The 2004 presidential election provides an excellent laboratory for assessing religion's role in contemporary electoral politics. Indeed, religion was involved in ...
Religious Mobilization in the 2004 Presidential Election
James L. Guth Furman University Lyman A. Kellstedt Wheaton College (emeritus) Corwin E. Smidt Calvin College John C. Green Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life and University of Akron
Prepared for delivery at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 1-4, 2005, Copyright American Political Science Association
Abstract
In this paper we examine the impact of religious variables on the vote in the 2004 presidential election. First we review and evaluate two theories that underlie many interpretations of religion’s role in American electoral politics, namely, the ethnoreligious and the religious restructuring perspectives. After demonstrating the strong association of both ethnoreligious and restructuring variables with vote choice and partisanship in 2004, we deploy a comprehensive classification incorporating religious affiliations, beliefs and practices that is even more successful in capturing the electoral impact of religion. We also demonstrate that religious variables were far more powerful in determining the vote in 2004 than social class, gender and other demographic traits of voters. Finally, we note some of the substantive implications of the findings for understanding public policies and policymaking.
The 2004 presidential election provides an excellent laboratory for assessing religion’s role in contemporary electoral politics. Indeed, religion was involved in almost every aspect of the campaign. As one early analysis put it, President Bush “showed himself willing to use religion forcefully to sharpen partisan divisions and highlight his own qualities as a leader,” while Kerry and the Democrats “faced obstacles in using religious rhetoric, in appealing to religion to underscore his qualities as a leader, and in benefiting from the political organization of religious groups.” Religion, this analysis concluded, “was at the heart of the campaign” (Muirhead et al. 2005, 222). Political scientists are in a better position than ever to gauge the validity of that assertion. In recent years they have made important strides in understanding the influence of religion on political attitudes and behavior, both in the mass public and among activists. Indeed, religious variables have appeared in the best analyses of voting (Miller and Shanks 1996), citizen activism (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995), and party politics (Layman 2001). As a result, we have a clearer view of the complex role that religion plays in American political life (Leege et al. 2002). Despite this emerging agreement on the political significance of religion, there is much less consensus on what aspect of religious faith is most relevant to political behavior. After all, American religion has always been extremely diverse and is becoming more so as new religious groups appear on the scene, older groups experience internal divisions or schisms, and the number of unaffiliated Americans grows. Religious beliefs and practices are equally diverse— and diversifying. This paper is designed to clear away some confusion about the measurement of religious variables and demonstrate the value of a comprehensive approach using religious affiliations, beliefs and behavior. In the first section, we review and evaluate two theories that underlie, if only implicitly, the way many observers see religion’s role: the ethnoreligious and the religious restructuring
perspectives. We argue that most analysts employ religious measures central to only one of these perspectives. After demonstrating the strong association of both ethnoreligious and restructuring variables with vote choice and partisanship in 2004, we deploy a comprehensive classification incorporating religious affiliations, beliefs and practices that is even more successful in capturing the electoral impact of religion. We wrap up our empirical analysis with multivariate tests of the influence of religious variables on electoral choice, first alone, then in combination with key demographic variables and, last, with both demographics and party identification. Finally, we comment on the substantive implications of our findings.
Religious Politics: Two Perspectives Anyone perusing the burgeoning popular and scholarly literature on religion in American politics is likely to be confused by the vast array of religious classifications and measures used by analysts. Our basic assumption is that the scheme which taps best all the important facets of American religion will provide the most insight into political behavior. To construct such a classification requires us to consider two competing views about the critical components of American religion. The first of these is the ethnoreligious perspective, which stresses categories based on religious belonging, especially membership in religious traditions, and the long-term political conflicts and alliances among those traditions. The second is the religious restructuring perspective, which emphasizes emerging divisions within religious traditions, based on changes in religious belief and behavior, and the consequent formation of new political coalitions across the boundaries of old traditions. Each perspective stresses different facets of religious faith and, thus, different operational measures, and each has virtues for political analysis.
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The Ethnoreligious Perspective and Religious Traditions Pollsters and pundits have long relied implicitly on an ethnoreligious interpretation of American politics. As developed more rigorously by historians, this perspective identifies the key religious groups as the historic denominations born in Europe and later multiplying on America’s shores. Presbyterians, Lutherans, Baptists, Episcopalians, Methodists and a myriad other Protestant groups combined distinct religious worldviews with other cultural attributes, such as ethnicity, race or regional location. These Protestants were eventually joined by a host of other traditions, including Catholics, Jews, Eastern Orthodox and other religious “minorities.” All these groups developed their own political cultures—often in conflict with neighboring religious groups—cultures that were fostered by religious leaders, houses of worship, and ethnic neighborhoods and activated by party leaders. In the nineteenth and early twentieth century, indeed, American party politics involved competing alliances of ethnoreligious groups (Jensen 1971; Kleppner 1979).1 The historical pattern was simple in broad outline—but often complex in practice. In the North, the Whigs, and later the Republicans, wooed “pietist” or “evangelical” Protestants, while Democrats mobilized “liturgical” or “ritualistic” Catholics, Lutherans, Jews and Orthodox Christians, along with free-thinkers and some dissident Protestants. Republican and Democratic religious groups differed in moral worldviews, lifestyles and attitudes about the proper role of government. Campaigns tried to maximize the vote among a party’s core religious supporters and win over a few critical religious groups not clearly aligned with either party (Jensen 1971). By the 20th century, this pattern changed as the previously dominant Protestant communities coalesced into two competing traditions, the Evangelical and the Mainline, with the former
1
We prefer “ethnoreligious” in preference to the “ethnocultural” label used by most historians (McCormick 1974) to keep our focus on the religious aspect of this interpretation of American electoral politics.
