PERFORMANCE MONITORING Reactions to Employee Performance ...

Performance Monitoring Running Head: PERFORMANCE MONITORING

Reactions to Employee Performance Monitoring: Framework, Review, and Research Directions

Jeffrey M. Stanton Bowling Green State University Department of Psychology Bowling Green, OH 43403-0228 (419) 372-7170

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Performance Monitoring

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Abstract A conceptual framework is described for examining employee reactions to performance monitoring. The framework incorporates attitudinal and motivational effects of performance monitoring on monitored employees and discusses effects of performance monitoring on performance feedback and performance appraisal. The framework is used to organize a review of research literature relevant to employee reactions to electronic and non-electronic performance monitoring. The paper includes specific propositions for additional research and general directions for future research in performance monitoring.


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Reactions to Employee Performance Monitoring: Framework, Review, and Research Directions Performance monitoring is a term applied to a variety of workplace practices that concern the collection of employee work performance data (Komaki, Zlotnick & Jensen, 1986; Niehoff & Moorman, 1993; Aiello & Svec, 1993). Interest in performance monitoring has surged as a result of technological innovations that allow artificial enhancement of an organization’s or supervisor’s ability to track the behavior and performance of its employees (U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 1987; U.S. House of Representatives, 1989). Reports of increased employee stress, and conflicting evidence about effects on productivity have stirred substantial research into these newer forms of monitoring (e.g., Aiello & Kolb, 1995a; Smith, et al., 1992), but research on traditional, nonelectronic monitoring has also continued unabated (e.g., Larson & Callahan, 1993; Brewer, 1995; Brewer & Ridgway, 1998). All of this research focuses on how employees react to performance monitoring: the behaviors, attitudes, affect, and physiological responses that result from the use of monitoring. Employee reactions to monitoring matter because organizations have a strong stake in maintaining both employee motivation and well being. The presence or absence of performance monitoring and the way in which monitoring is conducted influence the amount of effort that employees address to different tasks (Larson & Callahan, 1993; Brewer, 1995; Brewer & Ridgway, 1998). Monitoring plays a role in effective supervision (Komaki, 1986), optimal organizational structure (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jones, 1987), and good teamwork (Dickinson, 1993). Additional studies have linked performance monitoring to job satisfaction (Chalykoff & Kochan, 1989) and to worker stress (Smith, et al., 1992). Since Ostroff (1992) and others have documented links between employee satisfaction and


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organizational performance, these studies also indicate the importance of monitoring to smooth organizational functioning. Electronic performance monitoring (EPM) differs from more traditional forms of performance monitoring (e.g., direct observation) in that EPM can occur continuously and can record voluminous data about multiple dimensions of work performance. Traditional monitoring often relies upon the presence of a human observer with all the known limitations of perceptual processing. Other differences between these types of monitoring exist: EPM is novel, traditional monitoring is not; EPM can be hidden from workers, while traditional monitoring is usually noticeable; EPM requires machinery, traditional monitoring uses supervisor labor. Nonetheless, certain striking parallels also appear. Performance data from monitoring is utilized for common purposes (e.g., feedback and evaluation), regardless of its source. Both EPM and traditional monitoring can occur with or without employee acceptance or permission, can occur regularly or intermittently, can be expected or a surprise, and can be explained and justified by an organization or not. Despite these parallels, no prior attempt has been made to integrate these separate areas of research. Thus, the aims of this paper are threefold: First, the paper describes a heuristic framework that organizes research on employee reactions to both traditional and electronic performance monitoring. Next, a literature review integrates research in various areas of performance monitoring and attempts to interpret data about employee reactions to monitoring within the framework. Interlaced with the review, the paper presents research propositions to cover the gaps in existing research. Finally, a set of general recommendations attempts to influence future research in this area. This paper serves a unique purpose in the monitoring literature since existing frameworks have discussed performance monitoring (e.g., Flamholtz, 1979) but have not focused on employee reactions. Likewise, previous reviews of


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electronic monitoring (e.g., Lund, 1992; Carayon, 1993) have considered employee reactions, but have not integrated research about traditional monitoring. A Definition of Monitoring The diversity of research that explores performance monitoring suggests that monitoring may be defined differently depending upon whom one asks. Indeed, an examination of the EPM literature reveals that monitoring is not usually defined, but rather presented as a list of techniques. For example, DeTienne (1995) lists telephone call accounting, keystroke or computer time accounting, cards and beepers to monitor locations, computer file monitoring, screen sharing capabilities, telephone call observation, and video camera observation. This long list suggests that monitoring includes surveillance, tracking, observation, and recording functions. The United States Office of Technology Assessment (1987) proposes a continuum of monitoring with work monitoring on one end (e.g., output, keystrokes, call time) and worker surveillance on the other (e.g., drug testing, polygraph testing). The OTA defined EPM as: “the continuous collection and analysis of management information about work performance and equipment use.” Nebeker and Tatum (1993) additionally included reporting processes in their definition of monitoring, but did not clarify whether this included feedback of monitoring data to monitored employees. Outside of EPM, definitions obtain greater consistency. Komaki (1986) defined monitoring simply as the supervisory collection of information about performance. She also identified categories of activity that characterize monitoring, namely, work sampling (i.e., direct observation or inspection of work), examination of archival records, self-report (from the monitored worker), and secondary source report. Larson and Callahan (1990) defined monitoring as the gathering of information about the work effectiveness and productivity of individuals, groups, and larger organizational units. In contrast,


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agency theory researchers defined monitoring as the observation of work behavior as distinct from judgments concerning the outcomes of that behavior (Conlon & Parks, 1990). For integrative purposes, this paper will use a definition of performance monitoring that encompasses both electronic performance monitoring and more traditional types of monitoring. Using this orientation, performance monitoring is defined as the observation, examination, and/or recording of employee work-related behaviors, with and without technological assistance. Although contradictory to the agency theory definition, this definition includes examination of work products such as computer files, email, reports, and manufactured parts or products. Relative to the OTA’s continuum of worker versus work monitoring, the definition excludes practices such as drug testing that do not observe or record on-the-job behaviors. The review below does discuss some drug testing research, however, because this research area sheds light on certain employee reaction variables that have direct relevance to EPM. Finally, this definition keeps monitoring processes conceptually separate from feedback processes. Because this paper focuses sharply on employee reactions to monitoring, its definition requires two refinements. First, the phenomena of interest here are those of which the employee has some awareness. Thus, truly secret observation that employees never suspect, though ethically questionable, is not of interest here. Second, although Larson and Callahan (1990) include groups and organizations in their definition, the primary focus here is on individual reactions. Thus monitoring that takes place above the small group level (e.g., the departmental level) has lesser relevance in this discussion. Overview of Framework The article is constructed around a framework that attempts to roughly mimic the temporal flow of employee reactions to monitoring while also organizing sets of variables relevant to these reactions. This framework is not a theory but instead a heuristic scaffolding on which to hang extant research.


