Vices and Self-Knowledge - SSRN

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Vices and Self-Knowledge Author(s): Margaret Gilbert Source: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 68, No. 15 (Aug. 5, 1971), pp. 443-453 Published by: Journal of Philosophy, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2024756 . Accessed: 14/07/2011 17:44 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at . http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=jphil. . Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

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http://www.jstor.org Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1071018

THE JOURNALOF PHILOSOPHY VOLUME

T

LXVIII, NO. I5, AUGUST 5, I97I

VICES AND SELF-KNOWLEDGE

*

HE self-ascription of evil has certainlogicalpeculiarities

which other-ascription lacks. In this paper I show what thesepeculiaritiesare, and whattheyare not. I investigatethe topic with special referenceto a thesis about the ascriptionof charactertraitsin general. This thesis-which I shall call "spectatorism"1'is, roughly,that character-trait concepts are fittedfor other-ascription Sartre ratherthan for self-ascription. subscribesto a view of thiskind in Being and Nothingness.2 The term 'mechant' (translatedas 'evil' by Hazel Barnes) plays a large part in Sartre'sexamples. Sometimesit occurs in a list of termsapparentlysupposed to be equally well and for similar reasons illustrativeof spectatorism.3 But sometimesevil is singled out had relevantpeculiaritiesof its own. Thus an im(p. 273) as if it portantquestion for the evaluation of spectatorismarises: whether or not the thesisis true as a whole, can we at least accept a limited spectatorism withregardto evil? The obvious approach to spectatorismis to consider whether thereare asymmetries betweenthe self-ascription of traitsand their other-ascription that bear it out. I do this here with respect to theascriptionof evil and thenparticularvices. One verystrikingasymmetry thesisthat has been put forwardin supportof spectatoristclaims is the self-falsification thesis: the act * Earlier drafts of this paper were read at the Universities of Cambridge, Sussex, and Leeds. I am grateful for criticismsreceived there, and also from GwynnethMatthews,JudyBaker, and JustinGosling. 1 William Dray used this term,in a differentsense, in Laws and Explanation in History (New York: Oxford, 1957). 2 I am construingspectatorismas a thesis about the intrinsicnature of our character-traitconcepts, as a logical rather than a psychological thesis. It is not quite clear how Sartre means it to be taken. 3 See Being and Nothingness (Hazel E. Barnes, tr.; New York: Philosophical Library,1956),p. 274.

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of self-ascription of a traitis claimed to show that the assertionone therebymakesis false.One route to thisthesishas been via an argument espousingthe objectivationthesis:to see someonein termsof charactertraitsis to see him as an object, viz., to see him as bound to act in certaintypicalways.The argumentruns: the self-ascriber of a traitimpliesthathe is an object in the above sense.But his act of self-ascription shows that he is not an object in this sense. Thus the self-ascription of a trait is self-falsifying. lacks Other-ascription this radical peculiarity.Thus character-trait conceptsare fittedfor such ascription,ratherthanforself-ascription. Although not espousing the above argument,I show that there are indeed specifiablerelationshipsbetween the self-ascription of evil and both self-falsification and self-objectivation. Further,otherascriptiondoes not have theseconnections. The present discussion provides a basis for the assessmentof spectatorismwith regard to evil and specificvices. It bears, more generally,on the perennial question of the nature,scope, and conditions,of self-knowledge. I. THE ASCRIPTION

OF EVIL

The self-ascription of evil has certain problematicaspects. These may best be discussed in termsof certain propositionsmore specificthan 'X is evil'. I call these interpretations of the latter.They may be characterizedas natural ways of construing(or partially for construing)it. I here detail the peculiaritiesof self-ascription twogeneraland centralinterpretations of 'X is evil'. I shall not discuss whetherour endorsementof one or both of these interpretations provideseithernecessaryor sufficient grounds for the ascriptionof evil. This discussiondoes, however,clearlyrelate to the ascriptionof evil per se: if a man describinghimselfmay not espouse one or more of the centralinterpretations of the ascription of wickedness,or may only do so given certain special conditions,thiswould be a strikingfactabout the conceptof evil (character).It would also, obviously,bear on generalquestionsabout the scope and conditionsof self-knowledge. 1. The FirstInterpretation When one claims that someone is evil, one's belief may be or include the belief that the ends that person subscribesto should be deliberatelyshunned.We may thus take as a firstinterpretationof 'X is evil': 'What X thinksis worthwhile is not at all worthwhile'. Accordingto this interpretation,then, in saying,"I am evil," I am saying somethinglike "What I think is worth while is not worthwhile" or "There is an end, E, and I believe thatE is worth aiming for,but E is definitelynot worthaiming for." I am not ex-

