animals are sentient beings and should be spared pain; an attitude which is ..... don't think they should be in any pain whatsoever. (Johnny). If they had a nice ...
This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Science & Education 2010. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Science & Education 19(9),867-894; DOI: 10.1007/s11191-010-9238-y
Of pigs and men – Understanding students’ reasoning about the use of pigs as donors for xenotransplantation
Mats Gunnar Lindahl
School of Pure and Applied Natural Sciences, University of Kalmar, Barlastgatan 11, Kalmar S-39182, Sweden Abstract
Two important roles of education are to provide students with knowledge for their democratic participation in society and to provide knowledge for a future profession. In science education, students encounter values that may be in conflict with their worldview. Such conflicts may, for example, lead to constructive reflections as well as rejection of scientific knowledge and technology. Students' ways of reasoning are important starting points for discussing problematic issues and may be crucial for constructive dialogues in the classroom. This study investigates students' reasoning about conflicting values concerning the human-animal relationship exemplified by the use of genetically modified pigs as organ donors for xenotransplantation. Students’ r easoning is analyzed using Giddens’ concepts of disembedded and embedded practices in parallel with moral philosophical theories in a framework based on human-animal relationships. Thirteen students were interviewed and their stances categorized. Kantian deontological and classical utilitarian ethics were found within the patronage and the partnership models. These students appreciated expert knowledge but those using the partnership model could not accept xenotransplantation if pigs were to be killed. Students using care ethics did not appreciate expert knowledge since it threatened naturalness. The results suggest that stances against the use of scientific knowledge are more problematic than knowledge per se, and that conflicting stances have similarities that present opportunities for understanding and development of students’ argumentation skills for future participation in societal discourse on utilizing expert knowledge. Furthermore it is argued that science education could benefit from a higher awareness of the presence of different morals.
Keywords: science education, animal, ethics, morals, socio-scientific issues, gene technology
DNA: deoxyribonucleic acid
GMO: genetically modified organism
PUS: public understanding of science
PUST: public understanding of science and technology
RFLP: restriction fragment length polymorphism
SSI: socio-scientific issues
STS: science-technology-society
1. Introduction
One of the roles of education is to prepare students for their participation in society. Students are supposed to acquire knowledge and to develop personal stances as well as to understand that practices in society are dependent on subjective knowledge and morals. However, school science is a subculture that conveys beliefs, norms and values the students may adopt or feel obliged to adopt. Subsequently, as students are confronted with conflicting values, their worldviews are challenged, resulting in conflicts which they have to resolve. Thus, in science education students‘ worldviews are at stake, as is scientific knowledge and its use in societal practice. However, by making use of authentic problems in science education, students are provided with opportunities both to develop their epistemological understanding of scientific concepts and to negotiate moral stances by argumentation. Since such problems are laden with values from societal discourses, which may be difficult to analyse in order to reach understanding for different arguments, they involve a considerable risk of groundless dismissal of both scientific knowledge and different moral stances. This problem concerns students‘ difficulties in making meaning of scientific knowledge and its use in a societal context when they engage in classroom discussions where different societal discourses clash. The problem is also dependent on how teachers can help students to analyse the societal discourses and to resolve actualized conflicts. Hence, knowledge about students‘ different ways of reasoning provides insight into the societal discourses they may bring into the classroom and the relevance they assign to scientific knowledge. The aim of this paper is to discern how students‘ moral reasoning concerning the humananimal relationship relates to their view of science and its use in societal practice. For the purpose of this study, the example of using genetically modified pigs as organ donors will be used.
2. Changes in science education and its role in society
Science education for a knowledge/critical society changes over time, conveying different values concerning science as such, its use in society and how to participate in society. In this section the changes in education, with special reference to science education, are addressed. The change from a reproducing science education, that is, education for a knowledge society, towards a more transforming science education, that is, education for a critical society, is followed through a diverging scientific literacy concept and the development of new educational traditions. It is claimed that the role of education is to reproduce society (Giddens 1984) and to induce societal development (McWilliam and Lee 2006) by, for example, constructing and supporting the knowledge society (Brennan 2008; Szkudlarek 2007). Brennan (2008) additionally suggests that education has a role to play in the construction of the critical society. The reproduction of societal practices induces trust and a sense of security, which according to Giddens (1990) are necessary in a modern society. Science education starts with the most indubitable knowledge but most students do not get to learn the complexity of science (Giddens 1990). Being socially constructed, education is constructed through negotiations between different stakeholders (Connelly et al. 1980;
Giddens 1984; McWillams and Lee 2006; Young 1971). Thus, changes in science education over time reflect societal discourses. This is exemplified by the two different and conflicting traditions on which modern science education is built (Eisner and Vallance 1974; Fensham 1988a) and by the changing and diverging meaning of scientific literacy (Laugksch 2000; Roberts 2008). In the first tradition, the subject content is seen as an objective science aiming at scientific literacy within science (Roberts 2008) and the role of science education is to produce ―a scientifically based work forceǁ‖ (Fensham 1992, p790) and to induce culture acquisition (Aikenhead 1996). From this tradition, movements such as Public Understanding of Science (PUS) and Public Understanding of Science and Technology (PUST), which aim at informing the ignorant public, have developed. This educational tradition has conveyed a mythical image of science, unrealistically free of problems (Aikenhead 1973; Gaskell 1992; Milne and Taylor 1998). Hence, students would be expected to conceive natural science as well-grounded and true knowledge suitable for the development of society, that is, constructing and supporting the knowledge society. In the contrasting second tradition of science education, science is seen as subjective knowledge dependent on its value for society. Here education is aiming at literacy about science-related situations, that is, how science is used in society (Layton et al. 1986). The development of this tradition can be exemplified by Science-Technology-Society (STS), which since the late 1970s has been using social and technological contexts for the purpose of engaging students in science and its role in society (Fensham 1985; Fensham 1988b; Gaskell 1982; Solomon 1993). Following this tradition, science is embedded in the context of students‘ everyday life and opens up for communication, giving space to subjective views such as ethical, social and political opinions, by introducing problems connected to science and technology in order to stimulate informed decisions. Here the typical aim of science education is for all students to develop the ability to participate in democratic societies (Roberts 2008) and the role of science education may be seen as the construction of the critical society. Participation in a critical society would suggest active citizens and modern education would then be expected to enable students to transform their society (Kalantzis 2006). As Kalantzis suggests, in line with Giddens‘ theory of structuration (1984), this would call for a reconfigured balance between experts and novices where agency is rebalanced and learning is ―a dialogue between differencesǁ‖ (Kalantzis 2006, p 31). The use of socio-scientific issues (SSI) in education is an attempt to accomplish such rebalancing for the construction of a critical society. SSI, a development of STS, focuses on learning about science as a social practice and aims at developing students‘ argumentation (Driver et al. 2000; Ratcliffe 1996; Solomon 1992; Zeidler et al. 1992). Typically SSIs are ill-structured real problems usually pertaining to cutting-edge research (Kolstø 2001). Socioscientific issues challenge students to actively reflect on moral dilemmas and to make decisions about using scientific knowledge in society (Zeidler and Sadler 2008). Education using SSI is beneficial for scientific literacy about science (Zeider and Keefer 2003; Zeidler et al. 2005) and students‘ moral reasoning has been found to be supported by their knowledge (Fowler et al 2009; Sadler and Fowler 2006; Sadler and Zeidler 2004; Sadler and Zeidler 2005; Tal and Kedmi 2006; Zohar and Nemet 2002). Subsequently, the SSI can be said to support the construction of a critical society on the grounds that students‘ argumentation and
moral reasoning regarding a scientific issue is developed, and that it empowers students to engage in decisions with relevance to their own lives (Kolstø 2001; Zeidler and Sadler 2008). Scientific literacy and argumentation skills have the potential to induce the rebalancing effect required for the transformation of society called for by Kalantzis (2006). However, the path to scientific literacy is cumbersome for most students since their values and understandings are likely to be challenged in science education.
