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Science and Politics in Latin America: The Old and the New Context in Argentina Pablo Kreimer Science Technology Society 1996; 1; 267 DOI: 10.1177/097172189600100205 The online version of this article can be found at: http://sts.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/1/2/267

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Science and Politics in Latin America: The Old and the New Context in Argentina* PABLO KREIMER

The aim of this paper is to analyse the development of science policy in Argentina, from its emergence almost four decades ago to its challenges in the current context. In contrast to the functional kind of analysis that has been usual in Latin America for a long time, the attempt is to develop a theoretical framework based on the relationships among the most significant actors (the state, the scientific community, the university, and the business sector), both in social and institutional development. The process of institutional transformation as well as the most relevant aspects of the national/international context are also taken into account. In the concluding section some of the substantive problems that will undoubtedly form part of the debate on science policy in Argentina and in Latin America in the years to come are discussed.

Introduction DEVELOPMENT OF science policy in Argentina may in a sense be considered to be relatively similar to that of the majority of the most advanced Third World countries.’ Thus, it was in the decades succeeding the Second World War that a series of institutions were established whose objective was to become active in the fields of scientific and (although characteristically different) technological research. Many of the characteristics that this process gave rise to in Argentina present certain unique features that warrant special consideration. For this reason, the first part of this article will be devoted to describing this process as it unfolded in the Argentinian context. In the second part, we will analyse how conditions have transformed in the succeeding decades in order to arrive at the present situation which is characterised by a relationship between science and politics.

THE

Pablo Kreimer is at the University of Quilmes, E-Bola 5165 Buenos Aires, Argentina.

Capital


Federal 1425,

268 .

Part One The State and the Actors

Science and technology policies like other public policies are the products of a set of social contingencies and assumed postures. It is necessary to understand this process in order to study the development of these policies within a dimension of specific fields of power, pre-existent to the policies themselves, but which are also created through the emergence of a problematic field previously barren. First, we will theoretically restrict our reflections and study the process of historical emergence to one particular question. By question we refer to a set of concerns, or problems which, according to the perspective, the interests or needs of different groups or sectors, are socially problematic.&dquo; That is to say, in the enormous universe of existing questions, only certain ones will be taken up in such a way as to generate the taking of stands by other sectors, giving rise to the conviction that it is necessary to ’act’ in such a way as would tend to provide a solution to the said question. In this way, certain problems may be differentiated from others, according to the generalised conviction regarding whether taking action on these problems is deemed effective or not. For example, in the case of meteorological problems that are remote from human concerns, or when problems only concern a small segment of the population, and there is a lack of conviction for ’resolving’ the question in some way, it is not possible to take a social stand and, typically, the problem is marginalised in the ’agendas’ addressing such questions. In other cases, the conviction that some action must be taken, vigorously produces a whole array of possible alternatives. At this point, it is possible to hope for two possible solutions: first, that the sectors that wish to deny the problematic nature of the issue succeed in imposing themselves, such that the question is forgotten, although it may be taken up again at some later time. On the other hand, if the awareness of the problematic nature of the issue rises, and the sectors that oppose the intervention of the state retire, the problem acquires a new status as a result of the state taking a stand, as a consequence of a period of rising social problems during which the different sectors put pressure on the


269 state to intervene in

some way. The manner of intervention becomes the nucleus of the debate, in a process which implies the initiation of institutional transformations. The groups or sectors that take positions in the process of addressing a problem, may be analysed as social actors, a concept which is useful in understanding the behaviour of social groups in a dynamic sense, considering a collective subject with the capacity to socially interact. Actors are then those subjects who have the capacity to express their assumed positions, to generate demands and to establish, in specific fields of power, emerging conflicts and the possibilities for their resolution. It is possible, within this framework, to view the state as a social actor that participates in unfolding conflicts, but under the condition that we are dealing with a special actor. On the one hand, because, at least in an imaginary sense-as is often the case with actors-the state is an actor that represents or tries to represent society as a whole. This pretense, while present in the discourse of some actors, constitutes the central element of legitimacy for the state, and the primacy of the state over other actors. On the other hand, the state is not generally a homogenous actor, but rather a set of institutions that may in some ways act in coordination with each other, but may also act individually and even, quite often, in a contradictory manner. In this sense, for the study of policymaking, it is necessary to take into account what is the predominant type of state action, more so than what is the logic of each one of these actions taken as a singular entity. In addition, there is a certain relative autonomy of the state bureaucracy. This element is critical in understanding state action not only in the behaviour of the institutions, but also in terms of the particular interests of different groups of functionaries that in certain cases do not act according to the interests represented, but according to their particular roles as functionaries. What becomes important, then, for analysis of the historical appearance of a question, is the dynamic process of position taking and the composition of the actors with regard to this question.

