here (from functionings to capabilities), but it need not be a big jump, if only because the valuation of actual functionings is one way of assessing how a person values the options she has”. Sen’s arguments have been quite convincing in broadening the information space given by income alone to include social functionings. But then, the main challenge that arises is about the practical difference between the Capability Approach and any other approach that portrays development in terms of nonincome variables.
It appears that these differences will depend on the level of analysis adopted. At a macro level, not many differences are possible, since, for instance, aggregates on mortality levels or female illiteracy will provide the same information either from a capability or from a ‘utilitarian’ perspective. The significant difference lies in micro-economic studies where the valuational foundation of the Capability Approach allows people to express their ‘powers of discrimination’ with regard to the good life. But this would not solve completely the problem of defining freedom or capability as the fundamental theoretical concept and having to settle for an ‘empirical equivalent’ based on achieved functionings. It remains to be seen how the agency aspect of the Capability Approach, put in evidence by Sen as a “major engine of development”, can be measured and operationalized.
2. Aggregation
There are two possible basic levels of aggregation required by the Capability Approach. For the absence of better names, we could call them the horizontal and the vertical levels of aggregation8. We can think of a matrix where different functionings (or capabilities) are in the columns and different individuals are in the rows. In this scheme, horizontal aggregation would refer to aggregation of different functionings for one individual across their different dimensions. This would imply the reduction or collapse of the multidimensional nature of functionings into one or a couple of aggregates. Vertical aggregation would represent the total level of a particular functioning for all individuals in question. It would imply the reduction of interpersonal diversity among different individuals. Horizontal and vertical aggregation can be 8
These two levels of aggregation are present in Chiappero Martinetti’s argument that (2000: 7) “In a multidimensional framework the aggregative question also becomes much more complex because it can be conduced on different and/or subsequent levels. First, we could be interested in moving from the space of elementary indicators to the overall evaluation of a given functioning for each unit of analysis; secondly, the aggregation could involve the whole set of functionings for obtaining an overall picture of the individual or household standard of living; finally, we could be
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merged into a unique aggregate representing the general level of functionings across all dimensions for all individuals. This could be averaged to represent a more sensible and concrete picture. This figure would be equivalent to the very popular figures of GNP or GDP per capita. It is precisely in the critique against this high level of aggregation (or conglomerative perspective, as described in the 1997 HDR) that the Capability Approach finds its high intersection with a Human Development Perspective.
The Capability Approach’s emphasis on the diversity of human beings can be translated empirically into a principle of discrimination towards low levels of aggregation with regard to heterogeneous dimensions and individuals. It is conducive to micro-empirical studies (although not restricted to them) because it tries to assess social welfare according to the functionings and capabilities of individuals. As Sen puts it (1987: 33), “The passion for aggregation makes good sense in many contexts, but it can be futile or pointless in others”. Disaggregated characterisations are important depending on the issue to be analysed. Consequently, human diversity and the nature of the problem to be examined will define the criteria for selection of the level of the aggregation to be used. Horizontally, this will imply the definition of the relevant focal variables to be used, that is, the definition of the variables to be focused by the analysis and of the dimensions to be included. Vertically, this will lead to the definition of the unit of analysis (individuals, households, groups, regions, countries, etc) to be employed. Operationalization should be pursued as part of a/some analytical purpose. Therefore, the choice of space, selection of particular measures and unity of analysis would have to be made in the light of that purpose. Sen comments that (1999: 86), “A general approach can be used in many different ways, depending on the context and on the information that is available. It is this combination of foundational analysis and pragmatic use that gives the capability approach its extensive reach”.
It is important to note that for Sen, vertical aggregation is not much of an issue since he formally defines functionings and capabilities as properties of individuals. It could be said that his use of other units of analysis is derivative rather than intrinsic (1992: 117, n.1). Thus, in the case of an investigation of inequality between different groups, interest in groups could be qualified as derivative to the extent that it informs about inequality among individuals placed in different groups -and not because the functionings and capabilities of the different groups are intrinsically relevant.
