The complexity of security - Wiley Online Library

The Complexity of Security THE EMERGING COMPLEXITY—SECURITY PARADIGM

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ith the end of the Cold War, complexity became a new paradigm of the international security debate. The decade of the 1980s that established complexity and chaos as concepts in the natural sciences was ended by the demise of the structurally simple East-West conflict. In 1989, seemingly minor events accumulated to chaos-like changes of global and historic dimensions, following a path that nobody expected or predicted. What was set into motion by Mikhail Gorbachev to reform the Soviet Union, escaped his control and finally turned into a wave that removed himself out of power. When the socialist system disappeared, the world that emerged from the ashes was more complex than before. It became clear that not only the military arsenals were relevant for security, but also economic and technological as well as social and ecological factors, on global and regional levels. This turning point in world history was followed by a period of disorder and a transformation toward a globalized international system that continues to be unstable. The hostile relationship between the former superpowers USA and USSR was replaced by a relationship that involved cooperation, political dialog, crisis management, and verification. Progress in the field of nuclear and conventional disarmament was codified by several arms control agreements such as the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE). Although Cold War deterrence became obsolete, it was neither completely abandoned nor were the nuclear arsenals themselves. The positive consequences of the abandoned East–West conflict were challenged by countering trends. The unipolar dominance of the United States and the quest for supremacy provoked opposition from Russia and China and attracted criticism from European allies, most notable in the Iraq war of 2003 and its aftermath. Nuclear and missile proliferation continued, and new arms races emerged including outer space. Conflicts in the Balkans, in Africa, and in other parts of the world cost numerous lives and provoked military interventions by the US, NATO, and the United Nations. Environmental degradation, poverty, and hunger affected the living conditions in many parts of the world. Terrorism provided a justification to keep the cycles of hatred and violence alive. Today the international security landscape is quite fractal and complex. Decision processes and conflicts in the international system are determined by a variety of actors and factors, which mutually influence each other. While the concentration of power and the formation of cooperative structures among States can reduce complexity, the increasing influence of subnational and transnational actors has a rather opposite effect. In the emerging new multipolar world order,

Q 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc., Vol. 14, No. 1 DOI 10.1002/cplx.20242 Published online 31 July 2008 in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com)

JU¨ RGEN SCHEFFRAN

¨ rgen Scheffran is affiliated with the Ju Program in Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security (ACDIS), and the Departments of Political Science and Atmospheric Sciences, University of Illinois, Champaign, Illinois 61820. (e-mail: [email protected])

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cooperation is essential for the effective management of major global problems. The global challenge in the next two decades is to achieve a peaceful transition in the international system, and develop and implement effective multilateral policies. Instabilities can lead to rapidly changing security conditions and the outbreak of violence. Everything is connected to everything, and small changes in one part of the world could have significant impacts in other parts. How small differences can matter was demonstrated by the 2000 Presidential election in the United States, when a few individual votes made a difference that changed the course of history. The 9/11 terror attacks involved only a small group of individuals, and the decision to invade Iraq against world opinion and the majority of the UN Security Council was taken by a small groups of politicians in the US administration [1]. More ‘‘tipping points’’ may come in the future, in particular when considering the risks of climate change, which could turn into severe security threats [2, 3]. Tipping points involve three notions [4]: ‘‘that events and phenomena are contagious, that little causes can have big effects, and that changes can happen in a nonlinear way but dramatically at a moment when the system switches.’’ Complexity theory may be useful in understanding how the complex trends of our times could affect and be affected by security risks. In the following, some of the dimensions will be discussed where the interaction between security and complexity may play a role: new conflicts, the impact of technology developments on security, the modeling of security and conflict, and the emergence of complex networks and their vulnerability.