The Old Context for Science and

Policy

in

Argentina

As a consequence of the modernising model of the political elite that crystallised in the last decades of nineteenth century, science


270

began to develop into a set of institutions dedicated to research, at first encouraged by the ’import’ of European scientists, especially Italians and, later, Germans.’ Without a doubt, it is the figure of Sarmiento (writer, essayist, and President of the Republic between 1868 and 1874) that emerges most clearly, as the intellectual prototype. He is also the clearest antecedent, in the nineteenth century, for what would later become the chief scientific concerns. Until well into the present century, whoever dedicated himself to science was, in general, descendant from an illustrious family, who had the opportunity to study in Europe, and who founded the first schools in which teaching and research were slowly converging. -At the discursive level-and the formal level-it was after the University Reform of 1818, that the practice of research was integrated institutionally into university life, given that the Reform postulated three fundamental principals for the university: Instruction, Research, and Extension of the University.4 Thus, the country in the first decades of this century maintained a relatively important and high level of competence in certain disciplines, especially focused in the area of biomedicine at the University of Buenos Aires, while other disciplines, such as physics and chemistry, were also significantly advanced, the former at the University of La Plata and in Cordoba, as well as at the University of Buenos Aires. A central characteristic of this development of scientific activity is its particular ’functional isolation’ to which the socio-institutional aspects refer. In effect, the hypothesis may be formulated’ that Argentina experienced a modernising cultural and political development long before the productive structures were industrialised and began a process of substitution for imports. This modernisation had, as a consequence, an initiation highly imitative of the predominant behavioural patterns of the developed countries, an understandable consequence given the close relationship that united the elite of Argentina with the intellectual groups in the industrialised world. In other words, the positive social value granted to scientific research originated more from an abstract desideratum that considered science as a desirable good, than from a concrete concern linked to problems of material production or social

utility. If, in this development of science in Argentina, there exists a central personality, it is without doubt the figure of Dr Bernardo Houssay who dominates the protagonists’ role throughout this century. Houssay, like so many others of his generation, came Downloaded from http://sts.sagepub.com by Pablo Kreimer on May 1, 2008 © 1996 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution.

271

from a family whose position permitted him, at the beginning of the century, to meet the costs of his medical studies. His attitudes were, overall, centred in the rigours of scientific activity and the absolute conviction that the scientist had to dedicate his entire life to science and research.’ It is in this conviction that the first ideas of a socially problematic question emerges, that is, an area in which ’something must be done’, and ’someone has to take responsibility’. In the prologue to his doctoral thesis, in 1911, he said: ’I hope that soon the pecuniary conditions of the laboratories will be improved and improved remuneration will permit professors of the experimental sciences to dedicate themselves exclusively to their work’ .’ These three elements, the demand to ’do something’ in the area of research, the centrality of biomedical research, and the intention to regard research as an exclusive task, are key factors for understanding the development of science policy-making in Argentina. Let us consider, then, the trajectory of Houssay in terms of the constitution of a social group, a collective actor. If we take the liberty of setting aside the epistemological implications of the concept of a scientific community (especially in the Kuhnian sense),’ we can use this concept to metaphorically represent the historical constitution of a social actor: the scientists. This group began to establish itself as a movement at the end of the last century and, by the 1930s, was relatively stable and was able to make explicit demands on the political system. Nonetheless, it was at the end of the 1940s that a fundamental event occurred that permitted a qualitative leap in the science-society relationship in Argentina: the awarding of the Nobel Prize to Houssay in 1949, for his work in physiology (concerning the function of the hypophysis). From that moment onwards, Houssay’s role as a spokesman for the ’scientific community’ became evident, and on the social stage as well his position was legitimised: this was the first Nobel Prize ever awarded to an Argentine scientist. In the 1940s, demands were beginning to be made for a space, an environment towards which it was necessary to generate and develop specific actions from the public stage. Increasingly, there appeared the figure of the subject making demands: requesting that the state had to ’take responsibility’, and to articulate, within the ’array’ of sectorial parcels destined for policy-making, the area of scientific research. Thus, the state had to establish itself as the locus at which scientific activity had to be legitimised and, consequently, institutionalised. The justification for taking responsibility is


