International Journal of Language Studies (IJLS) Vol. *, No. *, Month 20**, pp. ***‐***
Third Factor “Relevance” Pragmatics and Syntax1
between
Semantics,
Peter KOSTA Institut für Slavistik, Universität Potsdam, Germany. Abstract:
The research concerning the division of labor between semantics, pragmatics and syntax as the three crucial faculties of Natural Language has always been the major concern of linguistics since the very beginnings. There is an ongoing discussion which domains of Language Faculty in Narrow Sense (FLN) can be language specific for syntax, which of them concern the distinction between functional and lexical categories, and which role play the interfaces. But there is little known about the division of labor between semantics and pragmatics. In my contribution I shall try to find out which parts of pragmatics could be included into FLN. If pragmatics can be considered as a relation between language systems, language as performance of the system, the language users and the way he/she refers to the world he/she is manipulating, how can we account for pragmatics as a potential third factor including pragmatic behavior of humans? We believe that this can be done if we account for a principle that is superior to both FLN and human behavior, namely the relevance principle. Can a special module based on relevance be a part of language faculty in the narrow sense (cf. Hauser, Chomsky, Fitch 2002)? Keywords: Relevance Theory, Quantum Mind Hypothesis, Radical
Minimalism, Pragmatics, Reference 1
I owe much in the last part of my paper to the model of Radical Minimalism introduced by Diego Gabriel Krivochen, especially his publications Krivochen (2011a‐d) and Krivochen (2012). Also the idea about ambiguity and the relation between form and content in the last part of my article is due to a long‐standing and intensive discussion and joint work with Diego in spring and summer 2011. All flaws and mistakes go of course to my own responsibility. ISSN: 2157‐4898; eISSN: 2157‐4901 © 201* IJLS; Printed in the USA by Lulu Press Inc.
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1.
The two types of meaning
1.1
Proposition, truth values and ‘meaning’
Semantics as the domain of natural languages has to do with the relation between signs and things or objects. This view is very old. It is found in Plato’s Kratylos (427‐347 BC). Words “name” or “refer to” things. It works well for proper nouns like Erika, Iuventus and Daimler Mercedes Benz. It is less clear when applied to abstractions, to verbs and adjectives ‐ indeed wherever there is no immediately existing referent (thing) in the physical world, to correspond to the symbol (word). An abstract notion as love can be interpreted only if we have a concept of the sign love. As an abstract notion it remains with no more meaning than the proposition (1) 1.
The present King of France is bald
Under the premise that this proposition would refer to a non‐existent King because France is not a Monarchy anymore, the whole proposition is false. France is presently a republic, and therefore has no king. Bertrand Russell pointed out that this raises a puzzle about the truth value of the sentence “The present King of France is bald.” The sentence does not seem to be true: if we consider all the bald things, the present King of France isn’t among them, since there is no present King of France. But if it is false, then one would expect that the
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negation of this statement, that is, “It is not the case that the present King of France is bald,” or its logical equivalent, “The present King of France is not bald,” is true. But this sentence doesn’t seem to be true either: the present King of France is no more among the things that fail to be bald than among the things that are bald. We therefore seem to have a violation of the Law of Excluded Middle. Is it meaningless, then? One might suppose so (and some philosophers have; see below) since “the present King of France” certainly does fail to refer. But on the other hand, the sentence “The present King of France is bald” (as well as its negation) seem perfectly intelligible, suggesting that “the Present King of France” can’t be meaningless. Russell proposed to resolve this puzzle via his theory of descriptions. A definite description like “the present King of France”, he suggested, isn’t a referring expression, as we might naively suppose, but rather an “incomplete symbol” that introduces quantificational structure into sentences in which it occurs. The sentence (1) “the present King of France is bald”, for example, is analyzed as a conjunction of the following three quantified statements: 2.
There is an x such that x is presently King of France: ∃x[PKoF(x)] (using ‘PKoF’ for 'presently King of France')
3.
For any x and y, if x is presently King of France and y is presently King of France, then x=y (i.e. there is at most one thing which is presently King of France): ∀x∀y[[PKoF(x) & PKoF(y)] → y=x]
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4.
For every x that is presently King of France, x is bald: ∀x[PKoF(x) → B(x)]
More briefly put, the claim is that “The present King of France is bald” says that some x is such that x is presently King of France, and that any y is presently King of France only if y = x, and that x is bald: 5.