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plicitly contradictingmyself,but, it may be argued, I am doing For although what I say implies that I thinkE somethingbaffling. worthwhile, in sayingit I implythat I thinkit is not worthwhile. Taking both kinds of implication into account, one might claim that the assertionthat p can be counted intelligibleonly if,where p entails q, it is not the case thatthe speakerimpliesnot-qin assertcase here,this intelligibilitycondiing p. Now in the self-ascriptive is untion is not met. Thus self-ascription, on this interpretation, intelligible. But the stated intelligibilitycondition can be met by self-ascription. We may show this-and some other things-by considering different waysof thinkingand believing. Firstconsiderthe case in which all one's verbal expressionsof belief have the same bearing. One never doubts for a moment,and certainlynever denies that (say) "It would be a good thing to exterminatethe Gypsies" (p). Let us say that when this is the case one believes that p wholeheartedly(believesWh that p). "I thinkWh thatp" entails "it is never the case that I think(momentarily)that not-p"whichentails "it is not the case that I am now thinkingthat is not-p." Now if I assert that "there is an end E that I thinkWh worthwhile but E is not worthwhile," what I say implies that I am not now thinkingthat E is not worthwhile, but in sayingit I imply that I am now thinkingthat E is not worthwhile. Thus I shall be saying somethingunintelligible according to the above conditions.There is, however,no need to assume that the ascription of evil is necessarilyabout wholeheartedbeliefs;the firstinterpretationneed not be construedin thisway. My thinking not-p at t, on one isolated occasion, does not ipso facto mean that I don't think that p, in the sense of 'think' in which there is no specifictime-reference, and where something of the nature of "usually-sincerely-asserts" is understood. Let us call this lattersense of 'think' 'think,'.Now we can see how "What I thinkiis worthwhile is not worthwhile" can be given sense. It may be the sincereexpressionof one's presentthoughtsabout one's usual opinions,one's "beliefs"in a weightysense. It is not clear that in general my assertingp need be held to imply (in any sense) more than that I now at this moment am thinking(or believe) that p. Further,there is good reason to suppose that one would normally construe 'what he thinks worth while' in the firstinterpretationin termsof thinkingi.We may thereforetake the followingas a reasonable specificationof the implications of an ascription of evil under the firstinterpreta-

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tion. Someone, x, thinksithat E is worth while, and the speaker thinksthat E is not worthwhile. Since one may think that not-p at t without ceasing to thinkithat p at t, self-ascription does not implytheexistenceof two incompatiblestatesof affairs. The above shows that this case gives no support for the claim that my now condemningE ("what I value") shows that my value systemhas changed. I may revertquickly to sincereexpressionsof myold beliefs.I may,in sayingthat I am evil, have the probability of such a reversionin mind. Whetheror not the self-ascriber of evil has lost his traitmust depend on the actualitiesof the particular case. Self-ascriptionon this interpretationis not necessarilyselffalsifying. The firstinterpretation, then,can be elucidated in such a way that is perfectlyintelligible.One mightargue that, even self-ascription so, the other-ascription of evil is asymmetricwith self-ascription. I may condemn even what another is presently thinking.I may expressa belieficondemningwhat anotherbelievesi.The other-ascription of evil presentsno problem if construedin termsof such condemnations, whereas self-ascriptiondoes. Self-ascriptionl can be understoodonly in termsof the above specification;hence it may seemmorestrange. The strangenessof self-ascription may not completelydisappear even for one who considers it with the above specificationin mind. We may show that it still has a peculiaritylacked by otherascription.All my momentaryevaluationsare evidentiallyrelevant to the truthof any claim about what I value. Now my self-ascription involves (i) an ascriptionof a certain evaluation to myself, (ii) an expressionof a contraryevaluation. My one assertionboth encapsulates a claim about myselfand is prima facie evidence against the truthof that claim. What I have argued is that it is not in itselfsufficient evidence against the claim it embodies. One may compare with it the assertion:I do not go in for self-examination. On the basis of what has been said above, we can see that,given any isolated self-ascription of evil, self-falsification occurs with the firstinterpretation only if thatinterpretation is construedin an unnaturallystrictway. The compound sentence"There is an end E whichI thinkwlh is worthwhile,but E is not worthwhile." cannotbe true if sincerelyasserted.For by asserting"E is not worthwhile" I bring about the falsityof my firststatement.The parallel otherascription,however,can be true. There is a strikingasymmetry

