Technical Note

70

Technical Note APPLYING RECOMMENDED SAFETY MEASURES IN ROAD TUNNELS – PIARC RECOMMENDATIONS APPLIED TO THE BURNLEY TUNNEL, MELBOURNE

Ruggero Ceci

PREFACE On March 23, 2007, a major vehicular collision and fire occurred in the Burnley tunnel, a major arterial passing under the Yarra River in central Melbourne. Three persons lost their lives that day due to a crash involving several trucks and cars. The driver of a truck subsequently reported that he had pulled over and stopped in the left-hand (nearside) lane, somewhere in the middle of the tunnel, in order to check a problem with one of the wheels of his vehicle. Because there was neither a lay-by nor an emergency lane, this caused the lane to be blocked. What then happened is the subject of Coronial enquiries still in progress at the time of writing. What is clear is that a series of collisions occurred as a result of the subsequent attempts at lane changing caused by the blocked lane. The tunnel has in place a number of emergency measures and an evacuation plan. Automatic cameras linked to the operator’s control room immediately detected the stopped vehicle. This activated the electronic message sign for the affected lane and a red cross was displayed to inform approaching drivers that the lane was closed. At this point, an incident response unit was sent to into the tunnel to assist the broken-down vehicle.

Disclaimer The opinions and views presented in this article are those of the author and should not be regarded as those of MUARC, the PIARC organisation, or the Editor or publishers of this journal. The Editor reminds readers that the PIARC Working Group recommendations referred to in this paper were not developed at the time the Burnley tunnel was planned and constructed, and that the assessment reported here is, to that extent, post facto. Furthermore, the author has not been involved in the investigation of the specific accident in the Burnley tunnel on March 23, 2007, and the paper should not be taken as having a direct bearing on actions and responsibilities of any party in that incident.

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The potential death toll was probably greatly reduced by the evacuation plan and the Deluge sprinkler system that reduced the fire and level of heat. Nevertheless, intense fire and smoke was generated by the burning vehicles. According to the investigations that followed, temperatures close to 1000ºC were recorded at the site of the crash.

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71 The smoke that follows such an incident could kill many in the vicinity of the collision. This has been the case in similar crashes in earlier tunnel disasters such as the Mont Blanc and the Gothard tunnels in the European Alps in 1999 and 2001. In the Mont Blanc accident 39 people were killed in the flames and smoke that followed, and in the Gothard tunnel 11 died, most of them due to suffocation from the toxic fumes in the smoke. The vital questions that usually follow this kind of tragedy concern how the accident could have been avoided, and how the effects could have been minimised. In attempting to answer questions such as these it is necessary to look closer at similar accidents that have occurred throughout the world during the last 10-20 years. Accident reports and overviews have been carried out previously for the purposes of improving levels of knowledge related to tunnel safety (for example, see JRC-ISIS Nedies (2001)). Comparison between accidents are, however, relatively difficult as most road tunnels are intrinsically different, e.g. uni-or bi-directional tunnel tubes, interior design, local traffic regulations, safety standards, signage, etc. Other important factors are of course the total length of the tunnel, the width of the tunnel tubes, grade differences, whether the tunnel is in an urban road system or a rural road environment, road surface quality, etc. Where a tunnel passes under water or a river, as is the case with the Burnley tunnel, there are seldom surface escape routes and little opportunity to escape through a connection to a parallel tunnel tube in the case of an emergency. Obviously, escape routes are critical in order to escape from a smoked filled tunnel tube with burning vehicles and goods. There is also a great need for visual guidance that directs people toward the escape route, or emergency exits if these exist. Another important factor, which may have had a bearing on the Melbourne case, is the speed limit and the actual speed of the vehicles approaching and passing through a tunnel. It is obvious but essential to point out that this factor not only affects the outcome of a crash in terms of physical force but also affects the prevention of a crash in terms of human reaction capability. The faster a vehicle moves, the harder for the human driver to react in time during an incident.