272

simple mechanism: it begins with the affirmation of the intrinsic good of science, as a human activity disposed to broadening knowledge-and, therefore, the domination~f the processes of nature. Sarmiento’s view that there is a need for scientific development in the countries lagging behind is recovered in its totality, absolutely disposing of the mechanisms of ’social appropriation’ for this generated scientific knowledge. Public statements about the necessity of taking specific actions for the development of science did not consider it in any way necessary to specify the ways in which the development of research could be utilised by society, given that these statements were based on, as a guiding principle, the belief that specific conditions of science worked for the ’common good’. What was it that this group of scientists demanded during those years? To begin with, two things: on the one hand, political a

institutionalisation, that is,

relevant status within the set of political’ agenda of problems of the state. In other words, resources, professionalisation of the field, recognition for the role of the investigator. On the other hand, autonomy for these same scientists who would be taking over the administration of the resources which they had been asking for. The first demand assumed the creation of a specific environment from which scientific activity could be recognised, that is, institutional space would be established for compliance with the second requirement, the distribution of resources. In the discourse, however, the need to establish a real science policy does not appear, at least in the sense that this would be thought out in terms of social interactions and planning. The explanation for this has to take into account that the initial concept of the scientists was opposed to all that might imply an external definition of the scientific environment with regard to regulation of research activities; they were of the opinion that only scientists had the competence to establish which were worthy research subjects, to identify priorities, and to

issues

assign

on

a

the

resources.

Second, it should be noted that in the process of institutionalisation of science in Argentina, as will be seen, an imitative pattern followed that did not necessarily take into account the local conditions into which these activities were inserted, so much as the political aspect and the economic consequences. In this way, there is a central component missing from the model that was present in was


273

the European experience with respect to science policies, that is, the existence of extensive and long-established bonds between the scientific and the political environments, which is referred to as the establishment of an implicit ’contract’ by which the state offers to science a specific institutional space and explicit support in return for a contribution to the resolution of concrete demands arising from the political environment’ and also the concern for social

(and economic) utility. It is the absence of this relationship which situates the local scientific community in a space of great autonomy and which causes it to conceive of the political world as distant from its own world. Any involvement by any other social actor not belonging to the scientific field is considered an act of ’intromission’. 10 The two explicit claims of responsibility, the claim for autonomy and the request for increasing resources, are presented together and are inextricably linked. There is an inherent contradiction in this formulation however, in that neither the state nor any other organisation is rationally willing to deliver resources at an increasing rate if, at the same time, there is no increase in its capacity to involve itself in the tasks to which it is contributing for solvency: it is a question of the necessity of establishing some type of contract, and this, it is understood, consists of at least two parts. Nonetheless, it was only towards the end of the 1950s, with the true institutionalisation of policies, that this conflict was resolved. The Institutionalisation of Science

Policy-making

In general terms, we would propose that the process of institutionalisation of science policy-making emerged at the end of the 1950s in the light of several distinct concurrent elements:&dquo;

1. The post-Peronist university. 2. The predominance of developmental models, a new place for science, and a boom in planning. The influence of the European Commission for Latin America (ECLA). 3. The process of institutionalisation of the Technology Policy Centres (PCT) in the developed countries. 4. The activities of international agencies like the OAS and UNESCO.


274

After the 1955 coup which ousted President Per6n, the university experienced a relatively festive climate; moreover, it was foundational : rather than reorganising the university staff as had been done previously, there was a true re-foundation of the institution: new programmes, new departments and chairs were created, in general there was a spirit of renewal and effervescence. The claim for the establishment of policies regarding scientific research had already extended well into the community, especially taking into account that the university did not have then in its regulations-no does it have even now-a category specifically for the researcher. This is not to be considered as extraordinary as researchers continue to constitute a small minority within the institutions of the university, whose professional bias prevails. In the 1950s, in the greater part of Latin America, consciousness about a central problem-development-increased. In Argentina, the fundamental idea was centred upon conceiving of the problem in terms of a necessity for qualitatively intensifying and transforming the process of substituting for imports which had begun in the 1930s. If the years leading up to Peronism had been concerned chiefly with substituting for imports in the area of consumer goods, with restrictions in the area of capital goods, in this latter period the central concern was with the problem of energy, on the one hand, and with the capacity for autonomous generation’of capital goods, on the other hand. In this context, the idea that was incorporated with great enthusiasm, first in the intellectual circles (especially as a consequence of work by the ECLA) and later in the political sphere, was the crucial role of scientific and technological research within the framework of a model for development. In addition, this conviction was simultaneous with the boom in planning theories: development must be planned, that is, it is necessary to elaborate plans for growth in the long term which take into account the necessities of each sector, the conditions in the country for production, and the selection of strategic areas for development. It is paradoxical that, on the one hand, the development models had as a model the United States, a successful country during those years with its strong impulse, both publicly and privately, towards R&D; nonetheless, on the other hand, the theories could not conceal the prevalent admiration for planning Soviet planning, policies to which many economists of the region dedicated themselves for many years of intensive study.’2 Within Downloaded from http://sts.sagepub.com by Pablo Kreimer on May 1, 2008 © 1996 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution.

