forms of conditionals: the types illustrated by I will do it if you help me, I would do it if ..... Because none of these instances need actualize at the time of speech, P is ... If I want to go on a drunken rampageand throw up in dustbins I wilt [without it.
Journal \ \
of
iterary Semantics an international review
Editor TREVOR EATON
Offprint
Mouton de Gruyter Berlln- New Vork
Articles On how to interpret
canonical
conditionals
in discourse RENAAT DECLERCK
Abstract The aim of this artiele is to examine the possible relations between form and meaning in some formal types of conditionals. To keep the investigation within manageable proportions. the author restricts himself to the three "canonical" forms of conditionals: the types illustrated by I will do it if you help me, I would do it if you helped me and I would have done it if you had helped me. The conclusion from the investigation is that these three forms correspond with quite an array of different interpretations - thirty-nine in al! - even if one limits oneself (as the author does) to the possible-world readings of two types of "case-specifying" conditionals, viz. actualization conditionals like You willbe punished if you do that and inferential conditionals like If the murder is proved, he willget a life sentence. The thirty-nine interpretations considered al! belong to six sets ofpossible-world readings: the conditional clause of such a case-specifying conditional may be factual, neutral, closed, open, hypothetical or caunterfactual.
1. Introduction Declerck & Reed (forthcoming) offer a rich typology of conditional sentences on the basis of their semantic, pragmatic and functional characteristics. Cutting across this typology is another one, which is based on purely formal characteristics.The latter is often (wrongly) restricted to the followingthree types, which I refer to as the "canonical" types: Type 1: I will be happy ij she comes. Type 2: I would be happy ij she {came / was here / were here}. Type 3: I would have been happy ij she had come.
Since conditionals of these forms may have various meanings, the labels "type 1/2/3conditionals" are suited to referring to the farms of the sentences only,irrespective of their interpretations. In order to be quite precise, we therefore have to define the three types as follows.(Note that, thinking of the logicalrepJ LS 29 (2000), 149-169
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resentation "if P,then Q", I refer to the head clause and the conditional clause as the "Q-clause" and the "P-clause", respectively.The propositions expressed in these clauses will be called Q and P.) Type 1: Q-clause with will + P-clause in the present tense. Type 2: Q-clause with would + P-clause in the past tense or past subjunctive. Type 3: Q-clause with would have + P-clause in the past perfect tense.
The purpose of the present artiele is to identify the many interpretations which each of the canonical types of conditionals can receive in a text or other piece of discourse.
On how to interpret canonical conditionals in discourse (2) a.
[My advice to anybody is as follows.] If you have problem A, go to a doctor; if you have problem B, go to a psychiatrist; ifyou have problem C, shoot yourself (neutral P-suppositions: the speaker is addressing any potential hearer/reader; there is no specific hearer/reader for which the speaker assumes that the condition is satisfied, not satisfied, possibly satisfied, etc.)
b.
[î'Has her daughter ever got married?" - "I don't know.] If she has, l've never been informed." (neutral-P conditional: there is no presupposition that the speaker treats the supposition as true, untrue, unlikely to be true, or as a real possibility)
c.
IJ, as has just been confirmed, the river wilt rise as high as this, we'd better move all valuable furniture to the first floor. (non-neutral-P conditional: the speaker assumes that the P-proposition is true, i.e. that the P-situation will actualize )
d.
If John had been careful, this would never have happened. (non-neutral-P conditional: the P-clause presupposes that the tensed P-proposition "John was careful" is false (counterfactual)
2. The possfble-world typology of conditionaIs In order to understand the different interpretations of canonical conditionals,it is necessary to refer to one of the parameters than can be used for building a typology,viz. the relation between the "possible world" (or "mental space" see Fauconnier 1985,Harder 1996:444) created by the conditional and the actual world. Most conditionals refer to a particular possible world. On the basis of whether this world is or is not the actual world, we can distinguish between "factual" P-clauses and "theoretical" P-clauses. Factual P-clauses refer to situations- that form part of the actual world (i.e. its present state and history), while theoretical P-clauses refer to situations that only exist in the mind of the speaker. In other words, a factual P-clause refers to a situation that has actualized or is actualizingin the real world, while a theoretical P-clausejust makes a theoretical supposition about a situation, i.e. a supposition about a situation in a theoretical (nonfactual, suppositional)? world. In factual-P conditionals' the speaker commits himself to the truth of P in the real world, whereas in theoretical-P conditionals he does not: (1) a. b.
c. d. e.
If I had a problem, I always went to my grandmother. (factual-P) ["Won't you come in?"] - "Don't be disappointed if I say no. [There's someone waiting for me at my office.]" (The P-clause is factual because it is "performative": it is by uttering "if I say no" that the speaker performs the speech act of declining the invitation.) If he has a problem, he's probably gone to his grandmother. (theoretical-P) "Won't you come in?" - "What would you say if I said no?" (theoretical-P) If she comes, I wilt be very happy to see her again. (theoretical-P)
Within the class of theoretical-P conditionals, further semantic distinctions can be made on t~e basis of the kind of supposition that is created by the P-clause (i.e. the kind of "world" that is evoked by the P-clause). To begin with, the supposition expressed by a theoretical P-clause may be "neutral" or "non-neutral". It is neutral if it is no more than a pure supposition. It is non-neutral if it is a supposition accompanied by a presupposition (assumptionr' about the relation between the supposed world and the actual world. For example:
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When the P-clause has non-neutral theoretical meaning, four possibilities can be distinguished, depending on the assumed relation between the supposed possible world and the actual world: non-neutral suppositions may be "closed", "open", "hypothetical" or "counterfactual". The supposition P is "closed" if the speaker assumes (presupposes) that P is true, as in (3a-b); it is "open" if the speaker treats fulfilmènt of the supposition as uncertain, but as a real possibility, as in (4a-b); the supposition is "hypothetical" if the speaker treats its fulfilment as a rather unlikely possibility,as in (5a-b); and it is "counterfactual" if the speaker presupposes that the supposition is false in the real world (i.e. contrary to fact), as in (6a-b). (3) a.
