SISA Report no. 12 -‐ 2014
The Punjabi Taliban
Dr. Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi Oslo, February 2014
Centre for International and Strategic Analysis © SISA 2014 All views expressed in the report are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Centre for International and Strategic Analysis. The text may not be printed in full or part without the permission of the author. Queries can be directed to: Centre for International and Strategic Analysis Phone: (+47) 932 49 083 E-‐mail:
[email protected] Internet: www.strategiskanalyse.no
Executive Summary This paper discusses the evolution of the Punjabi Taliban in context of their organizational depth in Punjab in Pakistan, and argues since they share a confluence of interests with regards to global jihadism, they are a logical ally of the Taliban & al-‐Qaeda groups. The author argues that it was natural that they would be activated due to this confluence of interests, particularly in wake of the of Pakistani Army's military operations in the tribal areas which placed the TTP under duress. This confluence of interests-‐ activation sequence is argued by the author in the post 2008 period with the help of examples, whereby the terrorist threat from the Punjabi Taliban has become a distinct possibility.
3
INTRODUCTION1 The discourse on Punjab has to be understood in two contexts. Punjab is not a Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA); the analogy of 'lawless badlands' which tends to be applied to FATA is far away from the truth in reference to Punjab. It is considered by many as the most progressive province of Pakistan, and boasts a number of cities which are well established metropolitan centers of modernity and liberalism. At the same time there is the 'other ' Punjab. This is the rural Punjab of the South and even adjoining major urban centers, which has traditionally been the nursery for organizations like Sipah-‐e-‐Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and Jaish-‐e-‐Muhammad (JM). These groups have sprung up from a conflict between a Shia elite and a burgeoning Sunni bourgeoisie in the city of Jhang in the case of SSP; and in the case of JM, a long standing toleration of militancy in Bahawalpur. This 'other' Punjab does not suffer from terrorist attacks as have been witnessed in cities in Punjab like Lahore and Rawalpindi, arguably because it is a sanctuary for these militants. As an Urdu proverb goes' One does not spit in the vessel in which one eats', the militants have tried not to attract attention in the South of Punjab so that they can continue to train and recruit without interference. Punjab accounts for almost 50 percent of Pakistan’s 172 million population. There are more than 20,000 madrasahs in Pakistan, 44 percent of which are situated in Punjab. The government has banned 29 organizations and put 1,764 people on its wanted list, out of which 729 are from southern Punjab2. The linkages between both al-‐Qaeda and the Pashtun Taliban groups to extremists in the core Pakistani provinces of Punjab and Sindh has long been documented, but so far much of the fighting within Pakistan has remained a struggle between the Pakistani government and the Pashtuns. Accordingly, the mobilization of Punjabi islamist militants may be the next phase in the militancy as a consequence of the pressure on the Taliban in Waziristan and Swat due to the Pakistani Army’s military operations in these regions. For the people of Khyber-‐Pakhtunkhwa (KP), the words ‘Punjabi Taliban’ are not new. It has been in use for more than a decade now, and the nomenclature used does not have any ethnic connotation per se as a derogatory marker, but is simply an
4
acknowledgement of reality. The Taliban are generally considered as those from the other side of the Durand Line. Talibanisation started in Pakistan, especially in Khyber-‐ Pakhtunkhwa in the late 90s, and the word ‘maqami’ (local) Taliban came into use well before 9/11. Furthermore, the Punjabi Talibani mobilization was also an early phenomenon. This evolution was due to the fact that Punjabi militants joined Kashmiri Jihad-‐oriented organizations; and also by virtue of the shared training facilities with the Pashtun Taliban. These two points have brought the two entities into intimate contact. Hassan Abbas explains the Punjabi Taliban as “a loose conglomeration of members of banned militant groups of Punjabi origin—sectarian as well as those focused on the conflict in Kashmir—that have developed strong connections with Tehrik-‐e-‐Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Afghan Taliban and other militant groups based in FATA and the North-‐West Frontier Province (NWFP, now KP).3” The organizations which are of prime importance are the Sipah-‐e-‐Shaba Pakistan (SSP), Lashkar-‐e-‐Jhangvi (LJ), Jaish-‐e-‐ Muhammad (JM) as well as their parent organizations Harkat-‐ul-‐Jihad ul Islami (HUJI) and Harkat-‐ul-‐Mujahedeen (HUM). To develop my thesis, I take a three pronged approach. First, I demonstrate linkages between the organizations which form the Punjabi militant groups and their deep affiliations with Punjab. Then I explore their linkages with the Pakistani Taliban and their terrorist ambitions, which I argue are inseparable from those of the Afghan Taliban and al-‐Qaeda. As such, the organizations would thus hardly be expected have converging interests. Finally, I argue that it's only logical to assume that the Pakistani Taliban and al-‐Qaeda have activated their 'sleeper' Punjabi cells and partners in response to the continued pressure exerted on them in Pakistan's tribal areas by the military. I will demonstrate this trend line with the help of examples. PUNJABI ORGANIZATIONAL DEPTH IN PUNJAB & LINKAGE WITH TALIBAN Pakistani Jihadi groups and the Pakistani Taliban are inextricably linked; in fact many of them have lost their separate identities and have now merged into the organizational structure of the Taliban. This should be unsurprising to any analyst covering the Afghan conflict, since these organizations have always played an important part in the Afghan Jihad. Similarly, many of these groups received their training in camps in Afghanistan such as the Sarobi and Jyora camps in Khost, the
5
Ghazni training centre in the Shahshgoo Hills, the Mohammad training centre in Bangarbar, the Rashkor camp to the north of Kabul and the Karaga camp to the west of Kabul. At times the number of Pakistani Mujahedeen at a particular front greatly outnumbered the Afghans. During the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, recruits of the Jaish-‐e-‐Muhammad and Lashkar-‐e-‐Taiba trained at Taliban run camps and were commonly referred to as Punjabi Taliban. The main stay of these Punjabi fighters was the Zahwar camp in Khost province, allegedly run by Osama Bin Laden and Jalaluddin Haqqani. In 1998, after the Kenya and Tanzania attacks, the US fired missiles on these camps, killing several Punjabis. Several Punjabi organizations had safe houses in Peshawar where Mujahedeen would come to take respite from the rigors of war. Shamsheer (a Jihadi periodical published from Hyderabad in Pakistan) in its April 2002 issue, quoted one Pakistani Mujahedeen activist as saying: "All of us (at the front) were Pakistanis. There were two Taliban fronts nearby and close to the Amu river were the fronts of the Arab Mujahedeen. On the Arab fronts there were no Mujahedeen from any other c ountry.” It would be too much to expect that the close ties between these Jihadis and the Afghan Taliban would be severed after the fall of Kabul. In fact, it seemed obvious from doing a literature review of Jihadi publications that many non-‐Pashtun organizations were preparing for a ‘new’ Jihad soon after the fall of Kabul; this would inexorably lead to the Taliban taking centre stage at the Pakistani militant scene. Al-‐Irshad, a Jihadi periodical for instance, published the following message from the Emirs of Harkat-‐ul Jihad-‐ul-‐Islami (HUJI) after the fall of the Taliban: “Victory shall be with those who are in the right (God willing). The Mujahedeen should work in a better manner now; they should sacrifice their lives and property to be dear to God. Harkat-‐ul-‐Jihad-‐ul-‐Islami is devoting all its strength on this occasion and we hope that the Mujahedeen and the workers too will do their best.” In this context, it is worth mentioning that HUJI has a strong presence in Punjab province. Amir Rana said at the time: "It is clear from these various reports that Pakistani Jihadi groups are taking part in the new Jihad against America and the Northern Alliance alongside al-‐Qaida and the Taliban. The prominent Pakistani groups making their
6
contributions include: Harkat-‐ul-‐Mujahedeen (Jamiat-‐ul-‐Ansar), Harkat-‐ul Jihad-‐ul-‐Islami, Jaish-‐e-‐Mohammad, Jamiat al-‐Furqan, Jamiat ul-‐Mujahedeen, al-‐Badr Mujahedeen and Lashkar-‐Taiba. Reliable Jihadi sources admit that the Jihadi organizations are winding up their base camps in Kashmir and moving them to the Afghan border regions. These Mujahedeen have moved especially to assist the Taliban.”4 Again, many of these 'Mujahedeen' were predominantly Punjabi. The Taliban and al-‐Qaeda were not the only organizations which were forced to retreat t o P akistan i n t he w ake o f t he U S c ampaign; m any P akistani J ihadist o utfits like HUJI, along with Harkat ul Mujahedeen (HUM) and Sipah-‐e-‐Sahaba (SSP) militants also found their way back home. Many HUJI commanders and warriors, engaged in the fighting in Kandahar and Qandooz, escaped towards Waziristan and B uner i n K P. H UJI w as o ne o f t he m ain P akistani o rganization s upporting A rab militants in Afghanistan, with its leader Qari Saifullah Akhtar being held in great esteem by Mullah Omar. HUJI’s importance in the eyes of the Taliban was such that Mullah Omer appointed three Taliban ministers and 22 judges, belonging to the Qari's HUJI, in the Taliban’s Government. These linkages would later ‘Al-‐ Qaedaise’ HUJI in Pakistan. 5 R ana asserts that HUJI was responsible for providing the recruiting and networking facilities for Al-‐Qaeda, with cadres being drawn from Lashkar-‐e-‐Jhangvi (LJ), Jaish-‐e-‐Muhammad (JM), Jamiat al-‐Ansar and Sipah-‐ e-‐Sahaba for al-‐Qaeda's operational wings; all are predominantly Punjabi manned organizations. 6 Another organization which has fed the vigor of the renewed insurgent organizations in Pakistan after 9/11 is Harkat-‐ul-‐Mujahedeen (HUM). HUM was initially formed as a splinter group of HUJI under the leadership of Fazlur Rehman Khalil. When the US bombed suspected Al-‐Qaeda camps near Khost and Jalalabad in A fghanistan i n A ugust 1 998, a n umber o f H UM m ilitants w ere a lso k illed.7 K halil vowed vengeance for these operatives, which would concretize later: In 2002, the HUM engineered a suicide bombing on the US consulate in Karachi, Pakistan. Furthermore, K halil t ook h undreds o f H UM m ilitants t o A fghanistan i n t he w ake o f the American defeat of the Taliban, many of them being killed in the hostilities in the c ountry. K halil r eturned t o P akistan i n 2 002, o stensibly t o r esume t he s truggle
7