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predominating in the “Solid Democratic” South and the latter among Republicans in the North. And during the 1930s, Catholics emerged as the core of the Democratic Party outside the former Confederacy (Prendergast 1999). By the 1980s, Evangelicals were gravitating toward the GOP, while both Catholics and Mainline Protestants wavered in their previous partisan commitments. By this time as well, Hispanic Catholics and Protestants, Muslims, Hindus and other religious traditions had appeared on the scene (Eck 2001), further complicating the ethnoreligious landscape—and the calculations of politicians. Whatever the transformations in American religious traditions over time, the ethnoreligious perspective has the merit of directing our attention toward the real communities in which people live their religious lives, rather than simply positing artificial categories, such as “conservative Christians,” sometimes used by pollsters and pundits. Members of Black Protestant denominations, for example, are socialized religiously, understand Christian doctrines, and practice their religion differently from denizens of white Evangelical churches, despite many religious commonalities, such as orthodox beliefs and “born-again” status. Similarly, adherents to the Presbyterian Church in America, an Evangelical church, participate in a very different religious milieu than members of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A., a Mainline body, despite common (but distant) roots in European Calvinism. In recent years, sociologists have often claimed that the ethnoreligious perspective has progressively less utility in describing American religious life. They argue that the ascriptive nature of religious affiliation is breaking down, as Americans move more freely among religious settings, ignoring the old ties of doctrine, denomination, ethnicity, region and even family (Ammerman 1997). Nevertheless, we think that location in the historic Evangelical, Mainline Protestant and Catholic traditions still matters, precisely because such membership is more freely chosen, putting believers in a congenial religious environment (Green and Guth 1993). And for 4
many “new” religious communities, such as Hispanic Catholics, the tight religious, ethnic and family bonds that once characterized “old” ethnoreligious groups such Irish Catholics may still be operative (Stevens 2004). Thus, for both the historic and newer traditions, the ethnoreligious perspective may still identify vital aspects of American religion. Whatever its status among contemporary sociologists, the ethnoreligious approach is still followed in rough and ready fashion by many researchers, although often without much theoretical reflection. As a result, some survey items still reveal the assumptions of this religious model. The most global measure is the “Protestant, Catholic, Jewish” trilogy that Will Herberg (1955) used in defining the religious underpinnings of American civic life. Although that formula was simplistic even when coined, expanded versions are still extant in empirical research a half century later. For example, the 2004 media exit poll questionnaire merely added “Mormon, Muslim, Other Christian, Something Else, and None” to Herberg’s trilogy (National Election Pool 2004). Even when elaborated by other measures (such as race or ethnicity) such questions go only a small way toward identifying the actual religious tradition within which voters move. First, as Stark and Glock noted years ago, when researchers talk about “Protestants” they “spin statistical fictions” (1968, 56). At the very least, it is important to distinguish between the Evangelical, Mainline and Black Protestant traditions (Kellstedt and Green 1993). In addition, categories such as “other Christian” and “something else” lack even face validity and, empirically, are often chosen by a wide range of religious people, many of them clearly “Protestants” or from non-denominational churches. Other widely used surveys, such as those of the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press (and the exit polls in some years), do a better job by making the vital distinction between “Evangelical” and “Mainline” Protestants, classifying “born-again” Protestants as “Evangelical” and others as “Mainline.” While a step in 5
the right direction, this strategy puts many members of historically Evangelical churches in the Mainline camp and classifies many Mainliners as Evangelicals (Jelen, Smidt and Wilcox 1993). An even better approach is that of the National Election Study, where detailed affiliation probes permit more accurate assignments to religious traditions (see Leege and Kellstedt 1993). If religious traditions still matter in politics, as the ethnoreligious perspective maintains, then accurate religious affiliation measures are critical.
Religious Classification: Religious Restructuring and “Traditionalism-Modernism” Although many analysts still focus on religious tradition, variously defined (Manza and Brooks 1999; Layman 2001), an alternative formulation has found considerable resonance among politicians, pollsters and scholars. Its central tenet is that American religion has been “restructured” into two camps with opposing worldviews, fostered by competing religious institutions and leaders. As Robert Wuthnow (1988) and James Davison Hunter (1991) have argued in influential books, major religious traditions have been polarized by theological, social and cultural conflicts into a “conservative” or “orthodox” faction on one side, and a “liberal” or “progressive” one on the other. And for some theorists, the rising number of secular Americans is a natural extension of the “liberal” or “progressive” side—and may even be the product of struggles over restructuring (Hout and Fischer 2002). Wuthnow saw such developments primarily in terms of a negative impact on religious institutions, but Hunter’s apocalyptic title, “Culture Wars,” projected the divisions into the polity, posing a threat to social stability. Although scholarly reaction to the “culture wars” notion has focused on those purported political manifestations (Williams 1997; Fiorina 2005), Wuthnow and Hunter’s original formulations were rooted in religious developments, especially the emergence of opposing worldviews. As both authors pointed out, the competing camps were characterized by alternate 6
religious belief systems, different religious observances, and adherence to rival movements within their institutions. Indeed, the identification of these competing forces constitutes the most valuable insight of the restructuring perspective. Scholars employ various names for the resulting factions, but for the sake of simplicity we will use “traditionalist” and “modernist.” Although critics are rightly skeptical about extreme statements of the restructuring theory, evidence for a milder version is convincing, especially in “old-line” American religious institutions. Perusal of the religious press reveals continual battles between traditionalists and modernists in almost every major Protestant denomination, as well as in the American Catholic Church. Although rooted in theology and practice, these struggles also produce opposing moral, social, economic and political perspectives. The “culture war” theorists do consistently overstate the consequent polarization, both within religious institutions and the mass public: there are “centrists” in the religious wars, and “moderates” in the political culture wars. But the divisions they identify may well influence electoral politics, if only because they shape the cues presented to the public by religious and political elites (Guth et al. 1997; Fiorina 2005). Ideally, then, to tap these worldviews the researcher must ask about religious behaviors, beliefs, and movement affiliations. Although few political surveys measure these facets of religion adequately, some common survey items do get at one or another of these dimensions, if only inadvertently. The most frequently employed are measures of religious behavior. According to Wuthnow and Hunter, traditionalists and modernists often are very different in religious practice. Traditionalists are more faithful in “normative” practices, such as regular attendance at religious services. And political analysts have not ignored the relationship between such observance and political behavior. Indeed, church attendance has perhaps been the most commonly cited religious measure in recent years: in 2004 the “religion gap” usually referred to Bush’s advantage among church-goers and Kerry’s among non-attendees (e.g. Fiorina 2005; 7