275

these schemes, science and technology, first in abstract terms but later in more real terms, were to become established as prerequisites for a model of development; accordingly, this would not be possible without a true impulse towards scientific research and technological development. In addition, there was an important concern for control of the transfer of technology from the exterior of the country, and diverse mechanisms of regulation of this flow were tried out. In conclusion, what was intended was the establishment of a similar contract to that which had been established many decades before in Europe, but with a more local content and with a (similarly) strong pretension of autonomy. Concerning the imitative character of the model, we agree with Oteiza,’3 in that

Why many of the groups concerned with these problems, took the ’package’ [of the policies for science and technology in European countries] as something universally good and valid, applicable in principle and without major difficulties to our reality. Thus, various ministries, secretaries and counsels were created in Latin America, policies were formulated, inventories, reviews and data-cataloguing were performed, organisations were

had

established, programs

were

elaborated and instruments and example of that which books and manuals.

designed, all to fit the image already been well-described in

were

It .should be noted that, nonetheless, in the study by Oteiza a fundamental lacuna is the lack of reference to the agents or actors in this process, that is, the concrete historical conditions in which the process described took place. For this reason, in the analysis that we present, the ’transference of institutional models’, in addition to being undeniable, occupies a central role, though not unique, in a process which, besides being ideological, is social. In the case of Argentina, the model that attracted the most attention was the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) of France, an organisation established in 1939 and refounded after the war. This is not the place for an in-depth discussion of the history of the CNRS, but we cite here, in synthesis, an opinion that describes especially well the discussions of the period. For Jean Perrin and other founders of the CNRS, the problem of reforming scientific research consisted essentially in locating a


276

sufficient number of

worthy men and authorising them with the necessary financing. Although a significant number of these reformers were Marxists, impressed by the Soviet system of financing, of coordination and exploitation of science, they were convinced, by and large, that it was under a system of laissez-faire that pure science functioned best. Therefore, the state should provide aid to the scientists, but the responsibility for defining the priorities of research and research activities should rest with the scientists themselves.’4 In this way, during the import of the ’institutional’ model, the same arguments and debates were generated as seen in the context of the emergence of the original. The National Council of Scientific and Technological Research (CONICET) was established in 1958, modelled on the general organisational example set by the French institution. Without doubt, and ironically, this would seem to contradict the statement made by the French Minister of Research, according to whom ’the CNRS is an example of an institution that the whole world admires and envies, but no one copies’. As in the case of the CNRS, the CONICET was given responsibilities at a variety of levels: planning and coordination, on the one hand, and promotion, on the other. Similarly, just as in the case of the prototype, the CONICET could never fulfil its primary objective. For this reason, 10 years later, the current Secretariat of Science and Technology (SECYT) was created which, after passing through diverse institutional branches, entered the orbit of the President of the nation. What the CONICET did accomplish (as did the CNRS) was an unforeseen function: carrying out research and investigation. First, with the creation in 1960 of permanent research positions, a body of more or less permanent scientists with a status similar to public functionaries was created. In the decade of the 1970s, there followed the creation of various institutes for the development of different areas of research. However, as the institutional model was available ’on the market’, there was a lack of a specific agent in order to render viable the ’transference’. This role was filled by the respective offices of the OAS and the UNESCO. They organised a series of meetings in which the necessity to implement a national scientific policy was discussed. On the part of the OAS, the development of programmes that impelled the deployment of instruments for the design of


277

science and technology policies was stimulated. And in the case of the UNESCO, the emphasis was fundamentally on the establishment of central planning organisations, at the highest possible political levels, those being at the level of ministries or secretariats of the state, a policy that was certainly not limited only to Latin America, but also covered the whole of the developing world.