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here-but no such asymmetry existson our more natural specification of thefirstinterpretation. Even given our more natural (thoughstill artificial)specification, theremay appear to be a link betweenself-ascription and self-falsiwill infication.It may be claimed that a series of self-ascriptions volve the ascriber in eventual falsificationof his claim. Suppose someone assertsrepeatedlythat thereis an end, E, whichhe thinksi worth while but which is not worth while. Will he at a certain point have falsifiedthe claim that he thinksiE worthwhile? For falsificationto occur we need, at least, a certainrestrictionon the of self-ascription: whetherone begins at a certain thought-context of evil depends (actions and point to make false self-ascriptions emotionsapart) on the quantityof one's endorsementsof E as compared with one's self-criticism. It depends on whetheror not it is true that one usually sincerelyassertsthatE is worthwhile. Clearly and the criticism thereis an asymmetry here betweenself-criticism of others. Re-iteratedother-ascriptionon the firstinterpretation need nevercarrywithit itsown falsity. 2. The Second Interpretation We have now dealt with those peculiaritiesspecial to the firstinterpretation,and may here introduce the second: X acts as it is quite wrongto act. I now considerthe link between ascriptionsof evil and "objectivation,"or "seeingas an object." I am not convinced-as Sartreseems to be-that 'X is evil' (on either interpretation)implies 'X is bound to act evilly' (X is an evil object). In what followsI considertwo argumentswhichmight be thoughtto show that thereis nonethelessa necessaryconnection betweentheself-ascription of evil and objectivation. The firstargumentstartsfrom the prima facie plausible claim that 'I am evil' has predictiveimplications.The argumentruns: 'I am evil' implies 'I shall act evillyin the future'.Now a sincereselfascriberof evil would desirenot to be evil. On realizingthathe was evil he would formthe intentionto avoid evil in the future.Given this intention,with the assumptionthat it is in his power to carry it out, he could no longerflatlyendorsethe claim 'I shall act evilly in the future'.Thus he could not endorse 'I am evil' either.Sinif the self-critic cerity,however,can be saved for self-ascription believes he cannot but be evil: he must "see himselfas an (evil) object." Believinghe cannot change,he will not formthe (irrational) intentionto change. Only thus may he come to endorse the claim that he is evil, with its predictiveimplications.But we could accept that the ascriptionof evil has predictiveimplicationswithout