IJ, as you say, John wilt come here himself tomorrow, we'd better not dispatch this letter to him but invite him to have a talk with us. (closed-P: the speaker treats John's coming tomorrow as if it were a present fact.)
b.
["It was John who did it." - "I believe you.] But if it was John, it will be difficult to prove his guilt. [He is a very clever and careful person.]" (closed-P)
(4) a. b. (5) a. b. (6) a. b.
I will be happy if we find a solution. (open-P) [I hope Liverpool won their home match yesterday.] Ifthey did, they still have a chance of winning the championship. (open-P) I would be happy ifwe found a solution. (hypothetical-P) If John were to do that, he would be severely punished. (id.) I would have been happy ifwe had found a solution. (counterfactual-P) If he were here, he would stop you from doing that. (id.)
The conclusion from section 2 is that (at least most) conditionals can be classified semantically on the basis of the followingparameters: (a) factual or theoretical meaning; (b) if theoretical: neutral or non-neutral supposition; (c) if nonneutral: closed, open, hypothetical or counterfactual supposition.
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3. Type 1 conditionaIs This formal type of conditional consists of a Q-clause using will and a P-clause in the present tense. It can receive the followinginterpretations. 3.1. Factual-Pconditionalsof type 1 In this type, the P-situation is represented / interpreted as factual, i.e. as forming part of the actual world. The speaker commits himself to the truth of P in the real world. Examples of this are not very common, because ifinherently creates a suppositional world, and it is only exceptionally that a situation which is to be interpreted as a fact is represented as a supposition in a conditional. Still, we can distinguish a couple of possibilities in which a type 1 conditional receives a factual-P interpretation: 3.1.1. The P-clause can be interpreted as factual when it does not refer to the future and serves as premise for an inferential reasoning process "if P,then Q" in which the Q-clause is considered to be true and uses the epistemic auxiliary will: (7)
If the postman is already there, it'll be later than I thought. (Uttered on seeing the postman arrive)
3.1.2. In a type 1conditional, P is also interpreted as factual when the P-clause is used in a "performative" way (i.e. if it is the very action of uttering the Pclause that makes the P-situation actualize): (8) a. b.
[Thirty-four witnesseswilt confirm thatI was on the bus.In fact,] thirty-fivewilt do so if you include the driver. ["Won't you come in?"] - "You wilt forgive me if I say no. [I really must go
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3.2.1. A first case is when the subject NP of the P-clause refers to a group which mayor may not include the hearer / reader. In such conditionals, the Pclause refers to a set of people in general. (In most examples the speaker uses you to address a non-specific addressee, i.e. an arbitrary member of a set.) Though the speaker naturally assumes that there are people belonging to this set, he does not assume (nor denies, for that matter) that the hearer (or any other specificperson) forms part of the set. There is simply no presupposition that the application of P to a specific person is true, false, unlikely to be true, or a real possibility.For example: (9)
[The boys swimming on the two nightsarelistedoverleaf If your son wil!be nine years old on Sunday 25th March he wil!swim on WednesdayBthFebruary.]If he is eight or ten on 25th March he wilt swim on lst February.(COB)5
3.2.2. A P-clause also expresses a neutral condition if the Q-clause receives a gnomic (generic, timeless) interpretation. Such conditionals imply the existence of past, pre-present.s present and future instances of actualization. The former three are factual, whereas the future instantiations are theoretical. It follows that, although the gnomic conditional as a whole has a factual present meaning, its P-clause has a neutral present meaning: the speaker does not presuppose actualization of a P-instauce at the time of speech: (10) a. b.
Indoor plants wil!die ifthe air in the room is too dry. Ifyou throw a piece offoam rubber into water,it wilt not sink.
This kind of conditional sentence (which typically expresses cause and effect) makes a statement of universal (timeless) or at least temporally unrestricted validity.The gnomic sentence as a whole is interpreted as factual (true at the time of speech), but the P-clause need not implypresent actualization. It must therefore be considered as expressing a neutral rather than a factual condition.
now.]"
Because the actualization of the P-situation is brought about by the speech act ofuttering the P-clause,it followsthat the speaker (who consciouslyuses the Pclause in this performative way) treats P as factual, and that the hearer interprets it as such. 3.2. Neutral-P conditionalsoftype 1 It is typicalof neutral-P conditionalsthat the speaker uses the P-clauseto express no more than a pure (~pposition about a theoretical case. That is, he assumes (presupposes) nothing as to the relation between the theoretical world and the actual world: there is no assumption that the P-situation is true, false, possibly true, or unlikelyto be (or have been or come) true in the real world. I have found three cases in which a type 1conditional receivessuch a neutral-P interpretation.