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The resulting structure may then facilitate the discovery of opportunities for future research. Thus, when examining Figure 1, be aware that the arrows often represent speculative, rather than established lines of influence between variables. The general left-to-right flow of the framework places independent variables on the left (boxes 1 and 2), dependent variables -- the important and focal employee reactions -- on the right (boxes 3 through 7 and 11), and moderators above (boxes 8 and 9) and below (box 10). Figure 1 indicates that monitoring occurs within an organizational context that established its use and general parameters of operation (box 1). As a function of organizational policies and with some discretion by individual supervisors, the actual practice of monitoring has several characteristics that can be perceived by employees (box 2). These perceivable characteristics of monitoring influence employees' thoughts, beliefs, and evaluations of monitoring and the monitored work (box 3). In addition to such cognitive evaluations, characteristics of monitoring may also influence physiological arousal (box 4). The shaded area around boxes 3 and four signifies that monitoring cognitions and arousal affect task motivation. In turn, motivation connects with performance (box 11). Performance is also a function of individual differences such as aptitude for the task (box 10 - 11 connection). A specific example can illustrate these ideas: Managers of a manufacturing organization set standards for performance that will be enforced and maintained with supervisory monitoring. As a result, the floor supervisor examines the work area every quarter-hour (thus making the frequency of monitoring perceivable to employees). The floor supervisor always examines the amount of work in progress but rarely checks its quality (thus directing workers' attention to speed of performance and away from the quality of performance). At the same time, the presence of the supervisor manifests a social facilitation effect that causes employees to work faster.


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Later on, after monitoring has occurred once or many times, employees may receive feedback based on the performance information collected. Employees may be more or less inclined to accept this feedback based on their beliefs about the process that produced it (box 5). Another reaction partially dependent on employees' beliefs about monitoring is stress (box 6). Monitoring-related stress may be a conjoint result of the arousal induced by monitoring and negative evaluations of monitoring. Further removed from the monitoring itself, general job attitudes may nonetheless be indirectly affected by monitoring (box 7). Dissatisfaction with feedback on monitored work, or monitoring-induced stress might have an adverse, albeit indirect, effect on job satisfaction. Figure 1 also indicates possible interactive influences on employee reactions. Organizational monitoring policies may influence employee's trust in the organization's management (box 8). Additionally, characteristics of actual monitoring events may influence trust in the supervisor who conducts the monitoring (box 9). Importantly, these trust beliefs may moderate the various reactions to monitoring described above. For example, frequent monitoring by a trusted supervisor might have no adverse effects, whereas frequent monitoring by a mistrusted supervisor might induce feelings of unfair treatment. Individual differences (box 10) may also moderate relationships depicted by Figure 1. For instance, some research suggests that locus of control influences susceptibility to arousal from the presence of an observer. Monitoring Research and the Framework The following literature review examines available research on monitoring. The order of topics generally follows Figure 1, although overlap in research findings has made an integrated discussion of some of the boxes more feasible. Whenever the cited empirical article provided sufficient statistical information, the paper presents the magnitudes of associative relationships (e.g., r or β), the standardized difference between means (d), or measures of overall effect size (e.g., R2 or Wilk's Λ).


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The Organizational Context of Monitoring Box 1 in Figure 1 symbolizes the context in which monitoring occurs -- procedures used to design and implement monitoring, performance standards enforced by monitoring, methods of communicating monitoring policies to employees -- but excludes aspects of actual monitoring events. Table 1 lists the set of variables in this category that are discussed in this paper. Organizationally mandated consequences are one contextual aspect of monitoring systems that influence employee reactions. For example, although telephone service observation sometimes occurs as a method of employee development, call time monitoring is often employed to enforce work standards. Evidence suggests that employee reactions to monitoring differ as a function of the consequences associated with monitoring results. Smith et al. (1992), in a survey of telecommunication workers, found that increased stress was associated with the use of EPM to enforce difficult work standards (Wilk's Λ=.53). Nebeker and Tatum (1993) found a similar result in a laboratory study: Using monitoring to enforce easy standards and administer small rewards led to increased task satisfaction, whereas enforcement of difficult standards decreased task satisfaction, even with larger rewards (adjusted R2=.62). On a related note, Chalykoff and Kochan (1989) found that clarity of rating criteria used in conjunction with monitoring was associated with monitoring satisfaction (β=.38). Although these results pertain to the links of monitoring to rewards, the OTA's report on EPM suggested that monitoring can also serve disciplinary purposes, including termination, and remedial purposes, such as referring employees to training, but a search did not locate any studies examining monitoring with these consequences. In a case study of monitoring at Federal Express Corporation, Westin (1992) reported positive effects when employees were encouraged to participate in development of a monitoring system. Similarly, Pearson (1991) found positive links between motivation (average β=.31) and participation in traditional performance monitoring processes. Stanton (in press) found that a greater degree of


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justification for monitoring from organizational representatives was associated with higher reports of fairness about monitoring (β=.11). These results converge on the idea that the organizational conditions under which monitoring occurs can have an effect on how employees react to it. Possibly, aspects of the organizational context besides policies and procedures also influence reactions to monitoring. Hales et al. (1994) found inverse associations between employees’ prior perceptions of job security and various musculoskeletal disorders in an EPM work environment (average odds ratio = 2.9). Although job security was measured by self-report in the Hales study, researchers (e.g., Brockner et al., 1992) acknowledge the intra- and extra-organizational environments as the source of job security perceptions. On a related note, Aiello and Kolb (1995a) examined the effects of social cohesion on employee stress reactions. Results indicated reduction in stress when working in a socially cohesive group (d=.60). To symbolize this set of findings, Figure 1 depicts an indirect connection between organizational context and stress reactions through monitoring cognitions. Research Opportunities. Some have proposed that job design issues and monitoring interact to influence employee reactions. For example, Amick and Smith (1992) suggested that participation in the monitoring system design process, allocation of control between employee and system, and the integration of feedback and appraisal with monitoring should all influence employee reactions. Carayon (1993) concluded that job demands, job control, and social support work to influence employee reactions. Yet, other than Smith et al. (1992) and Carayon (1994), empirical work has not examined how monitoring fits in with questions of job design. Additional research is needed on the optimal linkages between monitoring, work standards, and contingent reward systems. Proposition 1: Satisfaction with monitoring will be enhanced by implementing fair work standards, integrating monitoring and feedback systems, and provide mechanisms to enhance employee control over monitored tasks.