Part Two

The Conditions

Giving Rise

to the Current Context

Following the period we have just been discussing, there emerged, quite suddenly, what has often been referred to as the golden years, especially with reference to the years 1958-66. During this period, the articulation of what has been called the contract was in full force. Scientists received a relatively high quantity of resources, and certain disciplines were notably enriched, in particular physics (the first chair in nuclear physics was created), biology and social sciences (sociology as a career was established). This was the period which witnessed tremendous development of other science policy institutions: the National Commission of Atomic Energy (CONEA) which not only brought together and formed an important group of scientists, but also technologists concerned with production; the National Institute of Industrial Technology (INTI); and the National Institute of Agro-Technology (INTA). It may be said that, in general, the level of autonomy granted to scientific research activities with regard to the political powers was quite high. The CONICET was presided over by Houssay, together with Rolando Garcia, then Dean of the prestigious Facultad de Ciencias at the University of Buenos Aires. The mechanisms for promotion were functioning well, at a time when a new generation of scientists-now enlarged-was entering the field. But it was not only an autonomy with respect to the political powers, but also an autonomy with regard to society in general. However, within the scientific community there was a debate regarding the need to pay attention to such problems as social necessities or the world of production, a debate which pitted the scientists who believed in ’pure science’ against the ’committed’ scientists; the consequences in fact, beyond the discursive, are not particularly relevant, at least


278

within the complex that we might call ’academic’, of the researchers of the CONICET and the universities (though the situation was different in institutions such as the CONEA or the INTI). The relationship with the world of production was, at best, minimal; which was a consequence of the lack of communication between researchers and business leaders. During periods of high direct foreign investment (access to foreign capital began towards the end of the 1950s), local business saw little utility in taking advantage of the efforts made by local scientists. On the other hand, these were years in which a linear vision of research predominated, beginning in basic science, continuing into applied science, and ending in innovation. As the majority of scientists (within the aforementioned complex) attached greater value to basic research, the supposition was that the results would ’arrive later’, after traversing a long stretch of road; what was important, from the policy-making point of view, was to generate a stock of knowledge to be available for later use. Certainly, this model did not function well, for reasons that have been extensively studied and explained.&dquo; This process clearly broke down by 1966. As a consequence of the military coup that occurred in that year, a large number of scientists were forced to emigrate (the military occupied the universities and removed academic opponents, in what is referred to as the night of the long sticks) and the majority of research groups slowly disintegrated. This disintegration was especially apparent in the field of ’academic science’, principally linked to the university, although there were notable and rare exceptions in such institutes as the CONEA, in which activities and support for investigative teams were sustained continuously over successive periods. 16 For the remainder, the process of deterioration which began around this time continued, except for a brief period between 1973 and 1975, until the restoration of democracy in 1983, and the sudden changes which occurred subsequent to the end of the military regime, in large part due to the defeat in the Malvinas (Falklands) war.

military government which assumed power in change in some lines of policy while, in other sectors, it is possible to identify certain continuities. As a general pattern, the strongly discriminatory ideological content of the regime implied a consolidation of the process that began in 1966; The authoritarian

1976, signified

a


279

in effect, during the period 1976-83, a significant exodus of scientists occurred as a direct consequence of the persecution of the period. This process was especially important in the university environment and groups of the CONICET, many of which were literally dissolved. The explicit policy of the universities was to sideline the priorities of investigation, and those teams that did continue working had to do so under precarious circumstances, or with support from external or international organisations. In the organisation of research dependent on the CONICET a substantial change occurred, such as the creation of numerous institutes directly dependent on the Council which modified the initial structure of the organisation, conformed on a base in which the privileged interlocutors were scientists-the team heads. With the new system, the budget, rather than being attributable to projects periodically presented to the Council and evaluated by the Advisory Commissions, was distributed by the director of each institute, which implied a singular loss of information concerning the content of the work and projects developed in each institute at the time as greater political control of the scientists was assured. As an additional note, it may be observed that research in social sciences was virtually dismantled from the public research complex, such that-among those groups that remained in the country-there took place a sort of relocalisation of the private research centres that depended on financing from external organisations or foundations. With respect to other institutions, the panorama during the period may be best summarised by the experiences of two organisations devoted to science policy and research activities. In the CONEA, as has already been advanced, a high degree of continuity is verifiable in research activity, and the budget even grew considerably,&dquo; perhaps in relation to obvious direct applications signified by research in atomic energy for military use. In the INTA, on the other hand, a change in policy orientation occurred that is enormously revealing: from an emphasis on research related to regional economies, somewhat lagging behind in relation to international patterns of production, there was a shift to the development of research with a strong emphasis on application to the region of pampa humeda, traditionally a producer of exportable goods and generator of significant incomes and foreign currency. This change in research strategy perhaps reflects most clearly the