∃x[PKoF(x) & ∀y[PKoF(y) → y=x] & B(x)]
This is false, since it is not the case that some x is presently King of France. The negation of this sentence, i.e. “The present King of France is not bald”, is ambiguous. It could mean one of two things, depending on where we place the negation ‘not’. On one reading, it could mean that there is no one who is presently King of France and bald: 6.
~∃x[PKoF(x) & ∀y[PKoF(y) → y=x] & B(x)]
On this disambiguation, the sentence is true (since there is indeed no x that is presently King of France). On a second, reading, the negation could be construed as attaching directly to ‘bald’, so that the sentence means that there is presently a King of France, but that this King fails to be bald: 7.
∃x[PKoF(x) & ∀y[PKoF(y) → y=x] & ~B(x)]
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On this disambiguation, the sentence is false (since there is no x that is presently King of France). Thus, whether “the present King of France is not bald” is true or false depends on how it is interpreted at the level of logical form: if the negation is construed as taking wide scope (as in ~∃x[PKoF(x) & ∀y[PKoF(y) → y=x] & B(x)]), it is true, whereas if the negation is construed as taking narrow scope (with the existential quantifier taking wide scope, as in ∃x[PKoF(x) & ∀y[PKoF(y) → y=x] & ~B(x)]), it is false. In neither case does it lack a truth value. So we do not have a failure of the Law of Excluded Middle: “the present King of France is bald” (i.e. ∃x[PKoF(x) & ∀y[PKoF(y) → y=x] & B(x)]) is false, because there is no present King of France. The negation of this statement is the one in which ‘not’ takes wide scope: ~∃x[PKoF(x) & ∀y[PKoF(y) → y=x] & B(x)]. This statement is true because there does not exist anything which is presently King of France.
2. Alternative Analyses 2.1 Generalized quantifier analysis Stephen Neale, among others, has defended Russell’s theory, and incorporated it into the theory of generalized quantifiers. On this view, ‘the’ is a quantificational determiner like ‘some’, ‘every’, ‘most'’ etc. The definite description 'the' has the following denotation (using lambda notation): 8.
λf.λg.[∃x(f(x)=1 & ∀y(f(y)=1 → y=x)) & g(x)=1].
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(That is, the definite article ‘the’ denotes a function which takes a pair of properties f and g to truth just in case there exists something that has the property f, only one thing has the property f, and that thing also has the property g.) Given the denotation of the predicates ‘present King of France’ (again PKoF for short) and ‘bald (B for short)’ 9. a. λx.[PKoF(x)] b. λx.[B(x)] we then get the Russellian truth conditions via two steps of function application: ‘The present King of France is bald’ is true just in case ∃x[PKoF(x) & ∀y[PKoF(y) → y=x] & B(x)]. On this view, definite descriptions like ‘the present King of France’ do have a denotation (specifically, definite descriptions denote a function from properties to truth values—they are in that sense not syncategorematic, or “incomplete symbols”); but the view retains the essentials of the Russellian analysis, yielding exactly the truth conditions Russell argued for. 2.2 Fregean analysis The Fregean analysis of definite descriptions, implicit in the work of Frege and later defended by Strawson (1950) among others, represents the primary alternative to the Russellian theory. On the Fregean analysis, definite descriptions are construed as referring expressions rather than quantificational expressions. Existence and uniqueness are understood as a presupposition of a sentence
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containing a definite description, rather than part of the content asserted by such a sentence. The sentence ‘The present King of France is bald’, for example, isn’t used to claim that there exists a unique present King of France who is bald; instead, that there is a unique present King of France is part of what this sentence presupposes, and what it says is that this individual is bald. If the presupposition fails, the definite description fails to refer, and the sentence as a whole fails to express a proposition. The Fregean view is thus committed to the kind of truth value gaps (and failures of the Law of Excluded Middle) that the Russellian analysis is designed to avoid. Since there is presently no King of France, the sentence ‘The present King of France is bald’ fails to express a proposition, and therefore fails to have a truth value, as does its negation, ‘The present King of France is not bald’. The Fregean will account for the fact that these sentences are nevertheless meaningful by relying on speakers’ knowledge of the conditions under which either of these sentences could be used to express a true proposition. The Fregean can also hold on to a restricted version of the Law of Excluded Middle: for any sentence whose presuppositions are met (and thus expresses a proposition), either that sentence or its negation is true. On the Fregean view, the definite article 'the' has the following denotation (using lambda notation): 9.