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Following on the findings of Aiello and Kolb (1995a) about the benefits of a cohesive work group, more research is needed into the possibly salutary effects of the social context of monitoring on employees’ reactions. Perhaps monitoring within a team context as described by Dickinson (1992, 1993) can enhance the acceptability of electronic monitoring techniques. Proposition 2: Monitoring performed within a socially cohesive work team will have greater acceptability than monitoring performed in a non-team environment. Aiello and Kolb's (1995b) findings also suggested that employees may worry about access to the data generated from monitoring. These concerns may be mitigated when only aggregated data are available to supervisors. It is also possible that permanency of performance records is one of the concerns here. In research on social facilitation, permanency of record was an aspect of observation that influenced the reactions of the individuals being observed (e.g., Cohen, 1979). Proposition 3: Monitoring systems that display aggregated performance records will be more satisfactory to workers than systems that display individual performance records. Proposition 4: Workers will prefer monitoring policies that expunge old performance data over policies that retain performance data indefinitely. Characteristics of Monitoring Characteristics of monitoring differ from the organizational context in that characteristics pertain to the actual observational events conducted by supervisors or their electronic proxies. A list of characteristics of monitoring examined or suggested by researchers appears in Table 2. Although monitoring is commonly considered a supervisory task (Komaki, 1986), researchers have highlighted other possible “sources” of monitoring. For example, Dickinson (1992, 1993) outlined a framework for classifying teamwork behaviors that highlights the importance of performance monitoring as a component of teamwork: In his framework, monitoring serves as the prerequisite of


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team members’ provision of feedback and support behavior. In an educational context, McCurdy and Shapiro (1992) compared supervisory-, peer-, and self-monitoring groups and found equivocal evidence for optimal performance gains in a self-monitoring condition. Critchfield and Vargas (1991) found that publicized self-monitoring was a better motivator than monitoring by a coach in an athletic performance context. Welbourne, Balkin, and Gomez-Mejia (1995) also researched organizational circumstances that facilitated peer monitoring. In their research, however, no comparisons were undertaken to examine differences between monitoring sources. If the source of monitoring can vary, so too can the target of monitoring. One variation is monitoring of individual activities versus monitoring the outputs of an interacting group. Brewer (1995) examined differences between monitoring individual and group performance on individuals’ distribution of effort across tasks. Individual level monitoring affected the distribution of effort more strongly than did group level monitoring. The implied connection between monitoring and motivation is discussed further in the next section. The target of monitoring also varies at the intra-individual level. Research by Larson and Callahan (1990) and Brewer (1995) indicated that workers could differentiate which task among multiple simultaneously performed tasks was subject to monitoring (in Larson and Callahan, d=.54 quantity, d=.42 quality). Apparently, workers can also determine whether a supervisor is focused on correct performance of a task or errors associated with performance of a task (Emory Air Freight Corp., 1971; Komaki, Barwick & Scott, 1978). In these studies, monitoring was focused on detection of errors and was shown to help eliminate errors. Apparently, employees' awareness of which activity is the target of monitoring influences task performance. Research also indicates that the frequency of monitoring impacts employee reactions. Niehoff and Moorman (1993) ascertained that frequent monitoring of work tasks reduced the amount of extra-


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role behaviors that employees performed (average β=-.49). These researchers also found that monitoring frequency influenced employees’ perceptions of fairness concerning supervision and evaluation. In general, more frequent monitoring was associated with greater perceptions of fairness (average r=.20). A structural model relating these variables confirmed the importance of justice perceptions as a mediator between frequency of monitoring and amount of extra-role behaviors. Stanton (in press) also examined fairness and found that consistent monitoring was perceived as fairer than inconsistent monitoring (average β=.24). Consistency was operationalized in that study as the degree to which other monitored workers in the same environment were monitored similarly. Researchers have additionally explored three other characteristics of monitoring that receive fuller discussion elsewhere in this paper. Stanton and Barnes-Farrell (1996) manipulated the controllability of monitoring by giving or denying participants a mechanism to prevent monitoring at their discretion. Chalykoff and Kochan (1989) explored two "stylistic" characteristics of monitoring that inhere in the supervisor doing the monitoring: supervisory expertise and supervisory consideration behavior. Stanton (in press) also tested effects of supervisory expertise on perceived fairness. Research Opportunities. Attewell (1987) suggested that the use of performance monitoring is as old as industry itself. According to Attewell’s sociological analysis, although EPM provides new methods for examining employees’ work, the fundamental purposes, uses, and results of electronic monitoring do not differ from more traditional forms. If employees react more forcefully to EPM than to other types of monitoring, perhaps the origin of these differences lies in the operational characteristics of monitoring. Some characteristics of monitoring such as regularity of monitoring and recipient of monitoring data remain unexplored. Aiello and Kolb (1995b) suggested one possibly crucial characteristic: They referred to "pervasiveness" as the extent to which monitoring is continuous or intermittent. Lund's (1992) review drew a similar distinction between continuous and discrete


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monitoring. While this characteristic clearly relates to frequency, perhaps pervasiveness better captures an issue differentiating automated monitoring techniques from traditional forms of monitoring. As Lund suggested, pervasiveness can also distinguish among electronic techniques, e.g., between service observation and monitoring of call handling time. If researchers can operationalize pervasiveness, it may prove a critical factor in differentiating reactions to EPM and non-electronic monitoring. Proposition 5: Pervasiveness of monitoring will affect satisfaction with monitoring and stress induced by monitoring. Monitoring Cognitions The connections to boxes 3 and 4 in Figure 1 depict an important thesis of this paper: Employees who are aware of monitoring react to it by forming attitudes and making judgments (see Table 3), as well as by experiencing arousal. These monitoring cognitions can affect subsequent variables and behavior. For example, monitoring appears to provide information about role priorities: this role information differentially influences motivation to perform monitored and unmonitored tasks (Larson & Callahan, 1993). Attitudes Toward Monitoring. Eagly and Chaiken (1993, p. 1) define attitude as a “...tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favor or disfavor.” By this definition it would appear that monitored individuals do have attitudinal reactions to monitoring. Three such reactions are fairness, invasiveness, and satisfaction with monitoring. Research evidence suggests that monitored individuals make fairness judgments related to monitoring (Niehoff & Moorman, 1993): Workers considered frequent supervisory observation a positive contributor to workplace justice (average β=.64). Westin (1992) reported a case study on service observation of call center workers at a large shipping and delivery company. He found that workers perceived monitoring as more fair when they participated in the design of the system and had input into setting work standards. Similarly, a