280

presence of the

ruling power coalition, within which the landowning aristocracy occupied an eminent position, precisely for its capacity to equilibrate the balance of payments through the exportations of the region. During the military government regime, science and technology policy constituted a relatively marginal area within public policymaking. A large majority of researchers was considered potentially dangerous due to their political commitments, a situation that permeated the entire intellectual field. Perhaps the effect of the military regime can be said to have been the greatest on technology policy. For example, an indiscriminate opening of the economy permitted the import of not only capital goods, but also all types of products at prices much lower than those on the local market. This policy was based on the belief that Argentinian products would become more competitive in the world market. Nonetheless, as this process was not accompanied by any political initiative supporting technological transformation (to try to be more competitive), there were two major consequences: the gradual distintegration of -

medium and small firms, many of which had been the consequence of a long process of adaptive technological learning or endogenous development; and the concentration of production within the sectors composed of a few select internationalised groups with little or no impetus for local R&D. As a corollary, during this period, the existence of a set of policies (or the absence thereof) may be affirmed which emerged as a consequence of the type of coalition of actors which controlled the state. Concentrated business and agrarian groups linked to the export sector, sectors associated with research whose greatest utility was related to military uses (nuclear physics, certain branches of chemistry, aluminium) and ’intellectuals’ conforming to the model (particularly close to the official catholic church). On the other hand, this political coalition model assumes the active exclusion of certain other actors: the scientists from the academic complex previously referred to (that had been established as a collective subject during the previous period), the sectors of industrial production linked to medium and small firms and those sectors pertaining to agrarian production linked to regional and local

production. In 1983, there was a resurgence of a spirit and eagerness for ’restoration’ of past glory. Nonetheless, the conditions two decades


281

later were substantially different. The features characteristic of the scenario of the 1990s, as a consequence of the profound transformations during the previous decades, may be summarised as follows. 1. In contrast to the previous period of economic take-off (during the 1950s and 1960s), the so-called debt crisis was beginning to devastate Latin American economies, a consequence of debts accrued at low rates by the majority of enterprises. In Argentina, the state assumed both the large external public debt and the private one, and as a consequence its movements in subsequent years were greatly restricted with regard to the financing of public policies. 2. On the ideological map, the previous theories of development gave way to neo-liberal views which proposed downsizing the state. The state had to withdraw to what may be considered its primordial functions: security, health and education: although, in the sectors of health and education there was a powerful tendency toward privatisation. In effect, private universities have been multiplying in the last 15 years, leading to a certain elitisation in the training of professionals and researchers. Although some private universities have made some effort to incorporate scientific research into their programmes, by and large scientific research is still confined to public universities. 3. The science policy-making organisations have found themselves practically without resources, especially since the beginning of the 1990s, and have even put forth proposals for their own privatisation. In fact, the CONICET has become decreasingly important as an organisation for the promotion of research since its budget for scholarships, subsidies, field trips, etc. was drastically reduced at the end of the 1980s. The major portion of its budget is spent on the salaries of scientists and the maintenance of its own institutions. The INTI has been reduced to one-fourth its previous size, and the CONEA has been partially privatised. In effect, the CONEA was the only organisation that concentrated on its own sector planning, research, production and activities control. The transfer of production activities (the nuclear plants) to the private sector led to the withdrawal of an essential source of financing for research in the area.


282

4. In the years in which the institutions of science policymaking were established, the scientific community was able to find a privileged spokesman to dialogue with the political powers. However, since the 1980s, and even more evident in the 1990s, there have been difficulties in articulating as a collective. This may be explained in part as a consequence of the aforementioned exodus, and of the fact that many investigators, once residing abroad, have not returned to the country. Thus, from the point of view of tradition, there has been a (partial) generational rupture which would requireiif it were possible-the emergence and articulation of a whole new generation of scientists to overcome. 5. In connection with the preceding, one feature seems even more evident than it had been several years earlier: the majority of scientists have engaged in their postgraduate studies abroad, especially in the United States and in certain European countries (the UK, France, and Germany). When they return (although a significant percentage have not returned) they re-establish and maintain connections with the centres of research in which they were previously working, and within that same network of relations in which each respective centre was involved. Thus, their ’inward’ connections within Argentina tend to be considerably weaker than those that they maintain ’outwardly’ in the international arena. This leaves the weaker groups, those with less recognition and less quality, ’isolated&dquo; or confined within the local scientific community. This contrast is evident at two levels: on the one hand, those scientists who return, try to continue working along the same lines of research as they had developed in the foreign centres. However, in many cases this endeavour is frustrated by several constraints such as a lack of resource materials, equipment, and trained investigators, for which reason they must reconform. On the other hand, when the ’implantation’ of a line of work has succeeded, it tends to produce a ’breach’ with regard to the local scientific community, relative to possible social or economic interests that such lines might represent, given that the context of their formulation is substantially different from the local context (whether it be because of a real inadequacy in the work with respect to the local needs, or a lack of local means to take