THE PIARC HUMAN FACTORS SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS The worldwide PIARC organisation (or World Road Organisation) is the international organ for the exchange of knowledge on roads, and road transport policy and practices, including, amongst other things, a best practice for safety and the design of tunnels. The C3.3 Tunnels Operation technical committee has formed a number of working groups which, during the years 2004 to 2007, have developed new policy documents based upon knowledge and experiences from many different sources, e.g. through research and development activities from large tunnel safety projects worldwide and the gathering of experience and lessons learnt from some of the world’s major tunnel accidents. The main issues for these working groups are the following: 1.

to provide safer tunnels,

2.

to improve tunnel operations and maintenance,

3.

ventilation and fire suppression, and

4.

to take into consideration human factors for tunnel safety.

Each working group has been formed to meet a special theme or task from the following six areas: •

operation and management,

•

safety management, human factors,

•

detection and communication,

•

dangerous goods, and

•

ventilation and fire control.

The author of this article has been involved in the activities of the working group developing recommendations for human factors and safety from a user perspective, thus incorporating knowledge from the human factors field, ‘information-detection’ and communication perspectives. The safety of tunnel users has, however, been the general theme and has provided a direction for the work which deals with both preventive safety behaviour and post crash issues related to behaviour in an emergency situation, when the evacuation of a tunnel is essential. The Human Factors working group has produced two reports that were presented to a special session on ‘Management and Safety in Road

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72 Tunnels’ at the PIARC (World Road Association) congress in Paris, 17-20 September, 2007. The titles of these are: Human factors and road tunnel safety regarding users (Buvik et al. in press) and Management of the operator – emergency teams interface in road tunnels (Vergnault and Madsen in press). Thus, the scope and purpose of this article is to use the explicit policy recommendations as well as the implicit knowledge contained in the above reports to highlight some of the safety issues that are raised by incidents such as that in the Burnley tunnel. This analysis attempts to indicate the degree to which the PIARC recommendations could have influenced the initial trigger for the crash and its consequences, had they each been implemented. Given the fact that the PIARC reports were not published at the time of writing, the author cannot make any direct citations in this context. In the following analysis a comparison is made between the Burnley tunnel context and the safety criteria implied in the PIARC recommendations. A number of recommendations regarding both preventive and de facto situations will be listed. In the reports, there is a distinction between road tunnel behaviour in normal situations and critical situations. The outcome of this analysis will seek to answer the question of whether the existing safety level in the Burnley tunnel is adequate for the prevention of a similar accidents in the future or whether the implementation of PIARC human factors recommendations are considered (by the author) to be necessary. The author’s reasoning may be regarded as hypothetical; nevertheless, it is considered important to test these recommendations in this theoretical way in order to make assumptions related to their validity in a real-life accident situation. It should once again be pointed out that the author’s comments are made in relation to the PIARC human factors recommendations. The PIARC recommendations most relevant to the accident occurring in the Burnley tunnel are as follows: A. Additional measures recommended by the PIARC technical committee to improve road tunnel safety in normal traffic conditions: 1.

Use innovative means to inform tunnels users. Include ‘how to drive in tunnels’ in car driving

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lessons. Make sure that they have knowledge of road signs when approaching a tunnel, where to look for emergency exits and safety equipment. 2.

Organise specific training sessions for professional truck drivers (especially for specific tunnels frequently used by truck drivers).

3.

Present all (permanent) signs at sufficient distances (if possible 200 m) before the tunnel entrance and certainly not at the tunnel portal.

4.

Use signs and other means (chevrons, lights etc.) to implement existing regulations for maintaining safe headways between vehicles.

5.

To obtain a desired road user behaviour it might be necessary to repeat signs shown at the approach road to the tunnel, e.g. speed limitations, distance keeping, lane changing rules.

6.

Professional drivers should get proper training and refreshing courses as they could show the correct behaviour and (hopefully) set an example for others to follow.

7.

Advise drivers to cut their mobile conversation long before (1-2 km) entering a tunnel, even when using hands-free devices. This should be disseminated during driving lessons and information campaigns.

B. Additional measures recommended by the PIARC technical committee to prevent escalation of critical traffic conditions in road tunnels: 1.

In driving lessons and driving license examination, ensure that drivers know how to cope with critical situations. Interactive tools like simulators may be used to considerable benefit.

2.

[The use of lay-bys is taken for granted in the report. Therefore, the following recommendation reflects the additional safety measures in relation to these.] Lay-bys should always be provided with emergency stations and, if possible, with emergency exits.