from within Pakistan. 8 H e subsequently resigned from the leadership of the organization, but his Jihadist credentials came under international scrutiny when two American born Pakistani Jihadists were arrested in California by the FBI in 2005.9 T hese men revealed that they had received militant training under HUM auspices right in the centre of the densely populated Punjabi Pakistani city of Rawalpindi; this covert training facility was purportedly being run by Khalil. The militants revealed to their interrogators that the purpose of the HUM administered training was to target the British homeland. Similarly, SSP and HUM would later provide the substrate from which even more militant organizations like J M a nd L J w ould e merge. HUM is the epitome of a Kashmir Jihad-‐oriented organization, which was active in Kashmir, and heavily recruited Punjabis. In 2006, when Gen. Pervez Ashfaq Kayani (later the Pakistan Army chief) took over the ISI leadership he decided to wind up the Kashmiri Jihadi camps, most of which were located in various parts of Hazara and Azad Kashmir. After the October 2005 earthquake in the northern areas in Pakistan, these camps came into the spotlight and were easily identified by NATO relief missions. In the aftermath of this disaster, an increasing rapprochement with India changed the Indo-‐Pakistani foreign policy dynamics towards more cordial relations, as a result of which many Kashmiri Mujahedeen groups were dismissed. The Kashmiri Jihadis were greatly disillusioned by this new development; for want of logistical support, they began regrouping and reviving their links with the Afghani Taliban and the now easily accessible Pakistani Taliban groups in the KP. Subsequently, pockets of these well trained militants began to sprout up throughout KP, particularly in Waziristan, Darra Adam Khel, Swat, Kurram, Mohmand, Bajaur and Khyber. With the passage of time, they were absorbed into other organizations, of which the Taliban are a major recipient. Sipah-‐e-‐Sahaba Pakistan (SSP, since then renamed Ahle-‐e-‐Sunnat Wal Jamaat, or ASWJ, but such noms de guerre keep changing) which was formed in 1985 in the Punjabi city of Jhang was supported by the Zia regime in order to deal with what was ostensibly considered in Islamabad and Riyadh as the Iranian threat; besides, this was part of Zia's strategy to further his Islamist agenda in Pakistan. The main SSP ideologue was Haq Nawaz Jhangvi; Jhangvi was groomed during the 1974 anti-‐ Ahmedi agitation and served with the Jamiat Ulema-‐e-‐Islam (JUI) in Punjab, before joining
8
SSP.10 The Anjuman-‐e-‐Sipah-‐e-‐Sahaba was then renamed to Sipah-‐e-‐Sahaba Pakistan, with city of Jhang as its main operational base; this was presumably because the city had very high numbers of landholdings by the Shia landlords, while the bourgeoisie and working classes were predominantly Sunnis. Thus, this group can also be considered as socio-‐religious movement which turned violent; SSP cadres resorted to violent means to achieve their goals, and made public their intentions to make Pakistan a Sunni state, as well as getting Shias branded as apostates.11 SSP was set up with both internal and external sources; the internal source being mainly people from the local trader-‐merchant class in Jhang, like Sheikh Yusuf, who w as a lso a p rimary c ontractor f or t he a rmy. T he e xternal s ource c omprised o f funding received from the Arab rulers of the Gulf, who frequented Raheem Yar Khan on lavishly arranged hunting trips. This is one of the reasons why this outfit got so well entrenched in South Punjab, which is also a reason for an escalation of sectarian violence in South Punjab, especially during the 1980s and the 1990s. SSP was also active on the political scene, claiming political lineage by independently standing for elections in 1992. Its spiritual headquarters are located in Punjab too; in the two largest Deobandi madrasahs of Punjab, Jamiat-‐ul-‐Uloom Eidgah in Bahawalnagar city, and Darul Uloom Deoband Faqirwali in the Fort Abbas subdivision. 12 However, all organizational controls were exercised from regional headquarters located in Jamia Faruqiya, Jia Moosa, Shadara, near Lahore, while the international units were controlled by the Madrasah Mahmoodiya in Jhang, again in Punjab.13 The SSP paid special attention to setting up district level units, with 75 district-‐ level and 225 tehsil (micro-‐level unit of administration) units before being banned by the government in 2002.14 Their entrenchment in Punjab is thus self-‐evident. Azam Tariq, who was one of its founding members and became its head in 1997, contested in the 1990, 1993 and 2002 elections. It thus has a political and militant wing; the latter continues to be involved in jihad and now supports the Taliban.15 Lashkar-‐e-‐Jhangvi (LJ) is the epitome of what a decentralized Jihadi organization based on a modern, devolved, al-‐Qaeda model would look like. Founded by Riaz Basra, it is “very decentralized and compartmentalized,” 16 a nd is the ideal template within which al-‐Qaeda militants would be able to operate freely, as well
9
as probably being based on an organizational model which al-‐Qaeda itself has presumably adopted in Pakistan. The LJ militants gravitated back to Pakistan as a sanctuary after the fall of the Taliban, rather than risk a continued existence in Afghanistan with the attendant perils of falling into the hands of the Northern Alliance leaders. LJ was taken over by the ‘internationalists’; it became irrevocably intertwined with the radical ideologies of the Taliban and al-‐Qaeda. Launched in 1996 as a sectarian militant Sunni organization, Lashkar is the most violent terrorist group operating in Pakistan, with almost the entire LJ leadership made up of people who have fought in Afghanistan; most of its cadre strength is drawn from the numerous Sunni madrasahs in Pakistan. It is also almost entirely manned b y P unjabis. In October 2000, the LJ split into two factions, with one faction headed by Riaz Basra a nd t he o ther b y t he c hief o f t he g roup's M ajlis-‐e-‐Shoora ( Supreme C ouncil), Qari Abdul Hai alias Qari Asadullah alias Talha. Qari Hai was Basra's lieutenant and ran a training camp in Sarobi, Afghanistan, until the two leaders fell out and formed their own respective factions. Muhammad Ajmal alias Akram Lahori is the last well known leader as Salaar-‐e-‐Aala (Commander-‐in-‐Chief) of LJ, who succeeded Basra. Belonging originally to the SSP, he, along with Malik Ishaq and Riaz Basra, founded LJ. Lahori’s name is symbolic of his affiliation with Lahore, the main metropolitan city of Punjab. He had earlier attained fame when he established a training camp in Sarobi, Afghanistan, after securing support from the erstwhile Taliban regime. He succeeded Basra, who was killed on May 14, 2002. Lahori is currently in police custody. On August 14, 2001, General Musharraf banned LJ. Five months later, on January 15, 2002, Musharraf banned Sipah-‐e-‐Sahaba Pakistan (SSP). This, however, did not stop these organizations from t heir a ctivities. The Jaish-‐e-‐Mohammad (JM) is one of the deadliest militant groups operating from Pakistan; launched by Maulana Masood Azhar, its prime objective was to ostensibly engage in fighting the Indian security forces in Kashmir. However, it has morphed into a Punjabi organization which maintains active liaison with al-‐Qaeda and the Taliban. Azhar was initially a member of the SSP; later, he joined the Harkat-‐ul-‐
10
Mujahedeen (HuM), and was instrumental in forming the Harkat-‐ul-‐Ansar (HuA) by combining the HuM and another outfit called the Harkat-‐ul-‐Jihad (HuJ). The HuA was deeply involved in Afghanistan. According to one report, 39 out of 113 Jihadists caught in Afghanistan by the Northern Alliance in 1997 belonged to this group. 17 Harkatul Ansar (HuA) was banned in 1997 by the US State Department, due to its alleged association with Osama Bin Laden. This makes Jaish an ideological extension of Harkatul Ansar which rechristened itself as Harkatul Mujahedeen in 1998, a year after being banned. Azhar was arrested in Indian administered Kashmir in 1993, from where he managed to return to Pakistan in 2000; courtesy of a deal brokered under a hostage operation organized by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. While the Harkatul-‐ul-‐Mujahedeen never regained lost ground after the schism, Jaish-‐e-‐Mohammad evolved rapidly as the more radical militant group, because it retained links with two major Sunni sectarian groups: the Sipah-‐e-‐Sahaba (SSP) and the Lashkar-‐e-‐Jhangvi (LJ). The leadership of Harkat decided to distance itself from Masood Azhar, but hostility soon developed between the two groups, when some former Harkat (now indoctrinated to JM) militants took over control of over a dozen Harkat offices in Punjab. When these Punjabi militants came back to Pakistan, it was expected that their zeal would start manifesting itself. As soon as early 2002, an entity calling itself al-‐Saiqa distributed leaflets for printing to various newspapers, describing Pakistan as a Darul Harb (abode of war) and enjoining Jihad against the state. Soon afterwards a church in Bahawalpur in Punjab was attacked, with a hitherto unknown entity, Lashkar-‐e-‐Omer, claiming credit. It is probable that these were early attempts by returning and Kashmiri oriented militants to set up new groups; such names never surfaced again, and it is conceivable that these early attempts coalesced later into more 'durable' groups. During the Taliban heydays, thousands of Punjabis moved to South Waziristan over the years and successfully established themselves in the restive border region. Most of these migrants came from Raheem Yar Khan, Lahore, Multan, Sadiqabad, Bahawalpur and other parts of Punjab, with estimates of around 2000 people from southern and northern Punjab province moving to South Waziristan since March 2005.These migrants paid much higher rents to the
11
locals for their houses and shops, and started different business, mostly food and pharmacy-‐ related.18 These well-‐trained Punjabi militants soon started flexing their muscles by starting a confrontation with the Uzbeks in these areas, a task in which they were helped by the 'pro state' Taliban like the late Maulvi Nazir; the Uzbeks had become unpopular with the locals due to their high-‐handedness. A conservative estimate put the number of these foreign militants, especially Uzbeks, at around 2500 to 3000 in South – and North Waziristan in 2005.19 The Punjabis thus offered a counterweight to these foreign militants in providing a “Pakistani indigenous” mercenary force, which stood to gain territorial rights in a deeply clan-‐oriented area by ousting the 'meddlesome' Uzbeks. These Punjabi militants also reportedly established separate training centers in FATA, especially in North Waziristan.20 They had a distinct identity from their Pashtun counterparts, and were also comparatively more educated, better equipped and technologically savvier than their Pashtun brethren.21 This was a result of their upbringing in Punjab Province with its urban linkages, where internet access and communications equipment are more readily available; they were thus the confluence of the urban – and the 'other ' Punjab. They are also reportedly more unscrupulous than their Pashtun brothers, with the tendency to be bought by highest bidders. Many Criminal Investigation Department officers, from the Counter Terrorism wing of Police in Punjab have cited the criminal tendencies of the militants at the start of their careers.22 They relocated to FATA after their organizations were banned in order to raise funds through drug smuggling, and acquired weapons from the indigenous weapons markets Dara Adam Khel. Banned organizations resurfaced under new names or as charities, and several splinter groups also relocated to FATA.23 TERRORIST LINKAGES-‐THE CONFLUENCE OF INTERESTS SSP fought with Taliban against Ahmed Shah Masood and the Shiite Hazaras in Afghanistan, and is thought to be jointly responsible together with the Taliban for the massacre of Hazaras and Iranian diplomats in Afghanistan in August 1998. 24 Following the invasion of Afghanistan by the Allied Forces, Azam Tariq warned to fight alongside the Taliban militia. In an interview with the BBC, he openly praised the Taliban leadership and endorsed attacks on Shias in Pakistan. He was locked up in October 2001 as the Allied Forces rained bombs on the Taliban-‐ruled Afghanistan. Post 9/11 and the subsequent American invasion of Afghanistan, Azam Tariq had joined hands with members of the Afghan Jihad Council to condemn the allied