3 Societal discourses - conflicting values related to the human-animal relationship
In the first section below, the concept of worldview, that is, a person's presupposition of the world and how everything is interrelated, will be used to describe how the potential conflicts students may encounter can be handled in different ways and how this, in turn, affects their learning. In the second section, results from research on SSI and surveys reflecting students‘ attitudes to societal use of animals will be addressed, in order to provide information about some expressions emanating from students‘ worldviews with relevance to the subject. In the third section, counter-movements against the use of animals are presented. These counter-movements reflect different moral stances from subcultures which may be present in a classroom, and they reflect societal discourses aiming at the present and future societal use of animals in biotechnology or for any other purpose. The counter-movements are sustained by classical utilitarian and Kantian deontological reasoning and by the contrasting care ethics. In the fourth section, an attempt to systematize ethical problems related to animals is described. Here, three models of human-animal relationship are presented, which allow the inclusion of both contextualized (care ethics) and decontextualized (utilitarian and deontological ethics) ways of reasoning. 3.1 Challenged worldviews and students’ learning
Students‘ views of their world reflect values from their subcultures and societal discourses they have encountered. When learning science, whether it is aiming for science literacy vision I or vision II, students‘ views of their world are challenged as they encounter new knowledge bearing more or less unfamiliar sets of values. Such values may or may not correspond with the students‘ worldviews, that is, their perception of reality and how that reality is known (Kilbourn 1980). Some students are enculturated into scientific worldviews (Hawkins and Pea 1987; Costa 1993) and easily assimilate scientific knowledge when the educational content harmonizes with their worldviews. For other students, science education is a challenge to their worldview (Aikenhead 1996; Cobern 1996; Kilbourne 1980; Phelan 1991). For example, Costa (1995) showed that 92 percent of high school students had to cope with a lack of congruence between their worldview and those projected in the science classroom. It has been argued that such experienced conflicts are resolvable in different ways through collateral learning (Aikenhead and Jegede 1999) where the encountered worldview of science may be kept as separate, contextualized knowledge, that is, parallel collateral learning. Another possibility is to mix the new knowledge with, or to compartmentalize it from, the students‘ worldview. A mix of worldviews is the result of collateral learning which is either dependent, that is, parts of knowledge are exchanged with a low degree of reflection, or secure, that is, a new and modified worldview is produced through reflection. Secure collateral learning is, as described in other terms by
Cobern (1996), an active learning process allowing students to modify their worldviews instead of just producing merely rational structures of scientific knowledge without their everyday knowledge. The different variants of collateral learning reflect different outcomes of science education, some of which are quite unsuccessful if the aim is reproduction or transformation of society. 3.2 Students’ attitudes and societal discourses concerning the use of animals
The use of animals in science conveys values related to the human-animal relationship. Thus, students‘ worldviews may be challenged by the use of scientific knowledge to promote human health by using animals - a socioscientific issue suitable for education in biology. In a previous study (Zeidler et al. 2002) showed that students‘ reasoning about human utilization of animals could be described as based on scientific, religious or social considerations. They found that religious and scientific arguments could be conflated and that both scientific and social considerations followed consequentialist moral reasoning. In general, the students were cautious about using animals for scientific purposes and some expressed a protective attitude, stating that animals should not be killed or that animals are sentient beings and should be spared pain; an attitude which is supported by surveys (Plous 1996; Saucier and Cain 2006). According to Saucier and Cain (2006) there are a variety of arguments for and against using animals. For example, consequentialist reasoning as well as the use of intrinsic value are more often used as arguments for accepting the use animals, whereas arguments built on care and sympathy were used only to dismiss the use of animals. These arguments can be found in societal discourse about the human-animal relationship, often expressed by representatives from counter-movements such as animal rights and animal liberation, in their quest for the fair treatment of animals. 3.3 Counter-movements concerned with the use of animals
Peter Singer, a proponent of animal liberation, follows the classical utilitarian line of argumentation when claiming that there is no difference between human and animal suffering (Singer 2002). Hence, we should not treat animals and humans differently regarding, for example, suffering or interest. Interest here means striving for a good life, which according to Singer is something humans and animals share. However, Singer‘s idea of animal liberation is merely liberation from suffering. The relation between animals and humans appears asymmetrical in the sense that Singer does not grant animals the same rights as humans, such as living their lives as full members of society. Thus, animals in this view have no moral agency. The reason being that they cannot make moral decisions since they do not understand right from wrong. This position can be traced back to the contractarian ideas proposed by Hobbes, Locke and Hume. Tom Regan, following the ideas of Rawls (1999), defies contractarianism by claiming that the definition of moral agency is made not only by humans but by a fraction of them (Regan 1985). He points out that a major problem with this view is that some humans, such as the mentally retarded and infants, cannot have moral agency but are still regarded as humans with moral rights. Regan argues that since we do not accept torture and slaughter of infants and the mentally retarded, then animals should be given the same right to live their lives. Thus, we have a duty towards animals to treat them as what he calls subjects-of-a-life, giving them an inherent value. According to Regan, there is no difference between
the inherent value of an animal and that of a human, and he dismisses utilitarianism on the grounds that their egalitarianism has no room for any individual‘s inherent value. His position is close to Kant‘s deontological ethics when he claims that it is wrong for humans to use animals as resources and that no consequences can make it right. However, Regan‘s (1985) major deviation from Kant‘s reasoning is that there is no difference in intrinsic value between humans and animals - the same argument he uses to dismiss utilitarianism. In contrast to the rights-based ethics Regan proposes, feminists argue for animal rights based on care ethics (Curtin 2007; Manning 1992) based on the work by Gilligan (1982). Gilligan sought to contrast rational ethics and to describe a gender difference by confining rational ethics to males and care ethics to females. Care ethics challenge the impersonal and rule-based utilitarianism and deontological ethics which are both considered as typically male ethics (Manning 1992). This challenge, as pointed out by feminists, implies a polarity where care ethics depending on affect and relationship are distinguished from utilitarianism and deontological ethics. Thus, arguments relying on relational and affective values may be regarded as belonging to the care ethics perspective. Gilligan (1982) describes care ethics as being based within the context of the relationship where moral decisions could be associated with emotions and the commitment to maintain the relationship. Here, the roles of mutual interdependence and emotional response are emphasized. Additionally, sympathy for animals has been advocated / as the basis for care ethics (Donovan 2007) and there is no need for reciprocity (Curtin 2007). In fact, nature, seen as a community of organisms that can live and flourish, can be cared for (Clement 2007; Manning 1992). Thus the caring framework focuses on the responsiveness to needs in a context. This is in contrast to Singer's utilitarianism, which, just as Regan's deontological reasoning, is decontextualized and detached from personal relationships. 3.4 Models of human-animal relationships
The ideas put forward by Regan and Singer, deal with abstractions such as interest, agency, rights and value. Their animal rights theory represents a decontextualized and depersonalized perspective where only rational thoughts are valued. This is contrasted with care ethics which appear more relevant for practices in a social context due to the central role of emotions, although abstractions and generalizations for decontextualization of the human-animal relationship are also present in care ethics. The apparent polarity between animal rights theory and animal rights based on care ethics can be handled in a model proposed by Schicktanz (2006). Her model of human-animal relationship has the capacity to include decontextualized moral reasoning as well as moral reasoning within social contexts. It is also appealing because it includes anthropological, psychological, sociological and moral aspects to describe how the modern humananimal relationship has emerged. According to Schicktanz's model, three different ideals may be distinguished for the relationship between man and animal: i) the patronage model; ii) the friendship model and iii) the partnership model. Schicktanz acknowledges that the three models overlap and that they may change with context. The patronage model includes both classical utilitarian and deontological ethics. This ideal does not include personal relationships and it is abstract and lifted out of its context. It has emerged from religious and cultural anthropocentrism relating to Christian theological writings depriving animals of any moral status. Furthermore, according to Kantian deontological ethics, animals
have no moral status on the grounds that they are non-rational beings and have no intrinsic value. According to this rational and asymmetrical relationship we have no duty to care for animals. The only reason to care for animals would be to protect our self-image. In a more concrete line of argument, although still representing an asymmetrical relationship, the utilitarians' claim that we should consider animals' feelings and pain, not just those of humans. However, humans may use animals for their purposes as long as they do not cause them unreasonable pain. The friendship model includes both a decontextualized asymmetrical romantic naturalism and contextualized symmetric care ethics. This ideal has more room for ambivalence than the other two ideals, since it depends on the character of the relationship. The asymmetric and anthropocentric poles of this ideal borrow values from Rousseau and the romantic era. For example, nature and anything that may be regarded as natural represent the good. Nature is also good for humans because it has an aesthetic value. At the other end of the continuum, where the relationship appears almost symmetrical, we find signs of care ethics. Typically, pets and other animals must be cared for in a special way if we have a close relationship with them. The closeness of the relationship may explain different emotional loadings and thus differences in moral action. The partnership-model is compatible with the animal rights movement's use of modern interpretations of classical utilitarian and Kantian deontological ethics. According to this ideal the human-animal relationship is decontextualized and depersonalized. There is no difference between men and animals. Man and animals have similar intrinsic values giving them the same moral status. Thus, animals have the same rights as humans. If we take for granted that animals have the same intrinsic value as humans, then we may adhere to deontological ethics, which claim that we have a duty towards animals just as we have towards any human (cf. Regan 1985). This perspective displays a symmetric although depersonalized view of the relationship between man and animal. A more concrete line of argument would be that there is no difference in the suffering of man and animals, and that both should be given the chance to fulfil basic needs. This utilitarian perspective, which presents an asymmetric relationship, gives animals the same rights to live a good life but it does not necessarily mean that animals are granted the same intrinsic value as humans (cf. Singer 2002).