3.

The casing of fire extinguishers should be painted red, those of emergency telephones orange.

4.

It would be optimal if all radio stations in the region are re-broadcasted and can be interrupted in the tunnel. In that case only a sign ‘Radio on’ would be needed.

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73 5.

In case of need to evacuate the tunnel, pre-recorded messages are strongly recommended in order to have the same type of message in all tunnels, in order to relieve the operator task and in order to have a clear instruction. The same message should be used for both the radio interruption and for the P.A. (Public Address) system.

6.

In case of broken-down cars or in case of accidents: enable tunnel users to contact the tunnel control centre or rescue service by mobile phones via a redirected connection.

7.

In all tunnels the message to evacuate should be delivered from several different information channels, e.g. radio, loudspeakers (P.A. systems), and variable message signs in the tunnels.

8.

The existence of emergency exits should be visible to tunnel users in normal traffic situations by the use of conspicuous designs. The emergency exits should always be green; the doors should be indicated with large evacuation signs close to or even on the door; the use of extensive green areas that include the side-walls all around the exit is recommended.

This is a sample of the most relevant recommendations for the purposes of this paper. It should be noted that there are many other recommendations that are less relevant here but significantly more important in other situations. Thus, the fifteen recommendations presented represent a number of preventive actions that the author considers would largely improve safety in any tunnel. In the next section an analysis of the recommendations will be undertaken regarding their relation to the existing level of safety in the Burnley tunnel.

AN ANALYSIS BASED UPON THE EVENTS AND RECOMMENDED MEASURES First, it should be noted that the recommendations put together by the PIARC work group are of varying nature for various situations ranging from almost exclusively information and education measures, to rules and regulations relating to physical measures (e.g. placement of signs and design features, colour codes etc.). Thus, judgements about their respective potential and effect are dependent upon the nature of these different measures.

It is always very difficult to judge or draw conclusions from the impact of information campaigns and education activities. Also, the possible preventive or risk reduction effect of the content of road signs or their placement in the road or tunnel environment is also hard to judge. Therefore, in Tables 1 and 2 an assessment of the level of implementation of the different recommendations has been made, along with a cautious evaluation of the potential (low, medium or high) for each recommendation to prevent or reduce the effects of a collision in the Burnley tunnel. These ratings represent the author’s application of existing knowledge and as such may be considered subjective. This assessment should be seen as an attempt to evaluate the inherent risk situation in the Burnley tunnel based upon the information available, and should not be taken as being necessarily directly applicable to the March 2007 incident or any other incident that may have occurred. In Table 1, seven different recommendations are presented and evaluated. Three of these (1, 2 and 6) are related to educational measures targeting groups of tunnel users in different ways. The public is the broadest group that needs general information through the media or other means. Brochures with practical instructions, as well as safety information for the tunnel users, are disseminated in many countries along with, for example, Internet based information (special web pages etc.). In order to target certain groups, special education material needs to be produced and disseminated. It also needs to be adapted for both novice drivers and professional truck drivers. Truck drivers have been pinpointed in the media and elsewhere after the Burnley accident as a group in need of safety education. However, it is also true that truck drivers represent one of the most experienced driver categories on the road. Driving in tunnels is an issue that needs extended knowledge about such things as signs, regulations, safety measures and traffic rules (e.g. distance between vehicles). In the case of an emergency or accident, there should also be clear routines that are practiced by all types of emergency teams that should be involved in the aftermath of an accident (see Vergnault and Madsen, in press). It is a well known fact in traffic safety that information campaigns and other measures that aim to bring about behavioural change have a relatively moderate