12
forces’ bombing campaign of Afghanistan. Under his leadership, the SSP was linked with the Harkatul-‐ul-‐Mujahedeen (HuM) led by Maulana Fazlur Rehman Khalil and the Jaish-‐e-‐Mohammad (JM) under the leadership of Maulana Masood Azhar. SSP is also reputed to have been the first to dispatch its Jihadis to join Al-‐Qaeda. After being banned by the Pakistani government in 2002 due to American-‐exerted pressure, it simply changed its name to Millat-‐e-‐Islamia, 25 w hile its activities went underground. but continued nevertheless in the guise of a 'political party'; with the professed manifesto of constitutionally turning Pakistan into a Sunni state on the I ranian m odel.26 S SP c ontinued w ith i ts n ew t itle f or s ome t ime t his p ractice o f adopting new noms de guerre in response to bans, while continuing their activities, would characterize many Pakistani Jihadist organizations in the post 2002 period. Azam Tariq was assassinated in Islamabad on October 6, 2003, while going to the Parliament to attend a National Assembly session. Unabashedly pro-‐ Taliban, Azam Tariq had won a National Assembly seat in the 2002 general elections from the Sunni-‐dominated Jhang district of Punjab as an independent candidate; an occurrence which amply demonstrates how deep seated the organization h ad b ecome i n P unjab.27 Sipah-‐e-‐Sahaba diminished somewhat in importance after the assassination of its paramount leader Azam Tariq in 2003, and also due to the formation of the more radical breakaway splinter group, Lashkar-‐e-‐Jhangvi, from within the ranks of SSP. Subsequently, the divide between the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-‐N), the SSP and Lashkar-‐e-‐Jhangvi (LJ) was bridged through negotiations between the parties.28 Ostensibly, a deal was struck, in which the ruling PML-‐N Punjab government promised to create job quotas for SSP members, in exchange for the withdrawal of the LJ candidate standing against Chief Minister designate Shahbaz Sharif in Bhakkar. SSP also has international presence; with 20 branches in foreign countries including Saudi Arabia, Bangladesh, Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan etc. SSP claims to be the largest and most pervasive Sunni supremacist organization in the world.29 The organization reportedly has tens of thousands of active supporters, and active cadre strength of up to 6,000 activists.30 SSP has been suspected of links with Ramzi Yusuf, the WTC bomber. When exploring Ramzi Yusuf’s links to SSP, an
13
investigative news report stated: "The Pakistani investigators are sure of Ramzi Yusuf’s ties with the Sipah-‐e-‐Sahaba, which flourished mostly in the military training camps inside Afghanistan designated for Arabs and Pakistanis. Orthodox Sunni religious schools in Pakistan serve as feeders for these military training camps… Analysts suspect Ramzi Yusuf’s connection with Mujahedeen Khalaq because of his Iraqi background".31 The report added: "Ramzi is understood to have strong connections in the Pakistani and Iranian side of Baluchistan... investigators believed…the unit in charge of the Sipah-‐e-‐Sahaba in Chakiwarah, neighborhood of Karachi, was another close associate of Ramzi."32 The SSP seems to have been resurrected in South Punjab in the past couple of years and also has maintained links with breakaway outfits such as the JM. Apparently, in a meeting in October 2008, Masood Azhar performed the dastaarbandi of SSP’s Maulana Zia-‐ul-‐Haq Qasmi, who was appointed the chairman of the supreme council of the SSP. Even though the LJ has never been an organization with a very large number of followers, its adherents have been the most fanatical. Some say the numbers of trained LJ operatives has never crossed the figure of 500; notwithstanding, they have proved to be deadly. After the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the LJ militants preferred to take their chances with the Pakistani authorities, even risking liquidation, instead of falling into the hands of Northern Alliance commanders; there is a large human resource pool of these ‘boys’ upon which the LJ can draw to carry out terrorist attacks. In January 1997, a bomb blast at the Sessions Court in Lahore left 30 people dead, including the SSP chief Ziaur Rehman F arooqi, a long w ith 2 2 p olicemen a nd a j ournalist. A s a s wift r eaction, t he Iranian Cultural Centre in Lahore was attacked and set on fire, while seven people were shot dead in the Multan district of Punjab, including the Iranian diplomat Muhammad Ali Rahimi in the same month. In September 1997, five personnel of the Iranian armed forces, who were in Pakistan for training purposes, were killed. LJ w as i mplicated i n a ll a ttacks a s a v endetta f or F arooqi’s a ssassination. The SSP and the LJ enjoy easy access to sophisticated arms, with the ability to launch attacks against ‘hard’ as well as ‘soft’ targets. It was during the second tenure of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, that his younger brother Shahbaz Sharif's
14
government in Punjab moved against the SSP and the LJ, killing 36 of its leading militants, all within a short time span of one year. During his last days as the Pakistani premier, Sharif went public in naming Afghanistan as the country providing s helter a nd t raining t o t he S SP a nd L J h it m en. B efore t hat, o n J anuary 3 , 1999, Riaz Basra-‐led LJ had attempted to assassinate Nawaz Sharif. In March 2002, in an Islamabad church located within the well-‐guarded diplomatic enclave, LJ killed five Christians, including two American nationals. In May 2002, eleven Frenchmen, who were mistaken for Americans, were blown up in Karachi, and on June 14, 2002, twelve Pakistanis were killed in a suicide attack on US diplomats. At least five of the ten terrorists involved in these attacks were positively identified as belonging to the LJ cadres. Asif Ramzi, an LJ trainee, also came into the s potlight a s b eing w anted i n t he D aniel P earl m urder c ase. In all of the above cases, the al-‐Qaeda network ostensibly worked in close coordination with the LJ cadres in executing these attacks. On January 30, 2003, the US State Department added the Lashkar-‐e-‐Jhangvi to its List of Foreign Terrorist Organizations. The LJ is said to have masterminded the first women suicide bomber attacks in Pakistan to target several Shia places of worship in Karachi. This was disclosed by an arrested suicide trainer to the police in Karachi; LJ had brainwashed a few girls aged between 16 and 20 years to carry out suicide missions. Though the plan did not materialize, the very notion displays the group’s ingeniousness. Reportedly, Aziza, an Uzbek militant has been actively indoctrinating female suicide bombers in Waziristan at the behest of the Asif Chhotoo faction of Lashkar-‐e-‐Jhangvi.33 T wo arrested al-‐Qaeda accused, Dawood Badini a nd M osabir A ruchi, h ave a lso b een l inked t o L J a nd t o R amzi A hmed Y usuf, who has demonstrable SSP and LJ connections. Yusuf has already been convicted in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York. Dawood Badini is a brother-‐in-‐law of Ramzi Yusuf, and is wanted in a 2003 Quetta mosque bomb attack that killed more than 40 people. Mosabir Aruchi is the nephew of the al-‐ Qaeda's chief operational commander, Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, who was arrested in Rawalpindi. Reportedly, Badini and Aruchi were also involved in Daniel p earl’s m urder.34
15
Some s ay t hat L J i s o perated a s a s ort o f a D elta f orce o f a l-‐Qaeda; t his i s s aid t o b e a special al-‐Qaeda unit formed under the leadership of Khalid Sheikh Mohammad before his arrest, tasked with eliminating specific high profile targets, including Pervez Musharraf. A June 2006 attack on a high ranking general was said to be planned by this unit. Abu Musab al-‐Zarqawi was also reputed to be working closely with LJ; purportedly, Zarqawi shared LJ’s anti-‐Shia bias and violent techniques, right down to the May 2004 videotaped beheading of an American businessman, Nicholas Berg, in Iraq. 35 T he FBI also claims that Zarqawi and Ramzi jointly carried out the June 20, 1994 bomb explosion at the shrine of Imam Ali Raza in Mashhad, Iran. Another reputed LJ terrorist is Matiur Rehman, who is believed to have links with al-‐Qaeda, and is one of the prime suspects in the London airline plot. ABC News' Alexis Debat has done the lion's share of the investigation of Matiur Rehman. Just one day prior to the uncovering of the London Airline Plot, Debat described Matiur as "The Man Who Is Planning the Next Attack on America".36 I n March 2006, Debat contextualized Rehman’s role as the liaison between al-‐Qaeda and the Pakistani Jihadis, claiming that Rehman was the new chief of al-‐Qaeda's military committee. Ostensibly, Rehman has helped to train thousands of Pakistani militants at training camps during the late 1990s; LJ is s aid t o b e h is m ain c onduit. Even though LJ obviously takes direction from Al-‐Qaeda and offers sanctuary to it, the group’s prime focus stays focused on Pakistan. A January 6, 2007 editorial by Daily Times explored the Al-‐Qaeda links of the Lashkar-‐e-‐Jhangvi in these words: "According to Pakistani security, three incidents of terrorism in Karachi in 2006 -‐ the blast at the US Consulate [on March 3 killing diplomat David Foy], the Nishtar Park massacre [on April 11 which eliminated the entire leadership of Sunni Tehrik] and the murder of Shin leader Allama Hasan Turabi [on July 14] -‐ were all carried out by the sectarian militia Lashkar-‐e-‐Jhangvi and were planned in South Waziristan under the tutelage of al-‐Qaeda. The new combination is Lashkar-‐e-‐ Jhangvi, Wana and al-‐Qaeda, and the Lashkar-‐e-‐Jhangvi is the blanket term now used for all manner of jehad in which all the Deobandi-‐Ahle Hadith militants have made common cause. All three incidents were staged through the device of suicide-‐bombings which is clearly the Arab signature ….....All three incidents had
16