4 Theoretical framework
The changes of education over time mentioned above are regarded here as a consequence of ongoing societal discourses which are negotiated between different stakeholders, in line with Giddens theory of structural functionalism (Giddens 1984; Giddens 1990). Structural functionalism acknowledges the active interaction between both the organizational level of society, of which the educational system is an important part, and the citizens. An active interaction may be present in school and support either reproduction or transformation of society, or both. Science education using authentic problems such as SSI aims at both reproduction and transformation of society. However, the educational system has a role to play by inducing trust at the organizational level of society by balancing reproduction and transformation of society, that is, by constructing a knowledge society or a critical society. The need for trust in modern society, according to Giddens (1990) is due to the gap between social practice using experts‘ knowledge and social practice
using laymen‘s everyday knowledge. Furthermore, traditions hold together past time with the present and the future thus connecting trust to routinized social practices by being intrinsically meaningful and without referring to any particular belief. Thus traditions are practices that are safe not only for the present but also for the future and, by so being, they may inhibit development. Expert knowledge emanates from a disembedded practice, that is, a practice lifted out of social relations and values embedded in local contexts (Giddens 1990). Constructing a knowledge society, following the science education tradition built on objective scientific content knowledge, is typically disembedding. The opposite of disembedded practice is embedded practice, where social relations are present and the context is familiar to the student. The science educational tradition which presents a subjective view of science supports students‘ active learning regarding morals and values, and bridges the gap between embedded and disembedded practices, thus constructing a critical society. Research and the technological development are disembedded practices in society. For example, the intention of developing genetically modified animals for use in medicine and medical research is for the benefit of any human who might need medical care – not just for the scientists and medical doctors doing the work. It would of course be possible for a medical doctor to use the treatment he or she has developed for personal purposes thus a disembedded practice may be less disembedded or even embedded. This would not be possible for laymen, who, in order to receive treatment, must trust such experts. Any new technology may be associated with risk. Risk and trust are intertwined since trust can reduce the anticipated danger. As far as xenotransplantation is concerned, public ignorance about the risks and how to monitor the activity, fuel anxiety since the practice appears to be out of control. Trust can be induced by increasing the reliability of scientific principles, for example, by improving their accuracy and predictive validity or by reducing the impersonal and objective features of a disembedded social practice. The latter may be achieved by personal interaction between experts and laymen. These social encounters are re-embedding mechanisms in society and make it possible to induce trust in people thereby inducing trust in abstract systems (Giddens 1990). In science education a teacher or invited expert may induce trust in the students. Other ways to increase the trustworthiness in disembedded practices are to exhibit professional ethics and legislation of practices in accordance with certain ethical rules (Giddens 1990).
5 Aim of the investigation
Teaching which is aimed at developing students‘ argumentation and moral reasoning regarding a scientific issue, for example, by using SSI, may support the construction of a critical society. However, to empower students in a learning situation and to promote secure collateral learning, the discussion students are engaged in has to support a constructive dialogue. For that purpose, teachers can facilitate students‘ understanding of the logic in different lines of argumentation. The aim of this paper is to discern how students‘ moral reasoning concerning the human-animal relationship relates to their view of science and its use in societal practice. In the argumentation for or against the use of new technology, a conflict may appear between the apparent objective knowledge of technology, detached from familiar practices, and the subjective local practices, embedded in a context with social relations. The chosen example, the use of
genetically modified pigs as organ donors, provides a chance for the students to use ethical arguments and scientific knowledge as well as knowledge and emotions from their embedded practices. Thus, students may use scientific knowledge to produce or to distance themselves from a dilemma (Lindahl 2009). According to Giddens (1990), everyday knowledge in a context allowing social relations sustains embedded practices. The tension between disembedded and embedded practices, which appear in socio-scientific issues, will be used here to understand how students make meaning of their moral stances. The tension also reflects students‘ experienced conflicts between their worldview and that presented in the educational situation. Thus, students‘ reasoning may also reveal how they handle such conflicts. To discern how students reason about conflicting values concerning the human-animal relationship I pose two questions: 1. What moral stances may be discerned from students‘ reasoning about genetically modified animals for xenotransplantation into humans? 2. How do students appraise societal use of expert knowledge about animals for the benefit of humans?
6. Methods 6.1 Participants
The 13 participants (17.9 years) were students (year 11) from two classes, each belonging to one of two theoretical upper secondary school programmes: Natural Sciences and Social Sciences. The classes were from two different schools in a small city (50 000 inhabitants in the south of Sweden). Nine students (7 boys and 2 girls) studied Natural Sciences and four students (4 girls) were studying Social Sciences. Studies following such programmes continue for 3 years and during that time there are studies in natural sciences. The Natural Science programme has separate courses in biology, chemistry and physics, each with 150, 200 and 250 hours tuition respectively. The Social Science programme provides only 100 hours of tuition in natural sciences. However, the focus is on biology. The participants had previously participated in a similar study prior to their genetics course. The original sample consisted of 20 students who were invited to participate until interviews showed saturation with regard to arguments put forward about the use of gene technology. The participants in the present study were those who had could attend the arranged interviews. At the time of data collection, between three and five weeks had passed since they had finished their genetics course. Two teachers taught the genetics courses, which subsequently differed somewhat in content. The natural-science students had a combined biology-chemistry course where DNA as a chemical was studied in parallel with genetics. Furthermore, the natural-science students had the possibility to do laboratory work consisting of a simple RFLP analysis, intended to show how dissimilar genes could be detected. Apart from that, the genetic courses had similar contents dealing with Mendelian genetics, genetic diseases, DNA replication, transcription, protein synthesis and gene technology. Both classes had one group discussion, involving genetic diseases and ethics, where the students were divided into small groups (four to five students in each group).