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Technical Note

74 effect in accident prevention (Englund et al. 1998). However, it is still of great importance that campaigns and public education in road safety is a continuing activity in order to have an impact on the public agenda. In the case of tunnels is it also crucial to include knowledge about how to behave in the event of an emergency in public education programs (e.g. in driving schools). In the latest version of the New Drivers Handbook (Solo Driving) (VicRoads 2007) there is a section about driving in tunnels. The handbook presents driving advice for novice drivers regarding, for example, where to look for signs, speed regulation, when to turn on headlights, and when not to change lanes or to stop in the tunnel. Very little information is given regarding how to behave in case of an emergency or where to find emergency exits and equipment, and what they look like (colour codes etc.). This information should be very general and presented in a standardised format according to the PIARC recommendations. The impact of education programs on safety should preferably be in the range medium-to-high in an evaluation of their potential to prevent or reduce the negative outcomes of an accident similar to that in the Burnley tunnel (see Table 1). The remaining recommendations in Table 1 concern the use of signs and other means to inform road users about the rules for the tunnel (3, 4 and 5) and also a special note on the use of mobile phones in tunnels (and tunnel approaches). The possibility to prevent accidents by the use of signs and regulation is entirely dependent on two factors: 1.

the probability of the drivers to detect the signs, and, if detected,

2.

the probability of the drivers to act accordingly i.e. to follow the message as intended.

There is also a dependency on the levels of previous knowledge such as information and education at an earlier stage. With previous knowledge, the signs act as reminders with important information about the conditions ahead. The assumed potential for the signs to be able to prevent or reduce the negative outcomes of a stationary vehicle in the Burnley tunnel vary depending on what information is displayed and where the signs are placed. It is very clear from the PIARC report that signs should not be placed on the entry portal of a tunnel. Even so, if signs are placed at

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sufficient distance, they are easily neglected in the vast information stream that meets the driver on a busy road. The most important signs are those that have a direct effect on driving behaviour by way of enforcement, e.g. speed regulation and signage for distance keeping and lane changing. These should be assessed to have a medium-to-high potential to prevent accidents at the very least. The placement of these and other signs is important although they may not have a strong preventive effect (see Table 1). Signs that inform road users of the existence and placement of emergency equipment may have a higher potential to reduce the negative effects of accidents, e.g. where to find emergency exits and emergency telephones, etc. If a tunnel has restrictions for the transportation of dangerous goods, the placement of a suitable sign is critical so that the driver may start looking for an exit at an early point in time. These exits should also be clearly indicated for this purpose. In Melbourne, such restrictions exist for both the Burnley and Domain tunnels. This is clearly pointed out in the safety information brochure that can be found on the City Link Internet homepage. According to City Link there are also roadside signs informing the carriers of dangerous goods where to exit in good time prior to tunnel entry. The seventh recommendation is especially important. It concerns advice to road users regarding the risk of using mobile phones during tunnel driving. The issue has been pushed forward by the Swedish PIARC members who are leaning on recent research findings related to the problem of mobile phones in traffic. Paradoxically, this research was presented as a literature review in late 2006 by the Monash University Accident Research Centre in Melbourne. The main conclusion from the report ascertains that the use of mobile phones (both hand-held and hands-free) ‘…can have a significant impact on a number of safetycritical driving performance measures’ (Brace, Young and Regan 2007). The PIARC working group meeting in Rome in January 2007 discussed the inclusion of this new recommendation, which is of critical importance for road tunnel safety around the world. During these discussions different opinions were raised. Some members thought a ban on mobile phone use in tunnels would make it more difficult to call for assistance in

Technical Note

75 case of a breakdown; another argument was that such a ban would irritate road tunnel users as their phone conversations could be interrupted during the tunnel passage. In the case of the March 2007 incident, many contributing factors will no doubt be identified in relation to the onset of the accident chain, e.g. high speed, short distance to other vehicles, the closed tunnel environment, and the fact that one or more drivers were distracted. In the recommended measures presented in Table 1, advice to road users to stop using their mobile phones in the approach to a tunnel is evaluated to have a high potential to prevent or reduce the likelihood of negative outcomes of a stationary vehicle in a tunnel lane. In Table 2 the remaining eight recommendations are shown. These are related to the scenarios and events that take place during an emergency situation – or a post-crash situation – when an evacuation of a tunnel is necessary, or when it is crucial to be able to receive information from a traffic control centre via different sources (electronic signs, loudspeaker systems or via telephones). It may also be necessary to directly communicate with control room operators in the case of an accident by the use of emergency telephones (if fitted) or by mobile phones (see discussion regarding mobile phones above). According to the City Link information brochure (City Link 2007) there are three fire safe refuge rooms with independent air supplies, video surveillance and communication possibilities, etc., in the Burnley tunnel. In addition to the four cross passages and an emergency pedestrian egress tunnel leading to a safe surface exit, this should be sufficient for an evacuation of the tunnel. However, some of the reports from the Burnley tunnel accident and the following events indicate that people had a problem using these as intended. PIARC recommendations state that lay-bys should always be provided with emergency stations. These are also stated in the European Union directives (for tunnels longer than 1500 m – see European Parliament and Council (2004)). The absence of lay-bys can also be compensated by the existence of an emergency lane. However, neither of these safety measures is in place in the tunnel at present. An important question concerns whether the operators have any plans of this type of safety implementation in the near future.