3.2.3. Similar remarks can be made in conneetion with conditionals whose Qclause expresses a present habit (i.e. a characteristic of the referent of the subject noun phrase over an extended period of time includingthe time of speech - see Cornrie 1976:27-28). If a present habit involves repetition, it implies the existence of instances. (Thisiswhy when(ever) can substitute for ifin the example below.) Because none of these instances need actualize at the time of speech, P is neutral. However, the habit expressed by the Q-clause (and by the conditional as a whole) is itself factual, in that it is a characteristic holding at the time of speech. (11)
If I want to go on a drunken rampageand throw up in dustbins I wilt [without it even crossingmy mind that this is unacceptablefemale behaviour]. (COB)
In such examples, the habit as a whole is factual; the instances of which it is made up are partly factual (viz. those belonging to the past, pre-present or
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present), and partly theoretical (viz. those lying in the future ). The P-clause therefore has a neutral-P meaning. (Note that the Q-clause uses the modal auxiliary will expressing "characteristic behaviour" because the habit includes the time of speech. This means that the reference is to the habit as a whole, not to a present instanee of the habit. As a matter of fact, the habit exists at the time of speech even if there is no instanee of it actualizing at the time of speech.)
3.3. Closed-P conditionals of type 1
3.5. Hypothetical-P conditionals af type 1 The basic meaning of these conditionals (which Givón (1995: 120) calls "subjunctive conditionals") is that the theoretical P-world is assumed to be such that it might correspond with the actual world, but this possibility is considered as rather unlikely (but not impossible) to be (or to have been or come) true. Compare: (15) a. b.
In closed-P conditionals, P is assumed (or ostensibly assumed)? to be true. Since such conditio na Is are typically inferential, the assumption that P is true happens for the sake of the argument / reasoning. A closed P-clause may be introduced by if or (sometimes) given that, but not by any of the other conditional conjunctions (not even assuming that or supposing that). The reference may be to any time. For example: (12) a. b. c.
["I didn't do it." Fred."
"I believe you.] But ifyou didn't do it, it must have been
["The picture you are now looking at is the famous Mona Lisa. "] - "WeU, if this is the Mona Lisa, I can 't say I feel much impressed by it." Ij, as they say, they were late yesterday, it cannot have been because of the weath-
er. d.
e.
If I'm going to catch the 5.12 train, I'd better be on my way now. (presupposes that I want to catch that train) If (as lam told now) he wilt come here himself tomorrow, I no longer need to get into contact with him today.
Instances of closed- P conditionals of type 1 are easy to come by: (13) a. b.
c.
If (as appears to be the case) John is wanted by the police, he wilt no longer be in this country now. (epistemic wilT) If (as I believe) this is true, the government wilt soon resign. (future tense wilt) If that's how you react, I willieave at once.
Open-P conditionals of type 1
3.4.
In open-P conditionals, the theoretical world called up by the P-clause is assumed to be such that it mayor may not turn out to correspond with the actual world. It follows that the P-clause often refers to the future: since the future is unknown, the P-situa,tion and the Q-situation may be viewed as "open possibilities" (i.e. as neithereertain, probable nor unlikely). The following examples are therefore ilIustrations of open-P conditionals of type 1: b.
If the train is late, we wilt miss our conneetion in London. My life will be significantly impoverished if I never see another Shakespearean comedy.
If he does that, he wilt be in real trouble. (open-P) If he {did / were to do} that, he would be in real trouble. (hypothetical-P)
Type 1 conditionals cannot express a hypothetical meaning. Only conditionals in which the P- and Q-clauses use what Jespersen (1932: 151) calls "backshifted" tense forms (e.g. I would be happy if he resigned) can do so. Counterfactual-P conditionals of type 1
3.6.
In counterfactual-P conditionals the theoretical P-world is assumed to be contrary to fact, i.e. to be definitely different from the actual world. Thus, in I would have been happy if she had come, both Pand Q are presupposed to be false in the actual world and only true in a counterfactual theoretical world. Like "open" and "hypothetical", the term "counterfactual" thus refers to a presupposition concerning the relation between a theoretical P-world and the actual world. In the same way as type 1 conditionals cannot express a hypothetical meaning, they cannot normally express a counterfactual meaning. As a rule, only conditionals in which the P- and Q-clauses use "backshifted" tense forms can do so (e.g. I wouldn't be here if 1 were you; I would have been happy if he had resigned). There is an exception, though, to this rule. Under certain conditions, a type 1 conditional can be used as an "indirect inferential". Whereas in normal ("direct") inferential conditionals, P is the premise underlying an inference about the truth of Q, there are also inferentials where the inference ultimately goes from Q to P. Moreover, the conclusion is not explicitly asserted, but is to be inferred from the conditional sentence as a whole. I have found two subtypes of such indirect or "implicit" inferentials: 3.6.1. 'Ad absurdum" inferentials of type 1 Consider: (16) a. b.
c. d.
(14) a.
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If If If If
he he he he
is the genera I manager, he is the one we should try to speak to. is the genera I manager, lam Shakespeare! is appointed general manager, I wilt eat my hat! is appointed general manager, pigs will fly!
The first sentence is a direct inferential: the speaker infers that if P is true, Q must be true too. The conditionals (16b-d), the latter two of which have the
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type 1 form, illustrate the "ad absurdurn" type: the initial inference from P to Q is immediately seen to stand in need of qualification because of the absurdityof Q; the speaker then expects the hearer to drawan inference from the pragmatically obvious non-truth of Q to the speaker's rejection of the truth of P. I refer to this kind of conditional as "ad absurdum" because it exhibits a kind of reasoning ("P must be as absurd as Q") which is sirnilarto the "reductio ad absurdurn" argument in mathematics, which disproves a theorem by showing that it leads to absurd consequences. 3.6.2.
Indirect counterfactual inferentials of type 1
The main difference between "indirect counterfactual inferentials" and ad absurdum inferentials is that the counterfactual reading of the Q-proposition is now not the result of pragmatic absurdity: indirect counterfactuals do not say that P is absurd. However, the two are similar in that there is a counterfactual understanding of Q which leads the speaker to conclude that P must be counterfactual too. For example: (17) a. b. (18)
(19)
On how to interpret canonical conditionals in discourse
R. Declerck
If my mother-in-law had been coming today, I would have cleaned the house, wouldn't I? But Superman wouldn't be Superman if he didn't solve that problem too. And I feel that if I don 't do it, being in a relatively powerful position, who the hel! else is going to? (COB-W) If lohn is so clever (as you claim), how come he {isn't rich / is so poor}?