6.2 Procedure
Data collection was made in two steps. In the first step, the students were given two questions to be answered privately at home. The questions concerned: i) their knowledge of gene technology and xenotransplantation for treating human diseases; ii) their arguments for and/or against the use of our knowledge to use animals for the benefit of humans in need of organs. The students were asked to include feelings they had related to the issues. In the instructions, the students were informed that what they were to write would only be read by the researcher and it would serve both as data for research and as a starting point for a dialogue at the interview. The written material was interpreted and displayed as a mindmap-like drawing to be presented at the interview. The purpose was to have an overview of the presented ideas and to change it, if necessary, in order to reach a display that could represent the student‘s reflections and feelings. In the second step, the researcher interviewed each student. At the beginning of each interview, the students were told that none of the questions or comments were intended to be judgemental but were only to check that they had understood correctly. Additionally, the researcher informed the students that his intention was to reach an understanding of the meaning of the presented arguments in cooperation with them. The interview was carried out as a dialogue where the students were asked to describe in more detail what they had written and to deepen their arguments. Thus, the mind-map-like drawing served to initiate the interview and it also showed interest in the students‘ views of the subject. The students were given the chance to add arguments and to consider strengths and weaknesses in their arguments. Each student was interviewed for about 30 minutes. At the end of the interviews the students were asked if the mind-map-like drawing that had been subjected to changes during the interview displayed the students‘ knowledge and arguments in an appropriate way. Interviews were recorded and the students‘ utterances were transcribed verbatim. 6.3 Analysis
A content analysis (Lincoln and Guba 1985) was made focusing on utterances representing different kinds of moral argumentation. The mind-map-like drawing served as a guide during the analysis of each interview. The abductive analysis started by using Giddens (1990) concepts disembedded and embedded practices to categorize students‘ reasoning. The idea was to differentiate decontextualized reasoning from contextualized, where for example decontextualized reasoning comprised the use of scientific knowledge, abstractions and principles and contextualized reasoning comprised personal relations and personal knowledge related to students‘ everyday life. Since this investigation aims at understanding their personal stances and their experienced conflicts, each student's reasoning was categorized as belonging to a particular individual. However, their reasoning could be ambiguous and to some extent contain utterances that could be considered for both categories. To solve that, Toulmin's argumentation patterns (2003) were used in such a way that the students‘ main warrants, that is, the most elaborated arguments containing the largest number of backings, were used for categorization. Most of the students‘ reasoning was categorized as decontexualized and supporting the use of expert knowledge in disembedded practices. The next step was to categorize students‘ moral reasoning about the socio-scientific issue within the two main categories. Reasoning using intrinsic value in the main warrant was regarded as Kantian deontological reasoning,
whereas the focusing on need or suffering was regarded as classical utilitarian reasoning. The students‘ reasoning focusing on their care for people, animals or nature, was categorized as belonging to care ethics. To make a meaningful categorization of the students‘ stances that could be useful for understanding classroom discussions embracing both contextualized and decontextualized reasoning, the human-animal relationship models proposed by Schicktanz (2006) were used. The advantage of Schicktanz' framework is that it takes into account historic as well as modern cultural aspects. Following Schicktanz (2006), students‘ reasoning was categorized into one of the three models of humananimal-relation:. patronage, friendship or partnership. The students‘ most elaborated argument containing the largest number of backings, were analysed for their main warrant (Toulmin 2003). Then students‘ arguments were subcategorized in order to describe how students‘ argumentation is supported by three theories of ethics (Kantian deontological, classical utilitarian and care ethics) with relevance to human treatment of animals. Each category could be described using a common main warrant (Table 1). With these main warrants as operationalized arguments, another scientist was given the task of categorizing students‘ reasoning by using the transcribed interviews. Her categorization was found to fully match the initial categorization (see above). The resulting categorization then, is based on human-animal relationships and moral argumentation to which the concepts of disembedded and embedded practices can be added as a parallel framework. This can be done since students‘ reasoning using utilitarian or deontological ethics is typically decontextualized (c.f. disembedded practice) whereas students‘ reasoning using care ethics is typically contextualized (c.f. embedded practice). Thus, the categorization of the students‘ moral stances into the ethical framework serves the purpose of studying their use of, and attitude towards, scientific knowledge by using Giddens‘ concepts to describe any conflicts between students‘ moral stances and contextualized or decontextualized knowledge.
7 Results – Students’ views of the human relationship to animals
The students‘ views of the human relationship to animals and human utilization of animals could be categorized into three categories representing different views on human-animal relationship: patronage, friendship and partnership (cf. Schicktanz, 2006). In the first two categories animals are regarded as typically different from humans whereas in the last category, students present man and animal as typically similar. As for both the Patronage and the Partnership categories, students take a rational decontexualized approach typically leaning on either utilitarian or deontological ethics respectively. This is contrasted by the students‘ arguments in the friendship category, which are contexualized, and focused on caring for animals and what is believed to be natural. 7.1 The patronage model
This relation between man and animal is typically asymmetrical. The rational argumentation for human utilization of genetically modified pigs as organ donors is based either on our duty to help humans because they have a higher value than pigs, or on the argument that the needs and suffering of humans are greater than the needs and suffering of pigs. Even though the suffering of pigs is acknowledged and at least in the utilitarian view is unwanted, argumentation for
improving or saving human life is grounded on a distinct difference between humans and pigs (Table 2). 7.1.1 Acceptance of utilization of animals based on a comparably higher human value.
Some students considered human life to have a higher value than that of a pig. Thus, a human may be saved and a pig sacrificed for that purpose. I think its right in every aspect. It is worth sacrificing the life of a pig for the sake of a human. (Carl)
An explanation for such discrimination is found in the difference in perception and cognitive skills of the two species. They are less prioritized since their perception and cognitive skills are far from those of a human, even though they can feel simple pain of course. (Oscar)
Suffering was hardly considered by these students. Either they did not mention suffering or considered it to be of minor importance. Still, it was suggested that extreme pain should be avoided. If they [the pigs] should suffer terribly, if it, if an arm grows out from its cerebral cortex and makes it scream in pain throughout its life then it‘s obviously not worth it. (Carl)
Apparently, these students agree to the use of technology at, as it seems, any cost. Development and use of technology stands for something important for the future when they argue for the development of technology. It is unnatural that we, humans start to interfere with what nature has done for millions of years, but I also think it is good and I think we should develop this, I really do, because it opens totally new possibilities. (Carl)
By using the value of life as a measure to discriminate between animals and humans, these students were able to give rational arguments for the use of pigs as organ donors for the benefits of humans only. Concerns about suffering, used as rebuttals, did not appear to be primarily for the benefit of the animals. By using scientific terms such as ‗cognitive skills‘ and ‗cerebral cortex‘, these students maintained a distance to the animals, which is typically disembedding and safely protects against emotional engagement. These students are positive to the development of new technology. 7.1.2 Acceptance of utilization of animals based on needs or suffering.
The possibility of using animal organs for humans in need was seen as a positive development. It was argued that the need for humans to avoid suffering and death was greater than the need of the pigs. Students were strongly in favour of reducing human suffering even though there was ambivalence towards using the technique for their personal needs, since it appeared unpleasant or even disgusting. It sounds half-disgusting but since it helps some people. (Pamela) In particular I think it‘s good for children, if they can get organs. I think, I sympathize more with them than with grown-ups because they have already had a life. (Pamela)
Typically, it was considered more important to prevent human suffering than to prevent suffering in pigs. Here emotional arguments, such as disgust, occur and it seems easier to sympathize with humans than with animals. The argumentation is rationalized by the usefulness of this practice and the possibility of obtaining a better life for humans. Still, the students did argue against causing the animals any unnecessary suffering. But of course, you have to draw a line to limit what you can and what you cannot do to the animals. (Pamela) Well,
butbe I think, no I thinktoyou should it, I. think you should be allowed to use the organs even if it may discomforting them thedo pigs (Pamela)
Here the students end up with the problem of quantifying suffering. The idea of quantifying suffering, or any other experience for that matter, is here regarded as a sign of rationalization and of maintaining a distance, that is, xenotransplantation is seen as a disembedded practice. However, there are other ways of rationalizing. For example, the tradition of slaughtering pigs for food was used as support and the development of the technique per se was seen as unproblematic. Because, we have always eaten meat and animals by tradition, so in a way just by developing this technique towards a way to use the organs in a new way seems natural to me. (Henry)
Tradition may be used as a rational argument and makes a practice acceptable simply because it is familiar. In this particular case the positive attitude to the development of xenotransplantation is backed by tradition, which makes it a safe practice. Tradition is reinforced here by the use of the word ‗natural‘. To sum up, the students in the patronage relationship category adhere to the view that we can use genetically modified pigs as organ donors. They use either value or need/suffering to discriminate between humans and animals. Their completely rational argumentation follows two lines. The first line of argument holds that the insignificant value of a pig‘s life justifies using them and not caring about their potential needs or pain. The different values are supported by expert knowledge, thus xenotransplantation using genetically modified pigs is accepted as a disembedded practice. The second line of argument holds that human needs and suffering are more important than the needs and suffering pigs. Thus the suffering of the pig is considered, but on a gradient where human needs are given more attention. The students rationalize by quantifying suffering and by referring to tradition. 7.2 The friendship model.
In the friendship model, the relation between man and animal is more or less asymmetrical and may be almost symmetrical. Focus is on caring for humans, animals and a natural way of life. 7.2.1 Rejection of expert knowledge and its use in society.
