Take Home Exam
[Subtitle]
Name
Martín Rodríguez Alberdi
Student ID #
6075031
E-mail address
[email protected]
Course code
ACU3012
Group number
01
Supervisor/tutor
G Verbeeck
Assignment name
Take home exam
Assignment #
00
Always 7 positions, no letter I. Add a zero at the beginning if only 6 positions.
Attempt
The end work of a course always carries the number 00. All other assignments are numbered chronologically starting with 01. REGULAR REGULAR or RESIT
Academic year
2017/2018
Date
3-4-2018
Words
1328 - 1285
Filename
2017/2018-ACU3012-00-REGULAR-6075031.pdf
A. 3. “All that is solid melts into air” (Berman, 1982, p.17) With these words, Berman defined the much-contested concept of modernity, a concept that attempts to embody the set of experiences inherent to changes in contemporary life. The vertiginous pace set by modern society, central to the contemporary experience, is a consequence of the far-reaching processes of modernization. These processes of modernization relate to the development of systems of mass communication, the capitalist world market, bureaucratically structured nationstates or the discoveries in the physical sciences. These are all changes aiming for more rationalization and less arbitrariness and imply a redefinition of society’s fabric. These transformations, enabled by and large by technology, imply a paradoxical relationship between creation and destruction, renewal and disintegration, the future and the past, modernity, and anti-modernity. (Berman, 1982, p.16). For elucidating how the ambivalent relationship between modernity and anti-modernity takes practical form, this essay aims at discussing elements in Fascist and National Socialist ideology that prove this ambivalence. First, the ideology of Fascism will be investigated by drawing on the composition of its modernist nationalism and AntiAmericanism. Second, two of the core elements of National Socialist ideology, racial policy and their militarism, will be put in relation to modernity.
Lastly, a short
comparison between common ambivalent traits will follow. Gentile (2003) draws a distinction in fascist ideology between sane and perverse modernity. The Fascist self-perceived sane modernity refers to their conception of modernist nationalism, which is dialectically composed of the combination of a mythical thought of the future of the nation and an appeal to the heritage of the Roman Empire. Fascism accepted modernity as an irreversible result of modernization processes that were affecting “society, consciousness, and human sensibility” (Gentile, 2003, p.47). These changes were increasing the human power of perception and translated into an activist conception of life, whereby man should give priority to lived experience over ideology and faith over theory (Gentile, 2003, p.59). To constructively tame modernity for the nation’s advantage, Fascism attempted to develop a forwardlooking mythical conception of civilization based on the mechanical power of the machine. The aesthetic of power and violence embodied by modern technology could
precisely express the relentless will of radical transformation advocated by Mussolini. According to Gentile (2003), this mythical conception of the nation’s common destiny required a historical justification to highlight Italy’s uniqueness in driving forward modernity. This justification originated in the nation’s past as the founder of universal civilization which legitimized Italy’s right to embody a modern, nation-oriented conception of universal civilization (p.175). The heritage of the Roman Empire was effectively used not to claim past glories, but to find sources to justly political mobilisation. Hence, this new conception of civilisation evoked the simultaneous reference to the ancient and the modern proving the compatibility of the myth of the past with the myth of the future (Gentile, 2003, p.172-175). Heritage and modernity, seemingly irreconcilable concepts, shaped the dialectical ground stone of the ambivalent Italian modernist nationalism. In contrast, the fascist perverse conception of modernity relates to the role of American civilization, the cradle of capitalist greed and ruthless individualism (Gentile, 2003, p.164). The modern capitalist system, a symptom of the decline of family values and the sole identification of civilization with the economy, proved the dangers of the unrestricted effects of modernity. The “Americanisation” of society would pervade Italian society by substituting spiritual goals with material ones (Gentile, 2003, p.163f.). Only a totalitarian state could reconcile modern society with a collective and spiritual conception of life (Gentile, 2003, p. 172). Accordingly, modernity had to be conquered by “civilizing the nation under the banner of nationalism” (Gentile, 3004, p.47). The creation of a new secular religion was indispensable to control the masses and establish a collective understanding of the nation. The most effective mean to contain the perverse effects of American modernity were modern means of communication, a result of the processes of modernization. Hence, the ambivalent relationship between a traditionalist and modernist ideology is observable not only in the composition of Fascist nationalist rhetoric, but in the selective understanding of the sources of modernization. Whereas mass channels of communication to achieve nationalist goals are a sane result of modernity, the capitalist economy illustrates the perverse effects of the same phenomenon.