Muirhead et al. 2005). Attendance is, of course, just one measure of religious behavior. Recent National Election Studies add frequency of private prayer and Bible reading, which also tap the underlying division between religious factions. Although Bible reading may be more characteristic of Protestants, especially Evangelicals, other items may work well for other traditions. Modernist Catholics, for example, are much less likely to say the rosary or attend confession than are traditionalists. Unfortunately, space limitations often work against multiple items in surveys, especially those tailored to specific traditions. Even more critical to the traditionalist-modernist divide are differences in religious belief. Most surveys used by political scientists, however, have few, if any, belief items, making it difficult to assess the political impact of religious restructuring. The sole exception is often an item on scriptural authority, one that taps a key disagreement: whether moral authority is supernatural or conventional in origin (Hunter 1991, 120ff). Unfortunately, the NES version (like most others) produces skewed responses, with very high levels of “orthodoxy” (Kellstedt and Smidt 1993). Other belief questions have been used in religious surveys and have varying promise for identifying new belief structures: some produce a virtual consensus (such as belief in God) or massive non-response (as on fine points of Christian doctrine). Nevertheless, as we shall see, properly posed items can be strong predictors of electoral choices. Finally, some widely used survey questions tap the third aspect of the religious restructuring: membership in, or identification with, religious movements (Kellstedt and Green 1993). Long a part of the American religious scene, such movements seek to transform their historic religious traditions, either by “returning to the roots” or by “bringing the faith in line with the modern world.” In the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, American Protestantism generated the “holiness,” “pentecostal,” “fundamentalist” and “neo-evangelical” movements on the traditionalist side, and the “liberal,” “modernist,” or “ecumenical” ones on the “modernizing” 8
side. Even today various Protestant movements “attempt to restore traditions and doctrines that are perceived to have been lost, while others chart new ways of faith and practice” (Cimino 2001, 7). Catholicism and Judaism have experienced similar developments, although labels for the competing groups may differ from those that Protestants use (Steinfels 2003; Goldscheider and Zuckerman 1984). Indeed, public and academic parlance frequently employs religious movement labels, usually from the Protestant traditions. Surveys often ask whether respondents think of themselves as “fundamentalist,” “evangelical,” “conservative,” “mainline,” “ecumenical,” “liberal or progressive” Christians—all efforts to tap the potential power of movement identification. In fact, religion and politics scholars as well as sociologists of religion have devoted much energy to testing such measures, often with confusing results (Wilcox, Jelen and Leege, 1993; Smith 1998). This should not be surprising: “movement” language varies by tradition, and many Americans are not familiar with such terms, especially if originating outside their own tradition. Thus, unwary survey use of, say, “fundamentalist” or “evangelical” often produces problematic results. We will suggest a new way to measure respondents’ proximity to religious movements, one that admits a higher degree of accuracy than existing approaches. To summarize our argument to this point: we think both the ethnoreligious and restructuring perspectives supply important insight into the ways religion may influence American electoral politics. As we have argued, the religious measures commonly used in public opinion research often tap only one aspect of contemporary American religion, either the ethnoreligious or the restructuring perspective, and not always very well or with much attention to theoretical rationale. We suspect that the ethnoreligious model fully accounts for the political behavior of fewer groups as the social contexts that supported those traditions have eroded for some—but not all—citizens. In contrast, the religious restructuring perspective may be a better 9
fit for the contemporary scene where conflicts within religious traditions have become the norm, although these conflicts certainly do not engage all believers. In sum, we think that the insights of both perspectives are critical to understanding electoral politics, calling for a religious classification that incorporates both (cf. Layman 2001, 55).
Data and Methods As a data source, we use the Fourth National Survey of Religion and Politics, conducted by the Survey Research Center at the University of Akron, and co-sponsored by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life.2 The survey’s advantages for study of religion and electoral alignments are several. First, a large sample allows us to examine religious subgroups with considerable statistical confidence. This study initially polled a random sample of 4,000 adults between February and April 2004; after the fall election we reinterviewed 2,730 respondents. Second, the survey employs detailed affiliation probes for accurate classification of respondents into religious traditions (Kellstedt and Green 1993; Green et al. 1996) and also includes belief, behavior, and movement questions, integral to the restructuring approach.3 Some of these measures are identical to those used in other surveys, but others, like the belief in God and Bible items, are elaborated to produce more nuanced responses. All told, the religious batteries permit construction of a classification combining the ethnoreligious and restructuring perspectives.
Analysis As a first step toward constructing such a scheme, Table 1 reports the correlations between measures central to each perspective (tradition, beliefs, behaviors, and movement) and 2
Additional support for the post-election part of the survey was provided by the Paul B. Henry Institute for the Study of Christianity and Politics at Calvin College and the William R. Kenan, Jr. Endowment at Furman University. 3 See the Appendix for details on the survey items.
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two political variables (presidential choice and party identification). As the first section shows, religious traditions often differ quite dramatically in their politics: Evangelicals are distinctly more Republican than the rest of the electorate, as are Latter-day Saints. On the other side, Hispanic Catholics, Jews and the Other Religions (predominantly non-Christian) are more strongly Democratic, but do not match secular and Black Protestant voters in that respect. And the large Mainline Protestant and Catholic traditions fall in between, not differing significantly from all other voters. Thus, religious tradition, carefully measured, still provides considerable leverage in understanding political choices, especially among those groups retaining strong religious subcultures, whether theological or ethnic. [Table 1 about here] What about the religious variables tapping the restructuring approach? In 2004 many scholars and pundits pronounced that religious behavior, measured by church attendance, constituted the real religious dividing line in American politics. In fact, attendance at services was important: the more frequent the observance, the higher the Bush vote and Republican identification. But other religious practices are almost as strongly correlated with political behavior, including frequency of Bible reading and donations to religious causes. Private prayer and participation in religious small groups have slightly weaker correlations with partisan choices, and volunteering through religious organizations, the smallest coefficient. Nevertheless, a factor score derived from these six religious activities (theta=.88) performs better than any single item, especially on partisanship, confirming again the value of multiple items. What about religious beliefs? Our survey is unusual in the number of belief questions included. For the most part these were designed to tap adherence to a “theistic worldview,” precisely the central point of contemporary quarrels emanating from restructuring. Although admittedly some questions are more appropriate to the great majority of Americans from Judeo11
Christian backgrounds than for other faith traditions, these generalized belief measures are in fact powerful predictors of political attitudes across traditions. In fact, as Table 1 shows, religious beliefs are stronger correlates of vote choice and partisan affiliation than are religious behaviors. Beliefs in a personal Devil and in scriptural authority are the best indicators of Republican choices, followed by ideas about the nature of God and life after death. In questions phrased in the other direction, belief in “religious pluralism” or what Hoge, Johnson and Luidens (1994, 112-115) call “lay liberalism,” and in evolution as the best explanation for the origin of human life point a voter toward the Democrats. A factor score derived from these six items (theta=.84) taps a traditionalism-modernism dimension strongly associated with partisan choices, with correlations exceeding those for behavior, confirming that such items are desirable in surveys. Finally, we turn to religious movements. As we noted above, measuring orientation toward such movements has been troublesome for social scientists and pollsters, producing numerous ill-advised ventures, such as asking Catholics whether they were “fundamentalists.” To avoid such pitfalls, we limited our queries to movements historically relevant to each respondent’s tradition (see the Appendix). We also experimented with a new, alternative approach to religious movements. Instead of inquiring about labels, we asked respondents directly about their support for the goals of those movements: should their denomination or church (1) “strive to preserve its traditional beliefs and practices”; (2) “be willing to adjust traditions in light of new ideas”; or, (3) “strive to adopt modern beliefs and practices”? Although we experimented extensively with the numerous common labels used in past research, the extensive overlap among these measures (especially among Protestants) made it difficult to produce a single, easily comprehended summary measure. On the other hand, we found that the “traditional/conservative” and “progressive/liberal” labels had broad resonance among both Protestants and Catholics and, based on their relationship with other religious 12