Students discuss the utilization of pigs from a perspective that focuses on care and naturalness. They appreciate the positive aspect of utilization of animals and would be willing to use the technique for them selves as well as for the care
others. However, these students are ambivalent and show more or less hesitant support for using genetically modified pigs as organ donors (Table 2). But then you go in and disrupt and stuff, and add or remove, and then you disturb the course of events that should have been. (Hanna) I‘m sort of both for and against, when it comes to such advanced (techniques) that you really, I think animal breeding is a more natural way because you just let everything go on as usual, you just make some small changes. (Johnny) Well I think we don‘t need to be able to do more of these things. But still, it‘s difficult to decide, you know, suppose something happened to one's mother or someone in the family. (Gabrielle) I think it‘s a good thing if it helps someone, so I think it‘s good, but then I don‘t know why I hesitate. I don‘t think it is wrong to do it. (Linda)
Students‘ ambivalence is typical for the friendship model. They express caring for both animals and humans, especially relatives, as well as for what is natural. Treating people with diseases is of course necessary and good, as is a development that improves human life, but there are limits. Students argue that we should care for, that is, protect and follow, what appear to be typical processes or changes in nature. Traditional practices such as raising pigs for food are regarded as natural per se but we ought to care about how pigs live their lives and how they are slaughtered. They argue for embedded practices by stating that new knowledge and disembedded practices are not needed in society. Their argumentation is personal and contextualized, and the limited elaboration may be compensated for by claiming that what is natural is also good. Still I think that the pigs are supposed to live as naturally as possible while they are alive and I don‘t think they should be in any pain whatsoever. (Johnny) If they had a nice life and could live outside and, you know, live a really normal life. Then it wouldn‘t make any difference if you took their organs or if you slaughtered them, they, they just die. (Gabrielle)
Students use personal arguments based on their subjective view that what is natural is also very good and should be cared for. When tradition is used as an argument, it involves caring for pigs and assuring that they have a life which is as natural and good as the life they are presumed to have with less human interference. It manifests itself as caring for pigs by providing necessities for a good life; that is, the natural life is in focus, and painlessly killing the pig to get organs or meat does not conflict with this point of view.. Ambivalence is typical for the friendship model and reflects a caring attitude towards both animals and humans, although relatives are prioritized since the relation to them is closer than to animals. 7.3 The partnership model.
The relation between man and animal is typically symmetrical. The students‘ rational argumentation against human utilization of genetically modified pigs as organ donors is based on a similarity between man and animals. The argumentation is based either on the equal values of pigs and humans, or on the argument that human needs and suffering are equal to the needs and suffering of pigs (Table 2).
7.3.1 Rejection of the utilization of animals based on the similar values of humans and animals.
Expert knowledge is appreciated but its use is limited by the idea that humans and pigs are considered to have the same value and consequently have the same right to live. Since we have a duty to respect human life we must also respect the life of a pig. According to this rationale we should neither slaughter pigs for food nor use their organs for transplantation. I used to think about gene technology you just made random alterations and I didn't think that was any good, but now I have understood that you can use it for many purposes, and, well, then I think you might as well use it. (Veronica)
Expert knowledge and its use is appreciated if used for a purpose. However, there are limitations to the use of technology, which is very specific and not negotiable. I think animals are worth as much as people and I think it is wrong to do that to them. In my opinion, it is wrong because it kills the pigs. (Veronica)
It is either right or wrong to kill a pig. Veronica‘s stance is that it is wrong, based on the idea that humans and pigs have the same intrinsic value. Even though she has a personal stance against slaughtering pigs, tradition is for the time being presented as a support for societal use of pigs for food. As it happens, we have always eaten meat, you know, for ages in fact, and that‘s why I think you have sort of respected or accepted it in some way. That‘s the way it is. (Veronica) We haven‘t done this [used pigs as organ donors] for ages, you know. (Veronica)
The use of expert knowledge in disembedded practices is appreciated, but within limits; animals must not be killed. By referring to tradition, Veronica, who is a vegetarian, gives a rational explanation to why it is an acceptable practice to slaughter pigs for food but not to obtain organs for xenotransplantation. Tradition is by no means an argument for using pigs as organ donors. The main argument against using pigs as organ donors is that pigs and humans have the same value. Thus, it is not right to kill a pig unless the purpose is to get meat. However, on a societal level tradition cannot support xenotransplantation. 7.3.2 Rejection of the utilization of animals based on their similar needs and suffering.
The issue is that animals and humans are considered to have an equal need or right to life. In this utilitarian perspective it was implied that there should be negotiations about the need of humans and pigs to live. However, this does not mean that pigs cannot be used as organ donors since the same principle as for the use of human organs for transplantation may be applied. Of course, it‘s a good thing if you can use its organs, but you can do that when it has died a natural death. Then you can take its organs and use them. (Benny)
Expert knowledge is appreciated, as is its use in biotechnology, but only as long as a pig does not have to die. A pig is considered to be the same as, or equal to, a human individual and thus it has the same needs and right to live. However, there is no mutuality between pigs and humans since we do not do for them what we
expect them to do for us. Furthermore, we cannot get consent from the pigs to slaughter them and consequently we should neither slaughter pigs for food nor for organs. Well, the pig is an individual, and so it is obvious to me that it should have the same right to live, just like an ordinary human. Why, should the pig die just to save that human, really, I haven‘t seen any humans die to save any pigs. (Benny) I might add that you wouldn‘t exactly slaughter people to feed pigs. (Benny) Well, if they could talk, sure, then they could express their views on the matter, but since they can‘t I don‘t know how to ask them and, well I say it‘s up to the owner if he wants to decide for them since he is, you could say, their caregiver or something like that. (Benny)
The main problem seems to be how to negotiate about the need to live. Reciprocity is asked for but based on an idea of equal rights for pigs and men. The relation between humans and animals in the partnership model is not a person-toperson type of relation but rather a negotiated relationship without sympathy, as opposed to the friendship model. However, the suggestion that the owner can give consent in place of the pig is an analogue to the parent-child relation, which merely points out the problem of communication. It seems as if there are no arguments for taking a pig's life. Sure, I think it‘s wrong to take thousands of pigs and slaughter them just to, ehh, feed people. (Benny)
Here the student rejects tradition as an argument for depriving pigs of their lives for any purpose. In spite of the explicit stance against slaughtering pigs to feed people, Benny admits reluctantly that he eats other kinds of meat. His moral stance is a matter of principles. If only a pig could communicate that it was willing to give up its life for a human, then there would be no problem killing it since the pig's needs would appear to be taken care of as a result of a negotiation. The rational argumentation for the utilitarian variant of the partnership model is built on an idea of equality and mutual agreements where the respective needs and rights of humans and animals can be negotiated. This variant of the partnership relation breaks free of tradition and pictures pigs and humans as equals in our society.
8. Discussion
The purpose of the present investigation was to discern how students‘ moral reasoning concerning the human-animal relationship relates to their view of science and its use in societal practice. In the methodological discussion below, the reliability of the data collection and analysis is discussed. In the following sections students‘ reasoning categorized into each of the human-animal relationship models is discussed in relation to the main ethical perspectives, how students make meaning of objective (cf. expert knowledge) and subjective knowledge (cf. local everyday knowledge). Finally, the study is concluded with a general discussion of the results and their pedagogical implications.