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survey study of telecommunication workers revealed that the fairness of work standards enforced by monitoring was a critical determinant of job stress (Smith, et al., 1992; Wilk's Λ=.53). Finally, Kidwell and Bennett (1994) examined reactions to monitoring in a field setting. Their study found that perceptions of fairness concerning a monitoring system correlated with supervisory consideration behavior and expertise (average r=.50). The Kidwell and Bennett (1994) study also focused on satisfaction with the electronic monitoring system itself. Perception of fairness was the primary source of satisfaction with the electronic monitoring system (r=.67). Chalykoff and Kochan (1989) explored determinants of satisfaction with monitoring and found that five variables mattered. These were: immediacy of the feedback received from monitoring (β=.48), clarity of rating criteria used with monitoring (β=.38), supervisory expertise (β=.44), supervisory consideration behavior (β=.56), and sign of feedback received from monitoring (β=.40). Research on satisfaction with a monitored task has also occurred in the lab. Griffith (1993) found no mean differences in satisfaction between no supervision, human monitoring, and computer monitoring conditions. In a contra-hypothesized finding, Stanton and Barnes-Farrell (1996) reported evidence of greater satisfaction in a low personal control monitoring condition than in a high control condition (d=.23). In that experiment, personal control was manipulated by giving or denying participants a mechanism to prevent monitoring at their discretion. Another attitude variable of potential interest in the area of performance monitoring is perceived invasiveness. Perceived invasiveness is an issue that has frequently been linked to the use of various EPM and service observation techniques (Office of Technology Assessment, 1987). A search revealed no studies of performance monitoring that assessed this variable. Some drug testing studies have assessed invasiveness as a dependent measure. Stone and Kotch (1989) assessed invasiveness in an experimental field study of drug testing. One factor they manipulated was the presence or absence of


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advance notice (i.e., at least a day in advance) of drug testing. This factor has also been the focus of proposed legislation regarding telephone service observation (DeTienne, 1993; U.S. House of Representatives, 1989). Stone and Kotch found that advance notice of testing mitigated employees’ perceptions of the invasiveness of the testing (β=.23). Raciot and Williams (1993) found that perceived invasiveness of drug testing was influenced by the safety sensitivity of the target job. These issues have analogs in workplace use of EPM. One contentious issue is whether employees have the right to advance notice of whether and when they will be monitored (U.S. House of Representatives, 1989). Organizations have claimed that this capability is essential for maintaining the motivational value of monitoring, while employee advocacy groups have argued that the lack of advance notice is invasive. Research Opportunities. Although drug testing researchers (e.g., Racicot & Williams, 1993) often avoid defining invasiveness, the construct combines aspects of privacy violation, instrusiveness, and judgmental evaluation of appropriateness of the techniques used. Anecdotal data from one study of monitoring suggested that employees object to certain monitoring practices because of perceived invasion of privacy (Chalykoff & Kochan, 1989). A search revealed no monitoring studies that examined this invasiveness variable. Proposition 6: Perceived invasiveness of monitoring will be influenced by the frequency, regularity, controllability, and pervasiveness of monitoring, as well as the recipient of monitoring data and the permanency of monitoring records. Monitoring, motivation and performance. The shaded area labeled "Motivation Effects" in Figure 1 represents the plurality of theoretical stances and multiple motivational mechanisms by which monitoring can affect performance. Motivation to perform certain tasks or to focus on certain aspects of performance (shaded area) derives from monitoring cognitions (box 3) and arousal (box 4). In turn, these motivational effects and individual ability (box 10) influence performance (box 11). At least three


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motivation theories -- social facilitation, operant conditioning, and social information processing -support the idea of links between monitoring, motivation, and performance. Extensive research into social facilitation, beginning with Zajonc (1965), identified “mere presence” as the source of an important effect of observers on the performance of those observed. In the case of well-practiced tasks, the observer’s presence enhances performance, whereas it inhibits performance of complex tasks or tasks requiring learning. Cottrell (1972) and Cohen and Davis (1973; Cohen, 1979, 1980) found support for both mere presence and evaluation apprehension effects. Guerin and Innes (1982) stated that lack of predictability of the observer’s behavior caused the physiological and performance effects. Baron (1986; Groff, Baron & Moore, 1983) posited that attentional conflict and resultant physiological arousal explained social facilitation effects. EPM research has used a social facilitation paradigm to examine worker reactions. Research in this area cast EPM as the “electronic presence” of a supervisor. Griffith (1993) found limited support for the hypothesis that the electronic presence would enhance performance on a simple task in a similar fashion to the physical presence of a supervisor. In contrast, Aiello and Svec (1993) found that the electronic presence impaired performance on a complex task and induced stress in study participants. Aiello and Kolb (1995a) confirmed the social facilitation effect for electronically monitored members of a work group. These studies provide the key evidence that monitoring can have direct motivational effects on workers and their task performance. Social facilitation, however, is not the sole source of influence on motivation and performance. Komaki (1986) developed a model of supervisory behavior based upon the principles of operant conditioning. This model includes a key role for performance monitoring as the bridge between subordinate performance and the delivery of contingent consequences (Komaki, Zlotnick & Jensen, 1986). In a test of the model, Komaki (1986) measured performance monitoring and performance


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consequence behavior of supervisors. She found that effective supervisors differed from ineffective ones in emitting more monitoring behaviors (d=1.0). Komaki, Desselles and Bowman (1989, r=.51) and Brewer, Wilson and Beck (1994; r=.40) found relationships between frequency of performance monitoring and performance in a team context teams. Komaki also asserted that performance monitoring might affect worker performance interactively with feedback and consequences (Komaki & Citera, 1990). Komaki's writings and research portray a behaviorist perspective that downplays the importance of worker cognitions. A contrasting cognitive perspective on the motivational effects of performance monitoring comes from social information processing theory (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978; Zalesny & Ford, 1990). Monitoring may influence discernment of role priorities, task visibility, and task importance. Larson and Callahan (1990) found evidence that monitoring affects performance in part because employees ascertain the relative importance of different tasks based upon how closely different tasks are monitored by supervisors (performance quantity d=.54, quality d=.42). Later, Brewer (1995) confirmed this result (d=.43) but modified the interpretation. His results indicated that employees shift their effort from unmonitored tasks to monitored tasks based upon the greater likelihood of being evaluated on the monitored task. Previous efforts by White, Mitchell and Bell (1977) fit with this idea that increased productivity results from the apprehension of future evaluations. This dovetails with social facilitation effects that some researchers explain as the result of evaluation apprehension (Cohen, 1979; 1980). Monitoring directs workers' attention to valued aspects of performance and socially facilitates performance, but other motivation theories may also help to explain effects of monitoring. Agency theory proposes that when a “principal” can monitor an “agent’s” behavior, the agent is more likely to act in the principal’s interests (Eisenhardt, 1989). From this perspective, monitoring may motivate by enhancing awareness of the contingency between performance and rewards. Conlon and Parks (1990)