Furthermore, there is again an initial recommendation addressing the level of knowledge in relation to how to handle critical situations in a tunnel in Table 2. The reference to critical situations differentiates the recommendation from the educational recommendations in Table 1 (which relate to safety information and education of a more preventive nature for both car and truck drivers). Education focusing specifically on tunnels is rare in the teaching of learner drivers in most countries. In Sweden and other European countries the implementation of such issues in driver training and examination is being discussed, and in some countries has already being introduced. It can therefore be concluded that there is a need to develop tunnel safety education from a global perspective. Pre-recorded messages are strongly recommended for the purpose of informing tunnel users of any critical situation. This information should tell tunnel users how they should proceed in accordance with the prescribed safety requirements determined by those responsible for safety in the tunnel, i.e. the operators. In the Burnley and Domain tunnels overhead variable message signs exist which can provide instructions regarding how to act in certain (critical) situations, e.g. if one’s vehicle should break down in the tunnel. Information is also conveyed through a public address (PA) system, a radio re-broadcast system, and through emergency telephones. Tunnel signs also display speed limits and arrows indicating lane status (open or closed). These electronic signs are, however, active most of the time to guide tunnel users in normal traffic situations rather than being dedicated specifically to emergency situations per se. According to PIARC human factors recommendations, the message to evacuate a tunnel in the case of an emergency should be delivered from several different information channels. Therefore the risk of not perceiving or attending to an emergency message is greatly reduced. Also, there should be a future harmonisation of these messages on an international level so that standardised messages can be applied and understood by all tunnel users (e.g. pictograms on displays and unified sound signals). At this point in time, there seems to be a satisfactory level of message communication in the Burnley tunnel in the case of an emergency. Also, according to City Link, these messages are pre-recorded. The author suggests,

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Technical Note

76 Table 1 Application of PIARC Working Group recommendations to improve tunnel safety: Crash potential PIARC recommended measures to improve road tunnel safety in normal traffic conditions

Recommended measures already implemented in the Burnley tunnel

Potential for recommendation to prevent or reduce the negative outcome of a stationary vehicle in the Burnley tunnel (High/Medium/Low)

1. Inform tunnels users; include that drivers know how to drive in tunnels in car driving lessons and licensing.

Yes*

Medium

2. Organize specific training sessions for professional truck drivers

No

High?

3 Use signs and other means (chevrons, lights etc.) to implement existing regulations for distance keeping between vehicles

No

Medium

4. Present all (permanent) signs at sufficient distances (if possible 200 m) before the tunnel entrance and certainly not at the tunnel portal.

Yes?**

Low

5. Repeat signs shown at the approach road to the tunnel, e.g., speed limitations, keeping distance, lane changing rules.

Yes?**

Low

6. Professional drivers should get proper training and refreshing courses.

No

Medium

7. Advise drivers to cut their mobile conversation long before (1-2 km) entering a tunnel, even when using hands-free devices.

No

High

Note: Table shows recommendations from the PIARC working group on Human Factors and Tunnel Safety in comparison to the existing safety measures in the Burnley tunnel, and a qualitative assessment of the reduction in the crash potential triggered by a stationary vehicle. * Basic Victorian driver licensing handbook. ** From field inspection

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Technical Note

77 Table 2 Application of PIARC Working Group recommendations to improve tunnel safety: Post-crash risk PIARC recommended measures to prevent escalation of critical traffic conditions in road tunnels

Recommended measures already implemented in the Burnley tunnel

Potential for recommended measure to prevent escalation of risk during a post crash scenario in the Burnley tunnel (High/Medium/Low)

1. In driving lessons and driving license examination include that drivers know how to cope with critical situations.

No*

Medium

2. Lay-bys should always be provided with emergency stations and, if possible, with emergency exits.

No

High

3. The casing of fire extinguishers should be painted red, those of emergency telephones orange.

No

Medium

4. All radio stations in the region are re-broadcasted and can be interrupted in the tunnel. In that case only a sign “Radio on” would be needed.