THE COMPLEX LANDSCAPE OF CONFLICTS The number of military conflicts continuously increased after World War II 14

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and reached a maximum of around 50 close to the end of the Cold War. Although the breakup of the socialist system was temporarily associated with a series of violent conflicts, other conflicts were resolved and the total number of wars declined. Nonetheless, new conflicts emerged below the threshold of war between States, including civil wars and environmental conflicts. The instability in Eastern Europe was balanced by State formation and regime consolidation, partly associated with memberships in NATO and the European Union, despite opposition from Russia. The multicountry conflict in the Balkans was particularly complex due to the overlapping ethnic groups and mass killings, which attracted NATO intervention. Southeast Europe became one of the most unstable and violent conflict regions in the world, driven by conflicting tendencies of nation-breakup and nation-buildup [5]. A destructive, chaos-like dynamics lead to a sudden and violent breakup of existing nation States while new structures evolved only slowly. Yugoslavia broke apart into smaller fractions, each trying to preserve its ethnic identity. Serbia’s attempt to keep the Federation together by use of force failed, and Serbia itself lost its province Kosovo. Peaceful means of conflict resolution were not successful or too weak to make a difference. To better prevent and resolve new emerging conflicts and provide long-term stabilization, instruments for cooperation, democratic decision-making, and the development of collective security systems need to be further developed and implemented. The awaited reform of the UN Security Council, the enlargement and reorganization of the European Union, and its decision-making bodies along with the perspectives for a Common Foreign and Security Policy for Europe are recent policy fields. The conflicts in the Middle East contributed to major wars between

the US-led alliance and Iraq, which became examples of asymmetric warfare. The superior military force of the United States was not able to pacify the country against continued attacks from counterinsurgents and guerilla warfare. As this case shows, military superiority of a high-tech army is not sufficient to bring peace to a country if large fractions of the population continue to resist or fight against each other. As US troops pushed more deeply into Baghdad and its outskirts, Iraqi insurgents used increasingly sophisticated and lethal means of attack and demonstrated their ability to respond quickly [6]. Associated with developments in the Middle East and the Islamic world is the problem of global terrorism. The terror attacks of September 11, 2001, demonstrated that the world’s strongest military power is highly vulnerable to violence from organized individuals. Terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda challenged the pillars on which US power rests, including access to oil, military superiority, and globalization. Individual actors have always been able to create considerable damage and influence the path of history, but in the age of aircraft, huge dams, large tanker ships, atom bombs, and nuclear reactors new means exist to cause largescale destruction. They threaten the vulnerable complex networks of industrialized societies, such as air traffic and the infrastructure in big cities, and they provoke costly governmental efforts of counterterrorism that undermine the roots of democracy. Terror networks are characterized by decentral organization and diffuse communication structures that evade discovery. They use the principles of self-organization for destructive purposes. Because of the destructive potential of these systems, their use becomes a purpose in itself and their impact is further multiplied by governmental reactions. The interplay between individual and State terror perpetuates the cycle of violence into the 21st century. Q 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. DOI 10.1002/cplx

The arms race is supplemented by the interaction between terrorism and counter-terrorism (see article by A. Saperstein in this issue). Declaring the ‘‘war on terror’’ puts State and nonState actors on the same level and adds another layer of complexity, promoting a new totality of war. In other parts of the world destabilization has continued, most important in Africa, a continent with high conflict potential, often relating to the local and international struggle for dominance over rich natural resources. Many African States have lacked the financial resources to maintain an effective police force and a reliable army. Ethnic and religious differences have challenged the powers of central governments. One of the most critical security regions is the Horn of Africa, which is indicated by the failure of the 1993 UN intervention in Somalia. The complexity of the problems ‘‘boggles the mind,’’ as Jim Garamone in Defense News points out [7]. For Navy Rear Adm. Richard Hunt, commander of the Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa, ‘‘the size and complexity of the region is just unbelievable, and drought and disease make this puzzle even more difficult’’ [8]. In the Darfur region of Sudan, a complex interaction between actors and factors has aggravated the conflict constellation. Since 1983, the struggle between the North and the South is the longest conflict in Africa involving serious human rights abuses and humanitarian disasters. More than 2 million people have died during the conflict and 4.5 million persons were forced to leave their homes. In addition to the conflict between the government in the North and autonomyseeking rebels in the South, a series of drought events affected the Northern African regions since the 1970s and the fight for scarce resources became more intense. The predicted loss in agricultural land would lead to a significant drop in food production (20%). Desertification has pushed population Q 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. DOI 10.1002/cplx