measures, seem to get at underlying propensities toward religious movements.4 As the table shows, “traditional” believers are more Republican in both groups, and “progressives” more Democratic. Interestingly, “traditional” has a larger pro-Republican impact among Catholics than among Protestants, while “progressive” has a more powerful pro-Democratic effect for Protestants than Catholics. Our experimental strategy for measuring movement affiliation also showed much promise. Respondents who want their institutions to maintain traditional religious beliefs, on the one hand, and those who want them to adopt modern ideas, on the other, are quite different on both vote choice and party identification. Those preferring tradition are more Republican, while those preferring modern ideas are more Democratic. To create a summary measure of religious movement, we decided to use both “traditional/progressive” identification and preferences about religious change. Combining these two items produces a factor score (theta=.81) that performs considerably better than the religious behavior index in predicting electoral choices, but not quite as well as the belief index. Of course, our belief, behavior and movement measures are closely related: traditional beliefs are positively associated with normative religious behavior (r=.689), while both are correlated with traditionalist movement preferences at slightly lower but very respectable levels (r=.588 and .555, respectively). Indeed, this evidence suggests that religious belief, behavior and movement identification are part of a single underlying “traditionalist-modernist” dimension, an intuition confirmed by a second-order factor analysis that yielded a single highly reliable factor score (theta=.83), explaining 74 percent of the variance.
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The correlations between presidential vote and several Protestant movement labels were solid: “evangelical” (.19); “fundamentalist” (.17); and, “Pentecostal” (.10), but “traditional/conservative” (.19) and “progressive/liberal” (-.32) preferences were chosen by more respondents and had much less overlap between them. In addition, most respondents choosing one or more of the first three labels also chose “traditional/conservative,” making it a good summary estimate of traditionalist movement identification.
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For purposes of analysis and exposition, we have divided this score into thirds and classified members of the three largest Christian traditions (Evangelicals, Mainline Protestants and white Catholics) into “traditionalist,” “centrist,” and “modernist” camps, in line with our theoretical expectations. To characterize each briefly, traditionalists adhere to orthodox beliefs, participate frequently in normative religious behaviors, and want their religious institutions to maintain traditional beliefs and practices. Modernists, on the other side, reject orthodox beliefs and embrace new religious ideas, participate less frequently in normative religious behaviors, and hope their religious communities will adopt beliefs and practices consistent with modern ideas. Centrists naturally fall in the middle: they hold moderately orthodox beliefs, are somewhat active religiously, but tend not to identify with religious movements on either side. Although they are often neglected in discussions of restructuring, because of their numbers and position centrists are a critical religious and political group.5 For both practical and theoretical reasons, the table does not report traditionalistmodernist divisions among Hispanic Protestants and Catholics, Jews, Black Protestants or the other categories. First, the numbers are often too small to subdivide with great confidence. And ethnoreligious theory also suggests that these traditions are still shaped more by racial, ethnic or religious solidarity than by religious restructuring. Nevertheless, the traditionalist-modernist division may be encroaching on these groups as well. In 2004, for example, traditionalists in all these groups were at least somewhat more likely to vote for President Bush than their centrist or modernist counterparts (see below). If this trend continues, religious restructuring may increasingly influence the politics of these smaller ethnoreligious traditions.
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Our equally sized tripartite divisions are obviously somewhat arbitrary, but alternative cutting points produce very similar substantive results. For purpose of exposition, the three groups illustrate vividly the political differences based in the traditionalism-modernism dimension. For multivariate analysis, of course, we can use the original factor score, if so desired, as a more differentiated measure.
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Religious Groups and Electoral Choice in 2004 We think that our elaborated religious classification comports well with the new realities of American religion, reducing its complexities to meaningful categories (Steinfels 2004). But does it provide better understanding of political behavior? Table 2 reports the following data for each religious group in 2004: (1) the proportion of the potential electorate in that group; (2) the proportion of the two-party vote for Bush in the group; and, (3) the proportion of the two-party vote for Republicans in U.S. House races for the group. Consider first the electoral choices of the religious traditions: the range of vote choice is almost breathtaking. Latter-day Saints almost unanimously chose the Republican ticket, while less than one-fifth of Black Protestants did. Not surprisingly, Evangelical Protestants (about onequarter of the potential electorate) gave three-fourths of their votes to the GOP, white Catholics (one-fifth of the potential electorate and historically stalwart Democrats) gave the Republicans a narrow majority, but Mainline Protestants (less than one-fifth of the potential voters and once the religious bulwark of the GOP) were split down the middle in the presidential race and gave GOP House candidates a bare majority of their votes. The table also reveals a development often missed in recent discussion of the Hispanic vote: President Bush’s gain there came largely from Protestants, not from Catholics, who continued to vote Democratic in overwhelming numbers (cf. Leal et al. 2005). Jews and the mostly non-Christian “All Others” category were also heavily Democratic, as were secular voters, who gave Kerry over 70 percent. Of course, the most Democratic religious voters are Black Protestants, who gave Kerry 83 percent of their ballots. [Table 2 about here] Many religious traditions are clearly still quite distinct politically: Evangelicals have become the religious mainstay of the GOP, non-Hispanic Catholics have edged away from their ancient Democratic ties toward a slight GOP bias, and Mainline Protestants were even more a 15
“swing vote” than Catholics in 2004.6 At the same time, Democrats have largely kept their hold on most religious “minorities,” especially Black Protestants, Hispanic Catholics, Jews and nonChristians. They have also established a strong link to the growing coterie of unaffiliated voters, perhaps building a large constituency of “secular warriors” (Greenberg 2005, 128-130). Careful sorting of religious voters into the proper tradition clearly helps us understand contemporary electoral choices. But our grasp is further improved if we look at traditionalistmodernist divisions within the three major religious traditions (Evangelicals, Mainline Protestants and white Catholics), traditions that account for almost two-thirds of all voters. In all three, traditionalists are far more prone to vote Republican than their modernist co-parishioners. The differences range from a “modest” 38 percent among Evangelicals to over 54 percent among white Catholics. Thus, the religious worldviews identified by restructuring theorists certainly have a powerful influence on the 2004 vote. Restructuring may even be having an impact on “minority” traditions. A closer look at Hispanic Protestants—a rapidly growing group—shows that Bush carried handily the traditionalist voters in this largely traditionalist group. His success among comparable Hispanic Catholics is apparent but not as far advanced.7 Similarly, traditionalist Jews (mostly Orthodox) were also more Republican, but were outnumbered by the far larger modernist contingent (mostly Reform), which gave Kerry almost 90 percent of its vote (data not shown). Only among Black Protestants do traditionalists show at best very modest Republican proclivities.