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reachingthe conclusionof this argument.We could argue,for one thing,thatsuch implicationsneed involveno more than "I'll go on actingevillyunless. . ." wherethe "unless" clause mightbe filledin with,e.g., "[unless] I take myselfin hand." Thus the sincere selfcriticmightwell endorse the followingset of assertions:(1) I am evil; (2) I do not want to be evil; (3) I can help being evil; (4) I shall act evillyunless I take myselfin hand; (5) I shall trynot to act evilly; (6) I shall not act evilly (all being well). We can accept that the meaning of 'I am evil' includes predictiveclaims, but it seems to leave room for,and sincerityarguablymakes mandatory, the conjoint assertionof (1), (4), and (6). Thus it has not been shown that self-ascription is necessarilylinked to self-objectivation throughits having predictiveimplications.We would need a further argument-which I do not have-to show that the ascription of evil necessarilyinvolves the denial of the possibilityof deliberateimprovement. The second argumentruns: It is a conditionof one's having the belief that one is evil that one desireverystronglynot to be as one is. If over a long period someonehas so wanted to changehis ways, to change them.As his desireperhe will have made seriousefforts sists,so his effortswill continue. But, insofaras his way of living remains evil in his eyes, his effortswill have been unsuccessful. Thus, one who has believed over a long period, and still believes, that he is evil, will have beforehim evidence making mandatory the conclusion that he cannot act otherwise,that he is bound to of evil who is not act badly. A sincere longstandingself-ascriber self-deceivedabout his powers must, the argumentconcludes, see himselfas an object. This argumentraises several points of interest,and if it cannot be maintained in this rather strongform,a similar but weaker of evil to self-objectivation has argumentrelatingthe self-ascription some plausibility.We may reach the weakerargumentby an examinationof somedetailsof thestrongerone. First, let us allow that one believes that X is evil only if one stronglydisapprovesof X (one might contrast'evil'-that "great, historicalepithet"4-and 'lazy', with regard to the strengthof the implied disapproval). It may be that such strongdisapproval must carrywith it an equally strongdesirefora changein its object. But it is not clear,even wherethe object is oneself,thatthe sortof desire involved has any necessaryrelationshipwith an actual decision to effecta change. Given that I consider it within my power and 4 Cf. Henry James,Portraitof a Lady, ch. 59.

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withinmyrightsto change myself,it is stillnot clear thatmydesire to do so mustbe overriding. Perhaps we can at least show that thereis some a priori restriction on what goals a man may intelligiblyrank higherthan changing his admittedlyevil ways. We could start by noting that one who explained his non-attemptto change by saying"I simplycan't be bothered to change" mightbe presumedto be unaware of the strengthof the term'evil'. This shows,we mightclaim, that a goal such as not botheringoneself cannot be ranked above changing one's evil character. But it is not clear thatwe are not covertlymoralizingratherthan analyzing if we insist that a man cannot (logically) rank such a goal the highest,even above that of changinghis admittedlyevil ways. Let us grant that if a man believes he is evil he will count changing his ways an importantgoal-it will be the object of a strongdesire. And in practice most people would, surely,be surprised by an excuse for not changingof the form"I just couldn't be bothered."The excuse mightbe thoughtto imply the unimportance of the goal thatis being implicitlyweighedagainstthegoal of "not botheringmyself."In so thinkingwe assume that the latter goal is not itselfconsideredimportant(we know,if you like, thatit is not important).But it is not obvious that it could not be so considered. We may conclude,however,that some limit can be put on what goals a man may rank higherthan changinghis evil ways: he must at least count those goals important.But it is not clear how one could show that it is a necessarytruth that no goals may be thoughtmoreimportantthan changing. Second,if a man has triedhard to change,but failed,is it incombent upon him to conclude that he cannot change his nature,that he is bound to go on acting evilly all his life? Or must he rather, unless self-deceived,go on with the optimisticbelief that he can still change?There may seem to be an antinomyhere. On the one hand, as far as the excellentevidence available goes, this man cannot change. On the other,one mightargue that even so, optimism in his case is justified:a man's moral strengthcannot be testedas easily as physicalstrengthcan. In spite of any evidence of powerlessnessat a given time,he might findnew reservesof strengthat some timein the future.He is more likelyto do so, one mightadd, if he has not accepted thathe simplycannot change.Thus a charge of irrationaloptimismmay be counteredby one of perniciousdefeatism.

