Presenting

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private key (SOD = Digital Signature). ▫ May contain the Document Signer Certificate (DSC) that corresponds public key
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Blackhat Europe 2010

Verifying eMRTD Security Controls Raoul D’Costa

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Agenda

 Overview of ICAO / EU Specifications  eMRTDs decomposed  eMRTD Infrastructure (PKI)  Inspecting eMRTD  User Interface Design  Conclusion

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Introduction

 Section 1: Overview of eMRTD Specifications

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eMRTD Specifications

 ICAO Travel Document - Doc 9303  Core Specifications set by the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) NTWG / SC17 collaboration  Supplemented by BSI ASM for eMRTDs (EAC)  Authenticated eMRTDs provide identity verification of eMRTD holder  Issuing Authorities in nation states or Int’l bodies e.g. INTERPOL as enhanced identity security documents  Commonly issued eMRTDs include national ePassports and eID Cards but also Seafarers documents, Biometric Residence Permits use same specifications

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eMRTD Types

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eMRTD – RFID Integrated Circuit Card

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Symbol denoting Chipped eMRTD

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Nation States that issue MRTDs (2009)

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eMRTD Decomposed

 Section 2: eMRTDs Decomposed

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eMRTD Decomposed

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eMRTD Decomposed

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eMRTD Decomposed - Chip

Master Files

USER APPLICATION …

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Datagroup 1

 Contains the following information • • •

Date of Birth Passport Number Expiry Date

 Access to the file is protected by Basic Access Control

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Datagroup 2

 Encoded photograph to ISO Standard to ensure quality of data image  Access is protected by Basic Access Control  Images encoded in JPEG or JPEG2000 formats  Photographs are standardised to ensure visual comparison and automated biometric verification  Images to overcome interoperability challenges (different biometric verification algorithms)

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eMRTD Verification

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eMRTD Decomposed - EF.COM

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Datagroup 3

 Fingerprints and Iris are a second generation feature of eMRTDs  Sensitive Data protected by EAC as an enhancement to BAC  Access is protected by Extended Access Control (separate PKI authorisation scheme)  Images encoded in JPEG or JPEG2000 formats to overcome biometric interoperability problems  No International Standard yet

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EF.COM Data

 Contains a map of the tags, lengths values present in the file  Is not protected (digitally signed) by issuing authority  Cannot be trusted unless authenticated to EF.SOD

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eMRTD Decomposed – EF.SOD

 Contains the hash values of all the data groups  Hash values signed by a document signing authority with private key (SOD = Digital Signature)  May contain the Document Signer Certificate (DSC) that corresponds public key element used the create the SOD or reference to DSC.  Can be trusted provided the Document Signer Certificate is validated

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EF.SOD

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eMRTD Deconstructed - EF.SOD

SIGNATURE

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Presenting the results

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Verifying EF.SOD

 Part of the Passive Authentication process  Verify the ASN.1 Structure  Verify the hash values present  Verify the signature against the public key element contained in related Document Signer Certificate  Authenticate the Document Signer Certificate • •

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Verify the certificate chain of the DSC against the CSCA Certificate dynamically Pre-validated DSCs in protected Certificate Cache Store

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Reliance on genuine passport numbers

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eMRTD Infrastructure (PKI)

 Section 3: eMRTD Infrastructure (PKI)

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ePassport Infrastructure – 1st Generation

ICAO PKD

CSCA Authority National Infrastructure

Document Signer Service

Registration Authority

Issuance

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Inspection System

Verification

Second Generation Extensions

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SPOC

CVCA DVCA

Issuance

Registration Authority

Inspection System

Issuance Verification

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ePassport Infrastructure – 2nd Generation

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ICAO Public Key Directory

 Global repository of certificates used to validate eMRTDs  Relies on Issuing Authority subscribers uploading data to the PKD  Regularly updated with • • • •

Document Signer Certificates CRLs Null CRLs MasterLists

 Serves as a trust anchor on eMRTDs 29

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ICAO PKD

https://pkddownloadsg.icao.int/ICAO/pkdLDIFDownload.jsp

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eMRTD Verification

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Inspecting eMRTD Effectively

 Section 4: Inspecting eMRTD Effectively

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Inspection Terminals – RFID Readers

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eMRTD Verification Process MRTD to Be Inspected

Holder provides eMRTD

Perform Physical Checks

Physical Check

Y

Extract MRZ

Validate MRZ

MRZ Valid

Y

Record Result

Query against whitelist

Y

Record Result

N N Perform BAC using MRZ

Record Result

Perform Facial Checks

Extract Data

Record Result

Perform AA

BAC Sucessful

N

Y

AA Present

Y

Perform PA Checks

Record Result

N

Record Result

Perform EAC

Contains 2nd Gen Features

Y

EAC Sucessful

Perform Fingerprint matching

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Y

N

Produce Result

N

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Physical Checks: Reliance on experts?