been traced to Wana by the investigators: one ostensibly committed for al-‐Qaeda and two for the local sectarians... (after relocation to Afghanistan)... the terror group had to accept a kind of coexistence with the sectarian militias which were taking training in its camps. That is why whenever Pakistan demanded the return of the Lashkar-‐e-‐Jhangvi killers from the 'friendly' Taliban government, a deaf ear was turned to it, and the Lashkar terrorists continued to live in al-‐Qaeda camps outside Kabul.” 37 In FATA, the maqami Taliban initiated militancy from Darra Adam Khel, but were excelled by the Lashkar-‐e-‐Jhangvi, who brought a sectarian tinge to the militancy. These events actually sparked off the debate about Punjabi Taliban in the KP province long before it became mainstream discussion at the national level.38 Jaish-‐e-‐Mohammed was established on January 31, 2000 by Masood Azhar, who had been languishing in an Indian jail prior to this. In December 1999 five men hijacked an Indian airline plane '1C 814' and forced the pilot to land at Taliban controlled Qandahar airport in Afghanistan, where the hijackers demanded the release of Maulana Masood Azhar, Mushtaq Zargar and Sheikh Ahmed Omar Saeed in exchange for the passengers aboard the aircraft. The hostage swap was secured on December 31st, 1999. Masood returned to Pakistan shortly thereafter. Masood provided the definitive linchpin between the Taliban and JM. Jaish introduced the hitherto unique innovation of the suicide tactic in Pakistan when they carried out the first attack of this kind in Jammu & Kashmir on April 19, 2000; one of its members drove a hijacked car loaded with explosives into the main gate of the Badami Bagh Cantonment. The deadly strike marked the first suicide bomb attack in the 13-‐year-‐old history of Kashmir militancy. Since then, they have been implicated in some high profile attacks, like the December 13, 2001 Parliament attack in New Delhi,39 and an attempt on Pakistani president Musharraf’s life in 2003. The US State Department designated JM as a foreign terrorist organization in December 2001, with General Musharraf also banning it in Pakistan in January 2002. Masood Azhar simply got his outfit re-‐ registered under the new name of Khudam-‐ul-‐Islam, although it is still continued to function as before. The offspring organization was banned as well, when the government outlawed Khudam-‐ul-‐lslam on N ovember 15, 2003. The leadership of the outlawed group maintained that the government action had emanated at the behest of the US. Jaish is an extremely well-‐organized outfit. Madrasah Syed
17
Ahmed Shaheed, Bamako has been the primary military training centre of Jaish-‐e-‐Mohammed. The assets of the group run into millions of rupees; JM recently purchased land in Bahawalpur, which many believe is to be utilized as a location for a new training camps. 40 It was paid for by a sum of Rs 7,600,000 emanating from untraceable sources. 41 The suicide attacks on Musharraf were followed by a major state crackdown in which hundreds of Azhar’s followers were arrested, and most of Jaish’s offices were sealed across Pakistan. This followed earlier arrests of JM militants suspected of carrying out suicide attacks on churches and missionary institutes in Islamabad, Murree and Taxila, in the post 9/11 period and the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan. Azhar, however, blamed all these attacks on M aulana Abdul Jabbar’s breakaway splinter group (Jamaat ul Furqan); a feeling which was reciprocated by the other group towards JM. In July 2005, British intelligence agencies investigating the 7/7 (2005) bombings in London informed their Pakistan counterparts that two of the four suicide bombers Shehzad Tanweer and Siddique Khan, had met Osama Nazir, a Jaish-‐e-‐Mohammad suicide trainer, in Faisalabad, a few months before the 7/7 attacks, when the suicide attackers had visited Pakistan. 42 “Information provided by Osama Nazir after his arrest revealed that Shehzad Tanweer had stayed at another extremist Sunni religious school, Jamia Manzurul Islami, situated in the Cantonment area of Lahore, and being run by its principal, Pir Saifullah Khalid, who is considered close to Masood Azhar.”43 Jaish-‐e-‐Mohammed once again came into the Jihadi spotlight in August 2006 when Rashid Rauf, the al-‐Qaeda member suspected as the main plotter of a terrorist plan to blow up US-‐bound British airliners with liquid explosives, was undoubtedly demonstrated to be a close relative of Maulana Masood Azhar. The Pakistani authorities mentioned that there were strong indications of an al-‐Qaeda connection. 44 Rashid Rauf was arrested on August 9, 2007 from a Jaish run madrasah situated in the Model Town area of Bahawalpur, a bare couple of days before the British crackdown and arrests of the main plotters in London. 45 Amir Mir states: “On August 17, 2007, a senior Pakistani official conceded that the British airport terror plot was sanctioned by al-‐Qaeda’s No.2, Dr. Ayman al-‐
18
Zawahiri and that Rashid was the planner of the attacks. Subsequent investigations proved Rashid was the brother-‐in-‐law of one of Masood Azhar’s younger brother, Mohammad Tahir, who runs a religious seminary. Approached in the aftermath of the arrest of Rashid Rauf, the father of Masood Azhar and Abdul Rauf, told media people in Bahawalpur on August 16, 2006 that Rashid Rauf was a member of the Jaish-‐e-‐Mohammad but left the group to join its rivals who were more interested in promoting al-‐Qaeda’s anti-‐Western agenda.” 46 JM’s media wing reiterated its often repeated line of blaming the incident on the splinter faction: “He was a member of our group but later he deserted us and joined the Jamaat-‐ul-‐Furqan, led by a Jaish dissident, Maulana Abdul Jabbar," Hafiz Allah Bukhsh was quoted by Dawn on August 16, 2006: "Our cause is liberation of the Occupied Jammu Kashmir, while their main cause is Afghanistan. They are anti-‐America but we are not," Bukhsh added. Subsequently, Rashid Rauf managed to escape from police custody in Rawalpindi under mysterious, unsatisfactorily explained circumstances. Mufti Rauf’s (the brother of Azhar, to be distinguished from Rashid Rauf) name cropped up during the July 2007 Lai Masjid crisis in Islamabad, Pakistan. There were rampant media reports that a large number of JM militants were present inside the Lai Masjid and Jamia Hafsah to repel impending military operations; Rauf used the repetitive cliché that they were the 'disgruntled elements' of JM, already disowned by the organization. The most recent highlight of JM activity has been their alleged role in radicalizing Faisal Shahzad, the failed Times Square bomber. THE CONFLUENCE OF INTERESTS-‐ACTIVATION SEQUENCE The entrenchment of these organizations within Punjab should be evident by now, as should the fact that they have been engaged in helping and facilitating global Jihadism at the behest of Al Qaeda. At the same time they have been staunchly faithful to the Taliban, without which they could hardly be expected to thrive, especially in FATA. This brings me to my final point; it seems that the Punjabi Taliban have been activated after the Pakistani military has displayed its clear resolve in wiping out the insurgency in Pakistan's troubled areas. This evolution is demonstrable by the increased intensity of attacks in Punjab which
19
show linkages of Punjabi terrorists with the Pashtun Taliban. The deep seated organizational linkage has been provided by men who moved to Waziristan, who are by now entrenched in the fabric of the tribal society. Some are noteworthy commanders. One such commander, Tariq, reportedly heads the local Taliban in Darra Adam Khel, and has been previously implicated in sectarian terrorism and attacks on foreigners, especially the kidnapping of a polish engineer working for an NGO in the area... 47 T he Darra TTP are the most radical and group in the area, and have targeted Shias, as well as Pakistan Government troops, facilities and convoys traveling the road from the Kohat Tunnel, and even jirgas of tribal elders. 48 The organization seems to have liberal autonomy in its planning and execution of attacks; they operate primarily in Peshawar and Kohat. 49 In 2008, the Darra TTP was reportedly responsible for attacks that destroyed over 40 fuel tankers bound for NATO forces in Afghanistan, seizing the Kohat Tunnel three times, as well as attacking weapon – food – and oil transports along the entire distance from Karachi to the border of Afghanistan. Pakistani military offensives over the past years in Swat and South Waziristan have brought different groups closer together under duress of a common enemy. “Connections that have always existed are becoming tighter and more public than they have in the past,” explains Bruce Riedel.50 For example Qari Zafar, the Punjabi Taliban leader reportedly killed in a February 2010 U.S. missile drone strike, merged his organization Badar Mansoor into the TTP just before the Pakistani Army's offensive in South Waziristan.51 Reportedly, this merger was in addition to three and five thousand Punjabi fighters already present in the area before the army moved in.52 Many Punjabis are also part of the TTP Shura, the umbrella council of about forty top militant commanders supervising TTP activities in Pakistan.53 The Punjabis have tended to set up their own new groups as well. The emergence in North Waziristan of the Asian Tigers, for instance, a previously unknown Jihadi group, is just one indicator of the growth of the power of the Punjabi Taliban. This group seems virulently anti-‐state, as most of the Punjabi Taliban groups allied with TTP. Pakistani intelligence agencies believe that the Asian Tigers are a front group for Harkat-‐ul-‐Jihad-‐al-‐Islami (HuJI), headed by Illyas Kashmiri. 54 One of their most famous recent operations was the abduction and
20
assassination of Khalid Khawaja, a former Pakistan Air Force squadron leader who gained notoriety as a Jihadist ideologue in the 1980s. Khawaja was executed on April 30, 2010, while travelling with a group to meet TTP leaders. According to a Tehrik-‐e-‐Taliban Pakistan spokesman, “They tried to convince Hakeemullah Mehsud and Wali ur Rahman Mehsud to stop attacking the Pakistan army and discussed a mechanism to target NATO supply lines only. They offered to help Hakeemullah set up pockets in different parts of the country from where they could attack NATO supplies going to Afghanistan.” 55 He had also tried to appeal to the TTP to expel 14 senior Taliban commanders who were being suspected to be on the payroll of the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), India’s external intelligence agency; a majority of these commanders with suspected Indian loyalties were Punjabis, reinforcing the 'mercenary on sale' hypothesis for the Punjabi Taliban. 56 The Punjabi Taliban seems to be in favor of indiscriminate Jihad, and strongly refute the oft repeated doctrine that Jihad in Afghanistan and Kashmir is good, but Jihad against the 'infidel' Pakistan army is not. Mohammad Omar, a spokesman for the Punjabi Taliban, told a Pakistani journalist that Khawaja was killed partly because he would call the Punjabi Taliban “terrorists” but refer to the Afghan Taliban as “Mujahedeen.”