Whenever desirable, plurality of spaces can be reduced, as argued by Sen (1992: 133) either by: -
‘scrutinized’ exclusion of particular elements;
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‘combining’ or ‘uniting’ elements by some evaluative procedure;
interested in merging the individual well-being assessments into a synthetic index of socio multidimensional wellbeing”.
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using intersection partial ordering (techniques of dominance and intersection) to select the common information given by different spaces.
Yet, the argument remains that more often than not the Capability Approach privileges the study of diversity and heterogeneity instead of subsuming them into aggregates. Aggregation procedures are thus closely related to the identification of capabilities or capability deprivations9.
3. Weighting and Incompleteness
The valuational exercise, intrinsic to the Capability Approach, consists of identifying and ranking different valuable functionings and capabilities. The process of deliberation and judgment involved in evaluating these sets does not need to be comprehensive or complete for practical purposes. Weights do not need to be precisely specified to have practical significance; they can rather be confined to certain ranges or can cover merely the scope of the decision or of the judgment to be expressed in a particular case.
Incompleteness is a deliberate and pragmatical element of the Capability Approach. As Sen observes (1992: 46), “The capability approach can often yield definite answers even when there is no complete agreement on the relative weights to be attached to different functionings”. Techniques such as the dominance partial order and the intersection approach can be used without specification of weights. The idea here is not to demand a precise formulation of a problem that is complex and ambiguous, basically because given the multidimensional character of values and human diversity it is unavoidable the existence of a plurality of orderings. Part of the justification for adopting partial orderings in interpersonal comparisons is based on what Sen called the “pragmatic reason for incompleteness” which is an argument for using whatever parts of rankings made available instead of doing nothing until a complete ranking is achieved. This is tantamount in practice to a strategy of identifying contexts in which the Capability Approach can be used, trying to draw lessons from particular experiences. In Sen’s words (1999: 33), The motivation underlying the approach of “development as freedom” is not so much to order all states –or all alternative scenarios- into one “complete ordering”, but to draw attention to important aspects of the process of development, each of which deserves attention. Even after such attention is paid, there will no doubt remain differences in possible overall rankings, but their presence is not embarrassing to the purpose at hand” [emphasis added].
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In comparing the nature of deprivation in India and in sub-Saharan Africa, Sen remarks that (1999: 103) he has “also not attempted to produce an “aggregate” measure of deprivation, based on “weighting” the different aspects of capability deprivation. A constructed aggregate may often be far less interesting for policy analysis than the substantive pattern of diverse performances”.
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The selection of weights does not seem to be a methodological but an empirical issue in the Capability Approach. It is associated with the process of reflective and reasoned evaluation for individuals and with the exercise of participation and consensus building for societies. Sen criticises the pre-selection of weights needed for evaluative judgments. As he argues (1999: 80), “If informed scrutiny by the public is central to any such social evaluation (as I believe is the case), the implicit values have to be made more explicit, rather than being shielded from scrutiny on the spurious ground that they are part of an “already available” metric that the society can immediately use without further ado”. However, it is not clear whether this critique would apply to situations where there are situations of the kind ‘easy-to-guess counterfactual choices’, in which seems evident that social evaluation would avoid epidemics, hunger, deprivation, etc if possible.
Options in Operationalizing the Capability Approach It is important to keep two issues in mind when trying to operationalise the Capability Approach. The first issue concerns the distinction made by Sen between two different levels of analysis, namely, the foundational level and the practical level. He often keeps these two levels apart, arguing that the imperfections involved in the practical compromises needed to operationalize the approach do not interfere with the truth of the arguments carried out to support it. He suggests that the theoretical merit of the Capability Approach does not unequivocally imply the use of empirical measures based on capabilities. Sen emphasises that the foundational merits of the approach do not (1999: 81) “however, entail that the most fruitful focus of practical attention would invariably be measures of capabilities. Some capabilities are harder to measure than others, and attempts at putting them on a “metric” may sometimes hide more than they reveal”.