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confirmed that principals and agents engaged in four times as much task-oriented communication when monitoring was an available supervision option. Dobbins, Cardy and Platz-Vieno (1990) found a tradeoff in which employees who received insufficient monitoring depended upon infrequent appraisal meetings to set priorities for their jobs (β=.32). Welbourne, Balkin, and Gomez-Mejia (1995) found that a gainsharing plan motivated employees to monitor each other on the principal’s behalf (β=.21). Similarly, transaction cost theory proposes that monitoring improves performance by reducing shirking (Jones, 1984). Models of social loafing support this idea (Karau & Williams, 1995, Shepperd, 1993). Research on intrinsic motivation suggests another way in which monitoring may affect motivation (Deci, Connell, & Ryan, 1989). Research suggests that supervisory practices that individuals perceive as promoting self-determination can enhance intrinsic motivation and performance (Deci, Nezlek, & Sheinman,1981; Ryan, 1982). In contrast, frequent, intrusive performance monitoring appears to have a deleterious effect on monitored individuals (Lepper & Greene, 1975). Performance monitoring perceived as “too close” may diminish intrinsic motivation. Research Opportunities. Aiello (1993) wrote that one of the complaints voiced about some EPM systems is their focus on the quantity of performance and neglect of the quality of performance. The social information processing perspective discussed above and used by Larson and Callahan (1990) provides a perspective on this problem. When workers get information about a monitoring system's measurement capabilities, the information may shape their performance behavior. For example, monitoring systems focusing exclusively on quantity of performance may increase the amount of work employees accomplish at the expense of the quality of their work. Anecdotal evidence from telephone operators in the U.S. House of Representatives hearings (1989) supports this idea. Proposition 7: Employee's performance quality and quantity will be affected by their beliefs about what aspects of performance the monitoring system measures..


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Monitoring, Stress, and Control. The process of observation is known to exert physiological effects on observed individuals (Bond & Titus, 1983; Cacioppo et al., 1990; Snydersmith and Cacioppo, 1992). Such effects include non-specific physiological arousal, changes in skin conductance, and elevation of heart rate. Although these effects are inconsistent and subjects often habituate quickly, it is worthwhile to note that they are precursors and/or indications of stress reactions (Cacioppo et al., 1990). Some evidence from the EPM literature suggests that monitoring can induce stress reactions. The connections from cognitions and arousal (boxes 3 and 4) to stress (box 6) in Figure 1 depict this effect. Both laboratory and field studies have documented self-reports of stress resulting from the use of EPM (e.g., Aiello & Shao, 1993, Clement, 1992; Irving, Higgins, & Safayeni, 1986; Schleifer, Galinsky & Pan, 1995; Smith et al., 1992). Researchers have had difficulty, however, confirming these self-report results using physiological indicators of stress (Silverman & Smith, 1995, Galletta & Grant, 1995; Hales et al., 1994). One recent effort did reveal an arousing effect of electronic monitoring using blood pressure as the dependent variable (Henderson, Mahar, Saliba, Deane, & Napier, 1998, d=.34). The available positive findings resonate with earlier research linking supervisory styles and long-term mental and physical health outcomes. For example, Smith et al. (1981) used a survey methodology to document stressors and stress reactions in several groups of workers and found that clerical workers using video display terminals reported the closest supervision, the highest levels of stress, and the worst fatigue. Caplan et al. (1975) conducted a study for NIOSH that reported depression and illness associated with low social support from supervisors. Neither study provided clear evidence of causal links between supervisory characteristics and stress. Performance monitoring may also influence another construct related to stress: employees’ perceptions of personal control. Greenberger and Strasser (1986) developed a model relating of personal control in work organizations. Greenberger, Strasser and Cummings (1989) successfully used


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this model to relate perceptions of personal control, job satisfaction, and job performance. Stanton & Barnes-Farrell (1996) later applied this model to an examination of EPM. These researchers found that a manipulation of monitoring control affected workers’ perceptions of personal control (d=.38) and productivity (d=.19). Giving workers control over the timing of monitoring improved perceptions of personal control and also boosted productivity. In a field study, Smith et al. (1992) confirmed that electronically monitored workers reported lower levels of job control than those workers who were not monitored did (d=1.13). In total, the reviewed research suggests that performance monitoring can influence feelings of stress and perceptions of control. Research Opportunities. With EPM laboratory evidence suggesting possible benefits to enhancing personal control and field evidence that EPM reduces perceived control, this construct seems ripe for further investigation. Wright (1998) reviews a long history of studies that document the buffering effects of personal control on stress. The common finding is that, during exposure to a stressor, individuals who have higher feelings of control over the stressful situation will experience less stress than those with low perceptions of control. Researchers should ascertain the long-term effects of monitoring on perceptions of control and field test interventions that restore or enhance perceptions of personal control in monitored work environments. Proposition 8: Perceptions of personal control will buffer the stress inducing effects of characteristics of monitoring (e.g., lack of regularity or pervasiveness). Effects of Performance Monitoring on Feedback Reactions and Long Term Outcomes This section discusses research evidence that performance monitoring may influence workers' reactions to post-monitoring activities such as the delivery of performance feedback and appraisal. These variables appear in box 5 of Figure 1. For clarity the feedback process is depicted (by the small gray rectangle above box 5) as occurring prior to the formation of feedback reactions. As discussed


