SUPPORTING PLANNING AND SITUATION AWARENESS IN ARMY

(2003) In Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 47th Annual Meeting. Santa Monica, CA: Human Factors and Ergonomics Society.

SUPPORTING PLANNING AND SITUATION AWARENESS IN ARMY COMMAND AND CONTROL Jennifer M. Riley and Mica R. Endsley SA Technologies, Inc. Marietta, GA The planning process is the initial basis for tactical maneuvers and combat operations. Though plans are driven by the intent of the commanding officer, the quality of plans are heavily dependent upon the level of situation awareness of officers involved in the process. To support Army planning in command and control, it is important for us to understand planning and the challenges to providing the critical information underlying it. We conducted a theoretical investigation of maneuvers planning in combat situations. We used results from goal-directed task analysis, and insights from observations of Army training exercises and experiments, to make inferences on the activities carried out in preparation for tactical maneuvers. Our goal was to identify major characteristics of the planning process in current and future Army force structures. We were also interested in identifying human factors issues associated with planning in a rapidly evolving environment, and generating computer-based design concepts to support situation awareness and decision making. INTRODUCTION Plans are the initial basis for military actions. The planning process is conducted to formulate tactical maneuvers and operations for meeting a particular mission’s goals. The opportunity to adequately elaborate on plans and the ability to rapidly modify them during combat can be critical to decision making and operational success. Plans are driven by the desired outcome established by higher headquarters and the intent of the commanding officer. However, the quality of military plans is highly dependent upon the assessment, either good or bad, of current situations. The degree of soldier awareness of elements like terrain, time, the enemy, etc., directly influences his ability to predict, and plan for, what is likely to occur. It is important for us to understand the nature of the planning process and the challenges to providing the critical information underlying it. We conducted a theoretical investigation of maneuvers planning processes in combat situations. We used results from goal-directed task analysis (GDTA), following the methodology prescribed by Endsley (1993), and insights gleaned from observations of Army training exercises and experiments to make inferences on the activities carried out in preparation for tactical maneuvers. Our goal was to identify major characteristics of the planning process in current and future Army force structures. We were also interested in identifying human factors issues associated with planning in a rapidly evolving environment, and generating system designs to support decision making during planning for command and control (C2). THE INVESTIGATION We conducted several interviews with subject matter experts (SMEs) with recent experiences in positions requiring course of action (COA) planning (e.g., brigade-level operations officers (S3), intelligence officers (S2), and logistics officers (S4)). During interviews we used the GDTA to query subjects with respect to critical goals and decisions that are raised during the planning process. For example, subjects were asked to list the “overarching goals of the battle planning

process”, to “provide examples of decisions that must be addressed during planning”, and to discuss the “ideal information needs for making the decisions”. The result of the interviews was a hierarchy of goals and a catalogue of the battlefield decisions, as well a list of SA requirements associated with each decision. In addition to gathering the above information, the interview sessions were used to query subjects on the nature of planning, that is, the common characteristics that are observed or experienced across most planning sessions. Furthermore, we observed Army battle lab experiments and training exercises conducted at Fort Hood, TX, Fort Sill, OK, Fort Leavenworth, KS, and the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, CA, to gather information on Army planning processes. Each of these exercises involved tactical planning and decision making during wartime scenarios. Some involved soldiers using digital systems for C2 activities, while others involved use of legacy systems. All of the exercises included realistic combat scenarios with high rates of information exchange and the need for detailed plans and operation orders. Findings from the task analysis and field observations provided some understanding of aspects of Army planning for C2 that present challenges to soldiers involved in the process. In this paper, we discuss some of the more difficult planning issues and provide examples of design concepts generated for supporting soldiers in planning activities. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PLANNING PROCESS Planning in C2 is highly time-dependent. The fast pace of operations is a well-known aspect of military combat. The amount of time available for planning decreases as orders flow down to lower echelons. The Army currently uses the “onethird, two-thirds” rule, which basically states that the amount of planning time for a given headquarters should not exceed 1/3 of the total planning time available for a mission (FM 71123, 1992). The time limits can significantly impact the amount of detail and flexibility that can be incorporated into plans. Time pressures are also reflected in the number of COAs that can be developed and fleshed out by the staff. Responses elicited from SMEs suggest that the pace of tactical