The multidimensional understanding of the term modernity implies a different interpretation of its content by National Socialism. For National Socialism, the advent
of scientific inquiry and mass production, a consequence of modernization processes, represented two crucial means for the realization of their racial and expansionary agenda respectively. In a context of widespread belief in the scientific validity of racism, National Socialism advocated the role of scientific knowledge in shaping public policy and discourse. The sustainability of the welfare state was supposedly dependent on creating a pure society hierarchized exclusively on ethnic lines. Whereas the justification of such policy laid on reason and rationality, the fact is that there was no evidence for the regime’s stance on race. Driven by political purposes established outside the realm of science, racial policy responded more to the attainment of an inflexible utopia (Roseman, p.694f. 2011). Under the premise of commitment to modern efficiency and management, expelling undesired “elements” of society would lead to “radical renewal and rooting out decadence” (Roseman, p.695, 2011). Hence, the attainment of a new society in a mass political environment rested upon the interplay of modern and anti-modern elements, namely supposed scientific rationality to achieve utopian and irrational goals (Roseman, p.697f., 2011). The enactment of mass extermination and military victories abroad required the extensive use of warfare only achievable through mass production. Most leading national socialist leaders were active enthusiasts of modern warfare, as even Hitler hoped that a “Wunderwaffe [wonder weapon]” would change the outcome of the war (Rohkrämer, 1999, p.44). However, the incessant logic of the war required of clear bureaucratic structures and long-term planning for the technical developments necessary to mass produce. The enthusiasm for modern warfare was downgraded by an antiquated administrative structure that focused solely on the short-term exploitation of resources (Rohkrämer, 1999, p.46). The reliance on modern technology as an effective means to achieve military success did not match an anachronistic and arbitrary administrative structure dependent on personal relationships. The anti-modern organizational structures were more reminiscent of an absolutist conception of power than an impersonally organized bureaucratic nation-state. The genuine admiration for the destructive power of warfare to achieve military victories could not be sustained by an organizational system that did not supply the necessary tools for military success (Rohkrämer, 1999, p.45). On the one hand, in the name of scientific inquiry and rationality, an irrational and utopian racial policy was executed. On the other hand, the obtainment of military
victories through warfare was proven unsustainable in the long-term because of antiquated organizational structures and processes. If modernity were to signify solely the rationalization of conflict to deal peacefully with violent struggles, then both Fascism and National Socialism could be characterized as anti-modern (Joas, 1999, p.459). As modernity relates also to the expansion of modernization processes, the discussion is more nuanced. Most of all, both ideologies share a utilization of modern technology as a mean to achieve their arguably antimodern goals (Berman, 1982, p.10f.). Whether it takes the form of nationalism or militarism, technology is the indispensable element enabling the realization of a myth or conquest. Another common feature in both ideologies is the desire to own the term of modernity and signify it as synonymous with their narrow conception of progress. To their eyes, extreme violence and a totalitarian control of the population can be part of this quest towards modernity. As in the definition of modernity itself, in Fascist and National Socialist ideologies there is always interplay between opposing terms and the possibility to use modernity for political purposes allows interpreting it to strengthen the agent’s own arguments. The vast variety of changes implicit in modernity and the malleable nature of its understanding makes precisely ambivalence a fitting description for its theoretical and practical appreciation. Bibliography:
Berman, M. (1982). All that is solid melts into air. London: Verso.
Gentile, E. (2003). The Struggle for Modernity. Westport, Conn.: Praeger.