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previously, the framework is not concerned with feedback or appraisal processes per se, but only those reactions to feedback and appraisal that may have been shaped by experiences with performance monitoring. A small amount of research evidence has also suggested that performance monitoring may indirectly influence job attitudes and related withdrawal behaviors. These variables are collected in box 7 of Figure 1 under the designation of long term outcomes. The relationship between work performance and feedback has been studied extensively in the context of motivational theories such as social learning theory (Bandura, 1977). Generally, specific, accurate, and timely feedback enhances performance (Ilgen, Fisher & Taylor, 1979). Performance monitoring may play a role in establishing these important preconditions of specificity, accuracy, and timeliness of feedback. For example, Earley (1988) examined the use of electronic performance monitoring in generating performance feedback for employees. In his study, employees reported slightly higher trust in feedback generated from computer monitoring than that delivered by supervisors (d=.11). In essence, the EPM system that Earley used provided a form of “self” monitoring (not to be confused with the personality variable of the same name). Ivancevich and McMahon (1982) also found that such a self-monitoring-feedback loop improved performance (d=.85). This finding is consistent with research indicating that employees prefer feedback sources under their own control (Greller, 1980; Greller and Herold, 1975). Worker reactions to performance monitoring may also affect psychological processes in formal appraisal sessions that occur later. Instead of acceptance of feedback, however, the focal variables relating performance monitoring and performance appraisal appear to be perceived accuracy and fairness of appraisals. Landy, Barnes and Murphy (1978) developed the idea that the ratee's reactions to evaluation were related to characteristics of the appraisal, including workers' beliefs about supervisory knowledge of job performance. Clearly these beliefs could depend, in turn, upon the perceived


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characteristics and quality of performance monitoring. Other evidence indicates that daily interactions between employees and supervisors influence satisfaction with performance appraisal (Fulk, Brief and Barr, 1985, r=.51; Greller, 1980; Nathan, Mohrman and Milliman, 1991, r=.43; Pooyan and Eberhardt, 1989, r=.66). Finally, evidence from Niehoff and Moorman (1993) suggests that perceptions of evaluative fairness derive, in part, from the frequency with which supervisors monitor performance (average β=.64). Together this research suggests that performance monitoring may shape employees’ perceptions of fairness and accuracy of evaluative processes. As such, appropriate use of EPM and other monitoring supports operation of appraisal systems that are satisfactory to employees. Monitoring, when it entails supervisor-employee interaction, may also indirectly influence outcomes such as job satisfaction and turnover. Models of job satisfaction have been developed that include leader-supervisor relations as an influence (James & James, 1992). One of the key aspects of leader relations in this model was respectful and fair treatment from supervisors. Appraisal research supports this proposition: Appraisal interactions appear to influence job satisfaction (Nathan, Mohrman & Milliman, 1991; Pearson, 1991). Perhaps monitoring, which often occurs more frequently than appraisal, can also influence job satisfaction. Supporting evidence comes from field studies of EPM (Chalykoff & Kochan, 1989; Westin, 1992). In these studies, job satisfaction related positively to satisfaction with the monitoring system (β=.27 in Chalykoff & Kochan). In Chalykoff & Kochan (1989), satisfaction with monitoring also had an indirect relationship with propensity to turnover (β=.66). Finally, Niehoff and Moorman’s (1993) finding that monitoring frequency correlated negatively with organizational citizenship behavior bolsters the argument that monitoring affects outcomes beyond feedback and appraisal (average β=-.49). Research Opportunities. Although a few researchers have considered job satisfaction in relation to monitoring (Chalykoff & Kochan, 1989; Westin, 1992), the narrower construct of satisfaction with


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supervision has received no attention from monitoring researchers. Considering that traditional supervisory monitoring comprises the majority of some workers' interactions with their supervisors, this lack of attention is surprising. Pooyan and Eberhardt (1989) found a positive relationship between daily interactions with supervisors and satisfaction with appraisal (r=.66). An examination of the influence of monitoring on satisfaction with supervision could also shed light on the aspects of daily supervision that affect appraisal reactions. Other connections between monitoring and appraisal deserve more research attention as well. When workers believe that their supervisors possess sufficient performance knowledge, they may also perceive appraisals as fair (cf. Landy, Barnes & Murphy, 1978, β=.14). One finding from appraisal research was that workers could and did judge their supervisors’ knowledge of their job performance. The same consideration can be addressed toward both EPM and traditional monitoring: Did my supervisor use the appropriate techniques with suitable regularity to gather representative and relevant information about my performance? Proposition 9: Fairness of monitoring and perceived accuracy of monitoring will have positive links to appraisal fairness and satisfaction with supervision. Aside from Chalykoff and Kochan’s (1989) correlational examination, researchers have not examined withdrawal behaviors associated with performance monitoring. Turnover among monitored workers was cited as an important issue (U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 1987), but research has not provided evidence of any causal link between monitoring and turnover. If characteristics of monitoring covary with turnover, as Chalykoff and Kochan’s (1989) results hinted, perhaps they also relate to variables such as organizational commitment. Scant empirical evidence has been gathered, however, on beneficial or harmful long-term effects of various monitoring techniques on organizational commitment. The U.S. House of Representatives' (1989) report on telephone monitoring


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provided anecdotal evidence that workers engage in counterproductive behaviors as a way to subvert attempts at monitoring their work. No research has examined the role of monitoring in inducing counterproductive behaviors. Proposition 10: Dissatisfaction with monitoring and perceived unfairness of monitoring will link to counterproductive and withdrawal behaviors. Interactive Factors: Trust and Individual Differences Recent organizational research has focused on the importance of trust as an influence on the efficiency and productivity of organizations (Kramer & Tyler, 1996). According to one definition, trust involves "confident positive expectations about another's motives with respect to oneself in situations involving risk" (Boon & Holmes, 1991, p. 194). Performance monitoring involves risk insofar as the employee's contingent rewards, reputation, and future employment prospects are often dependent on monitoring-based performance records. Kipnis (1996) discussed the likelihood that monitoring impacts trust; he also highlighted the paucity of research in this area. Westin (1992) conducted qualitative research on the introduction of a new monitoring system and asserted that trust-in-management affected morale, stress symptoms, and satisfaction with the new system. In the appraisal literature, Fulk, Brief and Barr (1985) reported that trust-in-supervisor was associated with appraisal reactions (r=.57). Both studies highlight trust as a phenomenon that inheres in a relationship. Boxes 8 and 9 in Figure 1 depict the proposal that two relationships affect and are affected by monitoring: trust between the employee and the management of the organization, and trust between the employee and the specific agent of monitoring, typically a supervisor. Both trust variables are depicted as moderators of the monitoring characteristics-cognitions link (box 2 to box 3) because monitoring characteristics are typically a function of both organizational policies and the predilections of individual supervisors. Conversely, only trust-in-supervisor is depicted as moderating the cognitions-