operations leading up to new missions sometimes allows only enough time for full development and evaluation of a single COA. In addition, there is sometimes too little time for consideration of the various contingencies that might occur. The end result could be plans that are less flexible and do not lend themselves to quick modification. It is important to point out that planning is an ongoing process. It does not stop at the start of tactical operations, but continues throughout execution. In fact, Army Field Manual 71-2 concretely states that planning and execution are “complimentary activities that continue in uninterrupted manner from operation to operation” (FM 71-2, 1988). So, though plans are the initial basis for actions, staffs must expect that plans will vary as the battle unfolds and situations change often and rapidly. Officer’s point out that they must remind themselves to “fight the battle, not the plan”, which typically results in many modified versions of plans over the course of the battle as is evident in the proliferation of fragmentary orders during execution. In fact, SMEs describing the ubiquitous nature of the planning process suggested the need for computer-based tools to support planning activities, completely separate from any tools that might be provided for monitoring the execution of the battle. The SMEs suggest that while some soldiers are concerned with ensuring the commander’s intent is being carried out in current tactics, others are always projecting ahead to the next 24 to 72-hours of a battle. Another major characteristic of C2 planning is that it is a collaborative process. Staff members in various roles must work together to develop COAs to meet objectives. For example, the warfighters in the operations cell must develop initial maneuver schemes to accomplish the mission with the least damage to friendly units and assets. The logistics staff must develop supply schedules to ensure that task force units are always fully supplied and resourced, while also considering the safety of logistics teams on any number of supply routes. Soldiers in the intelligence shop must develop a deep understanding of the enemy situation and any likely, feasible, and/or dangerous enemy COA options. He or she must understand how these options may affect the friendly maneuvers and supply plans, and effectively impart this information to the planning team. Each individual needs to build SA on battlefield events to meet his or her individual goals. In planning, this SA must come together such that the individuals share a common picture (shared SA) and have all of the SA needs required to effectively and adequately contribute assessments and analyses to the overall plan. Each cell or team must provide accurate information to the commander so that all maneuvers can by synchronized during the execution phase. Poor SA in one cell or team can critically affect the quality of information fed into the global plan and be detrimental to the synchronization of events. CHALLENGES TO PLANNING IN C2 There are challenges to planning during C2 activities in the current force structure. More complex issues will arise with the Army’s new Objective Force concept of operations.

These challenges are directly related to the nature of the process and result in new needs for technological support. Contingency Planning. It is very challenging to plan in a time intensive, dynamic environment. Planners need support for generating more COAs and tactical options at multiple decision points more quickly. During combat, Army planning and execution must occur such that the enemy is forced to react to new and unpredictable offensive operations. This requires that planning staff incorporate a series of contingency plans at various decision points in multiple projected COAs. However, the operational pace frequently does not afford the time and opportunity to fully develop two or more distinguishable, feasible, acceptable COAs with all the potential contingencies on enemy activities. Furthermore, because planning continues throughout execution, soldiers are often planning on the move, such that elements like areas of operation, terrain effects, target areas, or enemy engagement are constantly changing. Planners need to be able to quickly modify plans, for example, alter locations of units or avenues of approach, change decision points, redefine unit commitment to tasks, vary tactical maneuvers, or shift the timing of the scheme of maneuvers. Support for capturing these contingency plans is needed. This can increase the probability that units will know what to do when one or more contingencies occur. For example, a battalion commander is responsible for a planned obstacle on the battlefield. Once his units reach a decision point, he may determine that he cannot cover the obstacle with fire. If contingencies are captured and built into the plan, there will be a predefined alternative for dealing with the obstacle such that it can be covered and still support the rest of the overall plan. This could eliminate problems with tactical synchronization that might occur with decisions made on-the-move which have not been previously coordinated with other units. Support for planning across distributed teams. Rapid planning on-the-move will be further complicated in the future, as our Army moves closer to a capabilities-based force, with tactical teams frequently moving in and out of operational areas and contact with the enemy. Tasks forces of the future may also be vastly distributed, which will have a serious impact on collaborative processes. Future distributed forces may have difficulty acquiring and maintaining a common operating picture of current battle situations. This will affect their ability to synchronize events and impart valuable knowledge with regard to how they will contribute to meeting higher level intent. Tools for supporting distributed, collaborative planning and decision making are required. Currently, soldiers plan maneuvers by participating in COA development and wargaming procedures that involve discussion of friendly actions, enemy reactions, and friendly counteractions. The intelligence officers “play” the red (enemy) units while the operations officers and battalion commanders “play” the blue (friendly) force. They step forces through the action-reaction-counteraction cycle to visualize the plan in motion and to ensure that supporting units, like the logistics team, and engineering and fire support cells, can meet needs during execution. Maintaining this kind of interactive collaborative planning while distributed will be difficult, but