In (17a-b), the counterfactuality of Q is signalled by the use of the verb forms would have cleaned and wouldn't beoThe fact that Q is thus represented as false
in the actual world forces the hearer to infer that P (which determines Q) must also be false (in the actual world), hence that not-P must be true. Thus the interpretation ofP in (17a-b) is that mymother-in-lawis comingtoday and that (in the relevant comicstrip or film) Superman does solvethe problem in question too. In (18) the counterfactual reading of Q follows from the fact that the question is interpreted as a rhetorical question, meaning "nobody else is going to do it". The use of who the hel! makes clear that the speaker considers this assertion as unthinkable, as something which cannot possibly be envisaged in the real world. This (weak) sense of counterfactuality of Q prompts the hearer to conclude that P ("I won't do it") should be rejected as false. Sentence (19) is rather different from (17)-(18) because Q (whichis either [q] (He is not rich) or [+q] (He is so poor)) is not counterfactual. However, the speaker obviously treats Q as incompatible with P. In his opinion, P cannot be true (factual) if Q is.The factuality of Q therefore leads him to conclude that P . must be false (i.e. that John cannot be so clever as is claimed). Indirect counterfactual inferentials can have the form of type 1: If I don't do it, who the hel! wil!?
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4. Type 2 conditionals Conditionals of this formal type use would in the Q-clause and either the past tense, the past subjunctive were, or the auxiliary were to in the Q-clause. They may receive the followinginterpretations. Factual-P conditionals of type 2
4.1.
4.1.1. In indirect speech (or thought) and free indirect speech (or thought), the tense forms of factual-P conditionals of type 1 are normally "backshifted". The result is a factual-P conditional of type 2. The followingare such backshifted versions of the three types of factual-P conditionals of type 1 that have been identified in sections 3.1.1-3.1.3: (20) a. b.
c.
[When she saw the postman arrive she thought that} if the postman was already there, she would probably be late for work again:» [When I invited him to come in, he asked if} I would forgive him if he said no. [He real!y didn't have time.} [Utter nonsense it was - what Bill had said.) If that were true, pigs would fly!
4.1.2. If the P-clause of a type 2 conditional with a counterfactual Q-clause is introduced by unless, that P-clause is interpreted as "if it weren't for the fact that...". This is actually a factual-P interpretation. Thus, when interpreted as (21a), (21b) implies that it is a fact that I am John's best friend: (21) a. b.
Ifit weren't for the fact that I am John's best friend, he wouldn't come to me for help. Unless I was his best friend, lohn wouldn't come to me for help.
4.1.3. If the P-clause of a counterfactual-P type 2 conditional is negative, the two negations - the one followingfrom the negator, the other from the counterfactuality - cancel each other, so that the P-clause is ultimately interpreted as factual: If I {wasn't / weren't} John's best [riend, he wouldn't come to me [or help. (im-
(22)
plies that the speaker is John's best friend)
4.1.4. Another kind of type 2 conditional with a factual P-clause is illustrated by the following: (23) a.
b.
["None ofthe villagers thatfought in the Great War survived." - "Do you mean that} if someone left for the front, they would never return?" - ["Yes. There wasn't a single one who didn't die over there. "} If a lew was sent to work in the secret German missile base in France, he would be killed the moment he was no longer usable.
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Here the P- and Q-clauses are both factual. As regards the P-clause, there is no real difference between if and whenever. The would in the Q-clause is an example of the only temporal use of would which combines the idea of posteriority to a past reference time with the idea of past factuality. (In this sense, was ta is an alternative to wauld.) 4.1.5. The conditional also has the type 2 form and is interpreted as factual in examples like If I went to Paris, I would always ga by train, in which would expresses a past habit. Neutral-P conditionals af type 2
4.2.
4.2.1. Here too I can start by referring to the (free) indirect speech versions of the types of neutral-P conditionals of type 1 that have been identified in sections 3.2.1-3.2.3.I will not repeat the discussion here but just give examples of the type 2 versions: (24) a.
b.
c.
[The boys swimming on the two nights werelistedoverleaf.If one'sson would be nine years old on Sunday 25th March he would swim on WednesdayBthFebruary.] If he was eight or ten on 25th March he would swim on l st February. (adapted from eOB) I knew that if one threw a piece of foam rubber into water,it would not sink. [She said that]if she wanted to go on a drunken rampageand throw up in dustbins she would [without it even crossingher mind that this was unacceptablefemale behaviour.](adapted from eOB)
4.2.2. Conditionals with an "imaginary" P-clause form another type of neutral P-conditionals. Like counterfactual-P conditionals, imaginary-P conditionals have a kind of "irrealis" meaning, but unlike the latter they presuppose or implicate nothing in conneetion with the real world. Thus,while (25a) is interpreted as counterfactual (i.e. contrary to the actual world), (25b) is interpreted as "imaginary" (i.e. referring to an irrealis world which does not suggest any kind of inference in conneetion with the actual world). The former, but not the latter, allows the factual inferences "I didn't teIl him about her" and "He didn't ask (me to tell him about her}". Sentence (25c)is a further example of a type 3 conditional whose P-clause is neutral because of its imaginary interpretation: (25) a. b. c.