from the north to move southward, contributing to the struggle for land between herders and farmers [9]. Darfur has been mentioned as an example for an environmentally induced conflict in which climate factors play a particular role [10]. Africa is a tragic example that a significant number of States is weak and fragile and poorly equipped to protect their societies from various problems and risks, which have the potential to exacerbate the destabilization and possible collapse of these States. An increasingly important factor in conflicts is environmental degradation, which undermines security in many parts of the world. Global warming causes additional stress to natural and social systems, depending on their vulnerabilities and adaptive capacities. Since human societies rest on certain environmental conditions, a changing climate that significantly alters these conditions will have an impact on human life and society. Some of the impacts, such as reduced water and food supply, disasters, and migration, pose direct challenges to human and international security [11]. Understanding the interaction between climate stress factors, their human and societal impacts and responses is crucial to assess the implications for security and conflict. One consequence of weak States is the phenomenon of private security services, which undermine the State monopoly of using force. After the end of the Cold War, hundreds of thousands of soldiers lost their jobs, and unemployed soldiers became ready to offer their services to anyone willing to ‘‘rent a soldier’’ [12]. For governments overwhelmed by the security tasks of protecting their country and inclined to reduce costs by transferring some duties, it has often been cheaper to hire soldiers on demand than to maintain expensive standing national armies. Demand for private sector soldiers was particularly strong in failed States in which the army or the police

were not willing or unable to secure public order. Transferring the means of violence and the instruments of war—the ultimate symbol of the sovereignty of a nation—into private hands, questions the State monopoly over legitimate forces. By privatizing security services, the firms have been able to directly pursue the interests of their customers, independent of government control. To anyone who could afford to use force in conflict, they could offer to train a complete army or to recruit the soldiers themselves. The weaker a State— in terms of military training or social and economic development—the greater the danger of losing control of the process and becoming dependent upon private mercenaries.

THE TECHNOLOGICAL ARMS RACE Throughout history, science and technology have contributed to warfare by inventing new weapons and making them more effective and destructive [13]. The physical sciences provided instruments to concentrate energy and force over larger spatial and shorter time dimensions, with increasing accuracy. A symbol is the nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missile, which can obliterate any point on the planet within half an hour. With this evergrowing destructiveness, science and technology have tremendously increased the complexity of warfare and provided the means for an all-encompassing total war. The technological arms race contributes to innovations of weapons systems and force structures toward fighting wars at any time and any place. Modernization no longer only affects the weapons systems and their components (warheads, delivery systems, command and control), but also the socioeconomic infrastructure and lifecycle within which weapon systems are embedded, designed, developed, tested, deployed, used, and removed. Scientific innovation and competition C O M P L E X I T Y

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perpetuate the arms race and undermine political solutions. Scientists explore new military applications of technological innovations and tend to justify their inventions by new threats. The battlefield becomes a testing ground for new weapons, the war altogether a scientific experiment. With the advent of nuclear weapons, the security landscape has fundamentally changed. For the first time mankind was able to destroy itself. Although the existing nuclear arsenals of the Cold War have been reduced, they still count tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, and they are being modernized. The nuclear club has been increasing in the past decade, and more countries may acquire nuclear weapons as long as the existing arsenals are not abolished. The proliferation of nuclear weapons and delivery systems continues and is a major threat not only in the Middle East where the crisis on Iran’s nuclear program continues, but also in the duel between India and Pakistan in South Asia or North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. Throughout military history, the offense–defense competition has been a major driver of the arms race. Offenses increased the potential damage to opponents while defenses tried to limit it. With the advent of nucleararmed ballistic missiles, any attempt to protect against this immense threat by defensive measures remained economically and technically unfeasible, despite enormous costs and efforts in missile defense programs such as the Strategic Defense Initiative or the current US Missile Defense program. The attempts to build a missile shield have been driving the arms race und undermined strategic stability [14]. Despite considerable political efforts and expenditures of more than a hundred billion dollars spent on missile defense, so far all attempts to overcome the vulnerability caused by nuclear weapons have failed [15]. One of the reasons is the speed of long-range 16