λf: ∃x(f(x)=1 & ∀y(f(y)=1 → y=x)).[the unique y such that f(y)=1]
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(That is, 'the' denotes a function which takes a property f and yields the unique object y such that y has the property f, if there is such a y, and is undefined otherwise) The presuppositional character of the existence and uniqueness conditions is here reflected in the fact that the definite article denotes a partial function on the set of properties: it is only defined for those properties f which are true of exactly one object. It is thus undefined on the denotation of the predicate 'presently King of France', since the property of presently being King of France is true of no object; it is similarly undefined on the denotation of the predicate 'Senator of the US', since the property of being a US Senator is true of more than one object. 2.3 Mathematical logic In much formal work, authors use a definite description operator symbolized using ιx. The operator is usually defined so as to reflect a Russellian analysis of descriptions (though other authors, especially in linguistics, use the ι operator with a Fregean semantics). Thus 10.
ιx (ϕx)
means "the unique x such that ϕx", and 11.
ψ(ιx(ϕx)
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is stipulated to be equivalent to "There is exactly one ϕ and it has the property ψ": 12. ∃x∀y(ϕ(y) ⇔ y = x ψ(y)) Under a pragmatic analysis of the proposition (1), however, the utterance becomes true (and not false) if we include the notion of deictic center. The pragmatic notion of deixis (going back to Bühler’s 1933 Sprachtheorie) is a very good tool to combine the Fregean notion of truth value and reference with the pragmatic point of view of the Speaker: Since the Fregean view is committed to the kind of truth value gaps we observe in a sentence such as (1) The present King of France is bold, the Fregean will account for the fact that these sentences are nevertheless meaningful by relying on speakers’ knowledge of the conditions under which either of these sentences could be used to express a true proposition. The Fregean view can thus hold on to a restricted version of the Law of Excluded Middle: for any sentence whose presuppositions are met (and thus expresses a proposition), either that sentence or its negation is true. If we consider the notion of deictic center as a corrective of truth values of sentences, then the Speaker can make an utterance if the King of France refers to a known concept of a French King whose attribute was ‘bold’. Moreover, if this attribute refers to a name, it can even be an individual king that became a nickname of Philip III (30 April 1245 – 5 October 1285), called the Bald (French: le Hardi), being the King of France, succeeding his father, Louis IX, and reigning from 1270 to
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1285. We can thus say that the propositional meaning of a sentence has to include speakers’ knowledge of the conditions under which either of these sentences could be used to express a true proposition. This is also the reason why a context free interpretation of propositions is limited only to a very little number of propositions, maybe only to descriptions. There is indirect evidence from Ontogeny of Language that this Fregean viewpoint enriched with the notion of deictic center is on the right track. How children develop concepts and how comprehension of concepts matures? The interpretation of propositional meanings has to be conceived as a function of the stage of language acquisition in the individual. If at initial state of language acquisition the lexical array of the mental lexicon consists of roots that have only a generic meaning, it would be the use of the mental lexicon that enables children to arrive at the concepts of adults step by step. This is exactly what we want to call procedural meaning (cf. part 3). Before we develop a theory of relevance that enables us to enrich generic meanings of roots of the mental lexicon with concepts of the target grammar, we have to introduce and repeat what we know about the interaction between meaning and pragmatics within the classical speech act theory (SAT) 3. About ‘meaning’ and illocution
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In the past four decades, SAT has been one of the most influential, most widespread and most vividly developing theoretical frameworks in linguistics. Originating in analytic philosophy, the speech act theory has been reflected in most of linguistic disciplines. The core topic of the speech act theory, “how we do things with words”, i. e., how people act by means of language or, what does it mean to use language, can be identified with the investigation of human communicative competence, competent (successful) use of language. In this viewpoint, the speech act theory deals with language/speech universals and with universals of human behavior. Even though several different speech acts (SAs) classification systems with different levels of comprehensiveness have been known, certain classes of different speech acts, namely assertions, promises and requests/directives (under more other labels) can be found in any of them. Therefore a question arises whether any language specifics (e.g., specific features of typologically related languages) can influence the performance of a particular speech act of a certain type. In other words, the crucial question concerned here can be formulated like this: Is there anything specific about speech acts performance in Slavic and other languages? Habermas (1971) calls such a theory the universal pragmatics. It should be emphasized, however, that Habermas’ concept of “communicative competence” in contrast to Chomsky's narrower term “linguistic competence” describes general structures of possible speech situations as its object, and that it is “the object of this theory to re‐design this system of rules by which we produce or generate situations of possible speech acts” (Habermas 1971:102; cf. Brekle 1972: 127).