8.1 Methodological discussion
The starting point for each interview was a mind-map-like drawing based on a text written by the student. During the interview the content of the drawing changed somewhat and at the end of the interview each student was given the opportunity to judge how the drawing reflected their views about the issues discussed and to suggest changes. The agreement of all the students supports the reliability of the data collection. During the interview the students‘ arguments were questioned in order to deepen the understanding and to probe for values or further arguments. The students‘ utterances, as well as their difficulty finding arguments, were shown respect. They were never dealt with in a judgemental way. Although they showed interest in the issues and appeared eager to talk, it is possible that they were nervous about being judged. This could have inhibited them and caused them to be less honest or willing to disclose some of their personal views. Thus, it is likely that the results do not give the full picture of their views on these issues. Some of the arguments put forward by the students have been reported before by experts and from small interview studies and public surveys of different populations. The arguments reported here are strengthened by the presence of similar arguments in several other studies. For the analysis of the data, Giddens‘ concepts disembedded and embedded practices were used as a starting point. Within the two categories, students‘ moral reasoning about the human-animal relationship was found to relate to three theories of moral philosophy typically used in arguments for animal rights. Since two of them, utilitarian ethics and deontological ethics, are equally applicable in arguments for the use of animals in, for example, biotechnology, the present choice covers a range of moral arguments. Students' reasoning focusing on the intrinsic value of pigs or humans is here categorized as leaning on Kantian deontological ethics, whereas students' reasoning focusing on suffering and need is categorized as leaning on classical utilitarian ethics. This broad approach is used rather than making many categories relating to different varieties within these ethical theories. This is done in order to avoid over-interpretation of interviews and to find categories that may be of practical use in education. Furthermore, since the foreground figures of animal rights take classical utilitarian (Peter Singer) and Kantian deontological (Tom Regan) positions, my choice enables categorization that is compatible with two important societal discourses. Care ethics was used as a category for students' reasoning focusing on the similarities or differences in relationship. However, there were examples where students‘ reasoning about suffering could be regarded as following either utilitarian or care ethics. This difficulty was solved by categorizing students' arguments which showed concern for a relative or living animals or people in a context as care ethics. The use of the word suffering without a context, that is, in an abstract sense, was categorized as utilitarian ethics. The three theories of moral philosophy used were found to fit into the human-animal relationship model (Schicktanz 2006). This is to be expected, since these models were developed to take into account anthropocentric as well as sentientistic ethical theories for the understanding of the human-animal relationship regarding moral issues in animal biotechnology. Furthermore, this framework may also be used together with Giddens concepts of disembedded and embedded practices since the patronage and the partnership models are decontextualized and fit into disembedded practices, whereas the friendship model is contextualized and fits into embedded practices. Although the ambivalence observed on the nearness-distance continuum for the relationship shows that there
are tendencies of decontextualization even for the friendship model (Schicktanz 2006). Thus, the resulting framework (Table 1), using the human-animal relationship models was used in parallel with Giddens‘ concepts (disembeddedembedded). The categories disembedded and embedded practices agree well with the students' appreciation of objective knowledge of science (disembedded) and subjective knowledge (embedded). By using Giddens‘ concepts, the students‘ appraisal of societal use of expert knowledge about animals could be analysed. Operationalization of students‘ arguments following the categorization systems (Table 1) was done to enable a reliability test for the performed categorization. By using the operationalized classes of generalized categorization of students‘ interviews, the analysis could be fully replicated by another scientist, that is, all students were categorized as presented in Table 2, thus supporting the reliability of the presented categorization. The limited number of students participating in this study makes a comparison of differences between sexes impossible. Furthermore, the categorization of students‘ reasoning (Table 2) was suboptimal due to the low number participating in this study. Hence, to each of the subcategories of the partnership model, utilitarian and deontological ethics, only one student was assigned. However, this only affects the possibility of presenting suitable quotations since the interviewed students could be categorized into all of the theoretical categories used. It may be argued that religious categories are missing. Other studies have shown the existence of religious arguments concerning our use of animals in science (Zeidler et al. 2002). In cases where students‘ reasoning was based on religious ethics, according to the framework of human-animal models (cf. Schicktanz), they would have been categorized as belonging to the anthropocentric patronage model. There were ambiguities in the students‘ argumentation. For example, students using the patronage model could utter emotional rebuttals such as: ―It sounds half-disgusting but since it helps some people … ― However, such ambiguities occurred only for students leaning on utilitarian ethics. Students using the friendship model showed both contextualized and decontextualized argumentation but their decontextualized argumentation was aimed at giving support to the idea that nature and what is natural is good and pure and should be protected. For example, these students think of nature as something that needs to follow its course: ―I think it‘s better if the body gets natural substances, I think it‘s easier for the body to take care of them than to adjust to new substancesǁ‖. When ambiguities appeared as a mix of decontextualized and contextualized arguments, students were categorized by their main argument (cf. method section). The same procedure was used if students showed an ambiguity between for or against xenotransplantation. The former example of ambiguity typically occurred among students in the friendship model as they cared about both the animals and people in need. The students‘ use of scientific knowledge (expert knowledge) as well as personal or everyday knowledge (embedded in local practice) in arguments was used to deepen the analysis of the students‘ understanding and to discern their appreciation of expert knowledge and disembedded practices. The use of scientific knowledge for their argumentation was regarded as an appreciation of expert knowledge, and their support for biotechnology relating to the discussed example was interpreted as their appreciation of disembedded practices. Typically, the use of expert knowledge was seen as a way to create objectivity and distance to the dilemma. Thus, expert knowledge may, for example, give support
to decontextualized ethical arguments to maintain the distinction between humans and animals. When a student contradicted his/her contextualized argument with expert knowledge, it was seen as an attempt to objectify. Another way to objectify was to refer to tradition. Tradition is not disembedded but it does not serve as a contextualized argument either. Thus, contradiction by using expert knowledge or tradition was interpreted as an attempt to rationalize and to withdraw from emotion. 8.2 Different kinds of relationship between humans and animals
In this section general similarities and differences between the three humananimal relationship models are pointed out. Students‘ reasoning pertaining to morals, their appreciation of expert knowledge and disembedded practices is discussed from the viewpoint of the three models and in relation to worldviews and collateral learning. In accordance with previous studies (Gunter et al. 1998; Macer et al. 2002; Pearce et al. 2006; Rios et al. 2004) the majority of the students in this investigation accepted the use of xenotransplantation. In fact, all the students could accept xenotransplantation on the condition that the life of the organ donor was spared. Only students categorized into the partnership model refused to accept xenotransplantation if it meant that the organ donor had to die. These students thought of animals as equal to humans, which contrasted with the views of the other students. Subsequently, students using the patronage model or the friendship model generally prioritized humans over animals, thus leaning on the anthropocentric view of human dominion over all other animals. As suggested by Schicktanz (2006), the patronage model stems from religious anthropocentric view of the human-nature relationship. Students‘ reasoning categorized as belonging to the patronage model could be considered as either following deontological or utilitarian ethics. Students‘ reasoning assigned to the partnership model was also found to follow deontological or utilitarian ethics. The apparent difference between these two models is seen as an asymmetrical relationship (patronage) or a symmetric relationship (partnership). The moral reasoning among students using the friendship model was associated with care ethics alone. 8.2.1 The patronage model is in agreement with disembedded practices
It is argued here that students using the patronage model appreciate expert knowledge as well as disembedded practices with few constraints. They appeared to have no conflict with the worldview encountered through the suggested use of animals. However, students adhering to utilitarian ethics were not fully content with the available scientific knowledge but tried to compensate by using tradition to re-embed the disembedded in order to build trust. The students using the patronage model have no problem with either genetic modification or the taking of a pig's life to save a human. The comparably more urgent needs or higher intrinsic value of humans, are the two different main arguments. Their stances are easily associated with trust in experts and disembedded practices such as research and biotechnology. These students seem to withdraw from the potential harm xenotransplantation using genetically modified pigs would do to the animals. Students using the patronage model and adhering to deontological ethics use decontextualized scientific language, possibly as an aid to associate themselves with experts and to maintain their view of man as more sophisticated than any animal. This can be seen as an indication that these