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ballistic missiles which make intercepting them a daunting task, further complicated by countermeasures an attacker could apply to undermine the effectiveness of missile defense. On the contrary, by making outer space a battleground for missile defense projects, vulnerability could rather increase and complicate international security, as recent anti-satellite tests in China and the United States have demonstrated. The so-called Revolution in Military Affairs is driving the transformation of US armed forces and comprises almost the complete high-tech sector (see article by G. Neuneck in this issue), including nanotechnology, biotechnology and genetic engineering, computer and communication systems, artificial intelligence, sensors, nuclear and space technology, lasers and material sciences. Technology shapes warfare toward ‘‘intelligent’’ weapons, guided missiles, electronic warfare, cyberwar, and biological warfare. On micro and nanoscales, physics, chemistry, and biology are merging into nanotechnology which opens new and quite complex dimensions of warfare (see article by J. Altmann in this issue). Advances in the biosciences open new avenues for biological warfare, making global biosecurity a challenging problem of biocomplexity that involves multifaceted processes such as interactions between humans and nonhuman biota, anthropogenic environmental and ecological factors, and socioeconomic and political pressures (see article by B. Wilson in this issue). Science and technology play a key role in the global command, control, communication and intelligence (C3I) systems that control the components of the military infrastructure of a country and observe the activities of potential adversaries. C3I serves as a backbone of the military and as a force multiplier [16]. It serves as the network of networks to control military operations and provides the medium for information warfare and cyber security.

These developments increase the technical performance of weapon systems, such as the global physical expansion of weapon use through transportation and communication systems, shortening of decision times, improvement of accuracy, damage limitation in weapons use, growth of information flows, and automatization of warfare. Although the dichotomy between civilian and military technology has been more distinct during the EastWest conflict, the boundaries eroded after the end of the Cold War. In the past, the military was often thought to be a pacemaker in many fields of hightech development, even though the spin-offs remained less than expected. Scarce resources and lack of public acceptance, combined with converging demand profiles, supported the dualuse of civil and military technologies, exploiting the ambivalence of science. Dual-use refers here to those technologies that have actual or potential military and civilian applications. The strategy of ‘‘commercial-off-the-shelf’’ (COTS) development puts more emphasis on spin-in; taking advantage of economies of scale, a technology developed in the civilian-commercial sector is used for military purposes. Modern semiconductor, nuclear, laser, bio, computer, and communication technologies, to mention some, are employed not only in the manufacture of civilian products but also in the production of weapons. The overlap between civil and military technologies poses severe challenges for the control of new weapon systems, which are seen as detrimental to international security. Countries that either want to keep their advantage in military technologies or want to prevent negative impacts on their own security are more ready to control their exports of ‘‘sensitive’’ technologies to ‘‘critical’’ countries. Major suppliers have agreed that certain technologies which are clearly devoted to the development and production of weapons of Q 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. DOI 10.1002/cplx

mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, or biological) and related dual-use items, including delivery systems, should be subjected to strict export controls. According to Reppy [17], the ‘‘military utility of dual-use technology is greater than ever, and the need for a policy to control diffusion of the relevant technology remains a pressing security concern.’’ In the long run, export controls cannot prevent proliferation on the supply side alone and need to be accompanied by preventive arms control that also restrains weapons technology on the demand side [18]. The consequence would be a more streamlined approach toward technology control that restrains the most dangerous technologies and seeks international cooperation in other fields of dual-use. Verifying agreements can apply advanced sensor technology. One of the most developed systems is the verification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty for nuclear weapons that combines seismology, hydroacoustics, infrasound, and radionuclide monitoring (see article by M. Kalinowski et al. in this issue).