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The results for Evangelical and Mainline Protestants demonstrate the advantage of using detailed denominational data to define these traditions. Using the Pew Center strategy noted above on our data reduces the “Evangelical” Protestant GOP vote by over 4 percent and raises the Mainline proportion by a similar amount, reducing the “gap” between the two traditions from 28 percent to only 20 percent. This results from the fact that “born-agains” in Mainline denominations (classified as “Evangelicals” by Pew) are less Republican than actual members of Evangelical denominations, and “non-born-agains” in Evangelical denominations (classified as “Mainline”) are much more Republican than true Mainline parishioners. 7 Among Hispanic Protestants, Bush carried 78 percent of the traditionalists, but only 14 percent of the much smaller coterie of centrists and modernists; among Hispanic Catholics the comparable figures are 59 and 21 percent, respectively, with proportionately more Catholics in the centrist and modernist categories.
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One additional conclusion from Table 2 is worth noting: within each major religious tradition President Bush did slightly better than House GOP candidates among traditionalists, while the reverse held true among modernists. Perhaps Bush’s personal religious expression and/or the campaign’s “moral values” issues (such as abortion and same-sex marriage) pulled more traditionalists to the president and drove more modernists into the Kerry camp. Or perhaps the House vote merely reflected more typical partisan patterns. To help consider this possibility, we now turn to the impact of religious variables on party identification.
Religious Groups and Partisan Identification Are the religious patterns in Table 2 mostly the artifact of the 2004 campaign with its particular combinations of religious personas and issues, or do they represent a long-term trend in partisan alignments? Our survey, like many others in 2004, shows a very close division between the Republicans and Democrats across the potential electorate, but as Table 3 reveals, most religious groups are not so closely divided. Evangelicals are heavily Republican or leaning that way, white Catholics are very slightly more Republican than Democratic, and Mainline Protestants are split almost literally down the middle. The smaller religious communities present few surprises, with the only GOP advantage appearing among Latter-day Saints (a large majority) and Hispanic Protestants (a modest plurality).8 Elsewhere, Democratic affiliation prevails, although Hispanic Catholics and seculars are also more likely to claim independent status. Nevertheless, partisanship corresponds closely to the vote in each religious tradition. [Table 3 about here] Once again, the traditionalism-modernism divide is a powerful factor within the major traditions. Traditionalists are more strongly Republican; modernists are much more likely to be 8
Note, however, that among Hispanic Protestant traditionalists, GOP identification rises to 60 percent.
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Democrats. And despite an apparent tendency for all Evangelicals to be a little more Republican than their counterparts in the other two traditions, traditionalists, centrists, and modernists appear remarkably similar across old lines, suggesting the potential erosion of tradition-specific political “distinctives.” This pattern could be the product of the special conditions of the 2004 campaign, but the power of religious tradition may also be waning, as restructuring theorists argue. Thus, the contemporary importance of religious traditions may lie primarily in the distribution of traditionalists and modernists in each, as well as the distinctive ways that religious institutions and leaders educate and mobilize their followers for politics—or fail to do so.
Religious Groups and Party Coalitions To this point, we have described the electoral preferences of America’s diverse religious population. Now we consider the data from a slightly different angle, examining the religious makeup of the Republican and Democratic electoral coalitions. Understanding that composition is vital both for evaluating the acumen of campaign managers and for understanding the behavior of public officials, as they respond to major voting blocs within their parties. The contribution that a group makes to a political party’s electoral coalition is determined by three factors: the size of the group in the electorate, its turnout rate, and the proportion of the vote that it gives to that party (Axelrod 1972; Leege et al. 2002, 231-236). We have previously noted the proportion of the potential electorate represented by each religious group and include that information in Table 4 as a reminder. The turnout rates of the three largest traditions vary, with Mainline Protestants still having a slight advantage over white Catholics and a somewhat larger edge over Evangelicals.9 Among the smaller groups, Jews have a very high turnout, with
9
Like all voting studies, our survey is characterized by over-reporting of turnout by respondents. We have used a statistical routine to correct for this tendency. For further information, contact the authors.
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the Latter-day Saints also well above the national average. But Black and Hispanic Protestants, Hispanic Catholics, Other Religions and secular voters trail the national average, an obvious disadvantage for Democratic candidates in the 2004 (and other) national elections. [Table 4 about here] Within the major religious traditions, turnout also varied along the traditionalismmodernism dimension. Among Evangelicals, Mainline Protestants and Catholics alike, it was highest among traditionalists, and in the first two traditions, next highest among modernists. For Catholics, turnout by centrists and modernists was approximately equal, but far behind that of the smaller traditionalist cohort. On the whole, then, the 2004 campaign clearly stimulated greater voting by traditionalists. Indeed, across the whole sample their turnout exceeded 67 percent, compared to 55 percent for centrists and 59 percent for modernists. Whether this reflected the tendency for regular church attendees to vote more frequently, stimulation provided by electionyear “moral” issues such as abortion or same-sex marriage, more effective mobilization through religious channels, or some combination of these, remains the subject for later analysis. In any case, the two parties have very distinct religious profiles. As the last two columns in the table show, almost fourth-fifths of the Bush vote comes from Evangelicals, Mainline Protestants and white Catholics, but less than half the Kerry vote does. The major elements in the Democratic coalition are secular voters (almost 22 percent); all other religious minorities, such as Jews, Hispanic Catholics and Protestants, and Other Religions (about 16 percent); and Black Protestants (over 13 percent), for a slight majority of the total. Note, especially, that in 2004 secular voters contributed a larger proportion of the Democratic ballots than did white Catholics, certainly a historic development. Another way of looking at the coalitions is to consider the contribution of traditionalists and modernists. Almost a third of Bush’s vote comes from Evangelical traditionalists alone. 19
Adding their Mainline and Catholic counterparts (totaling to 14 percent), Latter-day Saints (3.8 percent) and Hispanic Protestants (2.6 percent) produces a traditionalist majority in the GOP electorate. In addition, another one-quarter of the Republican vote is provided by centrists in the three major traditions. The Democratic coalition, on the other hand, bolsters its “secular-religious minority” majority with religious modernists (19 percent) and centrists (almost 20 percent) from these same three traditions.