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Austin’s (1962) primary formulations of speech act theory is based on a distinction between what he calls an utterance used for “stating” (describing) things, for conveying information (which, therefore, can be evaluated as true or false), and the “performative”, an utterance used for “doing” things, for performing actions. The phrases “I now pronounce you man and wife”, when uttered by a priest or mayor at a wedding, “I name/christen this ship Queen Elizabeth”, “I promise I’ll be there”, and “I bet you five dollars” convey no descriptive information, therefore are neither true nor false but they just perform actions simultaneously to the point of speech while they are pronounced: they perform the action referred to in the phrase (marrying, christening, promising, betting) by saying it. They can be evaluated as felicitious (successfully per‐ forming the act of marrying, christening etc.) or infelicitious if the speech act does not fulfill all the necessary conditions, e.g., if the person performing the act of marriage is not a person entitled to do so, if somebody utters the formula of promise without intention to accomplish the promised action etc. Performative speech acts are utterances that are assigned an illocutionary force, a meaning given to it by the speaker’s (producer’s) intention (illocutionary point). The speaker’s intention is realized in the performance of a certain utterance, by means of it. A very important distinction is further the dichotomy made by the follower of Austin, John Searle. Searle’s topic in the field of speech act
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theory is the notion of direct vs. indirect speech acts and the explanation of the indirect speech acts mechanism (cf. Searle 1969, 1975). His main point is that a Speaker performs a primary speech act (the act which is meant) by means of a secondary speech act (the act which is said). A sentence that contains the illocutionary force indicators for one kind of A can be uttered to perform another type of of illocutionary acts, in addition to the “literal” illocutionary acts. E.g. in a pair of sentences (cf. Searle, 1975: 61) (1) 13. A: Let’s go to the movies tonight.
B: I have to study for an exam.
the reaction B constitutes a rejection of the proposal A (primary illocutionary act), but in virtue of its meaning it is still a statement (secondary illocutionary act). The secondary IA is literal, the primary IA is not literal. Also, in some cases, the Speaker may utter a sentence and mean what he says and, at the same time, mean another illocutionary act with a different propositional content (which is the case of the well‐known question “Can you reach the salt?” meant as a request). The performance and interpretation of indirect speech act is based on asserting or questioning various felicity conditions of the speech act performed indirectly. The Speaker of an indirect speech act relies on the background information shared with the Hearer and on the Hearer’s ability to make inferences. In the later investigation of the broad field of “indirectness”, an important role belongs to principles of conversation (Grice 1975) and the theory of relevance (Sperber and
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Wilson, 1986; cf. Hirschová 2009). The assumption that the literal referential meaning of a proposition and its meaning in a concrete context as utterance (e.g. in a deictic situation) must be interpreted in two different ways referring to two different situations and verbalized as two different speech acts – a primary speech act with the intended meaning of the proposition (say illocution A) and a secondary speech act with the literal propositional meaning (B), can be shown on the following German sentence uttered in the context of “Oktoberfest” in a Munich “Biergarten” as a directive speech act but realized as a neutral assertive propositional act, (3) 14. Herr Ober, ich bekam ein Bier ‘Mr. waiter, I have received a beer’ The literal lexical meaning of the verbal predicate bekommen ‘to receive’ would be a suggestion or a statement or an assertion (B) about something that has happened, so a declarative speech act, the result being the speaker has received a beer and must be content. But the illocutionary force (A) of the primary speech act can only be interpreted as a reminder or as insisting to get some beer after having waited so long and nothing happened, so quite the opposite meaning, inferring an illocutionary meaning of a directive speech act ‘please, bring me a beer!’ The interpretation (A) that feeds into the literal meaning of the proposition (B) results in a conversational implicature
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(A (B)) A in the sense of Kosta (2011), deriving the following steps: the speaker is not content at all because he did not get any beer, so he is asking again until he gets a beer. To be able to interpret the literal meaning of the proposition not as a pure statement (B) about something that happened but on the opposite about something that did not happen but has to happen finally, we need the context and the situation in which the proposition has been uttered as utterance and as a speech act. After this short overview and recapitulation of the problem of literal and inferred meaning, we will try to implement some ideas how to account for the problem from the viewpoint of theory of relevance (Sperber and Wilson, 1986) within an account of language design and neurological optimization (Krivochen, 2012a, b). 4. How do syntax, semantics and pragmatics interact? Assuming that FLN is a “mental organ” (a module) with biological basis, and has, therefore, the general properties of other biological systems, then, according to Chomsky, we have to look for those factors that come into play in the development of this faculty within the species. These factors are (Chomsky, 2005: 6): 1)
Genetic endowment, initial genotypic state of the faculty which determines the limits of variation.