necessary to retaining the integrity of the process and resultant products (e.g., synchronization matrix, operation orders, etc.). Visualization of plans. Because C2 planning is ubiquitous in nature, with plans evolving as situations change and new intelligence information is received, there is a need for rapid visualization and comprehension of the dynamic situation. Plans are developed based on various assumptions and facts that are tracked by the staff during battle. The validity of these facts and assumption is constantly evaluated to determine if new assumptions or facts may apply to operations and require re-planning. A tool that presents unambiguous visualization information on elements of the battle, like terrain and weather effects, weapons and sensor capabilities, etc. would benefit planners. Tools need to support global situation awareness, so that users can understand battlefield elements both in-part and in-whole, as they adapt during the battle. Tracking of deviations between plans and reality. Planning staffs often need to evaluate the deviation between what is really happening on the battlefield and what was planned in order to assess the need for plan modification or aborting a mission. Thus, a means to make more concrete comparisons between battle states and corresponding stages of a plan is needed. Furthermore, with the commitment of units to the fight potentially rapidly changing in the future, units planning to move into the fight must quickly construct a mental model of what has taken place, the current state of the environment, and how current and past activities affect their projected actions. Tools to support visualization can benefit both the above issues. Rapid plan development and dissemination. Plans need to be simple, modifiable, flexible, and developed so that they are quickly understood by subordinate units. Plans must also be sufficiently elaborate, though, to develop coordination across task force units and synchronization of events. Understandability is essential as the products of the C2 planning process are the operation orders and synchronization matrices used by lower echelons. Also important, is that all of the planning products must be disseminated in a timely fashion to appropriate units. The faster plans and orders are sent down the chain of command, the more time available for developing details on how to meet the mission and coordinate with supporting or adjacent units. Support is needed for quick orders development and nearinstantaneous dissemination. Similarly, changes to plans and orders must be quickly passed to appropriate units. Retuning to the example of the commander providing a planned obstacle, once the decision to alter the location of the obstacle is made, the decision must immediately be shared with coordinating units, in specific the fire support cell and commanders at higher headquarters. Plan rehearsal. Plan rehearsal is a large part of finalizing projected COAs. It is the means for refining the scheme of maneuvers and identifying problem areas with decision points, contingencies, and synchronization. Distribution of future forces in not likely to provide opportunities for physical rehearsal of task forces. Therefore a need for virtual or simulated rehearsal is evident, as rehearsal should not be eliminated or overlooked.