Joas, H. (1999). The Modernity of War. International Sociology, 14(4), 457-472. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0268580999014004005
Rohkrämer, T. (1999). Antimodernism, Reactionary Modernism and National Socialism. Technocratic Tendencies in Germany, 1890–1945. Contemporary European History, 8(1), 29-50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0960777399000120
Roseman, M. (2011). National Socialism and the End of Modernity. The American Historical Review, 116(3), 688-701. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/ahr.116.3.688
B. 3. The surge of populism in contemporary liberal democracies raises the question whether populism can be regarded as a phenomenon alien to democratic practices or as an inherent part of it. Even though populism takes place within liberal democracies, the accommodation of populist parties within democratic state structures has proven sometimes difficult to maintain. Populists are, however, fervent defenders of democratic ideals and claim to truly embody the sovereignty of the people. To investigate the complex relationship between populism and liberal democracy, I will investigate whether populism is compatible with liberal democracy’s norms and values. My claim is that populism successfully coexists with democracy’s values but not with its norms. To defend my claim, I will firstly provide a definition of populism as elucidated by Mudde (2010). Secondly, based on a differentiated explanation of the terms “liberal” and “democracy” I will argue that these concepts exemplify Canovan’s (1999 & 2004) distinction between the pragmatic and redemptive face of democracy. This tension precisely highlights why populism is compatible with democratic values and not norms. I will thirdly reinforce my argument based on Mair’s (2009) distinction between representative and responsible government. My focus will be placed exclusively on liberal democracy and I do not intend to extrapolate my conclusions to other types of democracies. Please note that the terms liberal democracy and representative democracy are used interchangeably. Populism is a concept in dispute and there is yet not a widely accepted definition for it. I will sustain my analysis on Muddes’ (2010) definition of populism as a “thin centred ideology” that separates society into “two homogeneous and antagonistic groups”, namely “the people” in opposition to “the elite”. Populists also claim to express the legitimate will of the people by speaking in their name, thereby representing society at large and not fragmented interests (Canovan, 1999, p.4). The distinction between “the people” and “the elite” is based on morality instead of socio-economic class. This entails that the people are pure and authentic in their interests, while the elite is corrupt and driven by “inauthentic morals” (Mudde, 2017, p.4). Thus, the unit of distinction in populist ideology between one group and the other is based on values. The definition of liberal democracy requires a separation of the term into its components. On the one hand, the liberal pillar exemplifies the authority of the rule of
law, the importance to protect individual rights against a discretionary use of power, and the constraint of absolute power by check and balances (Abts & Rummens, 2007, p.410). On the other hand, the term democracy embodies the realization of the sovereign will of the people through a majority rule. Political legitimacy is achieved by being elected and translating the will of the majority into practice (Canovan, 2004, p. 244). These two aspects are intricately related and denote the tension between the practice and ideology of liberal democracy.