2)
Experience, which enables the initial state (conceived as an acquisition device, in any given module) and leads to the final
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phenotypic state, one of the possibilities licensed by the first factor. 3)
Principles not specific to a faculty, including: a)
Principles of external data analysis
b)
Principles of computational efficiency, and architectural constraints related to development of systems.
We believe there is a close relation between third‐factor requirements, architectural constraints that affect the very basis of the systems, and the principles of relevance, which would strengthen the hypothesis that Relevance Theory (RT) is an internist theory which works at a subpersonal level to provide principled explanations of the functioning of the inferential module. It is true that most applications of RT have to do with the area of Pragmatics, but this is not an obligatory thing to do, since, as Leonetti & Escandell (2011) say, “(...) procedural meaning is a class of encoded linguistic meaning that plays a decisive role in triggering pragmatic inference, but it is not itself a part of any sort of pragmatic rules or routines (...)” If our derivational model generates a Procedural‐Conceptual dynamics (as has been made explicit in other works, mainly Krivochen, 2012b), it is not because there is a stipulation, but because our syntax is blind and unbounded, and constraints are third‐factor principles. As there has been no clarification regarding the nature of these principles in
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Generative Grammar, we think a biologically‐based, computationally explicit version of RT can provide significant insight into the operations that take place at C‐I. Let us expand on the aforementioned derivational dynamics. We take roots to have a conceptually “nominal” nature. N is the most basic conceptual category, the non‐relational element and the conceptual terminal that does not decompose (Jackendoff’s 1983 [THING]). 15. N + P = Adj / Adv / V. (see Hale & Keyser, 1993 et. seq) 16. {cause Ø, {event Ø, {location Ø, √} = copy of the root’s corresponding p‐ signature in PF. Complex categories are formed with √ + a number of procedural nodes that cumulatively influence (and determine the interpretation of2) the subspecified conceptual content conveyed by the root (see Krivochen, 2012b, Chapter 2). We first have an entity (N), then, it is located in space, in relation to other entities (P, establishing a relation of central or terminal coincidence between Figure and Ground). Only after having undergone these periods can we conceive events, first uncaused, then caused, as the latter are more complex. The order of the bottom‐up syntactic (linguistic) derivation is by default the order of purely conceptual hierarchical representations, built in C‐I: 2
Escandell Vidal & Leonetti (2011)
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17. {cause, {event, {location {thing, {location, thing}}}}} Using traditional labels, this would be: 18. [vP Ø [VP Ø [PP [DP] [P’ [P] [DP]]]]] Does this imply a contradiction with our earlier claim that the C‐I – syntax interface is not transparent? The mirror instantiation is the simplest option, the first to be considered if we take the First Principle of Relevance to be valid. Other orderings are later‐accessed options, nonetheless available for the system. Ontogenetically, nouns are acquired first, and the holophrastic period in language acquisition is largely (if not entirely) based on Ns. Nothing prevents using naturalistic methodology in this research, and so our version of Relevance Theory can become a perfect complement to the generative model, traditionally focused on the computational system. What is more, we believe that the very formulation of the Principles of Relevance legitimates this possibility. The First Principle of Relevance, which makes a strong claim respect for the role of optimization of computations in the mental modules (without specifying a particular, note that says "human cognition", not "this or that faculty"), would correspond to the factor (3b), non‐specific principles of economy of a power which come to determine the nature of the acquired language (Chomsky, 2005b: 6). Its formulation is as follows:
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Cognitive Principle of Relevance Human cognition tends to be geared to the maximization of relevance This is a powerful claim on economy principles, since Relevance is defined as a cost‐benefit relation. In any mental process, then, there will be Relevance if the benefit is higher than the cost. In our terms, if the interface effects justify extra steps in the derivation or extra elements in representations. Notice that we integrate and explain motivations for, for example, Movement (understood as Remerge) without resorting to features or other stipulations, but only to third factor principles. The Second Principle of Relevance, which is formulated as follows: Second Principle of Relevance: Every ostensive stimulus carries the presumption of optimal relevance Corresponds, we believe, with the factor (3a), since it is a principle that involves an assumption about external data, be it linguistic or not. In deciding between different possibilities in a given interface, Relevance Theory is guided by the following principles, defined in Carston (1998): “a) Set up all the possibilities, compare them and choose the best one(s) (according to some criterion/a)