I would've told him about her if he'd asked. In your place l'd have told him about her if he'd asked. [If thingswerewhat they normalty are,I would have to writea letterto the Dean, and] if he didn't answer it, 1 would be fired. [Luckily, however,I don't need to send him a letterbecausethe ruleabout writingto the Dean has been temporarily suspended.]
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Clased-P conditionals af type 2
4.3.
4.3.1. In section 3.3,I have referred to the followinginstances of closed-P type 1 conditionals: (26) a. b.
If (asI was told) John is wanted by thepolice, he will no longer be in this country now. (epistemic wil[) If (asI believe) this is true, the government wil!soon resign.(future tense wil!)
As usual, backshifting in (free) indirect speech produces type 2 versions of these: (27) (a) [I realized that] if (as I believed) John was wanted by the police, he would no longer be in the country. (epistemic would) (b) [On hearing the news I got quite excited.]If (as I believed) what they said was true,the government would soon resign.(Would expresses posteriority to a past reference time.)
4.3.2. We also obtain a closed-P type 2 conditional if we 'backshift' a closed-P conditionallike (28a) in (free) indirect speech: (28) a. b.
If (as appearsto be the case) he killed one of them, he will also kilt the others. [I suspected that]if (asappeared to be the case)he kilted one ofthem, he would also kilt the ethers.
4.4. Open-P conditionals af type 2 In section 3.4, one type of type 1 conditional with an open P-clause has been identified. In (free) indirect speech, this type becomes an open-P conditional of type 2: (29) a. b.
[I knew that] ifthe train was late,we would miss our conneetion in London. [She had made up her mind.] If a suitable occasion arose,she would lure him awayfrom thefarm and shoot him.
4.5. Hypothetical-P conditionals af type 2 4.5.1. If the P-clause of a type 2 conditional refers to the future, it automatically receives a hypothetical interpretation. This means that the theoretical Pworld is assumed to be such that it might correspond with the actual world, but this possibility is considered as rather unlikely (but not impossible) to be (or to have been or come) true. Compare: (30) a. b.
If he does that, he wil! be in realtrouble. (open-P conditional) If he did that, he would be in realtrouble. (hypothetical-P conditional)
Note that "hypothetical" is not used here in its every-day sense of "making a hypothesis (supposition)". All theoretical conditionals are hypothetical (sup-
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positional) in this sense, because they refer to a theoretical world. In this article, "hypothetical" is used in the more specialized sense of "making a hypothesis that is unlikely to be fulfilled (but which is not counterfactualjv.? The difference between open-P and hypothetical-P conditionals appears to have some conneetion with our sense of reality. Whereas open- P conditions are seen in some way as extrapolating from the (present) world-as-we-Iagree to)know-it, hypothetical-P conditionals somehow signal a clear break with the world-as-we-know-it (though not entailing counterfactuality) - a requirement to imagine or hypothesize rather than project / extrapolate. The problem is that any way of naming this intuition would have to use words like "alternative world", "theoretical" ,etc., a11of which I use for closed and open P-clause meaning as we11as hypothetical and counterfactual meaning. It therefore seems difficult to avoid using the term "hypothetical", but it needs stressing that I use it exclusively in the above-defined sense. 4.5.2. Like open-P conditionals, hypothetical-P conditionals usua11y refer to the future, as in I would be happy if he resigned: the future is by definition unknown, so both Pand (in most cases) Q can be viewed as possible but unlikely. However, reference to the past or present is also possible. Compare: (31) a.
Ifthe world was hit by a meteor ofthat size, alllife on earth would be destroyed. (P-clause referring to the future )
b.
IJ, as they say, he was hit on the head with a lead pipe yesterday, he would be suffering from concussion, wouldn't he? (P-clause referring to the past) I would be surprised ifthat man over there were the man we're looking for. (Pclause referring to the present, albeit with an irnplication of finding out about the man's identity in the future ) ["I wonder if this is true. "j - "Well, even if it was, I would be the last one to know." (P-clause referring to the present)
c.
d.
(32) a. b. c.
4.5.3. Apart from its basic meaning (viz. the theoretical world is assumed to be such that it might correspond with the actual world, but this possibility is considered as rather unlikely to be, to have been or to come true), a hypothetical-P conditional may be selected for reasons of tentativeness (modesty, tact, politeness). This is the case, for example, in the following conditionals, which are used to suggest a course of action, and could in principle be replaced by open- P conditionals (which, however, would make the suggestion much more directly):
If we left immediately after breakfast we would reach the cottage by lunch time. It would be nice if you helped your mother clean the house. [Why take a taxi?'j It would be much cheaper if you used the underground.
When a hypothetical-P conditional is used for the sake of tentativeness, the Pclause need not always refer to the future, so that there is not always a corresponding open-P conditional. Compare: (33) a.
I think it'd be an idea ifwe had the meeting at our house. (COB) (tentative)
b.
111think
c.
I think it's an idea ifwe have the meeting at our house.
it'll be an idea if we have the meeting at our house. (nontentative)
4.5.4. Conditionals that are to be interpreted as requests form another type of sentence in which the use of tentative forms is very natural: Would it be all right if I borrowed your typewriter for half an hour? In some cases, a request virtua11y has to be in the type 2 form because the type 1 version is found to be rather impolite. Compare: (34) a. b.
Would you mind if I used your phone? (polite request: asking for permission) {?Will you I Do you} mind if I use your phone? (This either is a more direct request or does not really ask for permission at all; in the latter case the sentence is rather rude because it suggests that lam going to use your phone anyhow.)