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feedback link (box 3 to box 5) because reactions to feedback have been cast in research as a function of interactions between supervisor and employee. This logic is reasonable but untested: Research from the feedback literature fits these assertions (Greller, 1980; Greller and Herold, 1975), but unfortunately, no relevant monitoring research other than Westin (1992) has occurred so far. Research Opportunities. In Westin's (1992) report, management's poor communication and initial failure to obtain employee participation seemed to undermine trust. Whitener, Brodt, Korsgaard, & Werner (1998) have recently proposed a model of trust where both of these factors impact employees' trust-in-management. Proposition 11: Organizational policies about monitoring will influence employees' trust-inmanagement (e.g, a new monitoring technology introduced without adequate justification would reduce employees' trust-in-management). Although monitoring characteristics such as the frequency and consistency of monitoring reflect the real activities of supervisors and the technology they use, it is how employees perceive these characteristics that affects their reactions. If employees feel trust toward their organization and its representatives in upper management, they may have less inclination to interpret monitoring activities as threatening. Conversely, mistrust of management may hypersensitize employees to inconsistencies or changes in monitoring practice. Few studies (e.g., Scott, 1980) have explored trust-in-management as a moderating influence, so this reasoning also requires empirical testing. Proposition 12: Employees' trust-in-management will influence the relationship between monitoring characteristics and monitoring cognitions (e.g., employees would consider frequent monitoring less fair when trust-in-management was low than when trust-in-management was high). Whereas Proposition 11 asserted a relationship between policies and trust-in-management, the following proposition suggests an analogous relationship between supervisory practices and trust-in-


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supervisor. Folger and Konovsky (1989) explored antecedents of trust-in-supervisor and found that a measure of supervisory observation, containing such items as, "Frequently observed your performance," correlated r=.37 with a measure of trust-in-supervisor. Proposition 13: Employees' judgments about specific monitoring practices conducted by a supervisor will influence employees' trust in that supervisor (e.g., if a supervisor singled out a particular employee for inconsistent treatment, then that employee's trust in that supervisor would decline). The final two propositions about trust parallel the moderation effect proposed in Proposition 12 except with the focus on a different relationship: trust-in-supervisor instead of trust-in-management. For example, an employee would consider high frequency monitoring less fair when trust-in-supervisor was low than when trust-in-supervisor was high. Likewise, judgments about monitoring fairness might have a stronger link to feedback acceptance when trust-in-supervisor was low than when it was high. Feedback from a trusted supervisor would be less likely to trigger retrospective scrutiny of the fairness of the supervisor's monitoring activities than would feedback from a mistrusted supervisor. Proposition 14: Employees' trust-in-supervisor will influence the relationship between monitoring characteristics and monitoring cognitions. Proposition 15: Employees' trust-in-supervisor will influence the relationship between monitoring cognitions and feedback reactions. One final research question in the area of trust springs from a classic social psychology experiment by Strickland (1958). In his study, Strickland found that when a manipulation obliged a supervisor to monitor an employee, the supervisor's trust in the employee went down, even if that employee performed as well as an unmonitored employee. Supervisor cognitions are outside the scope of this paper, but the results raise the question of whether monitored employees might not feel less trusted by their supervisor or organization than unmonitored employees. In a sense, this introduces a


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new monitoring cognition -- attributed trust -- that employees may process as a function of how they are monitored. Proposition 16: Attributed trust (the extent to which employees believe they are trusted by their supervisor or organization) will be influenced by the consistency, controllability, frequency and pervasiveness of monitoring. Individual Differences. Connections between individual differences and reactions to monitoring spring from box 10 in Figure 1. These connections propose that issues other than characteristics of monitoring itself may moderate reactions to monitoring. Some EPM research supports this possibility. One individual difference that researchers have explored is prior beliefs about monitoring. Chalykoff and Kochan (1989) queried three aspects of workers' beliefs about monitoring: whether workers' believed that monitoring could be a good tool if used properly, whether they believed that monitoring was an invasion of privacy, and whether supervisors should be allowed to monitor. These beliefs had a small, but significant, correlation with monitoring satisfaction (r=.14). Their analysis tested a direct effect, rather than the moderation proposed in the Figure. In a moderator test, Aiello and Svec (1993) determined that locus of control influenced reactions to monitoring. Individuals with external locus of control reacted with greater anxiety to an EPM system. One other individual difference that may moderate links between monitoring characteristics and reactions is the task aptitude of the monitored worker. Schleifer, Galinski, and Pan (1996) studied a group of data entry workers who were selected for the study because their speed was insufficient to meet performance standards. These workers had greater tension, perceived time pressure, irritation and workload dissatisfaction when electronically monitored than when not monitored. Unfortunately the study did not compare low and high performance groups.


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Research Opportunities. A follow-up to Schleifer, Galinski, and Pan (1996) would help to address the question of whether prior job performance or task ability matters in reactions to performance monitoring. From a utilitarian perspective, the highest performing workers would have the least to fear and the most to gain from being monitored. Low performing workers might consider any given monitoring system more threatening than high performers would. Proposition 17: Performance capability on the monitored task will moderate links between monitoring characteristics and reactions to monitoring. Personality variables such as extraversion have been explored in research on supervision, but not transported over to research on EPM. For example, follower extraversion demonstrated a positive effect on leader-member exchange quality (Phillips & Bedeian, 1994). Phillips and Bedeian reasoned that extraverted individuals sought out interactions with their supervisors whereas introverts tended to shun them. To the extent that either electronic or traditional monitoring techniques involved high degrees of worker-supervisor interaction, the same logic could apply to monitoring. Proposition 18: Individual difference variables such as extraversion will moderate links between monitoring characteristics and reactions to monitoring. Conclusion Technology that amplifies organizations' ability to collect performance data has renewed interest in characteristics and outcomes of performance monitoring. Researchers in appraisal, supervision, leadership, stress and technology have also explored effects of performance monitoring on employees. The present review supplied a framework for organizing and analyzing this research. The framework encompassed research on both EPM and more traditional forms of monitoring. The framework highlighted particular variables and relationships that have yet to be explored in the empirical research on monitoring and research propositions were offered to fill these gaps.