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b) Select an initial hypothesis, test it to see if it meets some criterion/a; if it does, accept it and stop there; if it doesn't, select the next hypothesis and see if it meets the criterion, and so on.” These claims work extremely well as the formulation of the constraints of a Quantum Mind, with some comments: notice that principle (b) works in a DC, but not in a QC: we do not need to proceed linearly since a QC can compute many possible states of the physical system at once. We can improve the explanatory adequacy of Relevance Theory by enriching it with Radically Minimalist assumptions and get as a result a comprehensive model of the interaction between the syntactic workspace and the interfaces, whatever they are (since, as the reader must have noticed, there is no substantive claim regarding units or levels of representation in Relevance Theory). The model we are defending would look as follows (taken from Kosta & Krivochen, in preparation):
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Feed (roots /
semantic primitives)
Type-Array
Conservation Principle
C-I
Dynamic workspace: GEN function applies
Analyze
S-M
Analyze
Transferr
Transfer
Table 1: Quantum Mind and FLN In such a model, the optimal scenario, and the one we have in mind, is that all operations are interface‐driven, and, thus, ruled by our formalized, biologically‐oriented version of Relevance Principles. 5. The acquisition of Meaning In the process of language acquisition, the child is not only able to ‘learn’ how syntactic units and rules work (such as how the joining of simple lexical units to complex constituents and sets to work, and concur which units can merge and which cannot); the child also acquires ‘meanings’ (in the sense of Frege's term 'sense ', i.e. de Saussure’s signifié). Forms without meanings are not only of little
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communicative value and thus non‐relevant for comprehension, but they are permanently without concept, ie the objects do not allow for concept formation, when learning the meaning fails (eg this is the case in semantic impairments, called Wernicke's aphasia, ie semantic disturbances in a specific brain part). Unlike syntax acquisition, which is accomplished at a certain time and its development is relatively independent of the ontogeny of general cognitive structures, the acquisition of meanings represents a kind of never‐ending process (since it is also never finished in the mental lexicon of adults by learning new words and meaning modifications in the semantic part of the lexicon), and is apparently based on the interaction of various subsystems of cognition. The development of the semantic component requires basic cognitive structures and processes that fall within the scope of perceptual and conceptual structure formation. The mental lexicon is part of our working (ie short‐term and long‐ term) memory where the conceptual knowledge of all words in a language LX is stored (cf. Badeley, A./C. Papagno/G. Vallar (1988), Baddeley & Wilson 1986; Baddeley et al. 1988, Baddeley 1992). The basic elements of this subsystem are the mental lexicon entries, e.g. those lexical items, in which all phonological, syntactic and semantic information of words are related to each other and stored. The interaction of linguistic representational units is expressed in the following scheme: 19. LEX = {phonle, synle, semle}
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The index le indicates that it is an abstract lexical representation of mental units, therefore lexemes that contain the morpho‐phonological variants of each word as well as the idealized set of semantic features. The lexicon is thus the intersection, the actual Interface, with more or less formal and conceptual structure‐formation. Located in the language acquisition process, the stunning child must now first ‘learn’ how to ‘acquire’ the representational specification of the individual units of information (i.e. phon, syn and sem), and secondly, it must learn to recognize the relationships between these entities and learn how to ‘manipulate’ them (e.g. the coupling between semantic and phonological representation, or between the conceptual‐ intentional system (CI) and the sensory‐motor system (SM)). It must also develop the ability to relate the situation demands with words on their environments, e.g. the child must grasp the complex language‐ world relational structure and context‐specific strategies appropriate reference (see section 1 and 2 of this article). 6.