4.5.5. If the would of the Q-clause is an epistemic auxiliary (rather than the tense auxiliary expressing posteriority to a past reference time), the Q-clause of the type 2 conditional expresses hypothetical (conditioned) predictability: (35)
If you used three burners for, say, two hours per day, that would give you enough gas for 27 days. (COB)
Counterjactual-P conditionals of type 2
4.6. In these examples, the P-clause merely expresses a theoretical hypothesis, which is seen as a remote possibility rather than as a realone. In (31b-d), the hypothetical meaning of the P-clause results from the speaker's lack of knowledge about the real world. However, the speaker invariably assumes that the chances of actualizati~ of the P-situation are small.
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4.6.1. In a type 2 conditional, P is normally interpreted as counterfactual if the P-situation is interpreted as located in the present:
b.
If I knew the truth, I would tell you. If I {was I were} a rich man, I wouldn't have to work.
c.
If I had a lot of money, I would not be doing this lousy work.
(36) a.
Here the theoretical P-world is assumed to be contrary to fact, i.e. to be definitely different from the actual world. Thus, in (36a), both Pand Q are presupposed to be false in the actual world and only true in a counterfactual theoretical world. Like "open" and "hypothetical", the term "counterfactual" thus reters to a presupposition concerning the relation between a theoretical world and the actual world.
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11
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On how to interpretcanonicalconditionals in discourse
In direct speech, counterfactual-P conditionals of type 2 refer to the present. However, in (free) indirect speech, counterfactuals of type 2 express a past conclusion. Compare: (37) a.
If I knew the answer,I would know what to do. (direct speech: present conclusion about counterfactual
b.
present or hypothetical future situations)
c.
[She blamed herselffor not studying the instructionsproperly.j Ifshe knew them by heart, she would know what to do. (similar interpretation; free indirect speech)
4.6.2. The P-clause of a type 2 conditional is also interpreted as factual in "indirect counterfactual inferentials". As explained in section 3.6.2, these are inferential conditionals in which the inference ultimately does not go from P to Q but from Q to P: because Q is obviously counterfactual, the hearer has to infer that P (which entails Q) must be counterfactual too. (38)
But Superman wouldn't be Superman if he didn't solve thatproblem too.
5. Type 3 conditionaIs Type 3 conditionals use the past perfect in the P-clause and would have in the Q-clause. They may receive the followinginterpretations. 5.1. Factual-Pconditionalsaf type 3 5.1.1. As pointed out in section 4.1.2,in conditionals with a counterfactual Qclause, a P-clause introduced by unlessis interpreted as "if it weren't for the fact that" or "if it hadn't been the case that". This is a factual-P interpretation. Thus, (39a), which is interpreted as (39b), implies that it is a fact that the hearer has told the speaker the solution: (39) a. b.
Unlessyou hatHold me, I would never havefound the solution. Ifit hadn't been the casethatyou told me, I would never havefound thesolution.
5.1.2. If the P-clause of a counterfactual-P type 3 conditional is negative, the two negations - one following from the negator, the other from the counterfactuality - cancel each other, so that the P-clause is ultimately interpreted as factual: (40)
5.1.3. Sentences like (41a) are inferentials in which the P-clause expresses a factual premise and the Q-clause uses epistemic wilt (plus have for anteriority). Backshifting of them in (free) indirect speech turns them into a type 3 factualP conditional.t? (41) a.
[She blamed herselffor not studying the instructionsproperly. She realizedthat} if she knew them by heart, she would know what to do. (indirect speech: past conclusion about counterfactual situations that are simultaneous with the time of reaching the conclusion, or about hypothetical situations posterior to that time)
If you hadn't been my father, I would have hit you in theface. (implies that the hearer is the speaker's father)
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b.
["I've hada bad night." - "Don't ask me to be sympathetic.}Ifyou've had a bad night, you wil!have drunk too much at yesterday'sparty." [When she told me she'd had a bad night,I didn't feel sympathetic.}If she'd had a bad night,she would have drunk too much at theparty.
5.2. Neutral-P conditionals of type 3 "Imaginary" irrealis P-clauses form the only type of neutral P-clauses that can be found in type 3 conditionals: as explained in section 4.2.2, they presuppose or implicate nothing in conneetion with the real world. For example: (42)
[If thingshad been as they used to be,I would've had to writea letterto the Dean, and} if he hadn't answeredmy letter,I would've had to resign.[Luckily I didn't need to send him a letter,because the rule about writing to the Dean was abolished shortly afterI was employed.j
It is clear from the sentences following it that if he hadn 't answeredmy letter,I would've had to resign"should not be interpreted as counterfactual (i.e. as implying that the Dean did answer my letter, so that I did not have to resign). The irrealis conditional is of the "imaginary" type, i.e. it illustrates a pure thought experiment and bears no particular relation to the actual world. 5.3. Closed-P conditionals af type 3 5.3.1. Sentence (43a) is similar to a closed-P type 1 conditional, except that it uses perfect forms to express anteriority. Backshifting in indirect speech produces the closed-P type 3 conditional (43b). The conditional in (43c)is a similar free indirect speech example. (43) a. b. C.
If (as I believe) John has committed the murder, he wilt already have left the country. (epistemic wilt) I told them that if (as I believed) John had committed the murder, he would already have left the country. (epistemic would) [Martin turned things over in his mind. He was certainthatJohn had been there when Sally washed the blood oft her clothes.}If John had been thereat the time, he would no doubt have warned thepolice before the end ofthe day.
5.3.2. In (43b) and (43c),the time when the epistemic speech act of drawing a conclusion was made is the same as the time of the verbal or mental reporting of the conclusion. By contrast, in closed-P type 3 conditionals like the following,
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165
the Q-clause expresses a conclusion which was drawn at a time earlier than the time of the (free) indirect speech report:
Similar sentences can also be found in direct speech, provided that the open Pclause yields a clear "anteriority to a past time of reference" reading:
(44)
(48) a.