DISPLAY CONCEPTS TO SUPPORT C2 PLANNING With the above challenges in mind, we developed concepts for an operation and maneuvers planning and analysis tool. Tools and visualization concepts for SA acquisition, plan development, plan distribution, virtual rehearsal and COA evaluation, as well as contingency planning, were developed. Graphics and examples of various system features are provided here. We envision an operations planning tool that will be a component of Synergy - a complete decision support display suite for soldiers involved in the planning and execution process. For current operations, this planning tool would be applicable to soldiers in the S3 shop, as they are primarily responsible for all matters concerning operations and plans for the command at the brigade level. For the future Objective Force Unit of Action activities, this may involve soldiers in the Command Integration Cell and others involved in planning in other cells. The Operations and Maneuvers Planning and Analysis Tool (OMPAT) includes tools for building plans and capturing them through a computer-based system, as well as for electronically distributing plans and products to others. Iconic representations of units are presented over map data presenting critical terrain features like, contours, hydrology, vegetation, etc. More advanced concepts that reside in the OMPAT planning tool are designed to support global SA. The information is organized and presented based upon how it is used to satisfy goals that may be active at any point in time. We conceptualized graphical representations for affording quick and accurate visualizations of current combat states. Following the principles of SA-Oriented Design (Endsley, Bolte and Jones, 2003), we focused on providing SA rather than making decisions for users and aligned the information presented through displays with the capabilities/needs of intended users. Position-specific filter buttons are provided with information presented based upon results of the GDTA, where soldiers described the ideal SA requirements they needed to make good decisions during combat. Level 2 (comprehension) SA data is directly presented. For example, operations officers are frequently concerned with the weather conditions. However, rather than only wanting to know that rain showers are expected for a prolonged period and that low clouds will persist after the precipitation, they want to know the ultimate effects of weather (e.g. the mobility of wheeled vehicles will be hindered over muddy/marshy terrain and visibility will be limited due to cloud cover). (See Figure 1.) An important feature of the OMPAT is the provision of what we have termed “crayola” representations of planned unit types and locations. These are icons that look like hand drawn graphics placed over the map information. This representation is provided so that users can rapidly distinguish plans from information provided on real-time events that will be presented in juxtaposition or through an adjacent execution monitoring map tool. It is important that users do not confuse the plans, which are partly based upon assumptions and expectations, with real activities that occur during battle. Figure 2 provides a pictorial representation of the “crayola”


graphics representing an expected or planned unit, as compared to icons presenting real-time information.

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Figure 1. Example of Level 2 SA visualizations

“Crayola” unit

Tactical unit symbol

Figure 2. Example of a “crayola” representation vs typical tactical unit symbology (per mil-std-2525) The OMPAT is linked with a status summary and communications display (Figure 3). This tool is designed so that the operations officer can get an overview of the status of units during the battle as SA on friendly unit effectiveness critically affects decisions on task force commitment. Cursory information on units can be viewed on the display, while users can access more detailed data on units at lower echelons by interacting with the interface. Also provided are areas dedicated to sending and receiving alerts, to chatting with other friendlies, to viewing and editing particular orders, and tracking commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR). Alerts and chat features allow members of the command, who may be vastly distributed in the future, to quickly pass critical information or ask questions.

operation orders consist of lengthy hard-copy documents that are sent down to lower units. With a computer-based system, major sections of the order can be viewed (like the situation, the mission, and the execution statements), and modified as needed. Parts can be distributed as updates are made and various revisions can be stored, without the need for many lengthy paper documents. Officers in collaborative military planning often share SA requirements, though the same data may be used to address different goals or critical decisions, and is likely needed on a different scale or level of detail. For example, though the S2 needs very detailed data on intelligence assets like capabilities, status, location, unit ownership, etc., for determination of the enemy situation and to provide indication and warnings with respect to priority information requirements, the operations planners must also be aware of intelligence data. However, operations staffs might only be concerned with sensor coverage areas and locations of recon scouts to get a broad overview of holes that exist with respect to enemy activities. Planning officers are often interested in a limited set of SA requirements associated with other positions. Opportunities to view data from display suites tailored to other positions can present a broad overview of shared SA elements without providing unnecessary detail. Functions were designed to allow users to access the data easily. The goal was to provide only necessary information (based on SA requirements in the GDTA) at a very high level and to avoid burying data deep within numerous windows or layers. For example, the overview of unit status is provided at the top level on the status summary display (see Figure 3). Figure 4 shows how shared SA data from the intelligence shop can be accessed by affecting only one button on the tool.