57
Before being killed, Khawaja recorded a
'confession' in which he alleged that that Harkat-‐ul-‐Mujahedeen commander Maulana Fazlur Rehman Khalil, Jaish-‐e-‐Mohammad founder Maulana Masood Azhar and Jaish-‐e-‐Mohammad commander Abdullah Shah Mazhar were moved around unbothered because they did not target the state. “Jihadi organizations like Lashkar-‐e-‐Taiba, al-‐Badr, Jaish-‐e-‐Mohammad, Harkat-‐ul-‐Mujahedeen, Jamiat-‐ul-‐Mujahedeen etc. operate …(unbothered)….and they are allowed to collect their funds inside Pakistan." 58 As part of the strategy to avenge losses and force the army to halt operations in the FATA, the TTP and al-‐Qaeda seem to have activated their Punjabi component. “A new series of suicide attacks will take place soon,” Qari Hussain Mehsud, TTP’s deputy chief and head of suicide bombing, warned on March 31, 2010, adding: “The attacks will be carried out across the country, but the focus would be on Punjab where policies are made—attacks inside Punjab have more
21
influence than in the rest of the country.” 59 On May 11, 2010, it was reported that militants from Orakzai and Waziristan had entered Rawalpindi, Islamabad, and other Punjabi cities to carry out terrorist attacks, trigger sectarian violence and rioting in major Punjabi cities. 60 The U.S. embassy in Islamabad was said to be a prime target. 61 The May 28, 2010 Lahore assaults which killed over eighty worshippers from the minority Ahmedi community, 62 and the June 8, 2010 Taliban ambush around Islamabad which destroyed fifty U.S. and NATO supply trucks heading to Afghanistan, 63 were a testament to TTP’s claim about destabilizing Punjab. Such attacks, into which a distinct Punjabi group is now being tied, include the March 8, 2010, suicide attack on the Special Investigation Agency in Lahore, killing and wounding over one hundred people. 64 Both the TTP and al-‐Qaeda’s al-‐Jihad group in Punjab claimed responsibility. 65 “If the government does not halt military operation in the tribal area and drone attacks continue, the TTP will continue suicide bombings (on government installations),” TTP spokesman Azam Tariq warned. 66 Four days later, coordinated suicide bombings directed at Lahore killed at least fifty-‐seven and injured over one hundred soldiers and civilians. 67 Punjabi militants belonging to LJ carried out the attack, but the TTP leadership in Waziristan claimed credit for the strikes. 68 Subsequently, the police uncovered 4.5 tons of explosives and sophisticated arms in Lahore's residential areas 69 and arrested over fifty locals with links to militants in southern Punjab. 70 These incidents amply demonstrated the inroads of these militants into Pakistan’s urban centers, whence investigations showed that planning and arrangements for the attacks had originated in Lahore. 71 In a rare briefing, Pakistani interior minister Rehman Malik confirmed that Punjabi militant groups had joined forces with the Waziristan-‐based Taliban to carry out attacks in Punjab. 72 It is significant that such attacks – in which a distinct Punjabi entity was identified – were a rarity before 2008; many of the earlier attacks also had LJ & JM backing, but a distinct Punjabi identity was not being tied into such attacks earlier. It is also significant that the noms de guerre of the Punjabi Taliban as a distinct identity emerged only in 2009, when a previously unknown Punjabi group, Tehrik-‐e-‐Taliban Punjab, claimed credit for
22
a series of attacks inside Punjab, including a deadly assault on the Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore, and a suicide bombing targeting the army’s general headquarters in Rawalpindi. 73 Rural districts in southern Punjab seem to have become sanctuaries and training areas for banned Punjabi terrorist groups, as well as Pashtun and al-‐ Qaeda fighters escaping FATA in wake of the military operations there; it is logical that the latter would seek shelter with the help of the former due to their affinity with each other. “The militants who were hiding in south Punjab are now surfacing.... These people [LJ, SSP, and JM] are enemies of the country and are part of the TTP and al Qaeda,” Malik said. 74 Although southern Punjab is not Swat or Waziristan, and arguably may never be, grinding poverty, corruption, extremist religious seminaries and socio-‐economic inequities are a recipe for disaster in the area. 75 The populace in this area living below the poverty line is more than that in the three provinces of Sindh, Baluchistan, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa combined, which is a dangerous recipe for radicalization . 76 Incidents eerily like the ones which emerged when the Taliban were taking over territories in FATA and Swat have occurred in certain southern Punjabi Villages; typically, the extremists are demanding Islamic law, denouncing the government as incompetent and corrupt, 77 banning video and music shops, and urging local population for an Islamic revolution. 78 Moreover, the borders of South Punjab share certain topographical features with the tribal areas which makes permeation of militants easy even if entry points from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to Punjab could be manned effectively, which is a big question mark. 79 Even a cursory look at just two of the important districts in the area reveals fault lines in the socio-‐economic structures. Dera Ghazi Khan, the largest district in Punjab, is the gateway between central Punjab, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan. Militant Punjabi groups have regularly been recruiting from the area for the war against the U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan. 80 “No one is serious about preventing the Talibanisation of our area,” Khawaja Mudasar Mehmood, a local politician with the ruling Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), said in November 2009. “We face spillover from
23
South Waziristan. Taliban militants are already passing into this area, and the border military police can’t prevent it.” 81 The Taliban influence has steadily increased in the district of Bahawalpur, through their allied group the Jaish-‐e-‐Muhammad. This was already home to between fifteen and twenty thousand trained Punjabi militants, who went undercover of charity organizations or private schools and media outlets in the wake of Musharraf's enforced ban on militant organizations. 82 They became so strong that law enforcement in the area is unable or unwilling to tackle their influence. 83 For instance, the Bahawalpur police backed down in an attempt to arrest a JM commander in a Bahawalpur hospital after he had been wounded in a U.S. predator strike, since the police were threatened with large scale reprisal attacks. He then got refuge in one of the many madrasahs in Bahawalpur, 84 which together house over eighty thousand students. 85 With this background, the claim by the Punjab government that use of ‘Punjabi Taliban’ will give rise to provincialism is going to complicate matters, as without acknowledgement of the problem, tackling it effectively will not be possible; the tendency of Punjab Government's outright denial of existence of militants in Punjab is not helpful.86 ACTIVATION The diagram below represents the tip of the arrow as the confluence of interest activation sequence of the Punjabi Taliban; I have highlighted these factors, as well as increased pattern of activity in the past couple of years. This, not coincidentally, corresponds to escalating military operations in Swat and more recently in Waziristan, which have tended to displace Taliban from their strongholds. This progression cannot be understood as a linear sequence of events, since many events in time overlap each other, but as a gradual emergence of trends, which also overlap each other. As I have pointed out above, all the points exist for the emergence of Punjabi Taliban in Pakistan as a franchise of Taliban. Also, it should be evident by now, that this will not activate some monolithic entity but several disparate and distinct groups which will increase their activity, particularly in the province of Punjab. This is because the province has been marked out by the Taliban as the next target of mobilization, and it seems logical that the group would need to activate terrorists who are indistinguishable from the
24
general population of Punjab in order to enable these men to blend in; thus steps in the Punjabi Taliban. The fact that the number of attacks have increased in Punjab around 2008 and onwards also strongly indicates the possibility that Punjab has become a target due to the vigorous military actions carried out by the Pakistani Army in the tribal areas. This analysis is consistent with reports of an increased Punjabi Taliban presence in the region circulating in Pakistani media, as well as statements emanating from TTP’s high command indicating that Punjab had become a target. The methods used in Manawan and the Sri Lankan attacks also indicated that a Fidayin87 style methodology had surfaced in Pakistan, which was an innovation originally attributed to Lashkar-‐e-‐ Taiba, but actively adapted by LJ and JM. The Pashtun attackers till that time had been stressing mainly on the suicide tactic. One needs to remember that Punjabi militant presence is not a new phenomenon; Punjabis have for long been a part of many militant organizations, and after 9/11 they have been actively mobilized to help their Pashtun brethren. However, the fact that they have become known as an entity to be feared even in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa indicates that they have become quite strong within the overarching Taliban-‐led framework. Many policy analysts in KP are more worried about the Punjabi component in the region than their own indigenous Pashtun population, arguably because as strangers to the area they are a relatively unknown and thus a more worrisome entity. This may, of course, be the same sort of provincialized politicized discourse which surrounds almost every debate about terrorism in Pakistan. Karachi locals have been worried about Pashtun Taliban blending into the sizeable Pashtun population in their city, Pashtun in KP are tense about the Punjabi infiltration; while the federal city of Islamabad remains forever on high alert about the possibility of Pashtun terrorists seeking sanctuary by infiltrating the city’s not formidable Pashtun workforce presence. This has the potential of turning into a polemical political debate joined by politicians across the political divides that tend to blame each other and their constituencies for the ills of the society. At the same time, there tends to be at least an element of truth about reports about increased Taliban activity through its Punjabi affiliates, judging by the recently emerging media coverage given to the phenomenon. This activation sequence is supported by the increased Taliban activity in Punjab in roughly the same temporal parameters that the COIN operations gained momentum in Swat and FATA, demonstrating that the Punjabi
25
Taliban were posturing to become a force to be reckoned with in Pakistan in the times to come. Simultaneously, there has been an increase in the number of 'martyrdom' videos released by the TTP and its affiliates showing Punjabis 'embracing martyrdom' by carrying out terrorist acts88.