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In a more general light, however, this review reopens a debate about the developmental and long-term effects of monitoring. The vast majority of research reviewed in this paper examined a single slice of organizational time, usually shortly after monitoring was introduced. Similarly, reviewers have criticized the brief duration of laboratory studies of monitoring with the assertion that employees in real work environments would quickly habituate to monitoring and that acute negative effects would quickly wear off. Although Attewell’s (1987) history of monitoring tends to contradict this idea with its accounts of chronic negative reactions to certain monitoring conditions, the question has not been addressed with empirical research. Longitudinal research is needed to measure reactions to monitoring before, during, and long after a monitoring system was introduced. Future research should use a developmental approach that benchmarks employees' existing feelings about monitoring, discovers employee expectations when a new monitoring system is announced, and tracks their reactions until the novelty of the new system has fully dissipated. On a related methodological note, monitoring researchers have used an extensive battery of survey measures, mainly in field research, but also in assessing outcomes of laboratory experimentation. These measures have facilitated the examination of statistical relationships between constructs but may have hidden some interesting and worthwhile insights into the psychological reality of monitored workers. As counterpoints, the qualitative work of Westin (1992) and Attewell (1987) and the hearings conducted by the U.S. House of Representatives (1989) provided some uniquely insightful narrative and qualitative results. In the course of the longitudinal and developmental research suggested above, researchers may want to obtain open-ended self-reports of worker's personal experiences with monitoring. As a final note, the research discussed in this study primarily pertains to conventional supervision situations where supervisors are physically co-located with workers, and where workers


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perform computer-related tasks amenable to the monitoring technologies and software available in the 1980's and early 1990's. The flourishing use of the Internet in recent years and the arrival of other unique technologies (e.g., Global Positioning System) have enormously expanded organizations' options for monitoring employees. Now the movements, activities, and performance results of managers, professionals, and field personnel can be monitored, whereas the existing research pertains mainly to clerical and service personnel. Future research needs to pose the questions outlined in this paper to a greater variety of research participants as well as a greater variety of monitoring techniques.


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Table 1. Organizational Monitoring Context Variables Variable

Definition and Research Citations

Feedback Integration*

The degree to which monitoring processes are connected with feedback and appraisal processes. Amick and Smith (1992).

Job Control*

The extent to which employees control the scheduling, pacing, order, etc. of monitored job activities. Amick and Smith (1992); Carayon (1993).

Job Demands*

Workload on monitored activities. Carayon (1993).

Job Security

The degree to which monitored workers feel that they are at risk for termination. Hales et al. (1994).

Justification

The extent to which organizational representatives have explained the purposes of monitoring techniques or policies. Stanton (in press).

Monitored Performance Consequences

The disciplinary, punitive, or remedial outcome resulting from failing to meet a performance standard on a monitored task. Smith et al. (1992); Nebeker & Tatum (1993); U.S. Congress, OTA (1987).

Monitoring Criteria Clarity

Adequacy and clarity of performance rating criteria used with monitoring. Chalykoff & Kochan (1989)

Participation in system design

The degree to which employees affected by monitoring have or had a say in the design, implementation, and usage of the system. Amick and Smith (1992); Pearson (1991); Westin (1992).

Performance Standards Difficulty

Degree to which performance criteria or standards on monitored activities are difficult to attain. Nebeker and Tatum (1993); Smith et al. (1992).

Permanency of records*

How long performance records from monitoring are kept in employee files. Aiello and Kolb, 1995b; Cohen, 1979.

Work group social cohesion/support

Extent to which monitored individuals interact and identify with coworkers who are similarly monitored. Aiello and Kolb (1995a)

*Suggested construct: No prior empirical investigation was found in monitoring research.


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Table 2. Performance Monitoring Characteristics Characteristic


Consistency

The degree to which monitoring is applied similarly to a set of workers. Stanton (in press).

Controllability

Degree to which worker can control the onset or timing of monitoring. Stanton & Barnes-Farrell, 1996.

Frequency

How often monitoring occurs per unit time. Niehoff & Moorman, 1993.

Pervasiveness*

Whether monitoring is continuous or intermittent. Aiello & Kolb, 1995b; Lund (1992).

Recipient*

Who reviews and makes judgments based on the data generated from monitoring. Aiello & Kolb (1995b).

Regularity*

The degree to which monitoring occurs at equally spaced intervals. (No prior research)

Source

Agent that performs the monitoring. E.g., supervisor, self. Dickinson (1992, 1993); McCurdy & Shapiro (1992); Critchfield & Vargas (1991).

Source consideration

Consideration behavior of the supervisor conducting the monitoring. Chalykoff & Kochan, 1989.

Source expertise

Expertise of the supervisor conducting the monitoring. Chalykoff & Kochan, 1989. Stanton (in press).

Target level

Whether individuals or groups of workers are monitored. Aiello & Kolb (1995a); Brewer (1995).

Target task

Which task or tasks are monitored. E.g., individual, work group. Brewer (1995); Larson & Callahan, (1990); Komaki, Barwick & Scott, 1978.

Target task aspect

What aspect of the task (e.g., quality or quantity) is monitored. Emory Air Freight Corp., 1971; Brewer & Ridgway, 1998.



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Table 3. Monitoring Cognitions Cognition


Attributed Trust*

The extent to which workers believe that their supervisor (or organization) trusts them to perform their work tasks without coercion. (No prior research, but see Strickland, 1958)

Evaluation Apprehension

Extent to which monitoring of a task enhances awareness of the performancereward contingency for that task. Brewer, 1995.

Monitoring Fairness

The degree to which workers evaluate monitoring practices affecting them as reasonable and appropriate. Niehoff & Moorman, 1993.

Monitoring Invasiveness*

Extent to which employees perceive monitoring practices as an invasion of privacy. Office of Technology Assessment, 1987.

Monitoring Satisfaction

Generalized positive or negative evaluation of monitoring practices. Chalykoff and Kochan, 1989; Kidwell and Bennett, 1994.

Perceived Personal Control

Experienced feeling or ability to modify characteristics of or eliminate the occurrence of monitoring. ; Smith et al., 1992; Stanton & Barnes-Farrell, 1996.

Role Priorities

The perceived relative importance of different aspects of performance (e.g., the importance of speed vs. quality). Brewer & Ridgway, 1998; Larson and Callahan, 1990.

Task Importance

The perceived degree to which the organization or supervisor values different work tasks. Brewer, 1995; Larson and Callahan, 1990.


Performance Monitoring Figure Captions Figure 1. Framework depicting employee reactions to monitoring. Bold titles represent groups of related variables as indicated by the examples in the same block.

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8. Trust-in-Management

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9. Trust-in-Supervisor Feedb ack Process

2. Monitoring Characteristics 1. Organizational Context Consequences Performance Standards Justifications... (see Table 1)

Target Frequency Source Controllability Consistency... (see Table 2)

3. Monitoring Cognitions Satisfaction Fairness... (see Table 3)

5. Feedback Reactions Acceptance Appraisal Sat. Perceived Accuracy

4. Arousal

6. Stress Reactions

Motivation Effects

10. Individual Differences Baseline beliefs, Locus-of-control, Aptitude

11. Performance

7. Long-term Outcomes Job Sat. Org. Commit. Intent to Quit