The liberal component restraints the theoretical
impulses of democracy by accommodating minorities as legitimate part of the sovereign rule and following complex procedures in the decision-making process (Abts & Rummens, 2007, p.411). This combination of liberal and democracy is embodied by the practice of governance in the form of representative democracy. This system of government is based on the delegation of power by the people via elections to political elites and bureaucrats that manage the agenda of democratic institutions (Moffitt, 2016, p.88). The practical manifestation of representative democracy implies a tension between a pragmatic and a redemptive side. Whereas the pragmatic side conceives politics as the exercise of negotiation without an overriding purpose within the limits set by law, the redemptive side aims at mobilizing popular support by offering a compelling narrative seeking to achieve a higher goal beyond the confines of political compromise (Canovan, 1999, p.8-10). This two-fold dichotomy is analogous to democracy’s norms and values. Whereas norms focus on the pragmatic or performative side, the representation of values aims at the promise of realizing the ideal, redeeming side of democracy. Populism precisely attempts to exploit the gap between performance and promise (Canovan, 1999, p.13). At the core of the tension between norms and values – performance and promise - that populism attempts to exploit is the idea of representation. Populism defends to be represented by an unmediated direct relationship between the people and the political elite. This disintermediation of representative democracy is compatible with democracy’s purest values aiming for an ideal of popular sovereignty (Canovan, 1999, p.12). In contrast, when one takes into consideration the sets of norms that institutionally mediate the expression of the people’s will, then representation will only be indirectly embodied by the political representatives. The populist unmediated understanding of representation is incompatible with the pluralist nature of
representative democracies. A direct and homogenous interpretation of the will of the people clashes with the fragmentation of interests fundamental to the institutionalization of democratic power (Abts & Rummens, 2007, p.413). Whereas the norms of representative democracy structure the exercise of power to constantly revise the multiplicity of wills, populists see one integral and closed interpretation of the will of the people (Abts & Rummens, 2007, p.413). Hence, the logic of one-to-one direct representation characteristic of populism can only function at the cost of suppressing the actual norms of representative democracy. The voice of one singular will captured by democratic theory disregards the liberal logic of representing minorities and individual rights as part of the decision-making process (Abts & Rummens, 2007, p.414-417). This raises the fundamental question of whether the values embodied by democracy, coherent with the populist aspiration of representing the will of the people, are being fulfilled in representative democracies. The populist ideal of direct representation might be incompatible with democratic norms, but its values should be an aspiration to transform society (Canovan, 1999, p.12). Mair (2009) argues that central to representative democracy is the aspiration with which people vote. He differentiates between two types of voting: instrumental and expressive. The instrumental voter is concerned with ultimately producing a government, whereas the expressive voter aims at asserting a genuine political preference (Mair, 2009, p.7). The set of procedural norms and practices restrict a government’s degree of freedom, making direct representation increasingly incompatible with the exercise of governing. The sole focus on strengthening the governmental role at the expense of representation limits the expressive power of the voter. Hence, the populist demand for a direct and unmediated representation of the will of the people seems a desirable response to re-balance the interplay between the act of governing and representing voter’s wishes. When a government ceases to closely reflect the expressive will of its voters, it governs without representing (Mair, 2009, p.17). Therefore, populist ideals, a fundamental element of the redeeming and transformative side of democracy, can help in identifying the dysfunctions in representative democracies (Moffitt, 2016, p.90). After a detailed argumentation defending the claim that populism is only compatible with liberal democracy’s values and not norms, what seems clear is that populism exists within democratic practice. The theoretical understanding of democracy as the expression of sovereignty by the people is central to the construction of populist
discourse. The so-called redemptive side of democracy is fundamental to alter the passivity of the status-quo and democratic values precisely strengthen this will to transform. At the same time, the normative side of liberal democracy, that assures the fulfilment of individual rights and the moderation of extremes, is incompatible with the antagonistic and simplistic logic of populism. The complexity of governance and the institutional division of power embedded in norms are fundamental pillars to regulate the excessive passions displayed by populists. In any case, the tension between democracy and liberalism; pragmatism and redemption; and norms and values is the fuel necessary to revise and improve the pitfalls of representative democracy. Bibliography:
Abts, K., & Rummens, S. (2007). Populism versus Democracy. Political Studies, 55(2), 405-424. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2007.00657.x
Canovan, M. (1999). Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy. Political Studies, 47(1), 2-16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/14679248.00184
Canovan, M. (2004). Populism for political theorists?. Journal Of Political Ideologies, 9(3), 241-252. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1356931042000263500
Mair, P. (2009). Representative versus Responsible Government. Mpifg Working Paper 09/8, 5-19.
Moffitt, B. (2016). The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style and Representation (pp. 84-94). Stanford University Press.
Mudde, C. (2010). The Populist Radical Right: A Pathological Normalcy. West European Politics, 33(6), 1167-1186. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2010.508901
Mudde, C. (2017). Populism: An Ideational Approach. The Oxford Handbook Of Populism, 1-26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198803560.013.1