[The professor claimed that it was Harold who had succeeded Edward the Confessor. I had to believe him. However,] if Harold had succeeded Edward the Confessor, then he would have been bom much later than I had thought. (free indirect speech)
5.3.3. (45)
b.
The following illustrates another type of closed-P type 3 conditional: ["So, what you 're saying is that you ran away although you hadn't done anything wrong?" - "Yes." - "I believe you. But] ifyou hadn't done anything wrong, why would you have run away? [That's what the police wil/ want to know.j"
In this example, why would you have run away? is interchangeable with why should you have run away? This means that would has a "putative" (Declerck
5.4.3. Another case in which a type 3 conditional yields an open-P interpretation is when the P-clause is "backshifted" in order to represent a hypothesis about the past as more tentative (less certain, more remote). For example: (49) a.
1991b: 422) meaning: it represents the running away as something theoretical rather than factual. (The same use of wouldlshould is to be observed in sentences like Why wouldlshould he help me? or How would/should I know?) The Pclause of (45), however, is clearly interpreted as closed: the speaker uttering the conditional assumes that the contents of his P-clause are true.
b.
5.4. Open-P conditionalsof type 3 5.4.1. In (free) indirect speech the open-P type 1 conditional (46a) is "backshifted" into the open-P type 3 conditional (46b): (46) a. b.
[I don't know if Liverpool have won tonight.] If they have, they will have displaced Manchester at the top of the League. [I didn't know if Liverpool had won their game.] Ifthey had, they would have displaced Manchester at the top ofthe League.
As is made clear by the sentence preceding it, the conditional in (46a) is an openP conditional: the speaker does not know whether the P-situation has actualized or not. The same is true of the conditional in (46b), which results from backshifting in free indirect speech. The verb forms had [won] and would have displaced do not convey a counterfactual meaning here: have just expresses anteriority.
b.
I] he had seen Joan every day for the previous three weeks, then he would have seen her that day too. (epistemic "would"; past conclusion: free indirect speech; if is to be read as "if, as I considered quite possible,") Ij, as I thought possible, she had been on deck at the time of the murder, she would have seen what was happening. (past conclusion: free indirect speech)
Would she have recognized him if he had been in the pub that evening? (more tentative than "Would she have recognized him if he was in the pub that evening?") [Fanthorp shook his head. "I saw no one when I went out on the deck just before the shot was fired." - '~h, but you went out by the door on the starboard side." - "Yes. The same side as my cab in. " - "Then.] if there had been anybody at the port door looking through the glass you would not have seen him?" - ["No," admitted Fanthorp.] (Agatha Christie, Death on the Nile, London: Fontana, 1960, p.1l1)
In this example, Then, if there had been anybody at the port door looking through the glassyou would not have seen him? is the "backshifted" version of
Then, if there was anybody at theport door looking through the glassyou [T'will / would} not have seen him?, which could have been used instead. (Note that both versions refer to a present conclusion; the former is not an example of a free indirect speech sentence.)
5.5. Hypothetical-P conditionals oftype 3 There appears to be only one possibility available here: some hypothetical-P conditionals of type 2 change into type 3 by the addition of have to express referenee to the past or anteriority. Compare: (50) a.
5.4.2. Another possibility of an open-P type 3 conditional is illustrated by the following: (47) a.
If she had been on deck just before the murder was committed, she would have seen what was happening. [He could have lost his wal/et before or after he left town.] If he had already lost it when he left town, he would have used stolen money to buy petrol. (interpreted either as "this is my present conclusion" (= direct speech) or as "this was my conclusion at the time" (= free indirect speech))
b.
[I'm not sure what to do.] I would be surprised if that man over there were the man we're looking for. (type 2; direct speech) [I wasn 't sure what to do.] I would've been surprised if the man we saw had been the man we were looking for. (type 3; free indirect speech)
Note that the interpretation of the P-clause in (50b) is not counterfactual hypothetical. The same is true of the following: (51)
but
If he had hielden (he money before we [ound him, where woulel he have put it?
(Fr 'U indirect speech)
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5.6. Counterfactual-Pconditionals of type 3 5.6.1. Type 3 conditionals most aften receive a counterfactual-P interpretation. In fact, they are the on1ypossible way of expressing past, pre-present or future counterfactuality, although they may refer to the present as well:
5.6.2. The above conclusion concerns conditionals where the counterfactuality of Q depends on the counterfactuality of P.However, this is not the case in "indirect counterfactual inferentials" (see section 3.6.2 above), where P is interpreted as counterfactual because Q is: (55)
(52) a.
If he had not tampered with the machine, it would not have braken down. (past
b.
If you had come tomorrow instead of today, you would not have found me at home. (future P-situation)
c.
If I hadn't been here now, you wouldn't have been here either. (present P-situa-
or pre-present P-situation)
tion)
As noted in section 4.2.2, when P is counterfactual, Q may be counterfactual too, but in some cases it mayalso be "imaginary", which is a combination of "irrealis" and "neutral-P". An imaginary Q-clause does not imply anything about the truth of Q in the actual world. lts proposition farms part of a pure speculation or thought experiment. A counterfactual Q-clause, by contrast, is by definition interpreted as contrary-to-fact, hence as implying that what is true in the counterfactual world is false in the actual world and vice versa. As ari illustration of this difference, compare the sentences in the foUowingpairs of examples: (53) a.
T[we had taken the otherroad, we would have been here in time. (Q is interpret-
b.
["We are in time because we have taken the road I said we should take."} - "If we had taken the other road, we would also have been here in time." (The coun-
ed as counterfactual: we were not here in time.)