CURRENT SCENARIO Some Pakistani analysts are of the opinion that the Punjabi Taliban has by now become so powerful that they control logistics in tribal territories, and are ostensibly more powerful than the TTP.89 This is probably exaggerated, as the TTP leaders have until now all been Pashtuns, and there is no indication to date that command and control positions within the organization are going to be granted to a Punjabi. At the same time, it is by now almost unambiguous that the Punjabi Taliban occupy a prominent position within TTP's command structure. Key figures like the late Hakeemullah Mehsud, Wali-‐ ur Rehman and Qari Hussain were all firmly connected to Punjabi Taliban, and probably the latest head of TTP, Maulana Fazlullah, will also be. Qari Hussain, once known as the Ustad-‐e-‐Fidayeen (master trainer of suicide bombing squads), was a former member of LJ, and closely coordinated with the Punjabi Taliban in carrying out attacks in Punjab. The security situation in Punjab has slowly but perceptibly been deteriorating. The extremist imprint has already been mentioned in the form of people forcibly shutting down video shops in parts of South Punjab, but there is more. As a new report says: "The situation in Punjab is particularly worrisome because of the increasing involvement of banned militant groups such as Lashkar-‐e-‐Jhangvi and Lashkar-‐e-‐Islam (based in Khyber agency) in kidnapping for ransom cases as a means to finance their activities ….
26
The nature of crime has changed over the last few decades because of rapid population growth and social and economic changes in our society.” 90 At the same time, the capability gaps or unwillingness of local authorities to upset status quos mean that these committed groups find a wide physical and dialogical space to operate. Almost every head of Police, the District Police officer (DPO), head of civilian district administration, or the District Coordination officer (DCO) is more concerned about how long he can hold onto his 'seat', or present designation. They would rather leave the militants alone, which many officers perceive as a hornets' nest, as this would put local security in jeopardy if disturbed. Again, this is borne out by reports regarding parts of Punjab. "Sipah-‐e-‐Sahaba is active here with the new name Ahle Sunnat wal Jamaat led by Ahmad Ludhyanvi. The most violent sectarian outfit Lashkar-‐e-‐Jhangvi (LJ) is active in these areas, particularly Chakwal, Rawalpindi and Mandi Bahauddin …. District administration…greatly overlooks their activities. Jamat-‐e-‐Islami, Jamaatud Dawa, Khaksar Tehrik and Jamatul Ahrar are promoting extremism in district Gujranwala in the name of Islam."91 The number of incidents of terrorism in which Punjabi Taliban are being implicated is also steadily increasing, and they are said to have “mounted some of Pakistan's most notorious terrorist attacks” recently.92 Some of the most high profile attacks in Pakistan are said to have a Punjabi Taliban link, such as the bombing of the Marriott Hotel in 2008, the brazen attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore in 2009, a market bombing in Lahore, and bombing of a military mosque in Rawalpindi, to name just a few.93 The Punjabi Taliban also claimed credit for the 2010 attacks on the Ahmediya community in Lahore, the biggest until then on minorities in Pakistan,94 as well as the assassination of the Federal minorities' minister, Shahbaz Bhatti.95 Punjab Taliban was also implicated in attacks on foreigners, such as the assassination attempt on a Swedish charity worker in Lahore.96 Concurrently, news reports of Punjabi Taliban being killed in drone strikes have also been increasing.97 As soon as the current government took over after the May 11, 2013 elections, a group of terrorists stormed a base camp at the foot of Pakistan's second-‐highest peak, Nanga Parbat, frequented by mountaineers. A group of ten foreign mountaineers, with only one Pakistani Shia porter among them, were executed. The TTP claimed 'credit' for this
27
attack through their official spokesman Ehsanullah Ehsan, who attributed this attack to the Janood-‐e-‐Hafsah wing of the TTP. Ostensibly, Janood-‐e-‐Hafsah wing carried this attack out in retribution for the killing of a TTP top commander. Wali ur Rehman was killed in a US drone attack in North Waziristan a few days ago prior to the Nanga Parbat attack. It is critical here to note that the Janood-‐e-‐Hafsah is a TTP group formed and headed by the Punjabi militant commander, Asmatullah Muawiya. Muawiya is a prominent ex-‐JM commander who rose to prominence as the commander of the TTP Punjab chapter; ostensibly his TTP chapter contains mostly Punjabi Taliban. Muawiya is part of the TTP Shura as well. This shows the lineage of Punjabi Taliban and their importance within the TTP as it stands as of today. This importance was highlighted once again when the newly formed government decided to abolish a five-‐year moratorium on capital punishment, which had been in force due to international pressure on Pakistan to comply with abolition of the death penalty regime. In fact, this abolition of moratorium was due to the state's desire to execute hardcore terrorists on death row, in order to demonstrate resolve against terrorism to the public. As soon as the decision was announced, the TTP Punjab chapter's Muawiya released a warning to the government against the hanging of TTP Taliban, or face dire consequences of widespread terrorism in the country, especially Punjab. Muawiya illustrated the fate of the Awami National Party (ANP, the party ruling KP during the previous government), which had been relentlessly targeted by the TTP during the May 11 election campaign. Release of Mauwiya's statement coincided with preparations to hang the mastermind of the 2009 GHQ attack, Aqeel alias Dr.Usman, along with two LJ terrorists interred in Faisalabad and Sukkur jails respectively. The TTP further warned that it would immediately target two members of the ruling party if the planned executions went ahead. "Aqeel alias Dr Usman is our 'Mujahid' and we would never let the government hang our Mujahid," was mentioned in the statement released by a TTP spokesperson. The government recapitulated on its decision, and this decision was appreciated by Muawiya by offering to reciprocate the Pakistani Premier's recent offer to hold peace talks with the TTP. Apparently, Mauwiya's posturing did not go down well with the TTP high command, which expressed outright displeasure at Mauwiya's apparently go-‐alone initiative to
28
hold talks with the Government. Rumors circulated that Muawiya had been dismissed from the TTP, but even when the TTP were condemning his actions, they took utmost care in referring to Muawiya as "a most respected commander" and "worthy of respect". The stance was taken by the TTP leadership that they had not authorized Muawiya to go ahead and give the green signal for talks with the government, and this offer was extended by Muawiya at his own behest. Muawiya dismissively shrugged off TTP's condemnation, refuting that TTP had any authority to remove him from command. Muawiya vindicated views about Punjabi Taliban’s importance by mentioning that he refused to accept the TTP's dismissal, claiming that the TTP had no authority to sack him. He also explicitly made it clear that the Punjabi Taliban had their own identity as well as a 'Shura' to take decisions for them. Afterwards, in the wake of an All Parties Conference (APC) convened by political parties in Pakistan to discuss Pakistan’s responses to the terrorist challenge, the main TTP group also mentioned negotiations with the state as a possibility. This ostensibly 'main-‐streamed' Mauwiya's proposition and thereafter no mention of the rift between Muawiya and TTP cropped up. Ostensibly, now, differences between them stand settled. Since then, negotiations with the government have been on the table on and off for the TTP. Hakeemullah Mehsud had declared before his death that "We have succeeded politically after we were asked to negotiate by the government," in a letter to the media. Shortly after the APC, two major incidents of terrorism took pace. Major General Sanaullah Khan, General Officer Commanding (GOC) Swat, was killed by the TTP, followed by the deadliest attack on the Christian community in Pakistan’s history. In this incident, more than 80 Christians were killed when two suicide bombers blew themselves up outside the All Saints Church in Peshawar. Again, Janood-‐ul-‐Hafsah of the TTP claimed responsibility; it was initially unclear whether this was Mauwiya's organization, or a cell of it, or if it was another entity within TTP with the same name as Mauwiya’s TTP. It was later confirmed that this was indeed the work of the entity controlled by Muawiya, consisting mainly of Punjabi Taliban. This undeniably demonstrates the importance and strategic positioning of the Punjabi Taliban within the TTP, and even beyond.