Ambiguity and the Quantum Mind
Our concept of meaning and specially the notion of ambiguity or ambiguous forms is a crucial part of our argumentation. We have shown that ambiguous sentences are a problem for a theory of mind that has to work in a very effective and economic manner in order to process the load of information that is stored in the mental lexicon and
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has to be processed in working memory (cf. Baddeley & Wilson 1988; Baddeley 1986, 1992, Badeley et al. 1988). For the time being, the ideal scenario can probably be found in the theory of Quantum Mind that we will propose here in adopting the idea from Salmani Nodoushan’s (2008) proposal of the Quantum Human Computer Hypothesis. As exemplified in Krivochen (2011c, this volume) the “model of human mind” can be compared with quantum computers. The effectiveness in processing a lot of information within a very short time span leads us to a model of Quantum Mind. This model is not only supported by conceptual necessity and parsimony but also by empirical evidence in support of a minimalist model of mind (cf. Krivochen 2011a, b, c). The idea suggests that the Quantum Human Computer Hypothesis (QHCH) must nevertheless be completed with a more local theory of mental faculties, and that is where Radical Minimalism (Krivochen, 2011a) comes into play. Krivochen (2011a, b, c) aims at building a stipulation‐free theory of the quantum mind‐brain under Radically Minimalist tenets. The author takes language to be a physical system that shares the basic properties of all the physical systems, the only difference being the properties of the elements that are manipulated in the relevant system. The author also draws the reader’s attention to the proposal that in the physical world of language, the operations are taken to be very basic, simple and universal, as well as the constraints upon them, which are determined by the interaction with other systems, not by stipulative intra‐ theoretical filters. The paper ends with the proposal of a Strong Radically Minimalist thesis (SRMT). The term Quantum Linguistics is
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proposed and elaborated on for the first time in Krivochen (2011c). Now, we can also apply the notion of meaning and form and especially the problem of ambiguity to the model of Quantum. So‐called ambiguous forms and propositions as those I have mentioned in the first part of my paper are in fact not ambiguous. There is no ambiguity in our model. What looks like ambiguity in natural languages on the level of clause are rather they are totally different propositions (for which we will use the predicate (argument) notation), generated separately. As such ambiguity does not exist in natural language. Spell‐Out (S‐O) narrows down the way and there is only one materialized form, but many possible interpretations. Since the mind is Quantum, it can parse all possibilities behind a single phonological form, which are generated by the different Merge positions of procedural elements like Neg (ation) or Q (quantifier). Spell‐Out, that is, the materialization of syntactic nodes via phonological matrices, obeys certain patterns, which arise in the history of a language (SVO, SOV, etc., which are mere epiphenomena, or let us call them arbitrary in the sense of de Saussure, 1910). 3‐D models (Krivochen, 2012a) can operate on different levels simultaneously, so there is no extra‐ processing cost, which would only exist in a digital serial computer. In the derivation, procedural elements are E‐Merged in the position(s) in which they generate the wanted interpretation, regardless S‐O, which will depend on the inventory of available pieces of vocabulary (VI) in a given language L and Spell‐Out patterns, inductively acquired by the learner in a speech community.
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Form 1 ~(f (x))
Form 2 f(~x)
Form 3 ~f(x)
Spell-Out
Unique phonological result
C-I interpretation 1
C-I interpretation 2
C-I Interpretation 3
Table 2: S‐M and C‐I Interfaces and Spell‐Out As a provisional conclusion, we will put forth that, because of the linear character of the audible (i.e., externalized) linguistic sign (de Saussure, 1910), we can derive that the SM interface is not quantum (two simultaneous states, e.g., materializations, are not tolerated as outcomes of the system), and nor is the C‐I component as there is an unambiguous 1‐to‐1 relation between Form and Interpretation. This allows us to solve cases of apparent ambiguity fast enough and without any computational overload. Spelling‐Out, or any kind of Transfer, for that matter, is like opening Schrӧdinger’s box (cf. Schrödinger 1935). The visual faculty seems to have the very same impediment, as visual illusions show (e.g., one can see either two faces or a glass in the well‐ known illusion, but not both at a time). In this case, there is no linearity but figure‐ground dynamics, related to the physical impossibility of focusing eyesight on more than one object at a time (in turn,
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determined by brain architecture, mainly, the interaction between the prefrontal cortex and temporal and parietal lobes). We would like to make a distinction that we consider essential when building a theory about the mind: the distinction between Generative systems and Interpretative systems (Krivochen, 2011c: 93). This distinction is not only terminological, but has major consequences to the theory of QHC since we will demonstrate that only certain systems allow elements in their quantum state (i.e., comprising all possible outcomes), which, following Schrödinger (1935), we will call the ψ‐ state. a)
Generative Systems: Generation equals Merge, a free, unbounded, blind operation that takes elements sharing either ontological or structural format3 and puts them together. For example, the syntactic component, the
3 See Krivochen (2011a) for an analysis of both. A brief definition is the following:
“(…) Ontological format refers to the nature of the entities involved. For example, Merge can apply (“ergatively”, as nobody / nothing “applies Merge” agentively) conceptual addresses (i.e., roots) because they are all linguistic instantiations of generic concepts. With ontological format we want to acknowledge the fact that a root and a generic concept cannot merge, for example. It is specially useful if we want to explain in simple terms why Merge cannot apply cross‐modularly: ontological format is part of the legibility conditions of individual modules. Structural format, on the other hand, refers to the way in which elements are organized. If what we have said so far is correct, then only binary‐branched hierarchical structures are allowed in human mind. The arguments are conceptual rather than empirical, and we have already reviewed them: Merge optimally operates with the smallest non‐trivial number of objects. Needless to say, given the fact that ontological format is a necessary condition for Merge to apply (principled because of interface conditions, whatever module we want to consider), the resultant structures will always consist on formally identical objects (…)”
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arithmetical capacity, the musical capacity and the pre‐ syntactic instance of the conceptual‐intentional system. b)
Interpretative Systems: Interface systems, they have to read structural configuration build up by generative systems. For example, the sensory‐motor system and Relevance Theory’s inferential module (the post‐syntactic instance of the conceptual‐intentional system).