Yes

Medium

Yes?**

Medium

6. In case of broken-down cars or in case of accidents: to enable tunnel users to contact the tunnel control centre or rescue service by mobile phones via a redirected connection.

Yes

Low

7. In all tunnels the message to evacuate should be delivered from several different information channels, e.g., radio, loudspeakers (P.A. systems), variable message signs in the tunnels.

Yes

High?

No***

High

5. To evacuate the tunnel, pre-recorded messages is strongly recommended, to relieve the operator task and in order to have a clear instruction. The same message should be used for both the radio interruption and for the P.A. (Public Address) system.

8. The existence of emergency exits should be visible to tunnel users in normal traffic situations by the use of conspicuous designs. The emergency exits should always be green; the doors should be indicated with large evacuation signs close to or even on the door.

Notes: Table shows Recommendations from the PIARC working group on Human Factors and Tunnel Safety concerning postcrash behaviour, in comparison to the already existing safety measures in the Burnley tunnel, and a qualitative assessment of the potential for the different measures to prevent an escalation of risk during a post crash scenario in the Burnley tunnel. * Not included in basic driver licensing handbook. ** It has not been confirmed if the message is similar from all sources. *** The emergency exits are labelled with green signs but doors and adjacent areas are not colour marked according to PIARC recommendations. Vol 17 No 1

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Technical Note

78 however, that more effort is needed to reach the level suggested by the PIARC recommendations in terms of standardised and harmonised messages. Finally, in relation to incidents in the Burnley tunnel, the potential for these communicative measures to prevent an escalation of risk for the tunnel-users postcrash has been evaluated by the author to be of medium level (see Table 2). Used properly, a clear safety message can become the difference between life and death for anyone stuck in a tunnel during an emergency situation. If a message is unclear or ambiguous there is an increased risk for misunderstanding which may result in delayed reactions and faulty decisions with possible fatal consequences. The recommendation to include lay-bys, and the existence of emergency stations and exits (possibly in connection to the lay-bys) is evaluated to have a high potential to prevent an escalation of risk for tunnel users post-crash in the Burnley tunnel. The lay-bys are also needed in the pre-crash phase, as discussed above, but could serve other purposes than merely providing an area for broken down vehicles. A last comment (and evaluation) should also be made in relation to the visibility and colours of the emergency exits and equipment. In Table 2, recommendations 3 and 8 are evaluated to have a medium-to-high potential to prevent an escalation of risk for tunnel users in a post-crash situation in the Burnley tunnel, provided the suggested colour-codes are used correctly. Most importantly, the existing emergency signs and exits should be clearly marked in green.

CONCLUSIONS The following conclusions have been drawn by the author in his analysis of the existing level of safety in the Burnley tunnel, in conjunction with the forthcoming guidelines developed by PIARC. It is also important to note that these conclusions represent those of a human factors expert and not those of a traffic engineer. 1.

2.

Preventive measures in the form of information and education do exist but are not considered sufficient by themselves to prevent accidents occurring or reduce the negative outcomes of an accident that does occur. No special training is provided for professional drivers. There are no enforcement or informative measures in Melbourne to help road/tunnel users keep a

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safe distance to other vehicles. Effective interdistance regulation (e.g. signs or painted chevrons on the roadway) is needed to help drivers maintain a safe distance and, as a consequence, assist in speed management. 3.

Signs on the approach road to a tunnel should inform road-users about existing tunnel regulations in good time. In the approaches to the Melbourne road tunnels various signs exist that inform road users about the tunnel itself and certain traffic conditions.

4.

Research shows that mobile phones are a major cause of driver distraction. A rule (or at least a strong recommendation) should therefore be introduced to end a conversation approaching and prohibit mobile phone use within the tunnel (with exception for emergency calls). This is evaluated to have a high potential to prevent accidents.