MODELING SECURITY AND CONFLICT IN A COMPLEX WORLD Mathematical modeling and computer simulation can provide important tools to better understand and assess the complex security environments and problems the world is facing today. They can also contribute to a deeper understanding and the development of new solutions for conflict-resolution and cooperation, disarmament, security, and peace-building. Attempts to develop and use complex systems studies as an instrument of security theory and policy are still at a conceptual level [19, 20]. Nonetheless, complexity is increasingly seen as a useful theoretical concept to understand phenomena of world politics [21] and of security policy in particular [22]. A variety of modeling approaches have Q 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. DOI 10.1002/cplx

been applied to problems of security policy and related policy fields, such as environment and sustainability (see the methodological surveys in [23–25]). Linear system models and simple two-player games were the modeling paradigms during the Cold War [26]. The more complex international security landscape of today is better described by models that are able to analyze the nonlinear dynamic interaction among a large number of factors and actors across multiple levels of decision-making, from local to global levels. To analyze the complexity in international relations and security policy, rational choice models of decision making need to be extended toward models representing bounded rationality, e.g., by using decision rules and adaptive approaches, responding to environmental conditions in a flexible manner. Understanding the emergence of collective behavior and the evolution of cooperation is a dynamic field of current interdisciplinary research. The theory of dynamical systems determines equilibria and stability of differential and difference equations and studies conditions for chaos, selforganization, and phase transitions. The best known dynamic system models in security are the Richardson model of the arms race and the Lanchester model of warfare. Intriligator developed a modeling framework for the strategic armament dynamics based on decision rules with regard to security goals [27, 28]. Although such mathematical models help to structure the field of conflict research and international security by identifying fundamental relationships among system variables, they are often rather simple in dealing with the complexity of reality. To overcome the limits of linearity, complexity theory, chaos theory, and nonlinear dynamics have been applied to conflicts and arms race phenomena. The concept of chaos as a model for arms race and war outbreak was introduced by Saperstein [29] to show that

even simple nonlinear deterministic arms race models may lead to the breakdown of predictability. Chaos in dynamic arms race models was further investigated by Grossmann and MayerKress and published in the same year as the Cold War ended [30]. Factors provoking chaotic behavior are multinational interactions (more than two actors), delay in information processing, overshooting, or underestimation [31]. Game theory analyzes strategic decisions among different options depending on decisions by other players. There are numerous applications in security policy, such as decisions on war and peace and the buildup of weapon systems. Game theory has matured toward analyzing more complex strategic interactions among multiple players that change over time. Dynamic games deal with repeated game situations in which players interactively adapt their behavior to their environment, according to incentives, preferences, and expected outcomes, as well as the information sets and decisions taken by other players. Differential games extend Pontryagin’s maximum principle to the optimal control of dynamical systems by a few number of players, seeking to optimize their individual payoff functions for a given time-period (e.g., see [32]). Repeated and dynamic games have been used to analyze the evolution of cooperation in experimental games [33,34]. Increasing attention is focused on the link between cooperative dynamic games and coalition formation, which play a significant role in the multipolar stability of the international system [35]. A coalition becomes unstable if there are incentives for some actors to leave that coalition. The aim is to identify conditions for potential instabilities that could lead to an escalation of conflict and breakup of coalitions (e.g., the breakup of the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia). A related question is under which conditions the dynamics can be controlled to mainC O M P L E X I T Y