Multivariate Analysis Of course, religion is merely one of the sociodemographic traits often said to influence political behavior. Others include social class, gender, marital status, political generation, region or even occupation. Does religion retain an independent impact on political behavior once we control for these variables? Table 5 reports the results of four multivariate analyses that address this question. Model 1 uses dummy variables representing our religious groups as the sole predictors of the presidential vote in 2004, while Model 2 adds the most powerful demographic variables in a test of relative influence. In Model 3 we use both sets of variables to predict party identification. Finally, in a stringent assessment of the power of religious factors, we include the religious groups, demographic variables, and party identification in a model predicting presidential vote. [Table 5 about here] Model 1 summarizes rigorously our previous bivariate findings. Using the relatively large group of Mainline centrists (very close to the national average vote for Bush) as the omitted reference group, we see that Mormons, Evangelical traditionalists, Catholic traditionalists, and Mainline traditionalists are significantly more likely to vote for Bush, while religious modernists (except for Evangelicals), Black Protestants, other religions, Jews, Hispanic Catholics and 20
seculars are much more likely to choose Kerry. Evangelical and Catholic centrists do not differ significantly from their Mainline brothers and sisters in the omitted comparison group. Are these results somehow an artifact of other demographic factors? To provide a fuller test of the religious variables, we ran preliminary analyses using a large number of demographic variables. Those included in Model 2 are the only ones achieving, or even approaching, significance in any analysis. In fact, two measures of social class—income and education—had no significant linear relationship to vote choice once the religious groups were included, supporting contentions that the 2004 election may mark a low point in social class polarization (Hechter 2005). Efforts to identify social class groups with distinctive votes were only a little more successful. For example, we did find that the unemployed are significantly more likely to vote for Kerry. And those with both graduate degrees and high incomes—roughly Judis and Teixeira’s “Professionals” (2002, 39-49)—are more likely to vote for Kerry, although the coefficient did not quite reach significance in our trial analyses (data not shown). Age does make a difference, however: the oldest cohort (“the New Deal generation”) is significantly more Democratic than younger voters, as are women—especially single women. But female homemakers are actually more likely to vote Republican, although the coefficient just misses significance. A comparison of Models 1 and 2 shows that the collective impact of demographic variables on the religious coefficients is minimal—and, with a few exceptions, actually serves to increase the effect of religious group membership. Still, the introduction of the demographics provides only a modest boost in analytic power: Model 2 predicts correctly 73.7 percent of the vote, as opposed to 71.9 in Model 1 with religious variables alone. By now we suspect that the story will not be much different for party identification, and it is not. Model 3 assesses the contribution of Model 2’s variables to party identification, using an OLS regression analysis. Despite the differences in statistical routine, a quick glance at the 21
coefficients in Models 2 and 3 reveals virtually identical patterns. The only major difference is that income becomes significant as a predictor of party identification. Obviously, religion plays a major role in producing electoral choices and party identification, a role that is not merely an artifact of other social variables. Finally, we present the strongest test of all in Model 4, including party identification with the religious and demographic variables in predicting presidential vote. Not surprisingly, partisanship makes a substantial contribution to prediction, increasing accuracy to 92.2 percent. And party identification is clearly the vehicle through which many other variables influence the vote. For example, the effects of gender and marital status are clearly mediated by partisanship, having little independent impact once it is in the equation. On the other hand, the Democratic proclivities of the New Deal generation and the unemployed are actually enhanced when partisanship is taken into account. The impact of membership in several religious groups is also mediated by party identification. With partisanship in the equation, Hispanic Protestants and Catholics, Jews, members of Other Religions, religious centrists, and secular voters are not significantly more likely than Mainline centrists to vote Democratic in 2004, although the coefficients remain in the same direction. Nevertheless, some groups do provide more party votes than their partisanship would predict: Latter-day Saints, Catholic traditionalists and Evangelical traditionalists are considerably more Republican (although the LDS coefficient just misses significance), while Catholic modernists and Black Protestants are more Democratic. We ran a final analysis to address the relative merit of the ethnoreligious and the religious restructuring models—at least within the major Christian traditions. Do the Evangelical, Mainline and Catholic traditions still shape the political choices of adherents, or do those choices simply reflect voters’ position on the traditionalism-modernism continuum? To check each possibility, we ran Models 2 and 3, this time replacing the nine Evangelical, Mainline and white 22
Catholic categories with dummies for the three traditions and interactive terms for traditionalism within each. To include all three traditions, we used secular respondents as the omitted reference group. We also kept all the demographic variables in the analysis as controls. Under this specification, an Evangelical is 2.95 times as likely as a secular citizen to vote for Bush, a Catholic 2.26 times as likely, and a Mainline Protestant only 1.9 times as prone to vote for the President. Each interaction term, however, had roughly the same effect, although traditionalism among Catholics is a slightly more powerful predictor of a Republican vote than it is among Evangelicals and Mainliners. The results for party identification are quite similar, except the relative position of Mainliners and Catholics is reversed, with Mainline affiliation a better predictor of GOP identification. Thus, religious tradition influences both vote choice and party identification, independent of the considerable impact of traditionalism (data not shown).