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Perhaps the key to thisdilemmais thatin the case as describedand in most actual cases-our evidence for powerlessnessis unlikely to be as good as it might be. If we could point to a clear link between someone's deviltryand, say, an incurable disease of his liver (everyonewith that disease is uncontrollablymalicious, etc.) thingsmightbe easier. Now the optimistwould be flyingin the face of well-attestedscientifictheories.That would (perhaps) be too much. But this mere low-level brute fact: that he has not so farsucceeded,is not enough totallyto irrationalizeoptimism. On the otherhand, someone'sclaim thathe could not change,even at the pre-theoretical stage,may have excellentevidence behind it. If his only reason to believe that he can change is thatthe evidence thathe cannot lacks theoreticalbacking,his belief thathe is powerless would seem far fromirrational.On the contrary,the facts,as far as theygo, fullyjustifythat belief. This is not to claim that one who self-objectifies may not be self-deceived.For clearlysomeone mighthold fast to the belief that he has an ineradicablyevil nature when thereis far too little evidence or none that this is so. But the self-ascriber of evil may well have good reason to claim that he cannot change his evil ways. One who, wanting badly to change,made constantand strenuouseffortsto do so, but without success,would surelyhave such a reason. Thus a weak objectivationclaim may be formulated:There is an evil over a long understandableconnectionbetween self-ascribing of evil period and seeingoneselfas an object. For the self-ascription may well, and understandably,lead to action, and failed action There is may well, and understandably,lead to self-objectivation. a connectionhere,but it is not so strongas the original argument suggests. Given the above, it is clear how a self-ascriptionof evil may stronglysuggestto a hearer that the self-ascriber sees himselfas an object. We can see how it mightbe held that one who self-ascribes evil implies, in some sense, that he cannot be other than he is. But we have seen thatone who sincerelyand over a long period selfascribesevil need not in factself-objectify. II. THE ASCRIPTION

OF SPECIFIC

VICES

Many of the points I have so far noted with referenceto the most general and most highly condemnatorycharacter criticism may be carried over to ascriptionsof particular vices. The main pointsare as follows. We may interpretthe ascriptionof miserliness,for instance,folof 'X is evil'. We get somethinglike: lowing the firstinterpretation

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X thinks that the cheaper alternativeis always the more worth while, howevermuch trouble it entails in other respects;but it is not. Here again thereis at least a prima facie strangenessin one's sayingthis of oneself.But in this case, as in the earlierone, we are not forced to the conclusion that self-ascription is unintelligible. We may also interpret'X is miserly'followingthe second interpretationof the ascriptionof evil. Thus: X continuallychooses the cheapestway out, even ceterisnon paribus,and thispolicyis wrong. One might,as we have seen,have a beliefof thiskind about oneself. In the case of one's settledbelief that one was evil, we have seen that one mightwell be expected to believe that one could not act otherwisethan evilly. In the case of specificvices, however,and especially vices consideredminor, the likelihood of such a belief is not so great. For the special featureof the ascriptionof evil is that it automaticallyserves as a condemnationof great severity. One mighteasilyremarkabout his laziness,"It isn't really that important."But if one believesthatone is evil, one believesipso facto that one has a grievousfault.Thus the phenomenonof objectivation will fitmost comfortablyon to the case of the ascriptionof evil, and least comfortablyon to ascriptionsof minor vices and faults. 111.VICES, SELF-KNOWLEDGE,

AND SPECTATORISM

We may now assess spectatorismwith respectto vices. If we could show that self-ascriptions of vices were (forsome reason) self-falsifying, and other-ascriptions were not,we would, it seems,have shown the impossibilityof knowledge of one's own presentvices, while allowing for the possibilitythat one mightknow the vices of another. For my expressionof this "knowledge"would show that it was not knowledgeat all. Thus we mightformulatea strongversion of spectatorismas follows: we could conceivablyknow the vices of others,but knowledge of one's own present vices is impossible.

Now we have found that in one context the self-ascription of vice can be linked fairlyclosely to the phenomenonof objectivation. In that context,however,pace Sartre,one's view that one is bound to act as one abhors cannot be rejected as necessarilyfalse on the evidence available. So the case of self-objectivation at least does not lead one to a strikingasymmetry involvingself-falsification. In two ratherspecial cases self-ascription (alone) was shown to involve self-falsification. But in the firstan unusually "strict" sense had to be given to the ascriptionof evil, and in the second all that was shown was that self-ascriptions falsifythemselvesqua