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tain stability and determine optimal paths [36]. Evolutionary games analyze the competition among populations of game-strategies depending on their fitness in the replica equation [37]. In economic oligopoly theory, the competition of firms can be represented by the adaptation toward response functions according to Nash-Cournot strategies, the so-called tatonnement process. Applications of dynamic-game models comprise a large number of natural and social systems, ranging from warfare to the environment-economy interaction (see for instance [38]). Strategies, behaviors, and actions continuously evolve as agents accumulate experience in their attempt to cope with and learn within a permanently changing landscape. Agentbased modeling (ABM) uses computer simulation to analyze complex interactions between multiple agents who follow given action rules and stimulusresponse mechanisms to form complex social patterns [39]. ABM is a tool to study conflict among multiple agents and collective behavior that contributes to conflict escalation [40]. It provides important insights in how civil wars begin, develop or end and helps to analyze decision making in political regimes such as Iraq, North Korea, and Syria (see the articles by M. Findley and R. Bhavnani et al. in this issue). There is a growing interest to apply ABM in simulation of military operations, viewing land warfare as a complex adaptive system. Military ‘‘conflict’’ is treated as a nonlinear dynamical system composed of many interacting semiautonomous and hierarchically organized agents continuously adapting to a changing environment [41]. Models of artificial societies provide living laboratories for analyzing conflict and the evolution of cooperation [42, 43]. For a large number of homogenous agents, methods from statistical physics, nonlinear dynamics, and complexity science are applicable, building on concepts of ‘‘Synergetics’’ [44], such as self-organization or micro–macro 18

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phase transitions. Such approaches to collective phenomena have been transferred to interdisciplinary fields such as socio-physics and econo-physics [45–47]. Observed macroscopic properties emerge from the behavior and interactions of the component agents. Applications range from moving crowds and traffic systems to urban, demographic, and environmental planning.

SECURITY OF COMPLEX NETWORKS Modern societies are characterized by a variety of complex networks, including networks of agents, computers, or States that are highly interdependent. Examples are computer networks (internet, intranet); communication networks (fixed and mobile phones); socioeconomic networks (transport, energy, demographic, technology, production, and distribution networks); neural and cognitive networks (human brain, artificial intelligence); biological networks (spread of infectious diseases, metabolic circuits); environmental networks (pollution, climate system, population dynamics, resource management). The performance of these networks crucially depends on their stability against critical events which are uncertain and have a potentially high impact on the network structure, sometimes with disastrous consequences [48, 49]. Potential incidents that affect networks include: c Natural hazards and disasters: earthquakes, hurricanes, floods, droughts, etc. c War or terror attacks. c Technical accidents (fires, reactor meltdown, airplane crashes, explosions). c Spread of hazardous substances (radiological, chemical, biological). c Spread of diseases and epidemics (e.g., AIDS, SARS). c Possibly attacks against energy grids, communication networks, industrial facilities, or urban centers.

Complex networks are increasingly relevant in security policy, to mention the military C3I system or the vulnerability of the critical networks on which our society rests. The internet connects both social and systems networks and glues them into a supernetwork. Network performance is crucially determined by the evolving complexity-stability relationship, which implies that networks adapt to disturbances and critical events they experience during their evolution. Uncertain events, in particular events that are extreme in terms of frequency and impact, provide a particular challenge for network management as their interaction with the network can hardly be observed or tested in reality. A key question is why and how certain incidents in complex networks lead to disasters which are to be prevented. Disasters are often characterized by power laws and critical couplings, which drive a system to its limits and produce large-scale cascades, avalanches, or domino effects that contribute to the failure of network functions. Understanding the causality chains in security networks allows to assess the effectiveness of disaster preparedness, response, and management, and to estimate the time at which certain events may possibly spread within the network. This shifts the requirements for incidence management from responsive toward anticipative approaches of network stability that improve error and attack tolerance of networks and the coordination between networks. Rather than top-down optimal design of networks, more appropriate are evolutionary bottom-up approaches that learn from natural systems and their evolution based on adaptation, flexibility, and self-organization to reduce the impact of singular incidents [50]. Rather than relying on a centralized network structure which is vulnerable against loss of key nodes and links, complex adaptive networks are more appropriate to adjust the network Q 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. DOI 10.1002/cplx