5.

The use of lay-bys in road tunnels is strongly recommended by the European Parliament where emergency lanes (or similar facilities) do not exist. These measures are believed to have a high potential in the prevention of accidents in tunnels.

6.

Communicating information to tunnel-users via variable message signs, radio transmissions, PA systems, and two-way communication (e.g. mobile phones) in emergency situations is critical and is believed to have a medium-to-high potential to prevent an escalation of accident risk. In the Melbourne tunnels these systems exist and incorporate pre-recorded messages.

7.

Emergency equipment (emergency telephones, fire fighting equipment, etc.) and emergency exits must be coloured in accordance with the international standards for an optimal recognition and response. The equipment in the Burnley tunnel (and Domain tunnel) is, to date, not in accordance with the PIARC recommendations.

FINAL COMMENTS In the aftermath of the Burnley tunnel catastrophe, various injury prevention measures and safety initiatives have been suggested and some implemented. The measures taken by the authorities following decisions by the Victorian Government in May and June, 2007, are a series of new regulations

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79 which restrict lane changing in the tunnel, and impose reduced vehicle speed limits on the approach roads to the tunnel. These initiatives represent a useful first initiative to prevent similar types of accidents from occurring in the tunnel. Reducing the approach speed limit from 100 km/h to 80 km/h may be regarded as a preventive measure that will help improve safety in a number of different ways, for example by allowing more time to prepare for the approaching tunnel and the perception of information presented in signs. In the long-term however, these measures will not be sufficient to ensure and maintain a high level of tunnel safety in Melbourne. Finally, it should be noted that the PIARC recommendations stated in this report were formulated well after the Burnley Tunnel was designed and opened. The recommendations represent some of the highest safety standards regarding human factors and safety in tunnels that exist today. To meet these standards will therefore be a challenge not just for Victoria but also for tunnel operators worldwide.

REFERENCES BRACE, C, YOUNG, K, and REGAN, M (2007). Analysis of the literature: The use of mobile phones while drivin, Monash University Accident Research Centre, in Swedish Road Administration Publication series, Publication No. 2007:35. BUVIK, H, CECI, R, EVANS, A, MARTENS, M, RIGTER, B, SCHMITZ, P, TESSON, M, WELTE, U, and WORM, E (in press). Human factors and road tunnel safety regarding users. PIARC Working Group 3, Human Factors for Tunnel Safety, Paris. CITY LINK (2007). Your ready guide to safety in City Link tunnels, City Link/Trans Urban, Melbourne, April 2007. ENGLUND, A, GREGERSEN, NP, HYDÉN, C, LÖVSUND, P and ÅBERG, L, (1998). Trafiksäkerhet: En Kunskapsöversikt, (Traffic Safety: A Knowledge Overview) pp. 128-129, 96-102, 266-280. KFB Studentlitteratur, Lund: Sweden. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND COUNCIL (2004). Directive 2004/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on minimum safety requirements for tunnels in the Trans-European Road Network, Brussels, April 29, 2004. JRC-ISIS NEDIES (2001). Lessons Learnt from Tunnel Accidents EUR, JRC-ISIS Nedies project Report, March 2001. VERGNAULT, J-M and MADSEN HK (in press). Management of the operator – emergency teams interface in road tunnels, PIARC Working Group 3, Human Factors for Tunnel Safety, Paris. VICROADS (2007). New Drivers Handbook (Solo Driving), VicRoads Publication No. 00568/10.

Ruggero Ceci Ruggero Ceci is a Human Factors specialist with the Swedish Road Administration and a member of PIARC C3.3 Working Group on Tunnel Operations and Human Factors regarding Tunnel Safety. This article is based on his observations while on secondment at the Monash University Accident Research Centre in Melbourne.

CONTACT Dr. Ruggero Ceci, HMI-group, ITS section, Swedish Road Administration, SE-781 87 Borlange, Sweden. Email: [email protected]

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The author would like to thank Dr. Michael Lenné for his support and ideas in pursuing this work and Prof. Tom Triggs, Dr. Jeffery Archer and Dr. Bruce Corben for their help in the preparation of this report. Many thanks also to City Link for their additional information on tunnel safety.

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