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Physical Checks  Check that the document has not been tampered with  Check the document under various wavelengths of light  Check that the document has not expired

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Limitations of Physical Checks

 Difficult to automate  Not standardised  Can be subjective  Physical inspection is not always logged

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Validate MRZ  Validate that the contents of the MRZ are valid  Validate the checksum  Validate that they match the contents of the passport

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Validation of MRZ

Checksum 39

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BAC  Extract the following fields • • •

Date of Birth Document Number Expiry Date

 Send these to the chip  These should match DG1

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Facial Biometrics  Match the holder to the DG2 using facial biometrics  DG2 is required to meet certain standards  Used in some countries including • • •

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Portugal Australia UK (Trial)

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Biometric Facial Checking

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Passive Authentication  Check the validity of EF.SOD  Check the hash values of the datagroups  Check the signature of SOD  Check the chain of the document signer certificate  Check against null and non null CRLs  ICAO PKD Maintains Certificates for subscribers

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Active Authentication  Ensures the eMRTD is not cloned  Challenge response between the terminal and the eMRTD

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Passive Authentication

 CSCAs can be exchanged • •

By diplomatic channels Using CSCA MasterLists

 A CSCA is a trust anchor and can identify the eMRTD Issuing Authority  Inspection System Integrity and Performance  Security controls must ensure that bogus CSCAs cannot be inserted during the verification process  Inspection System Architecture designed to requirements (not one fits all) – depends upon operating environment, devices, key management strategy, network reliability

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Extended Access Control  Consists of the following • •

Chip Authentication Terminal Authentication

 Provides the following •





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Mutual authentication between the chip and the terminal Some indication of the issuer of the eMRTD Privacy of the fingerprints on the passport

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Second Generation Features

 EAC requires the implementation of the EAC infrastructure to ensure verification  EAC Protects the privacy of the fingerprints on the ePassport  EAC proves the issuer of the ePassport  EAC Ensures that only authorised terminals can read fingerprints

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Fingerprint matching  DG3 Contains the fingerprint  0 – 10 digits can be stored depending on the country where fingerprints are captured  Fingerprint image contained (not a template)

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Registration: A link in the chain

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Consolidating Checks

VALID

Physical

MRZ

Expiry Check

BAC

TA

AA

Facial Biometric

Fingerprint Biometric

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INVALID

NOT PRESENT

Use Case 1: Valid 2nd Gen eMRTD

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VALID

Physcial

MRZ

Expiry Check

BAC

PA

TA

AA

Facial Biometric

Fingerprint Biometric

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INVALID

NOT PRESENT

NOT IMPLEMENTED

Use Case: 1st Gen Fake Passport

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VALID

Physcial

MRZ

Expiry Check

BAC

PA

TA

AA

Facial Biometric

Fingerprint Biometric

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INVALID

NOT PRESENT

NOT IMPLEMENTED

Use Case: Cloned 2nd Gen eMRTD

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VALID Physcial MRZ Expiry Check BAC PA TA

AA Facial Biometric Fingerprint Biometric

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INVALID

NOT PRESENT

NOT IMPLEMENTED

Use Case: Possible Fake Passport

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VALID

Physcial

MRZ

Expiry Check

BAC

PA

TA

AA

Facial Biometric

Fingerprint Biometric

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INVALID

NOT PRESENT

NOT IMPLEMENTED

An expired eMRTD

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VALID Physcial MRZ

Expiry Check BAC

PA TA

AA

Facial Biometric Fingerprint Biometric

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INVALID

NOT PRESENT

NOT IMPLEMENTED

Use Case: Fake Passport

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VALID Physcial MRZ

Expiry Check BAC PA TA

AA Facial Biometric Fingerprint Biometric

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INVALID

NOT PRESENT

NOT IMPLEMENTED

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Usability of eMRTD Inspection Systems

 Section 5: Usability of eMRTD Inspection Systems

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Usability Challenges

 Use their terminology • • • •

Counterfeit (not PA has failed) Falsified (not Digital Signature is not verified) Cloned (not Active Authentication has been subverted) Access denied (Terminal Authentication does not have appropriate CV chains)

 Simplicity by design • • •

User Interface design aligns with tasks Clear feedback on processing State of device (security)

 Case Studies •

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Engage with Users

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Conclusion

 Section 6: Conclusion

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Conclusion

 eMRTDs are complex documents and need to be verified appropriately  Partial checking of some features is not enough to guarantee that the document is authentic  Various designs and physical layouts of documents from various countries can easily lead to confusion although the electronic features are standardised and the same  User interface design for eMRTD verification apps should provide a result in a clear and concise manner

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Questions?

 Raoul D’Costa  redcosta AT mmm DOT com  uk.linkedin.com/in/raouldcosta  00441635264104

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References



Myths about ePassports http://www.gemalto.com/myths_about_epassports/myths_2.html



ICAO 9303 Passport Standards - http://www2.icao.int/en/MRTD/Pages/Doc9393.aspx



Wikipedia entry on biometric passports - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biometric_passport



http://www.en.bmi.bund.de/nn_1176866/Internet/Content/Themen/Travel__ID__Documen ts/Electronic__Passport/Datenschutz__en.html



ICAO eMRTD Report Volume 203 Number 202 http://www2.icao.int/en/MRTD2/ReportsPastIssues/ICAO%20MRTD%20Report%20Vol.% 203%20No.%202,%202008.pdf



UK ID Card http://www.ips.gov.uk/cps/files/ips/live/assets/documents/id_card_security_guide_low.pdf



EAC Specification version 3.1.1 https://www.bsi.bund.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/532066/publicationFile/44792/TR03110_v202_pdf



Golden Reader Tool for Reading eMRTDs https://www.bsi.bund.de/DE/Themen/ElektronischeAusweise/Projekte/projekteGRT/GRT_ node.html

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