students may easily become enculturated (Aikenhead 1996; Aikenhead and Jegede 1999) since they adopt expert language and all appreciate disembedded practice. The students using the patronage model and adhering to utilitarian ethics claim that xenotransplantation is a good thing as it helps people in need. They use mainly contextualized arguments as they sympathize with particular human beings, especially children. This, then, is an argumentation that pertains to subjective local practices, that is, embedded practices, where social relations are more meaningful than objective knowledge. These students believe that human suffering is greater than the suffering of pigs. Science education seems to have little impact on their argumentation since they use neither scientific language nor scientific knowledge in their reasoning. However, they ask for knowledge related to the estimation of suffering since they express a belief that a difference exists between humans and pigs in this regard. In fact, they need this argument to support their acceptance of xenotransplantation. Thus, they may have doubts about the validity of their emotional arguments related to suffering, at least in the interview situation. Furthermore, these students use tradition to support their reasoning, as opposed to the students adhering to deontological ethics. This implies that tradition is more relevant for the utilitarian perspective. Tradition reembeds xenotransplantation as it makes this disembedded practice more familiar when it is made analogous to slaughtering pigs for meat. However, these students are not fully content as they still lack knowledge to make the important integration of scientific knowledge into their life-world. But their use of tradition to make xenotransplantation more familiar suggests that their learning resembles secure collateral learning (Aikenhead and Jegede 1999) since tradition, or the knowledge of tradition is used as a substitute for the lack of scientific information about the suffering of genetically modified pigs which are used as organ donors for xenotransplantation. Thus these students may try to build trust by building bridges between disembedded and embedded practices by using tradition. However, their asking for scientific knowledge to support their stance that humans are prioritized and have needs that are more important than animals, indicates that these students may become enculturated as they seek for and appreciate expert knowledge. These students are likely to benefit from science education in that they will trust that scientific knowledge is suitable for the development of society, that is, it constructs and supports the knowledge society. 8.2.2 The partnership model is in agreement with expert knowledge but in conflict with some disembedded practices
It is argued here that students using the partnership model appreciate and trust expert knowledge but that their symmetric relation to animals does not allow them to accept disembedded practices which violate the symmetry of the relation. Furthermore, tradition cannot re-embed disembedded practices which violate the symmetry. These students, who adhere to either deontological or utilitarian ethics, are likely to cope with such value conflicts by learning. This ranges from parallel to secure collateral learning. The partnership model provides an interesting contrast to the patronage model since both deontological ethics and utilitarian ethics may result in totally different solutions concerning the organ donor‘s life. For the students arguing for the symmetrical relationship in the partnership model, the historical discrepancy between man and animal is no longer valid. Singer‘s (2002) utilitarian claim that we should not kill animals since we have the same interest – striving for a good
life – is in accordance with these students‘ views. Similarly, Regan‘s (1985) claim that animals have the same right to live as any human is in accord with students adhering to deontological ethics within the partnership model. These students acknowledge a tension between their stance and that of our society as expressed in the slaughtering of animals for food. In their view, the tradition of using meat for food is not a valid argument for xenotransplantation if it is fatal for the animal. However, if the lives of pigs do not have to be sacrificed there is no problem. That means that students do not think of the genetic manipulation as depriving the pigs of their intrinsic value. Following the ideas of Rolston (2002), this might have been expected for students adhering to deontological ethics since the intrinsic value of the pigs would be changed in a non-evolutionary way. Possibly these students do not have enough knowledge to realize such a threat to the intrinsic value of pigs. Instead, life is in focus and has to be protected. The equal value of humans and pigs means that there are no excuses for killing a pig, not even tradition. However, tradition is used to understand why slaughtering pigs is legitimized in society, but on a personal level tradition is not a valid argument for killing a pig. On a societal level, tradition appears to be an acceptable excuse for producing meat, but tradition cannot justify killing pigs for the purpose of xenotransplantation. Biotechnology as such is appreciated as promising for the future, but only if the lives of animals as well as those of humans are protected. The use of expert knowledge to save human life is welcome, thus disembedded practice is appreciated. Scientific knowledge then is trustworthy and the students support the use of technology. However, in their argumentation about xenotransplantation, scientific knowledge has no meaning since the issue is to save lives and that stance cannot be changed by more knowledge. The positive attitude to biotechnology exemplifies a trust in expert knowledge as such but disembedded practices, compromising the intrinsic value of an organism by diminishing the value of its life, are unacceptable. Here the presence of conflicting values indicates that students may have to separate their personal view from that presented in the scientific content as in parallel collateral learning (Aikenhead and Jegede 1999). However, the positive attitude to expert knowledge observed here still enables students to learn scientific content as long as their values do not seem to be threatened. Thus, secure collateral learning seems possible here under the condition that the lives of pigs are spared. When utilitarian ethics are used within the partnership model, focus is on the need to be alive. However, the problem is that the need of pigs or humans to be alive cannot be negotiated. This is in line with the contractarian views of Hume (Treatise of human nature), apart from the fact that he excluded animals from society on the grounds that they cannot communicate in order to reach an agreement. Students favouring the partnership model include animals in society on the grounds that they have a right to disagree; only they cannot. Thus, their lives have to be protected since there is no possibility of a mutual agreement between humans and pigs. Typically, pigs are not just animals but individuals who should be respected. The relationship between farmer and pig is analogous to that between parent and child, which Benny expressed by using the word caregiver for the farmer: "…well I say it’s up to the owner if he wants to decide for them since he is, you could say, their caregiver or something like that". Such juridical vocabulary is interpreted as a sign of withdrawal from personal relations by objectifying the pig. The sought for mutual agreement between pigs and humans is like making an official contract, that is, a disembedded practice, about
xenotransplantation which is another disembedded practice. If a negotiation between humans and animals were possible this would have the function of an access point where the gap between humans and animals as individuals may be reduced. The business-like relationship gives no room for closeness and human caring for pigs in this example. Still, there are no signs of disregard for disembedded practices as such, since the possibility to genetically modify pigs is accepted, as is xenotransplantation, as long as no killing occurs, that is, the idea of equals in a partnership remains. Apparently, expert knowledge is trusted and disembedded practices acceptable on the condition that humans and animals may still be considered as equals with equal needs to be alive. The positive attitude towards expert knowledge enables secure collateral learning, but education focusing on biotechnological applications threatening the idea of equality between humans and animals might force these students into parallel collateral learning. These students appear to regard scientific knowledge as grounded and true. However, scientific knowledge may, according to them, not be fully suitable for the development of society. Thus, these students‘ attitudes may be interpreted as if they have been educated for a critical society, since they express a wish to change tradition and current technological development. However, it is more likely that they are educated for a knowledge society, but hold on to their personal stances. Instead, the results imply that these students would benefit from science education where conflicts between worldviews could be seen as possibilities instead of problems. 8.2.3 The friendship model is in conflict with expert knowledge and disembedded practices.
The friendship model is more or less asymmetrical and it is argued here that decisions about who gets sympathy and care depends on the closeness of the relation. These students turn away from expert knowledge and disembedded practices since they may violate naturalness. Naturalness is an important value which may, however, be used to re-embed disembedded practices. The perceived conflict between embedded and disembedded practices is handled by parallel collateral learning. The friendship model is based on care for both humans and animals. However, this model resembles the patronage model in the sense that it allows the use of animals. Humans are to decide, not negotiate, if pigs are to die. There is no intrinsic or given value to consider. The relationship to animals is more or less asymmetrical but caring for animals seems to be important and the decision to use animals depends on two things. First, the closeness of a relationship, that is. to an animal or a human, acts as a value (cf. Schicktanz 2006) and determines the amount or quality of care giving. This was exemplified by the students prioritizing caring for humans and especially relatives. Here, sympathy seems to be of importance. Sympathy for animals was strongly advocated by Schopenhauer in the 19th century and his ideas have later come to be used as support for feminist care ethics related to the human-animal relationship (Donovan 2007). Feminist care ethics are associated with the friendship relationship model because of the expression of sympathy among students in this category. Secondly, according to these students animals should be cared for during their life, that is, life is in focus instead of death. If a pig has a good life and is painlessly killed, there is no harm done. It is only natural. The friendship model uses a somewhat romantic context; one which stands for the idealization of nature and naturalness. Naturalness is an
appreciated value and may be as important to protect as intrinsic value in deontological ethics. Subsequently, by referring to naturalness students claim that nature is given to us and we should follow natural principles. Accordingly, they see genetic modification as a threat to what is natural since it brings about unnatural changes. In another vein, selection and breeding of animals is considered natural. By thinking of the genetic modification of animals as a more sophisticated form of animal breeding, this too is natural. However, it is not as natural as animal breeding. Thus, some students may use naturalness as a means of re-embedding such practices as xenotransplantation into a local context to make them more acceptable, whereas others still claim this is against nature. Tradition may also have a re-embedding mechanism since our tradition of using pigs for food is a valid argument for killing pigs to obtain their organs, as long as the pigs have a normal, that is, natural, life. For these students, disembedded practices are difficult to accept since they are threats to what is natural. Furthermore, the focus on relationship as a value alienates them from expert knowledge unless the students have the opportunity of personal encounters with experts. These students seek embedded practices and turn away from disembedded practices. This creates a tension that at best leads to dependent collateral learning, which might be possible if the context is familiar and allows their feeling of sympathy. Without supporting feelings of sympathy these students are likely to turn away from expert knowledge that threatens naturalness. Thus parallel collateral learning may be at hand. They have a problem with science education for the knowledge society since knowledge, or at least the use of knowledge, is threatening. The conflict which they experience is caused by a lack of trust in disembedded practices since they have difficulty appreciating expert knowledge. It is likely that these students would benefit from education for the critical society where apparent conflicts could be used to build trust in experts as persons with whom negotiations are possible (Giddens 1990). 8.3 General discussion and educational implications.