An essential difference is that, as Generative systems are blind to anything but format (see Boeckx, 2010 for a similar view, but with different aim), they can manipulate objects in their ψ‐state and transfer them to the interface systems. A structural relation between an element in its ψ‐state and a procedural element / logical unit with specific characteristics collapses the quantum state onto one of the possible outcomes. The interfaces can “peer into” the syntax (i.e., have access to the syntactic workspace), to make sure a syntactic object (or any symbolic representation, for that matter) is transferrable: this is what we call the operation “Analyze”. A typical derivation, then, would have three steps, which occur cyclically (following Krivochen, 2012b: 6; 2011c: 94): a)
Narrow Syntax: Merge {α, β[ψ]} This Merger collapses the quantum dimension on β for interface purposes.
b) 4
Conceptual Intentional System: Label4 {α, {α, β[D]}}
We will not discuss the labeling algorithm here. We refer the reader to Krivochen (2011a) for discussion.
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C‐I: Analyze: is {α, {α, β[D]}} fully interpretable? That is, are all of its elements fully legible / usable by the relevant interface?
These three steps are obligatory, but there is a fourth step that depends on the result of Analyze: if affirmative, then the structure is Transferred to the module that has analyzed it, performing the necessary modifications according to the legibility conditions of this module (as stated in the Conservation Principle). The relevant conclusion, and a powerful generalization regarding the architecture of the mind is the following: Interpretative Generalization: Interpretative systems are not quantum, generative workspaces are. Conclusion: In this short outline, we have tried to show how meaning in natural languages can be acquired. The major working hypothesis is the following: In my contribution I tried to find out which parts of pragmatics could be included into FLN. If pragmatics can be considered as a relation between language systems, language as performance of the system, the language users and the way he/she refers to the world he/she is manipulating, how can we account for pragmatics as a potential third factor including pragmatic behavior of humans? We believe that this can be done if we account for a principle that is
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superior to both FLN and human behavior, namely the relevance principle. Can a special cognitive module based on relevance be a part of language faculty in the narrow sense (cf. Hauser, Chomsky, Fitch 2002)? And how can we imagine a model of natural language? In the first section we have discussed the logical problem of reference. In the second section we have tried to show how reference (i.e. Frege's meaning) functions and how it can be set into relation with communicative intention or illocution in a particular utterance. In the third section, we presented a model of how the different levels (syntax = synle, semantics = semle, and phonetics = phonle) interact with one another with respect to meaning formation and pragmatics. Finally, we have tried to consider a model of procedural meaning formation based on Radical Minimalism, the theory of Quantum Mind and the relevance theory, bringing the production and processing of information, the syntactic, semantic and phonological components, to interfaces in order to be able to communicate with each other. The relevant conclusion, and a powerful generalization, regarding the architecture of the mind was the so‐called “Interpretative Generalization”. References: Austin, J. L. (1962): How to do things with words. Oxford. Bach, Kent/Harnish, Robert M. (1979/1991): Linguistic Communication: A Schema for Speech Acts. [Originally in: Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts. MIT Press. Cambridge, Mass. 3‐18.] Reprinted in: Davis, S. (ed): Pragmatics. A Reader. New York/Oxford. Bach, Kent (1994): “Conversational impliciture”. // Mind and Language 9. 124‐62. Bach, Kent (2001): Speech Acts.
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