283

advantage of the work). As

a

consequence, in any case, the

re-integration process proves to be a source of conflict. 6. Also related to the preceding, the 1980s, and 1990s have an international context that has been drastically altered. Economic processes have become increasingly globalised (as Latin America experienced recently after the Mexican crisis). Scientific research, far from being alien to this process, has experienced in recent decades tremendous internationalisation : thematic priorities, prospective lines, privileged disciplines and relevance of productive developments, are all directed as much by an ’international scientific community’ as by the most important business R&D centres in the international arena. Competitiveness appears to be the primary goal of any public policy in the current scenario.&dquo;

presented

As a consequence in the mid-1990s, we are faced with the fact that the elements that prevailed 30 or 40 years ago appear substantially different: the actors have changed, the state has been modified, and the international context has been altered. In this context we may dedicate a paragraph to the world of production. Until the 1970s, the predominant industrial model was based upon large businesses, in general, conglomerates of transnational capital, but, fundamentally, within a network of medium-sized and some small national enterprises which performed what has been termed in related literature a model of adaptive technologies, a kind of mix between the import of technology and local adaptations. In addition, there was a group of public enterprises that was viewed in good measure as the motor for a possible innovative strategy in the industrial world. Thus, for example, when the first nuclear reactor was built in Argentina, 40 per cent of the civil work was carried out in the country. In the last 15 years, however, this scenario has been drastically altered. The aforementioned network of firms has given way to a set of large businesses and business groups (holdings), centred in export-oriented sectors, with low aggregate levels, working with imported state-of-the-art technology, producers of commodities for which the country is a ’taker of prices’ at the international level, as well as in the industries related to agricultural production. This was concomitant with a process of greater centralisation in a decreasing number of enterprises, and with the (almost) completed


284

process of privatisation of public enterprises. Certainly, in the previous model it was rare that industry required the collaboration of scientific research. Nonetheless, according to the characteristics of the productive system, the likelihood of establishing an innovative ’demand-pull’ model appeared, at least, to be high.19 However, a certain degree of interaction was, in fact, promoted through the movement of professionals toward those productive sectors which undertook some investigative tasks, as may have been the case in the chemical and pharmaceutical industries. We can contend that the institutional context of science today is approaching a deep crisis whose resolution is still risky to predict. Within the framework of increasing restrictions on resources, some of the members of the academic complex (the CONICET as well as universities) have resorted to establishing agreements with business for the development of some products. In this context, the case of certain successful undertakings (especially in the area of biotechnology) can be cited. There are isolated cases however, and in no instance has it been possible to substitute for state financing as a fundamental source of resources. In other cases, also relatively successful, a part of the development has been supported by the mechanisms of international cooperation. What has not been possible to overcome, in general terms, has been the divorce between scientific research and society. As the state has partially withdrawn as a promoter (and supposed initiator) of research activities, it has been difficult to substitute its role as a mediator with social demands, and science appears to be confined only to fulfilling the demands for excellence placed upon it by the international scientific community.2° On the other hand, institutions such as the CONICET, that speak on behalf of an army of scientists with the stability of functionaries, have begun to be seriously questioned. Equal to some of the attacks against the French inspirational model (CNRS),21 the difficult relationship between CONICET, the universities and social (and economic) needs makes one think that the current institutional design is not the most adequate, in large measure because of its extreme rigidity. The most often proposed solution has been one of transferring the researchers to the universities. This solution would only be possible, however, in a framework in which the universities themselves would substantially transform their current functional model, modifying among other things the professional spirit that in many


285

still dominates, at the same time as they would incorporate flexible administrative mechanisms and norms of evaluation that succeed in breaking the rigidities of a model based on the oldtime party-boss system. As Salomon (1994: 23) pointed out, and this seems valid for Argentina, cases

more

the tropism of international science - forces many developing countries to two excesses: first, too much research oriented toward topics which are far from being the most urgent problems ; second, too many scientists who are not even interested in solving these problems .... It is in the long-term that the role of science is crucial as a factor in educational, cultural, social and institutional change. We return, then, to the point of departure: the development of policies results from a social process of articulation and negotiation. It is difficult to confront a state of crisis if there is a persistence of various models and attitudes that prevailed in the

past: 1. A

2.

3.

growing autonomy of the scientific-technological community, with the consequence of acceptance of the patterns of the international scientific community (especially of certain centres for research), as the only point of reference. The emergence of an ’enlightened’ planning bureaucracy with the ability to define priorities and lines of action. The counterpart of the preceding: partial withdrawal of the state with regard to the problems of scientific and technological development, leaving the problem in the hands of

market forces. 4. The continuation of ’imported’ institutional models that are inadequate for taking action against the current contextual challenges (both local and international). 5. The illusory strategy of national firms that assume that all the knowledge they could possibly need is ’accessible’ on the international market, with the consequent disdain for locally generated knowledge or, for that matter, the local development of printed material and the adaptation of knowledge generated abroad.