performance to the available structure of nodes and links and thus continues to work under structural change, even against extreme events. The first challenge is to timely detect and extract those patterns significant to predict the emergence of extreme events from the diversity of data acquired from a variety of sources. The second challenge is to design models sufficiently complex to anticipate the processes leading to extreme events and reproduce the observed patterns. Mathematical viability theory provides a framework to understand the adaptive evolution of complex systems and networks under uncertain environmental constraints and critical events that induce structural change [51]. Identifying the critical couplings is essential to use anticipative incident management and limit the risks of interactions between complex networks and uncertain incidents. To reduce vulnerability against attack and improve disaster response, most relevant is to develop criteria for adaptive and stable network design, and to define thresholds for qualitative change in network structure. This is of particular interest with regard to network survivability against terror attacks, but could also contribute to understand, prevent, and counter the emergence of terrorist networks and their societal basis as well as the effectiveness of their actions [52, 53]. Understanding these problems can help to identify key principles and criteria for network design, using advanced methods in mathematical modeling and computer simulation. These allow to model the interaction among a large number of agents that form socioeconomic networks within a changing environment. In socioeconomic networks, human agents are part of the network structure, shaping nodes and links according to their values, goals, and actions, which are guided by action rules. This is particularly relevant in case of crises and disQ 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. DOI 10.1002/cplx

asters where collective behavior drives network performance to a considerable degree [54]. Besides the mathematical analysis, experimental computer simulation of heterogenous agent behavior and interaction helps to mimic and visualize the evolution of social networks based on empirical data. Modules for different components of the security landscape need to be numerically implemented and linked into an integrated programming environment. A bottom-up approach would model the evolution of microeconomic networks and the formation of larger organizational structures via clustering of economic agents from local to global levels, thus implementing the micro–macro link across several hierarchical levels. The agents represent nodes in the evolving social network. They are both nurtured and restricted by their respective social neighborhood (‘‘niche’’), but are also able to shape their social environment depending on their capabilities. In this regard, the viability for each individual agent and the viability of the whole network are coevolving, an observation that is well-known from the link between biological species and ecosystems. The transfer of knowledge from ecological to socioeconomic systems can help to support policies and strategies, which avoid instabilities and conflicts that weaken the efficiency of the system. Interactions in networks are generally not controlled by a centralized entity, but are shaped by mechanisms of both competition and coordination. Thus, strategies, behaviors, and actions continuously evolve as agents accumulate experience in their attempt to cope with a permanently changing landscape. In such settings, heterogeneity is a fundamental source of innovation that drives the evolution of social networks. Social network analysis is a key technique in modern social sciences, operating on many levels, from fami-

lies up to the level of nations [55]. Social networks are appropriate to study the diffusion of innovations, practices, diseases, hostilities, conflicts. Topological features influence the functioning of networks, which are characterized by groups with strong positive connections (clusters, alliances) and those which are loosely or negatively connected [56, 57]. Interactions in social networks are influenced by mechanisms of conflict and coordination among actors. Human agents are shaping both nodes and links according to their values, goals, and actions. This is particularly relevant in case of crises, conflicts, and disasters, where collective behavior drives network performance. Although social network analysis has been widely employed in studies of social diffusion processes, it has only recently been applied to understand diffusion of military conflict [58– 60]. SNA is an analytical instrument to understand why and how conflicts spread in social networks, explicating the cascading sequence of events where an action taken by one actor provokes more intense actions by other actors. For example, the joining of an alliance, the declaration of war between two States, or the movement of troops condition the responses of neighboring States and change the network structure. Implementing these network links and behavioral responses leads to a sequence of actions that contributes to the spread of conflict as well as to opportunities for cooperation and conflict resolution. An example is World War I, where the alliance structure prior to the war was a major contributing factor to the escalation from conflict between individual States to an all-out global war. In this environment, the 1914 incident in Sarajewo had a dramatic ripple effect throughout the network of States. A theoretical analysis of such action-reaction cycles could help to get a better recognition of where critiC O M P L E X I T Y

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cal and unstable regions of the dynamic interaction are and to provide a basis for investigations into the sta-

bility of regional structures. This approach would help to recognize similar constellations in advance, to pre-

ventively minimize risks, and to build an early warning system as part of a decision-support for conflict analysis.

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