29
CONCLUSIONS In conclusion, the more or less clear distinctions consisting of Pashtun tribals fighting against foreign occupation forces in Afghanistan and western targets in Pakistan, and the mainly Indo-‐centric Punjabi militants groupings, have by now become less distinct.98 It is hard to pin down temporal parameters for when these distinctions became murkier, but it is probably linked to the Lal Masjid incident when militants forced the state’s hand in the federal capital of Islamabad by an operation against extremist vigilantism. The subsequent Lal masque operation generated many militant casualties, and became a symbol of state repression for the Jihadis. It is probably in the time around the Lal Masjid incident that Punjabi militants, who by then had extensive contact with their Pashtun counterparts through their forays in Waziristan and past association in the Afghan theater, started turning against the state. These hardened Jihadi veterans had been associated with many militant entities in Pakistan, and were reputed warriors. This linkage started increasing, and was probably concretized more with the formation of the TTP in December 2007. However, it needs to be remembered that anti-‐state militants had existed before under different noms de guerre; TTP just coalesced these militant groups, of which Punjabis became prominent members. The importance and preponderant population of Punjab was probably extremely important to the newly formed TTP, and they ostensibly kept up intensive contacts with the Punjabi militants, based mainly in South Punjab. This entrenchment of these Punjabi groups in different districts of South Punjab has already been documented. It should also be remembered that until now, the Punjabi Taliban branding has been quiet loosely applied; this refers to to Punjabi Jihadis with associations with many now obsolete Jihadi organizations: Punjabis who have had Indian – and Afghan-‐centric associations, and distinct Punjabi groups with TTP affiliations such as Mauwiya's in Punjab. However, when Pakistani analysts comment on this phenomenon, they sometimes use this terminology to refer to all Punjabi Jihadis. A distinction has to be made; the term logically applies to anti-‐state Punjabi militants who have had associations with the TTP or other anti-‐state affiliates. If the term is applied to all Punjabis who fought in Afghanistan during the Mullah Omar regime, then this categorization becomes vague as one cannot comprehend whether these are anti-‐state or neutrals, Kashmir-‐centric or Afghanistan-‐centric, or engage in terrorist activities or are dormant. Thus, it is logical to call Punjabi militants who commit terrorist acts against the state and have loose or close affiliations with anti-‐state
30
groups such as the TTP in FATA and KP as the Punjabi Taliban. This 'turning' against the state was probably triggered by the Lal Masjid incident, Pakistan's alliance with the US in the Global War against Terror, and the diminishing importance of Kashmir as a Jihadi theater99. The Punjabi Taliban do not exist as a distinct separate stand-‐alone entity, but is composed of loose conglomerates of militants who owe allegiance to one entity or the other, like LJ, JM, SSP, TTP, etc. Even when they had affiliations with entities like JM which are not anti-‐state per-‐se, they broke away from these groups because they had developed tactical differences with their parent groups regarding state targeting. Presumably, these breakaway Punjabi militants considered the state to be allied with the US War on Terror, and hence a legitimate target. They then moved from this less state-‐terrorism-‐centric organization to more inward looking entities. Whether allied to al-‐Qaeda or not, these Punjabis by this 'turning' started subscribing to Taqfiri ideology by default; it was only logical that they would then subsequently gravitate to such organizations, or entities allied to it, like LJ. The Punjabi Taliban is thus not a distinct group or even a distinct movement, but a phenomenon of violent radicalization of Punjabis who resort to terrorist activities against the state and beyond. The only similarity they have is hardliner Deobandi ideology, which has by now crystallized in strains of sectarianism and terrorism against the state. As discussed above, even distinct groups like Janood-‐al-‐Hafsah of Muawiya, who apparently are TTP allies, have the capacity to challenge the main TTP group's supremacy when internal conflict arises. It has probably transpired that the TTP banks substantially on support from Punjabi Taliban in Punjab where the militants are by now firmly entrenched, and have the capability to stand more or less at parity to their Pashtun counterparts, at least in their own turf. Mauwiya's statement about his group having a separate Shura ostensibly indicates that his group also has a command and control structure which must be regulated by this Shura. This in turn implies that his group must be a TTP affiliate rather than a subservient structure, even though Janood-‐al-‐Hafsah carries a TTP branding and carries out operations on similarly motivated ideological leanings. Another example of the Punjabi Taliban branding is LJ, a distinct group from the TTP but having similar ideological leanings and notoriously acknowledged al-‐Qaeda affiliations.
31
The militant importance of Punjab cannot be denied, no matter what the establishment says in favor of status quo; an analyst comments that Punjab “has become a major recruiting ground and hub for the planning of terrorist attacks, and … a human resource for the fighting in Afghanistan.”100This strategic importance of Punjab, especially the south, consists of a more or less continuous arch extending from the many madrasahs in South Punjab to its border with KP, Balochistan and beyond. It is not easy to pin down numbers for these Punjabi militants; as indicated, these are amorphous groupings, but analysts note that “…between March 2005 and March 2007, over 2,000 militants from southern and northern Punjab reportedly moved to South Waziristan to develop logistical networks.”101 Other analysts estimate figures of around 2000 militants in Punjab alone in 2010,102 but the figures are probably higher. One has to factor in the Punjabi presence in Waziristan as discussed above, and it is logical to assume that many people of the Punjabi Taliban is still present in the region and have undoubtedly gained more importance, probably reaching as high as Shura level positions. Nanga Parbat attack is just one example of the great outreach of these militants throughout the width and breadth of Pakistan, and it is also indicated by the increasing numbers of sectarian attacks being perpetrated by LJ in Balochistan. What is alarming is that it is only just very recently that state functionaries have openly declared the Punjabi Taliban as a palpable threat to peace and security in the country. This is despite the fact that speculation and apprehension is rife about the issue in media, intelligentsia and policy circles unofficially. Ex-‐prime minister Yousuf Raza Gilani just recently mentioned this in a press statement about the threat to Pakistan;103 it is worth mentioning here that Gilani's son was kidnapped by militants during his election campaign,104 and that he made this statement about the Punjabi Taliban only after stepping down from power as premier. Such denial which has existed on ground for many years obfuscates the fact that the Punjabi Taliban share with TTP the potential for being existential threats to Pakistan, and cannot just be wished or ignored away.
32
ENDNOTES 1 The report has been funded through a grant from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NMFA). All views expressed are those of the author. 2 Punjabi Taliban; a growing threat , Dawn, 30 May, 2010 . 3 Hassan Abbas, “Defining the Punjabi Taliban Network,” CTC Sentinel 2, no. 4 (April 2009): 1–4. 4 Amir Rana, The seeds of Terrorism (London: New Millennium Press, 2005), p.243. 5 Al Qaeda fights back inside Pakistan’s tribal areas, Muhammad Amir Rana and Rohan Gunaratna, (Islamabad, 2008:Pakistan institute of Peace studies). 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid. 10 The Fluttering Flag of jihad, Amir Mir, (Lahore, 2008;Mashal Press). 11 Ibid. 12 See Mir, Supra note viii. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 Ayesha Siddiqa, Terror’s Training Ground, Newsline, September 2009,pp.18-‐35. 16 Marium Abou Zahab and Olivier Roy, Islamist Networks: The Pakistan-‐Afghan Connection (London: Hurst & Co), p. 26. 17 See Ayesha Siddiqa , Supra note xiii. 18 Aamir Latif, Punjabi Taliban Rise in Waziristan, Islamonline, Apr. 22, 2007. 19 Ibid. 20 Pir Zubair Shah and Salamn Masood, “U.S. Reported to Kill 12 in Pakistan,” New York Times, September 12, 2008. 21 “Why Mehsud is Claiming Responsibility for Attacks,” Daily Times, April 8, 2009. 22 Personal interviews with CID officers. 23 Umer Farooq, “The Punjab: The Geography of Fundamentalism,” Asharq Alawsat (Islamabad), December 8, 2009. 24 See Zahab: Roy,Supra note xiv, p.25. 25 Ibid. 26 See Mir, Supra note viii. 27 Ibid. 28 See Ayesha Siddiqa, Supra note xiii. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid. 31 The News, March 27, 1995. 32 The News, March 27,1995 33 See Mir, Supra note viii. 34 Ibid. 35 'Zarqawi' beheaded US man in Iraq,’ BBC News, Middle East section, internet edition, 13 May, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3712421.stm. 36 Democratic Underground website, http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=364x1906081. Though ABC News later removed Debat’s story due to questions about its validity, local media sources tend to corroborate Debat’s postulates. 37 Daily Times, January 6, 2007. 38 Author interviews with senior law enforcement officials, provincial adminstartion and Home department officials in Kayber Pakshtunkhwa province of Pakistan. 39 B.Raman, Banning the banned; counter-‐terrorism a la Musharraf”, paper no.842, South Asia analysis group, http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers9%5Cpaper842.html. 40 See Ayesha Siddiqa , Supra note xiii. 41 Ibid. 42 See Mir, Supra note viii. 43 Ibid. 44 Ibid.