The second issue refers to the diversity of ways in which the approach can be used. So far, the Capability Approach has been used in a wide variety of ways. In general lines, the main empirical uses of the approach can be classified –despite their high level of intersection- within at least five groups: a) multivariate studies: use of multivariate techniques (factor analysis, principal component analysis, fuzzy sets, etc) to identify and measure components of valuable functionings. These studies put in evidence the inadequacy of standard monetary standards as unique indicators of poverty and deprivation. Some examples: Brandolini and D’Alesio (1998), Chiappero Martinetti (2000) and Lelli (forthcoming). They faced the difficulty of measuring ‘capabilities’ and ended up approximating them by describing their corresponding functionings;
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b) empirical studies: use of econometrics and/or descriptive statistics to challenge the unidimensional picture of poverty given by monetary indicators. These studies emphasise the target issue and involve the elaboration of indexes of particular functioning deprivations that help revealing the social dimensions of poverty. Some examples: Laderchi (forthcoming), Ardeni and Andracchio (forthcoming) and Dubois and Rosseau (forthcoming); c) case-study applications: use of descriptive data (often based on surveys) to contextualise and put in evidence the complexity of a certain situation such as health care (Tibandebage and Mackintosh), culture (Altman and Lagmontane, Ikemoto), food relief (De Herdt), labour markets (Sehnbruch) or education (Unterhalter, Flores-Crespo); d) theoretical applications: use of arguments provided by the Capability Approach to illuminate the analysis of situations or cases of factual interest. Some examples: Harrison (forthcoming); e) methodological applications: use of the framework provided by the Capability Approach to discuss issues that are difficult to be addressed within a Utilitarian perspective. Some examples: Harcourt (forthcoming) and Robeyns (forthcoming). After an examination of these ‘studies and applications’ the main question that remains is about to what extent the Capability Approach is essential for the research strategies pursued? Could not the same results be achieved without reference to capabilities?
According to Sen, the operationalization of the Capability Approach can be best served by a pragmatical principle of using whatever information available to get started in valuational assessments. Because it follows a context-dependent logic, it can be used in a variety of ways and no sacrosanct empirical formulation should predominate over others. Sen (1999: 81-83) discusses three alternative practical approaches to the Capability Approach: (1) the direct approach: it consists in examining and comparing directly vectors of functionings or capabilities. Sen notes that (1999: 81-2) “In many ways, this is the most immediate and fullblooded way of going about incorporating capability considerations in evaluation”. Variants of this approach include i) total comparison, comparing complete rankings of vectors; ii) partial ranking, comparing the ranking of some vectors and iii) distinguished capability comparison, comparing some particular focal capability. Sen stresses that despite its incomplete coverage, the distinguished comparison can be “quite illuminating”; (2) the supplementary approach: it consists in supplementing traditional income comparisons by incorporating capability considerations. It could lead to a broadening of the informational space and provide a more comprehensive picture than the one provided by income measures; (3) the indirect approach: it consists in calculated incomes adjusted by capabilities, as it is done in adjusting income by equivalence-scales.
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As mentioned above, the choice of strategy will depend on the context and the purpose of the application of the Capability Approach. The notion of practical compromises seems to dominate Sen’s argument for the choice of strategy and articulation of the foundational and practical levels. As he puts it (1999: 84-85), Each of these approaches has contingent merit that may vary depending on the nature of the exercise, the availability of information, and the urgency of the decisions that have to be taken. Since the capability perspective is sometimes interpreted in terribly exacting terms (total comparisons under the direct approach), it is important to emphasize the catholicity that the approach has. The foundational affirmation of the importance of capabilities can go with various strategies of actual evaluation involving practical compromises. [emphasis added]
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