Conclusions Many observers agree that religion matters in American elections and, especially, that it mattered in 2004. Yet scholars have seldom addressed systematically the complex ways that religion shapes contemporary electoral politics, often employing religious variables in ad hoc fashion. Indeed, the availability of particular measures, rather than any theory about the political nature of American religion, has largely dictated their use. We have outlined two competing perspectives on the way that religion influences American electoral politics, the ethnoreligious and the religious restructuring perspectives, and have developed a religious classification drawing on the insights of each. To test the contemporary value of ethnoreligious theory, we have undertaken careful measurement of religious affiliation to assess the power that religious traditions retain in shaping American electoral behavior. In addition, we have also considered the way that religious restructuring has 23
created differences within religious traditions, based on competing theological understandings and religious practices. Such a multidimensional understanding of the nature of religion requires the use of multiple measures of religion. Our analysis demonstrates that the careful sorting of voters into their proper religious tradition helps us understand contemporary electoral choices, but also that there are dramatic factional differences within traditions, as well as considerable convergence among traditionalists, centrists and modernists across tradition boundaries. Both religious tradition and traditionalism-modernism had important effects on vote choice and party identification. As our analysis has suggested, most of the electoral impact of religion seems to be mediated by party identification, although in 2004 membership in a few important religious groups provides an added boost to either the Republican or Democratic vote. Still, given the powerful influence of religion on party identification and the relative stability of such identification, the current “religious order” in electoral politics may be with us for some time. That order reveals remarkably distinct religious coalitions underpinning the two major parties. The Republicans depend heavily on Evangelical Protestants, Latter-day Saints, and traditionalists from all major (and most minor) religious traditions, with the bulk of their remaining support coming from centrists in the three largest ones. The Democrats have clearly retained their historic identity as the party of most religious minorities, but depend far more heavily on secular citizens than ever before, with the bulk of their remaining support coming from religious modernists and centrists. Our results have substantive importance far beyond describing the religious basis of electoral choice. Candidates for office and elected officials in office respond in myriad ways to their electoral constituencies. No reader of this paper is likely to miss many of its implications for electoral strategies and policymaking. In electoral terms, Republican strategists will continue to weigh the relative importance of mobilizing religious traditionalists in the three major 24
Christian traditions (but especially Evangelicals), appealing to the “new traditionalists” among religious minorities, such as Hispanic and Black Protestants, and satisfying enough religious centrists to carry Election Day. And, since November 2004, the Democrats have been engaged in an even more visible and sometimes rancorous debate over the best means to expand their existing religious coalition to other groups. This is likely to be a vexing task, given both the growing diversity of religious traditions and perspectives within the party, and an increasingly large and sometimes vocal secular component (see, e.g., Democracy Corps 2005). Indeed, the public experimentation with “new” religious strategies by potential 2008 Democratic presidential nominees, such as Senator Hillary Clinton, is but one indication of the importance and complexity of that task. The programmatic agendas of Republicans and Democrats similarly reflect these religious coalitions. Although much of the public argument has centered around the role of “moral issues” in the 2004 outcome, virtually every major issue of recent years has been shaped by religious politics: abortion, stem-cell research, same-sex marriage, judicial nominations, and the Iraq war, to be sure—but also tax policy, environmental politics and social welfare programs (Guth 2004; Guth et al. 2005; Yankelovich 2005). None of this should be surprising; not only have the Republican and Democratic activist cores been reshaped along religious lines, but the same religious formations have appeared in Congress as well, influencing voting on a wide range of issues (Layman 2001; Guth and Kellstedt 2005). Indeed, all this behooves political scientists to press on with their effort to understand and assess better the role that religion plays in all aspects of American political life.
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Appendix Religious Affiliations and Religious Traditions The Akron Survey uses an extensive series of questions and probes to determine as closely as possible the specific denominational affiliation of respondents. (The actual batteries are available from the authors on request.) For many respondents, the determination of affiliation is quite easy. For example, it usually takes little survey time or interviewer effort to identify Roman Catholics, Jews, Orthodox, Latter-day Saints, Muslims, and so on. The major problems usually come from “Protestants.” Members of the same denominational families are often split among the three major Protestant traditions. Thus, a “Baptist” or a “Presbyterian” can be an Evangelical, Mainline or Black Protestant, depending upon the specific denomination. To classify denominations into the proper tradition, we rely on a host of historical and contemporary sources, ranging from denominational histories to contemporary denominational websites and publications. Most important, we use expert sources such as Melton (1978 and supplements) and Piepkorn (1977-79). Evangelical denominations usually stress a high view of Scripture, belief in Christ as the only means of salvation, and a strong commitment to evangelism. Mainline denominations generally have a more accommodating theology (Wuthnow and Evans 2002). Many Evangelical denominations belong to the National Association of Evangelicals; almost all Mainline denominations belong to the National Council of Churches. In addition to the traditionally black denominations listed below, we have included all other African-Americans in the Black Protestant category. Protestant respondents in nondenominational churches or those giving a generic response such as “just Presbyterian”—a divided denominational family—were assigned on the basis of other religious variables (details available from the authors on request). The following are some denominations represented in the 2004 survey, for purposes of illustration. Evangelical Protestant American Baptist Association, Baptist General Conference, Baptist Missionary Association, Conservative Baptist Association of America, Free Will Baptist, General Association of Regular Baptists, Independent Baptist, United Baptists, Southern Baptist Convention, Other Baptists, Non-denominational Independent Charismatic, Christian Church, Churches of Christ, Congregational Christian, Church of God - Cleveland, Tennessee, Church of God-Anderson, Indiana, Non-denominational-Independent Evangelical, Bible Church, Gospel Church, Missionary, Other Evangelical, Evangelical Congregational Church, Evangelical Covenant Church, Evangelical Free Church, Church of God Holiness, Church of the Nazarene, Pentecostal Holiness Church, Salvation Army, American Rescue workers, Wesleyan Church, Other Holiness, Mennonite Church, Other Mennonite, Amish, Free Methodist, Wesleyan Methodist, Other Bible, Gospel, Born Again or Missionary Church, Christian and Missionary Alliance, Bible Holiness, Open Bible Standard, Assemblies of God, Church of God of the Apostolic Faith, Four Square Gospel, Open Bible Standard, Pentecostal Church of God, Other Pentecostal, Associate Reformed Presbyterian, Cumberland Presbyterian Church, The Evangelical Presbyterian Church, Orthodox Presbyterian Church, Presbyterian Church in America, Reformed Presbyterian Churches of North America, Christian Reformed Church, Seventh Day Adventist, Apostolic Christian Church, Worldwide Church of God, Lutheran Church Missouri Synod, Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Church, Evangelical Lutheran Synod.