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end membersof a series in a particularenvironment.Self-ascripnor are theyuninteltions of evil are not in general self-falsifying, ligible. Strongspectatorismis not borne out by the real peculiaritiesof self-ascription. We should note, however,an importantgeneral asymmetryin the ascriptionof traitswhich is of peculiar relevanceto vice ascriptions. Correct self-ascriptionalone implies that the person with whatevertrait it is believes that he has it. Now when, and only when, one believes that one has a given trait can one decide to change out of it. And in the case of one's acknowledgedvices the decision to change would be more likelythan in any othercase. X's self-ascriptionof evil falsifiesneither itself nor another's otherascription,but it does involvea new and possiblycrucial factabout X. He has a new piece of self-knowledge, one which is peculiarly apt to serveas a basis forthe attemptto changehis ways. So, it might be argued, whereas correctother-ascription of vice in generalprovidesa sound basis for the correlativepredictions(he will act viciouslyin the future),such predictionswill have a less firmfoundationonce the subject himselfbelievesthat (accordingto shared standards)he is vicious. For he now has good reasons for changinghis ways and may well falsifyour predictions(thoughhe maynot do so). Thus we mightformulatea milderversionof spectatorism.Trait termsserveas a basis forprediction.In the case of vice termsin particular, the language game will be spoilt by the self-ascription of such terms.Thus, accordingto mild spectatorismregardingvices, the functionof vice conceptsis such that self-ascription is necessarily anomalous. The rules of the language game of vices dictate thatself-ascription should not occur. Mild spectatorismcan be upheld only if it is assumed that the functionof trait concepts is the classificationof persons for the purpose of simple long-termpredictions(a not uncommonassumption). But especiallywith criticalconcepts,this view of the "function" of such concepts is not convincing.Vice concepts and the ascriptionof vices connectup with a whole range of human activities ratherdistinctfromlabeling, predicting,controlling-thus,for instance,we tryto bringthoseclose to us to see theirfaults,hoping that theymay be brought to change themselvesby virtue of this realization,and be, in thefuture,morepleasantto live with. We ascribe evil and particularvices to ourselvesand to others. The formercase is, conceptually,the more intriguingand complex one. Althoughthe self-ascription of evil is not so radicallypeculiar

COMMENTS

453

AND CRITICISM

remain.Selfas has been supposed,it is peculiar. The asymmetries ascriptionmust be understoodin a veryparticularway in order to be intelligible;it may for a varietyof reasons appear odd, and it may lead a man to view himselfas a beast.5Perhaps then a very mild formof spectatorismis true.But nothingverystrikingfollows from that thesis.The language game of vice-ascriptioncan quite properlybe played by one self-ascribing player. Crusoe could, in principle,have believed trulythat he was evil. And even a Crusoe mightwish to improve. MARGARET GILBERT

Universityof Manchester Universityof California,Davis

A

COMMENTS AND CRITICISM

INTENTIONS

AND THE STRUCTURE

OF INTENDING

MONG thefundamental thatstructure a system of principles

propositionsor, more generally,contentsof illocutionary acts (or sentences,if you wish) are principlesgoverning the heredityof some characteristicalong implicational lines. The such principlesare of theform strongest (a) If p impliesq, thenA(p) impliesA(q). where 'p' and 'q' stand for the primaryillocutionarycontentsand 'A' stands for an operator or property(in a broad sense), which can be non-indexedlike "It is analytic[logicallytrue,probablythe case, causally required, causally feasible, permitted,obligatory] that," or indexed like "Z believes (at time t) [perceives,conjectures, infers,claims, asserts,hopes, requests] that." Notoriously, purely intellectualor theoreticaloperations or states of mind do not abide by principlesof form(a), but by weaker heredityprinciplesof theform (b) If A(p impliesq), thenA(p) impliesA(q). Thus, crucial to the studyof the structureof intendingto do something or other is, therefore,the question about the form of the principlesgoverningthe heredityof the state of intending.This is preciselyone of the main topics dealt with in the threefinepapers by Roderick M. Chisholm,AnnetteC. Baier, and George Pitcher, which constitute the symposiumon the structureof intention (really intending) presentedat the 1970 meetingsof the Eastern 5 Cf. Dostoevsky,Crime and Punishment,ch. 2.