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Figure 4. Graphic of OMPAT link to intelligence information

Figure 3. Graphic of the Status Summary Display A list of the orders (e.g., operation orders, warning orders, or fragmentary orders) allows officers to take a quick look at what’s expected in the mission and to modify and expand upon orders for quick dissemination to others. Currently,

An important feature of the planning tool is the ability to add decision points and to capture branches at decision points. Branching allows the commander to plan for contingencies. Capturing the branches gives staff the opportunity to save and select the various branches during evaluation of COAs. This is initial support for working inside the opponent’s decision cycle and forcing enemy reactions to friendly offensive stances. Users can plan counteractions for enemy COAs ranging from the most likely to the most dangerous or any feasible possibilities between. (See Figure 5.)


The OMPAT expands upon the branching feature by allowing users to select various branches built into the plan and watch the COA play out. An animation tool displays the task force units and enemy units moving across the mapped area according to the projected actions and synchronizations defined during the planning process. This serves as a form of virtual rehearsal, where trouble areas in the scheme of maneuvers can be perceived and addressed. This function allows planners to play, pause, fast-forward, and rewind the animation to critically evaluate synchronization.

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Figure 5. OMPAT contingency planning tool We discussed the need to support mental model development of past battlefield actions and the need for visual representations of deviations between actual events and planned events. The OMPAT provides users the functionality to view a history of the battle for specified time periods and to compare plans to the real-time activities. The “history trace” shows an animation of task force units completing maneuvers captured during battle. The “history trace” is aimed a providing users with a broad sweep of friendly and enemy actions leading up to current operations. This allows soldiers who join a new unit of operation or who have been off-duty sleeping during 24/7 operations to rapidly come up to speed. The tool also leaves a graphical footprint on the display so that planners can see where units moved from in order to stage for the next engagement. The OMPAT also provides a function to overlay real-time battle information on the planned COA. Users can, at a glance, visually compare plans and actual activities. This supports the need to determine if plans and orders should be modified or completely discarded (Figure 6.)

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Figure 6. Comparison of plan with real activity

CONCLUSION We conducted task analysis and observed several Army field exercises and experiments to learn more about the nature of planning for C2 activities. Findings from the GDTA and data from observations highlight the substantial effect of time on the quality and detail of plans and the emphasis on collaborative processes, as well as use of goal- and productoriented procedures. The ubiquitousness of planning and the challenges introduced with the distribution of forces and increased dynamics of operations indicates a need for support of planning activities, in addition to that provided for the execution phase of combat. A planning tool was developed for the Army to facilitate SA and support decision making in the planning process by aiding in visualization, building a common operating picture for distributed, collaborative planners, and providing tools for shared SA and operational updates, comparison of plans to actions, and managing many of the products from the planning process. It should be noted that many of the ideas for this type of support were conceived based upon concepts for future military operations, including networked databases, real-time sensor feedback on unit locations, status, weapons usage, etc., and technological advances for monitoring enemy activities. These systems are not likely to be available in the very near future, but are possible for the prospective Objective Force. The challenge will be the effective integration of these kinds of support tools with the human such that he or she can successfully leverage them during stressful operations. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Work on this paper was prepared through participation in the Advanced Decision Architectures Collaborative Technology Alliance sponsored by the U.S. Army Research Laboratory (ARL) under Cooperative Agreement DAAD19-01-2-0009. The views and conclusions contained herein, however, are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as representing the official policies, either expressed or implied of the ARL or the U. S. Government. REFERENCES Department of the Army (1988). Field Manual 71-2, The tank and mechanized infantry battalion task force. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, DC. Department of the Army (1992). Field Manual 71-123, Tactics and techniques for combined arms heavy forces: armored brigade, battalion task force, and company team. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, DC. Department of the Army (1997). Field Manual 101-5, Staff organization and operations. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, DC. Endsley, M. R. (1993). A survey of situation awareness requirements in air-toair combat fighters. Int. J, of Aviation. Psychology, 3(2), 157-168. Endsley, M. R., Bolte, B., & Jones, D. G. (2003). Designing for situation awareness: An approach to human-centered design. London: Taylor & Francis. Tradoc Pamphlet 525-3-91 (2001). The United States Army Objective Force tactical operational and organizational concept for maneuver units of action. United States Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, VA. United States Army White Paper: Concepts for the Objective Force. available on-line at: http://www.army.mil/features/ WhitePaper/default.htm.