286

The articulation of adequate policies (leaving aside possible content) in this context only seems feasible after a definition of the spaces of interaction, negotiation and confrontation has been established, and in which the different logics (of each actor), active and operating in today’s reality, is made manifest. This implies, undoubtedly that there must be institutional redesign in order that the institutions charged with scientific policy-making may be able to incorporate the conflict, as well as design the instruments for processing it; a pachydermatous National Council hardly seems the appropriate space within which this may be carried out. Certainly, the transformation process that begins with the opening of spaces of confrontation implies a redefinition of the actors themselves as well as their relations with other actors. This process, as the recent aforementioned debate demonstrated, is a difficult one because of the deeply rooted logic of each individual actor. However, once society begins to demand greater accountability and to question the reasons for financing scientific research, in a context of increasingly scare resources, the issues become self-evident. This articulation of policies should, in addition, be based on a set of studies on the reality of scientific practices, as proposed by Elzinga and Jamison (1995), by a community of STS scholars who investigate the cultural particularities of locally produced science. The objective is two-fold: the STS community, still in its initial stages, should provide information to decision makers (the development of specific indicators, for example, is still at an embryonic stage, although some vigorous activity has already begun), but at the same time they could, and should, act as mediators for the rest of society which, at best, has only a vague idea of the scientific practices it finances. The perspectives outlined appear to leave little room for optimism, given the magnitude of the challenges and difficulties that we have identified. Nonetheless, as Vessuri (1994) has stated in a recent work, ’necessary, albeit insufficient for great success, that ultimately depends on radical social transformations and careful international

negotiations’.&dquo; NOTES *

I

am grateful to my colleagues at the Centro de Estudios e Investigaciones, Mario Albornoz and Leonardo Vaccarezza for their helpful comments and my


287 friend Peter Kahn for the

1. 2.

3. 4.

English version of this paper. The fieldwork for this paper was supported by a grant from the National University of Quilmes. See, for example, Vessuri (1994), Gaillard (1994). This approach has been developed especially by Oszlak and O’Donnel (1982). I follow the approach of these authors regarding the methodological aspects of treating the emergence of policies. The approach is similar to that developed by Elzinga and Jamison (1995), for whom science policy is seen as the outcome of the dynamic interplay among actors representing what we refer to as different policy cultures (p. 573). And: ’One way to analyze the interaction between politics and policy is by focusing on the various actors who are involved in the making of science and technology policy’ (p. 575). See, for example, Myers (1994). Of course, the overall incorporation of research into the university environment was a complex and conflictive process whose magnitude goes beyond the reach of this article. As Albornoz has done (1991: 180). See, for example, Buch (1994).

5. 6. 7. Houssay (1942). 8. In effect, this is a concept that has frequently been submitted to analysis, and continues to be satisfactory for sociological tradition, as a consequence of the heavy burden that its use implies. See, for a discussion of this problem: Casas (1980), Gaillard (1994), Bourdieu (1976), Knorr-Cetina (1982), Kreimer (1994b). And for more classical formulations, Hagstrom (1965), Crane (1972) in addition to, of course, the work by Kuhn (1962/70). 9. On this point, see Salomon (1970). Also, Gilpin (1968). 10. The prevailing model was characterised as scientific liberal which promoted laissez-faire and rejected state intervention in education and science. 11. See Kreimer (1988). 12. See, for example, the account given on this topic by Furtado (1987). 13. Oteiza (1992). 14. Lauger (1942). 15. See, among others, Bisang (1994), Kosacoff (1993) and Ablin (1985). 16. It does not seem by chance that this was an institution in which the presence of a significant social actor may be strongly perceived, such as the armed forces and the obvious interest that the development of nuclear energy and its possible applications awakened. 17. For a detailed description and analysis of budget allocation to research institutions during the period 1976-88, see Mosto (1989). For a more recent analysis on this topic, see Bisang (1995). 18. See Petrella (1993), Lisbon Group (1993). 19. See Katz (1987) and Katz and Kosacoff (1989). 20. In this context, see the interesting debate between scientists and political scientists towards the end of 1994, whose title was ’Is It Worth the Trouble to Resuscitate Science in Argentina?’ (’Vale la pena resucitar la ciencia en Argentina?’). The most relevant interventions can be read about in REDES, 3

(March 1995). 21. See Salomon (1993), Kreimer REDES, 3. 22. See Vessuri (1994).

(1994a)

and the intervention of Albornoz in


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