33
45
Ibid. Ibid. 47 Mazhar Tufail, “New Efforts Launched to Recover Remains of Polish Engineer,” The News, March 2, 2009. 48 Rahimullah Yusufzai, “Fiercest of them All,” The News, February 15, 2009, http://jang.com.pk/thenews/feb2009-‐ weekly/nos-‐15-‐2-‐2009/dia.htm 49 Ibid. 50 Quoted in Sabrina Tavernise, Richard A. Oppel Jr., and Eric Schmitt, “United Militants Threaten Pakistan’s Populous Heart,” New York Times, April 13, 2009 51 “Punjabi Taliban Leader Qari Zafar Killed,” Dawn (Miramshah), February 26, 2010. 52 Zeeshan Haidar, “Waziristan Mein Teen Hazar Punjabi Taliban Hai” [There Are between 3,000 and 5,000 Punjabi Taliban in Waziristan], BBC Urdu (Islamabad), June 23, 2009, available in Urdu at www.bbc.co.uk/urdu/pakistan/2009/06/090623_taliban_afrasyab_zs.shtml 53 Baqir Sajjad Syed, “Top Guns of Punjabi Taliban Captured,” Dawn (Islamabad), October 23, 2009. 54 The News ,(Islamabad), May 1, 2010. 55 A sia Times, April 28,2010. 56 F or a full list see The News, May 1,2010. 57 The News, May 2,2010. 58 Asia Times, April 24,2010. 59 Quoted in “Exclusive: Taliban Suicide Squad Chief Speaks,” Rediff News, March 31, 2010. 60 “Terrorists from Orakzai, Waziristan Enter Punjab,” Daily Times (Lahore), May 11, 2010. 61 “Al-‐Qa’idah Planning Attack on U.S. Embassy,” Daily Times (Lahore), May 9, 2010. 62 Omar Waraich, “Sectarian Attacks on Lahore Mosques Kill More Than 80,” Time Magazine, May 28, 2010. 63 Declan Walsh, “Taliban Torch 50 NATO Supply Trucks on Outskirts of Islamabad,” Guardian, June 9, 2010. 64 “Tahqiqati Edare Kaa Daftar Khodkosh Hamle Mein Tabah 14 Shaheed” [Fourteen Martyred in Suicide Attack on Investigation Agency], Daily Express (Lahore), March 9, 2010, available in Urdu at http://express.com.pk/epaper/PoPupwindow.aspx?newsID=1100876748&Issue=NP_LHE&Date=20100309. 65 “Lahore Khodkosh Hamla, 13 Afraad Jaan Bahaq” [Suicide Attack in Lahore, Thirteen Killed], Daily Jang (Lahore), March 8,2010, available in Urdu at www.jang.com.pk/jang/mar2010-‐daily/08-‐03-‐2010/index.html 66 Muhammad Faisal Ali, “Terrorists Strike at ‘Safe House’ in Heart of Lahore,” Dawn (Lahore), March 9, 2010. 67 “Lahore Cantt Mein Do Khodkosh Hamle, 8 Faujyon Samet, 57 Shaheed, 100 Zakhmi” [Two Suicide Attacks in Lahore Cantt, Fiftyseven including Eight Army Soldiers Killed, One Hundred Injured],Daily Express (Lahore), March 13, 2010, available in Urdu at http://express.com.pk/epaper/PoPupwindow.aspx?newsID=1100880711&Issue=NP_LHE&Date=20100313 68 Farhan Bokhari, “Fresh Lahore Suicide Blasts Kill 53,” Financial Times, March 12, 2010. 69 Ibid. 70 Muhammad Faisal Ali, “3,000 kg of Explosives, Arms, Suicide Vests Seized in Lahore,” Dawn (Lahore), March 17, 2010. 71 Saleem Safi, “New Strategy against Terrorism,” The News(Pakistan), May 10, 2010. 72 “Punjabi Taliban Tehrik-‐e Taliban Ko Mazboot Kar Rahe Hai,Kabina Ko Briefing” [Punjabi Taliban Is Strengthening Tehrik-‐e Taliban, Cabinet Briefing], Jang (Islamabad), March 17, 2010, available in Urdu at www.jang.com.pk/jang/mar2010-‐daily/17-‐ 03-‐2010/u24429.htm 73 See Frederick W. Kagan and Ahmad Majidyar, “Punjabi Taliban,” AEI Critical Threats, May 28, 2009, available at www.criticalthreats.org/pakistan/punjabi-‐taliban. See also Hassan Abbas, “Defining the Punjabi Taliban Network,” CTC Sentinel 2, no. 4(April 2009): 1–4. 74 28. Zulqernain Tahir, “Malik Hints at Army Action in South Punjab,” Dawn (Lahore), May 31, 2010. 75 See Ekram Arefi, “Junobi Punjab Mein Entaha Pasandi Kaa Masala” [The Issue of Extremism in Southern Punjab], Tajziat (Islamabad), January 2010, available in Urdu at http://tajziat.com/issue/2010/ 01/detail.php?category=taj&id=17 (accessed June 15, 2010). 76 Mansoor Ahmad, “Western, Southern Punjab,” The News (Pakistan),February 10, 2010. 77 Sabrina Tavernise, Richard A. Oppel Jr., and Eric Schmitt,“United Militants Threaten Pakistan’s Populous Heart.” 78 Aoun Abbas Sahi, “The Punjab Connection,” Newsline Magazine,October 15, 2008, available at www.newslinemagazine.com/2008/10/the-‐punjab-‐connection . 79 Sabrina Tavernise, Richard A. Oppel Jr., and Eric Schmitt,“United Militants Threaten Pakistan’s Populous Heart.” 80 Ijaz Mehr, “Jihadyoon Ki Kehanya, Khanadan Walo Ki Zabani” [Stories of Jihadists and Their Families], BBC Urdu (Islamabad), January 25, 2010, available in Urdu at www.bbc.co.uk/urdu/pakistan/2010/01/100125_punjab_ijaz4_uk.shtml . 81 Quoted in Alex Rodriguez, “Pakistan Taliban Taps Punjab Heartland for Recruits.” 82 Bill Roggio, “Jihad in Pakistan’s South Punjab,” Long War Journal, September 24, 2009. 83 Ayesha Siddiqa (visiting scholar, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, DC), in discussion with the author, March 28, 2010. 84 Matthew Rosenberg, “Taliban Wages War on Police in Its New Front in Pakistan,” Wall Street Journal, May 28, 2009 85 Shaukat Qadir, “Talibanisation of Punjab,” Daily Times (Lahore), July 18, 2009. 46
34
86
Khalid Munir,The truth about the Punjabi Taliban,The Express Tribune, July 7, 2010 http://tribune.com.pk/story/26062/the-‐truth-‐about-‐the-‐punjabi-‐taliban/ 87 Fidayin is a tactic first used and popularized by Lashkar-‐e-‐Taliban in Pakistan, which implies bold
guerilla attacks on a target – suicide bombing has only recently come to Pakistan in earnest since 2007. This term should not be confused with the middle Eastern context of the word, which is a different theater 88
For example, see Tehrik-‐e-‐Taliban pakistan ; an attempt to deconstruct the umbrella organization and the reasons for its growth in pakistan’s North-‐West , Qandeel Siddique, Danish Institute for International Studies( DIIS), Report 2010:12. 89 The Rising Phoenix of Punjabi Taliban, Mehboob Qadir, Policy Paper, Center for Policy and Media Studies, http://www.cpmspak.org/details.php?id=mehboob_articles. 90 Jamal and Ali, “All roads lead to FATA”, pp. 43-‐44. Also see Ambreen Agha, “Pakistan: terror by abduction – analysis”, Eurasia Review, April 9th 2012, http://www.eurasiareview.com/09042012-‐pakistan-‐terror-‐by-‐abduction-‐analysis. 91 PIPS (Pak Institute for Peace Studies), Understanding North Punjab in the Context of Pakistan Diaspora in Britain, November 2010, pp. 27-‐28, http://www.san-‐pips.com/download.php?f=134.pdf. 92 Cordesman, A. & Vira, V. 2011, Pakistan: Violence and Stability, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 7 June, p. 114, http://csis.org/files/publication/110607_Stabilizing_Pakistan.pdf. 93 Khan, R. 2010, Untangling the Punjabi Taliban Network, CTC Sentinel, Vol. 3, Issue 3, 3 March, pp. 7-‐9, p. 7, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/untangling-‐the-‐punjabi-‐taliban-‐network 94 Supra Note 1 95 „Things fall apart‟ 2011, The Economist, 3 March, http://www.economist.com/node/18285912/print. 96 Mir, A. 2012, "Swedish lady targeted by Punjabi Taliban", The News, 5 December ,http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-‐ News-‐13-‐19277-‐Swedish-‐lady-‐targeted-‐by-‐Punjabi-‐Taliban. 97 For instance see US strikes “Taliban compound” in Pakistan‟ 2013, Al Jazeera, 6 January, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/2013/01/20131681026650607.html 98 Khan, R. 2010, "Untangling the Punjabi Taliban Network", CTC Sentinel, Vol. 3, Issue 3, 3 March, pp. 7-‐9, p. 8 http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/untangling-‐the-‐punjabi-‐taliban-‐network. 99 Ibid. 100 Ibid. 101 Cordesman, A. & Vira, V. 2011, Pakistan: Violence and Stability, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 7 June, p. 114, http://csis.org/files/publication/110607_Stabilizing_Pakistan.pdf 102 Qazi, S.H. 2011, „Rebels of the frontier: origins, organisation, and recruitment of the Pakistani Taliban‟, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 22, No.4, pp. 574-‐602, p. 588. 103 Government finally acknowledges 'Punjabi Taliban', says Gilani, The News, 25 August 2013, http://www.thenews.com.pk/article-‐115249-‐Government-‐finally-‐acknowledges-‐Punjabi-‐Taliban,-‐says-‐Gilani. 104 Terrorists kidnap son of former Pakistan prime minister in middle of campaign rally, killing one and wounding five, Mailonline, 9 May 2013, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-‐2321872/Terrorists-‐kidnap-‐Ali-‐Haider-‐Gilani-‐son-‐ Pakistan-‐Prime-‐Minister-‐Yousuf-‐Raza-‐Gilani-‐middle-‐campaign-‐rally-‐killing-‐wounding-‐five.html
35