The apparent conflicts between the different models, values and morals are discussed. Within an anthropocentric perspective, values such as naturalness and closeness may be negotiated to some extent. Additionally, degrees of suffering may also be negotiated if knowledge is available. However, students using a biocentric perspective have no room for negotiations. Instead the chances of reaching understanding seem more promising than attempting to reach consensus. Science education may have a socializing effect regarding attitudes to disembedded practices. Knowledge from and about disembedded practices such as gene technology may have an impact on students‘ ethical and moral judgements. The science content may for example convey values to the student (Aikenhead 1996; Cobern 1996; Hawkins and Pea 1987; Kilbourne 1980). On the other hand, students may use the scientific knowledge to support their present stance. For example, students adhering to deontological ethics use scientific language as an aid to associate themselves with experts and to maintain their view of man as more sophisticated than any animal. If so, their new knowledge could be used to argue for pre-existing ideas which are in agreement with their worldview. The constant improvement of scientific knowledge by humans may, for example, contribute to an anthropocentric view. Most of the students (11) in this investigation had an anthropocentric view, a view which appears to confer asymmetric relationships. Students using the patronage model or the friendship
model hold anthropocentric views. They have no conflicts with societal utilization of animals as such. However, the belief that suffering is measurable and the lack of knowledge about how to estimate it is problematic for students with a utilitarian perspective (patronage model). Their sympathy is limited to humans, and since their scientific knowledge cannot compensate for that, they are unable to form integrated knowledge supporting their stance. The students using the friendship model have sympathy without limitations, but instead sympathy is dependent on the closeness of their relationships. Their anthropocentric view then, seems integrated with the concept of relationship. The main conflicts between students using the patronage or the friendship model concern both the value of expert knowledge and how to use it. Within the friendship model, negotiation is to some extent possible as long as the limits of the definition of naturalness may be extended, that is, the ambiguous concept natural is open for negotiation. Students using the partnership model have a biocentric view, where the historic differences between man and animal are disregarded. For them, societal utilization of animals is an important issue and creates a conflict not only with newly developed disembedded practices such as xenotransplantation, but also with traditional practices such as slaughtering for food. Their stance regarding utilization of animals is non-negotiable. Still, they appreciate expert knowledge but they call for its use to be limited in order to make it possible to take the needs and values of animals into account in society. The main apparent conflict between students concurring with the partnership and the friendship model concerns the value of expert knowledge. Their different ethical perspectives, that is, biocentric and anthropocentric, also present a problem. This may however be overcome somewhat if the closeness in the friendship relationship model may be extended to include a wider range of animal species. Students using the patronage model or the partnership model appreciate expert knowledge. However, students using the partnership model cannot accept disembedded practices which deprive animals of their lives. For students using the patronage model, disembedded practices following anthropocentric ethics are acceptable. Thus, science education is unproblematic and may give these students the arguments they need to support their view of technological development. However, there is an interesting difference between students arguing for classical utilitarian ethics and those arguing for Kantian deontological ethics since only the former need to re-embed disembedded practices to be able to understand how suffering or need may be used in a meaningful way for their decisions. From an educational perspective, both groups of students already accept and appreciate scientific knowledge, but to make disembedded practices meaningful, students with the utilitarian view need help to understand how expert knowledge can be made useful in a local context allowing appropriate social relations and sympathies. The friendship model, built on care ethics and protecting naturalness, has little room for decontextualizations and withdrawal from personal relations. Since relationship as such is a key concept, the disembedding mechanisms in modern society threatens social relations, disembedded practices can hardly be accepted. In an educational perspective, the students using the friendship model can only accept embedded practices, societal practices built on tradition or permitting social relations and sympathy. Science education with room for social relations and with support for future social relations with experts may be of importance for successful learning among these students. Students showing trust in expert knowledge would be expected to easily become enculturated. However, it appears that specific values make a paramount
difference since students using the partnership model strongly object to the killing of animals. Similarly, for students using the friendship model, expert knowledge used in a local context is acceptable but any threat to naturalness makes a social practice unacceptable. Thus, the idea of collateral learning supports the understanding of the difficulties students have forming integrated knowledge in science education when conflicting values appear, or when knowledge and context is immiscible for the students. For students who expect and are ready to accept expert knowledge, science education provides knowledge and arguments to support their views. This is here exemplified by the students‘ use of scientific language and is in line with previous findings showing that science education helps students to improve their reasoning (Sadler and Fowler 2006; Sadler and Zeidler 2005; Sadler and Zeidler 2004; Tal and Kedmi 2006; Zohar and Nemet 2002). Yet other studies claim that students become more positive to the use of biotechnology as they increase their understanding of scientific knowledge (Chen and Raffan 1999; Hill et al. 1998; Lock et al. 1995). However, at least in the study by Chen and Raffan (1999), where questions mainly reflected the potential usefulness of biotechnology, values of life or naturalness caused no conflict. Thus, the described change of attitude is likely to have provided knowledge that in a utilitarian perspective was most welcome. It seems, then, that research on the potential of science education to change the attitudes of students is needed in order to see if there are any qualitative changes in attitude. Furthermore, if science education is expected to change students‘ attitudes to expert knowledge or its use in societal practice, then a discussion about which changes are desirable is needed. There are many studies which argue that the role of science education is to provide students with knowledge for their participation in a societal discourse about how to use expert knowledge (Fowler et al. 2009; Sadler and Fowler 2006; Sadler and Zeidler 2004; Sadler and Zeidler 2005). The results from the present study show what values and which contexts are important to students in relation to xenotransplantation. My suggestion is that such knowledge should be used to develop science education using socio-scientific issues in such a way that the different groups of students may find ways to relate to the usefulness of expert knowledge or to understand how to argue for or against certain societal practices. For this purpose, both disembedded practices and embedded practices have relevance in science education. Education for a critical society by necessity has to embrace discussions that enable bridges to be built between experts and novices in order to build trust and to empower students to participate in the development of society using different kinds of knowledge (Giddens 1990; Kalantzis 2006; Kolstø 2001; Zeidler and Sadler 2008). In addition, students will benefit from activities for the integration of their values and new knowledge. Otherwise, science education is at odds with the idea of a critical society and democratic participation where the negotiations between laymen and experts involve trust. Science has a history which typically reflects both deontological and utilitarian perspective, whereas care ethics, being a new perspective, are less prominent in history. The apparent conflict between these ethical theories creates a problem in a classroom setting and is further complicated by the conflict between the anthropocentric and biocentric perspectives. There appears to be a possibility to negotiate but it is limited. The conflicting stances for and against disembedded practices do have similarities that present opportunities for understanding. Thus, it seems wise to reach understanding instead of attempting to reach consensus for the development of students‘ argumentation skills for a future participation in societal discourse on utilizing expert knowledge.
Furthermore, an awareness of these perspectives may promote understanding of science and its potential role in society. If students are unaware of the existence of different ethical perspectives, discussions or debates may be unproductive since such unawareness may prevent understanding of others' argumentation for values related to different contexts. By increasing the awareness of how others make values meaningful, and in what context, students may improve their appraisal of others claims for better understanding and their argumentation skills. Acknowledgements This study was supported by the Faculty of Natural Science and Technology and The Board of Teacher Training and Educational Research at Kalmar University. I would also like to thank Dr. Anne-Mari Folkesson for stimulating discussions throughout the writing process of this paper.
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Table 1 Main warrants of each relationship model including moral philosophical theories
Relationship model
Ethical theory Patronage Deontological ethics
1
Patronage Utilitarian ethics
2
Friendship
Care ethics Partnership Deontological ethics Partnership Utilitarian ethics 1
2
2
1
Main warrant The value of humans is superior to that of pigs The need or suffering of humans is greater than that of pigs Care for nature and the natural way to live a life for pigs The values of humans and pigs are equal The need or suffering of humans and pigs is equal
Refers to Kantian deontological ethics
Refers to classical utilitarian ethics
Table 2 Relationship between students' appreciation of expert knowledge and disembedded practices, and their arguments categorized on their use of relationship model and ethical theory. Relationship model
Claim about
Ethical theory (Number of students) Patronage model Deontological ethics1
Xenotransplantation
Qualifier for
Xenotransplantation
Utilitarian ethics2
Acceptable
Limits for what you
(2) Friendship model
Care ethics
Acceptable for the
(4)
caring of relatives
Not if they suffer terribly (R)
knowledge and Disembedded
is greater than that of pigs
way to live a life for pigs
practices We have a tradition to slaughter
pigs (B)
Appreciation of Expert
Deontological ethics
1
Not acceptable
If pigs are killed
The values of humans and
A traditional/natural way of life is good (B)
Partnership model Utilitarian ethics
2
Not acceptable
If pigs are killed
(1) 1
2
Refers to Kantian deontological ethics
Refers to classical utilitarian ethics
pigs are equal
practices
food is not applicable for
Appreciation of Expert
xenotransplantation (R) humans and pigs is equal
Our tradition to slaughter pigs for
knowledge and Disembedded
We do not need more knowledge
The need or suffering of
No appreciation of Expert
Our tradition to slaughter pigs for
knowledge and Disembedded practices
(B)
(1)
superior to that of pigs
Care for nature and the natural
Disembedded practices Appreciation of Expert
Partnership model
Not acceptable
can do to pigs
Development is prioritized (B)
The need/suffering of humans
Rebuttal (R)
Expert knowledge and
The value of humans is
(5) Patronage model
Typical Backing (B) or
Acceptable
Main warrant
food is not a valid argument for killing pigs for any purpose (R)
knowledge and limited use of Disembedded practices Appreciation of Expert
knowledge and limited use of Disembedded practices