(54) a.
b.
terfactual interpretation of Q is blocked by the preceding context and the use of "also". The result is an imaginary interpretation of Q.) Ifyou had attended the meeting, you would have known about their plans. (Q is interpreted as counterfactual: the implication is that the hearer does not know about their plans.) ["I only got to know about their plans because Iim told me."] - "Ij you had attended the meefiyg, you would also have known about their plans." (The counterfactual Q-interpretation, whichimplies "You don't know about their plans" is blocked by the addition of "also". This results in an imaginary reading of Q.)
In sum, the understanding that if Q is true in a counterfactual P-world it is not true in the actual world is not part of the meaning of a counterfactual-P conditional but is due to a pragmatic implicature. The unmarked interpretation of a Q-clause depending on a counterfactual P-clause is that the Q-situation is also contrary to fact, but this implicated understanding can be cancelled or blocked, in which case Q is interpreted as irnaginary,and hence as neutral (i.e. implying nothing whatever about the relation between the imaginary Q-world and the actual world).
167
Ifyour late grandfather had always been as honest as you say, he wouldn't have been senteneed to five years for fraud, would he?
However, this kind of conditional too is ultimately an instanee of a type 3 conditional which is interpreted as counterfactual-P. 6. Conclusion In this paper I have examined the possible relations between form and meaning in same formal types of conditionals. Ta keep the investigation within manageable proportions, 1have restricted myselfto the three "canonical" forms of conditionals. The condusion from the examination is that these three forms correspond with quite an array of different interpretations - thirty-nine in all even if one limits oneself (as I have done) to the possible-world readings of two kinds of "case-specifying" conditionals, viz. "actualization-conditioning-P" conditionals like You will bepunished if you do that and inferential conditionals like If the murder is prpved, he wil! get a life sentence. If one knows that there are other types of conditionals (e.g. pragmatic conditionals like Ifyou're hungry, there will be some food in thefridge), it is clear that a speaker or writer must be extremely careful in using conditionals. In accordance with Grice's (1975) Maxims of conversation, s/he must embed all conditionals into a context which unequivocally directs the hearer to the one and only intended interpretation. Department of Linguistics Catholic Universityof Leuven, Belgium
Notes 1. I use "situation" for anything that can be expressed in a sentence, i.e. an action, state, process, event ... The term "actualize" will be used as a cover term for the predicates that are naturally associated with these various situation types, viz. do/perform, hold, take place, happen ...
I would like to make a careful distinction between "nonfactual" and "counterfactual". The latter term means "incompatible with the actual world". Thus, the conditionall would appreciate it if you would do this for me refers to a nonfactual future world, which mayor may not turn out to develop into the actual world, whereas I would have appreciated it if you had done this for me refers to a counterfactual world, whi h mcuns that both the propositions Pand Q are interpreted as false in the actual world.
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3. "Factual-P conditionals" are conditionals with a factual P-clause.Similarlyfor "theoretical-P conditionals". 4. Our treatment of the assumption accompanyingnon-neutral theoretical P-clauses as a presupposition is in keeping with Givón's (1995:114)definition of a presupposition as a "proposition [which]is assumed to be true" and with the well-knownproperty of presuppositions that they remain unaffected under sentence negation: not only If Bill comes, he willlearn the truth but also If Bill doesn't come, he won't learn the truth presupposes the truth ofthe proposition "Bill may come". (The idea of may followsfrom the fact that the condition is an "open" one - see below.) 5. Examples followed by "(COB)" come from the Collins Cobuild corpus at Manchester. 6. In the tense theory developed by Declerck in a number of books and articles (see especially Declerck 1991a, 1997) a distinction is made between the "past timesphere" (referred to by a past tense form) and the "pre-present sector of the present time-sphere" (referred to by a present perfect form). However, this distinction is not crucial for our present purpose. 7. The possibilityofusing a closed-Pconditional with only ostensible orfeigned assumption of the truth of P is demonstrated in examples like the following: (i) If, as you told me, you made such a big impression on that woman, why did she just walk straight past you? (ii) If, as you say,you will be filming in Hollywood next month, why did I see you sending off job applications today? Here the speaker obviously has his doubts about tbe trutb of the P-proposition, but he (at least initially) purports not to have them. 8. For some reason, this example sounds much better with was going to instead of would. 9. In every-day speech "hypothetical" can refer e.g. to counterfactual situations: (i) I know he isn't bere. But, hypothetically speaking, if be was here he would be a great help. 10.Some of my informants found this combination of epistemic wil/I would and a perfect infinitive acceptable, wbile others did not.
References Comrie, Bernard (1976). Aspect. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Declerek, Renaat (1991a). Tense in English: lts Structure and Use in Discourse. London: Routledge. (1991b). A Comprehensive Descriptive Grammar of English. Tokyo: Kaitakusha. (1997). "When"-clauses and Temporal Structure. London: Routledge. Declerek, Renaat and Susan Reed (forthcoming). Conditionals: an empirical analysis. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Fauconnier, Gilles (1985). Mental Spaces: Aspects of Meaning Construction in Natural Language. Cambridge, MAS: MIT Press. Grice, H.Paul (1975). Logie and eonversation. In: Peter Cole and Jerry L. Morgan (eds), Syntax and semantics. Volume 3: Speech acts. New York: Academie Press. 41-58. Givón, Talmy (1995). Functionalism and grammar. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
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Harder, Peter (1996). Functional SCII/{/I/Iic.,·: {/ thcory ofmeaning, structure and tense in English. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Jcspersen, Quo (1932). A modern English granunar 01'1 hlstorical principles. Part 4: Syntax (3rd volume). London: Allen and Unwin; open hagen: Ejnar Munksgaard.