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Mainline Protestant American Baptist Churches USA, Church of the Brethren, Christian Church (Disciples of Christ), Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, United Church of Christ, Episcopal Church, Society of Friends, United Methodist Church, Presbyterian Church in the USA, Reformed Church in America Black Protestant National Baptist Convention, Progressive National Baptist Convention, some Primitive Baptist, Church of God in Christ, African Methodist Episcopal (AME), African Methodist EpiscopalZion, Christian Methodist Episcopal Church Religious Behavior Questions and Factor Score Church Attendance Aside from weddings and funerals how often do you attend worship services, more than once a week, once a week, once or twice a month, a few times a year, seldom or never? Donations for Religious Purposes Approximately what percentage of your income do you give to your congregation and other religious organizations in an average year? Nothing, 1 to 5%, 6 to 9%, 10%, or more than 10%? Pray Outside of Worship, Bible Reading, Participation in Religious Small Group Volunteering through Church Thinking about other religious practices: How often do you do the following activities, once a day or more, once a week or more, once a month or more, only occasionally, or never? How often do you pray outside of worship? How often do you read Scripture outside of worship? How often do you participate in a small group for religious purposes? How often do you volunteer your time to help the poor or other people through your church or other religious organization? Factor loadings: Attendance Bible Reading Small Group Donations Volunteering Prayer
.852 .843 .821 .743 .728 .714
Eigenvalue 3.705. Factor accounts for 61.74 percent of the variance. Theta=.88 27
Belief Questions and Factor Score. Biblical Authority Which of the following comes CLOSEST to your view of the Bible? It is. . . . . (1) The inspired word of God (2) A great book of wisdom and history (3) A book of myths and legends Those answering (1) were asked this follow-up question: Is the Bible… (1) True, to be taken word for word (2) True, but not to be taken word for word (3) True for religion, but with some human errors. These two questions were combined into the following scale: (1) True, to be taken word for word (2) True, but not to be taken word for word (3) True for religion, but with some human errors. (4) Great book of wisdom and history (5) Book of myths and legends Nature of God Which of the following comes CLOSEST to your views on the existence of God? (1) I am certain that God does NOT exist (2) I think that God does NOT exist, but I am not certain (3) I think God EXISTS, but I have some doubts (4) I am certain God EXISTS Which one of the following statements comes CLOSEST to your view of God? (1) God is a person who created and directs the universe (2) God is an impersonal force that set the universe in motion (3) God is a spirit found in all aspects of the universe These two questions were combined into the following scale: (1) I am certain God exists and is a person (2) I am certain God exists and is a spirit (3) I am certain God exists as an impersonal force (4) I think that God exists but am uncertain (5) I think or am certain that God does not exist
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Life After Death Which one of the following statements comes CLOSEST to your views on life after death? (1) I am sure there IS life after death. (2) I believe in life after death but have some doubts (3) I think there is NO life after death, but I am not certain (4) I am sure there is NO life after death Which of the following comes CLOSEST to your view of OBTAINING life after death? (1) The right beliefs lead to a rewarding life after death (2) The right behavior leads to a rewarding life after death These two questions were combined into the following scale: (1) I am sure about life after death and it is achieved by right belief (2) I am sure about life after death and it is achieved by right conduct (3) I believe in life after death but am not sure (4) I do not believe in life after death (sure or unsure) Devil The Devil really exists and is not just a symbol. Do you strongly agree, agree, have no opinion, disagree or strongly disagree? Evolution Evolution is the BEST explanation for the origins of life on earth. Do you strongly agree, agree, have no opinion, disagree or strongly disagree? Lay Liberalism All the great religions of the world are equally true and good. Do you strongly agree, agree, have no opinion, disagree or strongly disagree? Factor Loadings: Bible authority Nature of God Devil exists Life after death Evolution Lay liberalism
.829 .813 .772 .756 .755 .544
Eigenvalue 3.384. Factor accounts for 56.39 percent of the variance. Theta=.84
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Religious Movement Measures and Factor Score Support for Traditionalist or Modernist Goals Thinking about your denomination or church, which of the following statements comes CLOSEST to your view? My denomination or church should. . . . . (1) Strive to preserve its traditional beliefs and practices OR (2) Be willing to adjust traditions in light of new ideas OR (3) Strive to adopt modern beliefs and practices. Secular respondents (without any religious preference) were coded as (4) to create a four-point measure. Religious Movement Identifications Protestants Do any of the following religious terms apply to you? Please indicate Yes or No after each option. (1) evangelical Christian (2) Pentecostal Christian (3) charismatic Christian (4) fundamentalist Christian (5) traditional or conservative Christian (6) mainline Christian (7) liberal or progressive Christian (8) interfaith or ecumenical Christian Catholics As a Catholic, do any of the following religious terms apply to you? Please indicate Yes or No after each option. (1) traditional or conservative Catholic (2) liberal or progressive Catholic (3) charismatic Catholic (4) interfaith or ecumenical Catholic After examination, we used “traditional or conservative” and “liberal or progressive” for both Protestants and Catholics in a three-point scale: (1) Traditional ID only (2) Both or Neither (3) Liberal ID only. Factor Loadings: Movement Goals Movement ID
.917 .917
Eigenvalue 1.682. Factor accounts for 84.09 percent of the variance. Theta=.81.
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TABLE 1. Correlations between Religion Measures and GOP Presidential and Republican Party Identification (Pearson’s r) Bush Vote Party ID Religious Tradition Evangelical Protestant .300*** .262*** Latter-day Saints .128*** .095*** Hispanic Protestant .036 .015 White Catholic .020 .013 Mainline Protestant -.016 .021 Hispanic Catholic -.071** -.067*** Jewish -.083*** -.078*** All Others -.099*** -.057** Unaffiliated -.191*** -.113*** Black Protestant -.196*** -.220*** Religious Behavior Church Attendance Bible reading Donation for religious purposes Pray outside of worship Participation in religious small group Volunteering through church Behavior Index Religious Belief Devil really exists Bible authoritative Personal God exists Life after death All religions equally true and good Evolution best explanation for life
.247*** .242*** .224*** .201*** .201*** .139***
.145*** .165*** .142*** .124*** .126*** .087***
.261***
.165***
.343** .336** .320** .296** -.308** -.394**
Belief Index Religious Movement Catholic “Traditional” identification Protestant “Traditional” identification Catholic “Progressive” identification Protestant “Progressive” identification Prefer Denomination to Maintain Tradition/Modernize Movement Index
.236*** .221*** .213*** .215*** -.225*** -.279***
.427***
.322***
.336*** .194*** -.205*** -.318***
.180*** .149*** -.117** -.246***
.286***
.189***
.343***
.227***
Source: 2004 Religion and Politics Post-Election Survey, University of Akron *p
